DEBORAH B. BARNES, Chief Judge.
¶ 1 Loyde H. Warren (Warren) appeals from the trial court's "Journal Entry" (Judgment) refusing to approve a contingent fee contract executed between himself and Mildred Stanfield, Guardian of the Estate of Tracy Delbert Stanfield (Guardian), for legal services performed by Warren on behalf of Tracy Delbert Stanfield (Ward), and, instead, awarding an attorney's fee in quantum meruit in the amount of 10% of the sum recovered by Ward's estate through settlement. Guardian cross-appeals from the trial court's Judgment awarding the 10% fee. We affirm as modified.
¶ 2 The current appeal is the second appeal concerning Warren's request for approval of a contingent fee contract executed by Guardian on behalf of Ward. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma determined in In re Guardianship of Stanfield, 2012 OK 8, 276 P.3d 989,
¶ 3 The trial court conducted a hearing over two days during which it heard testimony from Warren, Ward, Guardian, and two attorneys who testified on behalf of Warren. The court also accepted into evidence numerous documents offered by the parties. The record also contains exhibits attached to various motions filed by the parties.
¶ 4 Appearing as Warren's attorney expert with regard to the reasonableness of the contingent fee contract was James Dawson (Dawson).
¶ 5 On cross-examination, Dawson agreed that it would be the attorney's responsibility to have the court approve his fee contract and agreed he would seek that approval as quickly as possible. However, on redirect, he testified that if the guardian had an attorney, that attorney should seek approval of the contract. Dawson also stated that had Warren not done the work he did on Ward's behalf, MetLife "would have paid [the money] to Wentworth."
¶ 6 The trial court questioned Dawson about the "timing" of the contingency fee contract because it appeared Warren was already representing Ward when the contingency fee agreement was executed with Guardian. Dawson testified that a contingent fee agreement could be executed as the first fee agreement or it might arise later even if the client was initially represented for an hourly fee; however, he could not say what occurred in this case. On re-cross, Dawson testified that an attorney is not ethically required to recommend that his client seek independent representation on "midstream" contracts — contracts that switch from an hourly rate to a contingency fee during the representation — though he agreed a client could do so, and testified that such contracts are not presumptively fraudulent.
¶ 7 Warren, who has practiced law for over 40 years and had been in private practice for 38 years at the time of the hearing, testified that Ward first sought his representation in June of 1998 concerning a collection matter. Warren testified about the work he did on Ward's behalf beginning in 1998 and during 1999 after Ward made Warren aware of the May 1998 Wentworth judgment against Ward from a Pennsylvania state court. Warren testified he did not charge a fee to Ward for that work though he stated he read the May 1998 Wentworth judgment, wrote a letter to MetLife and spoke to a MetLife representative by phone at least once, contacted three attorneys in Pennsylvania about their willingness to represent Ward in the Wentworth garnishment case, contacted a physician to evaluate Ward, and sent information to the attorney Guardian secured to establish the guardianship.
¶ 9 Warren further testified about the nature of the MetLife settlement conference as a "hearing" on cross-examination. Warren testified that if he had to attend a hearing on a motion to dismiss, for example, that would not be the type of hearing that would entitle him to the 40% fee, but instead to the base fee of one-third. He also stated that his attendance at a motion for summary judgment in which evidence and argument would be presented would likewise not entitle him to 40% under the contingency fee contract. He testified settlement conferences would also not be a hearing within the terms of the contract except the one he attended because the judge conducted the settlement conference, and Warren presented a summary of his witnesses' testimony and made legal arguments.
¶ 10 Throughout August of 2001, letters among the attorneys were exchanged in an effort to produce a settlement agreement to be presented to the federal court.
¶ 11 Warren also introduced two exhibits prepared by Guardian or Ward. According to Warren, Guardian said Petitioner's Exhibit 14 was a handwritten schedule depicting "how [Ward] wanted to divide the funds," but Guardian said they could discuss the schedule Ward proposed when Guardian and
¶ 12 From late 2001 until about mid-2005, Warren was paid according to the agreed upon payment schedule. However, in May 2005 the payments to Wentworth under the terms of the settlement agreement ended but MetLife's payments to Warren did not reflect the change. The matter was corrected, but by the time it was, Guardian hired her present attorney who sued Warren in a different lawsuit for, among other matters, malpractice and fraud.
