1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*63
In 1988, P was the subject of a leveraged buyout (LBO) that was treated as a redemption for Federal tax purposes. P incurred numerous costs in obtaining the debt financing used to complete the LBO. P capitalized these costs and amortized them over the life of the debt, deducting in full the costs attributable to debt retired in 1988. In addition, P now contends that a portion of an organizer fee constituted "additional interest" fully deductible in 1988.
103 T.C. 345">*345 Ruwe,
After severance of certain issues for trial and concessions by the parties, the issues for decision are: (1) Whether certain deductions taken by petitioner in 1988 are prohibited by
1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*65 FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. The stipulation of facts, first and second supplemental stipulations of facts, and attached exhibits are incorporated herein 103 T.C. 345">*346 by this reference. During 1988, petitioner was a corporation engaged in manufacturing, converting, and marketing a diversified line of single-use paper and plastic products including table napkins, paper towels, bath tissue, wipers, and boxed facial tissues. Petitioner is incorporated in Delaware and has its principal office in Green Bay, Wisconsin.
The facts in this case surround the 1988 leveraged buyout (LBO) of petitioner. In early 1988, petitioner's management was concerned about the market price of petitioner's common stock, which had declined considerably in prior months. After consultation with Morgan Stanley Group, Inc. (Morgan Stanley), petitioner's management concluded that an LBO would be the best way to increase stockholder value. On April 6, 1988, during consultations with management, Morgan Stanley proposed an LBO timetable that included: (1) A tender offer for petitioner's stock commencing during weeks 11 to 14; (2) expiration of the tender offer and purchase1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*66 of tendered shares in week 15; (3) merger of the acquisition vehicle into petitioner; (4) filing the SEC Form S1 registration statement for the sale of permanent debt in week 16; and (5) closing the sale of permanent refinancing debt in weeks 20 to 24. All the significant planning documents 2 contemplated a similar, if not identical structure, including a prompt refinancing via long-term debt after the merger. On June 7, 1988, petitioner's outside directors granted petitioner's management permission to explore the possibility of an LBO.
1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*67 Petitioner's management and Morgan Stanley made two formal proposals to petitioner's board of directors. On June 25, 1988, the board voted to accept the second, which proposed -- at a price of $ 53 per share -- an LBO of petitioner by its senior management, its largest individual shareholder, and outside investors consisting principally of Morgan Stanley, certain institutional investors, 3 and Bankers Trust Co. 103 T.C. 345">*347 (Bankers Trust) (hereinafter collectively referred to as the investors). Bankers Trust and a syndicate of 27 banks would provide bank financing for the transaction. Morgan Stanley played a substantial role in getting the commitment from the five lead banks and in selling the LBO as a credit risk to the remaining banks in the bank syndicate. It also acted as financial adviser and dealer manager for all stages of the LBO.
1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*68 Pursuant to the agreement and plan of merger (merger plan), Morgan Stanley organized FH Holdings Corp. (FH Holdings) and its wholly owned subsidiary, FH Acquisition Corp. (FH Acquisition), on June 22 and 23, 1988, respectively. Under the merger plan, the investors would initially become shareholders of FH Holdings. FH Acquisition would receive debt capital for the purpose of making a tender offer for all petitioner's outstanding shares. After the tender of shares, FH Holdings would merge into FH Acquisition, and the combined entity would then merge into petitioner.
In order to procure adequate capital for the tender offer, FH Acquisition obtained commitments from several of the investors to purchase subordinated floating-rate bridge notes (bridge notes) to be issued by it. The proceeds from the bridge note issuance would cover the difference between the bank financing and the cost of the shares to be tendered. As part of the merger plan, the bridge notes were to be replaced with long-term, fixed-rate subordinated notes and debentures (hereinafter referred to as permanent financing or permanent debt) as soon as the LBO was completed. 4 For numerous reasons, Morgan Stanley was1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*69 "highly confident" of its ability to underwrite the permanent financing. These reasons included the quality of petitioner's management, the quality of petitioner's production technology and its advancement over the technology of petitioner's competitors, the consistency of 103 T.C. 345">*348 petitioner's business, the timing of the LBO in the business cycle of petitioner's industry, and the economic environment.
1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*70 As of June 30, 1988, FH Acquisition had obtained commitments from the investors to purchase bridge notes worth $ 1.040 billion. Of this amount, $ 793 million was committed by Morgan Stanley on June 30, 1988. In the commitment letter, FH Acquisition agreed to pay Morgan Stanley a contingent amount -- described as additional interest -- on the bridge notes. 5 On August 1, 1988, FH Holdings, FH Acquisition, and the investors executed a securities purchase agreement, in which the investors made commitments to purchase bridge and permanent financing. In this agreement, Morgan Stanley International (MSI), a wholly owned subsidiary of Morgan Stanley, agreed to purchase the bridge notes to which Morgan Stanley had previously committed. In consideration for this agreement, FH Acquisition agreed to pay MSI $ 10,660,000, described as additional interest.
