Findings Of Fact Respondent has been employed by the School Board of Dade County, Florida, as a continuing contract teacher for some years. The contract between the Dade County Public Schools and the United Teachers of Dade, introduced as Respondent's Exhibit No. 1, contains the terms and conditions of Respondent's employment. The contract states that the superintendent has the authority to assign or reassign the Respondent to any school within the system. The superintendent or his designee may, when deemed in the best interest of the school system, involuntarily transfer a teacher. Before a teacher is involuntarily transferred a conference shall be held with the area superintendent or his designee or appropriate division head, except where such transfers are the result of a legal order. The contract further provides for the filing of grievances by employees concerning the application or interpretation of the wages, hours, terms, and conditions of employment as defined in the contract. The contract defines a grievance as a formal allegation by an employee that there has been a violation, misinterpretation or misapplication of any of the terms and conditions of employment set forth in the contract. Respondent was involuntarily transferred from a sixth grade teaching position at Edison Park Elementary School to a first grade teaching position at Primary C Elementary School. Prior to the transfer he was afforded the opportunity of a conference with a designee of the Area Superintendent at which time he unsuccessfully challenged his transfer. The Respondent believes that the conference which was held was a sham and was not meaningful. Respondent continued to be dissatisfied with the transfer and continued to seek a solution to his problem by engaging in subsequent conversations with the Area Superintendent and others within the Dade County School System. Respondent did not follow the provisions for grievance filing contained in the contract but rather reported for duty on August 25, 1976. On or about that date, he notified his principal and Mr. Steve Moore, the Assistant Superintendent for Personnel, that he would not and did not intend to remain at his assigned position. Respondent worked on August 26, 1976, but then departed, calling in sick for the work days up to and including October 8, 1976. This period of absence constituted authorized sick leave. On October 8, 1976, Respondent advised Dr. West and other members of the school system administrative staff that he was available for assignment to another school but would not report to work at Primary C Elementary School. Up to and including the date of the hearing, Respondent has failed and refused to report for duty at his assigned work location and has in fact performed no duties as a teacher during that time. The school system administration has at no time authorized Respondent's absence from duty from October 8, 1976, to the date of the hearing.
The Issue Whether the Broward County School Board (School Board) has an unwritten policy excluding all charter schools, including the City's charter schools, from consideration in the distribution of funds under Section 1011.71(2), Florida Statutes1 (Challenged Statement) and, if so, whether that unwritten policy constitutes a "rule," within the meaning of Section 120.52(16), Florida Statutes, that violates Section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes, as alleged by the City of Pembroke Pines (City).
The Issue The issue in this case is whether a district school board is entitled to suspend for 30 workdays, without pay, a paraprofessional for just cause based upon the allegation that he kicked an autistic student and struck the student with an umbrella.
Findings Of Fact Background The Miami-Dade County School Board ("School Board"), Petitioner in this case, is the constitutional entity authorized to operate, control, and supervise the Miami-Dade County Public School System. As of the final hearing, Respondent Robert Blanc ("Blanc") had worked in the Miami-Dade County Public School System for more than 20 years. During the 2006-07 school year, and at all times relevant to this case, Blanc was employed as a therapeutic paraprofessional at South Miami Senior High School, where he provided educational services to students with disabilities. The alleged incident giving rise to this case occurred on Friday, October 12, 2007. The School Board alleges that on that date, at approximately 2:30 p.m., Blanc kicked an autistic student named C. R. in the leg, and then used his umbrella to strike C. R. on the arm. This allegation is based on the accusations of two purported eyewitness (hereafter, collectively, the "Accusers")——Julie Ann Rodriguez and Nemy Aimable——both of whom were (and as of the final hearing continued to be) education paraprofessionals working at South Miami Senior High School. Blanc consistently has maintained his innocence, denying that he kicked or struck C. R. as charged. Moreover, he claims——and testified at hearing——that C. R. kicked him, and that he (Blanc) then used verbal commands to redirect C. R. and get the student to sit down, thereby protecting himself and others. This case boils down to a credibility contest between the Accusers and Blanc. If the Accusers' account is truthful and accurate, then Blanc is guilty of at least one of the charges against him and should be disciplined. On the other hand, if Blanc's account is believed, then he is not guilty of misconduct. Given that the credibility determination drives the outcome, the undersigned will first, as a predicate to evaluating the evidence, set forth the competing accounts of the incident in question, and then make determinations, to the extent possible, as to what might have happened. It is important to note, however, that unless otherwise specifically stated, the findings in the next two sections merely report what the respective witnesses said occurred; these do not necessarily correspond to the undersigned's findings about what likely took place on October 12, 2007. The Accusers' Story While the respective accounts of Ms. Rodriguez and Mr. Aimable concerning the incident in question differ as to some nontrivial details, they agree on the big picture. Their story begins at about 2:30 on a Friday afternoon. The Accusers were on "bus duty," as were other staff members, as was Blanc. Ms. Rodriguez and Mr. Aimable were sitting next to one another on a wall or ledge overlooking a field of grass that lay between them and the road where a line a buses stood waiting for children to clamber aboard. This was a busy time of day, and many people were moving about the bus loading area. Sitting on the long wall with the Accusers were a number of other school employees——at least 25 teachers and aides in all, maybe more, Ms. Rodriguez recalled (and the undersigned finds). Blanc, however, was not sitting on the wall; he was standing on the grass, among the students. Ms. Rodriguez and Mr. Aimable were engaged in conversation, when suddenly each noticed Blanc——who was located about 10 feet in front of them——kick C. R. on the leg and strike the student with an umbrella across the upper body. Ms. Rodriguez recalls that C. R. was sitting down on a ledge, near other faculty members, when Blanc attacked. Mr. Aimable, in contrast, remembers C. R. standing in the grass when Blanc struck. According to Ms. Rodriguez, Blanc yelled at C. R., threatening to "beat up" the student if C. R. ever hit Blanc again. Mr. Aimable does not recall Blanc making such a threat, although he vaguely remembers Blanc uttering something about not letting C. R. get away with hitting him. By their own admissions, which are accepted as credible and found as fact, neither of the Accusers saw anything that transpired between Blanc and C. R. before the alleged battery. The altercation upset Ms. Rodriguez, and she began to cry. She and Mr. Aimable continued talking——but not about the battery they had just witnessed. It is undisputed that neither of them made any attempt to protect C. R. or other students from Blanc; nor did they examine C. R. for injuries or offer any assistance.1 No one else did either. Apparently none of the other staff members on the scene saw Blanc attack C. R., and the Accusers (it is found, again based on undisputed evidence) did not mention to anyone sitting near them on the wall the remarkable event they had seen. About ten minutes later, the Accusers rose from the wall and walked to the office, where they would "sign out" for the day. Blanc's Testimony Blanc, who was on bus duty the afternoon of Friday, October 12, 2007, was standing in the middle of the grassy area near the buses, chatting with another teacher, when he felt a sharp pain in his lower right leg. C. R. had just kicked him hard, without warning, and was now pressing very close, invading his personal space. C. R. is a special education student who has been diagnosed with autism. He is reportedly nonverbal. (C. R. did not appear at the final hearing.) It is an undisputed fact that C. R. has a history of violent and assaultive behavior: he has injured teachers and once broke a bus driver's nose; in addition, he hurt a student by striking her in the stomach. Also material are the undisputed facts that C. R. is an adult- sized male who, at the time of the incident, was 17 years old, stood approximately six feet tall, and weighed about 200 pounds. Blanc, who is blind in one eye, was taken by surprise when C. R. attacked him. Though his hands were full——Blanc was holding a collapsible umbrella in one hand and a coffee mug in the other——he raised his arms to protect his face, yelled at C. R. to sit down, and began backing C. R. toward the ledge, where he could be seated. This approach worked. C. R. sat down, and the situation was defused. At this point, Isidro Alfonso, who is C. R.'s one-on-one paraprofessional, took charge of C. R. Blanc immediately reported to his supervisor, Yvette Williams, that C. R. had kicked him. Ms. Williams was (and as of the final hearing continued