¶ 13 Warren said he did not keep any time records in the MetLife case because it was a contingency fee case and admitted he had no documented record of the hours he spent on the case.
¶ 14 The court also heard testimony from Ward and Guardian. They testified that Warren's method of payment for legal fees, prior to the contingent fee contract, was to call them whenever he needed money and that they paid him in cash but did not receive receipts or information about the legal services for which the payments were made. Both claimed they did not understand what a contingent fee contract was. They both testified Warren failed to advise them to seek another lawyer's advice about a switch from an hourly or flat rate to a contingency fee contract and failed to tell them about a federal district court case favorable to Ward, that the MetLife case was set for settlement conference or what a settlement conference was, and that local counsel in Pennsylvania had been hired at the time the contingency fee contract was signed. They claimed they knew nothing about the terms of the settlement agreement until after Warren returned from Pennsylvania.
¶ 15 Ward claimed Warren was representing him on the Pennsylvania lawsuit from the time Ward hired Warren to represent him in several collection and foreclosure cases; consequently, Ward testified he believed Warren was responsible for Wentworth's judgment against him.
¶ 16 Ward further testified that after the MetLife settlement was reached, he prepared a document setting out how the monthly annuity payments would be divided to pay Warren's fee and Ward.
¶ 17 On cross-examination, however, Ward testified that at the time Warren represented him on the collection and foreclosure actions, the only other matter he brought to Warren was the MetLife interpleader and that he was sure all four were at the same time. Ward could not remember the dates he first consulted Warren about the foreclosure and collections cases though he claimed he saw Warren before he had been served in those cases. When asked whether he has "memory issues," Ward stated, "Sometimes I do;
¶ 18 Guardian testified she first consulted Warren in March of 1999 for a bankruptcy matter concerning credit cards. She said the first time she went with Ward to Warren's office was in January 2001 concerning Ward's "annuity, Pennsylvania thing." She testified that early in 2001 Warren suggested a guardianship be established for Ward and she agreed to be the guardian. Reminded that the guardianship for Ward was established in March 1999, Guardian could not remember if she spoke to Warren before or after she was appointed Ward's guardian.
¶ 19 Although she could not recall dates, Guardian said she spoke to Warren a few times and met with him "about the Pennsylvania lawsuit." What she recalled was that Warren said she needed to give him $10,000 to hire a lawyer in Pennsylvania "to represent us, [Ward]." She told Warren she could only secure $4,000, but he told her to come to his office and that he had "a paper that we may work out, you know, for the rest of it." She testified he showed her the paper and said he could not represent her unless she signed it. She testified she signed the contingency fee contract because Warren knew all about the case and that it was a late date to get another lawyer; she claimed she knew no other lawyers. She also testified on cross-examination that she never read the contract.
¶ 20 Guardian admitted she knew very little about the work Warren did before and after he went to the settlement conference. She testified she did not think he did "that much," but admitted she did not know. She claimed she did not know if Warren settled the case because other lawyers were there, too. She agreed there were many legal matters occurring in the MetLife case that she "flat [didn't] understand," and enough complication in the case that she did not fully understand everything. She maintained, however, she did not know what was occurring in the case because Warren did not tell her.
¶ 21 Guardian admitted on cross-examination that she signed Petitioner's Exhibit 15, a document setting out the amount of money Warren would be paid each month for his attorney fee. She stated the division prepared by Ward in Petitioner's Exhibit 14, and represented in Petitioner's Exhibit 15, was a fair calculation and division of the settlement. She testified she was satisfied with the settlement in 2001 through the first half of 2005, but claimed she was concerned before MetLife made a mistake on the check amount because she never saw the front of the checks she was signing and did not know if other checks had a higher amount on them. She admitted, however, that she chose to not turn over the checks to verify their amounts. It was after the MetLife mistake that she hired her present attorney.
¶ 22 On January 28, 2013, the trial court filed a "Court Minute Order" in which it set out extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law. On March 1, 2013, the trial court issued its Judgment denying Warren's motion to approve the representation contract and to set fees for the reasons set forth in its January 28 court minute order. The trial court, however, awarded Warren costs and determined an attorney's fee in quantum meruit "[a]fter reviewing all of the evidence, and considering the relevant factors set out in the case law[.]"