1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*71 On July 1, 1988, pursuant to the merger plan, FH Acquisition commenced a cash tender offer for all petitioner's outstanding shares. The tender offer terminated on August 8, 1988, and resulted in the tender of approximately 80 percent of petitioner's stock.
On August 9, 1988, in order to purchase the tendered shares, FH Acquisition incurred approximately $ 1.206 billion in term loans, $ 400 million in bridge loans, and a $ 400 million revolving credit facility from Bankers Trust and the bank syndicate. 6 On the same day, FH Acquisition also sold $ 1.04 billion in subordinated floating-rate bridge notes to MSI and the institutional investors. Of this amount, $ 533 million of bridge notes was purchased by MSI. By August 11, 1988, MSI had entered into secondary note purchase agreements with respect to $ 545 million 7 of bridge notes and participation agreements with respect to $ 60 million of bridge notes. 8 By August 11, 1988, MSI closed on secondary note purchase 103 T.C. 345">*349 agreements or participation agreements with respect to all but $ 75 million of the bridge notes it purchased. Also, on August 9, 1988, Morgan Stanley, Bankers Trust, and the institutional investors purchased1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*72 common stock for $ 414 million from FH Holdings, which promptly contributed the $ 414 million to FH Acquisition.
FH Acquisition used $ 2,835,527,083 of the above financing to purchase the tendered shares on August 9, 1988. On August 17, 1988, FH Acquisition filed a preliminary prospectus with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for the issuance of the permanent debt. The drafting of the preliminary prospectus had begun in early July 1988. According to an internal Morgan Stanley selling memorandum for the permanent debt, dated September 1988: "The1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*73 proceeds of the Permanent Financing being offered will be used to refinance the $ 400 million senior bridge loan and $ 800 million of subordinated bridge notes", as well as other elements of the bridge financing following the merger of FH Acquisition into petitioner.
On October 24, 1988, FH Holdings was merged into FH Acquisition, with FH Acquisition surviving the merger. Immediately prior to this merger, 32 members of petitioner's management and its largest shareholder purchased shares in FH Holdings. FH Acquisition then immediately merged with and into petitioner, with petitioner as the surviving corporation in the merger. This resulted, after operation of State law, in 100-percent ownership of petitioner by the investors. On November 1, 1988, the permanent financing was issued and used to pay in full the bank bridge loan and all the subordinated floating-rate bridge notes.
Petitioner (through its predecessor, FH Acquisition) incurred and paid numerous expenses in order to complete the LBO. These included fees for the services of Morgan Stanley and the various banks and legal expenses. They also included costs of obtaining the various loans and issuing debt and equity. As1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*74 to the issuance of debt and loan financing, these costs included commitment fees, transaction fees, bank agency fees, bond trustee fees, interest, and additional interest. On its 1988 return, petitioner treated debt and loan financing costs totaling $ 169,117,239 as capital expenses. Of the total amount capitalized, petitioner deducted on its 1988 103 T.C. 345">*350 return $ 43,431,208, representing the costs of debt amortized or retired in 1988.
In a letter dated June 25, 1988, FH Acquisition agreed to pay Morgan Stanley $ 40 million as a "transaction fee", "In the event that * * * [FH Acquisition] consummates an Acquisition Transaction". The letter was written by Morgan Stanley and signed by a representative of FH Acquisition. The letter further stated:
This letter is to confirm our understanding with you with respect to our engagement. In connection with this assignment, you and we have agreed that Morgan Stanley will assist * * * [FH Acquisition] in its preparation and structuring of the Acquisition Transaction and provide whatever financial advice and assistance may be required in connection therewith.
In the letter, FH Acquisition agreed:
to retain Morgan Stanley as sole dealer1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*75 manager for the Offer and to enter into a dealer manager agreement with Morgan Stanley in Morgan Stanley's standard form, but not providing for the payment of any fees other than those provided for in this letter agreement. * * *
Morgan Stanley billed FH Acquisition for the $ 40 million fee on August 8, 1988, by an invoice that described the payment as follows: "For
1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*76 OPINION
The first issue for decision is whether (1) In general. -- Except as provided in paragraph (2), no deduction otherwise allowable shall be allowed under this chapter for any amount paid or incurred by a corporation in connection with the redemption of its stock. (2) Exceptions. -- Paragraph (1) shall not apply to -- (A) Certain specific deductions. -- Any -- (i) deduction allowable under (ii) deduction for dividends paid (within the meaning of section 561). (B) Stock of certain regulated investment companies. -- Any amount paid or incurred in connection with the redemption of any stock in a regulated investment company which issues only stock which is redeemable upon the demand of the shareholder.
There is no question that petitioner's LBO constituted a redemption1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*78 within the meaning of
The words in a revenue act should be interpreted in their ordinary, everyday sense.
