KATHLEEN H. SANBERG, Bankruptcy Judge.
This adversary proceeding was commenced by Douglas A. Kelley, in his capacity as the court-appointed Chapter 11 Trustee of Debtors Petters Company, Inc.; PC Funding, LLC; and SPF Funding, LLC, (collectively "Plaintiff") in the Chapter 11 cases of Petters Company, Inc., and related entities. The history of Tom Petters' Ponzi scheme and the history of this adversary proceeding are well documented in other decisions.
DZ Bank's motion was heard on November 18, 2015 and taken under advisement.
This Court has jurisdiction over these adversary proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(1) & 1334, Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001, and Local Rule 1070-1. This is a core proceeding within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(H). Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.
This adversary proceeding was reassigned to the undersigned when Chief Judge Gregory F. Kishel retired on May 31, 2016. The undersigned hereby certifies familiarity with the record and determines that the matter at bar may be addressed without prejudice to the parties in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 63, as incorporated by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9028.
This motion arises out of DZ Bank's interface with Tom Petters' Ponzi scheme. Beginning in 2002, DZ Bank made loans to Opportunity Finance as part of a "tripartite business relationship."
The Plaintiff seeks to avoid transfers made by the debtor-entities to DZ Bank, as both an initial and subsequent transferee, under the actual and constructive fraud provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)
The Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on September 30, 2010.
Before oral argument was heard on DZ Bank's motion,
DZ Bank is a fraudulent transfer defendant in the Third Amended Complaint, as provided by Counts 1 through 8.
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), "[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Courts review motions for judgment on the pleadings under the same standard as motions to dismiss made under Rule 12(b)(6).
Under these standards, in order to prevail on its motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), DZ Bank has the burden to establish that there are no disputes over material facts regarding the Petters transactions and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the constructive fraud claims under MUFTA.
In its Answer, DZ Bank made a general denial of each allegation in the Complaint.
To establish a claim under MUFTA, a debtor must have made a transfer to a creditor without the debtor receiving reasonably equivalent value in exchange for that transfer. Here, the Plaintiff has alleged that DZ Bank received funds originating with PC Funding as either an initial or subsequent transferee. In its Answer, DZ Bank admits that it received payment for its loan to Opportunity Finance from funds in the PC Funding bank account and that funds were also deposited into that account for repayment to Opportunity Finance, who controlled the account.
The Court will next address both the initial transferee and subsequent transferee claims in terms of receipt of reasonably equivalent value.
DZ Bank argues that the Plaintiff has not pleaded sufficient facts to support a claim that PC Funding did not receive reasonably equivalent value in exchange for transfers made to DZ Bank.
DZ Bank argues that under MUFTA, the payments it received constituted repayments on a valid antecedent debt and are therefore reasonably equivalent value as a matter of law.
The Plaintiff argues that there that the payments received did not constitute antecedent debt because there was no antecedent debt running between PC Funding and DZ Bank.
In support of its arguments about a valid antecedent debt, DZ Bank relies on its Answer and the attachments as proof that transfers made from the PC Funding account to DZ Bank were repayment on a valid antecedent debt. Many of these documents are loan documents. The Court will address first the appropriateness of the submissions of the attachments and documents.
A court should consider materials on a motion for judgment on the pleadings that: 1) are part of the public record attached to the complaint, 2) do not contradict the complaint, or 3) are necessarily embraced by the pleadings.
First, the documents attached to the Answer are not part of the public record. Second, DZ Bank offers these documents for the purpose of contradicting the allegations in the Complaint that the repayments were not made on a valid antecedent debt to Opportunity Finance. DZ Bank wants to use the documents to establish the existence of valid antecedent debt in order to prove the exchange of reasonably equivalent value.
DZ Bank argues that when a contract attached to a complaint contradicts the allegations made in the complaint, the plain language of the contract controls.
Third, the documents attached to the Answer are not "necessarily embraced by the complaint." Documents necessarily embraced by the complaint are those which form the basis of a plaintiff's complaint or are integral to the claim.
Here, the basis of the initial transferee claims is the transfer of funds from a debtor entity to DZ Bank. The Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded a prima facie case for avoidance without including or discussing the exhibits attached to the Answer. The attachments are not integral to nor do they form the basis of the cause of action. Instead, the documents proffered establish that facts are disputed. Therefore, the Court will not consider the exhibits attached to DZ Bank's Answer in deciding this motion.
Based on the allegations in the Complaint and admissions in the Answer, the Court finds that DZ Bank's argument that the payments it received constituted antecedent debt fails because there was no antecedent debt running directly between PC Funding and DZ Bank.
DZ Bank also argues that if there is not an antecedent debt owed directly by the debtor entities, there is an antecedent debt due to the lending relationship and corporate structure of the three parties and the payments it received therefore constitute reasonably equivalent value. The Plaintiff argues that there was no debt owed by the Petters entities to DZ Bank. Rather, at best, there was a debt owed by the Petters entities to Opportunity Finance and a debt owed by Opportunity Finance to DZ Bank.
