Findings Of Fact 1. Petitioner (Randolph) is an African-American female. 2. Petitioner was hired by Respondent on June 2, 1997, and was terminated by Respondent from her employment on September 30, 1997. 3. When initially hired, Petitioner’s official employment class title was Other Personnel Services (OPS) Paralegal Specialist. 4. On July 1, 1997, approximately one month after her date of employment, Petitioner’s official employment class title was changed to Administrative Secretary and Petitioner’s pay plan status was changed from OPS to Career Service. 5. On September 1, 1997, Petitioner's class title was reclassified to Paralegal Specialist. 6. From July 1, 1997, until the date of her termination, Petitioner was employed in a probationary status by DOAH with her primary job responsibilities being that of a proofreader. 7. Probationary employees are not entitled to progressive discipline and can be terminated at will pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 60L-36.005. 8. Ann Cole, the clerk of DOAH, interviewed all candidates for the newly created proofreader position. 9. There were several applicants for the proofreader position and after a series of tests and interviews Ann Cole determined that Petitioner was the best applicant for the proofreader position and Petitioner was hired for the job. 10. Approximately one month after Petitioner was hired, a second proofreader (Dr. Rappendelli) was hired. Dr. Rappendeli is a white female. 11. Both Petitioner and Dr. Carol Ripandelli were supervised at DOAH by Ann Cole. ATTENDANCE HISTORY 312. During the first month of her employment Petitioner shared a work area in DOAH’s mailroom with current DOAH employee Elma Moore, an African-American female. 13. Elma Moore typically arrived at work between 7:00 and 7:15 a.m. even though the required start time for employees of the clerk’s office was 8:00 a.m. 14. Elma Moore was able to directly observe the times during which Petitioner arrived at work. Ms. Moore noted that Petitioner reported to work forty-five minutes late on her first day. Ms. Moore further noted that Petitioner would often be late. 15. Elma Moore was relocated to another part of the clerk’s office when Dr. Rappendelli was hired. 16. Elma Moore, even from her new workstation, continued to be situated such that she was able to observe the times at which Petitioner customarily arrived at work. 17. Elma Moore testified that during the four month period that Petitioner worked for DOAH, at least two to three times each week, Petitioner would arrive at work approximately ten to thirty minutes beyond the mandatory 8:00 a.m. start time for employees. 18. The testimony of Elma Moore is further corroborated by the affidavit of Deanna Hartford. 19. Ms. Hartford, who was the Deputy Clerk Supervisor for DOAH during Petitioner’s period of employment, stated that she observed Petitioner arrive to work late, without notice, on several occasions during her OPS employment and during her career service probationary employment. 20. Ms. Hartford stated in her affidavit that around the first week of September 1997 she was asked by Ann Cole to observe Petitioner’s attendance. Ms. Hartford noted that during this period of observation Petitioner arrived to work at’ the following times on the dates as indicated: September 8, 1997, 8:20 a.m.j; September 9, 1997, 8:25 a.m.; September 10, 1997, 8:10 a.m.; and September 17, 1997, 8:20 a.m. 21. Ms. Hartford reported to Ann Cole, Petitioner's supervisor, that Petitioner was frequently late for work. 22. This is consistent with Elma Moore’s testimony that Petitioner, at least two to three days per week, was customarily late for work in excess of ten minutes. 23. Petitioner attempted to contradict the testimony of Elma Moore and the affidavit of Deanna Hartford by testifying that she was told by her supervisor, Ann Cole, to make up her tardy time thereby excusing the fact that she was habitually late for work. 24. Ms. Cole stated the importance of proofreaders being punctual to work, and testified that she and Petitioner had at least two meetings where they discussed Petitioner’s tardiness issue prior to her termination. 25. Ms. Cole stated that she spoke with Petitioner about her timesheet and attendance, and the need for Petitioner to tell her when she is late and how she plans to make up her time. 26. Ms. Cole stated that Petitioner’s communication regarding her promptness and plans to make up time never improved. 27. Ms. Hartford stated that she never observed Petitioner disclose her late arrivals to her supervisor, Ms. Cole. On more than one occasion, Ms. Hartford stated, she reported Petitioner’s tardiness to Ms. Cole, who indicated she was unaware of the late arrival. PHONE USE 28. Unlike some of the other jobs in the clerk's office, the proofreader’s duties and responsibilities did not require the utilization of the telephone. 29. Elma Moore stated that during the time that she shared an office with Petitioner, her desk was in close proximity to Petitioner’s desk and that on several occasions she noticed that Petitioner was talking on the telephone. 30. Elma Moore stated that Petitioner was using the telephone for personal calls frequently. 31. Elma Moore further testified that she knew that the responsibilities and duties of the proofreader did not require Petitioner to use the telephone. 32. Deanna Hartford noted in her affidavit that she personally observed that Petitioner was always on the phone. 33. Ms. Hartford also noted in her affidavit that other employees at the Clerk’s office had complained to her about Petitioner’s excessive use of the telephone. 34. Ms. Hartford advised her supervisor Ann Cole about Petitioner’s excessive phone use. 35. In response to the complaint about Petitioner's excessive use of the telephone, Ms. Cole contacted DOAH’s information services department and requested that they audit all of the telephone extensions for the clerk’s office. 36. The audit results for the clerk’s office revealed that during the audit period, employees, excluding Petitioner, averaged 85.5 outgoing phone calls. 37. Petitioner, however, had 294 outgoing calls attributed to her extension during this period. Dr. Carol Ripandelli, the other proofreader, had 79 outgoing calls attributed to her extension during this same period. 38. The audit results for the clerk’s office revealed that during the audit period, employees, excluding Petitioner, averaged 1.6 outgoing calls that exceeded ten minutes in duration. 39. The number of outgoing calls exceeding ten minutes in duration that were attributed to Petitioner's extension during the audit period totaled thirteen. Dr. Carol Ripandelli had only two outgoing calls that exceeded ten minutes in duration attributed to her extension during the audit period. 40. Petitioner denied having made the number of phone calls attributed to her extension. Petitioner also charged that it was possible that other employees could have made outgoing calls from the phone on Petitioner’s desk. 41. Elma Moore testified that it was neither the practice nor the custom of employees of the clerk’s office to regularly use the telephone of other employees. INITIATIVE 42. Deanna Hartford, in her affidavit, noted that in July of 1997 she was asked by Ann Cole to provide additional training to the proofreaders. 