1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*81 Moreover, petitioner's payment of financing costs, its receipt of the debt capital, and the effectuation of the redemption were continuous events. The entire LBO transaction, from conception to completion and refinancing, took 103 T.C. 345">*353 only 8 months. The costs at issue were all incurred and paid during that time. These costs (and the debt capital obtained through them) were an integral part of a detailed plan which Morgan Stanley described as a "proprietary" strategy for funding the transaction. Thus, the financing costs were both a cause and an effect of the LBO. From an "ordinary, everyday" perspective, therefore, petitioner's financing costs were "in connection with" the redemption. Assigning a broad construction to the phrase, we reach this conclusion all the more easily.
In
Congress expressly imparted a broad application to the phrase as used in
The committee intends that amounts subject to this provision will include amounts paid to repurchase stock; premiums paid for the stock; legal, accounting, brokerage, transfer agent, appraisal, and similar fees incurred in connection with the repurchase;
1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*84
The exception in
The Senate amendment is generally the same as the House bill, except the provision does not apply to (1) interest deductible under
The clear implication is that the "in connection with" phrase would include interest were it not for the interest exception added by the Senate. There is no exception, however, for other costs of financing.
Petitioner notes that, historically, financing costs have been amortizable over the life of a loan. 18 Petitioner contends that neither
1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*88 Specifically, petitioner contends that
The phrase "in connection with" also suggests that Congress was at least as concerned with the breadth of the statute's application as it was with clarification. The conference report states:
The conferees wish to clarify that, while the phrase "in connection with [a] 1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*90 redemption" is intended to be construed broadly, the provision is not intended to deny a deduction for otherwise deductible amounts paid in a transaction that has no nexus with the redemption other than being proximate in time or arising out of the same general circumstances. * * * [H. Conf. Rept. 99-841,
The report goes on to provide several illustrative examples of the statute's scope. There is no mention in any of these examples of how prior law might have treated the expenses involved. Indeed, Congress explicitly considered the possibility that
In denying a deduction for payments in connection with redemptions of stock, the committee intends no inference regarding the deductibility of 103 T.C. 345">*357 such payments under present law. * * * [S. Rept. 99-313,
Thus, we cannot say that Congress intended no change in the law where costs associated with redemptions are concerned. 20
1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*91 Nor can we agree that the general rule -- allowing amortization of financing costs over the life of the loan -- implies that such costs are not "in connection with" a redemption. This rule, and most of the cases and rulings cited by petitioner in support of it, 211994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*92 deal with whether financing costs should be capitalized as part of the cost of purchasing or constructing an asset, or as the cost of "creating" a loan. Under
1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*93
The scope and language of
The committee understands that some corporate taxpayers are taking the position that expenditures incurred to repurchase stock from stockholders to prevent a hostile takeover of the corporation by such shareholders -- so-called "greenmail" payments -- are deductible business expenses. The committee wishes to provide expressly that all expenditures by a corporation incurred in purchasing its own stock, whether representing direct consideration for the stock, a premium payment above the apparent stock value,
We construe the phrase "in connection with" in the manner prescribed by Congress and prior case law interpreting that phrase. 23 The cases cited by petitioner1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*94 apply a different legal inquiry.
We respond similarly to petitioner's reliance on
The approach utilized by petitioner and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit assumes that the inquiry in this case is the same as that contemplated by the origin of the claim 1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*96 test. 25 We disagree. The origin test first arose out of a need to determine whether the expenses of defending a lawsuit were of a business or personal nature. See
1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*98 In utilizing the origin test in
The financing costs here correspond to the legal fees in the cited cases. The debt in this case is the analog to the lawsuits. Nevertheless, petitioner would have us end the analysis at this point. Petitioner argues that the origin of the financing costs is in its loan transaction 1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*99 and that we need look no further. This cannot be the end of the analysis. If it were, the Supreme Court in the cited cases would have ended its analysis by concluding that the legal fees originated in lawsuits. This would have told the Court nothing. Instead, the Court was forced to look further, to the origin and nature of the lawsuits.
If we were to apply the origin test here, we would also be forced to look further to the origin of the financing transaction. When we do so, we find that the loan transaction had its origin in the redemption plan. The financing originated in the planning stages of the redemption and nowhere else. At this point, however, the origin of the claim test breaks down. For the redemption was also a consequence of the financing. Thus, the origin test does not help to resolve this case. Nor should we expect it to. It was designed to make substantive distinctions between business and personal expenditures, or between current and capital expenditures. There are no such distinctions to be made here.
The appropriate test is found in the statute itself. It is an inquiry into whether1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*100 the expenditures are "in connection with" the redemption. 271994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*101 It applies simply and clearly to the 103 T.C. 345">*361 issue at hand. We see no reason to engage in difficult alternative lines of inquiry when the test provided in the statute is so readily applicable. Contrary to petitioner's arguments, and those of the Court of Appeals in
1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*102 Petitioner next attempts to classify its procurement of financing as a transaction having "no nexus with the redemption other than" its temporal and circumstantial proximity. Petitioner cites the conference report, which states:
The conferees wish to clarify that, while the phrase "in connection with [a] redemption" is intended to be construed broadly, the provision is not intended to deny a deduction for otherwise deductible amounts paid in a transaction that has no nexus with the redemption other than being proximate in time or arising out of the same general circumstances. * * * [H. Conf. Rept. 99-841,
In order to make this argument, however, petitioner relies on the case law regarding capitalization of financing costs. We have already determined that case law to be inapposite under
Payments in discharge of other types of contractual obligations, in settlement of litigation, or pursuant to other actual or potential legal obligations or rights, may also be outside the intended scope of the provision to the extent it is clearly established that the payment does not represent consideration for the stock
By contrast, petitioner's financing costs were expenses directly related to the acquisition of its stock, as we have found above. Thus, we reject petitioner's argument that such costs have no nexus with the redemption.
1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*104 Petitioner next argues that, structurally, the statute is organized to suggest that financing costs were not considered to be in connection with a redemption. For this argument, petitioner relies on the placement of the interest exception within subparagraph (A) of paragraph (2). The two exceptions listed in that subparagraph, according to petitioner, are of a kind; namely, deductions for amounts potentially characterizable as actual consideration for stock. According to petitioner, the exception in subparagraph (B), on the other hand, relates to incidental expenses (defined not to include financing costs) but only when paid or incurred in connection with the redemption of any stock in certain regulated investment companies. Under this theory, the statute contemplates interest -- a financing cost -- only as a potential payment in consideration for stock, not as an expense "in connection with" a redemption. From this, petitioner concludes that other financing costs, such as those at issue, are also not in connection with a redemption.
Petitioner's theory is mere speculation. In the absence of legislative guidance, we cannot say for certain why
Petitioner argues that our interpretation is insupportable because it "[indicates] a purported breadth of
1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*106 We need not address petitioner's fear that
103 T.C. 345">*364 Petitioner also argues that the revenue estimates for
Petitioner next contends that, even if the financing costs of its bridge loans are 1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*108 subject to
The confidential offering memorandum for the bridge notes, dated July 1988, is even more explicit. It states:
Because the Acquisition is expected to close prior to the time that the Permanent Financing will be issued, the financing1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*110
Thus, according to this document, the permanent financing was not only in connection with the redemption, but "necessary" to it as well.
In actuality, just 8 days separated the completion of the "redemption" and the issuance of the permanent financing. The tender offer for Fort Howard stock by FH Acquisition closed on August 8, 1988. The term and bridge loans were utilized on that date as well. On October 24, 1988, FH Holdings was merged into FH Acquisition. FH Acquisition survived the merger and was immediately merged with and into petitioner. And, on November 1, 1988, the permanent financing was issued and used to pay in full the bank bridge loan and all the subordinated floating-rate bridge notes.
On these facts, we find that the issuance of permanent financing on November 1, 1988, was clearly "in connection with" the redemption here at issue. The permanent debt was a refinancing of the bridge debt and term loans used to redeem petitioner's1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*111 shares in the tender offer. The credit agreement labels it as such and
Petitioner's primary argument in this regard is simply that the successful issuance of the permanent financing was1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*113 never certain because of the risk involved. However, this does not obscure the fact that the issuance of such financing was part of the merger plan from before the time such plan was adopted by petitioner's board. Moreover, regardless of any uncertainty, the permanent financing was indeed issued. As in
In
We do not herein decide that all types of refinancing of a principal residence fall outside the exception of sec. 461(g)(2). An example may be the building of a residence with a construction loan replaced upon completion with a permanent mortgage loan. Another example may be a "bridge" loan, depending upon the circumstances. * * * [
Both of these scenarios are represented in this case. The buyout group planned from the start to replace the bridge 103 T.C. 345">*367 debt with the 1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*114 permanent debt upon completion of the redemption. Moreover, the period between purchase and refinancing in
Finally, petitioner contends that
This concludes the legal analysis in this case as presented by the parties and as addressed by the Court of Appeals in
103 T.C. 345">*368
1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*117 The case law supports this conclusion. In
There is no question that the cost of the transportation equipment was "paid out" in the same manner as the cost of supplies, materials, and other equipment, and the wages of construction workers. * * * In acquiring the transportation equipment, taxpayer "paid out" the equipment's purchase price; depreciation is simply the means of allocating the payment over the various accounting periods affected. As the Tax Court stated in
For tax purposes, amortization serves a purpose similar, if not identical, to depreciation. See
1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*119
103 T.C. 345">*369 This treatment comports with the congressional intent to treat costs in connection with a corporation's purchase of its own stock as capital expenditures. S. Rept. 99-313,
The final issue for decision is whether portions of the $ 40 million fee paid to Morgan Stanley should be characterized as interest deductible under
By amendment to petition, petitioner contended (and continues to contend) that the $ 40 million payment should be allocated as follows: (1) $ 26.2 million as additional interest on the bridge financing, which would be fully deductible in 103 T.C. 345">*370 1988 due to retirement of such financing in that year; (2) $ 12.42 million as1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*121 pro rata costs of issuing or obtaining all the various loans and debt issuances (including the permanent financing) used to finance the LBO; and (3) $ 1.38 million as nondeductible costs of obtaining equity financing.
