Findings Of Fact The petition herein was dated January 9, 1975 by Petitioner, and was filed with PERC on January 17, 1975. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 1). The hearing was properly scheduled by notice dated March 26, 1975, and was conducted on April 17, 1975, by agreement of the parties. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 2, Tr. 10, 11). The Town of Palm Beach is a public employer within the meaning of Fla. Stat. Section 447.002(2). (Stipulation, Tr. 5, 6). The Town of Palm Beach Association of Firefighters, Local 1866, is an employee organization within the meaning of Fla. Stat. Section 447.002(10). (Stipulation, Tr. 6-8). During the course of the past five years, Petitioner has requested recognition, or has otherwise sought to engage in collective bargaining with the Public Employer on several occasions through written and oral communications. Most recently Petitioner sought recognition through letters dated December 28, 1974, and April 11, 1975. (Tr 85-240, Petitioner's Exhibits 1, 2). There is no contractual bar to holding an election in this case. (Stipulation, Tr. 9, 10). The parties have not engaged in collective bargaining under the auspices of the Public Employees Relations Act. The parties engaged in collective bargaining in a limited fashion prior to the passage of the Act. Efforts on Petitioner's part to engage in collective bargaining with the public employer began in 1969. (Tr. 85-240, Petitioner's Exhibits 1-23). Registration material delivered by Petitioner to PERC was dated January 7, 1975, and was received by PERC on January 13, 1975. Additional materials were received by PERC on February 10, 1975. PERC acknowledged receipt of the registration material on February 10, 1975. The Public Employer contended at the hearing that registration was not proper because the source of certain funds was not adequately revealed. PERC has previously concluded that registration was complete and proper. (PERC registration File No. 8G-OR-756-1044, TR 11-15, 22-27, 225-238; Hearing Officer's Exhibit 3; Petitioner's Exhibit 4). Petitioner filed the requisite showing of interest with its petition. The Public Employer has asserted that the showing of interest is not adequate, however, no evidence was presented to counter the administrative determination previously made by PERC. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 4; Tr 16, 17; Public Employer's Motion to Dismiss). There are between forty-five and fifty-five persons in the unit proposed by Petitioner. All of the employees within the proposed unit are engaged in firefighting and/or paramedical rescue operations. The employees within the proposed unit work the same twenty-four hours on duty, forty-eight hours off duty shift. They eat and sleep in the same area while on duty, and wear the same or similar uniforms. There is a significant amount of interchange in duties among the employees. Wages and other terms of employment, job and salary classifications are determined for all of the employees within the proposed unit in the same manner. The bargaining history indicates a firm desire on the part of the employees to belong to a unit such as Petitioner proposes. (Tr 148-151,298-345, 369-372). The Public Employer contends that the only appropriate unit would include all public safety employees. No direct testimony was offered in support of this contention. Direct and cross-examination of Petitioner's witnesses indicate that the fire department and other public safety departments do not generally work together. Firefighters do not perform police functions or lifeguard functions. Police and lifeguards do not perform fire department functions. There is no interchange of employees between the departments, although there was evidence presented that transfers between the departments do occur. (Tr 148-151, 298-345, 369-372). Fire lieutenants are the senior officers in charge of each shift at two of the Town's three fire stations. Captains are in charge of shifts at the headquarters fire station. Fire lieutenants have four persons working under them. Fire lieutenants work the same shift as the other firefighters, wear the same uniform with no adornment of any kind, perform the same daily duties such as cleaning equipment, and teaching or participating in classes and training exercises. They perform the same firefighting duties. The fire lieutenant is charged with filling out a log book, checking the roster, answering the radio, preparing training schedules, and filling out fire reports, which duties the other firefighters do not generally perform. The fire lieutenants fill out evaluation reports on personnel who work on their shifts. The personnel are graded numerically from one to ten in approximately twenty categories, e.g., public contact and taking directions. These reports form a part of the procedure through which an employee is granted or denied a merit pay increase or is granted or denied a promotion. If an employee who works under a lieutenant has a grievance, the lieutenant is the person to whom the grievance is first carried. The lieutenant is the person in charge of maintaining order at the fire station and is in charge of any fire operations until a senior officer arrives on the scene. The fire lieutenants report directly to fire captains. The lieutenant takes no direct roll, other than making reports, in hiring, firing, promotion or transferring employees. The lieutenant is not responsible for personnel administration nor for collective bargaining. He takes no roll in formulating or administering the budget. Lieutenants and captains do not perform any functions as a group. Lieutenant Walker indicated that he has never attended a meeting at which lieutenants and captains met as a group. If a lieutenant or a captain is absent from work, other personnel fill the position. Val Williams, a pumper/operator, has served as a captain for as long a period as two months. (Tr 248-296, 302-319, 315-332; Petitioner's Exhibits 24, 25, 26). Fire captains perform generally the same duties and fulfill the same rolls as fire lieutenants. Captains head the shifts at the headquarters stations. In addition to duties performed by lieutenants, captains conduct fire inspections, and serve as the next step in the chain of command above lieutenants. Captains answer directly to the assistant fire chief. (Tr 259-61, 334; Petitioner's Exhibits 24, 25, 26). Assistant fire chiefs are in charge of each shift for all three fire stations. They oversee the operations of each station, and visit each station on at least one occasion during the course of each shift. Assistant fire chiefs answer to the deputy chief; the deputy chief answers to the chief; the chief answers to the town manager. (Tr 265-66, Petitioner's Exhibits 24, 25, 26). Mobile Intensive Care Unit (MICU) attendants and driver/operators, and paramedic specialists work the same shifts and wear the same uniforms as firefighters. Each is paid approximately five percent more than a firefighter who has been employed for the sane period of time. Driver/operators answer fire calls, drive to the fire with a firefighter, and occasionally fight fires. They answer directly to lieutenants. Paramedic specialists answer directly to the deputy fire chief. Paramedic specialists receive extensive training apart from firefighting training. Paramedic specialists answer fire calls, but the testimony was not clear as to whether they are permitted to fight fires. Paramedic specialists do not perform any personnel administration or policy making roll. (Tr 333, 334, 346-358, 373-386). There are one clerk and one mechanic who work with the fire department. They apparently answer to the fire chief. Each works an eight hour day, five days weekly. They do not work directly with firefighters. (Tr 330- 333).
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witness and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received, I make the following relevant factual findings: Petitioner was employed by Respondent in its utilities department for approximately 10 years and 10 months. Petitioner's initial employment commenced in 1974, where he was employed in the position of treatment supervisor and remained in that position for approximately 2 years. In 1975, Petitioner was promoted to treatment supervisor superintendent and worked in that position until July 30, 1984. Respondent admits, and it is undisputed, that Petitioner was a good employee. (TR 8). It is also undisputed that Petitioner was the oldest employee (70 years old) in Respondent's utilities department and he resigned from his duty after he was transferred to a plant designated as the 3 B water treatment plant (3B). On July 20, 1984, Henry J. Block, an employee at 3 B submitted his resignation. Respondent thereafter held a meeting on July 23, 1984, with its operations superintendent, John Hayes, its operations manager, Michael J. Scottie, and chief plant operator II, Ralph Piacente, to discuss its staffing requirements and its need to shift personnel to maintain operations at 3 B on an interim basis. Following that meeting, it was determined that based on Petitioner's qualifications and the duties that he was them performing, which primarily involved process control and the collection of statistical data for both water and wastewater treatment operations, Petitioner would best be able to fill the new position brought about by Block's resignation with the least disruption of staff. Petitioner was therefore advised, on July 27, 1984, that he was being transferred, on an interim-temporary basis to 3 B , effective July 30, 1984. Petitioner was advised that the transfer was temporary and that he would retain his existing pay and benefits while fulfilling his newly assigned temporary responsibilities at 3 B. Additionally, Petitioner was advised that when a permanent replacement was employed to fill the vacancy created by Block's resignation, Petitioner would return to his previous duties. Respondent's two available employees who were able to be temporarily assigned to 3 B, Petitioner's temporary assignment was least disruptive to the efficient and effective operation of Petitioner's operations inasmuch as the other available employee, Ralph Piacenti, was already employed as an operator, whereas Respondent was involved in routine daily gathering and analysis of data that could be compiled and analyzed at a later time. Age was not a factor in Respondent's deliberations and Petitioner was temporarily assigned to 3B based on his ability to step in and perform the duties of retiring employee (Block) with minimal disruption of Respondent's available staff. Respondent has, in the past, required temporary transfers of employees to fill positions vacated by employees who resign. These transfers have included employees of higher rank assigned to lower rank positions and once a replacement is found, the temporarily assigned employees are transferred to their former positions. (TR 125-126). The 3 B plant is situated in the extreme south end of Broward County. It is one of Respondent's older treatment plants and requires more mechanical operations, i.e. requires a greater degree of input by the treatment plant operators who must closely monitor the various functions that take place at the treatment plant such as backwashing filters, etc. Over the years, the plant has been modified and improvements have been made. The 3 B water treatment plant is safe, works properly, and is not obsolete. The working conditions at 3 B are not deplorable and while it does not have some of the automatic capabilities that are available at some of Respondent's more modern plants, this absence of features does not render the working conditions deplorable at 3B. (TR 135-138). Petitioner was provided office space at 3 B. The office was airconditioned with a telephone and had adequate clerical and other support staff.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: The Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's prayer for relief and dismiss the petition. RECOMMENDED this 25th day of March, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March, 1987.
The Issue The following issues were presented by the Petitioner or arose at hearing: Was a proper investigation and showing of interest made in this Petition? Should Assistant Sorensen be included or excluded from the proposed unit? Whether the appropriate unit should be composed solely of personnel within the Road and Bridge Department.
The Issue Whether Petitioner must be discharged from his position as a sanitation equipment operator II because he can no longer perform the essential functions of that job, with or without a reasonable accommodation.
Findings Of Fact Chapter 2001-324, Laws of Florida, declared the Escambia County Utilities Authority an independent special district with transferred assets and enumerated powers. Chapter 2004-398, Laws of Florida, changed the Escambia County Utilities Authority’s name to ECUA. By law, ECUA provides utility services throughout Escambia County, Florida, and has the power to appoint, remove and suspend its employees, and fix their compensation within the guidelines of Escambia County Civil Services Rules. ECUA’s mission statement specifies that ECUA and its employees “are committed to providing the highest quality service” and that “ECUA will always provide cost-effective services.” ECUA has adopted standards set forth in the Manual in order to govern employee conduct. For instance, Section B-11 provides that “[r]easonable accommodation is available to all disabled employees, where his or her disability affects the performance of job functions.” Section B-13 A (10) of the Manual requires ECUA employees to maintain all capabilities that are necessary for them to perform their assigned duties. Mr. Smith is 52 years old and initially worked for ECUA as a sanitation equipment operator from March 1997 through October 2002. He returned to his previous position at ECUA in January 2018. ECUA’s description of the sanitation equipment operator II position describes the “essential job functions” as follows: Operates a heavy duty, highly technical, and specially designed, one-person automated residential or commercial refuse collection truck equipped with a hydraulically operated container loading and waste packing mechanism in order to remove solid waste on an assigned collection route. Required to manually load yard trash, brush, or bulk waste when assigned to yard-trash duty. Operates a heavy duty residential rear-loading, semi-automated refuse collection truck equipped with a hydraulically operated container leading and waste packing mechanism in order to remove solid waste on an assigned collection route, while acting as crew leader for the two/three person assigned crew. Other “essential job functions” include activities such as manually picking up waste containers for disabled customers, climbing in and out of trucks, climbing stairs and ladders, and walking refuse containers to and from residences. As for the position’s physical requirements, the job description states that: While performing the essential functions of this job the employee is regularly required to sit, stand, or walk, use hands to finger, handle, or feel, reach with hands and arms, stoop, kneel, jump, step, or crouch, and lift and/or move up to 100 pounds and occasionally required to lift over 100 pounds. On June 25, 2019, Mr. Smith’s right knee collided with the rear door or bumper of a refuse truck while he was dumping refuse into a landfill. He sought medical attention that day, and the resulting “work status report” from the Sacred Heart Medical Group indicated he could return to work on June 26, 2019, but was prohibited from bending at the waist, stooping, kneeling, crawling, climbing, or squatting for the next eight days. ECUA learned of Mr. Smith’s injury on June 25, 2019, and he was promptly placed on leave pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). The standardized form memorializing that action advised Mr. Smith that “[y]ou will be required to present a fitness-for-duty certificate to be restored to employment.” Mr. Smith’s injured knee did not improve to a point at which he could return to his position as a sanitation equipment operator II, and he exhausted his 12 weeks of FMLA leave in September of 2019.1 At that point, ECUA’s Human Resources department placed him in two light-duty positions. The first was a temporary position counting inventory. That temporary position comes open for a week at the end of every ECUA fiscal year. After Mr. Smith completed that work, he was assigned to removing paper and plastic from ECUA’s composting operation. Mr. Smith’s tenure with the compost operation was brief because he was unable to walk or stand for long periods of time.2 1 Mr. Smith enjoyed working for ECUA and was interested in other employment opportunities there following his accident. Because he has 20 years of customer service experience and associates degrees in culinary management and hotel and restaurant management, Mr. Smith inquired about becoming a customer service representative. However, ECUA only had one such opening between March and November of 2019 and typically receives hundreds of applications when such a position comes open. Also, ECUA’s Human Resources department does not have the authority to reassign employees from one department to another. An employee interested in a position outside his or her department must apply for the position, and the department seeking to fill that opening makes the final decision as to who is hired. 2 The witnesses disagreed about how long Mr. Smith worked at the compost operation. Chiquita Payne, a senior human resources generalist at ECUA, and Tim Dean, ECUA’s lead compost technician, testified that Mr. Smith spent no more than a few days with the compost operation. Mr. Smith testified that he was there for 2.5 weeks. Mr. Smith never returned to his position as a sanitation equipment operator II. The medical restrictions prohibiting Mr. Smith from activities such as bending at the waist, stooping, kneeling, crawling, climbing, or squatting were not lifted. A note from Dr. Juliet De Campos, Mr. Smith’s attending physician at the Andrews Institute of Orthopedics & Sports Medicine, gave the following assessment of Mr. Smith: This 52-year-old male, truck driver had an impact injury to the anterior [of] the right knee in the patellofemoral area with a fall to the ground which may have twisted his knee. He had a laceration which healed uneventfully but had recurrent swelling and giving way of his knee. X-ray showed no fracture or loose body. MRI suggested abnormal MRI and medial meniscus. What was not read was a prepatellar bursitis and contusion. The contusion has resolved but the patient still has recurrent swelling, catching, and giving way. He has had physical therapy and a knee sleeve. Exam today shows findings consistent with medial meniscus tear but no ACL injury, atrophy. Prepatellar bursitis has resolved. He continues to have recurrent swelling and instability. He has been in physical therapy which has helped but [has not restored] normal function. Within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, this injury was caused by the job injury and treatment is necessary on that basis. The note continued by recommending that Mr. Smith have right knee surgery, and he ultimately did so on January 22, 2020. Following the surgery, Mr. Smith’s attending physician anticipated that Mr. Smith would have a “permanent impairment rating” and recommended that he do no stooping, squatting, or kneeling. The attending physician also recommended that Mr. Smith not lift anything over 10 pounds. Thus, the attending physician noted that “[o]ffice work would be appropriate” and counseled against Mr. Smith engaging in “commercial driving.” Section D-16 of the Manual contains a section on workers’ compensation providing that: Employees will return to work anytime they are medically able, with or without reasonable accommodations, within six (6) months of the date of injury. If after six (6) months from the date of injury the employee remains unable to perform the essential functions of his or her job, with or without reasonable accommodation, the employee’s department director, in consultation with the Human Resources Director, shall consider the employee’s prognosis and anticipated return-to- work date, the department’s present and projected workload and needs, and all other relevant factors in determining whether additional leave is appropriate under the circumstances. Should the employee remain unable to perform the essential functions of his or her job, with or without reasonable accommodation, after passage of six (6) months from the date of the injury and any extension thereof, if any, he or she shall retire, resign, or be terminated. Keith Kyles Sr., ECUA’s sanitations collections manager, issued a letter to Mr. Smith on December 3, 2019, stating the following: The most recent medical note in your file shows you were last seen by your treating physician, Dr. DeCampos, on November 19, 2019. Regarding your ability to return to work to perform the essential functions of your job, Dr. DeCampos stated, “No change – will need to schedule surgery.” Based on the above, it is clear you are unable to perform the essential functions of your position as a Sanitation Equipment Operator II. Moreover, a return to work date is unknown and there is no estimated date for your return to work at this time. Your continued absence, without a probable date of your return to work, creates a substantial hardship on the operational needs of the Sanitation Department and impairs ECUA’s ability to properly fulfill its responsibilities to its ratepayers. ECUA is also unaware of any reasonable accommodations which would enable you to perform the essential functions of your job. Moreover, ECUA cannot indefinitely hold your position open, as the duties which it entails simply must be performed. We have done everything reasonably possible to accommodate your work restrictions. However, we can no longer allow your continuing inability to perform the essential functions of your job, with or without a reasonable accommodation, to create a substantial hardship and impair ECUA’s ability to properly fulfill its business obligations. The letter closed by notifying Mr. Smith that Mr. Kyles had scheduled a predetermination hearing for December 10, 2019, so that Mr. Smith could have an opportunity to discuss whether he could perform the essential functions of a sanitation equipment operator II, with or without a reasonable accommodation. After the predetermination hearing, Mr. Kyles issued another letter to Mr. Smith on December 12, 2019, notifying him that his employment with ECUA had come to an end: During your hearing, you provided information that your knee surgery is scheduled for December 26, 2019. After surgery, you stated that you would be required to be on crutches for 10 days, followed by an additional eight weeks off work for recovery post-surgery. Based on the information provided, I have determined your continued inability to perform the essential functions of your position, with or without reasonable accommodation, creates a substantial hardship and impairs ECUA’s ability to properly fulfill its business obligations. Your inability to perform the essential functions of your job, with or without reasonable accommodations, constitutes a violation of Section B-13 A (10) . . . of ECUA’s Human Resources Manual Therefore, it is with regret I notify you that your employment with ECUA is hereby terminated effective close of business December 12, 2019. The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that Mr. Smith cannot tolerate the physical demands associated with his former position as a sanitation equipment operator II, nor is there any reasonable accommodation that could be made that would allow him to perform the duties of a sanitation equipment operator II. Thus, Mr. Smith is not in compliance with Section B- 13 A (10) of the Manual. Mr. Smith did not meaningfully contest ECUA’s argument that he could no longer perform the physical tasks associated with a sanitation equipment operator II. Instead, Mr. Smith’s case focused on arguing that there are other, less demanding positions, within ECUA’s Sanitation Department and that assigning him to one of those positions would be a reasonable accommodation. However, Mr. Smith failed to prove that he was capable of handling the physical demands associated with those positions. For instance, Mr. Smith raised the possibility of being assigned to ECUA’s “miss truck.” ECUA’s standard refuse trucks occasionally miss refuse pick-ups due to inadvertence on the drivers’ part or residents’ failure to place their garbage on the curb in a timely manner. The miss truck is not as large as a typical refuse truck and is more automated. Therefore, miss truck duty is not as physically demanding as driving a typical refuse truck. Nevertheless, Mr. Kyles’s testimony demonstrated that miss truck duty is still a physically demanding position in that the miss truck driver must be capable of transporting large refuse cans to and from residences over all types of surfaces and distances. Because ECUA’s standard refuse trucks typically miss 40-50 refuse pickups a day, the preponderance of the evidence indicates that the physical demands associated with miss truck duty are not appropriate for someone with Mr. Smith’s physical limitations. Mr. Smith also raised the possibility of transporting ECUA’s fuel trailer. ECUA obtains fuel for its refuse trucks by transporting a fuel trailer to the Alabama-Florida line, acquiring the fuel, and transporting it back to ECUA. While this work is probably not as physically demanding as operating a refuse truck, Mr. Kyles testified that a fuel trailer operator would still have to satisfy the physical requirements associated with the sanitation equipment operator II position. Mr. Smith did not present any evidence to rebut Mr. Kyles’s testimony, and it is therefore accepted. Finally, Mr. Smith mentioned “monitoring piles” during his direct testimony. However, he presented no details about such duty. As a result, there is no competent, substantial evidence indicating that pile monitoring would be within his physical limitations, or that it would be a reasonable accommodation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the executive director of the Emerald Coast Utilities Authority find that James V. Smith, Sr., is no longer qualified to perform the functions of a sanitation equipment operator II and take such action as deemed appropriate under the pertinent provisions of the Human Resources Manual and Employee Handbook. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of March, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of March, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Kimberly E. Scruggs Emerald Coast Utilities Authority Post Office Box 17089 Pensacola, Florida 32522-7089 James V. Smith, Sr. 901 Booker Street Cantonment, Florida 32533 Jessica L. Scholl, Esquire Moore, Hill & Westmoreland, P.A. Post Office Box 13290 Pensacola, Florida 32591 (eServed) Steve E. Sorrell, Executive Director Emerald Coast Utilities Authority 9255 Sturdevant Street Pensacola, Florida 32514 (eServed) Cynthia Sutherland, Director Human Resources and Administrative Services Emerald Coast Utilities Authority 9255 Sturdevant Street Pensacola, Florida 32514 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner began employment with Respondent in November 1983. He was assigned to the Water and Sewer Department as a laborer. In 1986, Petitioner was transferred by the Respondent to the Water and Sewer Department water meter shop to be a water meter repairman. Petitioner continued his employment in that section until the spring of 1993. At that time, Petitioner accepted status under the Respondent's Disability Income Replacement policy. This arrangement is for an employee who is absent due to disability for more than 60 days. He then becomes eligible to receive payment of 60 percent of the employee's regular earnings. From the years 1986 into 1990, Petitioner enjoyed good health. During that period his employee work evaluations ranged from satisfactory to above satisfactory. In 1990, Petitioner developed psoriasis. In the beginning, the condition was controlled through medical treatment. However, in 1991, Petitioner was diagnosed with bladder cancer. As a result, while being treated for the bladder cancer in 1991 and 1992, to include two surgeries, Petitioner was unable to receive medical treatment for his psoriasis. Consequently the psoriasis became more severe. There was a change in supervisory personnel on April 4, 1991, which affected Petitioner's employment status together with that of other employees within the Water and Sewer Department. The change came about when Richard Davis, who headed the Water and Sewer Department was replaced by Henry Hicks. Respondent had found it necessary to replace Davis, because in Respondent's view Davis was not satisfactorily addressing the personnel issues within the Water and Sewer Department. When hired, one of the issues which Hicks felt he needed to address was a morale problem caused by employee perceptions that the Department of Water and Sewer employee rules were not being enforced in a consistent manner. Hicks was of the opinion that this perception existed, in part, because supervisors maintained a casual approach to employee counseling and discipline. Hicks, in his tenure, reminded the supervisors to formalize their procedures in dealing with employee counseling and disciplining. He required the supervisor provide documentation of any disciplinary action whether verbally given or by a written reprimand. This change in direction tended to increase the number of documented incidences of imposition of employee discipline within the Water and Sewer Department. The first employee evaluation which Petitioner received after Hicks' assumption of his position of director of the Water and Sewer Department was in 1991. The 1991 evaluation which Petitioner was given contained positive and negative remarks about Petitioner's work performance. In the spring of 1991, the Water and Sewer Department held a picnic, an activity in which the employees were encouraged to participate. As in prior years the Petitioner volunteered to be a member of the food committee for the picnic and was appointed to that committee. Members of the food committee would serve food at the picnic. At that time, the Petitioner's psoriasis was such that he was noticeably peeling and flaking. Howard Johnson, a supervisor with Respondent approached Hicks and told Hicks that several employees had stated that they, the employees, would not go to the picnic if Petitioner served food because they were afraid that Petitioner's skin would flake into the food. Having been apprised of this situation, upon a date prior to the picnic, Hicks met with Petitioner and told Petitioner what had been reported to Hicks and asked Petitioner to serve the needs of the picnic activity in some other manner than food service. Specifically, the Petitioner was offered the opportunity to help "set up" the picnic area. Petitioner did not accept the alternative offer to assist in the outing. Instead, Petitioner was offended and felt that he was unreasonably singled out due to his psoriasis. Nonetheless, the reaction by other employees to having Petitioner serve food and the response by Hicks to offer an alternative opportunity to assist in the activity did not constitute harassment or unreasonable conduct toward Petitioner. In association with the picnic for the spring of 1991, Bobby Thigpen, a supervisor with Respondent, made a comment to Petitioner about Petitioner's psoriasis and Petitioner's participation on the food committee at the picnic. Although Petitioner was mindful of Thigpen's candor about the subject, Thigpen's remarks contributed to Petitioner's hurt feelings concerning other employees not wishing Petitioner to serve food at the picnic. The remarks by Thigpen were not designed to harass Petitioner based upon Petitioner's physical condition. In addition, Petitioner did not report Thigpen's remarks to his supervisor pursuant to Respondent's "No times relevant to the inquiry, prohibited harassment on the basis of handicap status as well as other protected categories. The policy instructed the employee who believed that he had been harassed to bring the matter to the supervisor or to the Human Resource Department within the organization if the employee did not feel that he could discuss the matter with his supervisor. Respondent's employees are required to attend an annual meeting to review this policy. Petitioner did not complain to the Human Resource Department that he had been harassed by Thigpen through Thigpen's remarks regarding Petitioner's service on the food committee. No other competent proof was offered to the effect that Respondent's employees had made derogatory comments about Petitioner's physical disabilities. Because Petitioner's psoriasis was in a more severe condition, Petitioner would leave flakes of skin on chairs in the Water and Sewer Department break-room. When the Petitioner's co residue they would switch chairs rather than sit in the chair on which Petitioner had left flakes of skin. Although Petitioner found out that the other employees were switching chairs due to the flakes of Petitioner's skin being found on the initial chair, there is no competent proof that any employee ever commented to the Petitioner that the employee would be opposed to the Petitioner eating in the break-room due to his physical condition. Petitioner, together with other employees who were supervised by Dan Miller, had been harassed by Miller at times relevant to the inquiry. In Petitioner's instance, Miller's harassment was not directed to Petitioner's physical disabilities. Some of the remarks made by Miller to Petitioner were that Petitioner was short and fat and further derogatory comments about Petitioner's haircut and clothes. Miller had also called the Petitioner dumb or stupid because Petitioner asked Miller to repeat instructions over the radio that was used for communicating between the supervisor and his respective employees. Notwithstanding Petitioner's contention that he had told Miller that he was having trouble hearing because of psoriasis that had spread to Petitioner's ears, Miller denies that Petitioner had told Miller that psoriasis was affecting Petitioner's hearing, and Miller's testimony is credited. On the contrary, without knowledge of any physical disability concerning hearing which Petitioner had, and without regard for the reaction any other employees which Miller supervised might have, Miller made insulting comments to employees which he supervised when talking to them on the radio. Employees other than Petitioner to whom the insulting comments were directed had no known physical disabilities. James Scarberry, a co-employee who worked for Miller, overheard Miller yell at Petitioner on occasion having to do with Petitioner's job performance, not Petitioner's physical disability related to hearing. Petitioner asked Miller and a co-worker not to smoke in his presence because he had recently had bladder cancer surgery. Petitioner contends that this request was met with laughter and jokes. Miller testified that the request was not met with jokes or laughter. Instead, Miller recalls, and his testimony is credited, that Petitioner complained that Al Nichols, a co-worker, had smoked excessively in Petitioner's presence. The subject of Nichols' and Miller's smoking in Petitioner's presence was discussed among Miller, Nichols and Respondent, and it was agreed that Nichols and Miller would try not to smoke excessively in Petitioner's presence. No medical evidence was presented which tended to identify the necessity for Petitioner to be afforded a smoke environment due to his medical condition or that Petitioner had ever made requests other than that directed to Miller and Nichols regarding not smoking in his presence at work. Petitioner had made requests that he be provided light duty because of the problems he experienced with his knees due to psoriasis. These requests were directed to Miller, Petitioner's immediate supervisor. The requests were not always granted. When Petitioner was turned down for light duty it was based upon the fact that light duty was generally not available in the Water and Sewer Department for any employee. Moreover, at that time, employees in Petitioner's work assignment usually worked alone and it would adversely affect the production of the unit if two repairmen were dispatched to do a job which would ordinarily take only one repairman to complete. Petitioner presented no proof concerning denial of light duty at a time when a physician may have specifically recommended light duty for Petitioner. Concerning discipline directed to the Petitioner, on March 18, 1982, Petitioner stopped at a job site to which he had not been assigned. There he engaged David Lipps, an employee of Respondent, in a conversation. Lipps was a supervisor at the site and the conversation had to do with the meal policy which had been applied at the site. Eventually the conversation became an argument, at which point Lipps told Petitioner that he did not belong at the job site and asked him to leave. Lipps then reported the incident to his supervisor, Rodney Thompson and the matter eventually came to the attention of Hicks. Hicks discussed the matter with the Petitioner and Lipps and concluded that Petitioner had no business purpose for being at the Lipps' job site and that Petitioner was responsible for causing the argument with Lipps. Petitioner was issued a written warning on March 26, 1992. The disciplinary reprimand was not related to Petitioner's physical disabilities. On May 18, 1992, Petitioner received a written reprimand. The reprimand was based upon the Petitioner's conduct while on weekend standby duty. This assignment was in keeping with the periodic requirement to serve on weekend standby. On May 16, 1992, Petitioner was on a standby status with Lipps. Lipps was referred to as the "A" worker and Petitioner was the "B" worker. The "A" worker was in charge of the work