¶ 23 The trial court is granted broad, equitable powers to review a contingent fee contract executed by a guardian on behalf of a ward. In re Guardianship of Stanfield, 2012 OK 8, ¶ 19, 276 P.3d 989. In actions of equitable cognizance, the judgment made by the trial court will be reversed if it is clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence or contrary to accepted principles of equity or rules of law. In re Estate of Eversole, 1994 OK 114, ¶ 7, 885 P.2d 657. "A reviewing court will not disturb a trial court's equity decision absent abused discretion or a finding that it is clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence." Hedges v. Hedges, 2002 OK 92, ¶ 10 n. 27, 66 P.3d 364 (citations omitted). "An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is based on an erroneous conclusion of law or where there is no rational basis in evidence for the ruling." Spencer v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 2007 OK 76, ¶ 13, 171 P.3d 890 (footnote omitted) (emphasis omitted).
¶ 24 Warren argues the trial court abused its discretion in not approving the contract,
¶ 25 The trial court correctly found that in Stanfield, the Oklahoma Supreme Court directed the trial court to two other cases "that serve as examples [of] where court approval of a contingent fee agreement involving a minor need not occur contemporaneously with the date the agreement is made." 2012 OK 8, ¶ 25, 276 P.3d 989. Those cases, Abel v. Tisdale, 1980 OK 161, 619 P.2d 608 (Abel), and Sneed v. Sneed, 1984 OK 22, 681 P.2d 754, set forth factors trial courts should consider in determining the reasonableness of a contingent fee arrangement involving minors. Both of those cases, and Abel v. Tisdale, 1983 OK 109, 673 P.2d 836 (Abel II),
¶ 26 Guardian argues the trial court's refusal to approve the contingent fee contract is correct because, as the trial court found, Warren failed to produce time records in conjunction with his representation of Guardian in the MetLife interpleader case and failed to produce any evidence regarding the customary rate or a reasonable hourly rate for such services. Guardian thus contends the lodestar method of computing a reasonable attorney's fee makes "time and labor" the foundation of the reasonable fee analysis.
¶ 27 Although one of the reasons the trial court refused to approve the 40% contingent fee was Warren's failure to produce time records, the court also refused to approve the contract because it found the fee was excessive and, thus, unreasonable. Because we find the evidence supports the trial court's determination that the 40% fee was excessive, we will not address the parties' arguments concerning whether Burk controls approval of contingent fee contracts in guardianship proceedings.
¶ 28 In Stanfield, part of the Supreme Court's reasoning in requiring court approval of contingent fee contracts between a guardian, on behalf of a ward, and an attorney concerned the duty of courts to protect wards, including minors and adults such as Ward in the present case, from unreasonable attorney fees. 2012 OK 8, ¶ 20, 276 P.3d 989. In addressing the "timing" of Warren's motion for approval of the contingent fee, the Supreme Court discussed cases concerning minors. The Court explained that Abel was an example of a "trial court's role in determining the proper amount for a contingent fee contract involving minors" even though "that determination occurred after a jury trial, appeal, and settlement." Id. ¶ 25. Consequently, the Court held that Warren's failure to seek approval prior to payment of his fee, instead seeking such approval some eight years after the contract was executed, were not in themselves legally sufficient reasons to not approve the contingent fee. Id. ¶ 28.
¶ 29 The Supreme Court also stated that in Abel,
Stanfield, II, ¶ 25 (footnote omitted).
¶ 30 In Abel II, the Supreme Court shed greater light on the procedures to be used in determining the reasonableness of attorney fees. On remand in Abel, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing, at the conclusion of which, it awarded the attorneys less than the one-third contingency fee sought, and the attorneys again appealed. In Abel II, the attorneys argued, and the Supreme Court agreed, the clients presented no evidence to support the setting of the fee at less than the one-third requested. The Court noted the
¶ 31 In determining that an attorney fee award should be based on what is now Rule 1.5, the Abel II Court noted the rule's list of variables that serve "to guide a court in fixing a reasonable attorney fee." Id. ¶ 8. The Court stated the attorneys
Id.