As to those portions agreed by petitioner to be costs of obtaining debt financing, we have already decided that such costs were incurred in connection with the redemption and are neither deductible nor amortizable due to
"Interest" is "the amount which one has contracted to pay for the use of borrowed money."
In contrast to these definitions, at the time of the LBO, all the parties involved intended, agreed, and believed that the fee was compensation for services. First, we note that petitioner paid amounts -- other than the $ 40 million at issue -- that were specifically designated as "additional interest". At trial, Mr. Donald P. Brennan, head of merchant banking at Morgan Stanley and later a director of petitioner, was asked whether the points and interest (exclusive of the $ 40 million) paid to Morgan Stanley were sufficient to compensate the firm for its risk in committing to purchase the amount of bridge notes ($ 793 million). Mr. Brennan replied that "at the time it appeared to be" but that "in1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*123 hindsight" it did not. The proxy statement issued to the stockholders for the purpose of approving the merger of FH Acquisition into Fort Howard indicates that Morgan Stanley acted as financial adviser to 103 T.C. 345">*371 FH Acquisition and as dealer/manager for the tender offer, and that, as "compensation for such services", Morgan Stanley was paid a "transaction fee" of $ 40 million. Mr. Brennan agreed that this description was correct at the time the proxy statement was written. On October 25, 1988, petitioner filed the prospectus for the subordinated notes and debentures with the SEC. The prospectus states that Morgan Stanley received a financial advisory fee of approximately $ 40 million in connection with the acquisition. Mr. Brennan, who was a director of petitioner at the time the prospectus was filed, agreed that the description of the $ 40 million transaction fee was correct at the time. Petitioner's Form 10-K for the year 1988, filed with the SEC, contains an identical description of the $ 40 million transaction fee. Ms. Kathleen J. Hempel, a director and principal financial officer of petitioner, agreed that this description was correct at the time it was filed. She testified1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*124 that she would have been "very concerned" if the description had been inaccurate. Ms. Hempel also approved the allocation of the $ 40 million fee on petitioner's tax return for 1988. At the time of her approval, she did not believe that any of the $ 40 million was interest.
All the documentary evidence unambiguously treats the payment in question as a fee for services, and petitioner treated the payment as a cost of obtaining the financing rather than as interest on its 1988 return. Petitioner first agreed to pay the $ 40 million in a letter executed to "confirm the arrangements under which * * * [Morgan Stanley] is engaged on an exclusive basis by FH Acquisition Corp., * * * in connection with a possible acquisition * * * of Fort Howard Corporation". In the letter, dated June 25, 1988, the payment was characterized as a "transaction fee", "In the event that [FH Acquisition] consummates an Acquisition Transaction". The letter was written by Morgan Stanley and signed by a representative of FH Acquisition. It stated:
This letter is to confirm our understanding with you with respect to our engagement. In connection with this assignment, you and we have agreed that Morgan Stanley1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*125 will
103 T.C. 345">*372 In the letter, FH Acquisition agreed
to retain Morgan Stanley as sole dealer manager for the Offer and to enter into a dealer manager agreement with Morgan Stanley in Morgan Stanley's standard form, but not providing for the payment of any fees other than those provided for in this letter agreement. * * *
Thus, according to the letter, the parties contemplated that this would be the only "fee" that Morgan Stanley would receive for its services in organizing the LBO. 38
On July 1, 1988, FH Acquisition sent a formal letter to Morgan Stanley by which it engaged Morgan Stanley as "Dealer Manager" for the tender offer. 1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*126 That letter stated in pertinent part:
2. [FH] Acquisition hereby engages you as financial advisor and appoints you as Dealer Manager and authorize[s] you to act as such in connection with the Offer. As Dealer Manager, you agree, in accordance with your customary practice, to perform those services in connection with the Offer as are customarily performed by investment banking concerns in connection with tender offers of like nature, including but not limited to soliciting Shares sought to be purchased by [FH] Acquisition pursuant to the Offer.
* * *
5. [FH] Acquisition and you agree that your services as financial advisor and the Dealer Manager hereunder are to be compensated
1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*127 Morgan Stanley billed FH Acquisition for the $ 40 million fee on August 8, 1988, by an invoice that described the payment as follows: "For
103 T.C. 345">*373 The magnitude of the fee is not out of line with the size of the transaction and the extent of Morgan Stanley's services. At the time, petitioner's LBO was one of the largest on record and was the largest in which Morgan Stanley had been involved. Morgan Stanley played a substantial role in getting the commitment from the five lead banks and in selling the LBO as a credit risk to the remaining banks in the bank syndicate. It also acted as financial adviser and dealer manager for all stages of the LBO. 1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*128 Petitioner points to testimony that Morgan Stanley's fee schedule in effect at the time for mergers and acquisitions would have called for a fee of $ 13.8 million on a transaction the size of petitioner's without any commitment of funds by Morgan Stanley. From this, petitioner concludes that $ 26.2 million ($ 40 million less $ 13.8 million) must have been "compensation for the use of money."
The LBO was performed by Morgan Stanley's merchant banking department, which used a different fee schedule from the mergers and acquisitions department. Moreover, Mr. Brennan testified that it was not possible to compare a scenario in which Morgan Stanley committed capital to one in which it did not. According to testimony from Mr. Brennan and Mr. Robert H. Niehaus, another principal of Morgan Stanley, the fee schedule used by the merchant banking department in 1988 indicated a fee of approximately 1 percent for a transaction of $ 4 billion, which was the size of petitioner's LBO. This correlates perfectly to the fee of $ 40 million actually charged by Morgan Stanley.
Petitioner's primary arguments in this regard focus on Morgan Stanley. Petitioner contends that Morgan Stanley has an average1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*129 (or target) return on its equity capital, which Morgan Stanley utilizes (along with the risk involved) in determining whether to commit funds to a particular investment. Petitioner argues that, in this case, if the $ 40 million was not interest, Morgan Stanley would have been committing capital to an investment (the bridge notes) with a very high risk at a rate whose yield was potentially below the firm's target return at the time. Essentially, petitioner asks us to determine the characterization of the amount at issue based on what would have been a "good" investment for Morgan Stanley.
103 T.C. 345">*374 Implicit in petitioner's argument (and those of its experts) is the assumption that all amounts paid as compensation for risk constitute interest. We disagree. As respondent correctly points out, a commitment fee compensates a lender for its risk in committing to make a loan, but nevertheless, does not constitute interest. Cf.
Moreover, the established definitions of interest are not concerned with whether a lender receives a return commensurate1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*130 with its usual return. 40 Indeed, this Court has stated that, in analyzing whether a payment constitutes interest or a service fee, "arguments focusing on the lender's costs appear to deal with the wrong party so far as the borrowers are concerned".
Crucial in establishing whether a particular payment constitutes interest is whether the payment bears some relationship to the amount borrowed, or to the specific time period for which payment is designated. 411994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*132
Moreover, the payment was not dependent in any way upon the term of the financing. The bridge notes had stated terms of approximately 13 months and provisions allowing conversion to long-term "rollover debentures" due September 15, 2004. The bridge notes were actually outstanding for less than 3 months. Yet, the $ 40 million was payable up front, without any reference to the term -- stated or actual -- of the notes. This is strong evidence that the payment did not constitute compensation for the use or forbearance of money. 43
1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*134 103 T.C. 345">*376 Petitioner's attempts to use experts to support its characterization of the fee are simply restatements of its argument that the return received by Morgan Stanley would have been inadequate had the fee not constituted interest. These arguments ignore the fact that Morgan Stanley still received the same amount of money, whether it is characterized as interest or as a transaction fee. Mr. Charles B. Hintz, Morgan Stanley's treasurer, testified that -- as to Morgan Stanley's analysis of whether it received an adequate return on its capital -- the characterization of the $ 40 million as interest or service fee was irrelevant. Thus, we can infer nothing from petitioner's arguments regarding the return required by Morgan Stanley for its investment.
Petitioner agrees that some of the fee paid to Morgan Stanley constituted a payment for services. The question at issue, therefore, is how much. We must look to the actual evidence and testimony, rather than a theoretical model of risk and return, to make that determination. See
Hamblen, Chabot, Parker, Swift, Jacobs, Gerber, Wright, Wells, Whalen, Colvin, Chiechi, and Laro,
Halpern
In its long opinion, the majority spends little if any effort to determine Congress' reasons for adding the rule found in
Beghe,
Beghe,
The easy path would have been to go along with the majority's conclusion in this case. That could have been justified by the considerations that actuated Judge Reinhardt's special concurrence in
This is a close question. I cannot say that the conclusion reached in Judge McLaughlin's [Ruwe's] opinion is incorrect. If Congress intended a different result, it will now have the opportunity to make its intentions clear.
