MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
(Daubert Motion re: Shelby Thames, Ph.D.)
JOSEPH R. GOODWIN, District Judge.
Pending before the court is the Motion to Exclude the Opinions and Testimony of Shelby Thames [ECF No. 2039] filed by the plaintiffs. The Motion is now ripe for consideration because briefing is complete.
I. Background
This case resides in one of seven MDLs assigned to me by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation concerning the use of transvaginal surgical mesh to treat pelvic organ prolapse ("POP") and stress urinary incontinence ("SUI"). In the seven MDLs, there are more than 75,000 cases currently pending, approximately 30,000 of which are in this MDL, which involves defendants Johnson & Johnson and Ethicon, Inc. (collectively "Ethicon"), among others.
In this MDL, the court's tasks include "resolv[ing] pretrial issues in a timely and expeditious manner" and "resolv[ing] important evidentiary disputes." Barbara J. Rothstein & Catherine R. Borden, Fed. Judicial Ctr., Managing Multidistrict Litigation in Products Liability Cases 3 (2011). To handle motions to exclude or to limit expert testimony pursuant to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the court developed a specific procedure. In Pretrial Order ("PTO") No. 217, the court instructed the parties to file only one Daubert motion per challenged expert, to file each motion in the main MDL—as opposed to the individual member cases—and to identify which cases would be affected by the motion. PTO No. 217, at 4.1
II. Preliminary Matters
Before plunging into the heart of the Motion, a few preliminary matters need to be addressed.
I am compelled to comment on the parties' misuse of my previous Daubert rulings on several of the experts offered in this case. See generally Sanchez v. Bos. Sci. Corp., No. 2:12-cv-05762, 2014 WL 4851989 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 29, 2014); Tyree v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 54 F.Supp.3d 501 (S.D. W. Va. 2014); Eghnayem v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 57 F.Supp.3d 658 (S.D. W. Va. 2014). The parties have, for the most part, structured their Daubert arguments as a response to these prior rulings, rather than an autonomous challenge to or defense of expert testimony based on its reliability and relevance. In other words, the parties have comparatively examined expert testimony and have largely overlooked Daubert's core considerations for assessing expert testimony. Although I recognize the tendency of my prior evidentiary determinations to influence subsequent motions practice, counsels' expectations that I align with these previous rulings when faced with a different record are misplaced, especially when an expert has issued new reports and given additional deposition testimony.
Mindful of my role as gatekeeper for the admission of expert testimony, as well as my duty to "respect[ ] the individuality" of each MDL case, see In re Phenylpropanolamine Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1231 (9th Cir. 2006), I refuse to credit Daubert arguments that simply react to the court's rulings in Sanchez and its progeny. Indeed, I feel bound by these earlier cases only to the extent that the expert testimony and Daubert objections presented to the court then are identical to those presented now. Otherwise, I assess the parties' Daubert arguments anew. That is, in light of the particular expert testimony and objections currently before me, I assess "whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid" and "whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93. Any departure from Sanchez, Eghnayem, or Tyree does not constitute a "reversal" of these decisions and is instead the expected result of the parties' submission of updated expert reports and new objections to the expert testimony contained therein.
Finally, I have attempted to resolve all possible disputes before transfer or remand, including those related to the admissibility of expert testimony pursuant to Daubert. Nevertheless, in some instances I face Daubert challenges where my interest in accuracy counsels reserving ruling until the reliability of the expert testimony may be evaluated at trial. At trial, the expert testimony will be tested by precise questions asked and answered. The alternative of live Daubert hearings is impossible before transfer or remand because of the numerosity of such motions in these seven related MDLs. As these MDLs have grown and the expert testimony has multiplied, I have become convinced that the critical gatekeeping function permitting or denying expert testimony on decisive issues in these cases is best made with a live expert on the witness stand subject to vigorous examination.
