DAVIS, Justice:

The petitioners herein, American Electric Power Co., Inc., et al. (collectively, "AEP"), request this Court to issue a writ of prohibition to prevent the enforcement of an order entered August 5, 2015, by the Circuit Court of Mason County. By that order, the circuit court denied AEP's motion to dismiss based upon forum non conveniens.1 Before this Court, AEP contends that the circuit court erred by refusing to dismiss the underlying complaint pursuant to the forum non conveniens statute, W. Va.Code § 56-1-1a (2008) (Repl. Vol. 2012).2 Upon a review of the parties' briefs, the record designated for appellate consideration, and the pertinent authorities, we deny the requested writ of prohibition. In summary, we find that the circuit court adequately considered and applied the statutory forum non conveniens factors in refusing AEP's motion to dismiss on such grounds.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The instant proceeding originated when the respondents herein, the estate of Bobby Clary, by his administrator Joy Clary, et al. (collectively, "the Plaintiffs"), filed the underlying action against AEP in the Circuit Court of Mason County on August 9, 2014. In their complaint, the Plaintiffs sought damages for injuries they, or their family members, have incurred as a result of their exposure to coal combustion waste from the General James M. Gavin Power Plant, the General James M. Gavin Landfill, and associated facilities (collectively, "Gavin Landfill") in Gallipolis, Ohio. The Plaintiffs allege that they, or the parties they represent, have developed numerous different types of cancer and/or other health problems from their exposure to the coal waste. Specifically, the Plaintiffs claim that such coal waste, or fly ash, contains a variety of toxic metals, including arsenic, mercury, chromium, lead, uranium, cadmium, thallium, and molybdenum. Of the seventy-seven named plaintiffs, approximately nine plaintiffs are West Virginia residents; the remaining plaintiffs are primarily residents of Ohio and Kentucky, while a few reside in still other states.

The Plaintiffs allege that AEP owns and/or operates3 the Gavin Landfill and that its employee and named defendant below, Doug Workman ("Mr. Workman"), specifically directed the employee plaintiffs to work in and around the coal waste and fly ash. The Plaintiffs further allege that Mr. Workman failed to address concerns raised by the employee plaintiffs questioning the safety of coal waste exposure, that they were not provided with protective gear to minimize the effects of such exposure, and that AEP and Mr. Workman intentionally concealed the hazardous effects of the coal waste and exposure thereto. While the Gavin Landfill is located in Ohio, AEP conducts significant business in West Virginia, and Mr. Workman is a West Virginia resident.

In response to the Plaintiffs' complaint, AEP filed a motion to dismiss based upon forum non conveniens. To support its motion, AEP contended that because most of the Plaintiffs are not residents of West Virginia and because the Plaintiffs' cause of action, i.e., exposure to coal waste and resultant injuries, accrued in Ohio, and not in West Virginia, dismissal of the case pursuant to the forum non conveniens statute, W. Va.Code § 56-1-1a, was proper. The Plaintiffs replied that any inconvenience resulting from pursuing their claims in West Virginia, rather than in Ohio, was insignificant insofar as the geographical distance between the West Virginia and Ohio courthouses is less than ten miles, the majority of the defendants are amenable to suit in West Virginia, the Plaintiffs have all agreed to litigate their claims in West Virginia, and the vast majority of the case's witnesses are the Plaintiffs, themselves, who have agreed to make themselves available for depositions and courtroom testimony in West Virginia.

The circuit court held a hearing on AEP's motion, and, by order entered August 5, 2015, refused AEP's motion to dismiss based upon forum non conveniens. Applying each of the statutory factors, and rendering findings of fact and conclusions of law as to each,4 the circuit court determined that West Virginia is not such an inconvenient forum so as to require trial of the case elsewhere. The court further expressed concern that dismissal of the case would deprive West Virginia residents of their constitutional right to pursue their claims against the defendants in a West Virginia and simultaneously treat nonresidents differently by depriving nonresidents of rights afforded to West Virginia residents.5 Finally, the court noted that, to the extent that Ohio law might govern the parties' dispute, the court regularly applies Ohio law in cases over which it presides given its proximity to the Ohio border. From this adverse ruling, AEP seeks extraordinary relief from this Court to prohibit the circuit court from enforcing its August 5, 2015, order.

II.

STANDARD FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT

In this proceeding, AEP requests this Court to issue a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from enforcing its order which denied AEP's motion to dismiss based upon forum non conveniens. As an extraordinary remedy, this Court reserves the granting of such relief to "really extraordinary causes." State ex rel. Suriano v. Gaughan, 198 W.Va. 339, 345, 480 S.E.2d 548, 554 (1996) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Accordingly, "[a] writ of prohibition will not issue to prevent a simple abuse of discretion by a trial court. It will only issue where the trial court has no jurisdiction or having such jurisdiction exceeds its legitimate powers." Syl. pt. 2, State ex rel. Peacher v. Sencindiver, 160 W.Va. 314, 233 S.E.2d 425 (1977). Moreover, "this Court will use prohibition ... to correct only substantial, clear-cut, legal errors plainly in contravention of a clear statutory, constitutional, or common law mandate which may be resolved independently of any disputed facts and only in cases where there is a high probability that the trial will be completely reversed if the error is not corrected in advance." Syl. pt. 1, in part, Hinkle v. Black, 164 W.Va. 112, 262 S.E.2d 744 (1979), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State ex rel. Thornhill Grp., Inc. v. King, 233 W.Va. 564, 759 S.E.2d 795 (2014).