A brief review of the Ponzi scheme factual allegations regarding the Defendants is necessary. DZ Bank lent money to Opportunity Finance so that Opportunity Finance could lend it to Petters. Opportunity Finance lent the funds to PC Funding in order to fund Petters' diverting transactions. Petters, through PCI, ostensibly needed cash to purchase goods that he (or his entities) would resell for profit. When PCI sold these goods to the end retailer that sale would, in theory, create an account receivable owing to PCI. PCI would then assign the account receivable to PC Funding, which used the funds lent by Opportunity Finance. When the retailer paid for the goods on the account receivable, now owed to PC Funding, the retailer was to pay into a bank account at US Bank owned by PC Funding. PC Funding entered into an account control agreement with Opportunity Finance for this bank account. This arrangement allowed Opportunity Finance to "sweep" the account when funds were deposited for payment on the receivable. Opportunity Finance, having control over the account, had the ability to direct funds out of that account to DZ Bank to pay its own debt.
DZ Bank maintains that these transfers constitute reasonably equivalent value because they were made in repayment of an antecedent debt owed to DZ Bank by Opportunity Finance and because DZ Bank was an assignee of Opportunity Finance's third party beneficiary rights. DZ Bank relies on various sections of the transactional documents to support this debt repayment theory. DZ Bank argues that Section 8.13 of the Credit Agreement between PC Funding and Opportunity Finance (attached to the Complaint) provides that Opportunity Finance is a third party beneficiary of the Sale Agreement between PC Funding and PCI.
None of DZ Bank's arguments address the particular "rights" that were transferred as third party beneficiary rights or whether those rights would have been enforceable debt obligations under Minnesota law such that they would fall within Minn. Stat. § 513.43(a). Rather, DZ Bank argues that it was able to "claim against the funds in the PC Funding bank account" so that Opportunity Finance could repay the debt it owed.
Even assuming these assertions by DZ Bank are true, it has no impact on the reasonably equivalent value dispute. At most, it allows the Court to infer that DZ Bank was the third party beneficiary of a contract between PC Funding and PCI. It does not allow the Court to make the inferential leap to conclude, as a matter of law, that PCI or PC Funding owed a valid and enforceable debt to DZ Bank under Minnesota law and that any transfer to DZ Bank resulted in a dollar for dollar reduction of a purported third party beneficiary debt liability. Such an inference would be improper as all inferences are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party.
DZ Bank's reliance on the contract provisions in support of its arguments is misplaced. The contracts set forth the facts about how the parties were supposed to conduct themselves and how the transactions were supposed to occur. What actually happened, as alleged in the Complaint, is that Tom Petters and his entities frequently ignored contractual obligations.
The contracts, Complaint and Answer do not set forth facts that PCI or PC Funding owed a debt to DZ Bank. Further, DZ Bank's repeated assertion that it was being repaid for loans made to Opportunity Finance is irrelevant for purposes of this particular analysis. As noted above, the debt reduction must inure to the debtor-transferor. The debt reduction here is the debt owed by Opportunity Finance to DZ Bank.
The Court cannot find that reasonably equivalent value was transferred to the debtor entities by DZ Bank as a matter of law based on the current submissions. The Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings must be denied for the claims under the initial transferee allegations.
To recover an avoidable transfer from a subsequent transferee under § 550, a plaintiff must allege both that the initial transfer is voidable and that the subsequent transferee received the debtor's property from the initial transferee.
The Plaintiff has sets a factual narrative whereby Opportunity Finance was alleged to be an initial transferee of PC Funding and subsequent transferee of PCI. The rulings on the avoidance of the transfers to Opportunity Finance similarly apply to the extent that they impact any claims by PCI and PC Funding against DZ Bank as a subsequent transferee under § 550.
Next, the Plaintiff incudes in the Complaint the allegation that to the extent DZ Bank was not an initial transferee, it was a subsequent transferee from Opportunity Finance.
Section 550 provides that a trustee may not recover from a transferee if that transferee took for value. The undisputed facts demonstrate that DZ Bank received transfers from Opportunity Finance for value. It is undisputed that there was a creditor-debtor relationship between DZ Bank and Opportunity Finance.
The remaining issue for subsequent transferee liability is whether there are undisputed facts establishing that DZ Bank took the transfers in good faith pursuant to § 550(b)(1). Good faith is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code and "is determined on a case-by-case basis."
The Plaintiff alleges that DZ Bank "knew or should have known that they were benefiting from fraudulent activity, or at a minimum, failed to exercise reasonable due diligence with respect to Petters, PCI, PC Funding, and SPF Funding in connection with the Ponzi scheme."
DZ Bank denies both allegations.
Many of the Defendant's affirmative defenses were also argued as grounds for dismissal in the Opportunity Finance Motion to Dismiss.
DZ Bank has failed to meet its burden to show that there is no dispute as to any material fact and that DZ Bank is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all points. Whether the debtor received reasonably equivalent value is tied to the litigation against Opportunity Finance which is mired in its own dispute. This adversary proceeding is ready to proceed to discovery and final resolution.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: