OPINION

Bob Pemberton, Justice.

This appeal can be considered a sequel of sorts to this Court's recent Bonser-Lain decision,2 in which we held in part that the remedies provided by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)3 for challenging agency actions in court do not extend to authorizing suits to challenge an agency's refusal to promulgate rules.4 Here we consider whether, in an instance when an agency has denied a petition requesting it to promulgate rules — a decision that cannot in itself be judicially challenged under the APA, per Bonser-Lain — the APA has nonetheless conferred jurisdiction on courts to enforce an asserted right of the petitioners to obtain a public hearing at which they can present arguments and evidence to justify the rules they had requested. We conclude it does not.

BACKGROUND

While the underlying controversy encompasses a more diverse array of issues, the facts material to the narrow jurisdictional questions before us are straightforward and undisputed. The appellants are approximately 135 individuals who, with others, joined in filing a May 17, 2012 petition to the Public Utilities Commission requesting that the Commission initiate rulemaking processes to address a number of perceived concerns related to the ongoing deployment of so-called "Smart Meters" by Texas electric utilities. In their petition, appellants also prayed that the Commission convene a public hearing at which they could present evidence of what they regarded as the compelling need for the rules they had requested. The Commission docketed appellants' petition as "Project No. 40404," published notice of the petition, afforded an opportunity for public comment, and received over 120 written comments, most of which favored the petition. However, the Commission did not additionally convene the public hearing that appellants had requested.

On July 13, 2012, the Commission issued an order denying appellants' rulemaking petition. In the order, the Commission explained that it already had another project pending, No. 40190, in which it had been studying the feasibility of an opt-out program "to address [Petitioners'] concerns" about Smart Meters and in which it had received "extensive comments that raise concerns like those in the petition in this project." The Commission deemed it "more efficient and effective . . . to consider smart meter concerns in one project," and opted to "focus its consideration of concerns about smart meters [in] Project No. 40190" instead of 40404.5

Seeking to challenge this administrative order in the Judicial Department, appellants filed suit against the Commission in Travis County district court. As the suit originated, appellants' claims sought primarily to compel the Commission to proceed with Project 40404 and initiate the rulemaking they had sought in their petition, which had sought rules more expansive than merely an opt-out program. Appellants also complained specifically of the Commission's failure to afford them the "full hearing and determination on the merits" they had requested, insisting that both the APA and Commission rules guaranteed them that procedural right. To establish the district court's subject-matter jurisdiction over their claims (which, again, named the Commission as the defendant and would have thereby implicated sovereign immunity),6 appellants purported to rely on the waiver of immunity incident to the remedy provided by section 2001.038 of the APA, which authorizes "an action for declaratory judgment" against an agency to determine "[t]he validity or applicability of a rule" where "it is alleged that the rule or its threatened application interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair, a legal right or privilege of the plaintiff."7 The Commission answered and the other appellees identified in our caption intervened.

During the pendency of appellants' suit, this Court issued its decision in Bonser-Lain. That ruling prompted the Commission, with the briefing support of the other appellees, to file a plea to the jurisdiction seeking dismissal of all of appellants' claims based on Bonser-Lain's holding that the APA's remedies do not authorize claims seeking to challenge an agency's decision not to promulgate rules.8 In response, appellants acknowledged that Bonser-Lain precluded any claims purporting to seek judicial reversal of the Commission's denial of their rulemaking petition. However, appellants distinguished these claims focusing on the Commission's denial of their rulemaking petition, per se, from their claims complaining of the Commission's failure or refusal to convene a public hearing at which they could present argument and evidence to demonstrate the need for the rules they had requested. While Bonser-Lain was fatal to the former claims, it did not impact the latter, they insisted, because the APA and the Commission's rules conferred upon them an "absolute procedural right" to present their position to the Commission through this public hearing (and, perhaps, prompt subsequent Commission action) that was not dependant upon, nor could be avoided by, the Commission's denial of their rulemaking petition or whether that decision could be challenged in court. Appellants similarly reasoned that the APA authorized them to enforce these hearing rights in court and obtain a remand to the Commission for purposes of conducting the public hearing.

