RONAYNE KRAUSE, P.J.
Defendant, the Cheboygan County Prosecuting Attorney, appeals by right an order of declaratory judgment stating that the prohibition against discharging firearms within 150 yards of occupied residences in MCL 324.40111(6),
The underlying facts in this matter are not in any serious dispute. Plaintiff, the Cheboygan Sportsman Club, owns and operates a shooting range for both long guns and handguns, and it has done so since approximately 1952. At the time it commenced operations, no residences were located in its vicinity. Over the years, plaintiff has improved the range and received a safety certification from the National Rifle Association (NRA). According to the Michigan Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs, the "Sportsman Subdivision" was platted in 1974, due north of plaintiff's shooting range, in a fairly isolated wooded area near the shore of Lake Huron. At some point — the record does not disclose when, nor can we discover it from public information of which we may take judicial notice pursuant to MRE 201 — a residence was constructed on Lots 43 and 44 of the Sportsman Subdivision. That residence is within the 150-yard zone specified by MCL 324.40111(6). Only Lot 45 would have been closer to the shooting
That residence came to be owned by Roger Watts. We again do not know when, although the records available to us from the Cheboygan County Register of Deeds suggest that he may have acquired the property in 2004 or 2005. Watts was, in fact, formerly one of plaintiff's members. We note that plaintiff contends in its brief on appeal that Watts was "aware of the ranges and activities associated with the Club prior to moving to the area," a fact not explicitly stated in the record insofar as we can find. Nonetheless, it would be absurd to contend that any individual purchasing Lots 43 and 44, or building on those lots, could possibly have been unaware of the existence and nature of the shooting range at the time. It is therefore unambiguous and not seriously disputable that Watts came to the vicinity of the range, rather than the opposite. However, Watts executed a handwritten statement contending, among other things, the more recent users of the shooting range appeared no longer to appreciate the need to use "lighter" shooting loads.
On June 19, 2012, Watts reported to the Cheboygan County Sheriff Department that he had found a bullet on his property that he believed had come from plaintiff's range. The investigating officer opined that it appeared to be a nine-millimeter bullet. Although Watts allowed the bullet to be photographed, he refused to turn it over. Watts noted that this was not the first time he had found a stray bullet on his property. Further investigation determined that only one person had been shooting a handgun on the range recently, and that had been a .22 caliber pistol that was being fired in an easterly direction and not toward Watts's property, which was located to the north. The matter was turned over to the prosecutor's office, which informed plaintiff that "any individual discharging a firearm within 150 yards of a residence should face criminal prosecution for violating MCL 324.40111."
Plaintiff then commenced the instant litigation, seeking to preclude defendant from enforcing MCL 324.40111 against its members. Plaintiff asserted that, when read in context, MCL 324.40111 only prohibits a hunter from discharging a firearm within 150 yards of an occupied dwelling. The NRA, in an amicus brief, contended that even if MCL 324.40111 applied outside the context of hunting, the Cheboygan Sportsman Club was entitled to immunity from civil suit under the sport shooting ranges act, MCL 691.1541 et seq. The trial court agreed with the NRA's contention, ruling that the two statutes were incompatible and the latter, being the more specific, prevailed. The trial court concluded that, unless defendant could show that plaintiff's did not comply with the sport shooting ranges act, defendant could not prosecute plaintiff's members. The trial court thus granted summary disposition in favor of plaintiff.
A grant or denial of summary disposition is reviewed de novo on the basis of the entire record to determine if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Maiden v. Rozwood, 461 Mich. 109, 118, 597 N.W.2d 817 (1999). This Court likewise reviews de novo questions of statutory construction, with the fundamental goal of giving effect to the intent of the Legislature. Weakland v. Toledo Engineering Co., Inc., 467 Mich. 344, 347, 656 N.W.2d 175, amended on other grounds 468 Mich. 1216, 656 N.W.2d 175 (2003). The goal of statutory interpretation is to determine and give effect to the intent of the Legislature, with the presumption that unambiguous language should be enforced as written. Gladych v. New Family
We first conclude that the trial court erred by applying the sport shooting ranges act. It is inapposite not because it is more or less specific, but because it simply has no relevance to the facts at issue in this case. The act gives shooting ranges that "conform[] to generally accepted operation practices" several immunities. MCL 691.1542(1). In ostensibly relevant part, under MCL 691.1542, such ranges are immune to "civil liability or criminal prosecution in any matter relating to noise or noise pollution," "an action for nuisance," and an injunction against "the use or operation of a range on the basis of noise or noise pollution," if those ranges were in compliance with "any noise control laws or ordinances" to which they were subject when they commenced operation. The threatened criminal liability in the instant matter has nothing to do with noise or nuisance. Under MCL 691.1542a, such ranges are immune, under certain circumstances, to violations of ordinances. The threatened criminal liability in the instant matter involves violations of a statute, not an ordinance. In any event, plaintiff itself is not being threatened with any criminal liability; rather, the threat of prosecution is to any individuals who discharge firearms there. The sport shooting ranges act does not confer upon plaintiff any immunity relevant to this matter.
Plaintiff and amicus contend in the alternative that MCL 324.40111(6) was never intended to apply to shooting ranges, but rather to hunters.
The first predecessor statute, MCL 312.10b, was enacted by 1968 PA 61, which amended what was then the Game Law of 1929, and it read as follows:
MCL 312.10b has only been mentioned once in any published opinion that we can find, and in that case this Court only observed what is obvious, that "the statute is intended to protect the occupants of, or animals housed in, certain structures...." Holliday v. McKeiver, 156 Mich.App. 214, 217, 401 N.W.2d 278 (1986).
However, then Michigan Attorney General Frank J. Kelley issued an opinion interpreting MCL 312.10b and concluded, in relevant part, that the Game Law was intended by the Legislature to regulate hunting and that MCL 312.10b in particular was intended to regulate "the control and limitation of the discharge of weapons in the hunting and taking of wild birds and wild game and not the discharge of weapons in target practice activities." OAG, 1981-1982, No. 5960, p. 322 (August 18, 1981). Consequently, the 150-yard "safety zone" was inapplicable to landowners engaging in target practice on their own property. Id.
Former MCL 312.10b was repealed by 1988 PA 256. See former MCL 300.269. As part of the same public act, the Legislature enacted former MCL 300.262(5), which was almost identical to the presentday MCL 324.40111(6).
1988 PA 256 was the former Wildlife Conservation Act, MCL 300.251 et seq. Its title stated that its purpose was, in pertinent part, "to provide for the conservation of animals and the method and manner in which animals may be taken in this state[.]" The legislative history of 1988 PA 256 further reflects that the intention
The Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (NREPA), MCL 324.101 et seq., was enacted by 1994 PA 451. Its title provided that it was
Shortly thereafter, the Legislature enacted a series of public acts recodifying a long list of "current natural resources management statutes concerning wildlife conservation, recreation, habitat protection, and environmental issues" by "inserting them into the NREPA." Senate Legislative Analysis, HB 4348 through 4351 and 4385, April 6, 1995. Among many other provisions, 1995 PA 57 recodified 1988 PA 256 as Part 401 of NREPA, under "wildlife conservation." See id. Thus, MCL 300.262(4) became MCL 324.40111(4), which is now at MCL 324.40111(6) with irrelevant changes.
It has always been the law that statutes must be construed in such a way as to reflect the intention of the Legislature as derived from a strict reading of the language of the statute at issue, but at the same time, that language must not be "construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature." United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 76, 95, 5 L.Ed. 37 (1820). As noted, "the provisions of a statute should be read reasonably and in context," McCahan, 492 Mich. at 739, 822 N.W.2d 747, particularly "in the context of the entire legislative scheme," Madugula v. Taub, 496 Mich. 685, 696, 853 N.W.2d 75 (2014). Part of that context is the titles of their acts, and they may not exceed the scope of those titles. Bankhead v. River Rouge Mayor, 387 Mich. 610, 613-615, 198 N.W.2d 414 (1972), relying on Const. 1963, art. 4, § 24. Further context is any other statutes that are in pari materia, relating to the same common purpose, which should be read together. See Apsey v. Mem. Hosp., 477 Mich. 120, 129 n. 4, 730 N.W.2d 695 (2007). An act's title is not itself authority of any sort, but it is properly considered to assist in determining the act's purpose and scope. Malcolm v. East Detroit, 437 Mich. 132, 143, 468 N.W.2d 479 (1991). Although legislative analyses are of very little value in reading a statute, they have some value to courts as casting light on the reasons that the Legislature may have had and the meaning they intended for an act. Kinder Morgan Mich., LLC v. City of Jackson, 277 Mich.App. 159, 170, 744 N.W.2d 184 (2007).
