ZINTER, Justice.
[¶ 1.] SDCL 55-4-57(a) limits the time to commence a judicial proceeding contesting "whether a revocable trust or any amendment thereto, or an irrevocable trust was validly created." Settlor amended her revocable trust to expressly disinherit her son. Following settlor's death, her son commenced this action to invalidate the amendments on the grounds that settlor lacked capacity and was unduly influenced. Son also requested an accounting and made a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. Son, however, commenced the action more than sixty days after he received an SDCL 55-4-57(a)(2) notice that he had sixty days to commence a judicial proceeding regarding the trust. We affirm the circuit court's dismissal of the lack-of-capacity and undue-influence claims as untimely. We affirm the dismissal of the breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim and the request for an accounting on other grounds.
[¶ 2.] Judith and Thomas Briggs are the two children of Willard and Elizabeth Briggs. On November 28, 1995, both Willard and Elizabeth executed several estate planning documents, including separate revocable trusts. Elizabeth amended her trust on two occasions. In 2009, she amended it to expressly remove Thomas as a beneficiary and provide that her assets were to be distributed to Judith after Elizabeth's death. The amended trust stated: "Grantor has purposely omitted her son, Thomas F. Briggs, from any provisions hereunder for reasons known to him and also for reasons identified in a letter which Grantor has signed and directed her attorney
[¶ 3.] Elizabeth died on July 16, 2013. On August 15, 2013, an attorney for Elizabeth's trust and estate sent Thomas a letter informing him of his mother's death and that she had left him no property.
[¶ 4.] Thomas did not file this petition to contest Elizabeth's two trust amendments within sixty days. Instead, he emailed the Sanborn County clerk of courts and the trust's attorney. The email contained an unsigned, pro se "Notice of Objection to the Trust Instrument for Elizabeth A. Briggs."
[¶ 5.] On April 18, 2015 — 611 days after Thomas received notice that he had sixty days to commence a judicial proceeding — Thomas commenced this proceeding to contest the trust amendments. He alleged the amendments were invalid because Elizabeth lacked capacity and was unduly influenced by Judith, who was a beneficiary and the trustee. Thomas's petition also included a claim that Judith breached her fiduciary duty and requested that Judith "be held liable for any and all damages caused by the breach of her fiduciary duties." Thomas did not, however, name Judith as a party defendant or commence an action against her in her individual capacity. Finally, Thomas's petition contained a request for an accounting.
[¶ 6.] Judith in her capacity as trustee moved to dismiss the petition. She contended that Thomas's claims were barred by SDCL 55-4-57(a)'s time limitations for commencing a judicial proceeding. The circuit court granted the motion and dismissed the petition. The court concluded that although Thomas sent his Notice of Objection within sixty days, he did not commence a judicial proceeding. The court also ruled that the doctrines of substantial compliance and equitable estoppel did not apply. Thomas appeals.
[¶ 7.] Thomas first argues the circuit court erroneously interpreted SDCL 55-4-57(a) as a statute of limitations that barred his claims. He contends his action should be governed by the general six-year statute of limitations in SDCL 15-2-13. In response, Judith argues SDCL 55-4-57(a)
[¶ 8.] This is our first opportunity to address SDCL 55-4-57(a), which was enacted in 2010 and amended in 2013. Subsection (a) limits the time to contest whether certain trusts were validly created. It provides in relevant part:
SDCL 55-4-57(a)(1)-(2).
[¶ 9.] These subsections plainly impose time limits for commencing judicial proceedings to contest whether the designated trusts and amendments were validly created. If a settlor dies, subsection (a)(1) gives the contestant one year from the settlor's death. Subsection (a)(2), however, prescribes a shorter sixty-day limit if the contestant has been given a copy of the trust instrument, notice of the trust's existence, notice of the trustee's name and address, and notice of the time allowed for commencing a proceeding. The purpose of SDCL 55-4-57(a), which is very similar to section 604 of the Uniform Trust Code, is to set "a time limit on when a contest can be brought" and "allow an adequate time in which to bring a contest while at the same time permitting the expeditious distribution of the trust property following the settlor's death." See Unif. Trust Code § 604 & cmt. (Unif. Law Comm'n 2000).