team. Petitioner arrived at the first job site 34 minutes before Lipps. When Lipps arrived, Petitioner complained that Lipps was an hour late. Petitioner then told Lipps that he had somewhere else to go that day. Lipps and Petitioner went to a second job and by that time Lipps told Petitioner that he was tired of Petitioner's complaining about having to work that day and concluded that Lipps did not have Petitioner's full cooperation. As a result, Lipps determined to leave the completion of the second job until the following Monday. Lipps reported the incident to his supervisor, Rodney Thompson. Petitioner had been previously counseled about his attitude concerning standby duty. Hicks reviewed the facts surrounding Lipps' complaint and decided to issue a written reprimand to Petitioner for making negative verbal remarks about Petitioner's duties and for failing to cooperate with his supervisor on standby duty. The disciplinary action was not for purposes of discriminating against Petitioner because of Petitioner's physical disabilities. Moreover, Hicks had reprimanded two other employees, Ed Swift and Bob Buckley for making negative verbal comments about job duties. Hicks did not know these other individuals to be suffering from any form of physical disability. In June of 1992, Petitioner applied for and was granted a leave of absence for an unspecified period. By June 2, 1992, Petitioner knew that he would need to go on extended leave beginning June 8, 1992. He failed to inform any of his supervisors that he was going on this medical leave. He did not show up for work on June 8, 1992. Hicks inquired of Petitioner on June 8, 1992, about not telling his supervisor that he was going to be on medical leave. Petitioner responded to the inquiry by indicating that he had told Scarberry, Petitioner's co-worker, of his intention to go on medical leave and that he had told a city clinic nurse that he was going on leave of absence. Hicks pointed out, correctly, that telling the nurse and Scarberry of Petitioner's intentions to take medical leave did not relieve Petitioner of the duty to directly inform a supervisor of that intention. Moreover, Scarberry had told the Petitioner that he, Scarberry, would not be at work the first day of Petitioner's medical leave, making it questionable that Scarberry would have advised a supervisor that Petitioner was hoping to be absent from work that day. Scarberry made Hicks aware that Scarberry had pointed out to Petitioner that he would not be at work on June 8, 1992. Petitioner's assertion that he wrote a note to his immediate supervisor, Miller, regarding the plan to be out on June 8, 1992, if true, is of no utility because the note was not given directly to Miller and was never indirectly received by Miller. Miller had not been at work June 5, 1992, the friday before Petitioner was missing from his job duty on June 8, 1992. Petitioner knew that Miller was not at work on June 5, 1992. As a consequence of not informing a supervisor that he was going to be on extended medical leave, Petitioner was disciplined. The action by Respondent on which Petitioner was given a written reprimand for failure to inform a supervisor that Petitioner was going to take extended medical leave did not constitute discrimination against Petitioner based upon his physical disabilities. Petitioner was allowed to take the extended medical leave. Noel Werner, a secretary in the Water and Sewer Department had also been reprimanded by Hicks for failing to follow proper procedures for obtaining authorization to take medical leave. Hicks is unaware of any physical disability that Ms. Werner may have. When Petitioner took leave in June of 1992, he believed that he would be eligible for Disability Income Replacement. However, in August 1992, Petitioner was informed that the Respondent's Risk Management Department had determined that he was ineligible because he was under the care of a licensed health counselor as opposed to an M.D. or a Ph.D. Carol Ingham, Respondent's Human Resource Director, learned of this circumstance and contacted the Assistant City Manager, Dick Lewis, and requested that Petitioner be granted an exception to the policy of not being eligible for Disability Income Replacement when using a licensed health counselor. As a result, Petitioner's request was reevaluated and he was ruled eligible for Disability Income Replacement through the policy pertaining to that status for the period August 4 through 30, 1992. Concerning his physical condition, in the spring of 1992, Petitioner was diagnosed with osteoarthritis in his knees. This meant he was disabled to do any persistent bending or kneeling, which was a requirement of his employment in the Water and Sewer Department. His condition also disabled him from doing his assigned work because his work as a water meter repairman involved walking distances of a 100 feet or more on a persistent basis and standing all day. Concerning the medical leave of absence which Petitioner took in the summer of 1992, this subject was discussed by Ingham in conversation with the city clinic nurse, Holly McLaughlin. They talked about the stress which Petitioner seemed to be experiencing and the failure to follow the policy of informing his supervisor of his intention to take medical leave. On June 15, 1992, Ms. Ingham met with Petitioner and his wife to discuss Petitioner's stress. At that time, Petitioner reported to Ms. Ingham that Petitioner's supervisor Miller had treated him badly and that Miller had also treated other employees badly. Petitioner told Ingham that Miller had called Petitioner stupid and had been abusive in conversation over the radio. No claim was made by Petitioner that Miller had made comments directed to Petitioner's physical disabilities. As a follow Ingham discussed Petitioner's remarks about Miller's conduct with a number of the Petitioner's co-workers. Ingham decided that Miller had, in fact, yelled and cursed at a number of employees he supervised, to include Petitioner. No other employee reported to Ingham that Miller had made derogatory comments in their presence concerning Petitioner's physical disabilities. Based upon Ingham's findings, Hicks determined to discipline Miller for his conduct directed toward employees whom Miller supervised. Miller received a written reprimand and was given the option of being demoted or seeking counseling through an employee assistance program. Miller opted to go to the employee assistance program. Moreover, Miller was told that if conduct toward subordinates continued that he would be subject to more severe discipline to include discharge. Miller's treatment of the employees he supervises has improved since the imposition of discipline. Petitioner returned to work in August 1992, following his leave of absence for medical purposes. At that time, he was issued a service truck which another employee had been using. Petitioner felt that he should have been issued a new truck which the Water and Sewer Department operated. The truck that Petitioner had been issued was dirty and smelly. Miller told Petitioner that the newer truck was assigned to an employee who needed the larger truck because that employee would be performing heavier work than Petitioner would be called upon to perform. Miller offered to have the truck which Petitioner had been issued cleaned up or detailed. Petitioner declined that offer. Petitioner complained about the truck that he had been assigned to a co-worker, Fred Sauls. He told Sauls that he was going to take the truck he was issued and drive it to city hall to show Ingham, the Human Resource Director. In fact, Petitioner reported the incident to Ms. Ingham. The Petitioner received a letter of reprimand on September 4, 1992, for complaining to a co-worker and Ms. Ingham about an everyday work related problem rather than following the chain of command. Prior to receiving that written reprimand, Petitioner had been specifically counseled by Hicks concerning handling everyday work related problems through Petitioner's supervisor. Those specific instructions on everyday work related problems were not countermanded by the general opportunity which Hicks had described for employees to go outside the chain of command when they did not feel that they would get satisfaction from an immediate supervisor, and the open door opportunity to consult with the Human Resource Director. In this instance, the response from Miller was adequate to meet Petitioner's needs in confronting an everyday work related problem and Petitioner had no reason to complain to Sauls or to complain to Ingham. The written reprimand given to Petitioner was not designed to discriminate against Petitioner based upon his physical disabilities. Hicks and Ingham became aware of the Petitioner's inability to perform his assigned job duties due to his physical disabilities and they looked for other duties that the Respondent might be able to perform in view of his physical disabilities. The only positions that were found for which Petitioner was otherwise qualified and physically able to perform were part-time positions that did not offer medical benefits. Upon further reflection, Ingham and Hicks offered to combine these two positions in the Respondent's Recreation Department into a single job which would allow Petitioner to continue working and to receive benefits. The combined position was at a lesser pay than the present position which he held. Petitioner decided that he would prefer to be placed in the status of Disability Income Replacement in lieu of the combined jobs. In April 1993, Petitioner accepted the status of Disability Income Replacement and has not returned to work.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations which dismisses the Petitioner's claims. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of June, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of June, 1994. APPENDIX The following discussion is given concerning the Proposed Findings of Fact of the parties: Petitioner's Facts: Paragraphs 1 through 6 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 7 through 14 are contrary to facts found. Respondent's Facts: Paragraphs 1 through 26 are subordinate to facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: William A. Ramputi, Esquire Scott, Gleason & Pope, P.A. 409 Southeast Fourteenth Street Ocala, Florida 34471 David H. Spalter, Esquire Fisher & Phillips 2310 One Financial Plaza Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33394 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee FL 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Human Relations Commission Building F Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee FL 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact David F. Ramsey, Respondent, is a registered professional engineer holding registration No. 15307 and a registered land surveyor holding registration No. 2545 and at all times relevant hereto he was so registered. In April 1974 Respondent was President and qualifying professional engineer for Ramsey and Associates, Inc. , the engineering firm retained to prepare plans and specifications for a mobile home park known as Heritage Village. Approved financing for this project was near expiration date and the plans had not been approved by Indian River County officials. Before the plans for the sewage treatment plant and percolation pond associated therewith could he approved, a subsoil percolation test was required. On April 24, 1974, Respondent, in company with Larry Brown, General Manager of Brown Testing Laboratory, a wholly owned subsidiary of Ramsey and Associates, Inc., proceeded to the site of the Heritage Village project. There five test holes were dug to obtain subsoil conditions and prepare Subdivision Analysis Form (Exhibit l) for submission to Indian River County so the plans could be approved. No hole was dug deeper than 3.2 feet. Brown testified only a posthole digger was available for digging while Respondent recalled a hand auger also being available. Since Brown did the digging, his memory may be the better. During the procedure, Respondent took notes as the holes were excavated. Hardpan was found 2-1/2 to 3 feet below the surface, but the thickness of this hardpan was not ascertained. No water was put in the holes to ascertain the percolation rate for the subsoil. After the testing was completed, Respondent and Brown retired to the Holiday Inn for lunch where Respondent prepared page 4 of Exhibit 1, which is titled "Survey of Subsoil Conditions". Thereon for the 5 holes reported he included the percolation time for water in the test holes to drop one inch. These figures were estimated by Respondent based upon the type of soil observed in the holes. These figures were certified by Respondent to be representative of existing subsoil conditions at the time the test was made. It is this certification, which was submitted to Indian River County to get the plans approved, which forms the basis for the charge here under consideration. While Respondent was under investigation, and after being fully advised of his rights, he told an investigator that he had estimated the percolation rates because no water was available in the vicinity and submission of the subsoil report was urgent due to the financing deadline. In his defense, Respondent did not deny the percolation figures submitted on Exhibit 1 were estimates rather than the measurements they purported to be, but contended that the percolation rates and subsoil conditions shown on Exhibit 1 accurately represent conditions as they existed. Evidence to support this position was included in the tests conducted and reported in Exhibit 3. Standard procedure for taking percolation tests is to fill the hole with water and observe the time it takes the water level to drop three inches. It is also standard to dig a 6-foot deep hole. Here it was testified that hardpan prevented the hole depth from exceeding 3.2 feet. However, when a proper test was made shortly before the hearing, no difficulty was encountered getting to a depth of 6 feet using a hand auger. It is difficult to dig deeper than about 3 feet with a posthole digger.
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner was discriminated against based upon his age, in the manner addressed by Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was an employee of the City of Leesburg at times pertinent hereto. He was employed as a waste water operator trainee, commencing employment on or about June 5, 2000. The Respondent is a city government and unit of local government which operates two waste water plants. At times material to this proceeding the Respondent was employed and assigned to the "Canal Street Plant." The Petitioner was required to perform several job functions in his capacity as a waste water operator (trainee). Respondent's Exhibit Nine, in evidence, provides a job description for the Petitioner's employment positions which include the following: Record all flows; constantly survey charts and meter readings; repair leaking waste water pipes; perform building maintenance chores; maintain vigilance over all the department facilities and log or report any unusual situations; take oral and written instructions and carry them out in a quick and responsible manner; load and unload lawn cutting equipment, and cut and trim grass at utility plant sites; make repairs and/or replace parts on plant equipment; and repair leaks and other operations as directed. That job description also required a trainee to have knowledge of the functions and mechanics of pumps and other waste water plant equipment, knowledge of the occupational hazards and safety measures required in plant operations; to have an ability to detect faulty operating characteristics in equipment and to institute remedial action. The trainee is also required to be able to read meters, chart accurately and to adjust procedures to meet plant volume requirements. He must have an ability to understand and follow oral and written instructions. The Respondent's personnel policies and procedures manual (manual), in evidence as Respondent's Exhibit Eight, states at Policy No. 600.2(13) that "poor performance" is a violation of policy sufficient to initiate discipline. Poor performance is described in that section as a failure to perform assigned duties according to prescribed dimensions and standards on the individualized performance plan. Policy No. 600.2 provides for progressive discipline ranging from a verbal warning, to a written warning, a one-to-three day suspension, a four-to-five day suspension, or termination. Thus the discipline for violation of that policy is a range of appropriate actions from verbal warning to termination. On or about July 11, 2001, the Petitioner was the subject of a corrective action performance evaluation by his supervisor, Bob Mirabella. Mr. Mirabella, the Respondent's Operations Supervisor, accorded the Petitioner a grade of zero in several categories of work performance. Those are deficiencies indicating the Petitioner's lack of understanding of basic concepts related to his job position, including failure to following instructions, difficulty making simple decisions, difficulty or failure in following standard procedures, and a poor attitude. Overall his evaluation shows a rating of the Petitioner's performance as "unacceptable." That corrective action evaluation also contains a section that the Petitioner and his supervisor must initial, indicating that the Petitioner had reviewed the evaluation and that the performance deficiencies had been communicated to him. Mr. Mirabella advised the Petitioner of corrective measures to take and that any continued failure to meet expectations might result in termination. Mr. Mirabella created a type-written plan of improvement for the Petitioner with remedial activities, objectives, and developmental activities. Under the Respondent's consistent policy, the action plan would have been reviewed in 60 days, September 11, 2001, in order to determine that the Petitioner was meeting those expectations. On August 13, 2001, the Petitioner received a written reprimand for failure to perform duties assigned to him on July 23, 25, and August 9, 2001. These were duties that were in accordance with the prescribed dimensions and standards of the individual performance plan for the Petitioner. The written reprimand, in evidence as Respondent's Exhibit Two, included a description of the Petitioner's failure to perform duties including lawn maintenance, and again cited his argumentative attitude. On August 29, 2001, the Petitioner received a three-day suspension from duties for failure to perform assigned duties according to prescribed dimensions and standards as set forth in the individual performance plan. The disciplinary action form, in evidence as Respondent's Exhibit Three, specifically referred to the Petitioner's failure to perform lawn maintenance duties, failure to follow established rules and policies, and failure to take appropriate action to correct a leaking pump. It was also noted that the Petitioner was making coffee and watching television instead of performing assigned duties. Mr. Mirabella created a performance evaluation summary in preparation for the Petitioner's September 11, 2001, 60-day review of the initial, unsatisfactory evaluation of July 11, 2001. The summary showed a continuation of the Petitioner's difficulties and problems both in understanding his job and in dealing with other people in the course of his duties. The summary cited an incident where the Petitioner was abrasive, including swearing, toward other employees. It was Mr. Mirabella's intention to give the Petitioner a written reprimand regarding the swearing incident. However, due to the emergency nature of the events occurring on September 12, 2001, at the waste water plant, the written reprimand was not completed prior to the beginning of the investigation that ultimately led to the Petitioner's termination. The Petitioner made no major progress in correcting any of the problems outlined in the action plan that constituted part of the July 11, 2001, evaluation. On or about September 12, 2001, it was determined that there was a near overflow of sewage at the Canal Street Plant. Scott Moss, the employee who worked on the morning shift on September 13, 2001, discovered the problem and took corrective action immediately. Mr. Mirabella learned of the problem and reported it to the Respondent's Director of Environmental Services, Susanna Littell. Upon learning of the potential overflow occurrence, Ms. Littell began an investigation to determine when the overflow problem occurred. She gathered plant flow information and took measurements of the tanks. Employing engineering calculations, based upon the flow rates at the plant, Ms. Littell was able to determine that the problem had occurred on the Petitioner's shift. The Petitioner was the only employee on duty at the time the problem occurred. Ms. Littell consulted two outside engineers (non-city employees) to review her calculations. Those engineers found that her calculations were accurate. According to Ms. Littell, the waste water employees on duty at the plant should have observed the valve positions or otherwise noticed a problem in the plant that needed remediation. This was a regular part of their assigned duties, including the Petitioner. Mr. Mirabella determined a number of valves had been changed, which had caused the "aereation bay" to begin to fill with waste water. The aereation bay almost overflowed, which would have caused a serious environmental hazard and damage. It would have caused irreparable harm to the credibility of the waste water department, and could have engendered a minimum of $10,000.00 dollars in fines imposed by the Department of Environmental Protection. The importance of preventing these types of situations has been emphasized to employees who worked at the waste water plant, including the Petitioner. Because of the Petitioner's failure to notice the obvious serious problem occurring at the plant on his shift, and his failure to take corrective action, he was cited for negligence in performing his assigned duties in violation of the Respondent's policy. The employee who worked as his counter- part on the shift immediately after the Petitioner's, Elmer Wagner, was also cited for negligence in performing his duties because of his failure to notice the problem and to take corrective action. Mr. Wagner at the time in question was 67 years of age. The information obtained during Ms. Littell's investigation was forwarded to Ms. Jakki Cunningham-Perry, the Respondent's Director of Human Resources, in order for her to determine the appropriate disciplinary action to take. Ms. Cunningham-Perry performed an investigation of the September 12, 2001, incident. She spoke to several individuals, including, but not limited to, Mr. Mirabella, Ms. Littell, Jim Richards, who was one of the engineers consulted by Ms. Littell, as well as the Petitioner. She thereafter deliberated and prepared a written memorandum setting forth her investigative findings. Ms. Cunningham-Perry concluded that the closing of the valves occurred during the Petitioner's shift. She also concluded that Mr. Wagner should have noticed the change in the pump flow and valves during his shift. Both the Petitioner and Mr. Wagner were cited for failure to perform assigned duties in violation of city policy 600.0(13), as a result of the investigation performed by Ms. Cummingham-Perry. She reviewed the personnel history of both the Petitioner and Mr. Wagner in order to determine the appropriate levels of discipline. The Petitioner's prior history included the special corrective action evaluation of July 11, 2001, indicating unacceptable performance; the August 13, 2001, written reprimand for violation of policy 600.2(13); and the suspension for violation of that same policy. In light of the past performance of the Petitioner, as well as the September 12, 2001, incident, Ms. Cunningham-Perry recommended that he be terminated. On November 30, 2001, the Petitioner was terminated from his employment with the Respondent. The Petitioner's last day on the payroll with the Respondent was December 6, 2001. Mr. Wagner is older than the Petitioner and has had an exemplary performance record with the Respondent City. He never had any disciplinary problems on his record for 15 years of his employment with the Respondent. Because of his theretofore spotless employment disciplinary record, he was given a written reprimand as a result of his negligent performance of job duties on September 12, 2001. No evidence was adduced indicating that the Respondent treated any employees over the age of 40, including the Petitioner, any differently than employees under the age of 40. During the relevant time period the Respondent had approximately 22 employees in the waste water department. Fifteen of those 22 employees were over the age of 40. The Petitioner actually produced no evidence in his case establishing his date of birth or age. There is no evidence that the Petitioner's age was considered or was a factor in his termination decision. The decision to terminate him was based solely on his failure to perform assigned duties and his prior performance record. Moreover, the Petitioner adduced no evidence to show that he was replaced or otherwise lost his position to a younger individual. The individual who became a waste water trainee after the Petitioner's termination was Scott Moss. Mr. Moss is currently employed as Waste Water Operator with the Respondent. There is no doubt that Mr. Moss is a significantly younger individual, purported to have been in his late 20's when the incident in question occurred. The Petitioner, however, produced no evidence regarding Mr. Moss' date of birth or his age in relationship to the Petitioner's. He also produced no evidence to show that he was actually replaced by Mr. Moss. Mr. Moss had been hired on or about January 29, 2001, nearly one year prior to the date of the Petitioner's termination. Both the Petitioner and Mr. Moss were working at the Canal Street Plant in similar capacities and duties, at the time the Petitioner was terminated. Mr. Moss, therefore, just continued to work there and ultimately was elevated, through his adequate performance, to the position of Waste Water Operator. It was not established that he was hired simply to replace the Petitioner when the Petitioner was terminated. Further, the Petitioner did not adduce sufficient, persuasive evidence to show that he was actually qualified to perform the job. His prior performance had been unacceptable since at least July 11, 2001, and likely before that time. The Petitioner repeatedly failed to comprehend and perform assigned duties of a Waste Water Operator Trainee on multiple occasions. This was despite efforts by the Respondent to help the Petitioner correct his deficiencies. Accordingly, it has not been established that the Petitioner was "qualified" for the position of Waste Water Operator Trainee.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of May, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of May, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael George 25131 Southeast 167th Place Umatilla, Florida 32784 Steven W. Johnson, Esquire McLin & Burnsed, P.A. Post Office Box 491357 Leesburg, Florida 34749-1357 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether a citation and imposition of a $1,500.00 fine for installing a septic tank without a permit was properly imposed on Respondent, Paul Ware, a/k/a Paul Montgomery-Ware, by Petitioner, the Department of Health, Polk County Health Department (the "Department").
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the owner of three contiguous lots in Polk County (Bevington Manor, PB 20 PG 47, Lots 100 through 102), purchased via tax deed recorded on October 21, 2003. Respondent's lots are surrounded by property owned by Irma Walker, whose son, William Walker, testified at the hearing. Respondent apparently intended to develop his lots as a commercial enterprise and had erected a Quonset-type structure on the property. From his mother's adjoining property, Mr. Walker regularly observed Respondent's activities. Mr. Walker testified that Respondent was using his property to operate a motorcycle repair shop. On June 4, 2004, Mr. Walker observed Respondent using a backhoe on his property. Mr. Walker testified that Respondent was installing a septic tank. Mr. Walker told his mother, who then initiated inquiries as to whether Respondent had a permit to install a septic tank. When her inquiries met with a negative response, Ms. Walker called in a complaint to the Department. On June 7, 2004, the Department sent environmental specialist Susan Patlyek to the site. Ms. Patlyek observed infiltrator chambers on the site. Infiltrator chambers are used only in connection with OSTD systems. Ms. Patlyek also observed a recently excavated area and a rented backhoe, commonly used to dig out areas for septic tank installation. It was obvious to Ms. Patlyek that a septic tank and drainfield had been installed on Respondent's property, though no permit had been issued by the Department allowing installation of an OSTD system. Installation of an OSTD system without a permit constitutes a sanitary nuisance. The Department sent a letter to Respondent dated June 8, 2004, advising him of the need to abate the nuisance by obtaining a permit. With the letter, the Department enclosed a blank application form that Respondent could have completed and returned to the Department's permitting office. Respondent replied by contending that the Department lacked jurisdiction over activities on his land and suggested that the Department initiate court action. Respondent also returned the application form in its original blank form. The Department then issued Respondent a citation for violations of Subsection 381.0065(4), Florida Statutes (2003), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 64E-6.003(1), constructing an OSTD system without a permit; and for a violation of Subsection 386.041(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2003), maintaining a sanitary nuisance. The citation provides for a $1,500.00 fine. The Department's citation also informed Respondent of his right to a hearing pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes (2003). Respondent contends that the relegation of this matter to an administrative forum is unconstitutional.