Our dissenting colleague takes issue with our approach to understanding MCL 324.40111(6). To some extent, we can appreciate our colleague's concerns: in particular, we agree that if MCL 324.40111(6) is read strictly in isolation, that provision does not itself provide any exceptions for hunting on one's own property. It is true that "or" is a disjunctive term, and were
Were we to disregard any established legal principle that could conceivably be thought of — inaccurately in this case, we believe — as a "fiction," the result would be chaos. In any event, we also decline to adopt our colleague's approach of analyzing MCL 324.40111(6) divorced from its context. Considering statutes in the contexts of the remainder of any cohesive statutory provisions of which they are a part and of their history is also a cherished principle of statutory analysis. Robinson v. City of Lansing, 486 Mich. 1, 15-16, 782 N.W.2d 171 (2010); Arrowhead Development Co. v. Livingston Co. Road Comm., 413 Mich. 505, 516, 322 N.W.2d 702 (1982). Ultimately, the goal of all such principles is to determine the intent of the Legislature, and an overly mechanical application of such principles can be counterproductive. See Dagenhardt v. Special Machine & Engineering, Inc., 418 Mich. 520, 544 n. 24, 345 N.W.2d 164 (1984). We prefer an organic approach to what is really an organic challenge.
It is inescapable that MCL 324.40111 is part of NREPA, and for the entire history of it and its predecessors the relevant provision has been a small part of a large statutory framework governing hunting, which successively came to be incorporated into increasingly larger statutory frameworks governing natural resources of all kinds. It has never been part of a general penal statutory framework or a framework governing firearms. Under MCL 324.40118(1), which makes violation of MCL 324.40111 a misdemeanor, any issued permit is also to be revoked, further indicating that the statute at issue is part of a hunting regulation scheme. We are of the opinion, as was Attorney General Frank J. Kelley regarding the predecessor statute, that the context of MCL 324.40111 is an inextricable part thereof. Furthermore, although changes to a statute are presumed to reflect an intention to change meaning, that presumption is not a strong one and will not overcome other indications to the contrary. See People v. Harrison, 194 Mich. 363, 370, 160 N.W. 623 (1916). In this case, it is clear that every relevant change made to the statute since its inception was for the purpose of recodification or streamlining.
In short, we are convinced that the 1981 opinion of Attorney General Frank J. Kelley regarding former MCL 312.10b was correct at the time and continues to be correct regarding the modern version thereof, MCL 324.40111: "The focus of this section is the hunting and taking of wild birds and wild animals" and it was intended to "control and limit[] ... the discharge of weapons in the hunting and taking of wild birds and wild game and not the discharge of weapons in target practice activities."
We emphasize that our holding today does not immunize property owners from potential criminal or civil liability for discharging firearms on their own property merely because the discharge was for some purpose other than hunting. For example, the letter written by the Cheboygan County Prosecuting Attorney regarding plaintiff's referred not only to MCL 324.40111 but also to the possibility of criminal liability for recklessly discharging a firearm contrary to MCL 752.863a, a general penal statute. The latter statute was not made a part of the instant litigation, and we have not been asked to render an opinion as to its possible applicability to the facts at bar, so we do not. However, we do note that nothing in our opinion today necessarily precludes a potential criminal proceeding against any of plaintiff's members, or indeed any other person, under that or any other statute we have not explicitly discussed. We hold only that MCL 324.40111 applies to hunting contexts and not to target practice contexts, so the act of conducting target practice shooting on plaintiff's premises does not violate MCL 324.40111. We express no opinion, and none should be implied, as to whether any of the activities on plaintiff's premises are either permitted or prohibited by any other statute or law.
Affirmed.
FITZGERALD, J. concurred with RONAYNE KRAUSE, P.J.
WHITBECK, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I agree that the trial court erred by applying MCL 691.1541 et seq. (the "Sport Shooting Ranges Act"). The majority has ably stated the background facts and procedural history in this case, and I agree that the Sport Shooting Ranges Act does not confer immunity in this case because this case does not concern an issue of noise control or noise pollution.
However, I write separately because I would not address Cheboygan Sportsman Club's alternative ground for affirmance and because I strongly disagree with the majority's method of statutory interpretation to determine that issue. Accordingly, I dissent from that portion of the majority's opinion. I would reverse and remand for further proceedings.
The Legislature originally enacted the Sport Shooting Ranges Act in 1989, in
The Wildlife Conservation Act provides the authority under which the Department of Natural Resources regulates the taking of game animals.