In the course of examining a multitude of these very similar cases involving the same fields of expertise, I have faced irreconcilably divergent expert testimony offered by witnesses with impeccable credentials, suggesting, to me, an unreasonable risk of unreliability. The danger—and to my jaded eye, the near certainty—of the admission of "junk science" looms large in this mass litigation.
The parties regularly present out-of-context statements, after-the-fact rationalizations of expert testimony, and incomplete deposition transcripts. This, combined with the above-described practice of recycling expert testimony, objections, and the court's prior rulings, creates the perfect storm of obfuscation. Where further clarity is necessary, I believe it can only be achieved through live witness testimony— not briefing—I will therefore reserve ruling until expert testimony can be evaluated firsthand.
III. Legal Standard
By now, the parties should be intimately familiar with Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and Daubert, so the court will not linger for long on these standards.
Expert testimony is admissible if the expert is qualified and if his or her expert testimony is reliable and relevant. Fed. R. Evid. 702; see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597. An expert may be qualified to offer expert testimony based on his or her "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education." Fed. R. Evid. 702. Reliability may turn on the consideration of several factors:
(1) whether a theory or technique can be or has been tested; (2) whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) whether a technique has a high known or potential rate of error and whether there are standards controlling its operation; and (4) whether the theory or technique enjoys general acceptance within a relevant scientific community.
Cooper v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 259 F.3d 194, 199 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-94). But these factors are neither necessary to nor determinative of reliability in all cases; the inquiry is flexible and puts "principles and methodology" above conclusions and outcomes. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595; see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 525 U.S. 137, 141, 150 (1999). Finally, and simply, relevance turns on whether the expert testimony relates to any issues in the case. See, e.g., Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591-92 (discussing relevance and helpfulness).
At bottom, the court has broad discretion to determine whether expert testimony should be admitted or excluded. Cooper, 259 F.3d at 200.
IV. Discussion
Dr. Thames is a polymer chemist with a Ph.D. in organic chemistry. In 1969, Dr. Thames founded the Department of Polymer Science at the University of Southern Mississippi, and he has served as the Dean of the College of Science. Dr. Thames's has researched and designed polymers for various uses.
a. Properties
First, the plaintiffs challenge multiple statements made in Dr. Thames's expert report that are related to degradation and the support—or lack thereof—found in Ethicon's seven-year dog study. The plaintiffs argue that this testimony is unreliable because Dr. Thames contradicts himself and misstates the study's findings. I do not find any of Dr. Thames's supposed self-contradictions to warrant exclusion. Nor is Dr. Thames's testimony unreliably contradictory to the extent it uses the dog study to support his opinion that Prolene "does not undergo meaningful or harmful degradation in vivo." Thames Report 6 [ECF No. 2039-3]. I do agree, however, with the plaintiffs' argument that Dr. Thames has occasionally misstated the dog study's specific findings as to molecular weight. Specifically, although the study reported no significant difference in molecular weights, Dr. Thames reports the study as finding no molecular weight change. See, e.g., Thames Report 9. Insofar as Dr. Thames's testimony mischaracterizes the dog study's results on molecular weight change, it is EXCLUDED and the plaintiffs' Motion on this point is GRANTED.
Second, the plaintiffs challenge the reliability of Dr. Thames's opinion that the data collected from the seven-year dog study "validates toughness improvement after initial implantation." Mem. 5 [ECF No. 2042] (citing Thames Report 9). The plaintiffs disagree with the manner in which Dr. Thames has defined and measured "toughness." But the plaintiffs provide no support for their differing conception of the term or how it is most appropriately measured. Additionally, a review of Dr. Thames's expert report and Ethicon's Response shows that he used a systematic method to plot data collected in the dog study on strength and elongation that could reasonably be said to relate to toughness. Accordingly, the plaintiffs' Motion on this matter is
DENIED.
