Findings Of Fact The UBC filed it's petition with PERC on April 16, 1975. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit #1). The HMREBU filed it's petition with PERC on May 7, 1975. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit #9). The Laborers filed it's petition with PERC on June 16, 1975. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit #5). The hearing in these cases was scheduled by separate notices dated July 9, 1975. (Hearing Officer's Exhibits #2, 6, and 10). The Escambia County School Board is a Public Employer within the meaning of Florida Statutes, Section 447.002(2). (See: transcript of proceedings 1/ at page 7). The UBC, the HMREBU, and the Laborers are Employee Organizations within the meaning of Florida Statutes, Section 447.002(10). (Stipulation TR 8). There is no contractural bar to holding representation elections in these cases. (Stipulation, TR 8, 9). There is no relevant collective bargaining history that affects these cases. (Stipulation, TR 9). The UBC, the HMREBU, and the Laborers are properly registered with PERC. (Hearing Officer's Exhibits #3, 7 and 11; Stipulation TR 10). PERC has previously determined that the UBC, the HMREBU, and the Laborers have filed the requisite showing of interest with their petitions. (Hearing Officer's Exhibits #4, 8, and 12). No evidence was offered at the hearing to rebut the administrative determination previously made by PERC. The parties have stipulated that in the event PERC certifies a collective bargaining unit substantially similar to the one proposed by the Laborers, the positions of Transportation Director, Route Supervisor, Garage Foreman, and Assistant Garage Foreman should be excluded from the unit. (Stipulation TR 205, 206). In the event that a collective bargaining unit substantially similar to the one proposed by HMREBU is certified by PERC, the parties have stipulated that the Director of School Food Service, the Assistant Director, and the Lunchroom Managers should be excluded from the unit. (Stipulation TR 208, 209). In the event that a collective bargaining unit substantially similar to the one proposed by the UBC is certified by PERC, the parties have stipulated that the Supervisory Custodian, the Custodian in Charge, and the Custodial Foreman should be included within the unit. (Stipulation TR 210, 211). The Public Employee Relations Commission has previously certified a collective bargaining unit consisting of instructional personnel employed by the School Board of Escambia County. Each of the proposed units described in the petitions of the Employee Organizations in these cases include only non- instructional personnel. There are approximately 1740 persons employed by the Public Employer in non-instructional positions. Approximately 300 of these employees would be included within the unit proposed by the UBC. Approximately 230 would be within the unit proposed by HMREBU. Approximately 190 would be within the unit proposed by the Laborers. A civil service system, created by a special act of the legislature, has been in operation in Escambia County since 1953. See: Laws of Florida, Chapter 74-480 (1974). A Civil Service Board maintains a classification and salary plan, provides a central pool for testing and classifying new employees, and participates in an annual review of the salaries of classified employees. The Civil Service Board provides it's services for tide Public Employer in this case, and for other governmental entities within Escambia County, including the county. The classification system utilized by the School Board is the same as that utilized by the county. An employee of the School Board with a given classification would have the same qualifications, would perform approximately the same duties, and would receive the same salary and benefits as an employee of the county with the same classification. There are frequent transfers of employees covered by the civil service system among the governmental entities in Escambia County. All of the non-instructional personnel employed by the Public Employer, including all of the employees within the proposed collective bargaining units, are covered by the civil service system. All of these employees have salaries as set out in the civil service salary plan. The same sick leave and vacation leave policy, grievance procedure, disciplinary procedure, promotional process, insurance benefits, and retirement plan apply to all of these employees. It would be more time consuming for the Public Employer to engage in collective bargaining with several collective bargaining units than with one unit. During the week prior to the hearing in these cases the Public Employer's negotiating team spent four days in negotiations with the bargaining representatives of instructional personnel. Assuming that the bargaining representatives of several units successfully negotiated dues deductions, it is proper to assume that the existence of several units would place added bookkeeping chores upon the Public Employer. The three units for which certification is being sought include less than 40 percent of the non- instructional personnel employed by the Public Employer. Employees within the three proposed bargaining units are not interchangeable with one another. Custodial employees are not interchangeable with lunchroom employees, nor with bus drivers and mechanics, and so on. Employees within the three units have very little job contact with one another. Custodians perform limited functions in the lunchroom; however, custodians and lunchroom employees are not likely to have any contact with bus drivers or mechanics. Bus drivers and mechanics spend the greater portion of their work day off of the school campuses as distinguished from custodians and lunchroom employees. Custodians and lunchroom employees are supervised by the school principals. Bus drivers and mechanics are supervised by the Board's Director of Transportation, except that bus drivers are supervised by the school principals during the times they are carrying children to and from the schools. The work performed by personnel in the proposed units is very different, and lateral transfers between the proposed units are not likely to ever occur. While there is no collective bargaining history indicating a pattern of dealing with the proposed units separately, there has been a school food services association which performs social functions for food service employees. ENTERED this 6 day of January, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. G. STEVEN PFEIFFER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida
Findings Of Fact The petition herein was filed by Petitioner with PERC on February 12, 1976. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 1). The hearing in this case was scheduled by notice dated April 23, 1976. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 2). The Sheriff of Sarasota County is an officer who holds his position by virtue of Article VIII, Section 1(d) of the Constitution of the State of Florida. The duties, responsibilities, and powers of the Sheriff's Department are delineated in Florida Statutes, Ch. 30. There are no special statutes which alter the provisions of Ch. 30 with respect to the Sheriff of Sarasota County. The Petitioner is an association which is seeking to represent a group of public employees concerning matters relating to their employment relationship with the Sheriff's Department. The Petitioner has been certified by PERC to serve as the bargaining representative for employees of the City of Sarasota, Florida. The Petitioner requested recognition as the bargaining agent of the unit of employees described in the petition. The Sheriff's Department did not respond to the request. (Stipulation, Transcript of Record, Page 6). 1/ There is no contractual bar for holding an election in this case. (Stipulation, TR 6). There is no collective bargaining history which would affect the issues in this case. (Stipulation TR, 6, 7). PERC has previously determined chat the Petitioner is a duly registered employee organization. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 3). No evidence was offered at the hearing to rebut the administrative determination previously made by PERC. PERC has previously determined that the Petitioner filed the requisite showing of interest with its petition. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 4). No evidence was offered at the hearing to rebut the administrative determination previously made by PERC. The parties stipulated that probationary personnel employed by the Sheriff's Department, and special deputies who are not regularly salaried employees of the Sheriff's Department should be excluded from any collective bargaining unit ultimately certified by PERC as appropriate in this case. The organizational structure of the Sheriff's Department is accurately depicted in an organizational chart which was received in evidence as Hearing Officer's Exhibit 5. The Sheriff is the chief executive officer of the Sheriff's Department. The Sheriff's Department is divided into six divisions. There are six sworn law enforcement personnel in the Research, Development, and Training Division. The Division is headed by a Lieutenant. A Corporal serves in this division for two days weekly in the Crime Prevention office. There are four officers in the division. The Sheriff's Staff is headed by the Sheriff. There are no sworn law enforcement personnel in this division. There are five sworn law enforcement personnel in the Detention Division. The Division is headed by a Captain. One sergeant and three patrolmen serve in the division. Two of the patrolmen serve as process servers. The Sergeant supervises the activities of the patrolmen and answers to the Captain. There are approximately 78 sworn law enforcement personnel in the Patrol Division. A Captain is in charge of the Division. There are five lieutenants, seven sergeants, and seven corporals. There are five sworn law enforcement personnel in the Administration Division. The Division is headed by a Captain and includes one lieutenant, one corporal, and two patrolmen. There are sixteen sworn officers in the Investigative Division. The Division is headed by a Captain, and includes two sergeants and three corporals. The Sheriff is ultimately responsible for hiring, firing, suspending, and transferring employees of the Sheriff's Department. Captains serve as heads of four of the Department's divisions. The Captain is responsible for the functioning of his division, and for the assignment and training of personnel who serve under him. Captains are the second highest ranking officers in the Department, and answer directly to the Sheriff. Captains normally work a standard day shift. Lieutenants are in charge of the shifts in the Patrol Division. The lieutenants answer to the Patrol Division Captain. The Lieutenant in the Administration Division is in charge of the Purchasing Office and answers to the Administration Division Captain. The Lieutenant in the Research, Development and Training Division is in charge of the Division and answers directly to the Sheriff. Lieutenants who work the day shift work primarily in the central office. In the four to midnight and midnight shifts the Lieutenant works primarily in a patrol car. Lieutenants are responsible for scheduling the men on their shifts, and for inspecting the men. Lieutenants will serve as acting captain during all times when no captain is on duty. The uniform worn by lieutenants and captains includes a white shirt with the appropriate bars worn on the shoulder. Personnel with the rank of sergeant or below wear uniforms which have light green shirts with patches on the arms. Each of the captains in the Department has use of a department motor vehicle. Some but not all lieutenants and sergeants have use of automobiles. The Sergeants are directly responsible for supervising deputies on patrol. Sergeants are generally responsible for supervising fewer employees than Lieutenants supervise, and Sergeants do not perform regular office functions. Corporals generally serve as backup units for the road deputies. The Sheriff seeks recommendations from each level of the chain of command for personnel action including hiring, firing, transfer, suspension, and other disciplinary action. An advisory committee, which consists of sergeants, corporals, and deputies, makes recommendations respecting hiring of new employees. The Sheriff also utilizes an advisory committee to make recommendations respecting promotions. The Sheriff typically follows the recommendations of Captains respecting personnel administration. Typically the Captains recommendations will be based upon the Lieutenant's recommendations which will be based upon the Sergeant's recommendations. Each division and each department within each division submits proposed budgets to the Administrative Captain. The Administrative Captain and the Sheriff together prepare a proposed budget for the Sheriff's Department. Final budget approval must come from the County Commission. The Sheriff has the various appeal routes set out in Florida Statutes Ch. 30 in the event the County Commission does not approve his proposed budget. Only the Sheriff can expend funds on behalf of the Sheriff's Department. Staff meetings are conducted by the Sheriff on an as-needed basis. Captains and Lieutenants regularly serve on the Sheriff's staff. No personnel below the rank of lieutenant regularly serve on the staff. Other officers are invited to participate in the staff meetings when matters affecting their area of responsibility are involved. The Sheriff receives input at the staff meeting respecting new policies. The Sheriff is ultimately responsible for making decisions respecting new policies, but he does seek the advice of the staff. In the event that the Sheriff's Department engages in the collective bargaining process, no final plans have been formulated respecting which personnel would serve on any negotiating team. The Sheriff intends to do his own negotiating and has not determined whether he will utilize the services of any assistants. ENTERED this 9 day of July, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. G. STEVEN PFEIFFER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Findings Of Fact The School Board of Pinellas County is a public employer within the meaning of Florida Statutes Section 447.203(2). The Charging Party is an employee organization within the meaning of Florida Statutes Section 447.203(10). During December, 1975, the Charging Party filed a representation petition with the Public Employees Relations Commission seeking to represent a unit of employees of the Public Employer. Proceedings were conducted in accordance with the petition, and on February 2, 1976, the Public Employees Relations Commission, through its chairman, issued a Direction Of Election. A copy of the Direction was received into evidence at the hearing in this case as Respondent's Exhibit 1. The appropriate collective bargaining unit is therein described as follows: "Included: All eligible employees of the Pinellas County School Board employed in the ground maintenance, transportation, plant operations, warehouse and food-service departments. Excluded: All other non-instructional, instructional, and clerical employees; and all managerial/confidential employees of the Pinellas County School Board. See Attachment A." The election as conducted on or about March 11, 1976, and a majority of the employees in the unit described in the Direction of Election voted in favor of representation by the Charging Party for purposes of collective bargaining. The Public Employer thereafter filed objections to the conduct of the election (Respondent's Exhibit 4). The chairman of the Public Employees Relations Commission entered a report on objections on March 31, 1976 (Respondent's Exhibit 5). The chairman dismissed the objections on the grounds that they were not timely filed. On May 12, 1976, the Public Employees Relations Commission certified the Charging Panty as the exclusive bargaining agent for the unit of employees described in the Direction of Election and in the Erratum issued by the chairman of the Commission on February 26, 1976 (Respondent's Exhibit 3). The Public Employer filed a request for review of the chairman's dismissal of the objections (Respondent's Exhibit 6). By decision issued September 7, 1976, the Commission dismissed the objections (Respondent's Exhibit 7). The Public Employer thereafter filed a Petition For Re-Hearing. Further proceedings respecting certification of the bargaining unit were not made a part of the record in this case; however, it is assumed for the purposes of this Recommended Order that the Public Employer is in the process of appealing the Commission's decisions. Following the election, on April 2, 1976, the Charging Party wrote to the Public Employer requesting that negotiations be opened (General Counsel's Exhibit 1). The Public Employer responded by letter dated April 27, 1976 (General Counsel's Exhibit 2), as follows: "As you know, the school board, through the superintendent and my office, has taken appropriate steps to appeal certain procedures relating to the election held in the above matter. Until that procedure has been finalized before the Commission, we will not be in a position to enter into negotiations. It is further noted that you have not received an official notice that you are now the bargaining agent on behalf of a segment of the supporting services of the school board. Until such time as all the proper procedures have been taken before the Commission and a final determination has been made by the courts of the State of Florida, and you have been recognized by the school board as the bargaining agent on behalf of the supporting services employees, we would respectfully deny your request at this time." Following its certification as the collective bargaining representative, by letter dated May 17, 1976, the Charging Party again requested that negotiations be opened (General Counsel's Exhibit 3). Further requests were made by letters dated August 5, 1976, and August 26, 1976 (General Counsel's Exhibits 4, 5). The Public Employer has not responded either in writing or verbally to the requests to open negotiations, other than through its letter of April 27, 1976. The Public Employer has refused to enter into collective bargaining negotiations with the Charging Party, and continues to refuse to enter into negotiations until a final determination is made by the courts respecting the Charging Party's certification, and until the school board has recognized the Charging Party.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Public Employees Relations Commission enter an order requiring the School Board of Pinellas County to recognize the Pinellas County Custodial Union, #1221 as the exclusive bargaining agent of the unit of employees certified by the Public Employees Relations Commission; that the School Board of Pinellas County cease and desist from refusing to engage in collective bargaining negotiations with the Pinellas County Custodial Union, #1221; that the School Board of Pinellas County forthwith enter into good faith collective bargaining negotiations with the Pinellas County Custodial Union, #1221; and that the School Board of Pinellas County advise the Public Employees Relations Commission in writing of what steps it has taken to comply with the final order of the Public Employees Relations Commission between 30 and 45 days following entry of an order by the Commission. RECOMMENDED this 16th day of December, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. G. STEVEN PFEIFFER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: B. Edwin Johnson, Esquire Post Office Box 4688 Clearwater, Florida 33518 Austin Reed, Esquire Public Employee Relations Commission Suite 300 - 2003 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Edward Draper 5400 West Waters Avenue Tampa, Florida
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the relevant oral and documentary evidence, the following facts are found with regard to the issues in dispute. Overall organization. Exhibit No. 5, prepared by the City Manager, is an organizational chart of employees of the City. Excluding the first block of employees under the city commission, the office manager, library director, the police department chief and uniformed officers, the fire department (which consists of volunteers only) and the superintendents of the remaining five departments, there are approximately fifty-two employees of the City. The City Manager is the chief administrative officer of the City, and all employees are ultimately responsible to him. There is a uniform pay grade classification plan throughout the City and all full time employees work a forty hour week, though their actual working schedules may differ. There are two pay schedules. Most employees are paid weekly, though some, including the office manager department, are paid biweekly. Employees receive their pay checks either at the City Hall or the city warehouse, whichever is closer to their place of employment. If an employee desires to wear a uniform, the City pays one-half of the cost of such uniform. Office manager department staff. There are nine staff members of the office manager department who are hired and fired by the office manager. The basic function of this department is finance and accounting, and the employees do basically clerical type work.. Typical responsibilities of this department include preparation of the payroll, collection of utility bills, payment of bills for purchase and supplies, and record-keeping. Eight staff members work in City Hall and one works at the city warehouse. These employees share the same hours and fringe benefits -- vacations, sick leave policy, group hospitalization, retirement plan -- as other city employees, and are paid every other week. The office manager herself does the City Manager's confidential work. Another secretary of this department devotes approximately twenty-five percent of her time doing typing or other work for the City Manager. No college degree or other specialized training is required for a position within the office manager department. All office manager staff employees have access to city personnel records, as does everyone else who inquires. It was not known whether or not such employees would have access to labor relations policy data, inasmuch as the City has no prior bargaining history. Library assistants. There are two library assistants, one full time and one part time, under the direct supervision of the library director. The full time assistant works a forty hour week and participates in the same benefits as other full time city employees. The library is open a half day on Saturday. The old library building has been torn down and a new library building is planned. During the interim, one assistant is detailed to do clerical work in the city warehouse. The City Manager testified that there is presently no job description for library assistants, but that there is no educational or previous training requirement for the positions. Their duties include assisting the public and the library director. It was not known whether they actually and independently participated in the ordering of new books for the library. Radio dispatchers. There are six radio dispatchers who are housed in the police station and are under the direct supervision of the Chief of Police, who hires, fires and disciplines them. These employees share the same benefits and work the same number of hours as other city employees. They rotate their schedules so that one dispatcher is always on duty, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. All emergency calls, including police, fire and general government utility calls, are relayed through a radio dispatcher. Standard operating procedures are furnished them by the superintendents of the various departments. Dispatchers do not wear uniforms and do not carry weapons. There is no formal training requirement to qualify as a dispatcher, though apparently they must be federally registered in much the same manner as a CB operator. There is no ranking system among them and no head or chief dispatcher. While there is a jail at the police station, dispatchers have no contact with or authority over prisoners housed therein. The City Manager knew of no dispatcher duties other than receiving and relaying emergency calls. In accordance with F.S. s447.307(3)(a) and F.A.C. Rule 8H-3.23, no recommendations are submitted. Done and entered this 2nd day of June, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Curtis Mack, Chairman Public Employees Relations Commission 2003 Apalachee Parkway Suite 300 Tallahassee, Florida Mr. Stanley E. Marable Frank and Meyer, P.A. 500 Flagship Bank Building Tampa, Florida 33602 Mr. Harrison C. Thompson, Jr. Shackleford, Farrior, Stallings & Evans, P.A. P.O. Box 3324 Tampa, Florida 33601
Findings Of Fact The following quoted provisions of the joint stipulations of fact entered into by the parties, as attached to this recommended order, constitutes the underlying evidential facts to be considered by the undersigned in deliberating the charges in this case. The exhibits mentioned in the quoted provision may be found as a part of the attached joint stipulations of fact and exhibits, which have been made a part of the record herein. The quotation is as follows: JOINT STIPULATIONS OF FACT The charge herein attached as cumulative exhibit #1 was filed by the Charging party on October 21, 1976 and a copy was simultaneously served on Respondent. Pursuant to Florida Administrative Rule 8H-4.03 a copy of the charge is hereby attached. The trial and presentment of the above-captioned cause was assigned to Rodney W. Smith, attorney for the Charging Party on or about February 25, 1977. Respondent is a public employer within the meaning of F.S. 447.203(2) and has its principal place of business in the City of Jacksonville, Duval County, Florida where it is engaged in the business of operating a consolidated municipal government. Respondent is created directly by the legislature of the State of Florida so as to constitute a consolidated government administered by individuals who are responsible to public officials and/or the general electorate. Charging Party is now and has been at all times material herein an employee organization within the meaning of 447.203(l0) of the Act. On March 4, 1976 Respondent filed a PETITION FOR CERTIORARI with the opinion that said petition would stay the "proposed CERTIFICATION ORDER by the Public Employees Relations Commission until final determination of the case was resolved. On or about May 18, 1976 the Public Employees Relations Commission issued a CERTIFICATION ORDER certifying the Charging Party as the exclusive bargaining representative for the Public Employees in the following unit: INCLUDED: Firefighters Lieutenants Captains Employed by the City of Jacksonville Fire Department EXCLUDED: All officers above the rank of captain employed by the City of Jacksonville Fire Department and all other employees of the City of Jacksonville On or about June, 1976 the Respondent filed an APPEAL of the above- stated certification order by PETITION FOR REVIEW in the First District Court of Appeal in and for the State of Florida. At no time was a stay of the certification order sought or obtained by the Respondent. Although the CERTIFICATION ORDER was challenged by PETITION FOR REVIEW, the Charging Party has been the certified representative for purposes of collective-bargaining of all public employees in the unit described in the above paragraph since May 18, 1976. It has been the continuous policy, and most recently by special ordinance, for the City of Jacksonville to extend dues- deductions to firefighters, lieutenants and captains authorizing such deductions since on or about 1969. This policy of extending dues-deductions to captains, lieutenants and firefighters has continued at all times until October 15, 1976. On October 15, 1976 the biweekly paychecks of the captains (sic) and lieutenants employed by the, Respondent did not reflect the usual dues- deduction. The Charging Party was notified of the City's intention to discontinue dues-deductions for the employees "in the ranks of lieutenants and captains during contract negotiations in late September, 1976. On or about October 18, 1976 agents for the City, including Dave Thompson, Administrative Aide for the Public Safety Department and John Waters, Director of Department of Public Safety informed Robert Carver, President of the Charging Party, that the Respondent would not extend dues-deductions to the captains or lieutenants since the Respondent did not feel these positions were properly included in the certified bargaining unit. The action of the Respondent in discontinuing the dues-deductions on October 15, 1976 was resultant from the attached cumulative exhibit B, Memorandum of September 24, 1976 from John M. Waters to Jack Parker, City Accountant for the City of Jacksonville, which directs that positions above the rank of firefighter are to no longer receive dues-deductions. The Director of Employee Relations and chief negotiator for the Respondent, William Davis, was officially notified of the proposed discontinuation on September 29, 1976 by action of the attached cumulative exhibit c." The act complained of by the Charging Party, is the act of the Respondent in discontinuing the dues-deductions for the ranks of lieutenant and captain effective October 15, 1976. (The facts that led up to that action are established in the stipulations of fact entered into by the parties.) In the mind of the Charging Party the discontinuation of the dues-deductions on October 15, 1976, constituted: (1) an interference with the rights of employees as described in 447.501(1)(a), F.S.; (2) a unilateral change during the bargaining process in violation of 447.50l(1)(c), F.S.; and (3) a specific refusal to comply with the provisions of 447.303, F.S. The Respondent disputes and joins issue with that claim. To resolve the conflict, the case is best discussed by dividing the consideration into two broad categories. The first category is concerned with the question of whether the Respondent's initial petition for writ of certiorari filed with the First District Court of Appeal, State of Florida, on March 4, 1976, and/or the Respondent's appeal of the Public Employees Relations Commission's certification order, which was filed with the First District Court of Appeal, State of Florida; imposed an automatic stay of the effect of the proposed certification order by the Public Employees Relations Commission, and/or a stay of the certification order of May 18, 1976, entered by the Public Employees Relations Commission. Any stay of the proposed certification order and subsequent certification order by the Public Employees Relations Commission must have been effectuated by the filing of the initial petition for writ of certiorari on March 4, 1976, and the appeal of June, 1976, because the facts establish that no specific request was ever made of the First District Court of Appeal or the Public Employees Relations Commission to grant a stay. To that end, the Respondent contends that it could justifiably rely on the Florida Appellate Rule to grant an automatic stay in both the initial petition for writ of certiorari of March 4, 1976, and the appeal of June, 1976 Pertinent provisions of Rule 5.12 state: "Rule 5.12 Supersedeas Bond not Required of the State and its Political Subdivisions and their Boards, Commissions, etc.; Security when Required When Security Not Required. When the state or any of its political subdivisions, or any officer, board, commission or other public body of the state or any of its political subdivisions, in a purely official capacity, takes an appeal or petitions for certiorari, the filing of the notice of appeal or the petition for certiorari as the case may be shall perfect the same and stay the execu tion or performance of the judgment, decree or order being reviewed and no supersedeas bond need be given unless expressly required by the court. Court May Require Bond. The court may, on motion for good cause shown, require a super sedeas bond or other security, in such amount, form and manner as it may prescribe as a condition for the further prosecution of the appeal or certiorari." On the face of the language of Florida Appellate Rule 5.12, it would appear that the Respondent is correct in its assumption of having an automatic stay; however, there is a subsequent appellate decision which defeats the Respondent's right to rely on the theory it offers as standing for the proposition that an automatic stay is granted. That case is Panama City v. Florida Public Employees Relations Commission, 333 So.2d 470, (1st DCA 1976, Fla.). The decision in this case was initially rendered on May 5, 1976, and a rehearing denied on June 29, 1976. The effective date of the decision is July 14, 1976. The Panama City case, supra, concerns the determination by the Public Employees Relations Commission of an appropriate bargaining unit and direction of an election. Those actions by PERC were not found to be final orders and in discussing the position of that Petitioner requesting a writ of certiorari, the Court stated that a stay of the effect of the enforcement of the agency action does not transpire merely by filing the petition for writ of certiorari. Under the ruling, in the decision, the stay may be granted by the agency or by the Court upon appropriate terms and in keeping with the authority of 120.68(3), F.S. That section of Chapter 120 indicated the following: "(3) The filing of the petition does not itself stay enforcement of the agency decision, but if the agency decision has the effect of suspending or revoking a license, supersedeas shall be granted as a matter of right upon such conditions as are reasonable, unless the court, upon petition of the agency, determines that a supersedeas would constitute a probable danger to the health, safety, or welfare of the state. The agency may grant, or the reviewing court may order, a stay upon appropriate terms, but, in any event, the order shall specify the conditions upon which the stay or supersedeas is granted." Moreover, in the opinion of the Court in the Panama City case, under Florida Appellate Rule 5.5, the Petitioner for writ of certiorari shall apply to the agency for supersedeas to forestall the terms of the agency action. Through its memorandum the Respondent in this cause has concluded that there is a distinction in the facts of the Panama City case and the facts sub judice, in that the Panama City case dealt with determination of an appropriate bargaining unit and direction of an election which were interlocutory matters, whereas the question here deals with a certification order which is final agency action on the part of the Public Employes Relations Commission. As an adjunct to this argument, Respondent indicated that it is the June, 1976, appeal taken by the Respondent, challenging the Public Employees Relations Commission order of certification, that becomes the focal point of the inquiry upon the subject of an automatic stay. This latter phase of the argument is accepted and it is the June, 1976, appeal that should be addressed. With that fact in mind, the language of the Court's opinion in the Panama City case on a petition for rehearing clarifies any distinction which might be drawn between the right to stay in an interlocutory situation, and the right to a stay of final action by an agency. The Court, in its discussion on rehearing, stated that the PERC order certifying an employee organization's exclusive collective bargaining representative of employees is a final order, which is subject to judicial review, together with all prior interlocutory orders. The Court goes on to say that if PERC refuses to stay any bargaining pending the Court review, the Court would have authority to grant that relief, in A order to make the Court's jurisdiction effective. For this proposition it cites to Article V, Section (4)(b) 3, Florida Constitution. A close analysis of the Court's statement on the rehearing in the Panama City case, supra, points out that the party who takes an appeal of the final order of certification by the Public Employees Relations Commission should look to the Public Employees Relations Commission to grant a stay prior to turning to the Court for such relief. This is in keeping with the requirements of 120.68(3), F.S. It can be seen by an examination of the facts stipulated to in this cause that the Respondent has failed at any point to request of the Public Employees Relations Commission that the effect of the order of certification be stayed pending the outcome of the consideration of the appeal on its merits. Consequently, in keeping with the decision of the Panama-City case, supra, the effect of the certification order is not stayed and any action which