Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are made: At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner employed Respondent as a school bus driver pursuant to an annual contract. Said annual contract may be terminated for probable cause as set forth in Petitioner's local rule 3.27 (Exhibit P4). Respondent's employment was also subject to a union contract between the Petitioner and the International Brotherhood of Firemen and Oilers, Local 1227. Article 39 of said union contract provides for a formal hearing under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, when the Superintendent recommends termination of employment for any member of the bargaining unit. Upon employment, Respondent received training in the safe operation of school buses. As part of this training, Petitioner advised Respondent to exercise great caution at railroad crossings. Petitioner instructed Respondent on the correct procedures to follow when approaching and crossing a railroad track. During training, Petitioner provided Respondent with a copy of the Florida School Bus Drivers Handbook (Exhibit 4) which contains written procedures for bus drivers at railroad crossings. This handbook provides that the driver has the ultimate responsibility for the safe operation of the bus. It also contains a mirror provision of Section 316.1575, Florida Statutes, prohibiting anyone from driving through a railroad crossing when the crossing gate is closed or being opened or closed. Respondent's primary responsibility as a bus driver is to transport children to and from school. In the scope of his employment, he drives a bus through a railroad crossing on Forest Hill Boulevard near Interstate Highway 95 (I-95) everyday. On the morning of February 3, 1994, Respondent transported approximately sixty (60) children and two (2) teachers in a school bus on a field trip. Respondent exited I-95 and proceeded in a westerly direction along Forest Hill Boulevard. Respondent approached the railroad crossing on Forest Hill Boulevard near I-95 and stopped. After the bus came to a halt, the crossing lights started flashing and the crossing gate began to descend. Before Respondent proceeded across the railroad tracks, he did not: (a) open the school bus door to listen for the approaching train; (b) observe the signal lights as they started flashing; (c) observe the descent of the crossing gate; or (d) ensure that the passengers were quiet enough for him to hear the approaching train. As Respondent proceeded across the railroad track, the front of the bus struck the crossing gate, shattering it into several pieces. Respondent drove the bus to the other side of the crossing and stopped again before proceeding with the field trip. Two witnesses, concerned for the safety of the school bus passengers, immediately reported the incident to Petitioner's Transportation Department. Petitioner's employees must comply with school board policies and local rules which have been adopted in conformity with Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Respondent failed to comply with those policies on February 3, 1994, by: (a) failing to open the school bus door before crossing the track; (b) failing to heed the warnings of the flashing lights and descending crossing gate; (c) failing to maintain silence on the bus until it crossed the tracks; and (d) proceeding across the tracks before it was safe to do so. On July 20, 1994, the Superintendent recommended that Petitioner suspend Respondent without pay and terminate his employment for failure to adhere to state law and school board policies governing the safe operation of school buses. On July 20, 1994, Petitioner voted to suspend Respondent without pay and to terminate his employment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the undersigned recommends that Petitioner enter a Final Order suspending Respondent without pay and terminating his employment due to willful neglect of duty and misconduct in office by failing to follow proper procedures while operating a school bus at a railroad crossing. RECOMMENDED this 6th day of December, 1994, at Tallahassee, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD, Hearing Officer Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER 94-4679 The following constitute specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statues, on the parties' proposed findings of facts. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted in substance but modified in Finding of Fact (FOF) Number 1. Accepted in FOF Number 2. Accepted as modified in FOF Number 3 & Number 4. The Prehearing Stipulation references Article 39 of the Union Contract; however, there is no record evidence concerning a grievance procedure. Accepted in substance in FOF Number 5. Accepted in FOF Number 6. Accepted in FOF Number 6. Accepted in substance in FOF Number 7-Number 12. Respondent's testimony that he did not see flashing red warning lights while he was stopped at the crossing is not persuasive competent substantial evidence. Accepted in FOF Number 12. Accepted in FOF Number 12. Accepted; See FOF Number 13 and Conclusions of Law Number 24-27. Accepted in FOF Number 2. Accepted in FOF Number 15-16. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Respondent did not file proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Lee M. Rosenberg, Esquire Palm Beach County School District 3318 Forest Hill Boulevard West Palm Beach, FL 33406-5813 Wanda Stimpson, Business Agent Fireman & Oilers Local 1227 Post Office Box 449 Boynton Beach, FL 33435 Dr. Monica Uhlhorn Superintendant of Palm Beach County School District 3318 Forest Hill Boulevard West Palm Beach, FL 33406-5813
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent's employment as a teacher with Petitioner should be terminated for alleged willful neglect of duties and gross insubordination.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, the Miami-Dade County School Board (Petitioner) was a duly-constituted school board charged with the duty to operate, control, and supervise all free public schools within the district of Miami-Dade County, Florida. Judith Zucker (Respondent) began her employment with Petitioner, as a teacher, in 1968 and continued her employment with Petitioner until 1972. She began her employment with Petitioner again in 1989. Respondent holds a teacher certification in elementary education. She is also certified to teach the learning disabled and mentally handicapped. At all times material hereto, Respondent was employed by Petitioner as a teacher, assigned to Little River Elementary School (Little River), Citrus Grove Elementary School (Citrus Grove), and Miami Jackson Senior High School (Miami Jackson). Little River Elementary School In August 1989, Respondent resumed teaching with Petitioner. She was employed at Little River pursuant to a continuing contract of employment. On January 8, 1991, Respondent suffered injuries to her neck and spine when she attempted to break-up a fight between two students. Despite her injury, she immediately returned to work, not losing any time from work. In November 1994, Respondent was injured again. While walking down the hall of the school, a student, for whom she was not responsible, was hanging on a door. The student pushed himself off the door and fell on top of Respondent onto a cement floor. As a result, Respondent's original injury was aggravated. During the 1994-95 and 1995-96 school years, Respondent was a Title I tutor. She tutored three to eight students at a time in reading. During the 1996-97 school year, the reading program changed. For this school year, Little River, along with some other schools, was placed on Florida's critically low school list. Petitioner initiated a program called Operation Safety Net in which schools on the critically low list began using the Successful for All/Roots and Wings program (Success for All Reading Program). The Success for All Reading Program was for students who were critically deficient in reading. Little River and Petitioner's other critically low schools began using the Success for All Reading Program for the 1996-97 school year. In