Third, the plaintiffs challenge Dr. Thames's opinions on translucent flakes detected on Prolene explants and the presence of extrusion lines. These opinions, however, are apparently contained in Dr. Thames's case-specific expert report regarding a particular Wave 1 plaintiff. As such, these objections are not appropriately addressed in the instant Daubert motion, which was filed in the main MDL and should challenge general causation opinions only. The plaintiffs' Motion on this matter is DENIED. Further, the plaintiffs' Motion, insofar as it relates to the cleaning protocol employed by Dr. Thames in his plaintiff-specific examination of mesh, is similarly DENIED.
V. Recurring Issues
Many of the Daubert motions filed in this MDL raise the same or similar objections.
One particular issue has been a staple in this litigation, so I find it best to discuss it in connection with every expert. A number of the Daubert motions seek to exclude FDA testimony and other regulatory or industry standards testimony. To the extent this Motion raises these issues it is GRANTED in part and RESERVED in part as described below.
I have repeatedly excluded evidence regarding the FDA's section 510(k) clearance process in these MDLs, and will continue to do so in these case, a position that has been affirmed by the Fourth Circuit. In re C. R. Bard, Inc., 81 F.3d 913, 921-23 (4th Cir. 2016) (upholding the determination that the probative value of evidence related to section 510(k) was substantially outweighed by its possible prejudicial impact under Rule 403). Because the section 510(k) clearance process does not speak directly to safety and efficacy, it is of negligible probative value. See In re C. R. Bard, 81 F.3d at 920 ("[T]he clear weight of persuasive and controlling authority favors a finding that the 510(k) procedure is of little or no evidentiary value."). Delving into complex and lengthy testimony about regulatory compliance could inflate the perceived importance of compliance and lead jurors "to erroneously conclude that regulatory compliance proved safety." Id. at 922. Accordingly, expert testimony related to the section 510(k) process, including subsequent enforcement actions and discussion of the information Ethicon did or did not submit in its section 510(k) application, is EXCLUDED. For the same reasons, opinions about Ethicon's compliance with or violation of the FDA's labeling and adverse event reporting regulations are EXCLUDED. In addition to representing inappropriate legal conclusions, such testimony is not helpful to the jury in determining the facts at issue in these cases and runs the risk of misleading the jury and confusing the issues. Insofar as this Motion challenges the FDA-related testimony discussed here, the Motion is GRANTED.
A number of experts also seek to opine on Ethicon's compliance with design control and risk management standards. Some of this testimony involves the FDA's quality systems regulations, and some—likely in an attempt to sidestep my anticipated prohibition on FDA testimony—involve foreign regulations and international standards. I find all of this proposed testimony of dubious relevance. Although these standards relate to how a manufacturer should structure and document risk assessment, the standards do not appear to mandate any particular design feature or prescribe the actual balance that must be struck in weighing a product's risk and utility. Nor is it clear that the European and other international standards discussed had any bearing on the U.S. medical device industry when the device in question was being designed.
Nevertheless, because the nuances of products liability law vary by state, I will refrain from issuing a blanket exclusion on design process and control standards testimony, whether rooted in the FDA or otherwise. Each standard must be assessed for its applicability to the safety questions at issue in this litigation, consistent with state law. I am without sufficient information to make these findings at this time. Accordingly, I RESERVE ruling on such matters until a hearing, where the trial judge will have additional context to carefully evaluate the relevance and potential prejudicial impact of specific testimony.
Similarly, I doubt the relevance of testimony on the adequacy of Ethicon's clinical testing and research, physician outreach, or particular product development procedures and assessments otherwise not encompassed by the above discussion. Again, such matters seem to say very little about the state of the product itself (i.e., whether or not it was defective) when it went on the market. But because the scope of relevant testimony may vary according to differences in state products liability law, I RESERVE ruling on such matters until they may be evaluated in proper context at hearing before the trial court before or at trial.