The district court granted the Commission's plea in its entirety and dismissed all of appellants' claims for want of subject-matter jurisdiction. It is from that final judgment that this appeal is taken.

ANALYSIS

Appellants seek reversal of the portion of the district court's judgment that dismissed their claims seeking a public hearing. As refined by the briefing and oral argument on appeal, appellants' position rests upon two sets of basic contentions: (1) the APA and Commission rules entitled them to a public hearing at which they could present evidence and argument to justify the rules they had requested, and this "absolute procedural right" is not dependent upon, nor limited by, the Commission's decision not to grant their rulemaking petition; and (2) the remedy and accompanying waiver of sovereign immunity provided by APA section 2001.038 authorizes appellants to sue the Commission to enforce this right and obtain judicial relief compelling the Commission to hold the hearing. Both sets of contentions rest principally upon construction of the APA, which presents a question of law that we review de novo.9 We seek to ascertain the Legislature's intent, which is first and foremost a function of the objective meaning of the words it has used in the statute.10 We consider statutes as a whole rather than their isolated provisions.11 We presume that the statute's language was chosen with care, with each word included, or omitted, purposefully.12 We rely on the ordinary meaning of the words used, except where a different meaning is supplied by legislative definition or is apparent from context, or unless such a construction leads to absurd results that the Legislature could not have intended.13 Additionally, where, as here, we are analyzing whether or the extent to which the Legislature has waived sovereign immunity, the Legislature has instructed us not to construe a statute to be such a waiver unless that intent is "effected by clear and unambiguous language."14 Especially in light of the latter limitation, we must reject appellants' construction of the APA as unsupported by the statute's text.

As the statutory basis for the "absolute procedural right" to a public hearing that appellants claim, they cite section 2001.029 of the APA. That provision, titled "Public Comment," states:

Appellants emphasize subsection (b) and insist that because more than 25 of them joined in requesting a public hearing, the provision requires that the Commission "shall" — a term of mandatory obligation16 — grant them one.

As for how section 2001.038 of the APA authorizes them to seek judicial enforcement of this claimed right to a public hearing, appellants emphasize that courts have employed this remedy with some frequency to invalidate rules based on agency noncompliance with the procedural requirements for APA notice-and-comment rulemaking,17 requirements that include section 2001.029.18 Appellants similarly observe that section 2001.035 of the APA expressly provides that a "rule is voidable" unless adopted in substantial compliance with the Act's procedural requirements for rulemaking.19 They add that these procedural requirements, including the public-hearing requirement of section 2001.029, are aimed at ensuring that interested persons and the public have notice of proposed rules and the opportunity to offer meaningful input regarding them, and that the agency in turn "might exercise intelligently its responsibilities in arriving at the contents of the rule as finally adopted, in stating reasons for and against adoption, and in formulating the required contents of the adopting order, including a `reasoned justification' for the rule."20 Together, appellants reason, these statutory requirements and remedies embody "the strong objective of obtaining as much relevant public comment as possible on a proposed rule," coupled with a legislative policy judgment that "[f]ailing to follow [such] procedure is . . . fatal to the rulemaking process."

While appellants are correct about the salutary overarching objectives of the APA's notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements, they cannot quite connect their observations and reasoning to the actual statutory language that controls the district court's subject-matter jurisdiction here. Most critical is the text of section 2001.038, the waiver of sovereign immunity on which they rely in their attempt to establish jurisdiction. Section 2001.038, again, authorizes "an action for declaratory judgment" against an agency to determine "[t]he validity or applicability of a rule" where "it is alleged that the rule or its threatened application interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair, a legal right or privilege of the plaintiff."21 Thus, "[f]rom the face of [section 2001.038]," as we have previously observed, "a challenged agency action that constitutes a `rule' is among the facts (more precisely, a mixed question of law and fact) that must exist in order for a claimant to successfully invoke . . . a trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim for relief authorized by the statute."22 The APA defines a "rule," in turn, as:

Appellants' claims at issue do not complain of any Commission "rule" — rather, they arise in the admitted absence of a "rule," and focus on the procedure the Commission employed prior to its decision not to adopt a "rule."24 Consequently, these claims are not within the waiver of sovereign immunity provided by section 2001.038.