¶ 32 In Stanfield, the Supreme Court also referenced Sneed, 1984 OK 22, 681 P.2d 754, stating that there the Court also "discussed several factors for the trial court to consider regarding a contingent fee contract previously executed by a guardian ad litem on behalf of a minor." Stanfield, ¶ 25 (footnote omitted). In Sneed, "[c]ertiorari [was] granted for the limited purpose of deciding whether a contingent fee contract executed by the parents of a minor is binding on the minor after she attains majority, reaps the benefit of the representation, and then, attempts to repudiate the contract." Sneed, ¶ 1. The trial court denied any attorney's fee to the attorneys who had been hired by the parents. On appeal, the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the denial of any fee to one of the attorneys, but remanded the cause to award compensation to the other attorney because, on appeal, the minor acknowledged nine hours of work by that attorney inured to her benefit. On certiorari, the attorneys argued, and the Supreme Court agreed, the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to award any attorney fees.
¶ 33 The Court explained:
Sneed, ¶ 4 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
¶ 34 The common thread among Abel, Abel II, and Sneed is the fairness to the ward, judged in hindsight, in light of all the attendant circumstances and with consideration of the factors set out in Rule 1.5 and the analogous twelve factors set out in Burk. The trial court found Warren failed to present evidence of "awards in similar cases or the time and labor required,"
¶ 35 In exercising its equitable powers, however, the trial court also found a 40% percent contingency fee was "excessive based on the evidence." The trial court based its conclusion on the fact that no discovery had been undertaken, no pretrial or evidentiary hearings were undertaken, and the case was settled on the first court appearance. The trial court had evidence — though conflicting — from which it could determine that the settlement conference, while requiring work not ordinarily required in settlement conferences in Oklahoma, was not the equivalent of a hearing. For example, Warren testified that he would not consider a motion for summary judgment to be the equivalent of a hearing though the evidentiary materials in support of and in defense of such a motion can be extensive. Warren characterized the settlement conference as a "mini-trial" because under the Pennsylvania federal court rules the trial judge hearing the case was present and the parties had to report their deliberations to the judge at the conclusion of the conference. However, he also testified that no witnesses testified or were examined. Rather, the evidence upon which the parties relied was summarized.
¶ 36 In contrast to the lack of evidence in Abel II, here there was evidence demonstrating the requested 40% fee "was too large" and supporting the trial court's reduction. Abel II, ¶ 7. Consequently, we conclude the trial court's determination that the 40% contingent fee was excessive under the facts of this case was not clearly erroneous; therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to approve the contingent fee contract.
¶ 37 Guardian argues the trial court erred in awarding Warren any fee. While, as Guardian argues, Warren maintained the position that the value of his services under the contingent fee contract was 40%, we do not agree with Guardian's conclusion that no evidence was presented at the two-day hearing concerning the value of the legal services Warren rendered on behalf of Ward. Further, all of the precedent Guardian offers in support of her argument that the trial court was without authority to award any fee to Warren concern the award of attorney fees in prevailing party cases, not the circumstance as in the present case where the fee in dispute is between the attorney and his client. In other situations involving such a dispute, quantum meruit was the measure used for determining the value of the services rendered.
¶ 38 For example, in First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Bassett, 1938 OK 461, 183 Okla. 592, 83 P.2d 837,
Bassett, ¶ 23. See also Self & Assocs., Inc. v. Jackson, 2011 OK CIV APP 126, ¶¶ 13-16, 269 P.3d 30, and cases discussed therein.
¶ 39 The circumstances in the present case are different from those in Bassett because here, unlike the facts there, the contingency had been met — settlement had been reached with a favorable outcome for Ward's estate — and Warren had not been discharged. However, because the contingent fee contract in a guardianship proceeding can be, and in this case was, disapproved by the court after that result was obtained, we find Bassett instructive in determining that quantum meruit is the proper measure for fixing the value of Warren's services. Further, the Bassett Court's determination that among the elements to be considered in determining the value of the attorney's services — the attorney's skill and diligence, and the final results of the litigation, not just the "details of his service" — are among the Rule 1.5 variables discussed by the Stanfield Court in assessing the reasonableness of an attorney's fee in guardianship proceedings. Stanfield also makes clear a trial court has the power in equity to reduce an attorney's fee contracted by a guardian on behalf of a ward. As noted by the trial court, however, a ward is not entitled to free legal services.