Additional—and more broad—matters also warrant mention. While some of these concerns may not apply to this particular expert, these concerns are raised so frequently that they are worth discussing here
First, many of the motions seek to exclude state-of-mind and legal-conclusion expert testimony. Throughout these MDLs, the court has prohibited the parties from using experts to usurp the jury's fact-finding function by allowing testimony of this type, and I do the same here. E.g., In re C. R. Bard, Inc., 948 F.Supp.2d 589, 611 (S.D. W. Va. 2013); see also, e.g., United States v. McIver, 470 F.3d 550, 562 (4th Cir. 2006) ("[O]pinion testimony that states a legal standard or draws a legal conclusion by applying law to the facts is generally inadmissible."); In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 309 F.Supp.2d 531, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("Inferences about the intent and motive of parties or others lie outside the bounds of expert testimony."). Additionally, an expert may not offer expert testimony using "legal terms of art," such as "defective," "unreasonably dangerous," or "proximate cause." See Perez v. Townsend Eng'g Co., 562 F.Supp.2d 647, 652 (M.D. Pa. 2008).
Second, and on a related note, many of the motions seek to prohibit an expert from parroting facts found in corporate documents and the like. I caution the parties against introducing corporate evidence through expert witnesses. Although an expert may testify about his review of internal corporate documents solely for the purpose of explaining the basis for his or her expert opinions—assuming the expert opinions are otherwise admissible—he or she may not offer testimony that is solely a conduit for corporate information.
Third, many of the motions also ask the court to require an expert to offer testimony consistent with that expert's deposition or report or the like. The court will not force an expert to testify one way or another. To the extent an expert offers inconsistent testimony, the matter is more appropriately handled via cross-examination or impeachment as appropriate and as provided by the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Fourth, in these Daubert motions, the parties have addressed tertiary evidentiary matters like whether certain statements should be excluded as hearsay. The court will not exclude an expert simply because a statement he or she discussed may constitute hearsay. Cf. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. Hearsay objections are more appropriately raised at trial.
Finally, in some of the Daubert motions, without identifying the specific expert testimony to be excluded, the parties ask the court to prevent experts from offering other expert testimony that the moving party claims the expert is not qualified to offer. I decline to make speculative or advisory rulings. I decline to exclude testimony where the party seeking exclusion does not provide specific content or context.
VI. Conclusion
The court DENIES in part, GRANTS in part, and RESERVES in part the Motion to Exclude the Opinions and Testimony of Shelby Thames [ECF No. 2039].
The court DIRECTS the Clerk to file a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order in 2:12-md-2327 and in the Ethicon Wave 1 cases identified in the Exhibit attached hereto.
Exhibit A
Exhibit A — Thames Case Identification
Case No. Case Style
2:11-cv-00809 Wilma Johnson v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00256 Amy and Brent Holland v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00258 Carrie Smith v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00261 Mary F. Cone v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00265 Doris Chappell Jackson v. Ethicon, et al. WAVE 2
2:12-cv-00276 Cathy and John Warlick v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00277 Joy and Kevin Essman v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00279 Susan Thaman v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00286 Quillan R. and Thomas W. Garnett v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00322 Linda B. Ryan v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00335 Sandra Wolfe v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00337 Kathleen Wolfe v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00341 Helen M. Brown and Robert E. Ruttkay v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00344 Rose and Jesus Gomez v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00347 Deborah and Felipe Lozano v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00351 Kathy Barton v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00352 Charlotte Hargrove v. Ethicon, et al. CLOSED
2:12-cv-00358 Amanda and Raymond Deleon v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00368 Sharon and Michael Boggs v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00369 Dawna Hankins v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00376 Charlene Logan Taylor v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00378 Tina and Kenneth Morrow v. Ethicon, et al. WAVE 2
2:12-cv-00379 Teri Key and Johnny Shively v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00380 Terrie S. and Ralph R. Gregory v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00381 Susan C. and Leonard Hayes v. Ethicon, et al. CLOSED
2:12-cv-00387 Maru LuEllen and Thomas Lawrence Kilday v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00389 Janice Renee Swaney v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00397 Deborah A. Smith v. Ethicon, et al. CLOSED