Furthermore, we previously have recognized that cases involving venue determinations entail a high probability of reversal if errors are not corrected at the outset and, thus, are appropriate for extraordinary relief. See State ex rel. Huffman v. Stephens, 206 W.Va. 501, 503, 526 S.E.2d 23, 25 (1999) ("In the context of disputes over venue, such as dismissal for forum non conveniens ... a writ of prohibition is an appropriate remedy to resolve the issue of where venue for a civil action lies, because the issue of venue has the potential of placing a litigant at an unwarranted disadvantage in a pending action and relief by appeal would be inadequate." (internal quotations and citations omitted)).

When deciding whether the writ of prohibition should issue in a given case, we have held as follows:

Syl. pt. 4, State ex rel. Hoover v. Berger, 199 W.Va. 12, 483 S.E.2d 12 (1996).

Furthermore, we have previously held that whether a case should be dismissed based upon forum non conveniens grounds is best left to the discretion of the presiding tribunal because such a determination is driven by the facts of a particular case. Thus, "[a] circuit court's decision to invoke the doctrine of forum non conveniens will not be reversed unless it is found that the circuit court abused its discretion." Syl. pt. 3, Cannelton Indus. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. of America, 194 W.Va. 186, 460 S.E.2d 1 (1994). We also find the converse to be true and therefore additionally hold that a circuit court's decision to deny a motion to dismiss based upon forum non conveniens will not be reversed unless the circuit court has abused its discretion. See Cannelton, 194 W.Va. at 191, 460 S.E.2d at 6 ("`The forum non conveniens determination is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. It may be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion[.]'" (quoting Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257, 102 S.Ct. 252, 266, 70 L.Ed.2d 419 (1981) (additional citations omitted))).

Finally, to the extent that the doctrine of forum non conveniens has been codified by statute, our consideration of the case sub judice also is guided by the standard of review applicable to cases involving statutory interpretation: "Interpreting a statute or an administrative rule or regulation presents a purely legal question subject to de novo review." Syl. pt. 1, Appalachian Power Co. v. State Tax Dep't of West Virginia, 195 W.Va. 573, 466 S.E.2d 424 (1995). See also Syl. pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W.Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995) ("Where the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review.").

Mindful of these standards, we proceed to consider the parties' arguments.

III.

DISCUSSION

The sole issue presented for our consideration and resolution herein is whether the circuit court should have dismissed the Plaintiffs' underlying lawsuit based upon forum non conveniens. The Legislature has codified the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens at W. Va.Code § 56-1-1a (2008) (Repl. Vol. 2012), which provides, in relevant part:

We previously have interpreted the statutory codification of the doctrine of forum non conveniens as follows:

Syl. pt. 8, Mace v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 227 W.Va. 666, 714 S.E.2d 223 (2011). Thus,

Syl. pt. 9, Mace, 227 W.Va. 666, 714 S.E.2d 223.

We further have recognized that,

Syl. pt. 5, State ex rel. Mylan, Inc. v. Zakaib, 227 W.Va. 641, 713 S.E.2d 356 (2011). See also Syl. pt. 6, State ex rel. Mylan, Inc. v. Zakaib, id. ("In all decisions on motions made pursuant to West Virginia Code § 56-1-1a (Supp.2010), courts must state findings of fact and conclusions of law as to each of the eight factors listed for consideration under subsection (a) of that statute."). Finally, as we noted in the preceding section, a circuit court's ruling on a motion to dismiss based upon forum non conveniens is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Cannelton, 194 W.Va. at 191, 460 S.E.2d at 6 (observing that court's decision regarding forum non conveniens "1`deserves substantial deference'1" (quoting Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 257, 102 S.Ct. at 266, 70 L.Ed.2d 419) (additional citations omitted)).

In rendering its ruling, the circuit court addressed each of the eight forum non conveniens factors enumerated in W. Va.Code § 56-1-1a(a)(1-8) as it was required to do. See Syl. pt. 5, Mylan, 227 W.Va. 641, 713 S.E.2d 356. AEP, however, argues that the circuit court erred in refusing to find that forum non conveniens applies to require dismissal of the instant proceeding. In reviewing the circuit court's rulings, and the parties' arguments with respect thereto, we will retain the format employed by the circuit court so as to prevent duplicative analyses of the eight statutory factors.

