Findings Of Fact 1. Petitioner (Randolph) is an African-American female. 2. Petitioner was hired by Respondent on June 2, 1997, and was terminated by Respondent from her employment on September 30, 1997. 3. When initially hired, Petitioner’s official employment class title was Other Personnel Services (OPS) Paralegal Specialist. 4. On July 1, 1997, approximately one month after her date of employment, Petitioner’s official employment class title was changed to Administrative Secretary and Petitioner’s pay plan status was changed from OPS to Career Service. 5. On September 1, 1997, Petitioner's class title was reclassified to Paralegal Specialist. 6. From July 1, 1997, until the date of her termination, Petitioner was employed in a probationary status by DOAH with her primary job responsibilities being that of a proofreader. 7. Probationary employees are not entitled to progressive discipline and can be terminated at will pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 60L-36.005. 8. Ann Cole, the clerk of DOAH, interviewed all candidates for the newly created proofreader position. 9. There were several applicants for the proofreader position and after a series of tests and interviews Ann Cole determined that Petitioner was the best applicant for the proofreader position and Petitioner was hired for the job. 10. Approximately one month after Petitioner was hired, a second proofreader (Dr. Rappendelli) was hired. Dr. Rappendeli is a white female. 11. Both Petitioner and Dr. Carol Ripandelli were supervised at DOAH by Ann Cole. ATTENDANCE HISTORY 312. During the first month of her employment Petitioner shared a work area in DOAH’s mailroom with current DOAH employee Elma Moore, an African-American female. 13. Elma Moore typically arrived at work between 7:00 and 7:15 a.m. even though the required start time for employees of the clerk’s office was 8:00 a.m. 14. Elma Moore was able to directly observe the times during which Petitioner arrived at work. Ms. Moore noted that Petitioner reported to work forty-five minutes late on her first day. Ms. Moore further noted that Petitioner would often be late. 15. Elma Moore was relocated to another part of the clerk’s office when Dr. Rappendelli was hired. 16. Elma Moore, even from her new workstation, continued to be situated such that she was able to observe the times at which Petitioner customarily arrived at work. 17. Elma Moore testified that during the four month period that Petitioner worked for DOAH, at least two to three times each week, Petitioner would arrive at work approximately ten to thirty minutes beyond the mandatory 8:00 a.m. start time for employees. 18. The testimony of Elma Moore is further corroborated by the affidavit of Deanna Hartford. 19. Ms. Hartford, who was the Deputy Clerk Supervisor for DOAH during Petitioner’s period of employment, stated that she observed Petitioner arrive to work late, without notice, on several occasions during her OPS employment and during her career service probationary employment. 20. Ms. Hartford stated in her affidavit that around the first week of September 1997 she was asked by Ann Cole to observe Petitioner’s attendance. Ms. Hartford noted that during this period of observation Petitioner arrived to work at’ the following times on the dates as indicated: September 8, 1997, 8:20 a.m.j; September 9, 1997, 8:25 a.m.; September 10, 1997, 8:10 a.m.; and September 17, 1997, 8:20 a.m. 21. Ms. Hartford reported to Ann Cole, Petitioner's supervisor, that Petitioner was frequently late for work. 22. This is consistent with Elma Moore’s testimony that Petitioner, at least two to three days per week, was customarily late for work in excess of ten minutes. 23. Petitioner attempted to contradict the testimony of Elma Moore and the affidavit of Deanna Hartford by testifying that she was told by her supervisor, Ann Cole, to make up her tardy time thereby excusing the fact that she was habitually late for work. 24. Ms. Cole stated the importance of proofreaders being punctual to work, and testified that she and Petitioner had at least two meetings where they discussed Petitioner’s tardiness issue prior to her termination. 25. Ms. Cole stated that she spoke with Petitioner about her timesheet and attendance, and the need for Petitioner to tell her when she is late and how she plans to make up her time. 26. Ms. Cole stated that Petitioner’s communication regarding her promptness and plans to make up time never improved. 27. Ms. Hartford stated that she never observed Petitioner disclose her late arrivals to her supervisor, Ms. Cole. On more than one occasion, Ms. Hartford stated, she reported Petitioner’s tardiness to Ms. Cole, who indicated she was unaware of the late arrival. PHONE USE 28. Unlike some of the other jobs in the clerk's office, the proofreader’s duties and responsibilities did not require the utilization of the telephone. 29. Elma Moore stated that during the time that she shared an office with Petitioner, her desk was in close proximity to Petitioner’s desk and that on several occasions she noticed that Petitioner was talking on the telephone. 30. Elma Moore stated that Petitioner was using the telephone for personal calls frequently. 31. Elma Moore further testified that she knew that the responsibilities and duties of the proofreader did not require Petitioner to use the telephone. 32. Deanna Hartford noted in her affidavit that she personally observed that Petitioner was always on the phone. 33. Ms. Hartford also noted in her affidavit that other employees at the Clerk’s office had complained to her about Petitioner’s excessive use of the telephone. 34. Ms. Hartford advised her supervisor Ann Cole about Petitioner’s excessive phone use. 35. In response to the complaint about Petitioner's excessive use of the telephone, Ms. Cole contacted DOAH’s information services department and requested that they audit all of the telephone extensions for the clerk’s office. 36. The audit results for the clerk’s office revealed that during the audit period, employees, excluding Petitioner, averaged 85.5 outgoing phone calls. 37. Petitioner, however, had 294 outgoing calls attributed to her extension during this period. Dr. Carol Ripandelli, the other proofreader, had 79 outgoing calls attributed to her extension during this same period. 38. The audit results for the clerk’s office revealed that during the audit period, employees, excluding Petitioner, averaged 1.6 outgoing calls that exceeded ten minutes in duration. 39. The number of outgoing calls exceeding ten minutes in duration that were attributed to Petitioner's extension during the audit period totaled thirteen. Dr. Carol Ripandelli had only two outgoing calls that exceeded ten minutes in duration attributed to her extension during the audit period. 40. Petitioner denied having made the number of phone calls attributed to her extension. Petitioner also charged that it was possible that other employees could have made outgoing calls from the phone on Petitioner’s desk. 41. Elma Moore testified that it was neither the practice nor the custom of employees of the clerk’s office to regularly use the telephone of other employees. INITIATIVE 42. Deanna Hartford, in her affidavit, noted that in July of 1997 she was asked by Ann Cole to provide additional training to the proofreaders. 43. Petitioner and the other proofreader were instructed to inform Ms. Hartford when they were caught up with their work so that the additional training could be provided. 44. Dr. Carol Rappendeli, the OPS proofreader, sought and received additional training in several areas including filing, assisting in the quarterly file purge and destruction, outgoing docketing procedures, and maintaining the Florida Administrative Code supplements. 45. Petitioner never sought additional training as requested. 46. Ann Cole observed Petitioner nodding off on at least three occasions while in an important proofreading standards meeting. 47. Ms. Cole observed Petitioner cutting coupons at her desk the morning of September 22, 1997, during business hours. 10 48. Elma Moore also testified to the fact that Petitioner, during business hours would frequently work on a personal book when she wasn’t proofreading. DISRUPTIVE AND RUDE BEHAVIOR 49. Ms. Cole testified that along with the attendance problems and telephone usage, Petitioner also had attitude problems. 50. On two occasions, Petitioner felt the need to apologize for rude comments made to her supervisor, Ms. Cole. 51. Ms. Cole observed rude behavior by Petitioner directed toward Dr. Ripandelli when they were discussing proofreading on a particular order. 52. Ms. Cole stated that when Petitioner gets in one of her moods, teamwork between Petitioner and Dr. Ripandelli is ineffective. 53. Ms. Cole testified that she had to speak with Petitioner about her radio and that it was so loud it caused a disturbance in the break room. 54. Dr. Ripandelli testified that Petitioner’s radio was so loud that she bought herself headphones in order to drown out Petitioner’s radio. i 55. In contrast, Ms. Cole testified that Dr. Ripandelli gets along with all the judges and that Dr. Ripandelli interacts fine with her. TERMINATION 56. Ms. Hartford stated that Petitioner never discussed with her any need to accommodate her for a disability or for her religion. 57. Ms. Hartford further stated that Petitioner never mentioned that she was being discriminated against for any reason. Ms. Hartford never observed Petitioner walk with a limp, or have sores or bandages on her legs. 58. Petitioner was terminated on September 30, 1997, due to her chronic tardiness, excessive use of the telephone, and her general failure to demonstrate initiative.
Conclusions Petitioner: Ms. Audrey Randolph, Pro Se 2644 Edgewood Avenue, West Jacksonville, FL 32209-2431 904-713-9913 For Respondent: Mr. Linzie F. Bogan, Esquire Office of the Attorney General PL-01 The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399 850-414-3300 ext. 4650
Recommendation 29 In the present case, Respondent showed a legitimate reason for discharging Petitioner. Petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination based upon her race, religion, disability or marital status. Petitioner also failed to demonstrate that Respondent discriminated against her in retaliation for Petitioner engaging in an activity that was protected by Section 760.10(7), Florida Statutes. Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 4A day of Vabir ; 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, kative Law Judge sd Way, Bin A-0 32398-1703 Filed with the clerk of the Florida Commission of Human Relations this 2" day of December 2003. 30 COPIES FURNISHED: Ms. Audrey Randolph 2644 Edgewood Avenue, West Jacksonville, FL 32209 Mr. Linzie F. Bogan, Esq. Office of the Attorney General PL-01 The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399 Harry Hooper Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 Secretary of Commission Mike Hanson Room 1801, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001
The Issue The issues posed for decision are: 1. Whether the Respondent, by its agent Lawrence McCarthy, unlawfully discharged Jerome Cilhar on June 21, 1976, in violation of Section 447.501(1)(b), of the Act. 2 . Whether the Respondent, by its agent and representative, Lawrence McCarthy, unlawfully interrogated and threatened employees on April 30, and May 4, 1976, within the meaning of Section 447.501(1)(a), of the Act. Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, including the entire record compiled herein) I make the following:
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, City of Gulfport, Florida, is a Florida municipal corporation located in Pinellas County, Florida. During times material to this proceeding, the City Manager was Mr. Harry Perkins (Perkins) who had the ultimate authority over personnel matters including hirings, discharges, levels of manpower, administration of federal employment assistance programs, as well as labor relations. During times material to this proceeding, Mr. Lawrence McCarthy (McCarthy) was employed by Respondent as Director of Public Works. As such, he had operational responsibility for sanitation, water and sewer, streets and parks among others. While McCarthy had the authority to manage his department, the hiring and discharge of employees and the general administration of budgets was handled by Perkins with some input and recommendation by McCarthy. During 1975, Gulfport contracted with Pinellas County, Florida to be a member of a consortium to receive federal supplemental employment assistance funds from the federal government under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA). Under this contract, Gulfport was required to follow all federal rules and regulations adopted under the CETA program. In March, 1975, Mr. Jerome Cilhar (Cilhar or the alleged discriminatee) had been unemployed for the requisite period of time to qualify for employment under the Pinellas County CETA program. Cilhar applied for a CETA position with Gulfport and, after the interview, was hired as a sanitation worker in the Public Works Department on March 3, 1975. He (Cilhar) was hired along with a Mr. Johnson who was also hired by Respondent under the CETA prograin as a sanitation worker, On July 17, 1975, an election was conducted by PERC among a comprehensive unit of Respondent's blue and white collar employees. The Petitioner therein did not receive a majority of the valid ballots cast. With these facts, both Perkins and McCarthy were under the impression that no union organizational campaign could begin until after the expiration of a one year period from the date of the election. Respondent operates on a fiscal year basis from October 1, until September 30. For the fiscal year 1975 to 1976, Respondent had budgeted approximately 130 positions for employees. In April and May, 1976, testimony reveals that Perkins became concerned that estimated revenues from services and taxes would not be reached during fiscal year 1975 through 1976 and that expenses would exceed the amount estimated. In this regard, it was noted that Respondent realized an operating deficit of approximately $200,000 for the fiscal year 1975 to 1976. In response to projected deficits, Perkins began personnel cutbacks in May, 1976, since personnel costs represented the largest single budget expenditure. Between May of 1976 and September 30, 1976, Perkins trimmed the City's work force by approximately 20 percent or a net loss of 26 employees. (See Respondent's Exhibit #4). In this regard, the evidence revealed that the City operated the sanitation department without any upward manpower adjustments until February, 1977, when employees were transferred to that area. Mr. Cilhar stated that he voluntarily informed Mr. McCarthy (the Public Works Director) of his desire for a union in late April, 1976. He testified that he and Barney White, a fellow employee in the sanitation department volunteered this information respecting their union activity because White was upset about the lack of pay raises. He testified that Barney White took the initiative in the conversation with McCarthy and in this regard, the evidence revealed that White who, as best as the record reveals, made all of the comments respecting their union activities. Cilhar testified that he noted no change in his relationship with the City and its employees during the six week interim between the date he and White made known their union activities to Respondent's agent (McCarthy) and the date of his discharge on June 21, 1976. Evidence reveals that Respondent made the decision (jointly by Perkins and McCarthy) to retain CETA employee Johnson, whose seniority was equal to Cilhar's, based on the fact that Johnson was more versatile in terms of his employment skills and Respondent was of the opinion that he would be of more assistance in that he could be assigned to a multitude of tasks. Cilhar also advanced the position that Respondent terminated him because he was arranging to schedule a union meeting on the date that he was discharged. The testimony in this regard establishes, on balance, that the Respondent made its decision to terminate Cilhar on Friday, June 18, but could not locate Cilhar because he had left to go home when the final decision was made by Respondent. He was contacted and advised of the termination decision by Respondent early the following Monday, June 21, 1976. He was given an exit interview and advised that his job was being abolished due to the lack of CETA fundings for the next fiscal year. He was also paid for his accrued annual leave from CETA funds. In this regard, Respondent established that this was done to curb employment costs from municipal funds since the payment of Cilhar's leave would have come from municipal funds had the decision been postponed until the end of the fiscal year. It was also noted in this regard that in its effort to realize economy through personnel cuts, Perkins terminated Ryan Larison, a budgeted city employee in the Sanitation Department on June 16, 1976 and thereby realized an economic savings. Pertinent CETA rules and regulations as well as the Respondent's contract with Pinellas County required that the City utilize federal CETA funds only as supplemental to budgeted employment positions. Thus Respondent could not maintain CETA positions instead of budgeted positions under its contract and the regulations. See Respondent's Exhibit #2, Section 205(c)(8). With these facts, I conclude that the Respondent did no more than it was required to do or in fact was compelled to do based on the financial restraints that it was operating under and its regulations with Pinellas County under the CETA program. As Respondent aptly notes, union activity does not insulate an employee from discharge for cause. While there were some uncertainties in this record, and some suspicions automatically arise from the fact that a union adherent was discharged while an employee of equal seniority with, as best as can be determined by the record, little or no union sympathies, these suspicions provide no substitute for record evidence upon which a finding can be made that the Respondent discharged the alleged discriminatee based on his union sympathies or desires as alleged in the complaint. I shall therefore recommend that this allegation be dismissed. THE ALLEGED THREATS AND INTERROGATION The complaints cite two instances in which the Respondent's agent, McCarthy, engaged in unlawful threats and/or interrogation. Witnesses testifying to these remarks during the hearing were Messrs. McCarthy and Rousseau. Both testified that in essence McCarthy warned that "they had a constitutional right to do any damn thing they wanted, but while on City property and on City time, solicitation of union activities was not condoned. Any one I heard would be subject to dismissal". McCarthy testified frankly and openly with respect to his remarks to employees respecting solicitation while on City time and property. Given all of the circumstances of this case and the complete absence of any evidence indicating that the Respondent engaged in any independent acts to unlawfully interfere with, restrain or coerce employees to exercise those rights guaranteed them in Chapter 447, I am of the opinion that the remarks given employees by McCarthy respecting solicitations for unions on City time on City property did not rise to the level of unlawful activity as defined in Chapter 447.501(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Accordingly, I shall recommend that the complaint allegations be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, I hereby recommend that the complaint filed herein be dismissed in its entirety. RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of October, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Frank E. Hamilton, Jr., Esquire 101 East Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33602 William E. Sizemore, Esquire Post Office Box 3324 Tampa, Florida 33601
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner’s employment position was properly reclassified from Career Service to the Select Exempt Service (SES) on July 1, 2001, pursuant to Section 110.205(2)(x), Florida Statutes (2001).
Findings Of Fact In 1985, Petitioner was employed by the Department as an Engineer III. He was eventually promoted to Engineer IV and then to Engineer IV coordinator. Prior to July 1, 2001, Petitioner’s positions were classified as career service. On July 1, 2001, Petitioner’s position was changed from a career service classification to an SES classification and designated as an Engineer Supervisor IV. A knew job description was also prepared. Throughout his employment, Petitioner’s main duty was to inspect, maintain and repair fire and security alarm systems in State office buildings. In that capacity and depending on the particular system, Petitioner worked as part of and coordinated with a team of one to two other inspectors. Petitioner’s position as an Engineer IV was a position within the PERC certified Professional Career Service collective bargaining unit, represented by Florida Public Employees Council 79, Association of Federal, State, County and Municipal Employees Union (AFSCME). For inclusion within such a unit the position was considered to not involve managerial or supervisory functions. In fact, Petitioner’s positions as an Engineer III and IV did not involve supervisory functions. However, when he became an Engineer IV coordinator, Petitioner had some supervisory duties. Those duties were primarily approving time sheets and performing annual employee performance evaluations. Employee assignments and training were handled as a team with a particular employee’s specific equipment knowledge and building knowledge being key factors. When work was performed together, the employee with the greater expertise with the system directed the work. Prior to his termination, Petitioner supervised Ed McCann and Richard Lamberto. Approximately 90 percent of Petitioner’s time was spent responding to calls regarding the malfunctioning of fire and security systems. About five percent of his time was spent performing routine maintenance on such systems and another two to four percent on responding to fire marshall’s inspection reports. Less than one percent of his time was spent on supervisory duties. Petitioner’s primary duties involved the exercise of independent judgment. His duties were not routine or clerical in nature. Petitioner did not have the power to hire and fire an employee or the power to make purchase decisions. He could make effective recommendations regarding those decisions. He did not have authority over any budgetary matters. There was no evidence that Petitioner’s position dealt with confidential matters. In fact, Petitioner’s actual job performance did not change after his position was reclassified to Engineer Supervisor IV, SES. His day-to-day performance did not change primarily because his office was seriously understaffed for the statewide duties of their office. However, the new SES description expanded the supervisory or managerial duties of Petitioner’s old career service position description. In pertinent part, the position description as of July 2, 2001, stated the following: 20% Supervisory: Supervision of Fire & Safety employees in their duties and responsibilities. Evaluations and review of job performance, recommendation of disciplinary action if necessary, training and continued education. Supervise the project management duties that include the approval of timesheets, project specification, drawings, purchase orders, requisitions, correspondence, travel, purchase order completion of contract pay requests. Meet regularly with subordinate staff to discuss office procedures, work assignments and Division issues and goals. Addresses performance issues promptly and uses progressive and corrective action to resolve employee performance problems. Updates, discusses and presents Performance Planning and review forms, position descriptions and office procedures to subordinate staff. Provides each employee with a performance review within the designated time period in accordance with established rules and procedures. Ensure staff attend necessary training with designated time frames. Follows established rules, regulations and procedures for attendance and leave, travel reimbursements, appointment procedures, affirmative action and invoice processing. Duties contained in numbers three through eight were expanded from his earlier 1999 position description. The 2001 position description also had expanded supervisory or managerial duties contained in its other sections. The description stated, in relevant part: 40% preventive Maintenance: * * * * 2. Ensure the desired maintenance is being performed on a timely basis that does not fall within normal operations. * * * * Assist in providing engineering direction on system modifications, installations, upgrades and also see that the actual preventive maintenance efforts are being carried out. Set priorities for maintenance projects; * * *. * * * * 10% Specifications: * * * * 2. Monitor contractors through contract period for compliance with specifications. * * * * Instruct user personnel on the prescribed utilization, operation, testing and maintenance of alarms on the alarm systems installed. * * * * 10% Other: * * * * Keeps supervisor fully informed regarding work-related activities, relevant issues, upcoming events and potential problems. Ensures requests for leave are submitted and approved in accordance with established rules and Division procedures. * * * * Petitioner remained employed under the new classification until his termination on August 12, 2002. Petitioner was terminated in part for failing to perform his duties as a supervisor in overseeing the timely performance of repairs and setting priorities for accomplishing those tasks. The evidence demonstrated that Petitioner’s supervisory duties were expanded to include a significant amount of supervision and management. However, the evidence did not demonstrate that Petitioner actually spent a majority of his time supervising his staff. The evidence did show that he did spend some amount of time engaged in non-routine, non-clerical activities that involved the exercise of independent judgment, combined with a significant role in employee personnel administration in that he had the authority to effectivey recommend employment actions. The fact that he did not exercise such authority is not controlling and only demonstrates that the need for such action had not arisen. Given these duties, the reclassification of Petitioner’s position was appropriate under the Service First Initiative.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law reached it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Petitioner's position was appropriately reclassified as Select Exempt Service. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of January, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of January, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Avery McKnight, Esquire Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A. 906 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Jerry G. Traynham, Esquire Patterson & Traynham 315 Beard Street Post Office Box 4289 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-4289 Steven S. Ferst, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Linda South, Secretary Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
Findings Of Fact John Stewart is a correctional officer with permanent status. He filed a timely appeal on his five-day suspension with the Career Service Commission. Franklin Ashe, Assistant Food Service Director, was Stewart's immediate supervisor and rater at the time in question. Stewart had transferred to kitchen duties shortly after his initial rating as a Correctional Officer I in March, 1976. Ashe prepared Stewart's first rating as a Correctional Officer I working in the kitchen as a steward on April 25, 1977. At that time Stewart had worked in the southwest unit kitchen since the and of March, 1977. His duties in the southwest unit kitchen were direction and supervision of inmate cooks and cook's helpers. Prior to his transfer, Stewart's duties were to take the noon meal to the prisoners working on work details outside the prison. However, Ashe had also supervised Stewart prior to his transfer to the southwest unit kitchen. His performance of his initial duties were presumably satisfactory because this was apparently a good assignment and Stewart performed these duties until March, 1977. The benefits of this job included no shift work and weekends off. In late March, 1977, Stewart who was active in a union organizational effort received oral warning from D. E. Carter concerning passing out union material on the premises of the prison. Shortly thereafter, Stewart who was an alternate to the bargaining talks, was moved from his duties serving prisoners on work detail and assigned to shift work. Shortly after that he was moved to the southwest unit kitchen. The evaluation involved in this case followed shortly thereafter. Ashe's evaluation of Stewart was delivered to Ashe by one of the Correctional Officers II or sergeants who were assigned duties in the kitchen. Ashe was displeased about the rating and asked the sergeant about speaking to Ashe. A meeting occurred between Ashe and Stewart in Ashe's office shortly after Stewart came to work on May 23, 1977. This meeting lasted about five minutes. Stewart states that he asked Ashe about the rating and Ashe replied that it was self-explanatory and that he just called the facts the way they were. Beyond this Ashe gave no explanation of the basis for his rating of Stewart. Ashe does not deny this, but alleges that Stewart was abusive and insubordinate by stating that he (Ashe) was full of shit. Ashe then attempted to terminate the meeting by leaving. Ashe stated that Stewart blocked his way out of the door and told him that he was a baby not a man and that if they met on the street, Ashe had better move over. Stewart denies having used vulgar or threatening language with Ashe, but admits that be did stand in the door way and did say Ashe was a baby not a man. Stewart never received an explanation of his rating. Based upon the foregoing Stewart was suspended for five days.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Hearing Officer finds that good cause existed for disciplinary action against Stewart. DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of November, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Raymond Gearey, Esquire Department of Offender Rehabilitation 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Walter Thomas, Esquire Voyager Building 2255 Phyllis Street Jacksonville, Florida Mrs. Dorothy Roberts Appeals Coordinator Department of Administration Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner, Steven A. Ramunni, owner of Steven A. Ramunni, P.A., employed by the City of Moore Haven, Florida, as the part-time city attorney, is entitled to participate in the Florida Retirement System from November 25, 1986, through the present.
Findings Of Fact Based upon observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying in person and the documentary materials received in evidence, stipulations by the parties, evidentiary rulings made pursuant to Section 120.57, and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant and material facts are found: The City of Moore Haven, Florida (City), is a Florida Municipal Corporation classified as a local agency and participates in the Florida Retirement System (FRS). The city attorney part-time position is established by Article IV of the City of Moore Haven Charter. The City has no legal department. The cost for legal services rendered by its part-time city attorney is included in the City's annual budget. Petitioner, Steven A. Ramunni (Mr. Ramunni), owner of Steven A. Ramunni, P.A., was hired November 25, 1986, as the City's part-time city attorney. His immediate supervisors are the mayor and the City Council of Moore Haven (City Council). Mr. Ramunni's primary legal duties consist of mandatory appearances at two regularly scheduled monthly meetings and attendance at special meetings at the discretion of the City Council. He performs the legal duties and services needed or required by the City Council. He represents the City in all litigation and official business. He provides legal advice/opinions to the mayor, the City Council, and to all city department heads. Mr. Ramunni, by virtue of a monthly retainer, is obligated to be available as needed by his retainer client on a daily basis, if necessary. The City provides administrative assistance to Mr. Ramunni when he is engaged in legal projects for the City. However, the City hires and supervises the administrative staff. Additionally, Mr. Ramunni has authority and does use his private law firm's administrative staff to assist him in performing legal services for the City. The City is billed separately from the monthly retainer agreement for other legal services. The City pays for those legal seminars attended by Mr. Ramunni that are related to local agencies as that term is defined in Subsection 121.021(52)(b). Mr. Ramunni is responsible for attending and making payment for additional seminars necessary to comply with mandatory Florida Bar requirements. Mr. Ramunni has held the position of part-time city attorney for the City and has continuously performed legal services as the part-time city attorney continually since November 25, 1986. There was no formal contract of employment entered into by Mr. Ramunni and the City on November 25, 1986, and no formal contract of employment presently exists. Reimbursement for legal services rendered to the City For attending City Council meetings twice a month, Mr. Ramunni is on a fixed monthly retainer. Other than attending the two monthly City Council meetings, Mr. Ramunni has no other established legal duties as the part-time city attorney. He is available and he does provide requested legal counsel and engages in litigation when needed only on those issues determined by the City Council and/or the mayor. Other than his fixed monthly retainer for attending City Council meetings, any and all other legal services performed for the City require additional compensation, billed by the hour, plus cost, to be paid to Mr. Ramunni. This hourly billing rate plus expenses is separate and apart from his fixed monthly retainer for attending City Council meetings as part- time city attorney. Reporting income paid Mr. Ramunni for services rendered Mr. Ramunni asserts that he has not received an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form 1099 or a Form W-2 reflecting annual compensation paid him by the City from November 25, 1986, to the present. The Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement's (the Agency), ERQ-1 form, dated October 3, 2002, question 15, page 3, completed with the assistance of Maxine Brantley, City Clerk, and submitted to the Agency, answered the question, "How did the worker report the earnings for income tax purposes?" to the contrary. Answering the above question regarding how monies paid to Mr. Ramunni are reported to state and federal agencies for income tax purposes, the ERQ-1 form confirms that the City does not report annual earned income payments made to Mr. Ramunni as "Wages" for income tax purposes by Form W-2. The City chose to report, and Mr. Ramunni acquiesced, annual earned income paid to Mr. Ramunni by the City as "self employed income" for tax purposes by using Form 1099. The City chose, and Mr. Ramunni acquiesced, not to withhold federal income taxes and federal social security deductions from Mr. Ramunni's payment for services rendered. The City chose, and Mr. Ramunni acquiesced, not to withhold medicare deductions from Mr. Ramunni's annual pay. The City chose, and Mr. Ramunni acquiesced, not to make matching contributions for Mr. Ramunni's federal social security or medicare payments. The City chose, and Mr. Ramunni acquiesced, not to provide statutorily required workers' compensation coverage for Mr. Ramunni. The City is insured by its Public Risk Management Self Insurance coverage, to include legal work performed on behalf of the City by Mr. Ramunni. This coverage is not insurance coverage for legal malpractice claims that may be made against Mr. Ramunni, personally. Mr. Ramunni maintains a law firm, Stevens A. Ramunni, P.A., with offices in LaBelle and Fort Myers, Florida, offering legal services to the general public. Mr. Ramunni does not have office equipment or office space on the City's premises. The City makes remittance of the monthly retainer and of fees charged by Mr. Ramunni to Steven A. Ramunni, P.A., and not Mr. Ramunni personally. The City's remittance checks are deposited in the Steven A. Ramunni, P.A., law firm's account and not Mr. Ramunni's personal banking account. Mr. Ramunni, at his sole discretion, uses the administrative staff of his private law firm to assist him with the City's legal projects. The cost for use of the administrative staff of his private law firm is an integrated portion of his hourly total billing totals to the City. Although Mr. Ramunni may terminate his independent relationship with the City as city attorney without personal financial liability, he continues to have a professional and ethical duty to assist in the transition of ongoing litigation to a new attorney. As part-time city attorney, Mr. Ramunni may not substitute another attorney to provide legal services assigned to him by the City without expressed authority and approval of the proposed new attorney from the City Council and the mayor. Based upon the Findings of Fact herein above, the evidence demonstrates that Mr. Ramunni's relationship as the part-time city attorney is not that of an "employee" of the City as that term is defined by rule of the Agency, for participation in the FRS. Based upon the Findings of Fact herein above, Mr. Ramunni has failed to prove that his part-time city attorney relationship with the City is and always has been an employer- employee relationship as that term is defined by rule of the Agency and that he is eligible for participation in the FRS.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order denying Petitioner's request to participate in the Florida Retirement System from November 25, 1986, through the present. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of September, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of September, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven A. Ramunni, Esquire Post Office Box 1118 LaBelle, Florida 33975 Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Erin Sjostrom, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Monesia Taylor Brown, Acting General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
The Issue The issues presented at the Hearing on the Amended Petition were the same presented in the original RC Petition, as stated above. Who is the public employer? This issue has been raised by Motion as indicated above. The Sheriff's Department argues that the Sheriff is not the Public Employer because his power to hire, fire, discipline and promote employees is subject to the provisions of the Escambia County Civil Service Board which was established by law. Section 3 of Chapter 75-369, Laws of Florida, clearly places all employers of the Sheriff's Department with the exception of the Sheriff, Secretary to the Sheriff, and Chief Deputy Sheriff within the classified service of Escambia County. Further, the Sheriff's Department argues that it does not have any control over its budget because the County Commissioners approve the Sheriff's budget. See Section 30.49, et seq., Florida Statutes. The County Commission argues that although it appropriates the money for operation of the Sheriff's Department, that once appropriated the County Commission cannot control its expenditure. See Weitzenfeld v. Dierks, 312 So 2d 194. The Civil Service Board argues that it is not the employer but a statutory creature established for the protection of employee rights. See Section 4, et seq., Chapter 75-369, Laws of Florida. This issue as raised by the various motions mentioned above is presented for consideration by the Public Employees Relation Commission. Is the Petitioner an employee organization within the meaning of Florida Statutes, Chapter 447 and is there a sufficient showing of interest as required by Florida Statutes, Chapter 447? The Sheriff's Department questioned whether the Petitioner in this cause was the Florida PBA or Escambia County PBA. The Hearing officer ruled that the RC Petition was filed by Florida PBA. Subsequently, the Sheriff's Department developed testimony that indicates that although the employees questioned executed signature cards, they could not recall at the time of the hearing whether they had designated Florida PBA or Escambia County PBA as their Agent for Collective Bargaining. It was clear that the employees questioned knew when they signed the cards which of the organizations they were designating, and that they considered the two organizations to be as one; Escambia County PBA being a chapter of the statewide organization to which they belonged. This issue is one which must be resolved by examination of the signature cards to determine whether Florida PBA has presented the requisite showing of interest. As it might relate to the issue of who the public employer is, the employees questioned could not clearly recall who was designated the Public Employee on the signature cards. Is the Employee Organization properly registered with PERC? Clearly the record indicates that Florida PBA is duly registered with PERC; however, there is no evidence to substantiate that Escambia County PBA is registered with PERC as that issue might relate to the issue of which organization provided the requisite showing of interest. What is the appropriate unit of public employees in this cause? ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE The Sheriff's Department of Escambia County has 240 employees to include the Chief Deputy, Lieutenants, Sergeants, Investigators, Law Enforcement Officers I's and II's, I.D. Technicians, Jailers, Mechanics, Secretaries and Support Personnel. The RC Petition, as amended, seeks to include all full-time Sheriff's Deputies of the rank or classification of Sergeant, I.D. Technician, Investigator, LEO II, and LEO I. Petitioner would seek exclusion of all unsworn employees of the Sheriff's Department, Lieutenants and the Chief Deputy (or Captain). Within the Department, according to EXHIBIT 3 and EXHIBIT 2, there are 167 sworn officers. There are 52 LEO I's, 63 LEO II's, 17 Sergeants, 5 I.D. Technicians, 1 I.D. Officer, 1 Chief I.D. Officer, 6 Lieutenants 1/ , 1 Captain, 4 Motorcycle Officers, 5 Task Force Officers, and 14 Investigators. These personnel are organized with eight sub-areas some of which are combined, and make up the six Divisions within the Sheriff's Department: Administration, Investigation, Uniform/Traffic, Jail, Identification/Communications and Special Services. Each of these Divisions is commanded by a Lieutenant. Uniform and Traffic Divisions, as indicated on EXHIBIT 2, are both under the supervision and direction of Lt. Ward, and for all intents and purposes are considered as one Division. Within Uniform Division, there are four shifts, A, B, C, & D, each commanded by a uniformed Sergeant. Investigations Division has five Sergeants assigned and the 14 Investigators in the Department are assigned in this Division. These Investigators are primarily located in the crimes against property and crimes against persons Sections. There are five officers currently assigned to the Task Force according to EXHIBIT 3. Administration Division has within it Civil Process Section which is charged with serving legal pleadings and processes within Escambia County. Several LEO I's and LEO II's are assigned these duties under the direction of Sgt. Dean who is the assistant to Lt. Penton, the Division Chief. Jail Division is responsible for guarding the prisoners at the County Jail. The jailers are not sworn officers, however, there are sworn officers assigned to the jail. According to the testimony, new deputies are initially assigned to the jail prior to being placed on one of the uniformed shifts. The Petitioner does not seek to represent the unsworn jail personnel. Identification Division primarily consists of those personnel who investigate crime scenes. This function is under the direct supervision of the Chief I.D. Officer, who has the same rank as a Lieutenant. However, the Chief I.D. Officer is subordinate to the Lieutenant in charge of the Division. There is also an I.D. Officer assigned who has less authority than a Sergeant, but more than an I.D. Technician. There are five I.D. Technicians assigned. The I.D. Officer is the most senior and most experienced of the I.D. personnel and is available to assist the I.D. Technicians with technical problems. Beyond the sworn officers mentioned above, the only personnel assigned to Jail, Communications, and Special Services Divisions are the Lieutenants and Sergeants indicated on EXHIBIT 3 who perform basically administrative duties. DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS OF DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL The Chief Deputy as the name implies is the chief assistant to the Sheriff. The position is at the grade of Captain, and while it is currently a civil service job, subsequent to the retirement of the incumbent, it will be reclassified to unclassified status. The position and relationship with the Sheriff was described by the the Sheriff as being the "Co-Sheriff." Lieutenants are essentially administrative officers and do not generally engage actively in law enforcement duties and exercise line authority over deputies. Testimony was not presented regarding each Lieutenant's duties. They generally are charged with administration of their Division. They do provide input, and through their advice to the Sheriff participate to some extent in establishing Departmental policy. This is done through frequent but unscheduled conferences with the Sheriff. They were excluded from the unit for which Petitioner has petitioned. Sergeants are assigned in all Divisions of the Department. Their duties and functions vary dependent upon their specific assignments. Sergeants in the Uniform Division are shift commanders. These are four shifts within this Division, each shift composed of 15 - 18 Deputies. Two to three deputies are assigned out from under the control of the Shift Sergeant and patrol outlying areas of the County. Therefore, the shift is generally composed of 14 Deputies who are directly supervised by a Shift Sergeant. The duties and authority of the Shift Sergeant include assigning patrol areas, discipline of the shift, preparation of shift reports, approval of vacations and time off, and granting compensatory time and overtime. His authority is limited, as is the Sheriff's, regarding discipline; however, a Shift Sergeant may suspend personnel pending reinstatement or formal action by the Sheriff. The Shift Sergeant would approve or disapprove requests for transfers; however, the Sheriff or Captain would be the final decision maker. The Shift Sergeants spend 20-25 percent of their time preparing reports and attending to similar administrative duties. For this purpose, they use the Shift Sergeant's office. They spend the remainder of their time in the field. There they attempt to cover all the patrol area checking on the activities of their shift. They spend approximately 40 percent of their time in this function. The remaining time they spend on actual patrol, or backing up and providing assistance to their shift's deputies involved in a major law enforcement activity. Over 50 percent of the Shift Sergeant's total time is spent in administration or shift supervision. Shift Sergeants go directly to the Chief Deputy (Captain) to seek guidance or report matters of importance, by-passing the Lieutenant in charge of Uniform Division. This Lieutenant works from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., five days per week and spends his time basically on administration of the Uniform/Traffic Division. Sergeants in the other Divisions do not exercise the same degree of supervision that Shift Sergeants do because their personnel are generally more experienced, have been with the department a longer period of time and do not need the same degree of supervision. Further, the work performed by the other Divisions does not lend itself to close supervision. The testimony revealed, for example, that the Sergeant in Crimes Against Persons was presently assigned to a special task force which worked primarily at night. Therefore, his ability to supervise the activity of this Section which works basically during the day was severely limited. The investigators in this Division conduct their follow- up investigations on the Uniformed Deputies' field reports in a largely unsupervised fashion, completing their activities without further reports to or direction from the Sergeant in charge. The Sergeants in investigations perform investigative activity and also administer their particular Section. As stated above, the Sergeants assigned to the Jail and Communications Division perform primarily administrative duties. The Sergeant at the Jail commands one shift of jail personnel. The other shifts are commanded by the Senior LEO I or LEO II assigned. The grade of investigator is between LEO II and Sergeant. These are generally experienced deputies with some years on the Department. Their duties, as mentioned above, are to conduct investigation into crimes reported by Uniformed Deputies. This would include interviewing victim, witnesses, and suspects and preparing investigative reports. An Investigator would present his findings to the prosecuting authority and testify before petit and grand juries. The testimony indicates that because of the nature of the work and the experience of the personnel involved there is little supervision by the Sergeants. This is also the situation in the Civil Process Section of the Administrative Division. LEO I and LEO II The duties and responsibilities of these two positions are basically the same. Personnel in both classifications are assigned to several of the Department's Divisions but primarily they are found in the Uniform Division. Some LEO II's are assigned to Civil Process in Administrative Division and occasionally to the Jail Division. The LEO I position is the entry level position for sworn officers. After a year a LEO I is eligible for promotion to LEO II if there are vacancies. Both grades are primarily charged with enforcement of county ordinances and state laws. LEO I's and II's together with all the sworn officers mentioned above have arrest powers and carry badges and firearms. OTHER FACTORS Leave, insurance, and retirement benefits are the same for all sworn personnel. Because of the hazards of the work, these benefits differ from unsworn employees of the Sheriff's Department. The salaries of Department Personnel are based upon a pay classification system prepared and controlled by the Civil Service Board. The Civil Service Board also prepares the list of five most eligible officers for promotion based on resumes prepared by Department personnel. From these lists, the Sheriff selects the personnel to be promoted. All Deputies must pass the Civil Service entry examinations, and become Civil Service employees. As Civil Service employees, they have the right to make grievances to the Board and to appeal disciplinary action taken against them by the Sheriff. The Sheriff prepares the budget for the Department in conjunction with the Chief Deputy (Captain). Input is provided primarily by the Lieutenants. The budget is submitted to the County Commission who must approve the budget by category. The County Commission cannot, however, direct the Sheriff how to spend his appropriations after the budget is approved. On the other hand, the Sheriff cannot shift funds from one category of appropriation to another. One specific budget category deals with salary and personnel expense. All sworn officers by virtue of their sworn duty to enforce the law, are engaged in duties which are more hazardous than other non-sworn personnel employed by the Department or other Civil Service employees. This additional hazard is reflected in their retirement, insurance and similar benefits. This report respectfully submitted this 8th day of June, 1976. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675
Findings Of Fact The Orlando Police Department is organized on paramilitary lines and headed by a Director of Public Safety. Directly under him comes the Chief of Police who is the principal administrative officer of the department. His immediate staff which consists of 1 captain, 7 lieutenants, sergeants and patrolmen, includes an Administrative Aide who holds the rank of lieutenant and attends all staff meetings conducted by the Chief. In such position he is privy to all classified information received by the Chief and would appear to fit the definition of "confidential employee" under Section 447.02(5), Florida Statutes. Also in the Chief's Staff is a Research and Development Section and a Special Investigative Services Division. The former is headed by a lieutenant and is primarily responsible to research, develop and prepare all directives, regulations and general orders for the Department. The Special Investigative Services Division is headed by a Captain and contains an Internal Affairs Section, a Staff Inspection Section and an Intelligence Section, each headed by a lieutenant. The Internal Affairs Section handles all internal investigations of a confidential nature and monitors all disciplinary cases involving the police department. The staff Inspection Section conducts routine inspections of police units to insure compliance with guidelines and orders of the department. The Intelligence Section gathers information on organized crime and criminal acts on a larger scale than those routinely handled by the C.I.D. They interface with law enforcement agencies of the Federal government and keep the Chief apprised of developments. The Administrative Service Bureau is headed by a major and staffed with two captains, two lieutenants, 3 sergeants, seven patrolmen, sixteen civilians, cadets, and recruits for training. From this Bureau is assigned a patrolman as aide to the Mayor. This Aide attends all meetings involving the Mayor and the police department and is privy to all disciplinary actions within the police department that reach the attention of the Mayor. He also acts as courier between the Mayor and Police Department for confidential police records. Within the Administrative Services Bureau are numerous divisions and sections. The Personnel and Training Division handles personnel accounting, payroll records, training and records of personnel in detached service. Under this division is the Community Relations Section, Training Section and Personnel Section. The general function of the Community Relations Section is to handle public relations for the police department. This involves presentations at schools, civic associations, press releases, etc. The Training Section conducts recruit training and provides range the target practice ranges. Recruits are graded by the training officers, and these grades are based upon written exams given to all recruits. Similarly, the scores attained on the firing range are certified by the range officer and become part of the personnel record of the individual. The staff Support Bureau is headed by a major and includes two captains, one lieutenant, five sergeants, 14 patrolmen and 70 civilians. A forthcoming reorganization will reduce the number of patrolmen to two. Numerous divisions and sections come under the staff Support Bureau. In all of the above Bureaus, the personnel of which the City seeks to have excluded from the approved bargaining unit, the police officers generally wear civilian clothes and work a regular 40 hour workweek, 8:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M., Monday through Friday. In this regard they differ from the uniformed personnel in the Field Operations Bureau who maintain personnel on duty 24 hours per day 7 days per week. The Field Operations Bureau contains the majority of the sworn officer personnel and is comprised of 1 major, 2 captains, 15 lieutenants, 44 sergeants and 285 patrolmen. In addition, there are 18 civilian positions consisting of secretarial personnel and parking meter attendants. A patrolman is assigned as aide to the major. He prepares written orders and letters put out by the major and reviews all disciplinary actions within the Bureau. One patrolman is assigned as court liaison and assists the State Attorney's office in scheduling witnesses and performing general liaison between the department and the State Attorney's office. The Field Operations Bureau consists of the Criminal Investigative Division (C.I.D.) and the Uniform Division. The former are plain clothed police officers divided into a youth section, vice section, crimes-again-person section, crimes-against-property section and the general assignment section. The latter encompasses the control section, jetport section, special operations section, and traffic section. Watches are maintained with 60-80 patrolmen assigned at one time who stand an 8-hour tour of duty with three watches assigned daily. Each watch has seven squads or sections with a sergeant in charge of each squad. The Detention Bureau has 1 lieutenant, 6 sergeants, and 61 civilians assigned. The sergeants work regular 8-hour shifts and review every arrest report to determine appropriateness and legality. One sergeant is responsible for the protection and custody of evidence in criminal cases and control of lost and found property. They supervise the performance of the assigned civilians. Since the duties and responsibilities of the various ranks are a necessary ingredient in the determination of their exclusion or inclusion in the appropriate bargaining unit, the evidence relating thereto will next be presented. Sergeants are the lowest rank the City contends should be excluded for the reason that there would be a conflict of interest between sergeants and patrolmen if they are in the same bargaining unit. Accordingly these duties and responsibilities will be first discussed. Sergeant's duties and responsibilities are generally contained in Section 100, Regulations of the Orlando Police Department Exhibit (7) which list them under Supervisory Members of the Department. Supervisors are therein described as employees having as one of their major responsibilities the general authority in the interest of the Orlando Police Department to direct other employees or members, to review grievances or the recommendations of such action, and to make effective recommendations regarding disciplinary matters, transfers, dismissals, etc. In carrying out their assignments sergeants prepare evaluation reports on patrolmen assigned under them. In order for patrolmen drawing specialist pay to continue to do so they must receive satisfactory performance ratings. Unfavorable efficiency reports affect eligibility for promotion exams and rank certification. Sergeants have authority to mete out punishment for minor transgressions. The highest level of punishment that can be awarded by a sergeant is a letter of censure which is placed in the personnel record of the recipient. The sergeant in charge of a patrol section prepares the zone assignment sheet (Ex. 31) wherein he assigns sectors and duties to the patrolmen in his section. In making these assignments independent judgment is exercised. In the event a patrolman reports out of uniform or is otherwise unprepared for assignment to duty the sergeant has the authority to relieve the man from duty without pay and send him home to get into proper uniform. Personnel requests such as transfers, leave, etc. are endorsed by those in the chain of command until they reach the approving authority. The sergeant's endorsement is effective in approving or disapproving the request. Sergeants can submit recommendations for commendation of the patrolmen under him. He also has authority to authorize up to one hour overtime without higher approval and to grant compensatory time off. Sergeants and above do not qualify for overtime pay. When the Lieutenant Watch Commander is absent from duty the senior sergeant assumes command and exercises the watch commander's authority. Sergeant's uniforms were changed from brown to white shirts in late 1974. At the same time they were authorized to discipline patrolmen for minor transgressions. Uniforms of lieutenants and above have consisted of white shirts for many years. On the other hand all members of the police force are paid at the same interval, have the same fringe benefits, all must maintain the same basic training standards, all are classified by the Civil Service System as "police officers", all are eligible for revenue sharing incentive pay from the State, all are paid from the wage classification plan, and all have the same powers of arrest. Article XIII of the Orange County PBA By-Laws provides for grievance procedures whereby a patrolman could file a grievance against a fellow member in the same union who disciplined the patrolman and seek to have the fellow member removed from the union. Art. XIII Section 2 provides: Any member of this association who voices criticism of another member, group of members or the association itself, without first seeking recourse through the provisions of Section 1 of this Article, shall be sub- ject to suspension of his membership, or ex- pulsion from the association..." This provision has not been exercised in the Orlando Police Department and the president of petitioner stated the interpretation of the bylaw provision is that grievance there refers to social rather than departmental action. Other members of petitioner testified that they didn't feel that membership in PBA would interfere with their carrying out duties that involved disciplining a fellow member of the PBA. With respect to those ranks above sergeant, little evidence was presented of specific duties and whether these duties required a finding that these officers are managerial employees. The general duties of these ranks were presented in Section 100, Exhibit 7. Furthermore, throughout the testimony was the clear import that majors had more authority and responsibility than captains who had more authority and responsibility than lieutenants who had more authority and responsibility than sergeants.
Recommendation In The Matter of City of Bridgeport (Police Department) and Bridgeport Local No. 1159, Selected Decisions [paragraph 49,868] the Connecticut Board held that the fact that sergeants, lieutenants, and captains of a city's police department exercised supervisory functions did not exclude them from the benefits of Connecticut's Municipal Employees Relations Act (MERA). Here these same officers had voted a year earlier not to be included in the overall bargaining unit and the Board appears to have affirmed the prior determination that the MERA did not preclude supervisory employees from being in the same bargaining unit as rank and file employees. The provisions of the MERA so construed does not appear in the decision. In Town of Stratford and Stratford Police Union, No. 407, 63 LRRN 1124 (1966) the Board determined that an election was proper for the captains and lieutenants to vote whether they wanted to be included in an overall police unit or to be separately represented by a unit of supervisors. The expressed policy of the Board in determining appropriate bargaining units is that the unit should be the broadest possible which will reflect a community of interest. At the same time it respects the special interests of certain groups of employees. I am not aware that such a policy has been announced by PERC. In the Matter of Borough of Rockway and Patrolmans Benevolent Association, Local 142, LLR paragraph 49,999 A.22 the New Jersey Board held that lieutenants and sergeants were properly included within a bargaining unit with patrolmen. The Board found that the lieutenants and sergeants lacked an authority to effectively hire, fire or discipline patrolmen. In the Matter of Kalamazoo Township and Lodge No. 98 F.O.P., L.L.R. paragraph 49,996.20 (1969) the Board held that although corporals had the authority to suspend patrolmen for breach of department duties this was always reviewed by higher authority; and since corporals were engaged in the exact same work as police patrolmen for the majority of their working time, they did not identify or align themselves with management. Therefore, they were not supervisors and were properly included within the proposed unit with the patrolmen. In accordance with Section 447.009(3)(a), Florida Statutes, no recommendations are submitted. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of June, 1975. K. N. Ayers Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the Florida Human Relations Commission (Commission) created by Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and is an agency within the meaning of Section 20.03(11), Florida Statutes (1993). The Commission consists of twelve (12) members appointed by the Governor. The Commission is charged with the administration of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. Petitioner is Parrish Management, Inc. Petitioner is an "employer" within the meaning of Section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes, and, in accordance with stipulation of the parties, has standing to bring this proceeding. Evidence in this record of Petitioner's involvement as a participating party in another administrative proceeding convened pursuant to provisions of Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, as the result of a determination of reasonable cause, further serves to underscore Petitioner's qualification as a substantially affected party for purposes of this proceeding. Respondent enacted Rule 60Y-2.004(2)(e) and Rule 60Y-5.004, Florida Administrative Code, ostensibly pursuant to authority contained in Subsections 760.06(6) and (12), Florida Statutes. Those statutory provisions read as follows: Powers of the commission.--Within the limitations provided by law, the commission shall have the following powers: * * * (6) To issue subpoenas for, administer oaths or affirmations to and compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses or to issue subpoenas for and compel the production of books, papers, records, documents and other evidence pertaining to any investigation or hearing convened pursuant to the powers of the commission. In conducting an investigation, the commission and its inves- tigators shall have access at all reasonable times to premises, records, documents, and other evidence or possible sources of evidence and may examine, record, and copy such materials and take and record the testimony or statements of such persons as are reasonably necessary for the furtherance of the investigation. The authority to issue subpoenas and administer oaths may be delegated by the commission, for investigations or hearings, to a commissioner or the executive director. In the case of a refusal to obey a subpoena issued to any person, the commission may make application to any circuit court in this state, which shall have jurisdiction to order the witness to appear before the commission to give testimony and to produce evidence concerning the matter in question. Failure to obey the court's order may be punished by the court as contempt. If the court enters an order holding a person in contempt or compelling the person to comply with the commission's order or subpoena, the court shall order the person to pay the commission reasonable expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees, accrued by the commission in obtaining the order from the court. * * * (12) To adopt, promulgate, amend, and rescind rules to effectuate the purposes and policies of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 and govern the proceedings of the commission in accordance with chapter 120. (emphasis supplied.) Rule 60Y-2.004(2)(e) and Rule 60Y-5.004, Florida Administrative Code, read as follows: 60Y-2.004 General Description of Organization and Functions of Commission Staff. (2) The Executive Director is the chief administrative officer of the Commission and is responsible for implementing policy of the Commission. The Executive Director is appointed by the Commission and may be removed by the Commission for cause. The Executive Director has the following duties: make determinations as provided by Rule 60Y-5.004; * * * 60Y-5.004 Executive Director's Investigatory Determination; Notice. Upon completion of an investigation, if a complaint has not been settled or withdrawn, the Office of Employment Investigations shall report the investigation, with recommendation, to the Office of General Counsel. The Office of General Counsel shall review the report and shall make a recommendation to the Executive Director as to whether there is reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice has occurred. If the recommendation is based upon lack of jurisdiction over the respondent or subject matter of the complaint or upon untimely filing of the complaint, the Executive Director may dismiss the complaint pursuant to Subsection 60Y- 5.006(3) or (11), provided that the investigation does not reveal any disputed issues of material fact. The Executive Director shall issue a determination on the foregoing bases of lack of jurisdiction or untimeliness where disputed issues of material fact appear to exist. After a determination has been made by the Executive Director, the Clerk shall serve a Notice of Determination, with copies of the determination, upon the complainant and the respondent. A Notice of Determination of Reasonable Cause shall include an invitation to participate in conciliation. A Notice of Determination of No Reasonable Cause, No Jurisdiction or Untimeliness shall advise the complainant of the right to file a Petition for Relief, pursuant to Rule 60Y-5.008, within 30 days of service of the notice. A form, Petition for Relief, hereby incorporated by reference, in blank, shall be provided to the complainant at the time of service of the notice. A Notice of Determination shall further advise the parties of the right to request redetermination, pursuant to Rule 6OY-5.007, within 20 days of service of the notice. If the complainant requests redetermination, the 30-day period for filing a Petition for Relief shall be tolled until service of a Notice of Redetermination. After service of a Notice of Determination, the parties named in the determination may inspect the records and documents, in the custody of the Commission, which pertain to the determination. The Executive Director may direct that a particular record, document or portion thereof be withheld from inspection by a party only when necessary for the protection of a witness or third party, or for the preservation of a trade secret. Helpful to an understanding of the legal authority of the Commission and consideration of whether the subject rules are an appropriate result of legislatively delegated authority, is Section 760.11(4), Florida Statues, which provides that: In the event that the Commission determines that there is reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory practice has occurred in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, the aggrieved person may either: Bring a civil action against the person named in the complaint in any court of competent jurisdiction; or Request an administrative hearing under s. 120.57. The election by the aggrieved person of filing civil action or requesting an administrative hearing under this subsection is the exclusive procedure available to the aggrieved person pursuant to this act. (emphasis supplied.) Further, Section 760.11(3), Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part that, "Within 180 days of the filing of the complaint, the Commission shall determine if there is reasonable cause to believe that discriminatory practice has occurred in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992." (emphasis supplied.) As noted, Section 760.11(4), Florida Statues, provides two separate avenues of relief, one administrative and one judicial. Additionally, as set forth in Section 760.11(5), Florida Statutes, the judicial remedy permits the recovery of back pay, and allows damages for mental anguish, loss of dignity, any other intangible injuries, and punitive damages. The Commission's determination of reasonable cause pursuant to Section 760.11(4), Florida Statutes, is a condition or restriction upon the exercise by a complainant of a substantive right, i.e. the right to judicial remedy. Accordingly, provisions of Section 760.11(4), Florida Statutes, which authorize the Commission's determination constitute a substantive, as opposed to a procedural, law. In those instances of the Commission's determination of no reasonable cause, Section 760.11(7), Florida Statutes, provides: If the Commission determines that there is not reasonable cause to believe that a violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 has occurred, the commission shall dismiss the complaint. The aggrieved person may request an administrative hearing under s.120.57, but any such request must be made within 35 days of the date of determination of reasonable cause any such hearing shall be heard by a hearing officer and not by the commission or a commissioner. If the aggrieved person does not request an administrative hearing within the 35 days, the claim will be barred. . . . As established by evidence presented at the final hearing, members of the Commission meet formally on a quarterly basis throughout the year to consider policy issues but have no formal knowledge or involvement in any pending case prior to presentment of recommended orders rendered by Hearing Officers of the Division of Administrative Hearings. As established through official recognition of provisions of Section 760.11, Florida Statutes, the Commission is an adjudicative body with the quasi- judicial authority to determine the substantive rights of the parties, award back pay, prohibit specified discriminatory employment practices and provide affirmative relief from the effects of those practices.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice pursuant to chapter 760, Florida Statutes, against Petitioner due to his age.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by Respondent as an Employee Relations Specialist from July 30, 2007, to March 7, 2008. Petitioner’s position as an Employee Relations Specialist was a full-time salaried exempt position. Throughout Petitioner’s employment, Mary Campbell was the Director of Human Resources for Respondent, and William Davis was the Human Resources Manager for Respondent. Campbell was Petitioner and Davis’s direct supervisor. On March 6, 2008, Petitioner submitted a letter of resignation to Campbell, effective Friday, March 7, 2008. Pursuant to Respondent’s termination policy, salaried exempt employees are expected to provide a minimum of four weeks’ notice of their resignation, and failure to do so could block their eligibility for rehire and payment of accrued paid time off (PTO). Petitioner failed to provide the required four weeks’ notice when he resigned his employment with Respondent. Petitioner understood that resigning with less than four weeks’ notice would block his eligibility for rehire, but, despite that understanding, he chose to resign on such short notice because he was starting a new job the next Monday. Petitioner expressed that understanding in his resignation letter, stating: “I understand the ramification of my early resignation but my future employer will not hold a position for thirty days.” (Resignation letter, Respondent’s Ex. 1). On March 7, 2008, Campbell signed a Personnel Action Notice relating to Petitioner’s resignation of employment, stating that “Dwayne Clark resigned his position for another opportunity without proper notice, accepting the consequences of losing PTO and rehire eligibility.” Campbell, without the involvement of Davis, classified Petitioner as ineligible for rehire on March 7, 2008. At hearing, Petitioner acknowledged this action was not discriminatory. The Monday after his resignation, Petitioner began working for Citizens Property Insurance as a Human Resources Generalist, and was involuntarily terminated after six weeks of employment with Citizens. In July 2009, Davis was promoted to Director of Human Resources after Campbell resigned from her employment with Respondent. On April 15, 2011, Richard Rivera was hired by Respondent as the Human Resources Manager. Prior to that, Rivera was employed by University of Florida Shands Medical Center’s (UF Shands) Human Resources Department, which shares the same building with Respondent’s Human Resources Department. Rivera knew Petitioner as a human resources employee of Respondent in 2007/2008. However, they had never spoken prior to mediation of this matter in 2017. Since becoming Director of Human Resources, Davis has received several requests for an exception to the termination policy from former employees classified as ineligible for rehire. Though he has the authority to do so, Davis has never made an exception to the termination policy or rehired anyone who had been classified as ineligible for rehire. In July 2010 and early 2012, Petitioner asked Davis to make an exception to the termination policy and reclassify him as eligible for rehire. However, Davis did not reclassify Petitioner as eligible for rehire because “[w]hen you make an exception, you have problems enforcing the policy going forward, so that’s why I do not make exceptions.” Petitioner claims that while he was employed with Respondent, Campbell made two exceptions to the termination policy and allowed the rehire of two former employees who had been classified as ineligible for rehire. However, other than their gender and race, Petitioner could not name or otherwise identify the two former employees in a way that would allow Respondent to attempt to verify his claim. Petitioner asserted that a physician assistant (PA) had been rehired by Respondent after providing less than four weeks’ notice of her resignation. Respondent was able to identify that individual as Allison McFauls. Ms. McFauls has worked as a Senior PA since 1998 and has never been an employee of Respondent or subject to Respondent’s termination policy. Ms. McFauls has always been employed by UF Shands, which is a separate entity from UF Jacksonville Physicians, Inc., with a separate human resources department and separate personnel policies. Neither Davis nor Rivera is aware of any employee of Respondent receiving an exception to the termination policy. Davis classified Hubert Collins, an Employee Relations Manager, who is nearly 20 years younger than Petitioner, and Christy Wright, who is even younger than Collins, as ineligible for rehire due to their failures to comply with the required resignation notice period in the termination policy. During their conversation in July 2010, Petitioner asked Davis if Respondent would be interested in contracting with Petitioner’s consulting company to assist with the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) compliance review. Respondent did not contract with Petitioner because Respondent performed compliance review work and completed its Affirmative Action Plan in-house. Davis did not ask Petitioner questions regarding his age and does not recall having a conversation with Petitioner about retirement since Petitioner’s employment with Respondent. Even if such topics of conversation occurred, Petitioner agreed he may have been the one to raise them. On September 12, 2016, Petitioner applied online for a vacant Employee Relations Specialist position with Respondent. However, due to Petitioner’s failure to comply with Respondent’s four-week notice requirement, Petitioner was ineligible for rehire with Respondent in September 2016. On September 14, 2016, Rivera reviewed the applications and selected which applicants would be interviewed and considered for the open Employee Relations Specialist position. Because Petitioner was ineligible for rehire, Rivera removed Petitioner from further consideration. Rivera did not base his decision on Petitioner’s age, and there was no persuasive evidence of record that Rivera was biased against Petitioner because of his age. On September 14, 2016, Rivera rejected Petitioner’s application in the online application system and entered “ineligible for rehire” as the reason for rejecting Petitioner’s application. The same day, Petitioner was sent a form email notifying him that his application had been removed from consideration for the Employee Relations Specialist position. No one but Rivera was involved in the decision to remove Petitioner from consideration for the position. Rivera did not inform Davis or anyone else that Petitioner had applied for the Employee Relations Specialist position. Likewise, Davis never directed Rivera or anyone else to reject applications from Petitioner. Petitioner did not communicate with Davis, Rivera, or any other employee about his September 12, 2016, application. Nor did Petitioner request an exception to the termination policy from Davis or anyone else in 2016. Davis did not know that Petitioner had applied for the Employee Relations Specialist position until November 2016, when Respondent was notified by the Commission that Petitioner had filed a charge of discrimination. After receiving Petitioner’s charge of discrimination in November 2016, Davis reviewed Petitioner’s September 2016 application, and noticed that Petitioner stated that he had resigned from his employment with Citizens Property Insurance, which Davis knew to be false. If Petitioner had been hired for the Employee Relations Specialist position, Davis would have terminated Petitioner’s employment for falsifying his application.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 2017. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Margaret P. Zabijaka, Esquire Constangy, Brooks, Smith & Prophete, LLP Suite 1700 200 West Forsyth Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 (eServed) Jesse D. Bannon, Esquire Constangy, Brooks, Smith & Prophete, LLP Suite 1700 200 West Forsyth Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 (eServed) Dwayne E. Clark, Sr. 11334 Bridges Road Jacksonville, Florida 32218 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