2:12-cv-00401 Carol Jean Dimock v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00423 Pamela Free v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00443 Holy and Jason Jones v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00455 Pamela Gray Wheeler and Stan Wheeler v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00468 Amelia R. and Ernest B. Gonzales v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00469 Patricia Tyler v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00470 Mary Jane and Daniel Olson v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00476 Harriet Beach v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00481 Miranda Patterson v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00483 Carey Beth and David Cole v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00485 Danni Laffoon v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00486 Karen and Joel Forester v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00489 Melissa and Charles Clayton v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00490 Shirley and William Freeman v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00491 Gwendolyn T. Young v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00493 Nancy and Daniel Hooper v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00494 Penelope Ann Link and Dan Richard Saurino v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00495 Andrea Carol and Mark Thomas Chandlee v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00496 Sonya M. and James R. Moreland v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00497 Dina Sanders Bennett v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00498 Myndal Johnson v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00499 Kimberly Thomas v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00500 Krystal and Gregory Teasley v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00501 Jennifer and David Sikes v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00504 Donna T. and James W. Pilgreen v. Ethicon, et al. CLOSED
2:12-cv-00505 Mary and Kenneth Thurston v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00506 Martha and Stuart Newman v. Ethicon, et al. CLOSED
2:12-cv-00510 Charlene Miracle v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00511 Nancy Williams v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00516 Patricia Conti v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00517 Joann Lehman v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00539 Ann Louise Ruppel and Robert Dean Fuller v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00540 Nancy and Kenneth Feidler v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00547 Brenda and James Riddell v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00548 Rhoda Schachtman v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00554 Sharon and Gardner Carpenter v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00555 Carolyn Sue Doyle v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00567 Noemi and Cesar Padilla v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00571 Mary Catherine Wise v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00591 Beverly Kivel v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00594 Frances Ann and Herman Cortez v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00595 Mary and Thomas Hendrix v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00601 Deanna Jean and Bennie G. Thomas v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00609 Patricia O. Powell v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00651 Robin Bridges v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00652 Maria C. and Mark A. Stone v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00654 Stacy and Kevin Shultis v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00657 Judy G. Williams v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00663 Ana Ruebel v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00666 Donna and Leon Loustaunau v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00669 Teresa and Ricky J. Stout v. Ethicon, et al. CLOSED
2:12-cv-00679 Lisa and Henry Stevens v. Ethicon, et al. CLOSED
2:12-cv-00683 Louise Grabowski v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00736 Karen and Thomas Daniell v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00737 Beth and Stuart Harter v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00738 Sheri and Gary Scholl v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00746 Margaret Kirkpatrick v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00747 Karyn E. and Douglas E. Drake v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00748 Myra abd Richard Byrd v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00749 Jennifer D. and Willem C.J. Van Rensburg v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00751 Raquel and Ernesto De La Torre v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00755 Cheryl Lankston v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00756 Dee and Michael Woolsey v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00757 Barbara Jean and Keith Bridges v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00759 Diane and Robert Matott v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00760 Lois and Gerald Durham v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00761 Barbara J. and Gary L. Ware v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00762 Janet D. Jones v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00765 Rachel and Dwan Taylor v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00766 Kimberly Garnto v. Ethicon, et al. CLOSED
2:12-cv-00767 Rebecca and Charles Oehring v. Ethicon, et al. CLOSED
2:12-cv-00768 Sandra and Christian LaBadie v. Ethicon, et al. CLOSED
2:12-cv-00769 Kimberly T. Burnham v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00772 Harmony Minniefield v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00773 Tina and Keith Patterson v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00779 Dee and Timothy McBrayer v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00783 Wendy Hagans v. Ethicon, et al.