the Respondent took in derrogation of the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Panama City, supra, subsequent to July 14, 1976, the date the decision became binding, may constitute an unfair labor practice. See also, Duval Cty School Bd v. Fla. Pub. Emp. etc., 346 So.2d 1086 (1st DCA 1977, Fla.) Having determined that the effect of the certification order of the Public Employees Relations Commission has not been stayed, consideration of the effect of the Respondent's action which discontinued the dues-deduction after October 15, 1976 for those ranks of lieutenant and captain can be made. It is clear from the facts In the record that it had been the practice of the employer to authorize the dues-deduction for lieutenants and captains since 1969 and there is no showing that the employees in those ranks who requested the dues- deduction ever asked that the deductions be discontinued. The conclusion on the part of the Respondent that the dues-deduction should be discontinued was a unilateral action, premised upon Respondent's individual evaluation of the propriety of including lieutenants and captains in a unit with firefighters. In view of the history of the dues-deduction process for lieutenants and captains in the City of Jacksonville, and the outstanding unit certification by PERC which includes such employees, it is concluded that deductions should have been continued beyond October 15, 1976. This is authorized under the opinion of United Faculty of Palm Beach Jr. College, Case No. 8H-CA- 754-1158. The failure to continue this deduction program beyond October 15, 1976 constituted an action by the Respondent in regard to conditions of employment and was per se a violation of the duty to collectively bargain. See 447.309(1), F.S., and NLRB v. Katz, 396 U.S.736 (1962). This responsibility on the part of Respondent to continue the dues-deduction has now been specifically established in 447.303, F.S., as amended at 77-343, Laws of Florida which reads: "Any employee organization which has been certified as a bargaining agent shall have the right to, upon request, have its dues and uniform assessments deducted and collected by the employer from the salary of those employees who authorized the deductions, set dues and uniform assessments In a related argument, the Respondent attempts to suggest that the Public Employees Relations Commission has unilaterally expanded and redefined the bargaining unit that had been previously agreed to between the City of Jacksonville and Local 1884 IAFF. Specifically, the Respondent claims that the City of Jacksonville and Local 1884 IAFF had agreed that only fire privates be included in the unit in 1973-1974 and 1974-1975, and that thereafter the Commission expanded and redefined the bargaining unit to include firemen and fire officers. Although this may be a fact, this fact is not in evidence through the stipulation of facts and in view of the limitations imposed by the agreement of the parties through their stipulation, the above-referenced information may not be utilized in reaching conclusions in this case. However, assuming arguendo the propriety of those facts, they would not seem to promote a different result in this cause. This conclusion is drawn from an examination of Clearwater Firefighters Association; Local 1158, IAFF and City of Clearwater, Case No. 8H- RC-766-1O68, 77E-377, reported at 3 FPER 177 (1977) and City of Titusville v. PERC, 3,30 So.2d 733 (1st DCA 1976, Fla.) Even though the Commission and the Court seemed to be stating that the Public Employees Relations Commission may not extend the unit which has voluntarily been recognized by the parties, or offered for recognition by the Petitioner for unit determination, these cases demonstrate that each case that occurs should be examined on an individual basis. Applying that process, it would be necessary to request the Public Employees Relations Commission to reconsider their position in the instant case on the question of the appropriateness of the inclusion of lieutenants and captains in the certified bargaining unit, and that decision could be subject to appeal to the appropriate appellate court. Because a determination has not been rendered on the merits of excluding lieutenants and captains from the certified bargaining unit, either by the Public Employees Relations Commission or an appellate court, the certification order remains in effect and all rights and entitlements for ,the unit employees remain in force and effect until amended by a Perc order. Consequently, the act of discontinuing the dues-deduction for lieutenants and captains in the bargaining unit after October 15, 1976, constituted a specific refusal to comply with the provision of 447.303, F.S.; an interference with the rights of employees in violation of 447.501(1)(a), and an unilateral change during the bargaining process, in violation of 447.501(1)(c) , F.S.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Respondent, City of Jacksonville, be required to reinstate the dues-deduction authorizations of those lieutenants and captains in the certified bargaining unit. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of November, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Rodney W. Smith, Esquire Post Office Box 508 Gainesville, Florida 32602 Robert G. Brown, Esquire Assistant Counsel Office of General Counsel City Of Jacksonville 1300 City Hall Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Leonard A. Carson, Chairman Public Employees Relations Commission Suite 300 2003 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FLORIDA Exhibit A STATE OF FLORIDA
Findings Of Fact Broward County and Broward County Board of County Commissioners is a Public Employer within the meaning of Section 447.203(2), F.S. (stipulation of parties). The Teamsters Local Union #769, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America is an Employee Organization within the meaning of Section 447.203(10), F.S. (stipulation of parties). In January, 1974, thirty three airport security police employees of the Respondent who worked at the Ft. Lauderdale- Hollywood International Airport and North Perry Airport signed cards authorizing Teamsters Local Union #769 (hereinafter "Union") to represent them for the purpose of collective bargaining with the Respondent (Complainant's Exhibit 6, testimony of Mr. Sack). By letter of January 7, 1974, to Mr. Robert R. Kauth, Broward County Administrator, the Union advised that it represented the airport security employees police and requested that the Respondent recognize the Union as the collective-bargaining representative of the employees and enter into negotiations for the purpose of obtaining a collective bargaining agreement. The Union further offered to demonstrate evidence that it represented the aforesaid employees (Complainant's Exhibit 7, testimony of Mr. Sack). Mr. Kauth responded in a letter dated January 28, 1974, and advised the Union that its letter had been referred to the Board of County Commissioners, but in view of "existing state law", the Commission was unable to and could not recognize the Union as the collective bargaining representative of the airport employees in question (Complainant's exhibit 8). The Union responded by a letter of January 30, 1974, requesting that Mr. Kauth identify the "existing state law" referred to in his letter and advised that the International Union's Constitution specified that the Union did not assert the right to strike amoung employees in the public sector. It also informed Mr. Kauth that the Florida Constitution and statutes guarantee public employees the right to organize and to bargain collectively through a representative of their choice (Complainant's Exhibit 9). Receiving no further response from the Respondent, the Union filed a complaint for declaratory relief and mandatory injunction in the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit for Broward County requesting the Court declare that the Union be recognized by the Respondent as the collective bargaining representative for the airport security police employees who had designated the union to represent them, and directing and requiring the Respondent to enter into collective bargaining with the Union as required by Art. 1, Section 6 of the Florida Constitution, and Section 839.221(2), F.S. On July 29, 1974, the Court entered a final decree requiring Respondent to grant recognition to the Union pursuant to Art. 1 Section 6 of the Florida Constitution "as the collective bargaining representative or agent of those airport security police officers employed by the Defendants at the Ft. Lauderdale-Hollywood Airport and North Perry Airport, who, are members and who remain members of the Plaintiff or who have freely and expressly given their consent to the Plaintiff labor organization to act as their collective bargaining agent" (Complainant's Composite Exhibit 11). As a result of the court order, the parties began bargaining, and proposals and counter-proposals were exchanged during the period commencing August, 1974 (Complainant's Exhibit 13, testimony of Mr. Sacks). At one of the negotiating sessions in October, the Respondent gave the Union its proposal for a recognition clause in the eventual agreement, which provided that the Respondent recognized the Union as the collective bargaining representative for those employees who were and would remain members of the Union, and that it would continue recognition after January 1, 1975 for the term of the agreement provided that the Union complied with all state requirements pertaining to recognition as contained in Chapter 447, F.S., and that otherwise recognition and the agreement would cease forthwith (Complainant's Exhibit 14, testimony of Mr. Elster). The Union thereupon filed a motion in the Broward County Circuit Court to hold the Respondent in contempt for violation of the previous final decree. The court, on October 30, 1974, citing Sections 447.009 and .022, F.S., found that the Respondent's proposal as to recognition was not a proper subject of collective bargaining at that time and ordered that it be stricken as a proposal (Complainant's Exhibit 15). At the twelfth negotiation session held on January 8, 1975, the parties reached a proposed collective bargaining agreement, with representatives placing their initials on a rough-draft (Complainant's exhibit 16). Counsel for Respondent agreed to provide a final draft in one week which thereafter was to be submitted to the county commission and the Union membership for approval and ratification. On January 17, the employees in the unit voted to accept the, agreement and new authorization cards were executed by the employees. At this time there were 49 employees in the unit and 46 authorization cards were signed at this time (Complainant's Exhibit 18). Further correspondence and discussions ensued, resulting in agreement on a final draft of the proposed agreement (Complainant's Exhibits 17-21). Article 1 of the proposed agreement concerning recognition provided that the county recognized the Union as the collective bargaining representative of all airport security officers employed by the county at the airports in question "who are members and who remain members of the union, or who have freely and expressly given their consent to the Union to act as their collective bargaining agent". The draft was approved by telegram from the Union's Counsel on February 20th, A except for failure to put the effective date of the agreement, i.e., January 8, 1975 in the draft (Complainant's Exhibit 22). Upon request of the Union, the matter was placed on the agenda of the Board of County Commissioners for its March 4th meeting. By letter to the County Administrator, dated February 28, Respondent's counsel advised that the original recognition had been by court order to recognize the Union "for members only"; that new state labor legislation required that a labor organization register with and be certified by the Public Employees Relations Commission as the majority representative of employees in an appropriate bargaining unit before a legal obligation by a public employer to recognize and bargain with the Union is established; that the Union had not met the registration and certification requirements and that the County was currently appealing in the Fourth District Court