Recommendation RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, the Department of Health, Polk County Health Department, enter a final order imposing a $500.00 fine for the violations described in the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Roland Reis, Esquire Polk County Health Department 1290 Golfview Avenue, Fourth Floor Bartow, Florida 33830-6740 Paul Ware 6557 Crescent Lake Drive Lakeland, Florida 33813 R.S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Quincy Page, Acting General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
The Issue Whether the Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice by terminating the Petitioner’s employment on the basis of handicap.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, John Tadlock, (Tadlock) is a white male, age 46, and a resident of Panama City, Bay County, Florida. The Respondent, Westinghouse Electric Company, d/b/a Bay County Energy Systems, Inc. (Energy Systems), was and is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Florida. Energy Systems maintains a facility that collects garbage and burns it as fuel. The operation serves two basic functions. First, it disposes of unwanted garbage. Second, it produces energy by creating steam that in turn drives a turbine and produces electricity. From January, 1987, until September, 1993, Tadlock was employed by Energy Systems. Tadlock began as a B-class maintenance mechanic and advanced to the position of A-class maintenance mechanic. Subsequently, Tadlock moved to the operations portion of the company where he worked on boilers. Tadlock testified that he suffered injuries while at work during the years 1987, 1991, and 1993. Tadlock further testified that after each injury he recovered fully and resumed work at Energy Systems. As a result of the injuries sustained in his accidents at Energy System, Tadlock never testified that he was informed by any physician that he would have any permanent restrictions. In addition, at no time did Tadlock inform his employer, Energy Systems, that he suffered from any disability or restrictions relating to his ability to perform his job. During the period from October, 1991 through September, 1993, Tadlock had been cited for numerous violations of company policy and provided written warnings or reprimands. The first such violation occurred on October 24, 1991, when Tadlock was cited for violating company policy by failing to wear appropriate safety gear. Specifically, Tadlock failed to wear his indirect venting goggles. The memorandum memorializing the complaint noted that just two days prior to the complaint, Tadlock had received emergency training and, in response to a direct question raised by Tadlock, was informed that he must wear venting goggles. On September 17, 1992, Tadlock was cited for a safety violation for failing to wear appropriate hearing protection devices. As a result of this violation, Tadlock was given an oral warning. On June 3, 1993, Tadlock was cited for failing to wear gloves while on the floor of the facility. As a result of this violation of safety procedure, Tadlock was orally counseled on the correct policy and informed that such departure from set safety procedures would not be acceptable. On June 14, 1993, Tadlock was cited for failing to wear a personal respirator while in specific areas of the facility in violation of published safety procedures. On June 25, 1993, Tadlock received a written warning regarding his “unsatisfactory” safety record. Specifically, Tadlock was informed that he had a total of eleven accidents since his employment and that five of them were reportable to OSHA. The memorandum warned Tadlock that if he failed to show “immediate and sustained” improvement in his accident rate that he would be subject to disciplinary action. On July 30, 1993, Tadlock was verbally warned for failing to properly replace “pig pans” under an air dryer that resulted in oil running into a water drain. On August 31, 1993, Tadlock was verbally warned for failing perform his duties as an outside operator by failing to properly read his turnover log. As a result of his lack of action, Tadlock placed 55 gallons of bleach into a drainage basin. On September 19, 1993, Tadlock was informed, for a second time, that his safety record continued to be unsatisfactory. The letter referenced two accidents that occurred in August, 1993, that could have been avoided by practicing proper safety measures. As a result of those accidents and for his many past safety violations, Tadlock was suspended for three working days. Tadlock was offered employee assistance to help him perform his work in a more satisfactory and safe manner. On September 28, 1993, Tadlock was cited for a safety violation for failing to wear the appropriate shields on his prescription glasses. On October 10, 1993, Tadlock was cited for failing to properly maintain a boiler operator sheet log. This was the second time that Tadlock had been cited for improper maintenance of a log. Tadlock was also informed that if this type of action happened again, it would result in discipline. On October 15, 1993, Tadlock was observed urinating on the Boiler Room floor of the facility. Tadlock was cited for violating several rules of company conduct. A result of violating this company policy, coupled with the countless verbal and written warnings he had received, Tadlock was dismissed for cause. At the hearing, Tadlock admitted that he urinated on the floor of the facility but countered that he had no choice because Energy Systems failed to properly maintain its restroom. Tadlock was unable to support his assertion that there were no operating restroom facilities. First, in spite of every witness called by Tadlock, there was no testimony, even from Tadlock himself, that any of the bathrooms were not in working order.4 Energy Systems maintained that it had operational restroom facilities throughout its facilities. In addition, no competent evidence was presented that indicated that any of the restroom facilities were inoperable thus requiring someone to urinate in the middle of the facility. After being fired for the numerous safety violations and for violating company policy, Tadlock filed a complaint with the Commission on Human Relations alleging that he was discriminated against because of his handicap. Specifically, Tadlock asserted that he had suffered several on-the-job injuries that rendered him disabled and that he was discriminated because of the type injury or the lack of adequate medical treatment that he received. Such allegations were never proven and appear irrelevant to these proceedings. Specifically, any issues relating to his medical treatment and his injuries are more appropriately resolved in a worker’s compensation forum. At no time during his employment with Energy Systems did Tadlock inform his employer that he suffered from a handicap. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Energy Systems was aware that Tadlock suffered a disability or handicap. For example, Mr. James M. Leddy, the plant manager for Energy Systems testified that he was not aware of any condition which prevented Tadlock from functioning in a normal manner. The record is void of any evidence by a physician to indicate that Tadlock was considered disabled or handicapped. Mr. Dale J. McKeand, Manager of Plant Operations for Energy Systems, stated that Tadlock was not disabled and never asked for any accommodation for his “condition.” In addition, Mr. Richard S. Brookins, an industrial hygiene, safety and environmental coordinator for Energy Systems, stated that Tadlock worked full-time with no medical or duty restrictions and that he was terminated for his safety violations including urinating on the boiler room floor. Assuming that Tadlock could prove that he was handicapped, his actions after he was dismissed do not indicate a person with a handicap. Specifically, immediately after Tadlock’s dismissal, Tadlock opened a skinning shop for the purpose of skinning wild game (alligators, etc.). Skinning is a very physical job and it requires an individual to handle large game animals for the purpose of skinning hides from the carcasses of the animals. For the reasons stated above, there is no evidence to support that Tadlock was dismissed for any reason other than cause.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that this matter be dismissed with prejudice. DONE and ORDERED this 27th day of March, 1997, at Tallahassee, Florida. ` WILLIAM A. BUZZETT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of March, 1997.