the Success for All Reading Program a tutor had a group of 18 to 20 students for 90 minutes in the morning. For the rest of the day, the tutor worked one-on-one with first grade students. Respondent was not assigned to the Success for All Reading Program at the beginning of the 1996-97 school year. Respondent requested her principal to assign her to the Success for All Reading Program due to her medical condition resulting from the injuries to her neck and spine for which she was still undergoing physical therapy. The principal agreed to assign Respondent to the Success for All Reading Program because the principal wanted to make sure that Respondent was provided with the opportunity and the time to attend therapy. Respondent was assigned to the Success for All Reading Program with a modification. Respondent was allowed to assist other tutors with testing and was working in groups of two to four students, significantly smaller than the regular groups of 18 to 20 students. Using the smaller groups for Respondent caused the other morning groups to become even larger. At the time that the principal made the assignment with the modification, the principal expected the duration of the assignment to be short, but the assignment spanned the entire school year. Having groups expanding beyond the 18 to 20 students for the entire school year created a hardship in that it was counter-productive for the critically deficient readers. In the fall of 1996, Respondent was again injured. This time, Respondent was injured by a student to whom she was tutoring one-on-one. Respondent did not lose any work as a result of the injury she sustained. Respondent had now been injured by students at Little River on three separate occasions: January 8, 1991, November 1994, and the fall of 1996. Despite the injuries that she sustained, she immediately returned to work after each occurrence without any loss of time. At the end of a school year, teachers indicate what they would prefer to do during the following school year. In May or June 1997, the principal of Little River advised Respondent that she would be assigned to teach a regular class, a third grade class, for the 1997-98 school year. Respondent sought a transfer from Little River in August 1997. No transfer occurred. When Respondent returned to Little River in August 1997 for the 1997-98 school year, Respondent informed the principal that she was still in physical therapy; that she was unable to write on the chalkboard because to do so caused her to shake; and that she was, therefore, unable to return to a regular classroom. Respondent requested a return to tutoring. The principal informed Respondent that the tutors had already been assigned and that she (Respondent) was expected to return to a regular classroom. However, for the first two weeks of school, the principal allowed Respondent to tutor. The principal contacted Petitioner's Office of Risk Management1 to determine Respondent's status as to whether she was able to return to a regular classroom. Risk Management advised the principal that Respondent was cleared to return to her regular duties, to return to a regular classroom. On September 19, 1997, the principal explained to Respondent that, according to Risk Management, she was cleared to return to her regular duties and that she would be returning to a regular third grade classroom. The third grade classroom would contain no more than 29 to 33 students. Respondent informed the principal that she (Respondent) was not able to return to a regular classroom and that her doctor would have to contact Risk Management. On September 23, 1997, the principal again contacted Risk Management which again informed the principal that Respondent was cleared to return to her regular duties. The principal advised Respondent of the information that she had obtained from Risk Management. Respondent again informed the principal that she was unable to return to a regular classroom. Risk Management had also advised the principal that, if Respondent continued to insist that she was unable to return to a regular classroom, the principal should direct Respondent to leave the school's campus. The principal did as Risk Management advised and directed Respondent to leave the school's campus. Respondent complied with the principal's directive and left the campus of Little River. The Executive Director of Risk Management (Executive Director) had advised the principal to direct Respondent to leave the school's campus if Respondent insisted that she could not return to a regular classroom. He advised the principal to direct Respondent to leave the school's campus because of Respondent's medical condition. The Executive Director had reviewed Respondent's file and had become aware of a letter dated September 3, 1997, from Dr. Raul Grosz, Respondent's authorized2 neurologist. The letter stated in pertinent part: She [Respondent] has at this time chronic persistent [sic] and discomfort. I am recommending that she be placed in a non- threatening environment in which she does not have to move furniture or lift furniture whatsoever. I also feel that she is unable to carry a full class-load at this time. As a result of the letter, the Executive Director authorized the payment of workers' compensation benefits from the date that Respondent was directed to leave Little River's campus by the principal. Even though Dr. Grosz opined that Respondent was "unable to carry a full class-load," he did not state the number of students as to what represented a full class-load. However, Dr. Grosz considered a full class-load to consist of a large group of students who were not well-behaved and who were potentially dangerous. Dr. Grosz did not inform Respondent as to what he considered to be a full class-load. There was no neurological basis for restricting Respondent to a non-threatening environment or a reduced class size. Respondent requested Dr. Grosz to add the restrictions. Respondent also expressed her desire to be in a non-threatening environment. Respondent's requests seemed reasonable to Dr. Grosz and he attempts to accommodate his patients' subjective feelings, so Dr. Grosz included the restrictions in his letter. It was Dr. Gorsz's intent that Respondent and Petitioner attempt to reach a mutually acceptable solution and that Petitioner would provide what it determined was appropriate. As of September 19, 1997, Respondent had exhausted all of her available sick and personal leave. Petitioner and the United Teachers of Dade (UTD) have entered into a collective bargaining agreement (UTD Contract). The UTD Contract provides generous, extensive leave provisions. Respondent never applied for any type of leave, including leave pursuant to the UTD Contract. The Executive Director was authorized to direct a teacher to a work assignment. In determining a work assignment for Respondent, the Executive Director sought assistance from and relied upon Petitioner's Instructional Staffing Department to locate a position for Respondent which would meet her medical restrictions. Citrus Grove Elementary School The Director of Instructional Staffing informed the Executive Director that a varying exceptionalities (VE) position in special education was available at Citrus Grove. A VE teacher teaches a group of students who have different exceptionalities. The VE teacher may simultaneously teach the students with different exceptionalities in the same class or the teacher may teach the students with one exceptionality during the school day at one time and may teach other students with a different exceptionality during the same school day at another time. VE teaching is used for mildly handicapped students. By letter dated October 7, 1997, the Executive Director informed Respondent that a VE position was available at Citrus Grove and that the VE position was within her certification and met her medical restrictions. He also indicated that the position was an appropriate accommodation for Respondent. Moreover, the Executive Director directed Respondent to report to Citrus Grove immediately and to call the principal at Citrus Grove for further reporting instructions. Respondent