A. Factors 1, 3, and 8

The circuit court first considered factors 1, 3, and 8, specifically, (1) the existence of an alternate forum, W. Va.Code § 56-1-1a(a)(1); (3) whether the alternate forum can exercise jurisdiction over the parties, W. Va.Code § 56-1-1a(a)(3); and (8) whether the alternate forum provides a remedy, W. Va.Code § 56-1-1a(a)(8). In its August 5, 2015, order, the circuit court concluded that,

AEP argues that, regarding factor one, even though the Plaintiffs conceded that an alternate forum exists, the circuit court disregarded the same by opining that an alternate forum "almost always exists." Further AEP complains that the circuit court only mentions and does not substantively address factor three regarding Ohio's ability to exercise jurisdiction over all of the parties named as defendants below. Finally, AEP contends, under factor eight, that if remedies exist for the Plaintiffs' claims, such remedies are available in Ohio.

The Plaintiffs respond that the circuit court correctly ruled under factor one that Ohio is not a suitable alternative forum, particularly where AEP contended, below, that if the Plaintiffs' claims were brought in Ohio, they would require dismissal on substantive grounds. As to factor three, the Plaintiffs assert that because AEP and the other defendants are licensed to and do transact substantial business in West Virginia, and derive substantial income therefrom, it is not unjust to sue them in West Virginia. Finally, regarding factor eight, the Plaintiffs contend that if there is a question as to the viability of their claims under Ohio law, they are not guaranteed that that forum will provide them a remedy. Thus, they argue, the circuit court correctly rejected Ohio as an alternative forum.

We begin our consideration of these first statutory factors by noting that the forum non conveniens statute specifically directs that "the plaintiff's choice of a forum is entitled to great deference, but this preference may be diminished when the plaintiff is a nonresident and the cause of action did not arise in this state." W. Va.Code § 56-1-1a(a). In the instant proceeding, we note that certain Plaintiffs are, in fact, West Virginia residents, while most Plaintiffs are not residents of West Virginia. Moreover, it is undisputed that the Plaintiffs' causes of action arose in Ohio, where they were exposed to coal dust waste, not in West Virginia. Thus, while entitled to deference, the deference accorded to the Plaintiffs' choice of forum in West Virginia is necessarily diminished by these statutory considerations.

While it appears that an alternate forum exists insofar as the Plaintiffs may bring their suit in the State of Ohio, and that the State of Ohio can exercise jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs, the remedies available to the Plaintiffs in Ohio would be diminished if certain of their claims are not substantively viable in that forum. Although an unfavorable change in law does not automatically foreclose the availability of another forum, where "the remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all," Syl. pt. 8, Mace, 227 W.Va. 666, 714 S.E.2d 223, the "alternative" forum ceases to exist for purposes of a forum non conveniens analysis. Insofar as AEP has not borne its burden of establishing that Ohio's substantive law would entertain the Plaintiffs' claims such that their claims and resultant remedies against AEP would not be substantially diminished, we conclude that the circuit court correctly determined that factors 1, 3, and 8 weigh in favor of retaining jurisdiction of this case in West Virginia.

B. Factor 2

The circuit court next considered factor 2: "[w]hether maintenance of the claim or action in the courts of this state would work a substantial injustice to the moving party." W. Va.Code § 56-1-1a(a)(2). As to this factor, the circuit court ruled that,

AEP contends the circuit court erroneously relied upon the general venue statute, W. Va.Code § 56-1-1 (2007) (Repl. Vol. 2012), and improperly focused upon the amenability of AEP and the other defendants to personal jurisdiction in West Virginia. Rather, AEP suggests that the fact that Ohio substantive law governs the Plaintiffs' claims, and that their claims may include issues of first impression, render Ohio a more appropriate forum.

The Plaintiffs reply that maintenance of their claims in West Virginia would not constitute a "substantial injustice" to AEP or the remaining defendants insofar as they are either West Virginia residents or transact substantial business in this State. Moreover, the Plaintiffs contend that AEP has failed to demonstrate the substantial injustice it would suffer by maintenance of the Plaintiffs' lawsuit in West Virginia so as to defeat their choice of forum.

We agree with the circuit court's determination that consideration of this statutory factor militates in favor of West Virginia's retention of jurisdiction of this case. Unlike many of the forum non conveniens cases this Court has considered in recent years, the vast majority of the parties moving for dismissal in the case sub judice have direct ties to the State of West Virginia: most of the corporate defendants are incorporated and transact business in West Virginia, and Mr. Workman resides in this State. Moreover, the site of the alleged exposure is virtually equidistant from the two county courthouses at issue herein, and is actually closer to the West Virginia tribunal: the Gavin Landfill is approximately ten miles from the Mason County, West Virginia, courthouse, while the distance from the Gavin Landfill to the Gallia County, Ohio, courthouse is approximately eleven miles. Finally, with respect to AEP's choice of law complaint, that issue is more appropriately addressed in the context of factor 6 insofar as W. Va.Code § 56-1-1a(a)(6) specifically references "the application of foreign law" in its enumeration of public policy factors to consider. Thus, we concur with the circuit court's assessment that factor 2 weighs in favor of maintaining jurisdiction of the Plaintiffs' claims in West Virginia.