In maintaining otherwise, appellants advocate in essence that we should broadly construe section 2001.038's "rule" element so as to authorize suits challenging the "rulemaking process" even where no "rule" has been adopted, those challenging "agency consideration of rulemaking petitions," or those challenging other agency action that does not precede or concern an adopted "rule." The Legislature has instructed us to do precisely the opposite — "a statute shall not be construed as a waiver of sovereign immunity unless the waiver is effected by clear and unambiguous language"25 — and section 2001.038 is "clear and unambiguous" in its restriction to, not expansion beyond, "rule" challenges.26 Appellants further urge that if sovereign immunity is held to bar their claims here, APA section 2001.029 would have granted a "right" without a "remedy," which they regard as "a situation ... so inequitable that it could not have been intended" by the Legislature. That sovereign immunity might arbitrarily deprive a litigant of judicial remedies for its grievances against government or be perceived to operate inequitably is, like it or not, a characteristic feature of this centuries-old doctrine,27 and we must presume that the Legislature was well aware of such consequences when it limited section 2001.038's remedy as it did.28 We are bound to give effect to these statutory limitations and the Legislative policy judgments they reflect.29

Nor is this jurisdictional defect susceptible to being cured.30 Although appellants have not framed their claims in these terms, the claims' substance — predicated as they are on the claimed existence of a mandatory statutory duty on the part of the Commission to grant them a public hearing — could potentially implicate the ultra vires exception to sovereign immunity if repleaded to name the commissioners, in their official capacities, as defendants rather than the Commission.31 But that avenue would be available only if, as appellants insist, section 2001.029 imposed a non-discretionary duty upon the Commission to provide appellants the hearing they had requested.32 It does not.

As appellees emphasize, the public-hearing requirement under APA section 2001.029 comes into play only if and when an agency decides to promulgate certain types of rules. This is readily apparent from the face of the requirement, found in subsection (b) of section 2001.029 — "A state agency shall grant an opportunity for a public hearing before it adopts a substantive rule if a public hearing is requested...."33 Similarly, the broader public-participation requirement that appears in subsection (a) of section 2001.029 — "a state agency shall give all interested persons a reasonable opportunity to submit data, views, or arguments, orally or in writing" — is preceded by the qualifying clause, "Before adopting a rule,...."34 Both requirements are phrased as prerequisites to an agency's ultimate adoption of rules, not as an "absolute procedural right" to a public hearing in connection with a petition requesting an agency to adopt rules.

On the other hand, another subsection of section 2001.029, (c), requires that "[a] state agency shall consider fully all written and oral submissions about a proposed rule,"35 a proviso that, if read in isolation, could conceivably lend some support to appellants' arguments. However, any such uncertainties quickly dissipate once section 2001.029 is placed in its proper context within the APA's rulemaking subchapter. The material provisions of that subchapter can be summarized as follows:

It is within this framework that section 2001.029 requires that "[a] state agency shall consider fully all written and oral submissions about a proposed rule"; that "[b]efore adopting a rule," an agency "shall give all interested persons a reasonable opportunity to submit data, views, or arguments"; and that, in specified instances, an agency "shall grant an opportunity for a public hearing before it adopts a substantive rule."43 Against this statutory backdrop, it becomes clear that the public-participation rights set forth in section 2001.029 operate with respect to rules "proposed" by the agency pursuant to sections 2001.023 and .024, not rules merely requested through rulemaking petitions contemplated by section 2001.021. And this context brings into further relief the nature of the public-hearing right on which appellants rely and refutes appellants' notion of an "absolute procedural right" to a public hearing on a rulemaking petition whenever sufficient numbers request one.44

In sum, section 2001.029 does not, as a matter of law, impose any duty on the part of the Commission to afford appellants a public hearing. That conclusion would be fatal to any attempt to replead their claims under the ultra vires rubric.45 Appellants have suggested no alternative theories through which they might conceivably invoke the district court's subject-matter jurisdiction, nor do we perceive any.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court's judgment granting the Commission's plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing appellants' claims.