failed to call the principal. She also failed to report to Citrus Grove. Respondent decided, without making any personal investigation, that the VE position at Citrus Grove was not appropriate and was unreasonable. Respondent did not believe that she was physically capable of performing as a VE teacher at Citrus Grove. Respondent is in pain daily. She wears a Tens Unit to short-circuit some of the pain. Respondent expresses being afraid of being in groups wherein she may be bumped which would worsen her condition. However, Respondent's authorized neurologist, Dr. Grosz has no concern regarding physical contact by bumping causing further neurological damage or problems. He has more concern regarding further neurological damage or problems caused by Respondent being involved in a high-speed motor vehicle accident. Respondent did not observe the placement or inquire about the profiles of the students who she was going to teach. The composition of the VE class, as to students, at Citrus Grove was decided before Respondent was assigned the VE class, and, therefore, the composition was not decided with consideration given to Respondent's physical limitations. Respondent assumed that she would be required to use physical restraint techniques with the students. The UTD Contract provides for the use of the Safe Physical Management (SPM) program, which is the use of physical restraints for severely disabled students. Teachers, who are in self-contained programs for severely emotionally disturbed students and autistic students, receive training in techniques to contain highly disruptive students under unusual circumstances. The techniques are used to prevent injuries to persons, including the student, and damage to property. Before SPM is used, Petitioner's Multi-Disciplinary Team must recommend its use and the use of SPM must be documented on the student's Individualized Education Program (IEP). One student in Respondent's assigned class had an IEP which approved SPM. However, based upon the student's progress, it was unlikely that SPM would have been needed. Moreover, SPM is not used in VE classes at Citrus Grove; mildly handicapped students, not volatile students, are placed in the VE classes. Dr. Grosz opined that Respondent could teach a class of 25 to 30 well-behaved students. The VE classes at Citrus Grove were not full-load classes. The VE classes consisted of 7 to 10 mildly disabled students at any one time; whereas, the regular classes consisted of between 28 and 39 students. Elementary VE classes contained no more than 12 to 15 students. The number of students in VE classes at Citrus Grove were smaller than VE classes throughout Petitioner's district. Respondent also erroneously relied upon Dr. Grosz's opinion that she was unable to teach a full class-load. What Respondent considered a full class-load and what Dr. Grosz considered a full class-load were not the same. Pursuant to what Dr. Grosz considered a full class-load, Respondent would have been able to accept the VE position at Citrus Grove. Respondent would have been the third VE teacher at Citrus Grove. The VE students were all in one room separated by a partition. Respondent's class would have been on one side of the partition and one VE teacher would have been in the class with Respondent. The other VE teacher and the other VE students would have been on the other side of he partition. Citrus Grove was a safe, non-threatening environment. The needs of the VE students at Citrus Grove were more an educational concern than emotional, and the VE students were well-behaved. As to Respondent being injured at Citrus Grove in the VE position, such an occurrence was unlikely. Respondent would not have been required to lift or move any furniture or any heavy items at Citrus Grove. Respondent was qualified to teach the VE class at Citrus Grove. The Citrus Grove assignment met Respondent's medical restrictions. The assignment of Respondent to Citrus Grove was reasonable. Respondent's refusal of the Citrus Grove assignment was unreasonable and unjustified. Approximately one week after Respondent was assigned to Citrus Grove, Respondent, on October 13, 1997, presented to Dr. Grosz for an examination. Respondent did not inform Dr. Grosz of the assignment at Citrus Grove. Informing Dr. Grosz of the assignment would have provided Dr. Gorsz with an opportunity to explain to Respondent what he meant by his opinion. Respondent did not also inform Dr. Sanford Jacobson, her authorized psychiatrist, of the Citrus Grove assignment when she presented to him for a psychiatric evaluation on October 14, 1997. Dr. Jacobson prepared a report of the evaluation dated October 16, 1997.3 In the "Summary and Conclusions" section of his report, Dr. Jacobson states, among other things, the following: There have been three incidents which have resulted in injuries as described by Mrs. Zucker [Respondent]. While some of them may have been somewhat surprising, difficult to manage, and distressing, I would not think that they are the kind of injuries that one would see as causing a Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. . . . The most prominent symptoms are depressive symptoms. Clinical diagnosis at present is that of: Axis I: Mood disorder associated with cervical disc disease and stenosis with depressive-like episode. * * * It would appear that her depression is related to the injuries. . . . At this time I do not believe she can resume full classroom duties. In essence, Dr. Jacobson's diagnosis was that Respondent was suffering from depression related to her pain and discomfort from her physical injury. Even though Dr. Jacobson opined that Respondent could not resume "full classroom duties," he did not state the number of students as to what he considered a full classroom. However, Dr. Jacobson considered a full classroom to consist of approximately 25 to 30 students or more. As a result of Respondent not reporting to Citrus Grove, day-to-day substitutes filled her position. The needs of the VE students were not met with such an arrangement. Miami Jackson Senior High School On or about October 15, 1997, one of Respondent's physicians had placed Respondent on a no-work status. Subsequently, on November 10, 1997, Dr. Grosz returned Respondent to work but with restrictions. Dr. Grosz states in his report dated November 10, 1997, among other things, the following: She [Respondent] remains able to perform at light duty status with no lifting of furniture allowed and I will defer to psychiatry in terms of her emotional complaints. The Executive Director consulted again with Petitioner's Instructional Staffing to locate a position for Respondent. Instructional Staffing informed him of a VE position at Miami Jackson. On December 3, 1997, the Executive Director informed Respondent that a VE position at Miami Jackson was within her certification and met her medical needs. He directed Respondent to report to Miami Jackson. The Executive Director also directed Respondent to call the principal at Miami Jackson for further reporting instructions. Respondent failed to report to Miami Jackson. She also failed to call the principal at Miami Jackson. Respondent decided, without making any personal investigation, that the VE position at Miami Jackson was not appropriate and was unreasonable. Respondent did not believe that she was physically capable of performing as a VE teacher at Miami Jackson. Respondent did not observe the placement or inquire about the profiles of the students whom she was going to teach. The composition of the VE class, as to students, at Miami Jackson was decided before Respondent was assigned the VE class, and, therefore, the composition was not decided with consideration given to Respondent's physical limitations. Respondent assumed that she would be required to use physical restraint techniques with students. The VE classes at Miami Jackson were not full-load classes. The regular classes at Miami Jackson averaged approximately 35 students; whereas, the VE classes consisted of 14 to 21 students per class period in Respondent's proposed classes. The students in the VE classes were