43. Petitioner and the other proofreader were instructed to inform Ms. Hartford when they were caught up with their work so that the additional training could be provided. 44. Dr. Carol Rappendeli, the OPS proofreader, sought and received additional training in several areas including filing, assisting in the quarterly file purge and destruction, outgoing docketing procedures, and maintaining the Florida Administrative Code supplements. 45. Petitioner never sought additional training as requested. 46. Ann Cole observed Petitioner nodding off on at least three occasions while in an important proofreading standards meeting. 47. Ms. Cole observed Petitioner cutting coupons at her desk the morning of September 22, 1997, during business hours. 10 48. Elma Moore also testified to the fact that Petitioner, during business hours would frequently work on a personal book when she wasn’t proofreading. DISRUPTIVE AND RUDE BEHAVIOR 49. Ms. Cole testified that along with the attendance problems and telephone usage, Petitioner also had attitude problems. 50. On two occasions, Petitioner felt the need to apologize for rude comments made to her supervisor, Ms. Cole. 51. Ms. Cole observed rude behavior by Petitioner directed toward Dr. Ripandelli when they were discussing proofreading on a particular order. 52. Ms. Cole stated that when Petitioner gets in one of her moods, teamwork between Petitioner and Dr. Ripandelli is ineffective. 53. Ms. Cole testified that she had to speak with Petitioner about her radio and that it was so loud it caused a disturbance in the break room. 54. Dr. Ripandelli testified that Petitioner’s radio was so loud that she bought herself headphones in order to drown out Petitioner’s radio. i 55. In contrast, Ms. Cole testified that Dr. Ripandelli gets along with all the judges and that Dr. Ripandelli interacts fine with her. TERMINATION 56. Ms. Hartford stated that Petitioner never discussed with her any need to accommodate her for a disability or for her religion. 57. Ms. Hartford further stated that Petitioner never mentioned that she was being discriminated against for any reason. Ms. Hartford never observed Petitioner walk with a limp, or have sores or bandages on her legs. 58. Petitioner was terminated on September 30, 1997, due to her chronic tardiness, excessive use of the telephone, and her general failure to demonstrate initiative.
Conclusions Petitioner: Ms. Audrey Randolph, Pro Se 2644 Edgewood Avenue, West Jacksonville, FL 32209-2431 904-713-9913 For Respondent: Mr. Linzie F. Bogan, Esquire Office of the Attorney General PL-01 The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399 850-414-3300 ext. 4650
Recommendation 29 In the present case, Respondent showed a legitimate reason for discharging Petitioner. Petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination based upon her race, religion, disability or marital status. Petitioner also failed to demonstrate that Respondent discriminated against her in retaliation for Petitioner engaging in an activity that was protected by Section 760.10(7), Florida Statutes. Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 4A day of Vabir ; 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, kative Law Judge sd Way, Bin A-0 32398-1703 Filed with the clerk of the Florida Commission of Human Relations this 2" day of December 2003. 30 COPIES FURNISHED: Ms. Audrey Randolph 2644 Edgewood Avenue, West Jacksonville, FL 32209 Mr. Linzie F. Bogan, Esq. Office of the Attorney General PL-01 The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399 Harry Hooper Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 Secretary of Commission Mike Hanson Room 1801, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001
The Issue The ultimate issue in the instant case is whether Petitioner abandoned his position with Respondent and resigned from the Career Service.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, the Hearing Officer makes the following Findings of Fact: Respondent was formerly employed as a Tax Auditor II in Respondent's Fort Lauderdale office. In May, 1987, Petitioner filed a charge against Respondent with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The charge was docketed as Charge No. 150871115. Eleven months later, Petitioner filed a second charge against Respondent with the EEOC. This second charge was docketed as Charge No. 150881243. By letter dated May 3, 1988, Petitioner requested that he be granted leave without pay "until both EEOC investigations [were) over." Petitioner's request resulted in a memorandum of understanding and agreement between Petitioner and the Acting Director of Respondent's Division of Audits, Glenn Bedonie. The memorandum was signed by Bedonie on May 9, 1988, and by Petitioner the following day. It provided in pertinent part as follows: This memorandum will confirm our agreement that the Department is granting your request for leave without pay until such time as the two Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) investigations are completed and the findings or conclusions are rendered and final. This action is based upon your voluntary request dated May 3, 1988 attached herein. You will remain on approved leave without pay commencing at 8:00 a.m., Wednesday, May 11, 1988 for (12) twelve calendar months or until a finding or conclusion has been rendered and becomes final by the EEOC in both of the above EEOC investigations. If a finding is not so rendered in both investigations within (12) calendar months, and if you make a timely request to this office the Department agrees to request an extension from the Department of Administration of your leave of absence without pay under Rule 22A- 8.016(2), F.A.C. Such extension is to last until such time as an investigative finding or conclusion is rendered and becomes final in both investigations. On May 10, 1988, the same day he signed the foregoing memorandum of understanding and agreement, Petitioner advised his supervisor in writing that the following were "two addresses where mail will reach me:" P.O. Box 22-2825, Hollywood, Florida 33022 and 8311 Dundee Terrace, Miami Lakes, Florida 33016. Petitioner did not indicate any other manner in which he could be contacted. By letter dated August 31, 1988, Petitioner and Respondent were informed that the EEOC's Miami District Director had determined, with respect to Charge No. 150871115, that the evidence obtained during the investigation [did] not establish a violation of the statute." The letter also contained the following advisement: This determination does not conclude the processing of this charge. If the charging Party wishes to have this determination reviewed, he must submit a signed letter to the Determination Review Program which clearly sets forth the reasons for requesting the review and which lists the Charge Number and Respondent's name. Charging Party must also attach a copy of this Determination to his letter. These documents must be personally delivered or mailed (postmarked) on or before 09-14-88 to the Determinations Review Program, Office of Program Operations, EEOC, 2401 E. Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20507. It is recommended that some proof of mailing, such as certified mail receipt, be secured. If the Charging Party submits a request by the date shown above, the Commission will review the determination. Upon completion of the review, the Charging Party and Respondent will be issued a final determination which will contain the results of the review and what further action, if any, the Commission may take. The final determination will also give notice, as appropriate, of the Charging Party's right to sue. Petitioner requested review of the Miami District Director's determination in Case No. 150871115. By letter dated April 28, 1989, Petitioner and Respondent were notified of the results of that review. The body of the letter read as follows: The Commission has reviewed the investigation of this charge of employment discrimination and all supplemental information furnished. Based upon this review, we agree with the determination issued by our field office and hereby issue a final determination that the evidence obtained during the investigation does not establish a violation of the statute. Therefore, the Commission dismisses and terminates its administrative processing of this charge. As the charge alleged a Title VII violation, this is notice that if the Charging Party wishes to pursue this matter further, (s)he may do so by filing a private action in Federal District Court against the Respondent(s) named above within 90 days of receipt of this Determination. IF CHARGING PARTY DECIDES TO SUE, CHARGING PARTY MUST DO SO WITHIN 90 DAYS FROM THE RECEIPT OF THIS DETERMINATION; OTHERWISE THE RIGHT TO SUE IS LOST. By letter dated March 8, 1989, Petitioner and Respondent were informed that the EEOC's Miami District Director had determined, with respect to Charge No, 150881243, that the "evidence obtained during the investigation [did) not establish a violation of the statute," The letter further advised: If the Charging Party does not request a review of this determination by March 22, 1989 this determination will become final the following day, the processing of this charge will be complete, and the charge will be dismissed. (This letter will be the only letter of dismissal and the only notice of the Charging Party's right to sue sent by the Commission.) FOLLOWING DISMISSAL, THE CHARGING PARTY MAY ONLY PURSUE THIS MATTER FURTHER BY FILING SUIT AGAINST RESPONDENT(S) NAMED IN THE CHARGE IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT WITHIN 90 DAYS OF THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE DISMISSAL. Therefore, in the event a request for review is not made, if a suit is not filed by June 21, 1989 the Charging Party's right to sue will be lost. Petitioner did not request review of the District Director's determination in Case No. 150881243. Therefore, this determination became final on March 23, 1989. On May 5, 1989, Respondent's Personnel Officer, William P. Fritchman, sent Petitioner a letter by certified mail, return receipt requested, directing Petitioner to report to work immediately. The letter was mailed to P.O. Box 22- 2825, Hollywood, Florida 33022. The body of the letter provided as follows: This letter is to notify you that your tax auditor II position in Fort Lauderdale, Florida is ready for you to return to work. Your return to work will be effective immediately upon your receipt of this letter. The Department of Revenue agreed to your request for a leave of absence without pay for 12 months or until EEOC in Miami had concluded its investigation of your EEOC charges, numbers 150-88-1234 [sic] and 150-87-1115. As you know, EEOC has now concluded its investigations and issued its findings in both cases. The Department considers the reason for granting the leave of absence to be expired. Please contact Mr. Bill Hammock, Chief of Audit Activity or Mr. Howard Maxwell, Field Audit Supervisor, immediately upon receipt of this letter concerning your intentions regarding your actual reporting to work in Fort Lauderdale. Their phone number is (904) 488-0310. Your immediate supervisor will be Ms. Mary Jane Myscich. Please report to her concerning any necessary details surrounding your reporting to work. If you do not contact either of the above individuals as instructed in this letter within three workdays from the date you receive this letter, the Department will consider that you have been on unauthorized leave without pay for that three workday period. Such unauthorized leave will be considered to be abandonment of position and a resignation from the Department of Revenue as outlined under Rules 22A- 7.010(2) and 22A-8.002(5). Please contact me at (904) 488-2635 if you have any questions concerning this matter. Efforts to deliver the letter to Petitioner were unsuccessful. It therefore was subsequently returned to Fritchman as "unclaimed." By letter dated May 7, 1989, but not mailed until May 10, 1989, Petitioner requested "an extension of leave without pay status for six additional months."/1 In support of his request, Petitioner erroneously stated the following in the letter: Findings and conclusions of both EEOC Charge Nos.:150871115 dated 5/13/87 and 150881243 are as EEOC has informed you are rendered but not final. The former charge is still under appeal. Petitioner's May 7, 1989, letter, as well as the envelope in which it had been sent, reflected that Petitioner's current mailing address was 8311 Dundee Terrace, Miami Lakes, Florida 33316. Accordingly, on May 12, 1989, utilizing a next- day delivery service, Fritchman sent to that address the following letter informing Petitioner of the denial of his leave request: I am in receipt of your letter sent May 10, 1989 to Mr. Bedonie. In your letter you request the Department to seek an extension of your leave without pay for an additional six months. For the reasons expressed in my letter to you dated May 5, 1989, copy attached, your approved leave of absence is concluded. Under the written agreement between you and the Department the two EEOC investigations have concluded; therefore the reason for your leave no longer exists. A copy of my letter to you dated May 5, 1989 is attached to this letter and incorporated by reference as if fully set forth. If you have already received a copy of that letter, then your return to work is effective on that date of your receipt. You are expected to resume your duties as a Tax Auditor II. Please contact me at (904) 488-2635 if you have any questions concerning this matter. The next-day delivery service unsuccessfully sought to deliver this letter and attachment to Petitioner at 8311 Dundee Terrace, Miami Lakes, Florida 33316. On May 18, 1989, the letter and attachment were returned to Fritchman. Later that same day, Fritchman attempted to contact Petitioner by telephone, but was unable to reach him. As of May 18, 1989, Petitioner had not yet returned to work, notwithstanding that he had not received authorization to be absent at any time subsequent to the expiration of the leave he had been granted pursuant to the May, 1988, memorandum of understanding and agreement. In view of