¶ 40 Consequently, we conclude the trial court was acting within its equitable powers in using quantum meruit as the measure for determining the value of the services rendered by Warren on behalf of Ward. We disagree, however, with the conclusion the trial court reached about what that value was in light of the trial court's express findings and the attendant circumstances in this case as presented in the record on appeal. The award of an attorney's fee to Warren in this case is anchored in equity. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has stated: "If the record is sufficient, this court will — in an appeal from an equity — suit decision — render that decree which the chancellor should have entered." Larman v. Larman, 1999 OK 83, ¶ 18, 991 P.2d 536 (footnote omitted). However, "[w]hen reviewing an equity suit, an appellate court cannot exercise first-instance cognizance by making original findings of fact. Whenever necessary findings are absent, the cause must be remanded with directions that they be made." Id. (footnote omitted).
¶ 41 With respect to the period of time during which Warren was involved in matters pertaining to MetLife and Wentworth's claims, the trial court found Warren was representing Ward as early as August 31, 1998, in the aftermath of Wentworth's May 27, 1998 Pennsylvania state court judgment against Ward.
¶ 42 The trial court had before it Warren's denial that he represented Ward in any matter at the time Wentworth secured its Pennsylvania judgment against Ward. Warren also admitted that in August 1998 he wrote a letter to MetLife in which he stated he thought Wentworth's case had jurisdictional issues because the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas did not have "jurisdiction over [his] client, [Ward]." However, he further testified he stated in the letter that "[w]hen an attorney is employed, I will advise or have that person contact you." He also asked MetLife to keep him "advise[d] if anything occurs concerning the garnishment against" MetLife. Warren testified he contacted MetLife because the garnishment action by Wentworth was against it, and Warren informed MetLife that he was attempting to secure counsel for Ward. Warren told Ward he would attempt to find Pennsylvania counsel for Ward because Warren could not practice law in Pennsylvania.
¶ 43 The court also heard Warren's testimony that in early September 1998, he contacted three Pennsylvania lawyers, but each declined to accept Ward's case.
¶ 44 The trial court also found that "[i]n early 1999, [Warren] encouraged Ward to have a guardian appointed for him in order to assist in vacating the Pennsylvania judgment."
¶ 45 The trial court found the guardianship was established in March 1999. The record reflects another attorney was hired by Guardian as the guardianship attorney. Warren testified he sent the guardianship attorney the September 1998 garnishment order and correspondence Warren received from MetLife. Warren also notified MetLife that a guardianship was being pursued for Ward.
¶ 46 Despite the guardianship and the physician's report, Warren testified he believed the competency defense in the MetLife case would still be difficult because Wentworth's judgment had already been secured and had never been appealed, and Ward was represented by counsel both times he assigned his annuity. Warren stated he knew he would need a video deposition, at least, of the physician as well as the appearance of other witnesses in Pennsylvania. He also thought he could encounter difficulty because the date the guardianship was established in March 1999 and the dates Ward assigned his annuity having occurred three years earlier in 1996.
¶ 47 While the court specifically found that Warren had no written contingency fee contract with Guardian or Ward before May 11, 2001,
¶ 48 On May 11, when Guardian came to his office to sign the contingency fee contract, Warren testified he told Guardian a settlement conference had been scheduled and depositions were scheduled for several days in August 2001. Given Wentworth's answer and affirmative defenses, Warren testified he had the impression Wentworth intended to pursue the matter and settlement possibilities were low.
¶ 49 On May 25, 2001, Guardian's answer, including affirmative defenses, was filed by local counsel. Warren testified he had prepared that pleading but was not yet admitted to practice in the federal court, so it was signed by local counsel. The record reflects Warren also prepared a settlement offer letter to Wentworth, dated May 30, 2001, in which he detailed the guardianship and other circumstances involving Ward.
¶ 50 Warren testified that Wentworth did not respond to his settlement offer and the settlement conference, originally scheduled for June 19, 2001, was continued to July 19, 2001. Thereafter, Warren sent another letter to Wentworth dated July 18, 2001, withdrawing the May 30 settlement offer and proposing an offer of $207,000 less $59,300 that had already been paid to Wentworth at a monthly payment of $1,500 until paid.
¶ 51 Though, as previously discussed herein, the trial court found the settlement conference did not rise to the level of a hearing contemplated by the contingent fee contract, Warren testified he believed he was required to be prepared for a "mini-trial" at the settlement conference and he prepared to that degree.