mildly disabled, with the majority of the students being learning disabled and a few being emotionally handicapped and a few educationally mentally handicapped. Many of the students were being mainstreamed into the regular school setting. A majority of the students were on track for a standard diploma. Three students in Respondent's proposed class at Miami Jackson had IEPs which approved SPM. The students would have been in Respondent's proposed class in 1998. The students' prior IEPs had approved SPM and the SPM was carried over to Miami Jackson. However, based upon the students' progress, it was unlikely that SPM would have been needed. Moreover, SPM is not used in VE classes at Miami Jackson; SPM is only used in severly emotionally disabled classes at Miami Jackson. Miami Jackson was a safe, non-threatening environment. Respondent would not have been required to lift or move any furniture or any heavy items at Miami Jackson. Respondent was qualified to teach the VE class at Miami Jackson. However, the Miami Jackson assignment failed to meet Respondent's medical restrictions. The Miami Jackson assignment met Dr. Grosz's medical restrictions; but, it failed to meet Dr. Jacobson's medical restrictions. Dr. Jacobson did not state in his report the size of the class that he recommended that Respondent teach. Nor did he recommend to Respondent the size of class that she should teach. At hearing, Dr. Jacobson opined that he would recommend that Respondent teach a class with 7 to 10 students; however, he would not recommend that Respondent teach a class with 14 to 21 students. Respondent's proposed VE classes at Miami Jackson consisted of 14 to 21 students. The assignment of Respondent to Miami Jackson was unreasonable. Respondent's refusal of the assignment to Miami Jackson was reasonable and justified. It matters not that Respondent was unaware of the size of class recommended by Dr. Jacobson; it is sufficient that the assignment failed to meet his medical restrictions. Even though Respondent did not know the size of class to which Dr. Jacobson was referring, she relied upon his report, as well as Dr. Grosz's opinion, in refusing the assignment to Miami Jackson. As a result of Respondent not reporting to Miami Jackson, day-to-day substitutes filled her position until a permanent teacher could be assigned. Dr. Grosz examined Respondent again on December 12, 1997. Respondent did not advise him of her assignment to Miami Jackson. Because Respondent had failed to report to Citrus Grove and to Miami Jackson as directed, the Executive Director turned Respondent's case over to Petitioner's Office of Professional Standards (OPS). By letter dated January 26, 1998, OPS advised Respondent, among other things, that she had been absent without authorized leave and that such absence constituted willful neglect of duty and subjected her employment to termination. OPS also requested that Respondent provide a written request within 10 working days if she wanted a review of her situation. Respondent failed to reply to OPS' letter. However, Respondent's counsel for workers' compensation responded. The response from Respondent's counsel indicated that Petitioner was aware why Respondent was not working, but his response failed to specifically address the assignments to Citrus Grove and to Miami Jackson. Petitioner took action on March 18, 1998, to suspend Respondent and dismiss her from employment. According to Petitioner's computerized attendance records, at that time Respondent had been absent without authorized leave since September 19, 1997. From September 19, 1997, to October 7, 1997, Respondent was not absent without authorization. On September 19, 1997, Respondent informed the principal of Little River that she was unable to teach the regular third grade class. Subsequently, on September 23, 1997, the principal directed Respondent to leave Little River, upon the advice of the Executive Director, and the Executive Director authorized Respondent to receive workers' compensation benefits retroactive to the date that she was directed to leave. Moreover, Respondent was not directed to report to Citrus Grove until October 7, 1997.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Miami-Dade County School Board enter a final order sustaining the suspension of Judith Tucker without pay, but not dismissing her from employment, and reinstating Judith Tucker under the terms and conditions deemed appropriate. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of June, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of June, 1999.
The Issue Whether Respondent Southeast Grove Management, Inc., is indebted to Petitioner in the amount of $5,560.08 for limes grown by Petitioner and picked and sold by Respondent Southeast?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Joyce McKiness is a grower of limes in Homestead, Florida. Respondent Southeast Grove Management, Inc., (hereinafter "Southeast") goes to individual groves and picks the limes, then brings them to the packing house where they are graded, sized, and shipped to be sold at prices according to size. When the recipient of the limes pays Southeast after receipt of the limes, Southeast ascertains what prices were paid for the limes, and then calculates its costs and pays the grower the difference. Between the weeks ending March 4 and July 8, 1988, Southeast picked 1,165.1 bushels of limes grown by Petitioner. There is no dispute as to the number of bushels of Petitioner's limes picked by Southeast. Petitioner disputes Southeast's calculations as to the price which Southeast received for the limes, the percentage of the limes picked by Southeast which `graded out' for sale, and the amount of picking and inspection fees charged by Southeast. Petitioner bases the price that she claims Southeast received for the limes, for the eight separate pickings in question in this cause, on her belief that 1988 lime prices were 25% higher than 1987 lime prices. She, therefore, added 25% to the prices of limes picked in 1987 for the same months. No competent, substantial evidence was offered in support of Petitioner's belief. In one instance, Southeast paid her a higher price per bushel than she claims. Petitioner claims that 80% of each picking was saleable citrus. Southeast's records reflect that Petitioner was given credit for 80% of her limes on one of the eight pickings. For the remainder of the pickings, however, Southeast gave her credit for as little as 45.4% of the bushels picked and as high as 99.7% of the bushels picked. No competent, substantial evidence was offered to justify Petitioner's selection of 80% for all eight pickings. The 80% figure selected by Petitioner allows for no differences in the amount of marketable limes from each picking, and there is no evidence to support the proposition that no matter when during the season the limes are picked exactly 80% of them will be marketable. No competent, substantial evidence was offered as to how Petitioner computed the picking and inspection fees paid by Southeast, which fees were then deducted by Southeast from the sale price of the limes before crediting Petitioner with the balance of the sale price. In two instances, the picking and inspection fees charged by Southeast were less than what Petitioner claims they should be. Southeast admits that for lime pool #809 for the week ending March 4, 1988, it owes petitioner the amount of $393.36.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that Southeast Grove Management, Inc., is indebted to Petitioner Joyce McKiness in the amount of $393.36 and that such monies should be paid to her within fifteen days from the entry of the Final Order. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 30th day of January, 1990. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30 day of January, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Cliff Willis Florida Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company 1850 Old Dixie Highway Homestead, Florida 33033 Don Reynolds c/o Aaron Thomas, Inc. 11010 North Kendall Drive, Suite 200 Miami, Florida 33176 Joyce McKiness 20350 Southwest 346th Street Homestead, Florida 33034 Clinton H. Coulter, Jr., Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Benjamin S. Schwartz, Esquire #1 CenTrust Financial Center 36th Floor 100 Southeast 2nd Street Miami, Florida 33131 Honorable Doyle Conner Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Mallory Horne, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Ben Pridgeon, Chief Bureau of Licensing & Bond Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact Findings on general matters The Respondent was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on June 15, 1982, and issued certificate number 02-31243. The Respondent was employed as a law enforcement officer by the Riviera Beach Police Department from March 29, 1982, to July 31, 1988. He was re-employed by that police department on March 11, 1991, and was so employed as of the date of the formal hearing. At the time of all of the events described in the findings of fact which follow, the Respondent was a certified law enforcement officer. Findings regarding the Mangonia Park incident During the evening hours of May 17, 1987, the Respondent, while off duty, unarmed, and dressed in civilian clothes, ventured into the town limits of the Town of Mangonia Park where he became involved in a fracas with a uniformed, armed, on-duty police officer of that town, Officer James C. Carr. The fracas had its inception shortly after the Respondent stopped his automobile in the outside lane of a city street that had three lanes in each direction in order to watch what Officer Carr and another Mangonia Park police officer (Officer Combs) were doing with a young black male civilian they had just stopped in the median strip of the same street. Officer Carr shouted to the Respondent that the latter should move his car. The Respondent took no action in response to that directive from Officer Carr. Annoyed by the lack of response, Officer Carr began to walk towards the Respondent's automobile as he repeated his directive to the Respondent using coarse, vulgar, confrontational words which included what are commonly referred to as "swear" words, as well as references to the Respondent's race, which is black. 2/ Officer Combs also walked towards the Respondent's automobile. The Respondent protested the manner in which Officer Carr was speaking to him and also offered the mistaken 3/ observation that his automobile was in the City of West Palm Beach, outside of Officer Carr's jurisdiction. Annoyed by the Respondent's comments and his continued failure to leave as directed, Officer Carr continued his invective. Annoyed by Officer Carr's abusive language, the Respondent addressed Officer Carr in a coarse and vulgar manner as he began to try to get out of his automobile. Officer Carr interrupted the Respondent's efforts to exit the automobile by pushing against the automobile door, thereby catching the Respondent's foot between the door and the side of the automobile. The Respondent continued to address Officer Carr in a coarse and vulgar manner and continued to struggle to get out of his automobile. Officer Carr continued to prevent his exit. Momentarily the Respondent was successful in exiting the automobile and he and Officer Carr stood face to face shouting at each other. Officer Carr made at least one verbal threat to do physical violence to the Respondent, threatened to throw the Respondent in jail, and also made threatening gestures with a baton towards the Respondent. The Respondent asked if he was under arrest and told Officer Carr not to touch him if he was not under arrest. In response to Officer Carr's further threatening gestures with the baton, the Respondent said to Officer Carr: "Don't hit me with that baton, okay? If you hit me with that baton and I'm not under arrest, I'm going to blow your brains out!" The Respondent did not take any aggressive physical action towards either Officer Carr or Officer Combs. At about this point, Officer Combs stepped in between Officer Carr and the Respondent in an attempt to keep things from getting worse. At about the same time, other off-duty police officers arrived on the scene and joined in Officer Combs' efforts. After Officer Carr and the Respondent had cooled down, it was agreed by all concerned that it was just an unfortunate misunderstanding and the participants apologized to each other. Findings regarding the Lt. Wiesen incident On November 20, 1987, the Respondent got into an argument with Lt. Steven Wiesen, one of his supervisors, regarding the latter's announced intention to recommend that the Respondent be given a suspension for abuse of sick time. The Respondent felt that he was being wrongly accused and continued to argue with Lt. Wiesen about the matter. The argument escalated to the point that Lt. Wiesen decided to go see a superior officer about the matter. As Lt. Wiesen and the Respondent were walking up the stairs to the Assistant Chief's office, the Respondent said to Lt. Wiesen words to the effect of: "This is the kind of shit that, like the post office, you know, makes somebody want to come to work and kill everybody." 4/ Lt. Wiesen's response to that comment was to ask if the Respondent was threatening him. The Respondent answered, "I don't make threats." At the time of these comments the Respondent was walking in front of Lt. Wiesen. The Respondent did not take any aggressive physical action towards Lt. Wiesen. The Respondent and Lt. Wiesen both told the Assistant Chief their respective versions of what they were arguing about and the Assistant Chief told them to both put it in writing. Findings regarding the Chief Walker incident During the evening hours of May 5, 1988, the Respondent, while off duty, unarmed, and dressed in civilian clothes, attended a meeting of the Civil Service Board at the Riviera Beach City Hall. The subject of the meeting was whether the decision of then Police Chief Frank Walker to demote the Respondent from Sergeant to Patrolman should be upheld or reversed. The Respondent's parents also attended the meeting. At the conclusion of the meeting the Civil Service Board voted to uphold the Respondent's demotion. The Respondent and his parents all felt that the Respondent had been treated unfairly by both the Civil Service Board and by Chief Walker. Shortly after the conclusion of the Civil Service Board meeting, the Respondent's mother approached Chief Walker and began telling him how she felt about the matter. She was very upset and was crying. The Respondent approached his mother and told her not to talk to the Chief any more and to come along home. He also said words to her to the effect of, "He's going to end up getting a bullet put in his head anyway." Chief Walker apparently heard part of what the Respondent had said to his mother and asked the Respondent what he had said. The Respondent replied: "I said, sir, it is my opinion that if you continue to treat people the way you do, somebody's going to put a bullet in your head." Immediately following that statement, the Chief walked away in one direction and the Respondent and his mother walked away in another. The Respondent did not take any aggressive physical action towards Chief Walker.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a Final Order in this case dismissing all charges in the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of December, 1995, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of December, 1995.