In the meantime, courts must decide the cases that have already happened. Because I don't believe that Congress intended the result reached by the majority, I respectfully dissent. I will leave to others the task of rehashing the multiplicity of arguments advanced by the "numerous commentators", see majority op. note 11, who almost uniformly disagree with the result we reach today. 1 I write separately only to indicate another path to the contrary1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*137 result. 2
1994 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 63">*138 The result in this case cannot properly be determined merely by interpreting broadly the phrase "in connection with". There can be no quarrel with the majority opinion that the phrase is to be interpreted broadly, and that, if it is so interpreted, the expenses of issuing debt securities and 103 T.C. 345">*378 obtaining loans, which were necessary to effectuate the redemption, were,
Halpern,
1. Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the taxable year in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.↩
2. These planning documents included: (1) Preliminary evaluations regarding the viability of an LBO, which were presented by Morgan Stanley to petitioner's management; (2) the formal proposal memorandum addressed to officers of Morgan Stanley's merchant banking department; (3) the loan proposal memorandum from Bankers Trust Co.; (4) internal memoranda from Morgan Stanley's Merchant Banking group to Morgan Stanley's commitment and management committees; and (5) the actual agreement and plan of merger.↩
3. These included Morgan Stanley International (a wholly owned London-based subsidiary of Morgan Stanley), Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equity Fund II L.P. (a partnership formed by Morgan Stanley for the purpose of investing in leveraged buyout transactions, hereinafter referred to as MSLEF II), First Plaza Group Trust (on behalf of certain General Motors pension plans), and Leeway & Co. (on behalf of certain AT&T pension plans).↩
4. Donald P. Brennan, head of Morgan Stanley's Merchant Banking division, stated at trial that the issuance of permanent debt was "part of the plan" of the redemption. On June 25, 1988, the institutional investors had committed to purchase permanent financing securities of $ 95 million. In July of 1988, Mr. Brennan contacted Dillon, Read & Co., Inc., regarding the possibility that Dillon Read would act as qualified independent underwriter of permanent financing. On Aug. 1, 1988 -- 7 days before the close of the tender offer -- FH Holdings, FH Acquisition, and the investors executed a securities purchase agreement in which the investors made commitments to purchase permanent debt. All the major documents produced by Morgan Stanley relating to the LBO contemplated a "refinancing" of the bridge notes with permanent debt.↩
5. The agreed additional interest was equal to 1 percent of the following: $ 793 million less the aggregate principal amount of bridge notes committed to be purchased by certain other investors plus the actual amount of bridge notes purchased by Morgan Stanley.↩
6. Each bank's commitment was allocated among the bridge loan, term loan, and revolving credit line on a pro rata basis.↩
7. The record does not explain the discrepancy between the amount of notes purchased by Morgan Stanley International (MSI) and those for which it executed secondary agreements and participations.↩
8. Twelve of the secondary purchasers (amounting to $ 39,250,000 of bridge notes) did not fund their purchases until Aug. 12 and/or 15, 1988.↩
9. Petitioner considered the remaining $ 4 million (of the $ 40 million) to be a nondeductible cost of obtaining equity financing.↩
10. Except for portions of the $ 40 million fee paid to Morgan Stanley, discussed
As to certain portions of the $ 40 million fee, the parties have agreed that, if such portions do not constitute interest deductible under
11. Only one decided case has dealt with this issue. See
12. Petitioner agrees that the statute applies to any redemption. The House report states this explicitly. H. Rept. 99-426, at 248-249 n.15 (1986), 1986-3 C.B. (Vol. 2) 1, 248-249. Petitioner requested and received a ruling from respondent treating the transaction as a redemption of petitioner's stock to the extent of the bank loans and subordinated bridge notes.↩
13.
14. We undertook a similar analysis in
In this case, the central fact is that petitioner would have had no investment income * * * except for its return on investment of the bond proceeds. Petitioner generated gross investment income by investing the bond proceeds, and, as the bond prospectus states, petitioner's intent to invest temporarily the bond proceeds was explicitly for the purpose of obtaining investment income which would be used in the project. Further, petitioner would have had no funds to invest but for the issuance of the bonds. In the absence of the interest payments, the debt underlying the bonds would have been in default, and petitioner could have lost the use of the bond proceeds.
15. See
16. In
When Congress adopted "in connection with" for use in section 461(g)(2), it was aware of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the same language in
17. Petitioner notes certain other legislative proposals in 1986 and 1987 dealing with the disallowance of interest deductions. See "N.Y. City Bar Disagrees With ISP Paper on Amortization of Loan Commitment Fees", 28 Highlights & Documents 1809 (Jan. 27, 1993). Since these proposals were not enacted, however, reliance on them would be little better than speculation.↩
18.
19. If the statute's only purpose is to codify established law, the deductions to which it applies would not be "otherwise allowable". Thus, the use of those words in the statute would be meaningless. See
20. Petitioner makes numerous references to respondent's previous litigating positions regarding the effect of
21. We note that most of the cited cases base their decisions on the "primary purpose" test rejected in
22. Petitioner directs our particular attention to those few cases using the phrase "in connection with". See, e.g.,
Petitioner also relies on
23. Petitioner argues that this interpretation effects an "implied repeal" of a longstanding statutory tax rule, and as such, should be based on explicit instruction from Congress. See, e.g.,
24. Neither
25. This may stem from the similar genesis of
26. Indeed, we have found few cases that apply the origin test outside of the context of expenditures incurred during litigation. See, e.g.,
27. We do not believe that the references to
28. Petitioner contends that a distinction between financing costs (which should be amortized over the life of debt) and other capital expenditures (which are added to the asset's cost and amortized over its life if possible) is sound tax policy because borrowing costs do not add value to any asset, whereas other capital expenditures do add value. We disagree.