C. Factors 4 and 5

The third grouping of statutory forum non conveniens factors that the circuit court considered includes factor 4, the plaintiffs' state of residence, W. Va.Code § 56-1-1a(a)(4), and factor 5, the state in which the cause of action accrued, W. Va.Code § 56-1-1a(a)(5). With respect to these factors, the circuit court found that

AEP argues that because only nine of the seventy-seven Plaintiffs are residents of West Virginia, Ohio is the more appropriate forum in this case. Additionally, AEP contends that the circuit court erroneously focused upon the fact that a West Virginia resident is named as a defendant when the operative inquiry is the residency of the plaintiff(s). Furthermore, AEP asserts that because the Plaintiffs' cause of action arose in Ohio, Ohio is the more appropriate forum and that the circuit court erred by discounting this factor.

The Plaintiffs respond that the circuit court correctly found that neither of these factors substantially contributed to its determination in this case. Rather, because the statute merely requires the numerous factors to be considered but does not afford any particular factor more weight than another, and because several West Virginia residents are named as parties to this case, the Plaintiffs assert that the circuit court properly determined that these factors were not, in and of themselves, determinative of the appropriate forum in this case.

As to factor 4, we agree with the circuit court's assessment that consideration of this criterion affords no practical advantage to either side insofar as the Plaintiffs in this case reside both in West Virginia and in other states. However, we find that the circuit court abused its discretion in determining that factor 5 did not afford a practical advantage to the movants herein because it erroneously gave greater weight to the residence of the defendants, which is not included within the factor 5 criterion, rather than to the place where the cause of action accrued, which is the entirety of the factor 5 consideration. Because the Plaintiffs' causes of action accrued in the State of Ohio, and not in West Virginia, we find that consideration of factor 5 weighs in favor of forum non conveniens dismissal and maintenance of such claims in the State of Ohio's tribunals.

D. Factor 6

Factor 6, set forth in W. Va.Code § 56-1-1a(a)(6), requires a balancing of the "private interests of the parties and the public interest of the state" in determining whether to grant or deny forum non conveniens relief. We will consider each of these tests in turn.

1. Parties' private interests. W. Va.Code § 56-1-1a(a)(6) describes the factor 6 balancing test and enumerates the private interests to be considered as follows:

As to the private interest elements, the circuit court ruled that,

(Footnote in original).

AEP contends that a consideration of both the private and the public factors predominate in favor of Ohio as the preferred forum to hear the Plaintiffs' case. With regard to the private factors, AEP argues that the alleged act or omission complained of occurred in Ohio; many of the non-party witnesses reside in Ohio and will not be subject to compulsory process in West Virginia; it will be more costly for Ohio witnesses to attend trial in West Virginia; and it is possible that a West Virginia jury will have to be transported to Ohio to view the site of the alleged injury, i.e., the Gavin Landfill.

The Plaintiffs reply that the circuit court correctly found maintenance of their suit in West Virginia to be proper. With respect to the private factors, the Plaintiffs contend that AEP has provided only conclusory allegations that Ohio is the more appropriate forum under this analysis. Rather, the Plaintiffs assert that most of the witnesses in this case are parties to this action; most of the tangible evidence involved in this case is in the possession of the parties; and AEP and/or the other defendants own or operate the Gavin Landfill and, thus, can provide access to the premises should a jury need to inspect them.

Reviewing the private interests of the parties as required by the first portion of W. Va.Code § 56-1-1a(a)(6), we conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in finding that West Virginia is the more appropriate forum under this test. Sources of proof of the Plaintiffs' injuries rest predominantly in the hands of the parties, as medical records of the Plaintiffs or maintenance records of the defendants. The vast majority of the parties in this case, however, either have submitted voluntarily to the jurisdiction of this State or are subject to West Virginia's jurisdiction by virtue of their residency or business status in this State. Moreover, to the extent evidence resides in Ohio, or must be viewed in Ohio, as we noted in Section III.B., supra, the difference in geographical distance between the West Virginia and Ohio tribunals is negligible, and actually predominates in favor of West Virginia. Moreover, most of the witnesses in this case will be the parties, themselves, who, as noted, have, in the main, agreed to submit to jurisdiction in West Virginia. With the exception of the sole Ohio corporate defendant, the private interests of the parties weigh heavily in favor of maintenance of the Plaintiffs' claims in West Virginia.

2. State's public interest. W. Va. Code § 56-1-1a(a)(6) lists the factors to be considered in the public interest test as follows:

Considering the public interest elements, the circuit court ruled that

Finally, the court observed that,

Regarding the public factors, AEP asserts that the Mason County Circuit Court is more congested than that of the Gallia County court that would hear the Plaintiffs' case; all of the Plaintiffs' claims arise from alleged exposure to coal waste in Ohio, not because AEP and the remaining defendants operate facilities in West Virginia or near its border; the novelty of the Plaintiffs' claims and the fact that the case likely will involve certified questions to the Ohio Supreme Court predominate in favor of Ohio being the preferred forum; and West Virginia jurors should not be called upon to hear a case that arose in Ohio, is governed by Ohio law, and has only nine West Virginia resident plaintiffs. Considering all of these factors, AEP argues that Ohio is the more appropriate forum to hear the Plaintiffs' case.