of Appeals the order of the lower court which had stricken one of the Respondent's contract proposals during negotiations. He therefore stated that it would be appropriate for the County Commission to consider the appeal before rendering a decision on the proposed agreement (Complainant's exhibit 23). The County Commission, at its meeting, deferred action on the agreement because the Union had not been registered nor certified under current law, and directed its counsel to request an advisory opinion from PERC on the status of the Union in reference to the state statute (Respondent's Exhibit 2). By letter, dated March 12, counsel for the Respondent sought such an advisory opinion from PERC (Respondent's Exhibit 13). Notwithstanding the lack of action by the County Commission, Respondent's Director of the Division of Airports determined to observe the terms of the proposed contract as to various working conditions (Complainant's Exhibit 24). The Union had made an abortive attempt to register with PERC on June 28, 1974, but this was before PERC had been organized and apparently the request was never received (Complainant's Exhibit 12, testimony of Mr. Sack and Mr. Elster). On March 10, 1975, the Union again submitted registration materials to PERC and, by letter of March 25, 1975, the Commission advised the Union that it had met the registration requirements of the statute (Complainant's Exhibit 28). On April 18, 1975, the Union filed a Recognition - Certification petition with PERC seeking certification of the airport security police personnel (Complainant's Exhibit 30), and on May 8, 1975, the Union filed the unfair labor charge against the Respondent alleging that it had violated Section 447.016(1)(a)(c), F.S., by attempting to withdraw recognition that was previously established between the parties and by refusing to sign a final agreement which had been agreed upon on January 8, 1975, (Complainant's Exhibit 1). On or about May 16, 1975, the Union filed with PERC a Motion to Waive the Posting Requirements of Recognition Acknowledgement and Motion to Expedite Processing of Unfair Labor Practice Charges (Complainant's Exhibit 31). In this motion, the Union requested that the posting requirements of recognition acknowledgement under PERC Rule 8H-200.4 (now 8H-2.04) be waived and certification issued based on the fact that it would be inequitable and against the intent and purposes of the statute to deny certification under Section 447.009(1) because recognition had been obtained by court order and the Union represented a majority of the employees in the unit. However, the petition for Recognition - Certification was withdrawn by the Union on June 3, and by letter of June 10, PERC advised it that the withdrawal request had been approved (Complainant's Exhibit 32). The record does not disclose that PERC took any action on the Union's aforesaid motion to waive the posting requirements of recognition-acknowledgment. In April and early May, the parties met and negotiated over a "wage reopener" provision contained in the proposed collective bargaining agreement. However, on May 19, Respondent's Counsel declined to grant a request for a further meeting stating that since the Union had rejected counter-proposals of the Respondent's negotiating team on April 21, it was felt that further meetings would be unproductive (Complainant's Exhibit 25-27). On July 31, 1975, the Union filed an amended unfair labor practice charge against the Respondent and, on August 8, the Acting General Counsel of PERC issued a Complaint and Notice of Hearing which alleged unfair labor practices in violation of Section 447.501(1)(a) and (c) by reason of Respondent's refusal to execute the agreed upon contract and by unilaterally terminating negotiations with the Union thus having failed and refused to bargain in good faith (Complainant's Exhibit 1). On September 12, 1975, subsequent to the hearing, the Fourth District Court of Appeal rendered an opinion that the points on appeal were moot and that jurisdiction of the issues involved between the parties is in PERC pursuant to Section 447, F.S., and dismissed the appeal of Respondent concerning its proposed recognition clause (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 1).
Recommendation It is recommended that the Public Employees Relations Commission, pursuant to Section 447.503(4)(b) issue an order dismissing the charges. DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of November, 1975, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Allen M. Elster, Esquire MAMBER, GOPMAN, EPSTEIN & FOOSANER 16870 Northeast 19th Avenue North Miami Beach, Florida 33162 Thomas W. Burke, Esquire 2005 Apalachee Parkway Suite 105 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Joseph A. Caldwell, Sr., Esquire Suite 600, 100 Biscayne Boulevard North Miami, Florida 33132
The Issue Whether there is just cause to terminate Respondent's employment with the Monroe County School Board.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the entity charged with the responsibility to operate, control, and supervise the public schools within Monroe County, Florida. At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner employed Respondent as a non-probationary air-conditioning mechanic in the Upper Keys. As noted previously, Petitioner initiated the instant cause against Respondent on January 19, 2012. In a letter signed by the superintendent of schools on that date, Petitioner advised Respondent that it intended to terminate his employment: [F]or willful violation of school board policy, 4210(I), (L) and (Q), by theft of time, inappropriate use of a District owned vehicle, and by making fraudulent statements in required District paperwork, all of which are grounds for discipline up to and including termination. * * * This action is being taken in accordance with School Board Policies . . . and the Collective Bargaining Agreement. (emphasis added). The above-quoted language notwithstanding, Petitioner's Administrative Complaint ("Complaint"), filed contemporaneously with the superintendent's letter, does not purport to discipline Respondent in accordance the collective bargaining agreement,1/ the terms of which are neither referenced in the Complaint nor included in the instant record——a fatal error, as explained later. Instead, Petitioner seeks in its Complaint to terminate Respondent's employment based solely upon alleged violations of School Board Policy 4210 (specifically, subsections I, L, and Q), which provides, in relevant part: 4210 – Standard for Ethical Conduct An effective educational program requires the services of men and women of integrity, high ideals, and human understanding. The School Board expects all support staff members to maintain and promote these essentials. Furthermore, the School Board hereby establishes the following as the standards of ethical conduct for all support staff members in the District who have direct access to students: A support staff member with direct access to students shall: * * * not use institutional privileges for personal gain or advantage. * * * L. maintain honesty in all dealings. * * * Q. not submit fraudulent information on any document in connection with employment. (emphasis added). Significantly, the record is devoid of evidence that Respondent has direct access to students, and the nature of Respondent's position (an air-conditioning mechanic) does not permit the undersigned to infer as much; therefore, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that Respondent is subject to the proscriptions of School Board Policy 4210. In light of these unique circumstances——i.e., Petitioner has not proceeded against Respondent under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement (as it should have), but rather, under a school board policy that applies only to employees that have direct access to students——it is unnecessary to reach the merits of the underlying allegations of misconduct.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Monroe County School Board enter a final order: dismissing the Administrative Complaint; and immediately reinstating Respondent's employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of June, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S EDWARD T. BAUER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of June, 2012.
Findings Of Fact The Business of Respondent The Respondent is a public employer with its principle place of business located in Orange County, Florida, where it is engaged in the business of operating a school system. Respondent is created directly by the Florida State Constitution or legislative body so as to constitute a department or administrative arm of the government and is administered by individuals who are responsible to the public officials or to the general electorate. Respondent is now, and has been at all times material herein, a public employer within the meaning of Section 447.203(2) of the Act. The Employee Organization Involved The Orange County Classroom Teachers Association is now, and has been at all times material herein, an employee organization within the meaning of Section 447.203(10) of the Act. Background During April, 1975, PERC certified the employee organization as the exclusive bargaining representative of all employees in the following collective bargaining unit: INCLUDED: All certified non-administrative personnel including the following: teachers, teachers-countywide, teachers-exceptional, teachers-gifted, speech therapist, teachers- specific learning disabilities, teachers-adults full-time, guidance personnel, occupational specialist, teachers-adult basic education, librarians-media specialist, deans, department chairpersons, physical therapist. EXCLUDED: All other positions of the Orange County Public Schools. Soon thereafter, the CTA and the School Board began negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement. Each party submitted written proposals or counter proposals. (See Joint Exhibit #3 and #4, received in evidence). When negotiations began, teachers in the bargaining unit represented by the CTA were employed in one of the following categories: 10, 11, or 12-month contract. While most bargaining unit members were on 10-month contract status, some guidance counselors and approximately 90 teachers commonly referred to as vocational/technical teachers were on 12-month contract status. `These 90 vocational/technical teachers had been on 12-month contract status since at least 1970 and some since at least 1965. The negotiations resulted in a collective bargaining agreement which became effective on October 1, 1975. (Joint Exhibit #1). Neither the CTA's proposals nor the School Board's counter proposals for the 1975-76 contract contained a provision expressly granting the School Board the right to unilaterally change 12-month employees to 12 month status. Additionally, there was no specific discussion during negotiations regarding the alteration of the vocational/ technical teachers' 12-month contract status. During late spring, 1975, the Charging Party, and others similarly situated, were informed that during the 1975-76 fiscal year (which runs from July 1, 1975 through June 30, 1976) they would be employed for a full twelve months. They began their twelve month period of employment on July 1, 1975, prior to the effective date of the collective bargaining agreement-between the Board and the teachers' union. At that time there were approximately 200 teachers employed within the vocational/technical and adult education department. During the 1975-1976 school year, the school system with the exception of the post-secondary programs operated for two full semesters plus a summer school. Portions of the post-secondary programs, such as the vocational/technical and adult educational programs operated on a year-round basis. During the school year, the School Board decided to institute a system- wide program of year-round schools by adopting the quinmester system. Under the quinmester system the year is divided into five terms, each consisting of forty- five (45) days of student class time. Students can attend all five terms (or quins) thereby allowing them to graduate early, take extra courses or make up failed courses. Respondent takes the position that it was not possible to employ teachers on the 12-month