2:12-cv-00784 Schultz et al v. Ethicon, Inc. et al CLOSED
2:12-cv-00786 Swint et al v. Ethicon, Inc et al
2:12-cv-00787 Joplin v. Ethicon, Inc et al
2:12-cv-00799 Quijano v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-00800 Morrison et al v. Ethicon, Inc et al
2:12-cv-00806 Hill et al v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-00807 Sweeney et al v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-00811 Zoltowski et al v. Johnson & Johnson et al
2:12-cv-00821 Barr et al v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-00828 Nix et al v. Ethicon, Inc. et al CLOSED
2:12-cv-00829 Georgilakis et al v. Ethicon, Inc et at
2:12-cv-00830 Parrilla v. Ethicon, Inc. et al CLOSED
2:12-cv-00842 Stubblefield v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-00846 Raines et al v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-00848 Fisk v. Ethicon, Inc et al
2:12-cv-00854 Ballard et al v. Ethicon, Inc et al
2:12-cv-00856 Massicot v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-00859 Olmstead v. Ethicon, Inc. et al CLOSED
2:12-cv-00860 Pelton v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-00861 Smith et al v. Ethicon, Inc. et al CLOSED
2:12-cv-00863 Gunter et al v. Ethicon, Inc
2:12-cv-00864 Nolan v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-00867 Rock v. Ethicon et al
2:12-cv-00873 Walker et al v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-00875 Holzerland et al v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-00876 Hoy et al v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-00878 Fox et al v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-00880 Massey et al v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-00883 Wroble et al v. Ethicon, Inc et al
2:12-cv-00886 Umberger et al v. Ethicon, Inc. et al CLOSED
2:12-cv-00887 Kaiser et al v. Johnson & Johnson et al
2:12-cv-00888 Bruhn et al v. Ethicon, Inc et al
2:12-cv-00899 Barker et al v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-00921 Wilson v. Ethicon, Inc et al CLOSED
2:12-cv-00923 Atemnkeng et al v. Ethicon, Inc. et al CLOSED
2:12-cv-00931 Collins v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-00938 Kriz et al v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-00939 Reyes et al v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-00956 Justus v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-00957 Funderburke v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-00958 White et al v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-00960 Amsden et al v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-00961 Greene v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-00967 Shepherd v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-00995 Blake et al v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-00997 Springer et al v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-01004 Frye v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-01011 Hankins et al v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-01013 Lee et al v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-01018 Gwinn et al v. Ethicon, Inc. et al CLOSED
2:12-cv-01021 Ruiz v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-01023 Burkhart v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-01052 Babcock v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-01053 Baugher v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-01071 Schnering et al v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-01081 Dixon v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-01088 Wheeler et al v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-01090 Wright v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-01119 Rhynehart v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-01121 Guinn v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-01124 Bellito Stanford et al v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-01145 Constance Daino v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-01146 Monica Freitas v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-01148 Denise Sacchetti v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-01149 Cindy Smith v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-01150 Roberta Warmack v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-01151 Laura Waynick v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-01171 Patti Ann Phelps v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-01198 Stacy Pangborn v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-01199 Lisa Thompson v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-01202 Diane Kropf v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-01203 Joan Adams v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-01206 Jeanie Holmes v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-01215 Karen Bollinger v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-01216 Christine Wiltgen v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-01225 Ida Deanne Evans v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-01262 Saundra Landes v. Ethicon, Inc. et al CLOSED
2:12-cv-01267 Angela Coleman v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-01273 Rebekah Barlett v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-01274 Janice Colonna v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-01275 Long v. Johnson & Johnson et al
2:12-cv-01277 Duncan v. Ethicon, Inc et al
2:12-cv-01278 Nix v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-01279 Bertoni et al v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-01283 Cyrus v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-01284 Floyd v. Ethicon, Inc. et al Judith Gowin
2:12-cv-01285 Simpson et al v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-01286 Wilson v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-01293 Costello v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-01294 Herrera Nevarez v. Ethicon, Inc CLOSED
2:12-cv-01299 Destefano Rasten et al v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-01304 Irwin et al v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-01305 Lager v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-01311 Ridgley et al v. Ethicon, Inc. et al
2:12-cv-01318 Banks v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc. et al Marie Smith