Findings Of Fact On November 10, 1977, Henry was employed as a teacher working under a continuing contract for the Citrus County School Board in Citrus High School, Inverness, Florida. At or about 12:35 p.m., on that date, Henry was responsible for a fourth period driving education class. At that time, class was beginning when Henry removed himself from the classroom to investigate a commotion in the hallway. The door of the classroom swung shut by itself and the lights to the classroom were switched off. A general commotion ensued in the classroom. After a brief period of time, Henry reentered the classroom and closed the door behind him. Henry removed his belt from his pants and did not turn on the lights. There was very little light in the classroom because the room had only two windows, one leading to an interior office which had no light on and the other approximately 1 square foot in size and located in the door leading to the hallway. There was, however, barely enough light for some students to observe the ensuing sequence of events. Henry then angrily asked the class who had turned the lights off and at the same time swung his belt in a threatening manner striking not only desks in the classroom but also a student, one Tracy White, between one and five times on the leg. Miss White was not seriously injured but she did experience some anxiety. One other student shared Miss White's concern for her personal welfare and moved from her seat near Miss White to another portion of the room in which she was out of danger. The incident was terminated several minutes later when someone turned the lights on. On September 8, 1977, a recommended order was entered in Citrus County School Board v. Allen P. Henry, Jr., Case No. 77-970, Division of Administrative Hearings, which order was adopted by the Citrus County School Board on September 27, 1977. In that case, Henry was found to have used his belt to break up a fight between students. It was concluded that such injudicial use of force constituted inconsiderate treatment of the pupils and it was recommended that Henry be formally advised by the School Board that the methods he employed were improper and were not to be repeated. On September 30, 1977, the School Board mailed a letter to Henry, which letter Henry subsequently received, referring to the recommended order of the Hearing Officer and advising Henry that the methods he employed in the circumstances of that case were improper and were not toe be repeated.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated sections 1012.795(1)(f), (1)(g), and (1)(j), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-10.081(3)(a), as alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint; and, if so, the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses and other evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Florida Education Practices Commission is the state agency charged with the duty and responsibility to revoke or suspend, or take other appropriate action with regard to teaching certificates as provided in sections 1012.795 and 1012.796, Florida Statutes (2016). § 1012.79(7), Fla. Stat. Petitioner, as Commissioner of Education, is charged with the duty to file and prosecute administrative complaints against individuals who hold Florida teaching certificates and who are alleged to have violated standards of teacher conduct. § 1012.796(6), Fla. Stat. Respondent holds Florida Educator's Certificate 1128573, covering the areas of Elementary Education, English, English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) and Middle Grades Integrated Curriculum, which is valid through June 30, 2021. During the 2013-2014 school year, until her voluntary resignation effective June 3, 2015, Respondent was employed as a language arts teacher at Gulf Breeze High School. Since that time, Respondent has been employed as a third-grade teacher at a private Christian academy in Pensacola, Florida. Material Allegations The material allegations upon which the alleged violations are predicated are, in their entirety, as follows: On or about July 19, 2008, Respondent illegally operated a boat while under the influence of alcohol. As a result of conduct, she was arrested and charged with Boating Under the Influence. On or about February 18, 2009, Respondent was adjudicated guilty of Boating Under the Influence. In or around January 2015 through March 2015, Respondent provided a forum where underage students illegally consumed alcohol and/or consumed alcohol in the presence of students. This conduct includes, but is not limited to, instances: in or around February 2015, wherein Respondent provided alcohol to underage students; and on or about March 20, 2015, when Respondent drove to J.H.'s, a student's, home, while under the influence of alcohol, and thereafter, attempted to drive J.H. while so inebriated. On or about April 24, 2015, Respondent illegally operated a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. On or about May 26, 2015, as a result of the aforementioned conduct, Respondent was arrested and charged with DUI-Second Conviction More Than Five (5) Years After Prior Conviction. On or about April 7, 2016, Respondent pled nolo contendere to an amended charge of Reckless Driving; adjudication was withheld. Count 1 Count 1 alleged a violation based upon Respondent having “been convicted or found guilty of, or entered a plea of guilty to, regardless of adjudication of guilt, a misdemeanor, felony, or any other criminal charge, other than a minor traffic violation.” The Count was based on the two incidents described in paragraphs 3 and 5 of the Amended Administrative Complaint as follows: Boating Under the Influence -- 2008 On or about July 19, 2008, Respondent was maneuvering a boat onto a trailer at the Navarre Beach boat ramp. Her husband was driving their vehicle, and had backed their trailer into the water. As a result of actions at that time, Respondent was placed under arrest for Boating Under the Influence (BUI), a misdemeanor (her husband was arrested for Driving Under the Influence). Respondent entered a plea of no contest to the BUI offense and, on February 18, 2008, was adjudicated guilty. Subsequent to the final hearing, counsel for Petitioner researched the issue and discovered that the incident occurred prior to Respondent’s initial certification as a teacher. As a result, Petitioner correctly concluded and stipulated “that no disciplinary action should be taken as a result of this conviction.” Driving Under the Influence -- 2015 On April 24, 2015, Respondent and a friend drove, in the friend’s car, to Pensacola Beach for drinks. Respondent left her car in a Publix parking lot. Upon their return, Respondent correctly perceived that she was not fit to drive home. Her phone was dead, so she got into her car and started it in order to charge the phone. She called her son and asked that he come pick her up. At some point after calling her son, Respondent called her soon-to-be ex-husband, from whom she was in the process of a bitter divorce, and engaged in a heated and animated discussion with him. A complaint was called in, and Officer Kidd was dispatched to the scene. Upon his arrival, Officer Kidd observed Respondent in her car, with the engine running, “yelling at someone on the phone.” He noticed a bottle of Crown Royal in the center console. Respondent refused to perform field sobriety tasks. Office Kidd’s observations of Respondent while she was in the car and upon her exiting the car led him to believe that she was impaired. Respondent had been in the car, with the engine running, and was clearly in control of the vehicle regardless of her intent to drive. Although Respondent’s son arrived on the scene to take her home, Respondent was arrested and transported to jail.2/ Respondent was charged with DUI. The charges were reduced, and she entered a nolo plea to reckless driving. The trial judge withheld adjudication. Count 2 Count 2 alleged a violation based upon Respondent having “been found guilty of personal conduct that seriously reduces that person’s effectiveness as an employee of the district school board.” The Count was based on the incidents described in paragraph 4 of the Amended Administrative Complaint. March 20, 2015 -- The Garage On or about March 20, 2015, over spring break, Joshua Hartley was at Pensacola Beach with friends, including Respondent’s son. He had his father’s car. Apparently, Joshua’s father, Jon Hartley had been trying for some time to reach Joshua and have him return the car. Joshua and his group of friends had plans to stay at the beach into the evening. Respondent’s son suggested that Respondent, who he knew to be at the beach, could follow Joshua home, and then return him to his friends at the beach. Respondent was called, and she followed Joshua from the beach to his house, a drive of perhaps 15 minutes. When Joshua and Respondent arrived at the house, Mr. Hartley, Ms. Barrett, and a third man were sitting and drinking in the open garage. Other than agreement that Respondent and Joshua showed up at the house at the same time, the description of the events by Joshua Hartley, Mr. Hartley, and Ms. Barrett were so divergent that the three might well have been in different places. Ms. Barnett described the incident as occurring between 8:00 and 8:30 p.m., when it was dark. She testified that Joshua and Respondent pulled up in separate vehicles, and that Mr. Hartley initially approved of Joshua returning to the beach with Respondent as a good deed, since Joshua purportedly indicated that “she’s really drunk.” She indicated that Joshua got into the passenger seat of Respondent’s vehicle, whereupon Respondent put the vehicle in gear, and lurched forward, almost hitting Mr. Hartley’s vehicle. At that time, Ms. Barrett indicated that Mr. Hartley ran down, startled by the driving error, told Joshua that he could not go with her, and offered to let Respondent stay with them until she sobered up. Ms. Barrett further described Respondent as essentially falling out of her bathing suit, barefoot, staggering, with slurred and vulgar speech, and highly intoxicated. After about an hour, and as Respondent was preparing to leave, Ms. Barnett testified that Joshua, who had remained with the adults in the garage since his arrival, went to his room. Ms. Barnett testified that Respondent then excused herself to use the restroom. Ms. Barnett testified that after 15 minutes or so, she went inside, and found Respondent “exiting Joshua’s bedroom.” Her description of the event is not accepted, and her veiled insinuation that something improper occurred -- for which no evidence exists -- did not go unnoticed. Mr. Hartley described the incident as occurring between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m. He testified that Joshua and Respondent arrived at the house in Respondent’s car with Joshua as the passenger. He was “positive” that Joshua was not driving because he was 15 years old and did not have a driver’s license. When they pulled into the driveway, Mr. Hartley testified that he walked down to the vehicle and that Joshua got out of the car. Mr. Hartley was unsure if Joshua stayed in the garage at all, but at most went to his room after a matter of minutes. Respondent joined the adults in the garage. Mr. Hartley indicated that Respondent “looked like she had been at the beach” and, though her speech was not slurred, he could tell she had been drinking because he could smell alcohol and by “the way she was speaking.” His description of Respondent was far from the florid state of intoxication as described by Ms. Barnett. Mr. Hartley offered no description of Respondent’s vehicle lurching forward, Respondent staggering, or of Joshua asserting that Respondent was really drunk. Finally, his concern that “the grown, intoxicated woman [as described by counsel in his question] was in your 15 year old son’s bedroom” was based solely on Ms. Barnett’s description of what she claimed to have seen. Joshua testified that he drove to his house in his father’s black Lincoln Aviator, and that Respondent followed in her white Ford Expedition. It was daylight, around 4:00 in the afternoon. Upon their arrival, Respondent pulled onto the grass next to the driveway. Mr. Hartley was mad, possibly about Joshua having the car, would not let him return to the beach, and sent him to his room within a minute of his arrival. Joshua testified that Respondent was in typical beach attire. He had no complaint as to Respondent’s actions either at the beach or at his house, and did not see her drinking. He did, however, indicate that “they” told him that “she might have been drunk or something.” He testified that after Respondent spent some time with the adults in the garage, she then went inside to use the restroom. Joshua’s door was open, and Respondent stood at the door and apologized if she had gotten him into trouble. She then left. Given the dramatic divergence in the stories of the witnesses, the evidence is not clear and convincing that anything untoward occurred when Respondent agreed to give Joshua a ride to his house to return his father’s car, and offered to return him to his friends at the beach. Though credible evidence suggests that Respondent had alcohol on her breath, there was no evidence that she was “under the influence of alcohol,” that she was not able to lawfully drive a vehicle, or that Joshua suspected that she had been drinking. Ms. Barrett’s more dramatic testimony that Respondent was drunk and staggering, falling out of her clothes, with her speech slurred and profane, and the intimation that she was in Joshua’s bedroom in that condition, is not accepted. The evidence adduced at the hearing was not clear and convincing that, on March 20, 2017, Respondent engaged in personal conduct that seriously reduced her effectiveness as an employee of the district school board. February 15, 2015 -- Mardi Gras There was a good bit of evidence and testimony taken that Petitioner was seen drunk and staggering down the street at the 2015 Pensacola Mardi Gras, and was seen and assisted by students in that condition. However, the basis for the Amended Administrative Complaint was not that Respondent was publically intoxicated, but that she “provided alcohol to underage students.” Pensacola has a Mardi Gras event with a parade and floats. In 2015, “Fat Tuesday” was on February 17. The big 2015 Mardi Gras parade was on Sunday, February 15. Respondent had a group of friends that were in a Mardi Gras Krewe and she had been helping them with the float. She apparently drank a good bit. By the time her friends were ready to join the parade, around noon to 1:00 p.m., Respondent determined that she was drunk enough that she should go to the hotel room the group had rented. Unlike the evidence for the “Garage” incident, the evidence was convincing that Respondent was very intoxicated. Ms. Smith testified that Respondent joined a group of alumni and students at a Subway parking lot where they had gathered to watch the parade. The evidence is persuasive that Respondent came upon the scene by happenstance, and that the parking lot was not her destination. While there, Respondent very likely consumed one or more “Jello-shots.” However, the suggestion that Respondent was in any condition to have brought the Jello-shots with her to the parking lot is rejected. Rather, the evidence supports that the shots were there, and that she partook. It would not have been out of character for Respondent to have taken them and handed them around. Furthermore, the testimony that Respondent was distributing beers to students is, for the same reason, simply not plausible. After a while, Ms. Smith, followed but not assisted by Mr. Brayton, assisted Respondent to her hotel. Respondent was, by this time, in a state colloquially known as “falling-down drunk.” She could not walk unassisted, and at one point laid down on a picnic table. It was at this time that Respondent and Ms. Smith were photographed, a picture that received some circulation. Ms. Smith finally delivered Respondent to her hotel, where Respondent’s son saw them and relieved Ms. Smith of any further duties. Mr. Brayton’s testimony that he thereafter entered Respondent’s hotel room was not supported by Ms. Smith or others. His testimony regarding Respondent’s son and his friends at the hotel was not clear and convincing. January 2015 -- The House Party Amelia Smith testified to an alleged incident in the fall of 2014 in which she was at Respondent’s house and students were having a party in the garage at which students were drinking. There was no allegation in the Amended Administrative Complaint as to any event in the fall of 2014. Ms. Klisart testified to an incident involving students drinking at Respondent’s house around the Martin Luther King holiday, which in 2015 was on January 19. That corresponds to Petitioner’s statement that she returned to her house after an evening celebrating her birthday,3/ to find her son and his friends