Petitioner also argues that our interpretation would require the tracing of cash used in a redemption to determine its source for nondeductibility purposes. Petitioner contends that this is a "dispute-intensive proposition" which, as a tax policy matter, should be disfavored. We are not as certain that such tracing will be required under our interpretation. In any event, the "in connection with" inquiry is inherently fact intensive. See
29. In its argument on brief concerning a related issue, petitioner stated: "The uncontroverted trial testimony establishes * * * [that] Petitioner would not have been able to effect its stock acquisition transaction without Morgan Stanley's purchase of $ 533 million of bridge notes".↩
30. The conference report provides additional guidelines for limiting the scope of the statutory inquiry by conferring some protection on "Payments in discharge of * * * contractual obligations, in settlement of litigation, or pursuant to other actual or potential legal obligations or rights". [H. Conf. Rept. 99-841,
31. In
32. In exposing this assumption, the document states: "Practically, the merger and the refinancing will probably not occur simultaneously but the above presentation demonstrates the expected back-end capital structure."↩
33. While this was required only with respect to the $ 400 million bank bridge loans, the securities purchase agreement evidences an intention to replace the bridge notes held by the signatories thereto for permanent debt. Moreover, regardless of the amount involved, the credit agreement serves as evidence that the issuance of permanent debt was part of petitioner's overall plan. Indeed,
34. We note that petitioner's own argument in this case supports our conclusion. In that argument, petitioner contends that $ 26.2 million of the $ 40 million transaction fee paid to Morgan Stanley was interest. To prove this, petitioner relies on the allocation of part of this lump-sum fee to the permanent financing, suggesting a connection between the two integrated financings herein.↩
35. The explicit provision for nonamortization in the legislative history lends support to our conclusion that financing costs, which would be otherwise allowable as amortization deductions, should be considered "in connection with" a redemption.↩
36. We note, as did the Supreme Court, see
That rationale applies to our analysis herein.
37. See
38. It was also agreed that petitioner would reimburse Morgan Stanley for its costs (e.g., printing, legal, and transportation) incurred in rendering its services.↩
39. There is no letter of June 24, 1988, in the record. It appears that this reference corresponds to Morgan Stanley's letter of June 25, 1988, discussed
40. Even the provisions that impute interest on certain principal payments, e.g., secs. 483(b) and 1274(b)(2), do so based on the "applicable Federal rate" rather than the rate which is adequate for a particular investor.↩
41. We note that petitioner's reliance on the purported fee schedule discussed above establishes no such relationship.↩
42. Petitioner's expert, Mr. Paul J. Much, confirmed at trial that the $ 40 million was "not a function of an amount of money that Morgan Stanley put in" to the deal.↩
43. In the same vein, the rates and amounts of interest, which would have resulted had the $ 26.2 million been interest to Morgan Stanley, appear excessive. If the $ 26.2 million were interest, the effective interest rate on the $ 533 million in bridge notes held by Morgan Stanley would be 31.9 percent, based upon the assumption that they would be outstanding for 3 months, and 22.7 percent, based upon the assumption that they would be outstanding for 6 months. Petitioner objects to this finding on the grounds that it assumes that the notes would indeed be refinanced as intended. Petitioner contends that at the time the bridge notes were issued, there was a possibility that a refinancing would not be possible due to any number of hypothetical factors. Petitioner does not dispute the calculations, however. Moreover, petitioner's own expert (upon whose testimony petitioner primarily relies for the instant argument) noted that Morgan Stanley, itself, made the same assumption in issuing the bridge notes. The notes were actually outstanding for less than 3 months and, as noted in the text, within 2 days, Morgan Stanley had sold participations in or made outright sales of most of the bridge notes.
While the bridge loan and bridge notes from the bank syndicate are not precisely analogous, a rough comparison of their terms also yields an inference that an additional $ 26.2 million in interest on the bridge notes would be excessive. The bridge loan amount was $ 400 million, as compared to $ 533 million in bridge notes held by Morgan Stanley. The stated rate of interest on the loan was the U.S. "prime" rate + 2 percent (subsequently reduced by .50 percent due to the issuance of the "highly confident" letter by Morgan Stanley). On the notes, the stated rate was based on the London Interbank Offering Rate (LIBOR), and ranged from LIBOR + 3.5 percent to LIBOR + 8.0 percent. Petitioner paid additional interest on the loan of $ 6,666,667 and on the bridge notes held by Morgan Stanley of $ 10,660,000.↩
1. I'm well aware that the result argued for by these commentators coincides for the most part with the financial interests of their clients and the corporations and firms they would welcome as clients.↩
2. My only cavil with the persuasive majority opinion is its initial recourse to the dictionary (majority op. p. 352), which partially obscures the process of judicial reasoning by failing to tell us what informs the choice to do so. See Comment, "Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation",