Conclusions Objections 3B, 3C and 3D involve factual questions which can only be resolved by an evaluation of the credibility of various witnesses. Consequently, pursuant to Fla. Admin. Code Rule 8H- 3.28, a hearing shall be held where the underlying facts can be determined prior to ruling on the merits of those objections and the remainder of CWA's Objections are dismissed. It is so ordered. LEONARD A. CARSON CHAIRMAN 77E-207 THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on April 21st, 1977, this document was filed in the office of the Public Employees Relations Commission at Tallahassee and a copy served on each party at its last known address by certified mail. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RELATIONS COMMISSION BY: Judy N. Collins Deputy Clerk
The Issue Whether Respondent, a maintenance technician employed by Petitioner, committed the offenses alleged in the Notice of Specific Charges and, if so, the penalties that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner has been a duly-constituted school board charged with the duty to operate, control, and supervise all free public schools within the school district of Miami-Dade County, Florida, pursuant to Article IX, Florida Constitution, and Section 230.03(1), Florida Statutes (2001). At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was employed by Petitioner as a maintenance technician and was assigned to WLRN, the radio/television station operated by Petitioner. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Mr. Hernandez supervised a work crew consisting of Respondent and ten other maintenance technicians. At the time of the final hearing, Respondent, Mr. Hernandez, and several other members of the work crew had worked together since 1990. The work crew performed maintenance work at the radio/television station and at the various schools and other facilities that received signals from the radio/television station. At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent had his own truck that he used to travel to his various work assignments. Respondent is a frustrated employee who does not get along well with his co-workers or with Mr. Hernandez. Respondent believes himself to be more qualified than his supervisor and his co-workers, and he is ever vigilant for improperly performed work by the maintenance crew. Respondent keeps a copy of the job description for the position held by Mr. Hernandez, which he reviews on a regular basis to determine if Mr. Hernandez is fulfilling his responsibilities. Over the course of his employment with Petitioner, Respondent has had a history of threatening co-workers and other School Board employees. Prior to May 1, 2001, Respondent had threatened Mr. Hernandez with bodily harm on two occasions. As a result of his threats against Mr. Hernandez and other School Board employees, Respondent had been referred on more than one occasion to Petitioner's Employee Assistance Program. In 1995 Petitioner required Respondent to submit to a psychological evaluation 1/ to determine Respondent's fitness for work. For the two and a half weeks immediately preceding May 1, 2001, Respondent was off work. During that time Respondent's work truck was idle. On May 1, 2001, when Respondent returned to work, an incident occurred between Mr. Hernandez and Respondent that underpins this proceeding. 2/ While making the workday assignments on the morning of May 1, 2001, Mr. Hernandez informed Respondent that his work truck had been scheduled for routine maintenance that day. Respondent became upset because the truck had been idle for the previous two and a half weeks, and he believed that the maintenance should have been performed during that period. Mr. Hernandez assigned Respondent to work with Mr. Braddy, but Respondent refused that assignment. 3/ Respondent walked over to the maintenance garage with a tape recorder to have the mechanic state on tape when Respondent's truck would be ready. Respondent then returned to the area where Mr. Hernandez was still making assignments. Mr. Hernandez told Respondent to go work with Rafael Montesino, another member of the work crew. Respondent refused that assignment. When he heard the assignment and Respondent's refusal, Mr. Montesino told Mr. Hernandez he would not work with Respondent and that he would take the day off if he had to do so. By the time Mr. Hernandez began to leave the area to go to his own work assignment, the other members of the crew had left for their assignments. Respondent did not have an assignment and he remained in the area. As Mr. Hernandez was leaving the area, Respondent verbally assaulted Mr. Hernandez in a hostile, threatening manner. Respondent cursed Mr. Hernandez and threatened to kill him. Mr. Hernandez drove off from the confrontation. Mr. Hernandez filed a complaint with his supervisors regarding Respondent's behavior of May 1, 2001, by Memorandum dated May 2, 2001. Following an investigation Detective Mario Victores of Petitioner's school police prepared a report styled Preliminary Personnel Investigation (the report). The report substantiated two alleged violations of School Board rules by Respondent: Rule 6Gx13-4A-1.21, pertaining to responsibilities and duties of School Board employees and Rule 6Gx13-4.108, pertaining to violence in the workplace. Victoria Bradford held a conference-for-the-record with Respondent to discuss the incident of May 1, 2001. Based primarily on Ms. Bradford’s recommendation, 4/ Respondent was referred to Petitioner’s Employee Assistance Program and his employment was suspended without pay for a period of 30 days. Respondent is a non-probationary "educational support employee" within the meaning of Section 231.3605, Florida Statutes, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: As used in this section: "Educational support employee" means any person employed by a district school system . . . who by virtue of his or her position of employment is not required to be certified by the Department of Education or district school board pursuant to s. 231.1725. . . . "Employee" means any person employed as an educational support employee. "Superintendent" means the superintendent of schools or his or her designee. (2)(a) Each educational support employee shall be employed on probationary status for a period to be determined through the appropriate collective bargaining agreement or by district school board rule in cases where a collective bargaining agreement does not exist. Upon successful completion of the probationary period by the employee, the employee's status shall continue from year to year unless the superintendent terminates the employee for reasons stated in the collective bargaining agreement, or in district school board rule in cases where a collective bargaining agreement does not exist . . . In the event a superintendent seeks termination of an employee, the district school board may suspend the employee with or without pay. The employee shall receive written notice and shall have the opportunity to formally appeal the termination. The appeals process shall be determined by the appropriate collective bargaining process or by district school board rule in the event there is no collective bargaining agreement. At the times material to this proceeding, Respondent was a member of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) collective bargaining unit. AFSCME and Petitioner have entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), which in Article II, Section 3, provides that members of the bargaining unit may be disciplined for "just cause." The CBA does not define the term "just cause." Article XI, Section 1A of the CBA provides for progressive discipline as follows: . . . Whenever an employee . . . violates any rule, regulation, or policy, that employee shall be notified by his/her supervisor, as soon as possible, with the employee being informed of the . . . rule, regulation or policy violated. An informal discussion with the employee shall occur prior to the issuance of any written disciplinary action. Progressive discipline should be followed, however, in administering discipline, the degree of discipline shall be reasonably related to the seriousness of the offense and the employee's record. Therefore, disciplinary steps may include: verbal warning; written warning (acknowledged); Letter of reprimand; Suspension/demotion; and Dismissal. Article XI, Section 3 of the CBA provides as follows: 3. In those cases where any employee has not complied with the Board's policies and/or department regulations, but the infraction is not deemed serious enough to recommend dismissal, the department head may recommend suspension up to 30 days without pay. The Superintendent must approve all suspensions. School Board Rule 6Gx13-4A-1.21 states in pertinent part that: All persons employed by The School Board of Miami-Dade County, Florida are representatives of the Miami-Dade County Public Schools. As such, they are expected to conduct themselves, both in their employment and in the community, in a manner that will reflect credit upon themselves and the school system. School Board Rule 6Gx13-4-1.08 provides as follows: Nothing is more important to Miami-Dade County Schools (DCPS) than protecting the safety and security of its students and employees and promoting a violence-free work environment. Threats, threatening behavior, or acts of violence against any students, employee, visitors, guests, or other individuals by anyone on DCPS property will not be tolerated. Violations of this policy may lead to disciplinary action which includes dismissal, arrest, and/or prosecution. Any person who makes substantial threats, exhibits threatening behavior, or engages in violent acts on DCPS property shall be removed from the premises as quickly as safety permits, and shall remain off DCPS premises pending the outcome of an investigation. DCPS will initiate an appropriate response. This response may include, but is not limited to, suspension and/or termination of any business relationship, reassignment of job duties, suspension or termination of employment, and/or criminal prosecution of the person or persons involved. Dade County Public School employees have a right to work in a safe environment. Violence or the threat of violence by or against students and employees will not be tolerated.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order adopting the Findings of Fact and the Conclusions of Law set forth in this Recommended Order. It is further RECOMMENDED that the final order uphold the suspension of Respondent's employment for 30 days without pay. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of April, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of April, 2003.
The Issue The issues in the case are whether or not the Respondent (1) during the course of an organizing campaign by the Union engaged in a course of conduct amounting to unlawful surveillance and/or creation of the impression of surveillance (2) whether or not Respondent unlawfully refused to bargain in good faith with the Union and (3) whether or not Respondent unlawfully refused to execute dues checkoff authorizations signed by its employees. By the alleged acts referred above, the Respondent allegedly engaged in unfair labor practices affecting the orderly and uninterrupted operations and functions of government within the meaning of Florida Statutes 447. As stated, these issues arise on a complaint issued October 16, by the acting general counsel of the Public Employees Relations Commission (hereinafter referred to as PERC), as amended at the trial after PERC's investigation of-the charges filed by the Union on various dates. The Respondent denied the commission of any unfair labor practices. At close of the testimony all parties waived oral argument. A brief has been received by counsel for the general counsel and has been carefully considered by me in preparation of this hearing officer's report and recommended order which was signed and released by me on March 17, 1976, for distribution to the parties in the usual course. Upon the entire record in the case, observation of witnesses on the stand, and considerations of arguments of counsel, I make the following:
Findings Of Fact Respondent's operation and the status of the Union. The Respondent is now and has been at all times material herein, a public employer within the meaning of Section 447.203(2) of the Act. The Union is an employee organization within the meaning of Section 447.203(2) of the Public Employees Relations Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The Union was certified by the Commission on April 22, order no. 75E-6-31 and the parties commenced bargaining on or about April 23, 1975, and notice of negotiations was forwarded to the Commission's office on or about May 5, 1975. By way of background, the case was originally noticed for hearing to commence on October 29 and 30, 1975, in the Escambia County Courthouse. The Respondent, on October 29, applied for and obtained a temporary restraining order which had the effect of commanding the Public Employees Relations Commission to refrain from conducting or attempting to conduct the hearing based on the charges alleged in the subject complaint and notice of hearing. On the following day, the School Board filed a non-suit which had the effect of resolving the temporary restraining order. Prior thereto and subsequent to the non-suit, the Respondent filed numerous motions for continuance and dismissal based on alleged procedural violations. The basis of the procedural deficiencies were that (1) PERC failed to advise the Respondent of its investigation prior to issuing complaint and therefore the complaint was improperly issued. Additionally, the Respondent alleged that it has filed charges of a similar nature against the Union and that PERC has failed to expedite investigation of said charges which according to Respondent, amounts to violations of bad faith bargaining by the Union also in violation of Florida Statutes 447. Accordingly, Respondent asked that continuance be granted and that a period somewhere in the nature of 30 days be allowed to consider the charges alleged. Respondent also filed motions to dismiss alleging inter alia, that the charges filed by the Charging Party are false and groundless and that representatives of the Charging Party and PERC's agents have colluded to effectuate violations of its rules and enabling statutes as set forth in the complaint. Based thereon states the Respondent, it has been deprived of its opportunity for investigation and defense of the matters asserted in the administrative charges and the complaint and therefore the complaint should be dismissed. Aside from the fact that the hearing officer is without the authority to grant motions to dismiss, looking to the motion to dismiss and the motion for continuance, no evidence other than the bare claims were made to substantiate all of the allegations contained in both the motion to dismiss and the motion for continuance. Accordingly they are tentatively denied by the undersigned and the motion to dismiss is referred to PERC for final ruling. Respondent's counsel also made a motion for continuance on the final day of the hearing and as grounds therefor alleged that he had been recently retained. Aside from the fact that the testimony revealed that the law firm had been retained to represent Respondent months prior to the instant hearing, Dr. Moses, Respondent's chief negotiator under- took to represent Respondent at the hearing. Additionally, the motion was denied as being untimely filed. THE REFUSAL TO DEDUCT DUES ISSUE Guy Price, Special Education Teacher for approximately 4- 1/2 years, testified that he is a union member and that he signed a dues deduction authorization form in 1971. 2/ Price testified that the Respondent has refused to deduct dues since on or about July. He testified that the Respondent caused to be circulated in October, a notice which indicated it would only deduct dues pursuant to authorizations on a lump sum basis for the yearly dues which, according to the testimony, amounted to $110.00. He testified that inasmuch as he could not afford the lump sum deduction, he canceled his authorization go or about October 6. He testified that he was aware personally of approximately 10 other employees who canceled their dues deduction authorization based on the fact that according to his testimony, they were unable to afford a lump sum deduction. He testified that the Respondent permits piece meal deductions of other organizational and benefit drives whereas it refused to do so in this case. On cross-examination, he testified that during the months of March thru June, no deductions were made. On redirect examination, he reiterated his prior testimony that he canceled his dues deduction authorization based on the fact that he could not afford the lump sum payment as indicated by the Respondent's notice to employees. Carl Ledehman, an employee for approximately 18 months and a Union member indicated that he canceled his dues deduction authorization based on the fact that he too could not afford a lump sum deduction as testified to by Guy Price. He testified that the Respondent indicated sometime in early October that it would only deduct Union dues in a lump sum fashion and that based on this announcement, 3/ he then canceled his dues deduction. He testified that inasmuch as the Respondent indicated that it would only deduct dues pursuant to a lump sum method, he canceled his authorization and that he did so for no other purpose. He testified as did Mr. Price that to his knowledge, the Respondent deducts contributions for hospital, cancer and the united givers fund as well as other benevolent and humanitarian purposes. Albert M. Robuck, an employee for approximately 6 years, testified that he, signed a dues deduction authorization form yearly and that the employer refused, sometime in October, to deduct dues on a monthly basis. He testified that he received several memos citing in essence that Respondent would only deduct dues on a lump sum basis. Based on this statement, he canceled his dues deduction authorization on or about October 12, and that along with his cancellation, approximately three other teachers canceled their dues deduction authorization. He testified that he was aware that the employer is presently deducting health insurance, annuities and other deductions monthly. Jackie Barrineau, the Union's Chairperson and an employee for approximately three years as a teacher, testified that she has been a Union member throughout her employment with the Respondent. She testified that the Respondent submitted what she considered to be exorbitant proposals for the cost of processing the dues deductions and that the proposals ranged from $12,500.00 annually to its last offer which amounted to .05 per card per month for each employee utilizing the dues deduction procedure. On April 21, 1975, she testified that the Union agreed to pay $325.00 for dues deduction for the remainder of the school year, whereas the Employer on July 15, proposed the amount of $12,500.00 for dues deduction. She testified that the Employer amended its position and countered with the same figure it had originally proposed. Approximately two days later on July 17, the board reduced its cost for processing dues deductions and reduced the $12,500.00 figure to .50 per card per month for each employee utilizing dues deduction. In late July the parties declared an impasse and during the numerous proposals which were submitted during the impasse on or about September 4, the Respondent resubmitted the $12,000.00 figure as the cost for deducting dues. See for example Charging Party's Exhibit 7 received in evidence and is made a part hereof by reference. She testified that despite the adamant position taken by the Respondent on dues deduction, she did not cancel her dues authorization. On cross-examination she corroborated the fact that the parties tentatively agreed to a provision whereby the Respondent would deduct .05 per card for each member utilizing the dues deduction authorization procedure. The Employer advised that it had received legal advice regarding the legality of the notice given employees whereby it would only deduct dues in a lump sum and that a local attorney, William Davenport, advised that that procedure was permissible. She testified that she is charged with giving collective bargaining advice to all employees within the County School System. She testified as to a problem the Respondent advised that it had relative to incorrect signatures and improper amounts being recorded on dues authorization cards and that that was part of the stated motivation for the Employer cancelling the procedure of deducting dues on a monthly basis. She testified that as to the Respondent's release of its intention to deduct dues only on a lump sum basis, a substantial number of employees withdrew from the Union. The Respondent also claims that it refused to honor existing dues authorizations which were executed by its employees because numerous cards were either incorrectly executed or were undated. There is nothing in Section 447.303, F.S., which saddles Respondent with the responsibility of insuring that dues deduction authorizations are properly executed. Nor was there any credible testimony from any employee that dues deductions were being made without their express authorization. It thus appears that the Respondent's stated concern about the legality or propriety of the dues authorizations was nothing more than a pretext to effectuate its real desire of securing from employees mass cancellation of their dues authorizations and thus stifle the Union's ability to function. This becomes more apparent when consideration is given to the Respondent's attitude at the bargaining table relative to the amount that it proposed to the Union for the administrative costs for providing the dues deduction service. Respondent maintained the same basic "no give" position on this issue until the entry of the mediator into the negotiations. Although not specifically urged by Respondent as a defense to the refusal to deduct dues allegation, small mention was made of the fact that no contract was in existence between the parties when it (Respondent) ceased to deduct dues on a monthly basis as had been its practice during the remainder of the school year following the Union's certification as exclusive bargaining representative for Respondent's instructional personnel. Inasmuch as the statute which is pertinent to dues deduction (447.303, F.S.) at no point refers to the existence of a collective bargaining agreement as a prerequisite to dues deduction authorizations, the undersigned is constrained to conclude that the statute which is specific on its face, must be applied literally. Accordingly, even if Respondent had urged that as a defense for its actions stated above, the undersigned would recommend rejection of that ground as basis for its refusal to deduct dues pursuant to authorizations. 4/ THE SURVEILLANCE ISSUE Jack Bridges, who is the Employer's Director of Industrial Services and who is responsible for the media, news releases, etc., testified that he photographed pickets who picketed the Respondent's school administration building during the summer months of 1975. He testified that Charging Party's composite of approximately 17 pictures which the Respondent utilized in order to maintain a "historical" file. He testified that he was responsible for taking approximately 7 pictures and he recognized, after having been shown Mrs. Barrineau, Martha Smith and another teacher whom he described as being an active Union supporter. He testified that there was no blocking of ingress and egress into the school building and that the pickets picketed approximately 6 times. He testified that he had received advance notice from the news paper and TV advertisements that there would be a picket at the administration building. He testified that the photos were taken to the Director of Employee Relations, Dick Phillingem. 5/ He testified that the photos were taken with the school's camera and film. Bridges further testified that there were no blacks picketing during the time the photos were made and that to the best of his recollection there were only two pickets. On cross-examination he testified that he had received advance notice of racial picketing but that no photos were made nor was the division in which he headed asked to take pictures of such demonstration. On further recross, he testified that he was, contrary to his earlier testimony, asked to take pictures of racial matters. Thomas J. Le Master, the Respondent's Assistant Superintendent for approximately 5-1/2 years, testified that the pictures were taken to determine whether or not employees were breaking the law and to place such pictures in the labor files. He testified that Phillingem asked him if he had anyone to take pictures whereupon the answer was elicited that pictures were made such that there could be a record of labor relations. He testified that he was present at a school board meeting during mid September and that the pictures were discussed at such meeting and during a further conversation with Mr. Phillingem. He testified that he talked closely and worked closely with Phillingem on all matters relating to the operation of their division. When shown the pictures in Charging Parties Exhibit 11, he was able to identify the subjects in the pictures A,D,C,F and G. He testified that he presently serves on Respondent's bargaining team and has done so since January, 1975, when the pertinent divisions of Section 447, Florida Statutes, became operative. He testified that he had not witnessed a labor trial although he had seen Charging Party's Exhibit 2 which as stated was the notice to employees regarding dues deductions. The notice bears a date of October 2nd. On cross-examination, he also testified that the pictures were shown at a public board meetings and that few comments were made regarding the subjects contained on the pictures. He testified that the file which the pictures were part of, is used in collective bargaining negotiations between the Charging Party. He did not elaborate on this point. He testified that he obtained his advance notice for the picketing through either the news paper or the television. Dick Phillingem, Manager of Employee Relations for the past year, has been employed by the Respondent for approximately 24 years in various positions. He testified that he maintained records regarding employee relations and he referred to such correspondence a "blurb" sheets and Escambia Education Association fliers. He testified that he did not talk about his prior conversation regarding this hearing. He gave Le Master instructions to take the pictures. He testified that the instructions were to take pictures of bath the pickets and the legends contained thereon. Messr. Bridges called to inform him that the pictures were to be delivered to him via a courier and that he thereafter disbursed them at the Board meeting. He utilized the pictures to keep current his file which he uses to monitor Union activity. During the normal course of his work day he spends approximately 80 percent of his time visiting teachers, coordinators and checking records on disclosures at discussions of board meetings. When asked for the purpose for which he was collecting a "history" for his files, the witness was unspecific however, he did testify that no attempts were made to utilize the pictures for reprisals. Jackie Barrineau, who previously testified, was recalled and testified that she engaged in picketing on or about August 20, at approximately 3:30 p.m. She testified that there were approximately 25 pickets and that she confronted Jack Bridges and approximately 2 other photographers whose names she did not recall and that she approached Bridges and informed him that she did not like the idea of his taking photos of her. She testified that the Union obtained a Writ of Mandamus to compel the Respondent to disclose the budget and Dr. Moses' contract with the Respondent. The pickets expressed to her their fear of retaliation for engaging in such acts. There was no blockage of ingress or egress of the school's administration building where the picketing occurred. When shown the pictures, she was able to identify most of the subjects. She testified further that the picketing was at all times peaceful. On cross-examination she also stated that she is the Union's public relations official and reiterated her identification of Mr. Bridges as one of the photographers. 6/ Dr. Ruby Jackson Gainer, a counselor dean and an employee for approximately 20 or more years, testified that she engaged In the picketing and that she was also intimidated by a managerial employee taking pictures of her while she was picketing. She testified that despite this fear, she went along with the idea of picketing because she felt "committed to her task." She recalled an incident whereby she was discharged and her tenure removed due to her engagement in a walkout during school year 1968. She testified that the employer tried to discharge her for taking two days' sick leave and that this action was turned over to the professional practices committee. On or about August 28, she testified that she was demoted from administrative dean to counselor dean and that the difference being that as counselor dean, her work station is located in an isolated area removed from the other school facilities. William McArthur, the Respondent's Personnel Director, testified that the picketing occurred in front of the school building which is where his office is located. He is a member of the board's negotiating team and he testified that he was unaware of any employees being intimidated based on their engaging in picketing. He corroborated the earlier testimony that the pickets did not block any ingress or egress to the school's administrative building. He is the custodian of the instructional personnel records and to his knowledge, there was no data placed in the personnel files regarding the picketing. He also testified that the Respondent does not maintain any separate personnel file for pickets. He testified on cross-examination, that he viewed the picture in Mr. Odom's office which were lying on his desk uncovered. He was unable to witness pickets from the school's building as was previously testified to by other witnesses. In the private sector, the NLRB has consistently held that direct surveillance by company supervisory employees or executives is intimidating and coercive. However, the mere presence of a supervisor or agent of a Respondent is insufficient to prove surveillance where such presence is not out of the ordinary. In this case, evidence reveals that the occurrence of the picketing was a matter of common knowledge throughout the county. The picket was so well known that there was extensive media coverage. The evidence reveals further that the photos were passed around at a public School Board meeting and that since that time no reprisals have been practiced upon the subjects appearing in the photographs. There was no evidence that employees' job activities were more closely scrutinized than before the picture taking episode occurred. Jackie Barrineau, a chief spokesman for the Union testified that she engaged in picketing on or about August 20, at approximately 3:30 p.m. She testified that approximately 25 pickets gathered in front of the school's administration building and that Jack Bridges and two other photographers took pictures of the pickets. She as well as other witnesses testified that they feared reprisals would be taken against them for engaging in the picketing and that they were unable to discern any useful purpose as to why the pictures were being taken by Jack Bridges. The evidence also reveals that the Respondent's agents testified that the purpose for which the photos were made was to maintain "history" for their files. Further testimony on this point, however, reveals that the photos were openly discussed at a public meeting and that no attempts were made by the Respondent and/or its agents to utilize those photos for retaliation or for any other purpose unlawful under Chapter 447, Florida Statutes. The record was barren of any evidence that the Respondent attempted to use the pictures from the pickets to substantiate retaliatory motives. While one witness testified that she was demoted because she participated in a strike several years ago, such testimony standing alone is insufficient to base a finding that the Respondent during the picketing in 1975 utilized or planned to utilize the photos for some unlawful purpose. Furthermore, there is no evidence to show that the Respondent treated picketing employees any differently than it did any other employees who engaged in the strike following the time that the photos were taken. This tends to show the exact opposite of a surveillance situation or the creation of the impression of surveillance as alleged. It is true that there was scant evidence that the Respondent utilized the materials in a file relative to labor relations matters, no ulterior or unlawful motive was attached or shown by the evidence. While one might infer or surmise that the photos would be utilized for discriminatory purposes, there was no proof of that and mere suspicion is no substitute for proof. For these reasons, the undersigned hereby recommends that the surveillance issue be dismissed for lack of proof. THE REFUSAL TO BARGAIN ISSUE Fred Haushalter, the Charging Party's Executive Director for approximately 8 years and a consultant, testified that he requested access to budget information from the comptroller and for a copy of the contract given to the Respondent's labor negotiator, Ed Moses. He testified that the request was made on or about 5 different times during the month of July, 1975. He said when Respondent refused to honor his request for budget papers at the school board meeting, the mandamus suit was filed to compel disclosure whereupon the court ordered the Respondent to turn over those documents and, ill addition, the Union was awarded attorney's fees and cost for bringing the action. He testified that the school board plead that it was unable to pay any additional salaries since revenues were right and further, that there would be no economic improvements contained in the collective bargaining agreement that the parties were negotiating. He testified that all bargaining team members were notified that there would be no economic improvements forthcoming from the Respondent. On cross-examination, he testified that he requested the school board's budget work papers and a tentative budget. He testified that bargaining commenced in late July, 1975. Specifically, he testified that he asked the comptroller, Messr. Olden, for a copy of the tentative budget. Beginning in April, 1975, the Union formally began to formulate proposals and the procedure utilized was that of past practice when the employee organization had utilized in negotiating prior contracts. By letter dated September 8, Robert C. Mott, Deputy Superintendent, stated that he was supplying, (1) a copy of the tentative 75-76 budget; (2) a copy of Dr. Moses' contract; and (3) a copy of the administrative salary schedule. He testified that of the data which was requested by the union, some could not he supplied immediately as some of it needed to be assembled. As to the other request, Mott advised that "since it related so directly to the collective bargaining scene," he would need the "legal advice" from Dr. Moses concerning that data. He concluded by stating that he would submit the requested data when he was able to either assemble it or when Dr. Moses gave him the proper advice. 7/ He testified that Moses was Respondent's chief spokesman as of May 20, and that there were approximately 13 sessions. He phoned Dr. Moses on June 12, 13, 16, 18, 19, 20, 23 and 24 and he (Moses) failed to respond to his phone calls. He had previously been advised by Dr. Moses on June 4 that a negotiating session could be arranged on June 9. He testified that when his phone calls to Dr. Moses were unanswered, he started calling the school board's secretary; Mr. Phillinger and a Mr. Davis, who according to his testimony is Dr. Moses' assistant. Davis took the message and informed him that he would give it to Dr. Moses immediately. When he spoke to Mr. Phillinger, he indicated that he would try to contact Dr. Moses as soon as possible. After approximately 10 or more phone calls, Moses returned his call on June 24, a Tuesday, and informed him that he was told that no one would be in the office until around 1:00 p.m. on that day, i.e., June 24. He testified that Phillinger, Director of Employee Relations, stated that he would contact Dr. Moses since he did not have the authority to arrange dates for collective bargaining negotiation sessions. The following day a Messr. Leper was called and he informed him of the difficulty that he had encountered in trying to contact Dr. Moses. He testified that during a two-week period he made approximately 22 phone calls to both officers of Educational Services Bureau, Inc., a consulting firm in which Dr. Moses is employed and serves as its Executive Vice President. He testified that when he finally made contact with Dr. Moses, they arranged a tentative date of July 1 to commence negotiations and that he requested dates of June 25 or 26 and to that request, Moses indicated July 1 would be the earliest date. He testified that at the July 1 session, Moses brought with him no proposals, but merely read a statement that the union's proposals were hastily prepared and irresponsible. He testified that the negotiating team which consisted of approximately 6 members began preparing the original proposal in October of 1974 and that special preparation lasted through April 1975 when formal proposals were submitted. He testified that Phillingem advised that the employer would only discuss the preamble and the following three articles, mainly (1) recognition; (2) association and teacher rights and (3) negotiation procedures. 8/ He testified that at that session, Respondent would only propose language regarding the recognition article. During that meeting the employer submitted its "guidelines for negotiation" and previously thereto on April 23, Respondent advised that it would have prepared at its next session, a counter proposal. The Union's proposal consisted of some 123 pages containing approximately 33 articles. The next meeting was held on May 19, and the parties agreed to payroll deduction for the remaining school year. He testified that Moses, at that meeting, advised that he wanted the Union's negotiating team to "localize the agreement." He testified that the next three sessions mainly consisted of questions by Moses, who informed the Union's bargaining team that "when we start bargaining, we will get. responses." 9/ On cross-examination, Moses asked the witness a number of questions regarding the Union's necessity of affiliation, the understanding as to why two whereases were included in Hue Union's preamble and other questions regarding language contained in provisions of its (the Union's) proposal. Moses inquired of him what his definition of good faith bargaining was and how the Union derived the one 1000th figure as the cost for dues deduction payments. He testified that Moses indicated to him that most of the Union's proposals were "non-bargainable items." The Respondent counter-proposed with a one page proposal. The Employer's initial counterproposal, which was submitted on July, in essence contained provisions that all offers were package offers which had to be either accepted or rejected as a package; that the contract term be two years and that the salary level be that level that was paid to instructional personnel the last school year. The proposal also contained provisions that all negotiable benefits be maintained at the funded level as contained ill the last contract and for existing benefits only; that final and binding arbitration be added to the present concept of grievance as is now in use in the Escambia County Schools.. The counterproposal ended with a provision which stated that all other bargainable items proposed by the union and identified as bargainable by the board were rejected. 10/ Mrs. Barrineau testified that the board's final proposal which was mailed to the teachers contained provisions whereby lunch hours were discretionary with the principal; a no strike provision; dues deduction and mileage allowance which was less beneficial than that contained in the predecessor agreement. The counterproposal also contained more restrictive provisions regarding maternity leave, personal leave and a two year contract term. There was a provision regarding association and teacher rights, three paid holidays, professional leave and procedures for reviewing personnel files. There was a provision controlling posting, voluntary transfers, class size, teacher's schedules, $60.00 bonus and that in her opinion, the salary proposal was regressive. She testified that the Respondent attempted to withdraw certain items which had been tentatively agreed to by the parties. The Respondent advised that this proposal which was submitted to the union on or about September 26, could only be accepted or rejected "in toto." On July 3, Mrs. Barrineau asked the Respondent for a counter and that its failure to do so would result in the Union's filing an unfair labor practice charge with PERC. Respondent's chief negotiator indicated that management's rights superseded employee rights except as specifically restricted by law. She testified that the only items which he considered negotiable were those items which were existing items or items which were covered by Respondent's policy. She testified that the principle area of discussion at that session dealt with grievance procedures and Dr. Moses informed the Union's negotiating team that their proposals were "so far out of line that they would not be either accepted or entertained." She testified that while the Union was willing to discuss item by item in their proposals and various counterproposals, the Employer indicated that all proposals had to be either totally accepted or rejected. The Union pressed for an informal grievance procedure and a more expeditious manner to resolve such but this was not forthcoming through negotiations. She expressed the opinion the "in toto" position urged by the Respondent was stifling the bargaining process and in her opinion, an attempt was being made to create an impasse. Regarding maternity and sabbatical leave, the discussion surrounding those areas were more regressive and restrictive than the existing policy. 11/ She testified that the Union agreed to accept the Respondent's dormant position regarding insurance in order to enable it to put insurance bids to various carriers. The Employer took a "no give" stance on the preamble and refused to allow employees a "choice of forums to resolve grievances." The next session which was held on July 9 was, according to Mrs. Barrineau, a discussion which largely centered around grievance procedure and sabbatical leave and that in the Unions opinion, the grievance procedure advanced by Respondent was "too detailed." For a detailed discussion on the grievance procedure, see Charging Party's Exhibit 31, which is a counter dealing with grievance procedure. During the next discussion, the witness testified that she expressed concern about the absence of insurance, sabbatical leave and teacher's retirement provisions, and that this was a subject to which the Employer refused to discuss.. The only items that the Employer would discuss were sabbatical leave and insurance. During the July 9 meeting, the Employer agreed to withdraw its insurance proposal. At the next session on July 14, the Union submitted its counterproposal no. 5, which was a regression from its earlier proposal regarding unpaid leave and grievance procedures and all other proposals were identical to its earlier submission and previously adopted position. 12/ Another session was held the following day, i.e., July 15, and the employer adopted the position of making responses only via written proposals and during that session, the Union changed its dues deduction proposal and incorporated a hold harmless clause for the Employer. Thereafter, the Union changed its position on the grievance procedure and advanced an informal one which in her opinion, provided for a more expedited procedure of resolving grievances. During that period from May 20 through mid-July, the parties had only agreed to three items. The Employer adopted a "no give" position regarding sabbatical leave. During a negotiating session on July 17, Dr. Moses appeared at the session approximately one and one-half hours late. At that meeting he submitted a counter which in essence stated that all issues which were "bargainable" had been discussed. She testified that the employer refused to submit counters on promotions, overtime, transfers, calendars, affect of class sizes and all other items. The Employer remained adamant regarding its position that dues deductions were subject to a $.50 deduction per card per employee and that she expressed the opinion that all other deductions were not subject to a like charge and, therefore, the administration charge for dues deduction was punitive in nature. She testified that at the July 17 meeting, the Respondent submitted its counterproposals 9 and 10 and that there were no changes regarding bargainable versus nonbargainable items. The proposals contained regressive language and that employees had to specifically state the reasons for taking personal leave. There were other changes in military and professional leave which deviated from and were more restrictive than existing policies. She testified that the dues deduction pursuant to the $.50 per card charge amounted to approximately $12,450.00 for the Union. The Employer submitted a proposal whereby the instructional personnel would work an 8-hour day which had the effect of increasing the normal work day and the lunch period was reduced to 20 minutes. The proposal contained no compensation allotments for overtime work and the Employer took the position that salary supplements were not negotiable. The Employer refused to change its attitude with regard to physical examinations, mileage allowances and the collective bargaining contracts would be printed at the Union's expense. There was no movement from the initial salary proposals submitted on April 23. During the period from July 1 through July 23, Respondent was unprepared approximately seven times and was late approximately nine times for bargaining sessions. On July 23, the Respondent submitted its counter no. 11 which changed the contract terms from one year to two years and the recognition clause also contained the provision deleting "the board and the association and added the State of Florida." On dues deduction, the employer agreed to recede from its earlier position adopted in its counter no. 10 by an amount totaling $50.00, i.e., the amount previously stated from $12,450.00 to $12,400.00. The proposal also contained a provision that Respondent reserved the right to establish those deductions which it considered to be voluntary deductions and that said right also included the "establishment of a reasonable set deduction, if in the opinion of the board such cost is necessary." All other items were consistent with those contained in its earlier counterproposal. 13/ On July 23 the Union declared impasse which was 60 days prior to the Respondent's budget submission date. At the time of the impasse, the parties had not reached agreement on: the insurance proposal, grievance procedures, sick leave, illness in line of duty, personal leave, sabbatical leave, general leave of absence, military leave, professional leave, visitation rights, dues deduction, preamble, maternity leave, as well as others. 14/ The parties scheduled their first mediation session on August 13, and it was scheduled to begin at 4:30 p.m. At that session, the Respondent's team was late by approximately two hours. The testimony is that the dues deduction costs submitted to the mediator was for a lump sum payable by the Union of $12,400.00. At that session, the Employer took the position that the subject of discharges was a nonnegotiable item. At the next meeting, on or about August 26, the Respondent's chief negotiator was late approximately two hours. On November 10, the Union requested a further session and Moses wired a message that he would not be available until November 15. The witness remained at the negotiating meeting on November 15 for approximately one hour and no negotiating official of Respondent appeared. The Employer remained adamant on positions wherein there was disagreement only as to language but not in principle. The parties agreed to a marathon bargaining session beginning November 28, and the sessions continued through November 30, at which time an agreement was tentatively reached by the parties, subject to ratification by the bargaining unit members. 15/ The unit members voted against ratification of Charging Party's Exhibit 46 which is the agreement entered into by the negotiating team and the Respondent's team on that same date. Included therein, is a salary proposal which amounts to a reduction in the previous school year salary of approximately 3.6 percent, i.e., $8,320.00 per annum versus $8,266.00. The Respondent refused to accede to most proposals submitted by the Union based on its stated claim that most were already provided for by law and thus that there was no need to incorporate such in a collective bargaining agreement. A member of the Respondent's negotiating team allegedly made the statement that "the teachers had nothing, that the school board had everything, that the school board could do what it desired regarding salaries. Additionally, it considered as nonnegotiable such matters as: dismissal, layoffs, evaluation, tenure, discipline for annual contract teachers and the scheduling of planning periods." Floating teachers, assignment of summer school teachers, problems regarding absence without leave and class size were also nonbargainable. Respondant's negotiating team also took the position that the effects of such items were also nonnegotiable. The chief spokesperson, Mrs. Barrineau, testified that her duties consisted primarily of carrying out speaking engagements regarding collective bargaining rights, effectuating collective bargaining policy for the Escambia Education Association, the certified bargaining agent, to settle disagreements within the collective bargaining team, to formulate policy, to issue news releases, to make civic speeches, to attend EEA workshops and to formulate a collective bargaining budget. She testified that the proposals resulted from a joint effort of EEA's collective bargaining team. She became actively engaged in the formulation of proposals on or about March 1. She testified that she made approximately seven phone calls during the period June 12 through June 26, in an effort to schedule a session with Respondent. At the August 14 meeting, the Respondent presented the impasse proposals to the FMCS mediator. As of September 25, the parties reached the figure of approximately $1300.00 for the cost of deducting dues pursuant to checkoff authorizations. Mr. Phillingem was called and testified that the file to which he earlier testified to contain Chapter 447 and the pertinent enabling statutes and the Department of Education Rules and Regulations in addition to proposals submitted by EEA, the certified bargaining agent, "blurb" sheets which are distributed and various other Union news letters. He testified that the school board's legal counsel is, to the best of his knowledge, associated with Muller & Mintz, a Miami law firm. Wallace S. Odom, the comptroller, testified that he is responsible for maintaining all financial data with regard to the school's budget. He is charged with maintaining accurate records and during fiscal year from October 1, thru September 30, there was a county wide reduction in teacher aides by approximately 110. He testified that there was no increase in salaries based on the status of incoming revenues. He testified that there has been an increase in the millage paid for property tax in and around Escambia County and that such increase is up to, according to his testimony, a full 8 mills. Fred Haushalter, EEA's Executive Director, testified that he monitors correspondence which comes through his office. He testified that the allowance for dues deductions during the months of June, July and August was achieved through negotiations and that the parties stipulated as to the amount of the cost for such deductions. He testified that the stipulation was reached on or about May 20, 1975. Thereafter during the remaining months of the school year, the parties entered into a stipulation whereby the cost of administration and dues deduction were set at a cost somewhere in the nature of $325.00 for the remaining three months. While the basic issues here can be simply stated, they are not susceptible of a short and simple answer: Did the Respondent negotiate with the Union in bad faith and with the intent of avoiding reaching agreement or conditioning agreement with the Union's acceptance of terms and conditions which the Respondent knew or should have known are unacceptable to any self respecting Union? The governing principles need not be set forth in exhaustive detail. Section 447, F.S., (the Act) defines collective bargaining and imposes upon the parties the duty to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment or the negotiation of and agreement, or any question arising thereunder... but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. " The Public Employees Relations Act which was largely patterned after the National Labor Relations Act, 29 USC 151 et seq, sets forth the yard stick which is contained in Section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act and provides that the measurement of "good faith" is not rigid but, necessarily is an elastic concept having meaning only in its application to the particular facts of a particular case. See for example N.L.R.B. v. American National Insurance Company, 343 U.S. 395, 410 (1952). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the second circuit stated in N.L.R.B. v. National Shoes, Inc., and National Syracuse Corporation, 208F 2d. 688, 691-692 (1953), the problem is essentially to determine from the record the intention of the state of mind of [the employer] in the matter of [his] negotiations with the Union. In this proceeding, as in many others, such a determination is a question of fact to be determined from the whole record. See also N.L.R.B. v. Reed and Prince Manufacturing Company, 205F. 2d.131, 134-135 (C.A. 1, 1953), cert. denied 346 U.S. 887 (1954). The National Labor Relations Board has repeatedly held that it is without authority to either directly or indirectly compel concessions or otherwise set in judgement upon substantive terms of a collective bargaining agreement. A necessary corollary to this principal is that just as the Act contains no authority to force an agreement when the parties have reached an impasse (N.L.R.B. v. The United Clay Mines Corporation, 219F. 2d 120, 126 (C.A. 6, 1955), so also refusal to bargain cannot he equated with refusal to recede from an announced position advanced and maintained in good faith. Division 1142, Amalgamated Association of Street Electric Railway and Motorcoach Employees of America, AFL-CIO (Continental Bus System v. N.L.R.B., 294F. 2d 264, 266 (C.A.D.C., 1961). Applying these principles to the facts here, it becomes apparent that based on the small movement and the repeated standoffs by Respondent, I am constrained to conclude that the Respondent here has failed to fulfill its obligation to bargain in good faith with the Union. Turning to the pertinent facts in this case, up to and including the point of "impasse", the Respondent refused to recede from its initial stand on inter alia, checkoff, seniority, grievance procedure, all types leave, assignment scheduling, shorter lunch periods, reduction in pay and longer work days. Based on this position, one would readily infer that the Respondent approached the table with a preconceived determination never to reach agreement on these issues and that it maintained this position during negotiations without doing anymore than listen to Union argument on those points. Thus, in effect it engaged in surface bargaining on those as well as other issues without any attempt to explore argument thereon with a sincere desire to reach agreement. The Respondent's chief negotiator approached the table with a cleverly concealed scheme of displaying a real and sincere attitude of negotiating which was carried on with sophistication and finesse and the mere making of concessions on some items was the very means by which he concealed a purposeful strategy to make bargaining futile or fail. Using this approach, the Respondent opened negotiations with an extremely high cost for the administration of dues deduction and then failed to recede from this position until the waining moments of the negotiating sessions and after the parties had gone through the lengthly process of calling in mediators which were costly to both parties. There was no meaningful change on its consideration of position on the mandatory subject of checkoff as provided in Section 447.303, Florida Statutes. Throughout the sessions, the Union brought out and repeated all its main arguments regarding checkoff, salary levels, scheduling assignments, grievance procedures, contract terms, health insurance coverage as well as other items which the record is replete with documentary evidence. The Respondent, according to the testimony, stood fast on various articles which it deemed to be nonbargainable throughout the negotiation and as the sessions progressed, its position hardened. These are mandatory bargaining subjects and the Respondent's failure to enter negotiations with an effort to reach agreement constitutes bad faith bargaining in violation of 447.501(c), Florida Statutes. One example of this unlawful conduct can be examined by consideration of the fact that during the previous school year, the Respondent agreed to deduct dues on a monthly basis and the cost of such deduction amounted to approximately $325.00 for a three month period whereas when it entered the negotiation table it started out with the "outrageous" figure of approximately $13,000.00 for the same service that it had earlier provided for a total cost of $1300.00 if projected over a one year period. The same can be said for the Respondent's adamant refusal throughout the negotiations to accede to minor language changes in the preamble and other matters which in its opinion, were matters already covered by other laws and therefore there was no need to incorporate such in a collective bargaining agreement. While not suggesting that the Act requires concession by either side during bargaining nor the surrender of convictions or alterations of philosophies provided such convictions or philosophies are not made operative in such manner as to foreclose bone fide consideration of bargainable issues, the repeated refusal to consider or counter when proposed with items which amounts to nothing more than language changes, such a position militates a finding that the employer approaches the bargaining table with the intent of reaching an agreement and/or to engage in good faith bargaining. While parties oft times approach the bargaining table and jockey for positions, there comes a time when there must be a sincere desire to reach agreement. Further support in this position can be found in the fact that the Union on numerous occasions made futile attempts to reach the Respondent's Chief negotiator. During one period during the negotiating sessions, the Union's chief spokesman testified that she made more than ten phone calls during a twelve day period and that at no time were her calls returned by the Respondent and/or its agents. This in the opinion of the undersigned evinces a practice on the part of the Respondent to engage in dilatory and evasive tactics designed to make the bargaining process a sham and fruitless process. For example, anti-discrimination clauses are customarily included in contracts whereas there are other specific laws which specifically provide for and cover such proscribed activity. The fact that a proposal is made to include such in an agreement does not detract from or otherwise modify from other existing laws covering the same procedure. Further support for the conclusion reached by the undersigned can he found in the fact that the Respondent's chief negotiator entered the negotiating sessions with the idea that all proposals submitted by the Respondent would be package proposals and that the Union could not accept part of a counter proposal put by the Respondent without completely accepting or rejecting the entire proposal. This is not to say that the parties cannot enter into negotiations and negotiate on an item by item basis but the adoption of an "in toto", or take it or leave it" policy is further indication of bad faith bargaining. This is of much significance here since Respondent refused to agree to insignificant or traditional items contained in collective agreements. See e.g., Big Three Industries, 201 N.L.R.B. No. 105. Another indicia of the negotiating process which is indicative of bad faith bargaining is the fact that after the Union had been certified for approximately 6 months, the Respondent without prior consultation with the Union, unilaterally indicated that dues deductions could only be effected on a lump sum basis which ultimately had the effect of forcing numerous employees to cancel their dues deduction authorizations. This statement is based on the credited testimony of several witnesses including Mrs. Barrineau and Mr. Price. Although the Respondent, during the course of the hearing, testified that the dues deductions were canceled or that attempts were made to get employees to execute new authorization forms, there is nothing in Florida Statutes which places such a burden on the Respondent. A careful reading of Section 447.303, Florida Statutes, indicate that such authorizations are revokable at the employee's will upon 30 days written notice to both the employer and employee organization. Based on the foregoing, I therefore conclude and find that the Respondent's negotiating team entered the table with no intent to fulfill their duty to bargain in good faith and that its actions in forcing employees to execute forms which call for the single deduction of Union dues was a deliberate attempt on its part to force mass withdrawals from the Union in an effort to undermine it.
Findings Of Fact The petition herein was dated January 9, 1975 by Petitioner, and was filed with PERC on January 17, 1975. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 1). The hearing was properly scheduled by notice dated March 26, 1975, and was conducted on April 17, 1975, by agreement of the parties. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 2, Tr. 10, 11). The Town of Palm Beach is a public employer within the meaning of Fla. Stat. Section 447.002(2). (Stipulation, Tr. 5, 6). The Town of Palm Beach Association of Firefighters, Local 1866, is an employee organization within the meaning of Fla. Stat. Section 447.002(10). (Stipulation, Tr. 6-8). During the course of the past five years, Petitioner has requested recognition, or has otherwise sought to engage in collective bargaining with the Public Employer on several occasions through written and oral communications. Most recently Petitioner sought recognition through letters dated December 28, 1974, and April 11, 1975. (Tr 85-240, Petitioner's Exhibits 1, 2). There is no contractual bar to holding an election in this case. (Stipulation, Tr. 9, 10). The parties have not engaged in collective bargaining under the auspices of the Public Employees Relations Act. The parties engaged in collective bargaining in a limited fashion prior to the passage of the Act. Efforts on Petitioner's part to engage in collective bargaining with the public employer began in 1969. (Tr. 85-240, Petitioner's Exhibits 1-23). Registration material delivered by Petitioner to PERC was dated January 7, 1975, and was received by PERC on January 13, 1975. Additional materials were received by PERC on February 10, 1975. PERC acknowledged receipt of the registration material on February 10, 1975. The Public Employer contended at the hearing that registration was not proper because the source of certain funds was not adequately revealed. PERC has previously concluded that registration was complete and proper. (PERC registration File No. 8G-OR-756-1044, TR 11-15, 22-27, 225-238; Hearing Officer's Exhibit 3; Petitioner's Exhibit 4). Petitioner filed the requisite showing of interest with its petition. The Public Employer has asserted that the showing of interest is not adequate, however, no evidence was presented to counter the administrative determination previously made by PERC. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 4; Tr 16, 17; Public Employer's Motion to Dismiss). There are between forty-five and fifty-five persons in the unit proposed by Petitioner. All of the employees within the proposed unit are engaged in firefighting and/or paramedical rescue operations. The employees within the proposed unit work the same twenty-four hours on duty, forty-eight hours off duty shift. They eat and sleep in the same area while on duty, and wear the same or similar uniforms. There is a significant amount of interchange in duties among the employees. Wages and other terms of employment, job and salary classifications are determined for all of the employees within the proposed unit in the same manner. The bargaining history indicates a firm desire on the part of the employees to belong to a unit such as Petitioner proposes. (Tr 148-151,298-345, 369-372). The Public Employer contends that the only appropriate unit would include all public safety employees. No direct testimony was offered in support of this contention. Direct and cross-examination of Petitioner's witnesses indicate that the fire department and other public safety departments do not generally work together. Firefighters do not perform police functions or lifeguard functions. Police and lifeguards do not perform fire department functions. There is no interchange of employees between the departments, although there was evidence presented that transfers between the departments do occur. (Tr 148-151, 298-345, 369-372). Fire lieutenants are the senior officers in charge of each shift at two of the Town's three fire stations. Captains are in charge of shifts at the headquarters fire station. Fire lieutenants have four persons working under them. Fire lieutenants work the same shift as the other firefighters, wear the same uniform with no adornment of any kind, perform the same daily duties such as cleaning equipment, and teaching or participating in classes and training exercises. They perform the same firefighting duties. The fire lieutenant is charged with filling out a log book, checking the roster, answering the radio, preparing training schedules, and filling out fire reports, which duties the other firefighters do not generally perform. The fire lieutenants fill out evaluation reports on personnel who work on their shifts. The personnel are graded numerically from one to ten in approximately twenty categories, e.g., public contact and taking directions. These reports form a part of the procedure through which an employee is granted or denied a merit pay increase or is granted or denied a promotion. If an employee who works under a lieutenant has a grievance, the lieutenant is the person to whom the grievance is first carried. The lieutenant is the person in charge of maintaining order at the fire station and is in charge of any fire operations until a senior officer arrives on the scene. The fire lieutenants report directly to fire captains. The lieutenant takes no direct roll, other than making reports, in hiring, firing, promotion or transferring employees. The lieutenant is not responsible for personnel administration nor for collective bargaining. He takes no roll in formulating or administering the budget. Lieutenants and captains do not perform any functions as a group. Lieutenant Walker indicated that he has never attended a meeting at which lieutenants and captains met as a group. If a lieutenant or a captain is absent from work, other personnel fill the position. Val Williams, a pumper/operator, has served as a captain for as long a period as two months. (Tr 248-296, 302-319, 315-332; Petitioner's Exhibits 24, 25, 26). Fire captains perform generally the same duties and fulfill the same rolls as fire lieutenants. Captains head the shifts at the headquarters stations. In addition to duties performed by lieutenants, captains conduct fire inspections, and serve as the next step in the chain of command above lieutenants. Captains answer directly to the assistant fire chief. (Tr 259-61, 334; Petitioner's Exhibits 24, 25, 26). Assistant fire chiefs are in charge of each shift for all three fire stations. They oversee the operations of each station, and visit each station on at least one occasion during the course of each shift. Assistant fire chiefs answer to the deputy chief; the deputy chief answers to the chief; the chief answers to the town manager. (Tr 265-66, Petitioner's Exhibits 24, 25, 26). Mobile Intensive Care Unit (MICU) attendants and driver/operators, and paramedic specialists work the same shifts and wear the same uniforms as firefighters. Each is paid approximately five percent more than a firefighter who has been employed for the sane period of time. Driver/operators answer fire calls, drive to the fire with a firefighter, and occasionally fight fires. They answer directly to lieutenants. Paramedic specialists answer directly to the deputy fire chief. Paramedic specialists receive extensive training apart from firefighting training. Paramedic specialists answer fire calls, but the testimony was not clear as to whether they are permitted to fight fires. Paramedic specialists do not perform any personnel administration or policy making roll. (Tr 333, 334, 346-358, 373-386). There are one clerk and one mechanic who work with the fire department. They apparently answer to the fire chief. Each works an eight hour day, five days weekly. They do not work directly with firefighters. (Tr 330- 333).
Findings Of Fact Thee PBA filed it's petition with PERC on April 17, 1975. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 1). The FOP filed it's petition with PERC on April 28, 1975. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 5). The hearing in these cases was scheduled by notice dated June 6, 1975. The two cases were consolidated for the purposes of the hearing by agreement of the parties. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 2, TA 4). The City of Tampa is a Public Employer within the meaning of Florida Statute s447.002(2). (Stipulation TA 5). The Hillsborough County Police Benevolent Association is an Employee Organization within the meaning of Florida Statutes 447.002(10). (Stipulation TA 5). The Florida State Lodge, Fraternal Order of Police is an Employee Organization within the meaning of Florida Statutes 447.002(10). (Stipulation TA 5). The PBA and the FOP have requested recognition as the exclusive bargaining agent of employees described in their respective petitions, and these requests have been denied by the Public Employer. (Stipulation TA 6). There is no contractual bar to the holding of an election in this case. (Stipulation TA 6). There is no bargaining history between the Public Employer and any members of the proposed bargaining units. (Stipulation TA 7). The PBA is properly registered with PERC. (Stipulation TA 7, Hearing Officer's Exhibit 3). The FOP is properly registered with PERC. (Stipulation TA 7, Hearing Officer's Exhibit 7). PERC has previously determined that the PBA filed the Requisite Showing of Interest with it's petition. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 4). No evidence was offered at the hearing to rebut this administrative determination. PERC has previously determined that the FOP filed the Requisite Showing of Interest with it's petition. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 8). No evidence was offered at the hearing to rebut this administrative determination. The parties stipulated and agreed that the position of Police Legal Advisor, the Chief of Police, the Assistant Chiefs of Police, or lieutenant colonels, and police majors should be excluded from any collective bargaining unit ultimately certified by PERC. (TA 8 - 10). The City of Tampa Police Department is organized into seven divisions consisting of Police Headquarters, two Uniform Districts, a Detective Division, a Tactical Division, a Services Division and an Administrative Division. Police Headquarters is commanded by the Chief of Police. A total of 12 sworn personnel work at headquarters. These are two lieutenant colonels or deputy police chiefs, an administrative sergeant, two administrative corporals, the Criminal Intelligence Unit, the Internal Affairs Unit, and the Police Legal Officer. The two Uniform Districts are organized in the same manner. Uniform District 1 covers roughly the western geographic half of the city, and Uniform District 2 covers the eastern half of the city. Each uniform district is commanded by a police major. The districts are divided into three shifts, each of which is commanded by a shift commander who holds the rank of police captain. There is a field commander who generally holds the rank of lieutenant and five to seven squads on each shift. The squads are commanded by a police sergeant and consist of one police corporal and nine police officers. Two of the police officers are designated field instructors. There are approximately 210 sworn personnel in each uniform district. The Detective Division is commanded by a police major. The function of the Detective Division is to conduct latent criminal investigations. There are four bureaus in the division. The Homicide Bureau, the Burglary Bureau and the Larceny Bureau are each commanded by a captain, with a sergeant as second in command. The Juvenile Bureau is commanded by a captain with a lieutenant second in command. One sergeant in the Juvenile Bureau commands the Missing Persons, Social Welfare, Police Athletic League, and Community Relations sections. Another sergeant commands the ten detectives who are assigned to the juvenile section. There are 82 sworn personnel in the Detective Division. The Tactical Division is commanded by a police major. It is composed of 3 major subdivisions: the Vice Control Bureau, the Police Air Service, and the Selective Enforcement Unit. The Vice Control Bureau is commanded by a captain with a lieutenant second in command. The Vice Control Bureau is divided into two squads, one responsible for lottery and beverage investigations, and one for narcotics investigations. Each of the squads is commanded by a sergeant. The Police Air Service is commanded by a police flight supervisor who is roughly equivalent in rank to a police captain. The assistant flight supervisor is second in command, and is roughly equivalent in rank to a police sergeant. The Selective Enforcement Unit is commanded by a captain with a lieutenant second in command. There are approximately 83 sworn personnel in the Tactical Division. The Services Division is commanded by a police major. Two bureaus compose the Services Division: the I.D. and Records Bureau and the Communications and Maintenance Bureau. Each bureau is commanded by a captain with a lieutenant as second in command. There are 42 sworn personnel in the Services Division. The Administrative Division is commanded by a major. Two bureaus comprise the division: Personnel and Training, and Budget Research. Each bureau is commanded by a captain. A bureau sergeant and a range sergeant command the two sections of the Personnel and Training Bureau. The Budget and Research Bureau has two sections: Property and Research commanded by a sergeant, and Payroll and Accounting which is staffed entirely by civilians. There are 27 sworn personnel in the Administrative Division. The majors who command the two Uniform Districts, the Detective Division and the Tactical Division, answer directly to the operation's lieutenant colonel, who answers to the Chief of Police. The majors who command the Services Division and the Administrative Division answer to the administrative lieutenant colonel, who answers to the Chief of Police. There are approximately 665 sworn personnel in the City of Tampa Police Department. The Chief of Police is the top management official in the City of Tampa Police Department. His responsibilities include, inter alia, establishing standards of conduct for police officers; supervising preparation of the departmental budget, and administering departmental expenditures in accordance with budget provisions; interpreting departmental rules, regulations, and policies to employees; and supervising the selection and development of new patrolmen. The Chief of Police has ultimate responsibility for hiring, firing, and promoting employees within the Police Department. The Chief conducts staff conferences on an as needed basis. Lieutenant colonels and majors attend these conferences. The staff formulates policy for the Chief's approval. It is anticipated that the staff would formulate collective bargaining procedure in the event that a bargaining unit is established, and will ultimately administer any collective bargaining agreement that is formulated. The parties stipulated and agreed that the Chief of Police should be excluded from any collective bargaining unit ultimately certified PERC. The two lieutenant colonels are also referred to as deputy chiefs of police. The administrative lieutenant colonel supervises the support functions of the department. The operations lieutenant colonel supervises the field activities. The lieutenant colonels make inspections of assigned operations to ascertain level of performance, review employee problems and insure that necessary steps are taken to maintain high morale, receive and dispose of complaints and report thereon to the Police Chief and review expenditures and assist the Chief in preparation of the annual budget estimates. The lieutenant colonels serve on the Police Chief's staff. At the hearing the parties stipulated and agreed that lieutenant colonels should be excluded from any collective bargaining unit ultimately certified by PERC. Police majors command the major divisions of the Police Department other than the Police Headquarters Division. Police majors are commonly referred to as the chief law enforcement officers. The major has the primary responsibility for the planning, coordination, and direction of activities and functions assigned to his division. He has supervisory control and direction of all members and employees assigned to his division. The major is required to make or cause to be made, inspections of all units, personnel, equipment and facilities under his command. The major is required to investigate, or cause to be investigated, any cases of apparent or alleged misconduct of his personnel and to prepare a report for review by the Chief of Police and the lieutenant colonel. The major takes whatever immediate disciplinary action is required. The major is responsible for making personnel assignments within his division. The major is charged with responsibility for preparing an annual budget estimate for his division, and he exercises control over disbursements of budgeted funds within his division. The major is required to report in writing to the Chief of Police any probationary officers who for any reason appear unfit or unqualified for police service, and to make recommendations concerning their continued employment. Majors serve on the Police Chief's staff. At the hearing the parties stipulated and agreed that majors should be excluded from any collective bargaining unit ultimately certified by PERC. Police captains plan, direct and coordinate the activities of a bureau, or are in command of a police shift. The police captain is responsible for directing and training personnel under his command, and assumes responsibility for occurrences on the shift. It is the police captain's duty to assure adequate performance by all assigned personnel. The captain assists in the selection and development of new patrolmen, and participates in the police training program. The captain recommends disciplinary action. He is responsible for the care and maintenance of all equipment, materials and facilities assigned to his command. Captains generally work at Police Headquarters, and have field duties only under unusual circumstances. Police captains can modify deployment of personnel under their command without further authority. Police captains attend the Chief's staff conferences in the absence of a major, or for special reporting purposes. The day-to-day activities undertaken by captains within the Police Department vary according to the particular assignment; however, the captains are interchangeable with one another. Standard Operating procedure Bulletins outlining the particular duties assigned to each police captain have been promulgated. These bulletins accurately describe the duties, responsibilities, and day-to-day activities of each police captain. These bulletins were received into evidence as Public Employer's Exhibits #12, 25, 29, 40, 47, 53, 55, 61, and 65. The Public Employer contends that police captains are managerial employees. The PBA is not seeking to include captains within it's proposed bargaining unit. The FOP is seeking to include police captains in a collective bargaining unit with lieutenants and sergeants. Police lieutenants are frequently referred to as field commanders, or field supervisors. They serve as supervisors in one of the major administrative functional areas. Police lieutenants exercise immediate supervision over uniform sergeants and patrolmen, and are responsible for overseeing activities in the field. A lieutenant in one of the Uniform Districts would supervise from 3 to 6 sergeants, and from 30 to 60 police officers. A police sergeant's reports and recommendations respecting disciplinary action are submitted to the captain through the lieutenant. The lieutenant can make independent recommendations respecting disciplinary action. A police lieutenant would typically spend from 1 to 3 hours weekly on discipline problems. When circumstances such as a large number of calls in a given zone warrant it, a lieutenant can make immediate decisions respecting the deployment of squads. The lieutenant is responsible for coordinating the activities of squads, and generally will make recommendations to the shift commander respecting deployment of personnel. The police lieutenants evaluate police sergeants, but not at regularly scheduled times. Lieutenants can place material in a sergeant's personnel file. Lieutenants wear a different uniform than officers with lower ranks. Lieutenants wear white shirts and blue slacks while other uniform personnel wear blue shirts and blue slacks. Lieutenants serve as captains during the latter's absence. In the Uniform Districts, this regularly occurs at least two days per week. In the absence of both the captain and a major, the lieutenant would serve as district commander. The lieutenant in the Services Division, I.D. and Records Bureau, serves as the bureau chief for an average of 5 to 6 weeks per year. The day-to-day activities of lieutenants will vary depending on the assignment; however, lieutenants are interchangeable with one another. Standard Operating Procedures Bulletins respecting lieutenants assigned to various bureaus and divisions have been promulgated. These bulletins accurately describe the duties, responsibilities, and day-to-day activities of the lieutenants. These bulletins were received into evidence as Public Employer's Exhibits #13, 14, 30, 48, 54, and 56. The Public Employer contends that lieutenants should not be included in a collective bargaining unit with rank and file personnel, but could be included in a unit of supervisory personnel with police sergeants. The PBA does not contend that lieutenants should be included in it's proposed unit. The FOP contends that lieutenants should be included in a unit of supervisory personnel including captains, lieutenants, and sergeants. Police sergeants serve as the immediate supervisors of police corporals, field instructors, officers, and detectives. Sergeants command squads within the department. The rank of sergeant is the first rank which is viewed by the department as an actual promotion. The ranks of corporal, field instructor, detective, and officer are viewed as assignments, although corporals, field instructors and detectives receive more pay than officers. Corporals and field instructors do frequently act as sergeants. Sergeants have close working relationships with the personnel in their squads, but do not perform precisely the same functions. On a typical day the sergeant will call the roll, read directives to the officers, check crime reports, perform additional administrative duties, then go into the field in a patrol car. The sergeant continues to supervise the officers, but he may perform some of the same duties that officers perform. Sergeants make the determination of which personnel within a squad perform which functions. Sergeants spend more time in the field than in their offices, but they answer far fewer calls and make far fewer arrests than do the officers. Sergeants wear a uniform consisting of blue slacks and a blue shirt. This is the same uniform worn by corporals, field instructors, and officers; however, sergeants wear gold badges and hat insignias rather than the silver worn by the lower ranking personnel. In the Detective Bureau sergeants serve as acting captain for approximately two to two and one half months per year. Sergeants occasionally serve as division commander within the detective division. A sergeant in the Detective Division does not investigate offenses. He examines reports of investigations, and if not satisfied instructs the detective as to what additional steps should be pursued. Sergeants regularly evaluate corporals, field instructors, officers, and detectives on forms which have been adopted by the department. The sergeant maintains a pending evaluation file for personnel under his supervision. An evaluation rendered by a sergeant cannot be changed, although the sergeant's recommendations may not be followed. Lieutenants, captains, and majors can make notations on the evaluation, but cannot change it. The sergeant's evaluation is reviewed with the officer. The sergeant and the lieutenant generally confer about the evaluation. The division commander, or major, reviews the evaluations and frequently discusses them with the officers who have been evaluated. Evaluations play some part in determining promotions. Promotions are determined 70 percent on the basis of a civil service test, 10 percent on the basis of seniority, and 20 percent on the basis of findings of an evaluation board appointed by the Chief. Sergeants can serve on the evaluation board, and the sergeant's evaluations are among the items considered by the board. In a sergeant's absence, a corporal would perform the evaluation. Disciplinary action against corporals, field instructors, officers or detectives is initiated by sergeants. The sergeant will make an initial determination as to whether disciplinary action is necessary. The sergeant might frequently counsel the officer rather than initiate disciplinary action. The sergeant will investigate the incidence and ultimately will make recommendations which go into the personnel file, and could be used in consideration of promotion. A sergeant's recommendations respecting discipline are not changed, although they are not necessarily followed. If an officer is tardy in arriving at work, the sergeant can send him home without pay and then initiate disciplinary action. The officer could lose a vacation day and the month's sick day. A sergeant can relieve an officer of duty for performing duties improperly or for being incapable of performing duties without prior authority. The sergeant would then initiate disciplinary action. The sergeants serve as the first step in the department's grievance procedure. If a sergeant does not resolve a grievance within 48 hours of submission, he will forward it up the chain of command. The sergeant's comments in a grievance matter become part of the grievance file. The sergeant's recommendations respecting grievances are not changed although they are not necessarily followed. Granting or denying unscheduled time off is initially the responsibility of the police sergeant. The police sergeant determines when comp time and vacation days can be taken, and this determination is not reviewable unless a grievance is initiated. Extra duty work is work which an officer can perform while off duty for extra pay. The sergeant authorizes or refuses requests for extra duty. Without prior approval, a sergeant can require that officers work overtime. The sergeant makes recommendations respecting which officers in his squad are assigned the designation field instructor. The sergeant's recommendation has always been followed in the recollection of each witness who testified. In a squad within the Uniform Districts, sergeants, corporals, field instructors and one other officer are permitted to use a department car. The sergeant makes the determination of which officer is permitted use of a car. Requests for transfer are submitted to sergeants. The sergeant makes the initial recommendation respecting request for transfer, and his recommendation is generally followed although the request is sent up the chain of command. Sergeants make recommendations respecting discharge and suspension, but they do not make the final decision. The day-to-day activities of a police sergeant will vary depending upon the particular assignment. Standard Operating Procedure Bulletins respecting each assignment which a sergeant might be given have been promulgated. These bulletins accurately describe the duties, responsibilities, and day-to-day activities of the assignments. These bulletins were received in evidence as Public Employer's Exhibits #15, 16, 26, 32, 36, 41, 49, 57, and 62. The Patrol and Traffic Divisions referenced in Public Employer's Exhibit #15 have been merged into the two Uniform Districts since the time that that bulletin was prepared. The sergeant assigned to the personnel and Training Bureau no longer performs the functions set out in paragraph 6 of Public Employer's Exhibit 62. The Public Employer contends that sergeants should not be included in any unit of lower ranking personnel, but could be included within a unit consisting of lieutenants and sergeants. The PBA contends that sergeants should be included within the unit described in it's petition. The FOP contends that sergeants should be included within a unit consisting of captains, lieutenants, and sergeants. The position of police corporal is not considered a permanent assignment. Police corporals serve as acting sergeant in the absence of the police sergeant. Standard Operating Procedures Bulletins respecting various assignments that a corporal might receive in the department have been promulgated. These bulletins accurately describe the duties, responsibilities, and day-to-day activities of police corporals. The bulletins were received in evidence as Public Employer's Exhibits #17, 18, 33, 38, and 50. The Public Employer, the PBA, and the FOP are in agreement that corporals should be included in any non-supervisory collective bargaining unit that might be certified by PERC. A police sergeant is assigned to the position of administrative sergeant. The administrative sergeant answers directly to the Chief of Police. Four police corporals are assigned the position of administrative corporal. One administrative corporal answers directly to the administrative lieutenant colonel, one answers directly to the operations lieutenant colonel, and two answer directly to the two majors assigned to the Uniform Districts. The administrative sergeant and the administrative corporals perform duties assigned by their supervisor. Generally all of the files, information, and correspondence available to the supervisor is available to the administrative sergeant and administrative corporal. This would include personnel files. The administrative sergeant and the administrative corporals occasionally investigate citizen complaints, and perform research respecting proposed changes in procedure. The administrative sergeants and corporals handle escort work, screen personnel coming into their supervisor's office, and receive telephone calls and correspondence. The person presently serving as administrative sergeant has been assigned to that position for some time. The administrative corporals are rotated. It is anticipated by the Chiefs the lieutenant colonels, and the majors, that the administrative sergeants and corporals will not reveal information that is available to them. The Police Air Service is commanded by a police flight supervisor. The police flight supervisor is roughly equivalent in rank to a police captain. The second in command is the assistant flight supervisor. The assistant flight supervisor is roughly equivalent in rank to a police sergeant. Standard Operating Procedure Bulletins respecting the positions of police flight supervisor and assistant police flight supervisor have been promulgated. These bulletins accurately describe the duties, responsibilities, and day-to-day activities of the police flight supervisor and the assistant flight supervisor. These bulletins were received in evidence as Public Employer's Exhibits #43, 44, and 46. The Criminal Intelligence Unit is headed by a police sergeant, who reports directly to the Police Chief. The Internal Affairs Unit is headed by a police lieutenant who answers directly to the Police Chief. The Criminal Intelligence Unit conducts investigations dealing with subversive activities and organized crime. The Internal Affairs Unit conducts investigations involving misconduct on the part of police personnel. When the need arises the personnel in the Criminal Intelligence Unit will assist the Interal Affairs Unit, and vice versa. Information gathered by these units are not distributed to anyone without the consent of the Police Chief. Personnel are assigned to these units by the Chief of Police on a rotating basis with the recommendation of the sergeant or lieutenant. It is probable that any investigations of illegal strike activity would be conducted by one of these units. There are approximately 151 unsworn personnel employed by the City of Tampa Police Department. Neither Employee Organization sought inclusion of unsworn personnel in their proposed bargaining units. The Public Employer agreed that unsworn personnel should not be included in any collective bargaining unit consisting of sworn personnel. Very little testimony was presented at the hearing respecting unsworn personnel. ENTERED this 5th day of January, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. G. STEVEN PFEIFFER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675
The Issue Whether Respondent's employment should be terminated for the reasons set forth in the Notice of Specific Charges.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: The School Board is responsible for the operation, control and supervision of all public schools (grades K through 12) and support facilities in Miami-Dade County. Respondent is employed by the School Board as a school bus aide. She is currently assigned to the John Schee Transportation Center. Respondent was initially hired by the School Board on September 8, 1992. She was terminated, effective October 31, 1995, for having been absent without authorization for three consecutive days. The School Board rehired Respondent on May 3, 2000, and assigned her to the Northwest Transportation Center. On October 11, 2002, Respondent was given her current assignment at the John Schee Transportation Center. As a school bus aide employed by the School Board, Respondent is a member of a collective bargaining unit represented by the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Local 1184 (AFSCME) and covered by a collective bargaining agreement between the School Board and AFSCME (AFSCME Contract). Article II, Section 3, of the AFSCME Contract provides, in pertinent part, as follows: ARTICLE II- RECOGNITION SECTION 3. The provisions of this Contract are not to be interpreted in any way or manner to change, amend, modify, or in any other way delimit the exclusive authority of the School Board and the Superintendent for the management of the total school system and any part of the school system. It is expressly understood and agreed that all rights and responsibilities of the School Board and Superintendent, as established now and through subsequent amendment or revision by constitutional provision, state and federal statutes, state regulations, and School Board Rules, shall continue to be exercised exclusively by the School Board and the Superintendent without prior notice or negotiations with AFSCME, Local 1184, except as specifically and explicitly provided for by the stated terms of this Contract. Such rights thus reserved exclusively to the School Board and the Superintendent, by way of limitation, include the following: . . . . (2) separation, suspension, dismissal, and termination of employees for just cause; . . . . It is understood and agreed that management possesses the sole right, duty, and responsibility for operation of the schools and that all management rights repose in it, but that such rights must be exercised consistently with the other provisions of the agreement. These rights include, but are not limited to, the following: A. Discipline or discharge of any employee for just cause; . . . . * * * Article XI of the AFSCME Contract is entitled, "Disciplinary Action." Section 1 of Article XI is entitled, "Due Process." It provides as follows: Unit members are accountable for their individual levels of productivity, implementing the duties of their positions, and rendering efficient, effective delivery of services and support. Whenever an employee renders deficient performance, violates any rule, regulation, or policy, that employee shall be notified by his/her supervisor, as soon as possible, with the employee being informed of the deficiency or rule, regulation, or policy violated. An informal discussion with the employee shall occur prior to the issuance of any written disciplinary action. Progressive discipline steps should be followed, however in administering discipline, the degree of discipline shall be reasonably related to the seriousness of the offense and the employee[']s record. Therefore, disciplinary steps may include: verbal warning; written warning (acknowledged); Letter of reprimand; Suspension/demotion; and Dismissal.[2] A Conference-for-the-Record shall be held when there is a violation of federal statutes, State Statutes, defiance of the administrator's authority, or a substantiated investigation to determine if formal disciplinary action should be taken (1.e., letter of reprimand, suspension, demotion or dismissal). A Conference-for- the-Record in and of itself shall not be considered disciplinary.[3] The parties agree that discharge is the extreme disciplinary penalty, since the employee's job, seniority, other contractual benefits, and reputation are at stake. In recognition of this principle, it is agreed that disciplinary action(s) taken against AFSCME, Local 1184 bargaining unit members shall be consistent with the concept and practice of progressive or corrective discipline and that in all instances the degree of discipline shall be reasonably related to the seriousness of the offense and the employee's record. The employee shall have the right to Union representation in Conferences-for-the- Record held pursuant to this Article. Such a conference shall include any meeting where disciplinary action will be initiated. The employee shall be given two days' notice and a statement for the reason for any Conference-for-the-Record, as defined above, except in cases deemed to be an emergency. A maximum of two Union representatives may be present at a Conference-for-the Record. The Board agrees to promptly furnish the Union with a copy of any disciplinary action notification (i.e., notice of suspension, dismissal, or other actions appealable under this Section) against an employee in this bargaining unit. Section 2 of Article XI is entitled, "Dismissal, Suspension, Reduction-in-Grade." It provides as follows: Permanent employees dismissed, suspended, or reduced in grade shall be entitled to appeal such action to an impartial Hearing Officer or through the grievance/arbitration process as set forth in Article VII of the Contract. The employee shall be notified of such action and of his/her right to appeal by certified mail. The employee shall have 20 calendar days in which to notify the School Board Clerk of the employee's intent to appeal such action and to select the method of appeal. If the employee when appealing the Board action, does not select the grievance/arbitration process as set forth in Article VII of the Contract[,] the Board shall appoint an impartial Hearing Officer, who shall set the date and place mutually agreeable to the employee and the Board for the hearing of the appeal. The Board shall set a time limit, at which time the Hearing Officer shall present the findings. The findings of the Hearing Officer shall not be binding on the Board, and the Board shall retain final authority on all dismissals, suspensions, and reductions-in-grade. The employee shall not be employed during the time of such dismissal or suspension, even if appealed. If reinstated by Board action, the employee shall receive payment for the days not worked and shall not lose any longevity or be charged with a break in service due to said dismissal, suspension, or reduction-in-grade. Non-reappointments are not subject to the grievance/arbitration procedures. Section 4 of Article XI is entitled, "Types of Separation." It provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Dissolution of the employment relationship between a permanent unit member and the Board may occur by any four [sic] distinct types of separation. Voluntary-- . . . . Excessive Absenteeism/Abandonment of Position-- An unauthorized absence for three consecutive workdays shall be evidence of abandonment of position. Unauthorized absences totaling 10 or more workdays during the previous 12-month period shall be evidence of excessive absenteeism. Either of the foregoing shall constitute grounds for termination. An employee recommended for termination under these provisions shall have the right to request of the Chief Personnel Officer for Human Resources a review of the facts concerning the unauthorized leave. Such right shall exist for a period of up to 10 working days after the first day of notification of the unauthorized absence.[4] Disciplinary-- The employee is separated by the employer for disciplinary cause arising from the employee's performance or non-performance of job responsibilities. Such action occurs at any necessary point in time. Non-reappointment-- . . . . AFSCME, Local 1184 bargaining unit members employed by the school district in excess of five years shall not be subject to non- reappointment. Such employee may only be discharged for just cause. Layoff-- . . . . As a School Board employee, Respondent is obligated to act in accordance with School Board "rule[s], regulation[s], and [p]olic[ies]. If she does not, she may be disciplined pursuant to the AFSCME Contract.5 Among the School Board's "rule[s]" are School Board Rule 6Gx13-4A-1.21 and School Board Rule 6Gx13-4E-1.01. School Board Rule 6Gx13-4A-1.21 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Permanent Personnel RESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTIES I. EMPLOYEE CONDUCT All persons employed by The School Board of Miami-Dade County, Florida are representatives of the Miami-Dade County Public Schools. As such, they are expected to conduct themselves, both in their employment and in the community, in a manner that will reflect credit upon themselves and the school system. * * * School Board Rule 6Gx13-4E-1.01 addresses the subject of "[a]bsences and [l]eaves." It provides, in pertinent part, that, "[e]xcept for sudden illness or emergency situations, any employee who is absent without prior approval shall be deemed to have been willfully absent without leave." School Board bus drivers and aides are governed by the following "[a]ttendance [p]olicy" set forth in the School Board Transportation Department's Handbook for Drivers, Aides and Operations Staff: Drivers and aides are expected to be prompt and punctual in their attendance on all workdays in accordance with the current calendar and their assigned schedule, and their contract. AUTHORIZED ABSENCES For absences to be authorized, they must be reported to the driver's or aide's Transportation Center Dispatch Office in advance. This notice shall be made at the earliest possible time, but no later than before the next scheduled report time. Even in an emergency, every possible effort must be made to inform the Dispatch Office. The supervisory staff evaluates the driver's adherence to this rule. Intent to return should be treated in the same manner. Leave forms must be completed promptly for payroll purposes. UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCES Unauthorized absences are subject to disciplinary action as prescribed under existing labor contracts. If a driver or aide does not report to work within 15 minutes after the scheduled report time, or does not call in absent before the report time, the absence will be considered unauthorized. If time off is taken during a regular working school day without a supervisor's approval, this absence may also be considered unauthorized. Additionally, any employee who does not have available sick/personal time may be charged with an unauthorized absence. NOTIFICATION OF ABSENCES -Drivers and aides must notify their Transportation Center[']s Dispatch Office as soon as they have determined they cannot report to work. Drivers are not to make arrangements on their own for a substitute. All arrangements must be made by the Dispatch Office. -If a driver will not be reporting for work on regular school days, the driver must call in immediately and speak with the Dispatcher, or the Field Operations Specialist. -If a driver cannot report to work because of an emergency situation, the driver must contact the Dispatch Office as soon as possible. If the situation requires a driver to leave the area, the driver should have a relative or friend contact the office for the driver. -If the absence will occur sometime in the future, the Dispatch Office should be given as much advance notification as possible. -When the Dispatch Office is contacted, an explanation for the absence should be given along with the length of absence and estimated date of return. -If the driver is off from work for more than one day, the driver must contact the office each day, prior to the report time, with a complete update of the situation. The only times the driver does not have to contact the office on a daily basis are as follows: -Admission to a hospital as a patient -Maternity leave -A doctor's work release for a specified number of days -Extended sick leave -Approved leave of absence -Out of town CHECK-IN POLICY -All employees are expected to arrive at work on or before their scheduled report time. -Drivers and aides will be given a five minute grace period to report to work, during which no disciplinary nor financial actions will be taken. For example, if the driver or aide is scheduled to report for work at 6:00 a.m., but signs-in by 6:05 a.m., the driver or aide will be allowed to go out on the assigned route with no repercussions. -Drivers and aides who report to work 6-15 minutes after the scheduled report times will be considered "tardy." Tardy drivers and aides will be permitted to work. However, the dispatch may assign a stand-by or substitute driver or aide to the route of the tardy employee. Drivers and aides who are more than 10 minutes late, but less than 16 minutes late, will be used as substitute drivers and aides and will not be allowed to operate their regularly assigned route. For the tardy driver or aide who was replaced by a substitute or stand-by driver or aide, such driver or aide will then be assigned as substitute for other routes needing coverage, as requirements dictate. A record will be kept documenting all tardiness. Lost time will be accumulated for tardiness and employees will be docked pay in 1/2 day increments. -Drivers and aides who report to work 16 or more minutes after the scheduled report time will be considered "absent without leave" (AWOL). These persons will not be permitted to work. They will be placed on "unauthorized leave-without pay" (ULWOP) and will be subject to disciplinary action in accordance with the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) Collective Bargaining Agreement -Extenuating circumstances will be evaluated by the Center Director and, upon proper documentation, may not be held against the employee. Repeated occurrences, such as "car broke down for the third time this week," will not be considered extenuating. DOCUMENTATION It is the responsibility of the drivers and aides to report to the supervisor in order to complete and/or produce all required paperwork related to the absence on the first workday upon return to work. Failure to comply with this procedure may result in an unauthorized absence regardless of extenuating circumstances. During the time she has been assigned to the John Schee Regional Transportation Center, Respondent has had a history of poor attendance, which has adversely impacted the operations of the center. On February 21, 2003, Respondent was issued a verbal warning for an unauthorized absence. On March 20, 2003, Respondent was issued the following written warning regarding her attendance by Dr. Michael Exelbert, a Coordinator III at the John Schee Regional Transportation Center: Payroll records indicate that you have accrued 7 days of Unauthorized Leave Without Pay and/or Tardies. Records indicate you were verbally warned regarding this issue on Feb. 21, 2003. Article V, Section 27 of the contract between Miami-Dade County Public Schools and AFSCME 1184 states: "Unauthorized Absence - Any absence without pay which has not been requested by the employee and approved by the supervisor, in writing, at least five days in advance. Absences of the employee, where notice of absence is made prior to the start of the workday, but are not covered by the employee having accrued sick or personal leave, shall be charged as unauthorized absence and may result in disciplinary action in accordance with Article XI." Article XI, Section 4B of the contract between Miami-Dade County Public Schools and AFSCME 1184 states: "Excessive Absenteeism/Abandonment of Position - An unauthorized absence for three consecutive workdays shall be evidence of abandonment of position. Unauthorized absences totaling 10 or more workdays during the previous 12-month period shall be evidence of excessive absenteeism. Either of the foregoing shall constitute grounds for termination. An employee recommended for termination under these provisions shall have the right to request of the Deputy Superintendent for Personnel Management and Services a review of the facts concerning the unauthorized leave. Such right shall exist for a period of up to 10 working days after the first day of notification of the unauthorized absence." Section 9 of the M-DCPS, Department of Transportation Handbook for Drivers, Aides and Operations Staff addresses the department's Attendance Policy. It states: " Drivers and aides are expected to be prompt and punctual in their attendance on all workdays in accordance with the current calendar and their assigned schedule, and their contract." This section addresses: 9.1-Authorized Absences, 9.2-Unauthorized Absences, 9.3- Notification of Absences, and 9.4-Check-In Policy. You are instructed to review this section of your handbook. Deficient performance exhibited by the accrual of unauthorized absences and/or tardiness negatively impacts the department, coworkers and the educational program of the students we serve. This behavior is unacceptable and must be corrected by reporting to duty when scheduled and reporting on time. With this memorandum, you are warned that future occurrences of Unauthorized Absences and/or Tardies will lead to progressive disciplinary action compliant with District policies and procedures and the contract between M-DCPS and AFSCME Local 1184. Be advised M-DCPS has a District Support Agency that may be able to assist you regarding attendance deficiencies and can be reached at . . . . You are encouraged to contact them for assistance in regards to your attendance deficiencies. Please contact me if additional information is required. Respondent signed this written warning, acknowledging receipt thereof, on March 26, 2003. On October 23, 2003, Mr. Exelbert held a conference- for-the-record with Respondent to discuss "attendance requirements." The following day, Mr. Exelbert prepared a memorandum in which he summarized what had transpired at the conference. The memorandum read as follows: A Conference-For-The-Record was held in my office on Thursday, October 23, 2003. You were asked if you were a member of the Union. You indicated that you were, but did not seek representation. Present at the meeting was Cynthia Brown, Bus Attendant, and this administrator. You were told the purpose of today's conference was to review attendance requirements. You were given a copy of the Notification of this Conference-For-The-Record. You acknowledged receiving and signing receipt for today's Conference-For-The-Record. You also received: a copy of all LWOP-U absences since your written warning and a copy of your M-DCPS screen 026 leave status dates. You received a Verbal Warning about your LWOP-U absences on February 21, 2003, and a written warning about you[r] LWOP-U absences on March 20, 2003. During those meeting the following LWOP-U absences were discussed. November 22(D), 2002. December 05(A), 06(D), 09(D), 10(D), 11(D), 20(P), 2002. February 04(P), 06(A), 11(A), 13(A), 14(P), 20(D), 24(D), 25(A), 2003. March 06(A), 10(D), 11(D), 12(D), 13(D), 2003. For today, the following LWOP-U attendance days since the Written Warning on March 20, 2003 were discussed: March 27(A), 2003. April 11(D), 17(A), 21(A), 23(D), 24(D), 2003. May 09, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 27, 28, 29, 30, 2003 (ALL Days). June 02, 03, 04, 05, 2003 (ALL Days). August 26(A), 29(A), 2003. September 04(A), 05(A), 11(A), 2003. A total of fifty occurrence of LWOP-U The seriousness of missing work and good attendance was discussed. You were given copies of Section 9 (Attendance Policy) from the Handbook of School Bus Drivers, Aides and Operations Staff. You indicated that you would bring documentation to change the unexcused absences of: April 11, 17, 21, 23, 24, 2003, May 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 27, 28, 29, 30, 2003, June 02, 03, 04, 05, 2003, (due to medical problems that you experienced at those times), and that you could bring in other documentation for: August 26, 29, 2003 and September 04, 05, 11, 2003, as a result of domestic problems you experienced at those time, from unacceptable to LWOP-A. You were asked if you had any other comments. You indicated that by Friday, October 31, 2003, you would bring in additional documentation for other dates listed above. You were told that this case would now be sent to Mr. George C. Millar, Director of the John Schee Regional Transportation Center and possibly to the Office of Jerry Klein, District Director, Department of Transportation Administration for further review. You were told that a summary would be prepared of today's session. You were apprised of your right to append, to clarify, or to explain any information recorded in this conference, by this Summary. You were asked to review this summary on Monday October 27, 2003, after 8:30AM, in Gail Allen, the Executive Secretary's Office. Respondent signed this memorandum, acknowledging receipt thereof, on October 29, 2003. Mr. Exelbert referred Respondent to the School Board's Employee Assistance Program for help in dealing with problems affecting her attendance. George Millar, the Director of the John Schee Regional Transportation Center, held a conference-for-the-record with Respondent on February 13, 2004. On February 17, 2004, Mr. Millar prepared a memorandum in which he summarized what had transpired at the conference. The memorandum read, in pertinent part, as follows: * * * CONFERENCE DATA It was stated that over the previous 12- month period, excluding summer, you have accrued 35.5 days of unauthorized absences. It was noted that several days previously unauthorized had been changed to authorized with a current net total of 35.5 days . . . . It was noted that the 35th day does not show on the report because the pay period just closed. A review of the record showed the following incidences attempting to assist you improve your attendance: Verbal Warning - February 21, 2003 Written Warning - March 20, 2003 . . . Conference for the Record - October 23, 2003 . . . . District Support Agency Referral - October 23, 2003 . . . . You were asked to present any additional documentation or response to address the issues presented. You stated that you were ill at the end of last year and you brought documentation. During a portion of that time you were hospitalized. You were instructed to submit documentation and it would be reviewed and considered for changing the identified absences to authorized. Your AFSCME Representatives were asked if they had any comment, Mr. Houghtaling said no. Action Taken The following section of the contract between Miami-Dade County Public Schools and AFSCME Local 1184 and Department of Transportation Handbook were reviewed and you acknowledged understanding their meaning and intent Article V, Section 27 . . . . Article XI, Section 4, Paragraph B . . . . Section 9 Attendance - M-DCPS, Department of Transportation Handbook for Drivers, Aides and Operations Staff . . . . The following instructions were given at the conference: Report for duty each day and shift that you are scheduled to work. Call in or submit a leave card in advance of your reporting time when you intend to be absent. Present documentation for absences not covered by accrued leave time to this administrator or Dr. Michael Exelbert upon your return to duty. Conclusion You were instructed that this conference would be summarized and forwarded to the Administrative Director, Department of Transportation, and the Office of Professional Standards for review and subsequent disciplinary action as merited. You were informed of your right to appendage (provide a written statement), which will be attached to the conference summary if you feel any facts or information is misrepresented or statements omitted which occurred during the conference. You will have 24 hours from receipt of the conference summary to submit this appendage. These statements concluded the conference. Respondent signed this memorandum, acknowledging receipt thereof, on February 24, 2004. Barbara Moss, the School Board's Office of Professional Standards' District Director, held a conference- for-the-record with Respondent on March 16, 2004, to discuss Respondent's absenteeism and her "future employment status" with the School board. In the 12-month period prior to this conference, Respondent had been absent a total of 72 days and had 33.5 days of unauthorized absences. On March 24, 2004, Ms. Moss prepared and furnished Respondent a memorandum in which Ms. Moss summarized what had transpired at the conference. In those portions of the memorandum addressing the "action taken" and the "action to be taken," Ms. Moss wrote the following: Action Taken You were advised of the availability of services from the District's support referral agency. The following directives are herein delineated which were issued to you during the conference concerning future absences: Be in regular attendance and on time. Intent to be absent must be communicated directly to Mr. George Millar or designee. Absences for illness must be documented by your treating physician and a written medical note presented to Mr. Millar or designee upon your return to the site. Failure to comply will result in the absence being recorded as Leave Without Pay, Unauthorized (LWOU). During the conference, you were directed to comply and provided with a copy of School Board Rules 6Gx13-4A-1.21, Responsibilities and Duties, and 6Gx13-4E-1.01, Absences and Leaves. You are advised of the high esteem in which employees are held and of the District's concern for any behavior, which adversely affects this level of professionalism. Action TO Be Taken You were advised that the information presented in this conference, as well as subsequent documentation, would be reviewed with the Assistant Superintendent in the Office of District Compliance Units, the Administrative Director of Transportation, and the Director of [the] John Schee Transportation Center. Upon completion of the conference summary, a legal review by the School Board attorneys will be requested. Receipt of their legal review with endorsement by the Chief Communications Officer, will compel formal notification of the recommended disciplinary action. All disciplinary actions will be consistent with the concepts and practice of progressive or corrective discipline. The degree of discipline shall be reasonably related to the seriousness of the offense and the employee's record. You were apprised of your right to clarify, explain, and respond to any information recorded in this conference by this summary, and to have any such response appended to your record. At its June 16, 2004, meeting, the School Board "took action to suspend [Respondent] and initiate dismissal proceedings against [her]."