having a party in the garage at which students were drinking. The allegation in the Amended Administrative Complaint that Respondent provided a forum where underage students illegally consumed alcohol in January 2015 was adequately pled. The evidence supports a finding that Respondent had been drinking when she arrived at her house. The evidence is not clear and convincing that she joined the students in the garage, but she clearly knew the party was ongoing, that it involved high school students, that the students were drinking, and that she made no effort to put a halt to the party. Notoriety of the Incidents The evidence is clear and convincing that the incidents described herein were widely known by students at Gulf Breeze High School, by other teachers, and by the school administration. Counts 3 and 4 Count 3 alleges that “Respondent has violated the Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession prescribed by State Board of Education rules.” Count 4 alleges “that Respondent has failed to make reasonable effort to protect the student from conditions harmful to learning and/or to student's mental health and/or physical health and/or safety.” Rule 6A-10.081(3)(a) “does not require evidence that Respondent actually harmed [a student’s] health or safety. Rather, it requires a showing that Respondent failed to make reasonable efforts to protect the student from such harm.” Gerard Robinson, as Comm’r of Educ. v. William Randall Aydelott, Case No. 12-0621PL, RO at 76 (Fla. DOAH Aug. 29, 2012; EPC Dec. 19, 2012). Under the circumstances described herein, Petitioner proved that Respondent, by allowing, if not condoning, student drinking at her home in January 2015, failed to make reasonable effort to protect students from harm.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law reached herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Education Practices Commission enter a final order finding that Respondent violated sections 1012.795(1)(g) and (1)(j), and rule 6A- 10.081(3)(a). It is further recommended that Respondent be placed on probation for a period of five years, and be required to obtain treatment through the Recovery Network Program at a frequency and for a duration deemed appropriate by the Education Practices Commission. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of June, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 2017.
The Issue Whether a discriminatory housing practice occurred against Petitioner by Citrus Health Network Inc., and Jose Garcia.
Findings Of Fact Lomax is a black female who lived at 125 Northwest 15th Street, Lower Level, Miami, Florida ("old residence"). Lomax's disability income is $1,291.99 monthly. From January 2011 to September 2011, Lomax did not pay any rent at her old residence, even though there was no interruption in her income. Lomax was going to be evicted because the building was in foreclosure and had been neglected by the property owner. The Housing Assistance Network of Dade ("HAND") is a program that helps prevent people from becoming homeless. The program is funded by a grant from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. The grant is awarded to the City of Miami who subcontracts with Citrus to operate the HAND program. On or about August 11, 2011, Lomax sought financial assistance for housing by applying to the HAND program for first and last month rent. Lomax was assigned a case manager, Robert Butler ("Butler"), to process her application. During the application process, Lomax tried to talk to and meet with HAND program administrators about her application instead of working with her case manager. Lomax was able to speak to Maria Bringas ("Bringas"), the Citrus Health Service Coordinator for the HAND Program. Lomax did not like Bringas' demeanor and requested that she speak to her supervisor Jose Garcia ("Garcia"). Lomax talked to Garcia afterwards. Even though Butler was processing Lomax's application, Lomax called Citrus numerous times and felt she should have had more communication with the administration during the process. The HAND program does not have a working site. It is community based and set up whereby applicants work with case managers in the field. The level of assistance provided to participants is based on the income level. The HAND program evaluated Lomax and determined that she was qualified to be approved for the program. Lomax found new rental accommodations from James and Valarie Errol. On or about September 2, 2011, Citrus sent Alberto Abella ("Abella") to inspect Lomax's prospective rental unit for habitability and determined the property was above standards. Abella provided his report, a HUD requirement, to Citrus as part of Lomax's application process. Citrus processed Lomax application expeditiously in less than 10 days and helped Lomax obtain new housing at 212 Northwest 15th Street, Miami, Florida 33136, ("new home") by approving her application and providing her first month's rent so that she could move into the new residence upon eviction and never be homeless. Lomax was transitioned straight from the eviction of the old residence to a stable housing situation with Citrus' assistance of first month's rent for her new home. Lomax was not satisfied with the level of assistance that she received from the HAND program and appealed to receive the last month's rent she had originally requested. As a result of Lomax's first appeal, Citrus denied her request but had its attorney call Lomax's new landlord and negotiated a plan for Lomax to pay her rent for the last month in installments instead of all upfront. Lomax still was not satisfied with her level of assistance and filed a second grievance to the funder, the City of Miami, for more funding. The city denied her request after determining she had not lost any income prior to her eviction. Lomax protested the denial, alleging she had been financially caring for the property where she had been residing by paying the maintenance services like plumbing and lawn care, and that is why she didn't have the savings from her monthly income where she had not paid rent. The City of Miami agreed to reconsider Lomax's appeal for more assistance and requested she provide maintenance receipts to document her maintenance payments. The City of Miami reviewed the receipts Lomax provided and determined Lomax did not provide the right receipts for the City of Miami to provide additional funding to her. It was determined that Lomax did not demonstrate that she lacked financial resources needed to pay her last month's rent. Therefore, the City of Miami denied her grievance appeal. Lomax filed a discrimination case against Citrus with the Commission because she believes that the reason she was not provided last month's rental assistance was because of her race and sex. Lomax felt that Citrus' administration was racist, hateful and offensive, and the administrators did not return her calls during the application process. From October 1, 2010, to October 1, 2011, Citrus provided financial assistance to 1,146 individuals without regard to race, sex, or ethnicity. African Americans make up 576 (51 percent) of the persons served. Hispanic/Latinos make up 554 (49 percent) of the persons served. Females make up 64 percent of the total adults served. A majority of the individuals served have a lower income than the Petitioner. At the time of the hearing, Lomax still resided in her new home she obtained with the financial assistance of first month's rent from the HAND program.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief filed by Mattie Lomax in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of July, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JUNE C. McKINNEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 2012. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 violet.crawford@fchr.myflorida.com Lawrence F. Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Olga Maria Golik, Esquire Citrus Health Network, Inc. 4175 West 20th Avenue, Third Floor Hialeah, Florida 33012 olgag@citrushealth.com Mattie Lomax Apartment Number 1 212 Northwest 15th Street Miami, Florida 33136