¶ 52 Based, then, on the trial court's findings and the record on appeal, Warren was representing Guardian on Ward's behalf prior to execution of the written contingency fee contract on May 11, 2001. Further, though Warren testified he charged no fee for the services he provided at various times in 1998 and 1999, prior to his acceptance of service in the MetLife interpleader action in March 2001, the trial court specifically found the action he took during that period was on behalf of Ward.
¶ 53 Regarding the contingent fee contract, the trial court expressly found there was no fraud or undue influence in the procurement of that contract.
¶ 54 In addition, the trial court found that after the MetLife case settled, Guardian and Warren "agreed to a distribution of future payments to satisfy the fee."
¶ 55 Also bearing upon the appraisement of Warren's employment is "his skill, diligence, and the final results in the litigation[.]" Bassett, ¶ 23. The trial court specifically found "[t]he amount involved in the litigation and the savings realized [were] significant to [Ward] and [Ward's] estate. Even though there was a risk of non-recovery, [Warren] achieved a successful result."
¶ 56 Given the foregoing findings of the trial court and the attendant circumstances in the record on appeal, and given, in particular, Guardian's partial performance of the agreed payment schedule for Warren's fees for nearly five years, we reject Guardian's argument that Warren should be awarded no attorney's fee and conclude Warren's fee should be fixed at the amount he has already been paid; that is, $98,890.71.
¶ 57 Inasmuch as this case is grounded in equity, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to approve the contingent fee contract for the reason that the 40% contingency was excessive and, thus, unreasonable. Evidence in the record supports that determination. We also conclude the trial court correctly determined that quantum meruit is the proper measure for fixing the value of Warren's services; however, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion in fixing only a 10% attorney's fee award in light of the trial court's findings and other attendant circumstances present in the appellate record. The only "percentage" evidence presented was Warren's evidence that a 40% fee was reasonable. In accord with this Court's equitable power and after consideration of the trial court's findings, including its findings that most of the Rule 1.5 factors were present in this case, and of the attendant circumstances presented in the record, we conclude the trial court should have approved an attorney's fee to Warren in the amount of $98,890.71, the amount he has already been paid. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's Judgment disapproving Warren's 40% contingent fee and affirm the award of costs and an attorney's fee determined in quantum meruit, but modify the Judgment fixing the fee in an amount equal to 10% of the savings to Ward's estate by
¶ 58 AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
GOODMAN, J., concurs, and WISEMAN, P.J., concurs in part, dissents in part.
WISEMAN, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
¶ 1 For the reasons enumerated below, I would affirm the trial court's order without modification. I concur with the Majority that the trial court was correct in denying Warren's request to approve the contingency fee contract as being unreasonable, whether the percentage was 331/3 or 40%. From the description in the record, this settlement conference does not appear any more rigorous than any other settlement conference in federal court, where one must be prepared to summarize the evidence and argue the law to the settlement judge to effect the most positive settlement terms for one's client. The evidence does not support finding this settlement conference to be the equivalent, either in substance or procedure, of an evidentiary hearing or trial, as contemplated by the contract, particularly when the judge merely told the parties to go outside and settle the case. I also agree that there is no basis on which to deny Warren a fee altogether, and the trial court correctly denied Guardian's request to do so.
¶ 2 After reviewing the circumstances here, however, I part company with the Majority when it concludes that the fee of almost $99,000 that Warren has received is reasonable (and therefore equitable). The record establishes the following:
¶ 3 Based on these circumstances, I conclude the following legal precepts apply:
¶ 4 Based on the foregoing, I respectfully dissent from the Majority's view that the award must be modified to reflect that the trial court should have awarded the amount that Warren has been paid, nearly $99,000. The Majority states that "no evidence was presented that 10% was equitable" as awarded by the trial court. If this is so, there is likewise no evidence that $99,000 represents the reasonable value of Warren's services (quantum meruit) and is therefore an equitable fee.
¶ 5 The trial court's well-reasoned and well-founded determination as to this contested attorney fee was neither clearly against the weight of the evidence nor contrary to established equitable principles, and I would affirm its decision without modification. I therefore concur with the Majority in part and dissent in part.
Id. ¶¶ 2-4 (footnote omitted).
Id. ¶ 6.
In finding that the Structured Settlement Protection Act of 2001 was enacted after the purchase agreement between Wentworth and Kaufman, the Court held:
Id. ¶ 21 (footnote omitted). Ward's assignments of his annuity and Wentworth's Pennsylvania judgment occurred prior to 2001.