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the School Board issue a final order sustaining Respondent's suspension and terminating her employment with the School Board pursuant Article XI, Section 4B, of the AFSCME Contract. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of March, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of March, 2005.
Findings Of Fact JURISDICTION The Respondent, a Public Employer, has its principal place of business in the City of Winter Haven, Polk County, Florida, where it is engaged in the business of providing municipal services. Respondent is created directly by the Florida Constitution, a legislative body, and is administered by individuals who are responsible to public officials and/or the general electorate. On the foregoing facts I find that Respondent is a Public Employer within the meaning of Section 447.203(2), hereinafter referred to as the Act. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The Charging Party is now, and has been at all times material herein, an employee organization within the meaning of Section 447.203(10) of the Act. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES Introduction On or about May 28, 1975, the Commission issued a written certification certifying the charging party as the exclusive bargaining representative for firemen and fire engineer drivers employed by the City of Winter Haven. On or about January 27, 1975* the parties commenced collective bargaining negotiations. On or about May 28, the parties reached impasse. On or about July 31 and August 14, the parties met with the Special Master, and on September 18, the employer approved the Special Master's report. On September 19, the City Manager, Mr. W. D. Fultz, sent a letter to the Chairman of the Commission, Curtis L. Mack, and to the Association, stating that the Respondent had accepted the Special Master's Report without any changes and that the Respondent was enclosing the contractual provisions to the union to be added to those provisions to which the parties had tentatively agreed. Additionally, the Respondent, upon ratification by the bargaining unit, agreed to execute and adopt the agreements with approval from the City Commission. On or about September 25, the City Manager, prior to formal action by the City Commission, notified Mr. Mack and the Association that the Respondent was revoking its prior approval of the agreement submitted to the Association. The following day, September 25, the Association notified Respondent that the bargaining unit employees had ratified the contractual agreement that was sent by Respondent to the Association for ratification. On October 2, the Association attempted to sign the ratified agreement and the Respondent refused to do so. During the course of the negotiations, the Respondent was represented in collective negotiations by its agent, Paul Pothin and L. D. Woodard who, according to the pleadings, had the authority to enter into and negotiate on behalf of Respondent. The transmittal letter forwarded to PERC's Chairman stated, in pertinent part, that: "Therefore, I have this day furnished enclosed 'Contractual Provisions' to the Union to be added to those provisions to which the parties have tentatively agreed. Subsequent to ratifi- cation by local membership, the City agrees to enter into and execute the agreement in whole. Absent such ratification, it is our intention to implement all economic improvements guaran- teed by the agreement as a sign of good faith to our employees." The agreement transmitted from the City to the Employee Organization contained articles concerning both merit increases and salary increases. According to the evidence, the City's chief negotiator, Paul Pothin, was in agreement with the Special Master's Report until the morning of September 25. He apparently became unhappy with the report after the City became informed that a survey conducted by or on behalf of the Special Master revealed that the Respondent's firemen were making approximately 4.7 percent less than the Cities in the local operating area. With this information, Pothin contacted the City Manager who, in turn, sent a letter to the Employee Organization seeking to revoke his prior approval by letter dated September 25, 1975. The Employee Organization, on the evening of September 25, ratified the previously agreed to articles and notified the City of that action on the following day, September 26. On October 2, Messrs, Motes and Clifford Lewis, agents of the Charging Party, visited the Respondent's City Managers in an effort to sign the agreement to no avail. When the City Manager refused to sign the contract as submitted, the Charging Party offered to submit the question in issue to the grievance procedure under the contract, which the City rejected, and state that they did not feel compelled to sign the agreement. It is the Charging Party and the General Counsel's position that under Florida Law, the City Manager cannot unilaterally revoke a prior commission action. Citing State ex rel. McIver v. Swank, 12 So.2d 605, Ramsey v. City of Kissimmee, 19 So.2d 474, Brown v. City of St. Petersburg, 53 So.141. The Respondent, on the other hand, takes the position that it revoked this offer prior to acceptance by the union and therefore it cannot be bound by an offer that contains an error when the other party is notified of such error prior to acceptance. Accordingly, Respondent takes the position that by failing to execute the document which did not represent its intent, such act cannot be evidence of an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Florida Statutes 447.501. Therefore the Respondent urges that the Complaint be dismissed. ANALYSIS, DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION Section 447.309, F.S. states in essence that any collective bargaining agreement reached by the negotiators shall be reduced to writing and such an agreement shall be signed by the chief executive officer and bargaining agent. Additionally, Section 447.501(1)(c) states that an employer commits an unfair labor practice by refusing to sign a final agreement agreed upon with the certified bargaining agent for the public employees in the bargaining unit. These are the guiding statutes which control resolution of the issue posed in this case. The facts here show that when the union received the certification, the parties commenced negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement and met on approximately six different negotiating meetings in an attempt to reach a full collective bargaining agreement. The parties reached impasse on a number of items and being unable to resolve the deadlock on the impasse items, the parties called in a Special Master, Dr. James J. Sherman, Professor of Industrial Relations, University of South Florida. (The Special Master's Report was received into evidence and made a part hereof by reference.) Contained in the Special Master's Report was a provision dealing with wages wherein the Special Master arrived at a figure based on a study conducted of all fire departments in the Winter Haven area. The salary contained in his recommendation was that employees covered by the certified appropriate unit shall be paid a rate of no less than $8,089 per year. He further recommended that the City agree to pay the employees covered by the agreement "the average salary increase" granted for cities in the "local operating area" effective October 1, 1975. Pursuant to a special commission meeting held on September 18, 1975, and approved by the City Commission of the City of Winter Haven, Florida, in regular session on October 1, 1975, the City Commission met and Commissioner George L. Harris moved for adoption of the findings, opinions, and awards of the Special Master. This act was seconded by Commissioner George L. Harwick. The Commissioners unilaterally agreed to adopt the economic benefits contained in Special Master's award provided the union did not ratify such by October 1 such that the City could implement them by the same date. Mr. Pothin, the City's Labor Consultant, presented the findings, opinions, and awards and recommended adoption of such by the City. These recommendations were relayed to the union by letter and a copy sent to Curtis L. Mack, PERC's Chairman, and the union members voted to ratify the Special Master's Report as prepared by Mr. Pothin which contained the awards and findings of the Special Master. The ratification vote occurred on September 25. Earlier that same day, Pothin and the City Manager sent a letter to the union revoking the prior letter which indicated the City had formally approved the findings of the Special Master as embodied by the transmittal letter and contract to the union. The union advised the City of such ratifzzz ication on September 26 and on October 2, Mr. Motes, along with Clifford Lewis, visited City Hall in an attempt to obtain the City Manager's signature on the agreement. The City refused and the union attempted to invoke the grievance procedure contained in the contract whereupon the Respondent rejected stating that they did not feel compelled to sign the agreement and further, that the grievance machinery was not operative inasmuch as there was no contract containing such grievance arbitration machinery. It is clear that parties are required to bargain in good faith for employees contained in a certified appropriate unit with the certified bargaining agent and attempt to embody such agreement in a final form and reduce it to writing when such an agreement is entered into. Section 447.501(c) F.S. The evidence here reveals that the City initially agreed to adopt the Special Master's findings and later attempted to renege on this action once it noted that the current wages for the unit employees was approximately 4.7 percent lower than those salaries recommended by the Special Master. However, in doing so, the withdrawal of the acceptance did not meet the authorization required in a commission manager form of government. Thus there was no proof that the City Manager alone had the authority to rescind the prior action entered into by the City Commissioners as far as this record reveals. It is clear that the recommendation that the Special Master's award be adopted took place at an open meeting of the commissioners whereupon they formally agreed to adopt the Special Master's findings. There was no further evidence indicating that the City Commissioners formally rescinded this action by a special meeting or any other formal action. Nor was there any other showing of any form of ratification of the acts of the City Manager wherein he attempted to repudiate the agreement entered into by the full commission at the special commission meeting held on September 18 and formally adopted by a regular meeting held October 1, 1975. Based on the above, it is concluded that the action of the City Manager on September 18 was not authorized by the full city commission and therefore the actions taken by him were incomplete and unauthorized. See for example, Brown v. City of St. Petersburg, 153 So. 141; Ramsey v. City of Kissimmee, 190 So. 474. Accordingly the city's failure to implement the agreement submitted to the union on September 9, 1975, resulted in a refusal to bargain within the meaning of Section 447.501(a)(c). Based on the above I find that the actions of the respondent set forth above amounted to bad faith bargaining by attempting to repudiate its previously agreed to article concerning wages. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and on the entire record in this case, I make the following:
Recommendation I therefore recommend that the Respondent be required to implement the provisions of the agreement to which it previously agreed to concerning wages and all other terms contained therein. DONE and ORDERED this 6th day of July, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Findings Of Fact The following quoted provisions of the joint stipulations of fact entered into by the parties, as attached to this recommended order, constitutes the underlying evidential facts to be considered by the undersigned in deliberating the charges in this case. The exhibits mentioned in the quoted provision may be found as a part of the attached joint stipulations of fact and exhibits, which have been made a part of the record herein. The quotation is as follows: JOINT STIPULATIONS OF FACT The charge herein attached as cumulative exhibit #1 was filed by the Charging party on October 21, 1976 and a copy was simultaneously served on Respondent. Pursuant to Florida Administrative Rule 8H-4.03 a copy of the charge is hereby attached. The trial and presentment of the above-captioned cause was assigned to Rodney W. Smith, attorney for the Charging Party on or about February 25, 1977. Respondent is a public employer within the meaning of F.S. 447.203(2) and has its principal place of business in the City of Jacksonville, Duval County, Florida where it is engaged in the business of operating a consolidated municipal government. Respondent is created directly by the legislature of the State of Florida so as to constitute a consolidated government administered by individuals who are responsible to public officials and/or the general electorate. Charging Party is now and has been at all times material herein an employee organization within the meaning of 447.203(l0) of the Act. On March 4, 1976 Respondent filed a PETITION FOR CERTIORARI with the opinion that said petition would stay the "proposed CERTIFICATION ORDER by the Public Employees Relations Commission until final determination of the case was resolved. On or about May 18, 1976 the Public Employees Relations Commission issued a CERTIFICATION ORDER certifying the Charging Party as the exclusive bargaining representative for the Public Employees in the following unit: INCLUDED: Firefighters Lieutenants Captains Employed by the City of Jacksonville Fire Department EXCLUDED: All officers above the rank of captain employed by the City of Jacksonville Fire Department and all other employees of the City of Jacksonville On or about June, 1976 the Respondent filed an APPEAL of the above- stated certification order by PETITION FOR REVIEW in the First District Court of Appeal in and for the State of Florida. At no time was a stay of the certification order sought or obtained by the Respondent. Although the CERTIFICATION ORDER was challenged by PETITION FOR REVIEW, the Charging Party has been the certified representative for purposes of collective-bargaining of all public employees in the unit described in the above paragraph since May 18, 1976. It has been the continuous policy, and most recently by special ordinance, for the City of Jacksonville to extend dues- deductions to firefighters, lieutenants and captains authorizing such deductions since on or about 1969. This policy of extending dues-deductions to captains, lieutenants and firefighters has continued at all times until October 15, 1976. On October 15, 1976 the biweekly paychecks of the captains (sic) and lieutenants employed by the, Respondent did not reflect the usual dues- deduction. The Charging Party was notified of the City's intention to discontinue dues-deductions for the employees "in the ranks of lieutenants and captains during contract negotiations in late September, 1976. On or about October 18, 1976 agents for the City, including Dave Thompson, Administrative Aide for the Public Safety Department and John Waters, Director of Department of Public Safety informed Robert Carver, President of the Charging Party, that the Respondent would not extend dues-deductions to the captains or lieutenants since the Respondent did not feel these positions were properly included in the certified bargaining unit. The action of the Respondent in discontinuing the dues-deductions on October 15, 1976 was resultant from the attached cumulative exhibit B, Memorandum of September 24, 1976 from John M. Waters to Jack Parker, City Accountant for the City of Jacksonville, which directs that positions above the rank of firefighter are to no longer receive dues-deductions. The Director of Employee Relations and chief negotiator for the Respondent, William Davis, was officially notified of the proposed discontinuation on September 29, 1976 by action of the attached cumulative exhibit c." The act complained of by the Charging Party, is the act of the Respondent in discontinuing the dues-deductions for the ranks of lieutenant and captain effective October 15, 1976. (The facts that led up to that action are established in the stipulations of fact entered into by the parties.) In the mind of the Charging Party the discontinuation of the dues-deductions on October 15, 1976, constituted: (1) an interference with the rights of employees as described in 447.501(1)(a), F.S.; (2) a unilateral change during the bargaining process in violation of 447.50l(1)(c), F.S.; and (3) a specific refusal to comply with the provisions of 447.303, F.S. The Respondent disputes and joins issue with that claim. To resolve the conflict, the case is best discussed by dividing the consideration into two broad categories. The first category is concerned with the question of whether the Respondent's initial petition for writ of certiorari filed with the First District Court of Appeal, State of Florida, on March 4, 1976, and/or the Respondent's appeal of the Public Employees Relations Commission's certification order, which was filed with the First District Court of Appeal, State of Florida; imposed an automatic stay of the effect of the proposed certification order by the Public Employees Relations Commission, and/or a stay of the certification order of May 18, 1976, entered by the Public Employees Relations Commission. Any stay of the proposed certification order and subsequent certification order by the Public Employees Relations Commission must have been effectuated by the filing of the initial petition for writ of certiorari on March 4, 1976, and the appeal of June, 1976, because the facts establish that no specific request was ever made of the First District Court of Appeal or the Public Employees Relations Commission to grant a stay. To that end, the Respondent contends that it could justifiably rely on the Florida Appellate Rule to grant an automatic stay in both the initial petition for writ of certiorari of March 4, 1976, and the appeal of June, 1976 Pertinent provisions of Rule 5.12 state: "Rule 5.12 Supersedeas Bond not Required of the State and its Political Subdivisions and their Boards, Commissions, etc.; Security when Required When Security Not Required. When the state or any of its political subdivisions, or any officer, board, commission or other public body of the state or any of its political subdivisions, in a purely official capacity, takes an appeal or petitions for certiorari, the filing of the notice of appeal or the petition for certiorari as the case may be shall perfect the same and stay the execu tion or performance of the judgment, decree or order being reviewed and no supersedeas bond need be given unless expressly required by the court. Court May Require Bond. The court may, on motion for good cause shown, require a super sedeas bond or other security, in such amount, form and manner as it may prescribe as a condition for the further prosecution of the appeal or certiorari." On the face of the language of Florida Appellate Rule 5.12, it would appear