With respect to the public factors, the Plaintiffs contend that they also weigh in favor of Mason County as the appropriate forum. In this vein, the Plaintiffs note that the Mason County circuit judge is in the best position to determine the congestion of his docket, and he deemed it not to be too crowded to entertain this suit; moreover, the circuit court observed that, because of its border location, it is familiar with and regularly applies the law of the State of Ohio to cases over which it presides. Finally, the Plaintiffs suggest that the prospective jurors in West Virginia have an interest in determining this case because they are individuals who live in the shadow of the subject power plant, and similar power plants; regularly experience the air pollution referenced in the case; and likely work at or know someone who works at one of the defendants' power facilities. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs contend that the circuit court properly found West Virginia to be the appropriate forum when weighing the private and public interest factors.

As with the private interests analysis, we conclude that the consideration of this State's public interest also weighs in favor of retention of the Plaintiffs' claims in West Virginia. We agree with the circuit court that it is in the best position to determine the weight of its docket and to assess whether it would be overburdened by maintenance of this suit in Mason County, West Virginia.7 Moreover, to the extent that the corporate defendants operate coal-fired power plants both in Gallia County, Ohio, and Mason County, West Virginia, and the coal waste generated by such power plants has adversely affected the residents of Mason County, West Virginia, these citizens have an interest in deciding the instant controversy.

Furthermore, as we recognized in the case of State ex rel. Khoury v. Cuomo, No. 15-0852, ___ W.Va. ___, ___, 783 S.E.2d 849, 2016 WL 596240 (W.Va. Feb. 10, 2016), when defendants seek the benefits of this State through licensure, a corresponding public interest in ensuring that they comply with their licensure requirements is created. By the same token, to the extent that the corporate defendants herein are incorporated under the laws of this State or regularly transact business within our borders, West Virginia's citizens have a tremendous public interest in monitoring and regulating their behavior to ensure it complies with the protections they have been afforded by this State. Finally, that a choice of law analysis might require the application of Ohio substantive law to the instant controversy is of no moment. In short, "the mere fact that the court is called upon to determine and apply foreign law does not present a legal problem of the sort which would justify the dismissal of a case otherwise properly before the court." Hoffman v. Goberman, 420 F.2d 423, 427 (3d Cir.1970) (footnote omitted). Therefore, we conclude that consideration of both the private interests and public interest tests of factor 6 weigh in favor of West Virginia's retention of jurisdiction over this case.

E. Factor 7

The final statutory factor considered by the circuit court is "[w]hether not granting the stay or dismissal would result in unreasonable duplication or proliferation of litigation[.]" W. Va.Code § 56-1-1a(a)(7). In this regard, the circuit court ruled that,

AEP argues that the circuit court improperly based its analysis of this issue on the general venue statute, W. Va.Code § 56-1-1, rather than the forum non conveniens statute, W. Va.Code § 56-1-1a, which governs the resolution of this case. Thus, AEP argues, whether the West Virginia plaintiffs can maintain their suit in West Virginia is not the determinative issue; rather, the court should have considered whether West Virginia is an inconvenient forum under W. Va.Code § 56-1-1a.

The Plaintiffs respond that the circuit court correctly ruled that it cannot dismiss the West Virginia plaintiffs' claims. As such, two different proceedings would be required if the circuit court granted AEP's forum non conveniens motion: one in West Virginia, brought by the plaintiffs who are West Virginia residents, and one in Ohio, brought by the remaining plaintiffs. These two, different proceedings would then proceed even thought they both arose from the same coal waste exposure, at the same location, and involve the same evidence and witnesses. The Plaintiffs contend that this is precisely the type of duplicative litigation that W. Va. Code § 56-1-1a seeks to prevent and that the maintenance of such a bifurcated proceeding could lead to inconsistent rulings and outcomes, as well as the assertion of numerous claims of res judicata and collateral estoppel in the two jurisdictions. Thus, the Plaintiffs argue that West Virginia is the more appropriate forum.

Upon consideration of the seventh factor of W. Va.Code § 56-1-1a(a), we agree with the circuit court's ultimate conclusion that dismissal of this action on forum non conveniens grounds would undoubtedly result in duplicative litigation in multiple jurisdictions. As noted previously, W. Va.Code § 56-1-1a(a) requires that "the plaintiff's choice of a forum is entitled to great deference," which choice is diminished only where "the plaintiff is a nonresident and the cause of action did not arise in this state." For several of the Plaintiffs in the case sub judice, their West Virginia residency entitles their chosen forum to substantial deference. If the Plaintiffs' case is bifurcated, and the resident Plaintiffs maintain their claims in West Virginia while the remaining, nonresident Plaintiffs are required to bring their claims in Ohio, it goes without saying that duplicative discovery will be conducted and analogous legal arguments will be made, with no guarantee that the two different tribunals will reach the same, or even similar, rulings. The potential for such inconsistent decisions undercuts the very notions of justice for the parties and judicial economy for the presiding tribunals.

Moreover, to the extent that the litigation may proliferate, due to the filing of additional lawsuits alleging the same injuries resulting from exposure to coal waste, joinder of additional plaintiffs, the complexity of the legal issues, or simply the intricacies of discovery involving so many parties, West Virginia has in place a mechanism to handle cases of this nature and magnitude: the Mass Litigation Panel. Although we recognize that, generally, to constitute "mass litigation" there first must be a minimum of two or more civil actions to consider such a transfer,8 we have recognized that, sometimes, a singular case may qualify for mass litigation treatment. In University Commons Riverside Home Owners Association, Inc. v. University Commons Morgantown, LLC, 230 W.Va. 589, 741 S.E.2d 613 (2013), we observed that

University Commons, 230 W.Va. at 596, 741 S.E.2d at 620. Because we find that the instant lawsuit likewise would benefit from the Mass Litigation Panel's facilitation of the maintenance of multiple, similar claims alleging the same injuries by numerous plaintiffs, we hereby invoke our inherent authority to refer the instant matter to the Mass Litigation Panel for further proceedings. With respect to the balancing of interests under factor 7, we find that consideration of this factor also preponderates in favor of the Plaintiffs' choice of forum in West Virginia.

In the final analysis, weighing all of the statutory factors of W. Va.Code § 56-1-1a(a) as required by both the statute, itself, and our prior holding in Syllabus point 5 of Mylan, 227 W.Va. 641, 713 S.E.2d 356, we are left with the firm conviction that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing AEP's motion to dismiss based upon forum non conveniens. On balance, we simply cannot conclude that "`trial in the [Plaintiffs'] chosen forum [of West Virginia] would establish... oppressiveness and vexation to [the] defendant[s] ... out of proportion to [the] [Plaintiffs'] convenience.'" Sinochem Int'l Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 429, 127 S.Ct. 1184, 1190, 167 L.Ed.2d 15 (2007) (quoting American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 447-48, 114 S.Ct. 981, 985, 127 L.Ed.2d 285 (1994)) (additional quotations and citations omitted).

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the requested writ of prohibition is hereby denied.

Writ Denied.

LOUGHRY, Justice, dissenting:

(Filed April 15, 2016)

Given the preponderance of factors that weigh heavily in favor of resolving the underlying action in our sister state of Ohio, the majority's decision rests on decidedly infirm grounds and, as a consequence, I am compelled to dissent. In affirming the circuit court's refusal to dismiss the underlying action on grounds of forum non conveniens, the majority adopted the circuit court's improper focus on the existence of minimal contacts with this state while intentionally overlooking the clear indicia which demonstrate that Ohio, and not West Virginia, is the preferred forum for this matter based on the controlling statutory factors. See W.Va.Code § 56-1-1a (2012).

At the center of the suit below are allegations of harm arising from exposure to fly ash at a landfill in Gallia County, Ohio, where the plaintiffs or their family members worked. Nine of the seventy-seven plaintiffs are residents of West Virginia; fifty-six of the plaintiffs are residents of Ohio.1 In making its decision that the action should remain in West Virginia, the circuit court confused notions of general venue with the principle at issue: whether there is a more appropriate forum outside this state to try the underlying case. Of further and critical import is the trial court's mistaken notion that the doctrine of forum non conveniens does not apply when one of the plaintiffs is a resident of the forum in which the lawsuit is filed. Because the trial court's ruling is replete with both procedural and substantive error, the majority's refusal to issue the writ of prohibition sought by the petitioners only served to exacerbate that error.

The circuit court's misdirected analysis began with its identification of Abbott v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 191 W.Va. 198, 444 S.E.2d 285 (1994), superseded by statute as stated in State ex rel. Ford Motor Co. v. Nibert, 235 W.Va. 235, 773 S.E.2d 1 (2015), as "still controlling law" on the issue of forum non conveniens. Abbott — a decision applying common law principles of forum non conveniens — was legislatively abrogated with the enactment of West Virginia Code § 56-1-1a in 2007. See Nibert, 235 W.Va. at 240, 773 S.E.2d at 6 (remanding based on trial court's failure to recognize that Abbott was superseded by enactment of W.Va.Code § 56-1-1a); Mace v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 227 W.Va. 666, 671 n. 3, 714 S.E.2d 223, 228 n. 3 (2011) (discussing common law doctrine of forum non conveniens and subsequent codification of separate forum non conveniens statute in response to Morris v. Crown Equip. Corp., 219 W.Va. 347, 633 S.E.2d 292 (2006)); accord Savarese v. Allstate Ins. Co., 223 W.Va. 119, 122-23 n. 8, 672 S.E.2d 255, 258-59 n. 8 (2008). While the circuit court also utilized the eight factors set forth in West Virginia Code § 56-1-1a, the decision it reached was greatly influenced, and arguably tainted, by this Court's pre-statutory decision in Abbott.2 As this Court has made clear in our decisions issued after the enactment of the forum non conveniens statute, the statute is the controlling and governing law on whether "in the interest of justice and for the convenience of the parties" a case should be "heard in a forum outside this State." W.Va.Code § 56-1-1a(a); State ex rel. Mylan v. Zakaib, 227 W.Va. 641, 649 n. 6, 713 S.E.2d 356, 364 n. 6 (2011).

Through its decision, the majority has inexplicably and unwisely resurrected the Abbott decision. Not once since the enactment of West Virginia Code § 56-1-1a has this Court relied upon or even cited favorably to Abbott in resolving a motion for forum non conveniens. With the adoption of our forum non conveniens statute, and the doctrine's codification, the common law precedent was superceded. Until now, this Court has been clear in each of its decisions to reinforce the controlling effect of West Virginia Code § 56-1-1a. Through its lengthy and repeated recitation of the trial court's reasoning and its multiple references to Abbott, the majority has arguably muddied the waters of statutory forum non conveniens. While giving lip service to the fact that a forum non conveniens motion is to be governed by statute and not "our cases decided before the promulgation of said statute,"3 the majority, through its recurring approval of the trial court's reasoning and extensive quoting from that reasoning, appears to be sanctioning a continued and improper reliance on Abbott.4 In marked contrast to the Court's decision in Nibert, where remand was required due to the absence of clear application of the statutory factors set forth in West Virginia Code § 56-1-1a and improper reliance on Abbott, the majority does not call into question the basis of the circuit court's ruling despite the trial court's repeated reliance on non-controlling precedent.5 As a result, rather than steering the circuit courts of this state away from Abbott, the majority seems to be, with a wink and a nod, suggesting that you may apply this Court's pre-statutory precedent as long as you throw in an obligatory mention of the statutory factors.6

Besides its erroneous reliance on Abbott, the trial court's order demonstrates confusion with regard to applying principles of forum non conveniens. Citing to law that was included in a previous venue statute,7 the trial court corrupted its ruling in this case with an improper focus on matters of venue and joinder.8 Furthermore, the trial court discounted the petitioners' arguments with regard to the existence of an alternate forum based solely on the existence of a West Virginia plaintiff. Numerous courts have applied the doctrine of forum non conveniens when a resident's suit is determined to have been filed in an inconvenient forum. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 957 A.2d 576 (D.C.2008) (affirming dismissal of resident's suit against Mississippi defendant on grounds of forum non conveniens where alternate forum determined to have more connection to matters in dispute); Warlop v. Lernout, 473 F.Supp.2d 260 (D.Mass.2007) (granting forum non conveniens motion despite presence of resident class members); V.G. Marina Mgmt. Corp. v. Wiener, 337 Ill.App.3d 691, 272 Ill.Dec. 529, 787 N.E.2d 344 (2003) (affirming dismissal of resident's suit on forum non conveniens grounds); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Estes, 353 Mass. 90, 228 N.E.2d 440, 445 (1967) (observing that suits by state's residents are "subject to the considerations of policy underlying the doctrine of forum non conveniens" and are not "shield[ed] ... from the operation of that doctrine").

Turning to the statutory factors that control the outcome of this case, only three of the eight factors were in dispute. This is because the plaintiffs, as the record demonstrates, had conceded factors (1) the existence of an alternate forum; (3) that the alternate forum could exercise jurisdiction over the parties; (4) the state in which the plaintiff(s) reside; (5) the state in which the cause of action accrued; and (8) that the alternate forum provides a remedy. Consequently, the only statutory factors that were truly disputed on the issue of whether this case should be tried in Ohio, were factors (2) whether maintenance of the action in West Virginia would work a substantial injustice to the petitioners; (6) whether the balance of the private interests of the parties and the public interest of West Virginia predominate in favor of the action being tried in Ohio; and (7) whether dismissing the claim would result in unreasonable duplication or proliferation of litigation.

Beginning with factor two, the circuit court and the majority simply got it wrong. The only basis given by the trial court for its ruling on this factor was the existence of a West Virginia defendant and the amenability of the defendants to personal jurisdiction. Rather than addressing the wholesale inapplicability of venue concerns to a factor predicated on the issue of whether the defendants would be judicially harmed by maintenance of the suit in West Virginia, the majority chose instead to contrast the facts of this case to previous forum non conveniens cases.9 Falling into the net improperly cast by the respondents, the majority seized upon a minimum contacts analysis,10 by mentioning the ties of the petitioners to this state and then proceeding to spell out the mileage between the court houses to the situs of the alleged exposure.11 In taking this tack, the majority goes seriously astray of the subject factor.

In support of the factor aimed at examining the possibility of substantial injustice, the petitioners argued to the circuit court that the respondents' complaint involves novel legal theories and issues of first impression that have yet to be decided by the state of Ohio. There is no dispute that the substantive law of Ohio law, and not West Virginia law, will govern this matter as the situs of the cause of action exists in and is confined to Ohio. As a result, the petitioners argued below that the need to involve the Ohio courts to resolve matters of undecided law would cause further delays in the litigation of this matter in West Virginia. Deferring heavily to the circuit court on this issue, the majority simply deemed the trial court the best judge both with regard to the management of its docket and to its professed ability to apply Ohio law.

The sixth factor requires a balancing of the private interests of the parties and the public interest of West Virginia in maintaining this action. This statutory factor sets forth multiple issues for consideration and begins with an examination of whether the subject "injury or death resulted from acts or omissions that occurred in this state." W.Va.Code § 56-1-1a(a)(6). Identifying the private interests that relate to trying the case in this state, the statute enumerates a litany of litigation-related concerns such as the ease of access to sources of proof; the availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses; the cost of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses; the possibility of a view of the premises; and "all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive." Id. (emphasis supplied). Glossing over both the additional expense and the additional time required to seek out-of-state subpoenas from the Ohio courts, the trial court faults the petitioners for not identifying a sum specific for its additional expenses to try this case in West Virginia and declares that the private factors tip the scale in favor of the respondents. The majority's agreement with the trial court on this issue demonstrates a woeful ignorance of what is involved in gathering evidence and trying a case of this size. Viewing the production of witnesses and evidence as a minor matter, easily accomplished by virtue of the voluntary submission of the Ohio plaintiffs to the jurisdiction of this state, the majority effectively ignores the issue of compulsory compliance. The statute seeks to determine the costs of compelling the unwilling witnesses, not the willing witnesses. See id. The plaintiffs are not the parties that the petitioners will have difficulty compelling: it is the former plant employees and any lay and medical witness who are beyond the subpoena power of the West Virginia courts that will present problems.12 Simply put, the majority, like the circuit court, categorically dismissed any real concern for the increased costs or difficulties that the petitioners will incur in trying this case in West Virginia.

Turning to the second part of factor six-the public interest that this state has in maintaining the cause of action-requires an examination of administrative difficulties related to maintaining the action in this state,13 the interest in having localized controversies decided within this state, the avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflict of laws or in the application of foreign laws,14 and the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty. W.Va.Code § 56-1-1a(a)(6). Missing the boat on this second aspect of factor six also, the majority buys lock, stock and barrel into the faulty reasoning of the trial court. The trial court opined that Mason County citizens have a right to decide this case because, they too, have been subjected to exposure to coal combustion waste. In framing the issue of whether a West Virginia jury has an interest in this matter in personal terms that are patently beyond the scope of the allegations-exposure from a landfill rather than ambient air exposure from coal-fired power plants — the circuit court and then the majority have gone seriously astray of the statutory objective. The legislatively-declared focus in a motion for forum non conveniens is to decide whether it makes sense to try this matter in West Virginia in comparison to the alternate available forum. As the petitioners rightly observe: "No good reason exists for a West Virginia jury to be called upon to decide a case which originated in Ohio, must be decided under Ohio law, and involves only 9 of 77 plaintiffs who reside in West Virginia."

The final contested factor — number seven — looks at whether a dismissal would result in unreasonable duplication or proliferation of litigation. In making its finding on this factor, the trial court again displayed its misapprehension that this case could not be dismissed under the general venue statute — W.Va.Code § 56-1-1. That finding is clearly unrelated to the issue of duplicative litigation. As a result, the trial court's finding on the issue of duplicative costs — that the majority rubber stamped — is seriously flawed. Other than the initial costs related to the refiling of the action in Ohio, there is little reason to believe that the costs of trying this action just miles away from its initial filing would greatly increase the overall costs of this litigation or unnecessarily delay its resolution.

When the focus is properly framed on the correct issues — where this case should be tried given the location of the alleged injury-causing event in view of the quantity of out-of-state plaintiffs and the clear need to employ both substantive and procedural Ohio laws to try this matter — there is only one conclusion. Ohio is the obvious answer. For this Court to affirm the lower court's decision raises the unwelcome hint of "home cooking" and forum shopping: two constructs that the majority of this Court should have taken more pains to consider before casually approving the flawed reasoning and decision of the circuit court. See Pollux Holding Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 329 F.3d 64, 71 (2d Cir.2003) (commenting that deference afforded to plaintiff's choice of forum is limited if there are indicia of forum shopping).

As I previously observed in my dissent to Nibert, the forum non conveniens statute is written in mandatory terms and directs a court to "decline to exercise jurisdiction under the doctrine of forum non conveniens" when the movant demonstrates that there is an alternative forum that is preferential in terms of serving the interests of justice and providing for the convenience of the parties. W.Va.Code § 56-1-1a(a), Nibert, 235 W.Va. at 245, 773 S.E.2d at 11 (Loughry, J., dissenting). The petitioners unquestionably demonstrated the existence of an alternate forum which is, hands down, the preferred tribunal in which to resolve the matters at issue in this case. The majority's decision to deny the petitioners' motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds on the facts of this case was a judicial mistake of lasting consequences. The finite judicial resources of this state will be required to untangle this litigation that could best be handled by the courts of the state in which the majority of the plaintiffs reside and in which the alleged tortious conduct undisputedly took place. To volunteer to give away our scarce judicial resources and to require this state's citizens to give up either their work hours or their personal time to sit on a jury to consider matters entrenched in Ohio law when Ohio could resolve this matter more expeditiously at no cost to this state's citizens was not only improvident but markedly myopic. See Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508, 67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055 (1947) ("Jury duty is a burden that ought not to be imposed upon the people of a community which has no relation to the litigation."). As a final observation, a possible ramification from this decision is that border state employers may simply decide not to employ our citizens if the end result is that West Virginia courts are unwilling to dismiss cases that deserve to be tried in their states "in the interests of justice and for the convenience of the parties." W.Va.Code § 56-1-1a(a).

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

Justices BENJAMIN AND LOUGHRY dissent and reserve the right to file separate opinions.