basis as they would not be available for the required number of days. This is based on the fact that, as stated during the hearing under the 12-month system of employment, employees were only available for a total of 233 working days. Such a figure is derived by taking the number of days in a year, 365, and subtracting the number of Saturdays and Sundays, 104, which leaves 261 days. The School Board allows up to nineteen (19) days annual leave each year. Further, employees did not work on nine legal holidays on which the school system was closed which together with the 19 days annual leave made an additional 28 days that the employees would not be available for work in addition to the 104 Saturdays and Sundays. Thus when Saturdays, Sundays, Holidays and leave time are subtracted from the total 365 days, there are 233 available working days that employees working on a 12-month basis would be available. Therefore, the Board contended that in making its operational decision to change to a year-round school system, by adoption of the quinmester program, it needed employees to be available for 237 days if the teacher would be available to work all five quinmesters. Such a figure is derived by computing the number of days that the student will attend and the number of days that the teacher would therefore be required to be in attendance. Under the quinmester system, the student attends classes forty-five (45) days each quinmester, which means that the teacher needs to be present at least 225 days when the students are going to be present. Additionally, the Respondent urges that the collective bargaining agreement (Joint Exhibit #2) requires that teachers be on duty twelve (12) days when the students are not in attendance. These twelve days consist of five days of preplanning, five days of in-service training and two days of post-planning. With these figures, it is apparent that the teacher who is to work the entire year must be available the 225 days which the students are to be present together with the twelve days which the students are not present. Thus, wider this system, the teachers must be available 237 days during the school year. It is based on these figures that the Respondent contends that it made the operational decision to convert to a year-round school system, during the spring of 1976. In so doing, the Board advised its employees in the bargaining unit that they would be employed for an initial period of ten (10) months and given an extended contract for services rendered in programs extending beyond the regular school year. The regular school year comprises 196 days during a 10-month period of employment. Under the 10-month appointment, the teacher would be employed for an initial period of 196 days as provided for by the collective bargaining agreement and by statute. Out of the 196 days, the teacher earns 4 days leave which leaves available 192 work days in the initial employment period. The 192 work days include the 12 days that teachers are present and students are not. It also includes 180 days that the teacher is present with the students. This of course equals the first 4 quinmesters. The teacher employed to work year-round during the fifth quinmester would, under the operation of the quinmester system, be issued an extended contract to cover the additional 45 days of the fifth quinmester. By so doing, the 45 working days of the fifth quinmester with the 192 working days of the initial employment period provided for in the 10-month contracts provides the total 237 days needed to implement the year-round school system. It suffices to say that the neither the employee organization nor Respondent bargained about the implementation of the year-round school system. The teachers' union was not given advance notice of this action by the school board nor was there any attempt by the school board to bargain the impact of this decision with the teachers' union. During the course of the hearing, the Respondent introduced evidence to establish that the Charging Party and others similarly situated who are employed on a 10-month basis would receive a salary of $17,629.00 whereas the salary for the same services rendered under the 10-month plus extended contracts for the fifth quinmester would be $18,063.75. Respondent also introduced evidence establishing that the sick leave under either system was identical and that the Charging Party and others similarly situated are able to work 4 more work days under the 10-month plus extended contract than was available under the 12-month system. As stated, Respondent does not deny that it made its decision to employ vocational/technical teachers on a 10 month plus extended contract basis and that such was a departure of the contract status which said teachers had received in the past. In making its decision, Respondent contends that its acts were permissible under Chapter 447.209,F.S., since it is clothed with the statutory authority to unilaterally "determine the purpose of each of its constituent agencies, set standards of services to be offered to the public, and exercise control and discretion over its organizations and operations It contends further that armed with this authority, it was not required to bargain concerning its management rights (which it contends that this was) in that here there is no violation of any contractual provision or of any other section of Chapter 447, Florida Statues, since Chapter 447 does not call for year-round bargaining. Chapter 447.309, F.S., provides in pertinent part that a certified employee organization and the public employer shall jointly bargain collectively in the determination of the wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment of bargaining unit employees. Respondent contends that since a collective bargaining agreement "shall contain all the terms and conditions of employment for the bargaining unit employees" and that since the current collective bargaining agreement does not provide in any part that bargaining unit employees are given a contractual right to a 12 month contract, there has been no violation of Chapter 447, F.S. While research reveals no reported decisions in Florida defining or otherwise interpreting terms and conditions of employment, other public employment relations boards aid state courts have determined that terms and conditions of employment means "salaries, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment". The length of the work year is a function of hours or work and thus has been determined to be a term of employment, and thus a public employer is required to negotiate with its employees concerning all terms and conditions unless a specific statutory provision prohibits negotiations on a particular item. See for example, Board of Education of Union Free School District #3 of the Town of Huntington v. Associated Teachers of Huntington, 30 N.Y. 2nd 122 at 129. First of all it is clear in this case that there has been no bargaining on this item and further that there has been no express waiver to bargain regarding the employment term. It is also clear that the employees in question had been granted 12 month contracts during previous years and that they were not advised of the alteration of the term of their contracts until Respondent had unilaterally made its decision to employ said teachers on a 10 month plus extended contract basis. Finally, there is no specific statutory provision which prohibits the parties from negotiating the term of the employment contract other than Section 447.209(5), F.S., which is inapplicable here. Based thereon, I find that the Respondent's actions in unilaterally adopting a year round instructional program by terminating the 12 month contract status of teachers-adult full-time and teachers-adult basic education by placing such teachers on 10 month plus extended contract status was a unilateral alteration of a term and condition of said employees' employment relationship in violation of Sections 447.501(1)(a) and (c) and is a derivative violation of Section 447.301(a) of the Act.
Recommendation Having found that the Respondent has violated the Act as stated above, I shall therefore recommend that it: Bargain collectively upon request, with the Orange County Classroom Teachers Association as the exclusive representative of the employees in the unit described above. Such duty to bargain shall extend to all mandatory subjects of bargaining including changes in the term of the contract year of said bargaining unit employees. Post at its facilities, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are usually posted, on forms to be provided by PERC, a notice substantially providing: that it will not refuse to bargain, upon request, with the Orange County Classroom Teachers Association, as exclusive representative of the employees in the unit described above; and that its duty to bargain shall extend to all mandatory subjects of bargaining including, but not limited to, any changes in the term of the employment contracts of bargaining unit employees. DONE and ORDERED this 17th day of February, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Rowland, Petruska, Bowen & McDonald by John W. Bowen, Esquire 308 North Magnolia Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Thomas W. Brooks, Esquire Staff Attorney for the Public Employees Relations Commission 2003 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 300 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John W. Palowitch, President Orange County Classroom Teachers Association 6990 Lake Ellenor Drive Orlando, Florida
The Issue Whether Respondent's employment should be terminated for the reasons set forth in the Notice of Specific Charges.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: The School Board is responsible for the operation, control and supervision of all public schools (grades K through 12) and support facilities in Miami-Dade County. Respondent is employed by the School Board as a school bus aide. She is currently assigned to the John Schee Transportation Center. Respondent was initially hired by the School Board on September 8, 1992. She was terminated, effective October 31, 1995, for having been absent without authorization for three consecutive days. The School Board rehired Respondent on May 3, 2000, and assigned her to the Northwest Transportation Center. On October 11, 2002, Respondent was given her current assignment at the John Schee Transportation Center. As a school bus aide employed by the School Board, Respondent is a member of a collective bargaining unit represented by the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Local 1184 (AFSCME) and covered by a collective bargaining agreement between the School Board and AFSCME (AFSCME Contract). Article II, Section 3, of the AFSCME Contract provides, in pertinent part, as follows: ARTICLE II- RECOGNITION SECTION 3. The provisions of this Contract are not to be interpreted in any way or manner to change, amend, modify, or in any other way delimit the exclusive authority of the School Board and the Superintendent for the management of the total school system and any part of the school system. It is expressly understood and agreed that all rights and responsibilities of the School Board and Superintendent, as established now and through subsequent amendment or revision by constitutional provision, state and federal statutes, state regulations, and School Board Rules, shall continue to be exercised exclusively by the School Board and the Superintendent without prior notice or negotiations with AFSCME, Local 1184, except as specifically and explicitly provided for by the stated terms of this Contract. Such rights thus reserved exclusively to the School Board and the Superintendent, by way of limitation, include the following: . . . . (2) separation, suspension, dismissal, and termination of employees for just cause; . . . . It is understood and agreed that management possesses the sole right, duty, and responsibility for operation of the schools and that all management rights repose in it, but that such rights must be exercised consistently with the other provisions of the agreement. These rights include, but are not limited to, the following: A. Discipline or discharge of any employee for just cause; . . . . * * * Article XI of the AFSCME Contract is entitled, "Disciplinary Action." Section 1 of Article XI is entitled, "Due Process." It provides as follows: Unit members are accountable for their individual levels of productivity, implementing the duties of their positions, and rendering efficient, effective delivery of services and support. Whenever an employee renders deficient performance, violates any rule, regulation, or policy, that employee shall be notified by his/her supervisor, as soon as possible, with the employee being informed of the deficiency or rule, regulation, or policy violated. An informal discussion with the employee shall occur prior to the issuance of any written disciplinary action. Progressive discipline steps should be followed, however in administering discipline, the degree of discipline shall be reasonably related to the seriousness of the offense and the employee[']s record. Therefore, disciplinary steps may include: verbal warning; written warning (acknowledged); Letter of reprimand; Suspension/demotion; and Dismissal.[2] A Conference-for-the-Record shall be held when there is a violation of federal statutes, State Statutes, defiance of the administrator's authority, or a substantiated investigation to determine if formal disciplinary action should be taken (1.e., letter of reprimand, suspension, demotion or dismissal). A Conference-for- the-Record in and of itself shall not be considered disciplinary.[3] The parties agree that discharge is the extreme disciplinary penalty, since the employee's job, seniority, other contractual benefits, and reputation are at stake. In recognition of this principle, it is agreed that disciplinary action(s) taken against AFSCME, Local 1184 bargaining unit members shall be consistent with the concept and practice of progressive or corrective discipline and that in all instances the degree of discipline shall be reasonably related to the seriousness of the offense and the employee's record. The employee shall have the right to Union representation in Conferences-for-the- Record held pursuant to this Article. Such a conference shall include any meeting where disciplinary action will be initiated. The employee shall be given two days' notice and a statement for the reason for any Conference-for-the-Record, as defined above, except in cases deemed to be an emergency. A maximum of two Union representatives may be present at a Conference-for-the Record. The Board agrees to promptly furnish the Union with a copy of any disciplinary action notification (i.e., notice of suspension, dismissal, or other actions appealable under this Section) against an employee in this bargaining unit. Section 2 of Article XI is entitled, "Dismissal, Suspension, Reduction-in-Grade." It provides as follows: Permanent employees dismissed, suspended, or reduced in grade shall be entitled to appeal such action to an impartial Hearing Officer or through the grievance/arbitration process as set forth in Article VII of the Contract. The employee shall be notified of such action and of his/her right to appeal by certified mail. The employee shall have 20 calendar days in which to notify the School Board Clerk of the employee's intent to appeal such action and to select the method of appeal. If the employee when appealing the Board action, does not select the grievance/arbitration process as set forth in Article VII of the Contract[,] the Board shall appoint an impartial Hearing Officer, who shall set the date and place mutually agreeable to the employee and the Board for the hearing of the appeal. The Board shall set a time limit, at which time the Hearing Officer shall present the findings. The findings of the Hearing Officer shall not be binding on the Board, and the Board shall retain final authority on all dismissals, suspensions, and reductions-in-grade. The employee shall not be employed during the time of such dismissal or suspension, even if appealed. If reinstated by Board action, the employee shall receive payment for the days not worked and shall not lose any longevity or be charged with a break in service due to said dismissal, suspension, or reduction-in-grade. Non-reappointments are not subject to the grievance/arbitration procedures. Section 4 of Article XI is entitled, "Types of Separation." It provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Dissolution of the employment relationship between a permanent unit member and the Board may occur by any four [sic] distinct types of separation. Voluntary-- . . . . Excessive Absenteeism/Abandonment of Position-- An unauthorized absence for three consecutive workdays shall be evidence of abandonment of position. Unauthorized absences totaling 10 or more workdays during the previous 12-month period shall be evidence of excessive absenteeism. Either of the foregoing shall constitute grounds for termination. An employee recommended for termination under these provisions shall have the right to request of the Chief Personnel Officer for Human Resources a review of the facts concerning the unauthorized leave. Such right shall exist for a period of up to 10 working days after the first day of notification of the unauthorized absence.[4] Disciplinary-- The employee is separated by the employer for disciplinary cause arising from the employee's performance or non-performance of job responsibilities. Such action occurs at any necessary point in time. Non-reappointment-- . . . . AFSCME, Local 1184 bargaining unit members employed by the school district in excess of five years shall not be subject to non- reappointment. Such employee may only be discharged for just cause. Layoff-- . . . . As a School Board employee, Respondent is obligated to act in accordance with School Board "rule[s], regulation[s], and [p]olic[ies]. If she does not, she may be disciplined pursuant to the AFSCME Contract.5 Among the School Board's "rule[s]" are School Board Rule 6Gx13-4A-1.21 and School Board Rule 6Gx13-4E-1.01. School Board Rule 6Gx13-4A-1.21 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Permanent Personnel RESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTIES I. EMPLOYEE CONDUCT All persons employed by The School Board of Miami-Dade County, Florida are representatives of the Miami-Dade County Public Schools. As such, they are expected to conduct themselves, both in their employment and in the community, in a manner that will reflect credit upon themselves and the school system. * * * School Board Rule 6Gx13-4E-1.01 addresses the subject of "[a]bsences and [l]eaves." It provides, in pertinent part, that, "[e]xcept for sudden illness or emergency situations, any employee who is absent without prior approval shall be deemed to have been willfully absent without leave." School Board bus drivers and aides are governed by the following "[a]ttendance [p]olicy" set forth in the School Board Transportation Department's Handbook for Drivers, Aides and Operations Staff: Drivers and aides are expected to be prompt and punctual in their attendance on all workdays in accordance with the current calendar and their assigned schedule, and their contract. AUTHORIZED ABSENCES For absences to be authorized, they must be reported to the driver's or aide's Transportation Center Dispatch Office in advance. This notice shall be made at the earliest possible time, but no later than before the next scheduled report time. Even in an emergency, every possible effort must be made to inform the Dispatch Office. The supervisory staff evaluates the driver's adherence to this rule. Intent to return should be treated in the same manner. Leave forms must be completed promptly for payroll purposes. UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCES Unauthorized absences are subject to disciplinary action as prescribed under existing labor contracts. If a driver or aide does not report to work within 15 minutes after the scheduled report time, or does not call in absent before the report time, the absence will be considered unauthorized. If time off is taken during a regular working school day without a supervisor's approval, this absence may also be considered unauthorized. Additionally, any employee who does not have available sick/personal time may be charged with an unauthorized absence. NOTIFICATION OF ABSENCES -Drivers and aides must notify their Transportation Center[']s Dispatch Office as soon as they have determined they cannot report to work. Drivers are not to make arrangements on their own for a substitute. All arrangements must be made by the Dispatch Office. -If a driver will not be reporting for work on regular school days, the driver must call in immediately and speak with the Dispatcher, or the Field Operations Specialist. -If a driver cannot report to work because of an emergency situation, the driver must contact the Dispatch Office as soon as possible. If the situation requires a driver to leave the area, the driver should have a relative or friend contact the office for the driver. -If the absence will occur sometime in the future, the Dispatch Office should be given as much advance notification as possible. -When the Dispatch Office is contacted, an explanation for the absence should be given along with the length of absence and estimated date of return. -If the driver is off from work for more than one day, the driver must contact the office each day, prior to the report time, with a complete update of the situation. The only times the driver does not have to contact the office on a daily basis are as follows: -Admission to a hospital as a patient -Maternity leave -A doctor's work release for a specified number of days -Extended sick leave -Approved leave of absence -Out of town CHECK-IN POLICY -All employees are expected to arrive at work on or before their scheduled report time. -Drivers and aides will be given a five minute grace period to report to work, during which no disciplinary nor financial actions will be taken. For example, if the driver or aide is scheduled to report for work at 6:00 a.m., but signs-in by 6:05 a.m., the driver or aide will be allowed to go out on the assigned route with no repercussions. -Drivers and aides who report to work 6-15 minutes after the scheduled report times will be considered "tardy." Tardy drivers and aides will be permitted to work. However, the dispatch may assign a stand-by or substitute driver or aide to the route of the tardy employee. Drivers and aides who are more than 10 minutes late, but less than 16 minutes late, will be used as substitute drivers and aides and will not be allowed to operate their regularly assigned route. For the tardy driver or aide who was replaced by a substitute or stand-by driver or aide, such driver or aide will then be assigned as substitute for other routes needing coverage, as requirements dictate. A record will be kept documenting all tardiness. Lost time will be accumulated for tardiness and employees will be docked pay in 1/2 day increments. -Drivers and aides who report to work 16 or more minutes after the scheduled report time will be considered "absent without leave" (AWOL). These persons will not be permitted to work. They will be placed on "unauthorized leave-without pay" (ULWOP) and will be subject to disciplinary action in accordance with the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) Collective Bargaining Agreement -Extenuating circumstances will be evaluated by the Center Director and, upon proper documentation, may not be held against the employee. Repeated occurrences, such as "car broke down for the third time this week," will not be considered extenuating. DOCUMENTATION It is the responsibility of the drivers and aides to report to the supervisor in order to complete and/or produce all required paperwork related to the absence on the first workday upon return to work. Failure to comply with this procedure may result in an unauthorized absence regardless of extenuating circumstances. During the time she has been assigned to the John Schee Regional Transportation Center, Respondent has had a history of poor attendance, which has adversely impacted the operations of the center. On February 21, 2003, Respondent was issued a verbal warning for an unauthorized absence. On March 20, 2003, Respondent was issued the following written warning regarding her attendance by Dr. Michael Exelbert, a Coordinator III at the John Schee Regional Transportation Center: Payroll records indicate that you have accrued 7 days of Unauthorized Leave Without Pay and/or Tardies. Records indicate you were verbally warned regarding this issue on Feb. 21, 2003. Article V, Section 27 of the contract between Miami-Dade County Public Schools and AFSCME 1184 states: "Unauthorized Absence - Any absence without pay which has not been requested by the employee and approved by the supervisor, in writing, at least five days in advance. Absences of the employee, where notice of absence is made prior to the start of the workday, but are not covered by the employee having accrued sick or personal leave, shall be charged as unauthorized absence and may result in disciplinary action in accordance with Article XI." Article XI, Section 4B of the contract between Miami-Dade County Public Schools and AFSCME 1184 states: "Excessive Absenteeism/Abandonment of Position - An unauthorized absence for three consecutive workdays shall be evidence of abandonment of position. Unauthorized absences totaling 10 or more workdays during the previous 12-month period shall be evidence of excessive absenteeism. Either of the foregoing shall constitute grounds for termination. An employee recommended for termination under these provisions shall have the right to request of the Deputy Superintendent for Personnel Management and Services a review of the facts concerning the unauthorized leave. Such right shall exist for a period of up to 10 working days after the first day of notification of the unauthorized absence." Section 9 of the M-DCPS, Department of Transportation Handbook for Drivers, Aides and Operations Staff addresses the department's Attendance Policy. It states: " Drivers and aides are expected to be prompt and punctual in their attendance on all workdays in accordance with the current calendar and their assigned schedule, and their contract." This section addresses: 9.1-Authorized Absences, 9.2-Unauthorized Absences, 9.3- Notification of Absences, and 9.4-Check-In Policy. You are instructed to review this section of your handbook. Deficient performance exhibited by the accrual of unauthorized absences and/or tardiness negatively impacts the department, coworkers and the educational program of the students we serve. This behavior is unacceptable and must be corrected by reporting to duty when scheduled and reporting on time. With this memorandum, you are warned that future occurrences of Unauthorized Absences and/or Tardies will lead to progressive disciplinary action compliant with District policies and procedures and the contract between M-DCPS and AFSCME Local 1184. Be advised M-DCPS has a District Support Agency that may be able to assist you regarding attendance deficiencies and can be reached at . . . . You are encouraged to contact them for assistance in regards to your attendance deficiencies. Please contact me if additional information is required. Respondent signed this written warning, acknowledging receipt thereof, on March 26, 2003. On October 23, 2003, Mr. Exelbert held a conference- for-the-record with Respondent to discuss "attendance requirements." The following day, Mr. Exelbert prepared a memorandum in which he summarized what had transpired at the conference. The memorandum read as follows: A Conference-For-The-Record was held in my office on Thursday, October 23, 2003. You were asked if you were a member of the Union. You indicated that you were, but did not seek representation. Present at the meeting was Cynthia Brown, Bus Attendant, and this administrator. You were told the purpose of today's conference was to review attendance requirements. You were given a copy of the Notification of this Conference-For-The-Record. You acknowledged receiving and signing receipt for today's Conference-For-The-Record. You also received: a copy of all LWOP-U absences since your written warning and a copy of your M-DCPS screen 026 leave status dates. You received a Verbal Warning about your LWOP-U absences on February 21, 2003, and a written warning about you[r] LWOP-U absences on March 20, 2003. During those meeting the following LWOP-U absences were discussed. November 22(D), 2002. December 05(A), 06(D), 09(D), 10(D), 11(D), 20(P), 2002. February 04(P), 06(A), 11(A), 13(A), 14(P), 20(D), 24(D), 25(A), 2003. March 06(A), 10(D), 11(D), 12(D), 13(D), 2003. For today, the following LWOP-U attendance days since the Written Warning on March 20, 2003 were discussed: March 27(A), 2003. April 11(D), 17(A), 21(A), 23(D), 24(D), 2003. May 09, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 27, 28, 29, 30, 2003 (ALL Days). June 02, 03, 04, 05, 2003 (ALL Days). August 26(A), 29(A), 2003. September 04(A), 05(A), 11(A), 2003. A total of fifty occurrence of LWOP-U The seriousness of missing work and good attendance was discussed. You were given copies of Section 9 (Attendance Policy) from the Handbook of School Bus Drivers, Aides and Operations Staff. You indicated that you would bring documentation to change the unexcused absences of: April 11, 17, 21, 23, 24, 2003, May 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 27, 28, 29, 30, 2003, June 02, 03, 04, 05, 2003, (due to medical problems that you experienced at those times), and that you could bring in other documentation for: August 26, 29, 2003 and September 04, 05, 11, 2003, as a result of domestic problems you experienced at those time, from unacceptable to LWOP-A. You were asked if you had any other comments. You indicated that by Friday, October 31, 2003, you would bring in additional documentation for other dates listed above. You were told that this case would now be sent to Mr. George C. Millar, Director of the John Schee Regional Transportation Center and possibly to the Office of Jerry Klein, District Director, Department of Transportation Administration for further review. You were told that a summary would be prepared of today's session. You were apprised of your right to append, to clarify, or to explain any information recorded in this conference, by this Summary. You were asked to review this summary on Monday October 27, 2003, after 8:30AM, in Gail Allen, the Executive Secretary's Office. Respondent signed this memorandum, acknowledging receipt thereof, on October 29, 2003. Mr. Exelbert referred Respondent to the School Board's Employee Assistance Program for help in dealing with problems affecting her attendance. George Millar, the Director of the John Schee Regional Transportation Center, held a conference-for-the-record with Respondent on February 13, 2004. On February 17, 2004, Mr. Millar prepared a memorandum in which he summarized what had transpired at the conference. The memorandum read, in pertinent part, as follows: * * * CONFERENCE DATA It was stated that over the previous 12- month period, excluding summer, you have accrued 35.5 days of unauthorized absences. It was noted that several days previously unauthorized had been changed to authorized with a current net total of 35.5 days . . . . It was noted that the 35th day does not show on the report because the pay period just closed. A review of the record showed the following incidences attempting to assist you improve your attendance: Verbal Warning - February 21, 2003 Written Warning - March 20, 2003 . . . Conference for the Record - October 23, 2003 . . . . District Support Agency Referral - October 23, 2003 . . . . You were asked to present any additional documentation or response to address the issues presented. You stated that you were ill at the end of last year and you brought documentation. During a portion of that time you were hospitalized. You were instructed to submit documentation and it would be reviewed and considered for changing the identified absences to authorized. Your AFSCME Representatives were asked if they had any comment, Mr. Houghtaling said no. Action Taken The following section of the contract between Miami-Dade County Public Schools and AFSCME Local 1184 and Department of Transportation Handbook were reviewed and you acknowledged understanding their meaning and intent Article V, Section 27 . . . . Article XI, Section 4, Paragraph B . . . . Section 9 Attendance - M-DCPS, Department of Transportation Handbook for Drivers, Aides and Operations Staff . . . . The following instructions were given at the conference: Report for duty each day and shift that you are scheduled to work. Call in or submit a leave card in advance of your reporting time when you intend to be absent. Present documentation for absences not covered by accrued leave time to this administrator or Dr. Michael Exelbert upon your return to duty. Conclusion You were instructed that this conference would be summarized and forwarded to the Administrative Director, Department of Transportation, and the Office of Professional Standards for review and subsequent disciplinary action as merited. You were informed of your right to appendage (provide a written statement), which will be attached to the conference summary if you feel any facts or information is misrepresented or statements omitted which occurred during the conference. You will have 24 hours from receipt of the conference summary to submit this appendage. These statements concluded the conference. Respondent signed this memorandum, acknowledging receipt thereof, on February 24, 2004. Barbara Moss, the School Board's Office of Professional Standards' District Director, held a conference- for-the-record with Respondent on March 16, 2004, to discuss Respondent's absenteeism and her "future employment status" with the School board. In the 12-month period prior to this conference, Respondent had been absent a total of 72 days and had 33.5 days of unauthorized absences. On March 24, 2004, Ms. Moss prepared and furnished Respondent a memorandum in which Ms. Moss summarized what had transpired at the conference. In those portions of the memorandum addressing the "action taken" and the "action to be taken," Ms. Moss wrote the following: Action Taken You were advised of the availability of services from the District's support referral agency. The following directives are herein delineated which were issued to you during the conference concerning future absences: Be in regular attendance and on time. Intent to be absent must be communicated directly to Mr. George Millar or designee. Absences for illness must be documented by your treating physician and a written medical note presented to Mr. Millar or designee upon your return to the site. Failure to comply will result in the absence being recorded as Leave Without Pay, Unauthorized (LWOU). During the conference, you were directed to comply and provided with a copy of School Board Rules 6Gx13-4A-1.21, Responsibilities and Duties, and 6Gx13-4E-1.01, Absences and Leaves. You are advised of the high esteem in which employees are held and of the District's concern for any behavior, which adversely affects this level of professionalism. Action TO Be Taken You were advised that the information presented in this conference, as well as subsequent documentation, would be reviewed with the Assistant Superintendent in the Office of District Compliance Units, the Administrative Director of Transportation, and the Director of [the] John Schee Transportation Center. Upon completion of the conference summary, a legal review by the School Board attorneys will be requested. Receipt of their legal review with endorsement by the Chief Communications Officer, will compel formal notification of the recommended disciplinary action. All disciplinary actions will be consistent with the concepts and practice of progressive or corrective discipline. The degree of discipline shall be reasonably related to the seriousness of the offense and the employee's record. You were apprised of your right to clarify, explain, and respond to any information recorded in this conference by this summary, and to have any such response appended to your record. At its June 16, 2004, meeting, the School Board "took action to suspend [Respondent] and initiate dismissal proceedings against [her]."
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the School Board issue a final order sustaining Respondent's suspension and terminating her employment with the School Board pursuant Article XI, Section 4B, of the AFSCME Contract. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of March, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of March, 2005.