The prosecutor contends that the trial court erred by concluding that the Sport Shooting Ranges Act applied here because this matter does not concern noise or noise pollution. I agree.
The trial court concluded that the more specific Sport Shooting Ranges Act took precedence over the Wildlife Conservation Act because both statutes involve the discharge of firearms, and thus both were applicable in this case. However, the Sport Shooting Ranges Act provides shooting ranges immunity against noise complaints. This case does not involve noise complaints. It requires a determination of whether a prohibition against discharging a firearm within 150 yards of an occupied building is an issue of public safety or a hunting regulation under the Wildlife Conservation Act. Neither party's argument concerns noise or noise pollution. Thus, this suit is plainly not a matter "relating to noise or noise pollution," and the Sport Shooting Ranges Act does not apply. The trial court erred when it determined that the Cheboygan Sportsman Club was entitled to immunity from civil suit under the Sport Shooting Ranges Act.
I would therefore conclude that the trial court erred when it determined that the Cheboygan Sportsman Club was entitled to immunity from prosecution under the Sport Shooting Ranges Act because this action does not involve noise or noise pollution. I would reverse and remand on this ground.
As an alternative ground for affirmance, the Cheboygan Sportsman Club contends that the Wildlife Conservation Act does not apply because, when read in context, the statute limits only the discharge of firearms related to hunting, not range shooting. The prosecutor responds that the plain language of the provision at issue is not that specific in scope, and prohibits anyone from discharging a firearm within 150 yards of an occupied building. I note that, while the Cheboygan Sportsman Club made this argument below, the trial court failed to address it and it is not the focus of the parties' briefs on appeal.
For these reasons, and although the issue is purely legal in nature, I would decline to interpret the Wildlife Conservation Act. However, because the majority chooses to address the interpretation of Wildlife Conservation Act, I will also address the issue in order to dissent from the majority's method of interpretation.
We in the legal profession hold firm to the belief, to the point of reducing the words to a cliché, that the primary and overriding rule of statutory interpretation is that our goal is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature.
But is this really true? Certainly, when a bill passes the Legislature, that passage is the result of collective action by both houses of that Legislature. But in each house, that collective action is itself the result of the individual actions of individual legislators, each casting his or her own vote. And that individual legislator may cast his or her vote for a very, very wide variety of reasons. For example:
My point is a simple one: the legislative process is almost infinitely complex and the reasons for an individual legislator's vote on a particular piece of legislation can be almost infinitely variable. To suppose that a collective intent somehow arises out of this welter of varied individual motives is to elevate fiction over reality. It may be a useful fiction — perhaps even a necessary fiction — but it is a fiction nonetheless.
To assist us in dealing with this fiction, we have developed over the years certain conventions designed to lead us to legislative intent. Statutes provide some of these rules. For instance, MCL 8.3a provides that common words and phrases should be construed according to common meanings while technical words and phrases should be construed according to their particular meanings, and MCL 8.4b provides that catchline headings are not part of a statute.
The judiciary has created other rules of statutory interpretation, some of which have their basis in logic. For instance, when the Legislature includes language in one part of a statute that it omits in another, we make the logical assumption that the omission was intentional.
Other rules have their basis in grammar. For instance, we conclude that the Legislature's use of the present perfect tense indicates that an action was started in the past and continues or has been recently completed,
As I stated earlier, this Court and the Michigan Supreme Court state, endlessly and perhaps even liturgically, that our goal is simply to give effect to the intent of the Legislature.
But whatever label we use — and I acknowledge that the concept of legislative intent is firmly embedded in our jurisprudence — the problem lies in how we express the concept rather than how we apply it. Michigan courts have consistently stated that if the plain and ordinary meaning of a statute's language is clear, we will not engage in judicial construction.
In very simple language, the Wildlife Conservation Act prohibits hunting or discharging a firearm within 150 yards of an occupied building:
The majority uses the statute's title, legislative history, and legislative analyses to reach the conclusion that this statute does not mean what it says, but rather only means that a person may not discharge a firearm within 150 yards of an occupied building while hunting. Indeed, the majority's very statement of the case — that this matter involves a declaratory judgment holding that the "prohibition against discharging firearms within 150 yards of occupied residences ... is inapplicable to plaintiff's shooting range" — illustrates the fundamental problem here. The statute does not simply prohibit discharging a firearm within 150 yards of an occupied building. It prohibits hunting or discharging a firearm in such a fashion. By changing the word "or" to the word "and" — and this is exactly what the majority's interpretation does — the majority is able to affirm the trial court's holding that the Wildlife Conservation Act is inapplicable to the Cheboygan Sportsman Club.
This interpretation runs afoul of a number of the conventions — those basic and time-honored rules of statutory interpretation — that we by necessity follow when we pursue the chimera of collective legislative intent.
Here, as I have noted, the statute provides that an individual may not "hunt or discharge a firearm within 150 yards of an occupied building...." The Michigan Supreme Court has very recently emphasized that this Court may not ignore statutory language in favor of a more "reasonable" interpretation:
It is well established that
That the statute appears to be inconvenient, unnecessary, or unwise is not a reason for this Court to avoid the application of plain statutory language.
In this case, the word "or" does not render the statute dubious. Accordingly, there is no reason to avoid giving effect to the word "or." Were we to give effect to the word "or," it would prohibit both actions — hunting or discharging a firearm within 150 yards of an occupied building — not merely hunting. Contrary to the majority's holding, therefore, such an interpretation would mean that the Wildlife Conservation Act is applicable to the Cheboygan Sportsman Club's shooting range and prohibits target shooting on that range.
This distinction also illuminates how the majority's opinion runs afoul of another of our cherished conventions: that courts must avoid interpretations that render parts of a statute surplusage.
And, by limiting the application of the Wildlife Conservation Act to "hunting contexts and not to target practice contexts," the majority's interpretation runs afoul of yet another basic rule of statutory interpretation: that this Court may not read provisions into a statute that the Legislature chose to omit.
In creating this exception, the majority's reliance on legislative history and legislative analyses is most troubling. The Michigan Supreme Court has expressed disapproval of reliance on legislative analyses in the past, particularly when it creates a conflict with an unambiguous statute's plain language.
There is no reason in the language of the statute itself to ignore the placement and use of the word "or" between the phrases "hunt" and "discharge a firearm." This Court should particularly not rely on legislative analyses to do so. Rather clearly, we are simply not free to ignore
The majority makes several comments in its opinion to which I am obligated to respond. First, the majority asserts that we must read statutes "in context." I take this to mean that we are obliged to consider not only the "surrounding statutory framework" but also legislative history and, presumably, legislative analyses. But if I am right, or mostly right, about the dubious nature of the concept of a collective legislative intent, then this context is conceptually irrelevant. And I note that I am not alone in this critique; see Justice Antonin Scalia's comment that "with respect to 99.99 percent of the issues of construction reaching the courts, there is no legislative intent, so that any clues provided by the legislative history are bound to be false."
Second, the majority categorizes my analysis in this dissent as "an impressive academic exercise." I appreciate the kind words. But I do not regard my analysis to be at all academic in nature. Rather, I suggest, it is grounded in practical reality. Only the most innocent observer would conclude that the chaos that occurs in the rotunda of the Capitol on the last day of a legislative session — with bills flying from one chamber to the other, with every available arm being twisted and every possible political chit being called in, with compromises being made and then unmade within a matter of minutes — is capable of producing a rational and understandable collective legislative intent as to each individual piece of legislation. This is not an academic observation; it reflects reality as I have seen it.
Third, the majority states, "Were we to disregard any established legal principle that could conceivably be thought of — inaccurately in this case, we believe — as a `fiction,' the result would be chaos." I am not a proponent of chaos, nor do I propose to disregard established legal principles. Rather, my critique of the majority's approach is that it disregards time-honored principles of statutory construction to reach a result contrary to the actual words of the statute construed according to such principles.
Finally, the majority states, "We prefer an organic approach to what is really an organic challenge."
I agree with the majority that the trial court erred when it determined that the Cheboygan Sportsman Club was entitled to immunity from prosecution under the Sport Shooting Ranges Act because this action does not involve noise or noise pollution. On that basis, I would reverse and remand for further proceedings.
But I would not graft an interpretation onto the Wildlife Conservation Act (1) that suggests that a person may not discharge
The majority states, "We hold only that MCL 324.40111 [the Wildlife Conservation Act] applies to hunting contexts and not to target practice contexts, so the act of conducting target practice shooting on [Cheboygan Sportsman Club's] premises does not violate MCL 324.40111." Actually, the majority's opinion is simply that the Wildlife Conservation Act applies only to hunting and therefore target practice shooting is not prohibited. The clear wording of the statute is otherwise. I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority's method of interpretation of the Wildlife Conservation Act.