Petitioner's failure to report to work, Fritchman sent to Petitioner's Hollywood post office box a letter dated May 19, 1989, informing Petitioner that, because he had been absent without authorized leave for three consecutive workdays, he was deemed to have abandoned his Tax Auditor II position with Respondent and resigned from the Career Service. Fritchman further explained in the letter as follows: You did not report to work on May 11, 1989 under the terms of your agreement with the Department. You were therefore on unauthorized leave without pay effective May 11, 1989 or on receipt of the May 5, 1989 letter, whichever occurred first. You have not reported to work as agreed in the May 11, 1988 agreement. You are not entitled to rely on a unilateral request for an extension of leave without reporting to work. Rule 22A-8.002(5)(b), F.A.C. states: "If an employee's request for leave is disapproved and the employee takes unauthorized leave, the agency head shall place the employee on leave without pay and after an unauthorized leave of absence for 3 consecutive workdays shall consider the employee to have abandoned the position and resigned from the Career Service." You did not report to work on May 11, 1989 nor any day after that. The Department considers you have been on unauthorized leave of absence for three consecutive workdays. The Department considers that effective certainly no later than 5:00 p.m., Thursday, May 18, 1989 you have abandoned your position and resigned from the Career Service. The Department's records will indicate that this is a voluntary resignation from employment with the Department. It is this determination that Petitioner abandoned his position and resigned from the Career Service which is the subject of the instant controversy.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration enter a final order sustaining Respondent's determination that Petitioner abandoned his Tax Auditor II position with Respondent and resigned from the Career Service. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 12th day of October, 1989. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of October, 1989.
The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner was a supervisory employee as defined by Section 110.205(2)(x), Florida Statutes (2001), and was therefore properly reclassified from Career Service to Selected Exempt Service effective July 1, 2001.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner became employed by the Commission as an Engineering Supervisor in 1984, and held Select Exempt status prior to 1991, when he was reclassified to a Career Service employee. From 1997 until his retirement, he held Position No. 00168, titled “Utility Systems/Communications Engineer Supervisor.” The first paragraph of his October 1, 1997, Position Description states: This is work supervising engineers in the Bureau of Economic Regulation. The primary duty of the employee in this position is to spend the majority of time communicating with, motivating, training and evaluating employees, planning and directing their work; and having the ability to effectively recommend to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward or discipline subordinate employees. The October 1, 1997, Position Description was in effect at the time Petitioner was reclassified to Select Exempt following enactment of the Service First Initiative. Following the decision of the District Court of Appeal in Reinshuttle v. Agency for Health Care Administration, 849 So. 2d 434 (1st DCA 2003), Petitioner was notified of his right to seek an administrative hearing for the purpose of challenging his reclassification. Petitioner timely requested a hearing on August 13, 2003. Petitioner does not dispute the supervisory nature of the job outlined in the Position Description. He claims that despite his Position Description, his position was not truly “supervisory” as a practical matter and thus did not fit within the authorized grounds for reclassification under Section 110.205(2)(x), Florida Statutes (2001). The Position Description alone is not controlling, because it is possible the actual nature of Petitioner’s job changed and the Position Description had not been amended to reflect that. It is therefore appropriate to look behind the Position Description to see whether the actual duties expected of Petitioner were supervisory in nature. To support his claim that his responsibilities had “eroded” to the point they were no longer supervisory in nature, Petitioner points to the hiring of several individuals to work in the section for which he was responsible. Several individuals (Ed Fuchs, Ted Davis, Gerald Edwards, and Jeanette Sickel) were hired to work under Petitioner by the Commission. Petitioner objected to the hiring of some of those persons on the ground that they lacked qualifications, educational and otherwise, for their positions, but they were hired nevertheless. Another individual, Wetherington, was hired with Petitioner’s assent after interviewing with Petitioner and the Bureau Chief. Once the individuals were hired, they worked under the supervision of Petitioner. He was responsible for approving their time sheets, conducting their annual evaluations, approving travel and leave requests, and training. Petitioner was responsible for assigning the work to employees Sickel, Munroe, Davis, Edwards, and Wetherington, and for monitoring its quality. It was Petitioner who the Commission held responsible for the work product of the section. Petitioner directed the manner in which the employees performed their work on a day-to-day basis. Petitioner answered to Marshall Willis, Bureau Chief of Rate Filings. Willis was responsible for evaluating Petitioner’s performance on the basis of how well Petitioner managed the performance of employees under Petitioner’s supervision, and Petitioner was rated and held accountable to communicate, train, direct, and assign work to subordinate employees assigned to him. Petitioner’s evaluation by Mr. Willis dated December 8, 2000, notes that Petitioner must put forth greater effort in reviewing the work of his engineering section and in improving the analysis reflected in written recommendations. Similar issues had been raised in an earlier evaluation. In response to a November 1998, evaluation of his performance by Mr. Willis, Petitioner acknowledged deficiencies in the performance of his engineering section, and provided assurance that he would “strive to do a better job of supervising my staff” in the future. At all pertinent times, Petitioner’s position was not of a routine, clerical, or ministerial nature, and did require the application of judgment. Petitioner had a significant role in personnel administration, as he served as the officer trusted by the state to verify the hours worked, to direct the amount and quality of work performed during those hours, and to be held accountable for the collective performance of the employees in the engineering section. Petitioner did lack the ultimate authority to hire and fire personnel, but that does not make his role in personnel administration insignificant. While hiring and firing are indeed important decisions, in state