that the Respondent is correct in its assumption of having an automatic stay; however, there is a subsequent appellate decision which defeats the Respondent's right to rely on the theory it offers as standing for the proposition that an automatic stay is granted. That case is Panama City v. Florida Public Employees Relations Commission, 333 So.2d 470, (1st DCA 1976, Fla.). The decision in this case was initially rendered on May 5, 1976, and a rehearing denied on June 29, 1976. The effective date of the decision is July 14, 1976. The Panama City case, supra, concerns the determination by the Public Employees Relations Commission of an appropriate bargaining unit and direction of an election. Those actions by PERC were not found to be final orders and in discussing the position of that Petitioner requesting a writ of certiorari, the Court stated that a stay of the effect of the enforcement of the agency action does not transpire merely by filing the petition for writ of certiorari. Under the ruling, in the decision, the stay may be granted by the agency or by the Court upon appropriate terms and in keeping with the authority of 120.68(3), F.S. That section of Chapter 120 indicated the following: "(3) The filing of the petition does not itself stay enforcement of the agency decision, but if the agency decision has the effect of suspending or revoking a license, supersedeas shall be granted as a matter of right upon such conditions as are reasonable, unless the court, upon petition of the agency, determines that a supersedeas would constitute a probable danger to the health, safety, or welfare of the state. The agency may grant, or the reviewing court may order, a stay upon appropriate terms, but, in any event, the order shall specify the conditions upon which the stay or supersedeas is granted." Moreover, in the opinion of the Court in the Panama City case, under Florida Appellate Rule 5.5, the Petitioner for writ of certiorari shall apply to the agency for supersedeas to forestall the terms of the agency action. Through its memorandum the Respondent in this cause has concluded that there is a distinction in the facts of the Panama City case and the facts sub judice, in that the Panama City case dealt with determination of an appropriate bargaining unit and direction of an election which were interlocutory matters, whereas the question here deals with a certification order which is final agency action on the part of the Public Employes Relations Commission. As an adjunct to this argument, Respondent indicated that it is the June, 1976, appeal taken by the Respondent, challenging the Public Employees Relations Commission order of certification, that becomes the focal point of the inquiry upon the subject of an automatic stay. This latter phase of the argument is accepted and it is the June, 1976, appeal that should be addressed. With that fact in mind, the language of the Court's opinion in the Panama City case on a petition for rehearing clarifies any distinction which might be drawn between the right to stay in an interlocutory situation, and the right to a stay of final action by an agency. The Court, in its discussion on rehearing, stated that the PERC order certifying an employee organization's exclusive collective bargaining representative of employees is a final order, which is subject to judicial review, together with all prior interlocutory orders. The Court goes on to say that if PERC refuses to stay any bargaining pending the Court review, the Court would have authority to grant that relief, in A order to make the Court's jurisdiction effective. For this proposition it cites to Article V, Section (4)(b) 3, Florida Constitution. A close analysis of the Court's statement on the rehearing in the Panama City case, supra, points out that the party who takes an appeal of the final order of certification by the Public Employees Relations Commission should look to the Public Employees Relations Commission to grant a stay prior to turning to the Court for such relief. This is in keeping with the requirements of 120.68(3), F.S. It can be seen by an examination of the facts stipulated to in this cause that the Respondent has failed at any point to request of the Public Employees Relations Commission that the effect of the order of certification be stayed pending the outcome of the consideration of the appeal on its merits. Consequently, in keeping with the decision of the Panama-City case, supra, the effect of the certification order is not stayed and any action which the Respondent took in derrogation of the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Panama City, supra, subsequent to July 14, 1976, the date the decision became binding, may constitute an unfair labor practice. See also, Duval Cty School Bd v. Fla. Pub. Emp. etc., 346 So.2d 1086 (1st DCA 1977, Fla.) Having determined that the effect of the certification order of the Public Employees Relations Commission has not been stayed, consideration of the effect of the Respondent's action which discontinued the dues-deduction after October 15, 1976 for those ranks of lieutenant and captain can be made. It is clear from the facts In the record that it had been the practice of the employer to authorize the dues-deduction for lieutenants and captains since 1969 and there is no showing that the employees in those ranks who requested the dues- deduction ever asked that the deductions be discontinued. The conclusion on the part of the Respondent that the dues-deduction should be discontinued was a unilateral action, premised upon Respondent's individual evaluation of the propriety of including lieutenants and captains in a unit with firefighters. In view of the history of the dues-deduction process for lieutenants and captains in the City of Jacksonville, and the outstanding unit certification by PERC which includes such employees, it is concluded that deductions should have been continued beyond October 15, 1976. This is authorized under the opinion of United Faculty of Palm Beach Jr. College, Case No. 8H-CA- 754-1158. The failure to continue this deduction program beyond October 15, 1976 constituted an action by the Respondent in regard to conditions of employment and was per se a violation of the duty to collectively bargain. See 447.309(1), F.S., and NLRB v. Katz, 396 U.S.736 (1962). This responsibility on the part of Respondent to continue the dues-deduction has now been specifically established in 447.303, F.S., as amended at 77-343, Laws of Florida which reads: "Any employee organization which has been certified as a bargaining agent shall have the right to, upon request, have its dues and uniform assessments deducted and collected by the employer from the salary of those employees who authorized the deductions, set dues and uniform assessments In a related argument, the Respondent attempts to suggest that the Public Employees Relations Commission has unilaterally expanded and redefined the bargaining unit that had been previously agreed to between the City of Jacksonville and Local 1884 IAFF. Specifically, the Respondent claims that the City of Jacksonville and Local 1884 IAFF had agreed that only fire privates be included in the unit in 1973-1974 and 1974-1975, and that thereafter the Commission expanded and redefined the bargaining unit to include firemen and fire officers. Although this may be a fact, this fact is not in evidence through the stipulation of facts and in view of the limitations imposed by the agreement of the parties through their stipulation, the above-referenced information may not be utilized in reaching conclusions in this case. However, assuming arguendo the propriety of those facts, they would not seem to promote a different result in this cause. This conclusion is drawn from an examination of Clearwater Firefighters Association; Local 1158, IAFF and City of Clearwater, Case No. 8H- RC-766-1O68, 77E-377, reported at 3 FPER 177 (1977) and City of Titusville v. PERC, 3,30 So.2d 733 (1st DCA 1976, Fla.) Even though the Commission and the Court seemed to be stating that the Public Employees Relations Commission may not extend the unit which has voluntarily been recognized by the parties, or offered for recognition by the Petitioner for unit determination, these cases demonstrate that each case that occurs should be examined on an individual basis. Applying that process, it would be necessary to request the Public Employees Relations Commission to reconsider their position in the instant case on the question of the appropriateness of the inclusion of lieutenants and captains in the certified bargaining unit, and that decision could be subject to appeal to the appropriate appellate court. Because a determination has not been rendered on the merits of excluding lieutenants and captains from the certified bargaining unit, either by the Public Employees Relations Commission or an appellate court, the certification order remains in effect and all rights and entitlements for ,the unit employees remain in force and effect until amended by a Perc order. Consequently, the act of discontinuing the dues-deduction for lieutenants and captains in the bargaining unit after October 15, 1976, constituted a specific refusal to comply with the provision of 447.303, F.S.; an interference with the rights of employees in violation of 447.501(1)(a), and an unilateral change during the bargaining process, in violation of 447.501(1)(c) , F.S.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Respondent, City of Jacksonville, be required to reinstate the dues-deduction authorizations of those lieutenants and captains in the certified bargaining unit. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of November, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Rodney W. Smith, Esquire Post Office Box 508 Gainesville, Florida 32602 Robert G. Brown, Esquire Assistant Counsel Office of General Counsel City Of Jacksonville 1300 City Hall Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Leonard A. Carson, Chairman Public Employees Relations Commission Suite 300 2003 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FLORIDA Exhibit A STATE OF FLORIDA
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent's employment by the School Board of Miami-Dade County, Florida, should be terminated.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, the Respondent was employed by the Petitioner as a bus driver and was assigned to Central East Regional Transportation Center (Central East), which is within the school district of Miami-Dade County. The Respondent is a member of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Local 1184 (AFSCME) bargaining unit. At all times material, Randy Mazie (Mazie) was the Director of Central East. Juan Perez was the Coordinator of Central East (reporting to Mazie), and Frank Hernandez and Florence Birch were Administrative Assistants (reporting to Perez and Mazie). When a bus driver is absent without advance notice, it often has a substantial impact on the work site. Absenteeism of bus drivers causes delays on that particular route and typically puts stress on both students and school site employees. On a number of occasions, Mazie personally had conversations with the Respondent about her poor attendance record and the consequences of her absenteeism. In addition, employees, including the Respondent, received training about attendance policies and procedures. In March 2000, the Respondent was referred to the Employee Assistance Program. On April 28, 2000, the Petitioner received notification that the Respondent declined to participate in the Employee Assistance Program. The Petitioner accommodated the Respondent by approving leaves of absence for the Respondent during the following time- frames: January 21, 1998, through April 1, 1998; April 2, 1998, through April 1, 1999; November 29, 1999, through January 2, 2000; January 3, 2000, through January 31, 2000; and February 25, 2000, through March 3, 2000. On November 19, 1999, School Board administrators held a conference with the Respondent to address the Respondent’s excessive absenteeism. At the conference the Respondent was advised that she had been absent a total of 52.5 days since April 1999, including 18 days of unauthorized absences. In addition, the Respondent was advised that continued absenteeism would result in a second conference. At the conference, the Respondent was asked if there were any mitigating circumstances for her absences. The Respondent did not provide any explanation for her unauthorized absences. Shortly thereafter, the Respondent received a written summary of the conference. On March 2, 2000, School Board administrators held a second conference with the Respondent to address the Respondent’s continued excessive absenteeism. At the conference, the Respondent was advised that she had been absent without authorization for 6.5 days since the first conference. In addition, the Respondent was advised that she had been absent a total of 74 days during the past 12-month period, including 24.5 days of unauthorized absences. The Respondent was instructed that continued absenteeism would result in a third and final conference, which could result in termination of her employment. At the second conference, the Respondent was asked if there were any mitigating circumstances for her absences. The Respondent did not provide any explanation for her unauthorized absences. Shortly thereafter, the Respondent received a written summary of the second conference. On May 31, 2000, School Board administrators sent a memorandum to the Respondent regarding the Respondent’s continued absenteeism. In the memorandum, the Respondent was directed to report to duty daily, as all of her leave time had been exhausted. The Respondent refused to sign a copy of the memorandum. Notwithstanding the above directive, the Respondent’s excessive absenteeism continued. From November 30, 2000, to December 19, 2000, the Respondent was absent from work. On January 4, 2001, the Respondent presented the School Board Administrators with a medical document signed by the Respondent’s physician purporting to excuse the Respondent from work from November 27, 2000, through January 3, 2001. On January 6, 2001, the School Board Administrators discovered that the Respondent’s physician did not excuse the Respondent from work from November 27, 2000, through January 3, 2001, and that the medical document provided by the Respondent had been falsified. On January 22, 2001, School Board administrators held a third conference with the Respondent to address the Respondent’s continued excessive absenteeism and submission of fraudulent medical documentation. At the conference, the administrators advised the Respondent that she had been absent a total of 38 days during the past 12-month period. The Respondent was also informed that, since March 2000, she had been absent without authorization for 18 days. At the conference, the Respondent was afforded an opportunity to refute the charges that she had submitted fraudulent medical documentation. Despite this opportunity, the Respondent did not refute the charges or provide an explanation. Thereafter, the Respondent received a written summary of the conference; however, the Respondent refused to sign the summary. On February 22, 2001, the Office of Professional Standards held a conference with the Respondent to address the Respondent’s excessive absenteeism and submission of fraudulent medical documentation. At the conference, the Respondent was afforded an opportunity to refute the charges that she had submitted fraudulent medical documentation. Despite this opportunity, the Respondent did not refute the charges or provide an explanation. The Respondent received a written summary of the conference. During the hearing, the Respondent testified that she went to the emergency room (but was not admitted to the hospital) during the time-frame from November 30, 2000, through December 19, 2000. The emergency room personnel told her to follow up with her physician. Notwithstanding these directions, the Respondent admitted that she failed to follow up with her physician. During the time-frame from November 30, 2000, through December 19, 2000, School Board administrators directed the Respondent to submit documents indicating that she was under medical care. Thereafter, the Respondent falsified the medical note. The Respondent also generally testified during the hearing that she was undergoing counseling by a social worker for stress related to her personal life. However, the Respondent never offered as evidence any records from the social worker, and Mazie testified that she never had a conversation with him about meeting with a social worker. Moreover, the Respondent admitted that the School Board Administrators authorized absences related to her daughter’s pregnancy/illness, as well as housing problems she encountered during a storm. In addition, the Respondent conceded that the School Board never denied the Respondent a requested leave of absence. Between April 1, 1999, and November 19, 1999, the Respondent was absent without authorization for 20.5 days. During that same time-frame, the Respondent was absent with authorization (and without pay) for 20 days. Between November 19, 1999, and March 2, 2000, the Respondent was absent without authorization for 8.5 days. Between March 3, 1999, and March 2, 2000, the Respondent was absent without authorization for 28.5 days. During that same time-frame, the Respondent was absent with authorization (and without pay) for 51 days. Between January 23, 2000, and January 22, 2001, the Respondent was absent without authorization for 22 days. During that same time-frame, the Respondent was absent with authorization (and without pay) for 12 days. Between March 3, 2000, and March 3, 2001, the Respondent was absent without authorization for 21 days. During that same time-frame, the Respondent was absent with authorization (and without pay) for 8 days. Between November 30, 2000, and December 19, 2000, the Respondent was absent without authorization for 14 consecutive days. Based on the Respondent’s leave history records, she was absent without authorization, between March 3, 2000, and March 3, 2001, as follows: March 10, 2000 (½ day); April 10, 2000 (½ day); April 13, 2000 (½ day); May 30, 2000 (½ day); May 31, 2000 (½ day); June 2, 2000 (½ day); July 18, 2000 (½ day); July 21, 2000 (½ day); November 30, 2000 (1 day); December 1, 2000 (1 day); December 4, 2000 (1 day); December 5, 2000 (1 day); December 6, 2000 (1 day); December 7, 2000 (1 day); December 8, 2000 (1 day); December 11, 2000 (1 day); December 12, 2000 (1 day); December 13, 2000 (1 day); December 14, 2000 (1 day); December 15, 2000 (1 day); December 18, 2000 (1 day); December 19, 2000 (1 day); January 10, 2001 (½ day); January 11, 2001 (½ day); February 15, 2001 (1 day); February 22, 2001 (½ day); and February 27, 2001 (½ day). As a result of the Respondent's conduct, School Board administrators recommended dismissal of the Respondent. Thereafter, the Petitioner suspended the Respondent without pay and initiated these dismissal proceedings.
Recommendation On the basis of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered terminating the Respondent's employment and denying all other relief sought by the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of March, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of March, 2002.