[¶ 10.] Thomas, however, contends SDCL 55-4-57(a) does not bar his claims asserting lack of capacity and undue influence. In his view, the question whether a trust was validly created only concerns "whether the trust was actually formed or properly in existence." We disagree because the creation of a trust involves more than document formalities: there must also be "[a]n intention on the part of the trustor to create" the trust. SDCL 55-1-4 (emphasis added). And if the trustor lacked
[¶ 11.] Thomas, however, also points out that lack of capacity and undue influence claims are arguably governed by two statutes of limitation: the six-year period in SDCL 15-2-13, and the shorter periods in SDCL 55-4-57(a). He stresses that the longer statute has been applied in some incapacity and undue influence cases. See In re Matheny Family Tr., 2015 S.D. 5, ¶ 9, 859 N.W.2d 609, 611 (contract for deed); Delany v. Delany, 402 N.W.2d 701, 704-05 (S.D. 1987) (real property deeds). But by its own terms, SDCL 15-2-13 is a general statute of limitations that does not apply "where, in special cases, a different limitation is prescribed by statute," and this trust contest is a special case specifically governed by SDCL 55-4-57(a). Therefore, SDCL 15-2-13 does not apply.
[¶ 12.] Thomas alternatively contends that his pro se Notice of Objection substantially complied with the requirements of SDCL 55-4-57(a) and that the statute's time limitations were equitably tolled. However, neither doctrine applies. Because SDCL 55-4-57(a) is a statute of limitations, strict compliance is required and the "doctrines of substantial compliance [and] equitable tolling [may not be] invoked to alleviate a claimant from a loss of his right to proceed with a claim." Murray v. Mansheim, 2010 S.D. 18, ¶ 21, 779 N.W.2d 379, 389.
[¶ 13.] Additionally, even if Thomas could assert those doctrines, his Notice of Objection did not substantially comply with SDCL 55-4-57(a), and he has failed to show why the statute should be equitably tolled. "Substantial compliance cannot be shown unless the purpose of the statute has been served." State v. Arguello, 2015 S.D. 103, ¶ 12, 873 N.W.2d 490, 495. As previously noted, the purpose of SDCL 55-4-57(a) is to facilitate the expeditious administration of trusts by limiting the time period to commence a trust contest. But here, Thomas's Notice of Objection did not identify his objection, and he made no claim for relief. Without identifying an objection and actually commencing a judicial proceeding, the purpose of SDCL 55-4-57(a) was frustrated rather than served. So also, equitable tolling is unavailable because if it is applicable at all, it is "limited to situations where extraordinary circumstances, truly beyond the plaintiff's control, exist to prevent timely filing." Stern Oil Co. v. Border States Paving, Inc., 2014 S.D. 28, ¶ 21, 848 N.W.2d 273,
[¶ 14.] Thomas next contends that even if the foregoing claims are barred, the circuit court erred in dismissing his claim for damages against Judith for breach of fiduciary duty. We disagree. A claim for breach of fiduciary duty sounds in tort, O'Toole v. Bd. of Trs. of S.D. Ret. Sys., 2002 S.D. 77, ¶ 17, 648 N.W.2d 342, 347, and Thomas's petition is based on the theory that Judith wrongly used her position as Elizabeth's caretaker — not as the trustee
[¶ 15.] Thomas finally contends the circuit court erred in dismissing his request for an accounting. We disagree because Thomas had no standing to demand an accounting.
[¶ 16.] Trustors, fiduciaries, and beneficiaries are authorized to request accountings and court supervision of trusts. SDCL 21-22-9; SDCL 21-22-13. Thomas asserts standing to request an accounting because he was a potential beneficiary of Elizabeth's trust. A beneficiary includes "any person in any manner interested in the trust." SDCL 21-22-1(1) (Supp. 2016).
[¶ 17.] Thomas's petition seeking to invalidate Elizabeth's trust amendments on grounds of undue influence or lack of capacity was barred by SDCL 55-4-57(a). The circuit court did not have in personam jurisdiction to adjudicate Thomas's breach-of-fiduciary-duty-claim against Judith. Thomas was not a person entitled to demand an accounting. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in dismissing Thomas's petition.
[¶ 18.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and SEVERSON and KERN, Justices, and WILBUR, Retired Justice, concur.