government the ultimate authority to hire and fire always resides with the agency head or office head. The bulk of the day-to-day management of personnel does not consist of hiring and firing, but rather of assigning the work and monitoring its successful completion. In addition to the expectations set out in the Position Description, the course of conduct and of communications received from his Bureau Chief establish that supervisory responsibility was in fact a requirement of Petitioner’s position. Petitioner was actually expected to spend a majority of his time communicating with, motivating, and training employees, and planning and directing their work. The clearly established expectations for Petitioner’s position would place upon the incumbent the responsibility for making effective recommendations for hiring, transfer, suspension, layoff, recall, promotion, discharge, assignment, reward, or discipline of subordinate employees. The instances of other Commission officials declining to follow Petitioner’s recommendations regarding hiring reflect the officials’ lack of satisfaction with the way Petitioner was carrying out those supervisory responsibilities, not an acknowledgement that those responsibilities do not exist.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Public Service Commission enter a final order that Petitioner’s position was properly reclassified as Selected Exempt Service. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of December, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S S. SCOTT STEPHENS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of December, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert J. Crouch 245 Pond Court Havana, Florida 32333 Michael Mattimore, Esquire Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A. 906 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1906 Christiana T. Moore, Esquire Public Service Commission 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850 Blanco Bayo Director of Records and Reporting Public Service Commission 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850 William D. Talbott, Executive Director Public Service Commission 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850 Richard D. Melson, General Counsel Public Service Commission 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850
Findings Of Fact In recommending that the Public Employees Relations Commission uphold HRS' demotion of petitioner Linda Cook Allen, PERC Hearing Officer Rix wrote: In the instant case, HRS demoted Allen without conducting a special performance appraisal as required by rule 22A-9.009. Rather, Allen was demoted pursuant to HRS Regulation No. 60-10 Section 5(a)(2). This section provides that: As related to this regulation, an employee shall not be demoted as a form of disciplinary action. Rather, this type of action may be used to remove an employee from his class when the employee fails to perform his assigned duties at a satisfactory level. There must be specific documented reasons for such demotion supported by employee performance appraisals and/or documented counseling sessions. See (Exhibit A-10). In short, Powell evaluated Allen's performance over a nine- week period and then initiated action to demote Allen because Powell perceived that Allen was not carrying out her job duties competently. The evidence demonstrates that Powell conducted several counselling sessions with Allen over the nine-week period, which Powell documented pursuant to the above-cited regulation. Recommended Order, page 11. Adopting the Recommended Order, PERC upheld petitioner's demotion from pay grade 19 to pay grade 15, on account of numerous performance deficiencies. The letter HRS sent Ms. Allen notifying her of her demotion made no mention of HRS Regulation No. 60-10. HRS does not have any policy or general practice to rely on "documented counseling sessions" in lieu of employee evaluations before demotions. On September 17, 1990, HRS had in fact prepared a written employee appraisal detailing petitioner's derelictions as a protective investigator, HRS Exhibit No. 3, but petitioner prevailed on a grievance she pursued in connection with the evaluation.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, ORDERED: The petition for administrative determination of rule by hearing officer is denied. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of March, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of March, 1992. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 1 was neither established nor refuted. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 2 through 7 and 11 through 15 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 8, 9 and 10 are properly conclusions of law. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 16, 17 and 18 pertain to subordinate matters. COPIES FURNISHED: James C. McCarty, Esquire P.O. Box 2883 Gainesville, FL 32602 Robert L. Powell, Sr., Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 407 Building One 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 John Slye, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700
The Issue The issues posed for decision are: 1. Whether the Respondent, by its agent Lawrence McCarthy, unlawfully discharged Jerome Cilhar on June 21, 1976, in violation of Section 447.501(1)(b), of the Act. 2 . Whether the Respondent, by its agent and representative, Lawrence McCarthy, unlawfully interrogated and threatened employees on April 30, and May 4, 1976, within the meaning of Section 447.501(1)(a), of the Act. Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, including the entire record compiled herein) I make the following:
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, City of Gulfport, Florida, is a Florida municipal corporation located in Pinellas County, Florida. During times material to this proceeding, the City Manager was Mr. Harry Perkins (Perkins) who had the ultimate authority over personnel matters including hirings, discharges, levels of manpower, administration of federal employment assistance programs, as well as labor relations. During times material to this proceeding, Mr. Lawrence McCarthy (McCarthy) was employed by Respondent as Director of Public Works. As such, he had operational responsibility for sanitation, water and sewer, streets and parks among others. While McCarthy had the authority to manage his department, the hiring and discharge of employees and the general administration of budgets was handled by Perkins with some input and recommendation by McCarthy. During 1975, Gulfport contracted with Pinellas County, Florida to be a member of a consortium to receive federal supplemental employment assistance funds from the federal government under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA). Under this contract, Gulfport was required to follow all federal rules and regulations adopted under the CETA program. In March, 1975, Mr. Jerome Cilhar (Cilhar or the alleged discriminatee) had been unemployed for the requisite period of time to qualify for employment under the Pinellas County CETA program. Cilhar applied for a CETA position with Gulfport and, after the interview, was hired as a sanitation worker in the Public Works Department on March 3, 1975. He (Cilhar) was hired along with a Mr. Johnson who was also hired by Respondent under the CETA prograin as a sanitation worker, On July 17, 1975, an election was conducted by PERC among a comprehensive unit of Respondent's blue and white collar employees. The Petitioner therein did not receive a majority of the valid ballots cast. With these facts, both Perkins and McCarthy were under the impression that no union organizational campaign could begin until after the expiration of a one year period from the date of the election. Respondent operates on a fiscal year basis from October 1, until September 30. For the fiscal year 1975 to 1976, Respondent had budgeted approximately 130 positions for employees. In April and May, 1976, testimony reveals that Perkins became concerned that estimated revenues from services and taxes would not be reached during fiscal year 1975 through 1976 and that expenses would exceed the amount estimated. In this regard, it was noted that Respondent realized an operating deficit of approximately $200,000 for the fiscal year 1975 to 1976. In response to projected deficits, Perkins began personnel cutbacks in May, 1976, since personnel costs represented the largest single budget expenditure. Between May of 1976 and September 30, 1976, Perkins trimmed the City's work force by approximately 20 percent or a net loss of 26 employees. (See Respondent's Exhibit #4). In this regard, the evidence revealed that the City operated the sanitation department without any upward manpower adjustments until February, 1977, when employees were transferred to that area. Mr. Cilhar stated that he voluntarily informed Mr. McCarthy (the Public Works Director) of his desire for a union in late April, 1976. He testified that he and Barney White, a fellow employee in the sanitation department volunteered this information respecting their union activity because White was upset about the lack of pay raises. He testified that Barney White took the initiative in the conversation with McCarthy and in this regard, the evidence revealed that White who, as best as the record reveals, made all of the comments respecting their union activities. Cilhar testified that he noted no change in his relationship with the City and its employees during the six week interim between the date he and White made known their union activities to Respondent's agent (McCarthy) and the date of his discharge on June 21, 1976. Evidence reveals that Respondent made the decision (jointly by Perkins and McCarthy) to retain CETA employee Johnson, whose seniority was equal to Cilhar's, based on the fact that Johnson was more versatile in terms of his employment skills and Respondent was of the opinion that he would be of more assistance in that he could be assigned to a multitude of tasks. Cilhar also advanced the position that Respondent terminated him because he was arranging to schedule a union meeting on the date that he was discharged. The testimony in this regard establishes, on balance, that the Respondent made its decision to terminate Cilhar on Friday, June 18, but could not locate Cilhar because he had left to go home when the final decision was made by Respondent. He was contacted and advised of the termination decision by Respondent early the following Monday, June 21, 1976. He was given an exit interview and advised that his job was being abolished due to the lack of CETA fundings for the next fiscal year. He was also paid for his accrued annual leave from CETA funds. In this regard, Respondent established that this was done to curb employment costs from municipal funds since the payment of Cilhar's leave would have come from municipal funds had the decision been postponed until the end of the fiscal year. It was also noted in this regard that in its effort to realize economy through personnel cuts, Perkins terminated Ryan Larison, a budgeted city employee in the Sanitation Department on June 16, 1976 and thereby realized an economic savings. Pertinent CETA rules and regulations as well as the Respondent's contract with Pinellas County required that the City utilize federal CETA funds only as supplemental to budgeted employment positions. Thus Respondent could not maintain CETA positions instead of budgeted positions under its contract and the regulations. See Respondent's Exhibit #2, Section 205(c)(8). With these facts, I conclude that the Respondent did no more than it was required to do or in fact was compelled to do based on the financial restraints that it was operating under and its regulations with Pinellas County under the CETA program. As Respondent aptly notes, union activity does not insulate an employee from discharge for cause. While there were some uncertainties in this record, and some suspicions automatically arise from the fact that a union adherent was discharged while an employee of equal seniority with, as best as can be determined by the record, little or no union sympathies, these suspicions provide no substitute for record evidence upon which a finding can be made that the Respondent discharged the alleged discriminatee based on his union sympathies or desires as alleged in the complaint. I shall therefore recommend that this allegation be dismissed. THE ALLEGED THREATS AND INTERROGATION The complaints cite two instances in which the Respondent's agent, McCarthy, engaged in unlawful threats and/or interrogation. Witnesses testifying to these remarks during the hearing were Messrs. McCarthy and Rousseau. Both testified that in essence McCarthy warned that "they had a constitutional right to do any damn thing they wanted, but while on City property and on City time, solicitation of union activities was not condoned. Any one I heard would be subject to dismissal". McCarthy testified frankly and openly with respect to his remarks to employees respecting solicitation while on City time and property. Given all of the circumstances of this case and the complete absence of any evidence indicating that the Respondent engaged in any independent acts to unlawfully interfere with, restrain or coerce employees to exercise those rights guaranteed them in Chapter 447, I am of the opinion that the remarks given employees by McCarthy respecting solicitations for unions on City time on City property did not rise to the level of unlawful activity as defined in Chapter 447.501(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Accordingly, I shall recommend that the complaint allegations be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, I hereby recommend that the complaint filed herein be dismissed in its entirety. RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of October, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Frank E. Hamilton, Jr., Esquire 101 East Kennedy Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33602 William E. Sizemore, Esquire Post Office Box 3324 Tampa, Florida 33601
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner’s employment position was properly reclassified from Career Service to the Select Exempt Service (SES) on July 1, 2001, pursuant to Section 110.205(2)(x), Florida Statutes (2001).
Findings Of Fact In 1985, Petitioner was employed by the Department as an Engineer III. He was eventually promoted to Engineer IV and then to Engineer IV coordinator. Prior to July 1, 2001, Petitioner’s positions were classified as career service. On July 1, 2001, Petitioner’s position was changed from a career service classification to an SES classification and designated as an Engineer Supervisor IV. A knew job description was also prepared. Throughout his employment, Petitioner’s main duty was to inspect, maintain and repair fire and security alarm systems in State office buildings. In that capacity and depending on the particular system, Petitioner worked as part of and coordinated with a team of one to two other inspectors. Petitioner’s position as an Engineer IV was a position within the PERC certified Professional Career Service collective bargaining unit, represented by Florida Public Employees Council 79, Association of Federal, State, County and Municipal Employees Union (AFSCME). For inclusion within such a unit the position was considered to not involve managerial or supervisory functions. In fact, Petitioner’s positions as an Engineer III and IV did not involve supervisory functions. However, when he became an Engineer IV coordinator, Petitioner had some supervisory duties. Those duties were primarily approving time sheets and performing annual employee performance evaluations. Employee assignments and training were handled as a team with a particular employee’s specific equipment knowledge and building knowledge being key factors. When work was performed together, the employee with the greater expertise with the system directed the work. Prior to his termination, Petitioner supervised Ed McCann and Richard Lamberto. Approximately 90 percent of Petitioner’s time was spent responding to calls regarding the malfunctioning of fire and security systems. About five percent of his time was spent performing routine maintenance on such systems and another two to four percent on responding to fire marshall’s inspection reports. Less than one percent of his time was spent on supervisory duties. Petitioner’s primary duties involved the exercise of independent judgment. His duties were not routine or clerical in nature. Petitioner did not have the power to hire and fire an employee or the power to make purchase decisions. He could make effective recommendations regarding those decisions. He did not have authority over any budgetary matters. There was no evidence that Petitioner’s position dealt with confidential matters. In fact, Petitioner’s actual job performance did not change after his position was reclassified to Engineer Supervisor IV, SES. His day-to-day performance did not change primarily because his office was seriously understaffed for the statewide duties of their office. However, the new SES description expanded the supervisory or managerial duties of Petitioner’s old career service position description. In pertinent part, the position description as of July 2, 2001, stated the following: 20% Supervisory: Supervision of Fire & Safety employees in their duties and responsibilities. Evaluations and review of job performance, recommendation of disciplinary action if necessary, training and continued education. Supervise the project management duties that include the approval of timesheets, project specification, drawings, purchase orders, requisitions, correspondence, travel, purchase order completion of contract pay requests. Meet regularly with subordinate staff to discuss office procedures, work assignments and Division issues and goals. Addresses performance issues promptly and uses progressive and corrective action to resolve employee performance problems. Updates, discusses and presents Performance Planning and review forms, position descriptions and office procedures to subordinate staff. Provides each employee with a performance review within the designated time period in accordance with established rules and procedures. Ensure staff attend necessary training with designated time frames. Follows established rules, regulations and procedures for attendance and leave, travel reimbursements, appointment procedures, affirmative action and invoice processing. Duties contained in numbers three through eight were expanded from his earlier 1999 position description. The 2001 position description also had expanded supervisory or managerial duties contained in its other sections. The description stated, in relevant part: 40% preventive Maintenance: * * * * 2. Ensure the desired maintenance is being performed on a timely basis that does not fall within normal operations. * * * * Assist in providing engineering direction on system modifications, installations, upgrades and also see that the actual preventive maintenance efforts are being carried out. Set priorities for maintenance projects; * * *. * * * * 10% Specifications: * * * * 2. Monitor contractors through contract period for compliance with specifications. * * * * Instruct user personnel on the prescribed utilization, operation, testing and maintenance of alarms on the alarm systems installed. * * * * 10% Other: * * * * Keeps supervisor fully informed regarding work-related activities, relevant issues, upcoming events and potential problems. Ensures requests for leave are submitted and approved in accordance with established rules and Division procedures. * * * * Petitioner remained employed under the new classification until his termination on August 12, 2002. Petitioner was terminated in part for failing to perform his duties as a supervisor in overseeing the timely performance of repairs and setting priorities for accomplishing those tasks. The evidence demonstrated that Petitioner’s supervisory duties were expanded to include a significant amount of supervision and management. However, the evidence did not demonstrate that Petitioner actually spent a majority of his time supervising his staff. The evidence did show that he did spend some amount of time engaged in non-routine, non-clerical activities that involved the exercise of independent judgment, combined with a significant role in employee personnel administration in that he had the authority to effectivey recommend employment actions. The fact that he did not exercise such authority is not controlling and only demonstrates that the need for such action had not arisen. Given these duties, the reclassification of Petitioner’s position was appropriate under the Service First Initiative.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law reached it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Petitioner's position was appropriately reclassified as Select Exempt Service. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of January, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of January, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Avery McKnight, Esquire Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A. 906 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Jerry G. Traynham, Esquire Patterson & Traynham 315 Beard Street Post Office Box 4289 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-4289 Steven S. Ferst, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Linda South, Secretary Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has been employed with the Florida Department of Transportation since 1971. He is a graduate of the University of West Florida, with a degree in business management. Petitioner is 38 years old, with a physical disability which limits his use of his left hand and arm, and his left leg is shorter than his right. In 1979, Petitioner was employed by Respondent in its right-of-way section, as a Right-of-Way Agent III. In that position, he was responsible for the coordination of the Acquisition, Relocation and Property Management sections of Respondent's District III. One of Petitioner's subordinates was H. E. Walls, who was in charge of the Acquisition section. Petitioner's immediate supervisor was J. F. Culpepper, Assistant Right-of-Way Administrator. In April, 1980, a new Right-of-Way Administrator, J. A. Alfes, was assigned to District III. In 1980, and again in 1981, Petitioner filed charges of discrimination against Respondent with the Florida Commission on Human Relations premised upon Petitioner's aforementioned disability. The 1980 charge was resolved through the entry of a settlement agreement. The charge filed in 1981 was premised upon the same disability, but that charge was ultimately dismissed by the Florida Commission on Human Relations. In January, 1981, a hearing was held in Tallahassee, Florida, on one of the charges of discrimination filed by Petitioner. On the day following that hearing, Petitioner was called into Mr. Alfes' office in Chipley, Florida, and was told that the hearing held in Tallahassee had been several hours of "horse shit." On May 18, 1981, Mr. Alfes advised Petitioner of an impending reorganization of the section in which Petitioner was employed. Subsequently, on June 17, 1981, Mr. Alfes told Petitioner that there would be "consequences" as a result of Petitioner's having filed complaints with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. In 1981 a reorganization of functions occurred in all six districts statewide of DOT. This reorganization eliminated one classification of position, Right-of-Way Agent III, which Petitioner had held in District III, and elevated the positions at the head of Acquisition and Relocation sections to the administrator level. At the time this reorganization occurred, Petitioner, as previously mentioned, was a Right-of-Way Agent III, and Herbert Walls headed the Acquisition section. Mr. Alfes, Petitioner's immediate superior, recommended that Petitioner be placed in charge of Relocation, and that Mr. Walls, who had been working in Acquisition, be placed in charge of the Acquisition section in light of his experience in that area since 1978. J. F. Culpepper, who occupied the position on DOT's organization chart to whom the Acquisition section, Relocation section, and Property Management section would report, recommended that the Petitioner be placed in charge of the Acquisition section, based upon his belief that Petitioner was better qualified by reason of his real estate training and college degree. Mr. Walls had only a high school diploma. During the period of his employment with DOT, Petitioner had not handled any complete right-of-way acquisition matters, and had never negotiated for DOT in the acquisition of any right-of-way parcels. Petitioner had, however, attended two relocation seminars while employed by DOT. Mr. Walls had been continually engaged in acquisition work for DOT since at least 1978. DOT's District Engineer, Alan Potter, was the DOT employee ultimately responsible for selecting the heads of the Acquisition and Relocation sections. Mr. Potter concurred with the recommendation that Petitioner be placed in charge of the Relocation section, based upon his belief that it was the most important job involved in right-of-way acquisition, and that it required a very thorough and cautious person. Based upon Mr. Potter's evaluation of Petitioner as possessed of high ability, and being very mature and compassionate, Petitioner was placed in charge of the Relocation section. At the time Petitioner was named as head of Relocation and Mr. Walls was placed as head of Acquisition, the two positions were both classified as Right-of-Way Specialist II's, pay grade 22. Later both were reclassified as Right-of-Way Administrator I's, at pay grade 23. The record in this cause establishes that neither position was more prestigious" than the other, or that either position placed the individual holding it in a more favorable posture for promotion or advancement. Subsequently, in the summer of 1981, the reorganization of DOT was completed, with Mr. Walls having been appointed head of Acquisition, with approximately six subordinates. Petitioner became responsible for Relocation, and shared the supervision of a clerical employee with the head of Property Management. After reorganization, Mr. Alfes relocated Petitioner's office in another building 100 feet away from the main office. Petitioner's office was initially located in a passageway and, as a result, Petitioner was required several times a day to make trips to the main building to obtain files necessary to complete his work. In August of 1983, prior to final hearing in this cause, Mr. Alfes retired, and Petitioner's office was relocated in a more spacious office close to the Acquisition section.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the State of Florida, Commission on Human Relations, dismissing the petition for relief, and denying the relief requested therein. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd of May, 1984, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM E. WILLIAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 904/488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: BEN R. PATTERSON, ESQUIRE POST OFFICE BOX 4289 TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32315 VERNON L. WHITTIER, JR., ESQUIRE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION HAYDON BURNS BUILDING TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32301 JEAN OWEN, ESQUIRE ASSISTANT GENERAL COUNSEL FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS WOODCREST OFFICE CENTER 325 JOHN KNOX ROAD SUITE 240, BUILDING F TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32303 DONALD A. GRIFFIN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS 325 JOHN KNOX ROAD BUILDING F, SUITE 240 TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32303
Findings Of Fact On July 9, 1986 Petitioner, a Clerk Typist Specialist employed by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, signed a receipt acknowledging that she had received a copy of the Department's Employee Handbook which contains the information that an employee who is absent for three consecutive workdays without authorization may be considered to have abandoned his or her position and thereby to have resigned. On September 3, 1987 Petitioner telephoned her supervisor to advise him that she had an interview scheduled and that she would be at work by 9:30 a.m. She, however, thereafter failed to appear at work and failed to make any further contact with her supervisor on September 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, and 11, 1987. On September 11, 1987 by certified letter the Department advised Petitioner that, as of the close of business on September 9, she was deemed to have abandoned her position and to have resigned from the Career Service due to her unauthorized absence for three consecutive workdays, i.e., September 3, 4, and 8, 1987.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered deeming Petitioner to have abandoned her position and to have resigned from the Career Service. DONE AND ORDERED this 30th day of November, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Ruby Holloway-Jenkins 649 West 4th Street Riviera Beach, Florida 33404 K. C. Collette, Esquire District IX Legal Counsel 111 Georgia Avenue West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