to be) a special education teacher at South Miami Senior High School. She, too, was on bus duty that day but had arrived on the scene after the incident took place. Blanc told Ms. Williams that he was going home to put ice on his ankle, which hurt. Ms. Williams saw no need to report the incident because C. R. was known to lash out at teachers and others. Blanc, for his part, declined to make a formal report out of concern for Mr. Alfonso, who, he felt certain, would be disciplined for inattentiveness if the matter were brought to the attention of the administration. Resolutions of Evidential Conflict The competing accounts of what occurred are sufficiently in conflict that both cannot simultaneously be considered fully accurate. The fact-finder's dilemma is that neither account——the Accusers' on the one hand, Blanc's on the other——is inherently incredible, impossible, or patently a fabrication; neither, in short, can be readily or easily dismissed as false. Of course, it is not the School Board's burden to prove to a certainty that its allegations are true, but only that its allegations are most likely true. As the fact-finder, the undersigned therefore must consider how likely it is that the incident took place as described by the respective witnesses. In evaluating the credibility of the witnesses who testified against Blanc, the undersigned has considered the relationship that existed between Ms. Rodriguez and Mr. Aimable, as well as their post-incident conduct. As mentioned above, after the incident, the Accusers walked to the office together, arriving at about 2:45 p.m. At some point, they agreed to report what they had observed, namely that Blanc had physically attacked a disabled student. Yet, once the two were in the office, they decided that it was "too busy" there——and so, rather than waiting to be seen, they left after at most ten minutes, without telling anyone in authority that Blanc had (at least as they understood the situation) committed a battery on a minor. This impatience seems a bit strange, given the circumstances. The undersigned supposes that a reasonable school employee, having witnessed an incident as serious as the one the Accusers claim to have seen, would have been insistent about speaking to someone in the administration about it. That the Accusers lacked such persistence does not completely discredit them, but it does raise doubts about their veracity. Leaving the office, Ms. Rodriguez and Mr. Aimable walked to the parking lot, got into Ms. Rodriguez's car, and drove off the premises together, around three o'clock. This was not unusual for them: they carpooled to work. Ms. Rodriguez and Mr. Aimable were not, in other words, merely co-workers; they were co-workers who spent off-duty time together. The Accusers made two stops on the way home that day, to pick up Ms. Rodriguez's children from their respective schools. Ms. Rodriguez then dropped off Mr. Aimable at his place. By that time, it was about 3:35 p.m. At home, Mr. Aimable continued to stew about the incident, he says, and after about an hour, around 4:30, he called Ms. Rodriguez to ask that she pick him up and return with him to the school to report the matter. According to Mr. Aimable, Ms. Rodriguez assented; she arrived at his residence around 4:50 p.m. From there, they proceeded to the school, where they eventually found an assistant principal, Ms. Tudor. It was now around 5:30 Friday evening, some three hours after the alleged event. Each of the Accusers prepared for Ms. Tudor a written statement about the incident. According to Mr. Aimable, this process took until about 6:45 p.m., at which time the Accusers went home. Later Friday night, at a homecoming dance, Ms. Tudor notified the school's principal, Gilberto Bonce, about the complaint made earlier against Blanc; she also let him know that the Accusers' statements were on his desk. Mr. Bonce took no action that night, however, nor did he do anything in reference to alleged incident over the weekend or during the following Monday, October 15. Curiously, in view of the possibility (if the Accusers were believed) that one of his staff might have committed a crime against a student, Mr. Bonce did not report the matter to the school police until Tuesday, October 16, 2007. All in all, the circumstances——especially the following——give the undersigned reasons to discount the Accusers' testimonies. The failure of Ms. Rodriguez and Mr. Aimable to take any immediate action at the scene of the incident not only is inconsistent with their claim to have seen Blanc beat C. R., but also it ensured that there would be no better evidence than their eyewitness accounts of a sudden and unexpected, fast-moving event whose duration can be measured in seconds. Had the Accusers gone to the aid of C. R., as a reasonable, responsible adult in their position should have done, they could have examined him for injuries. If Blanc had given C. R. a hard kick in the leg and struck him with an umbrella, the blows likely would have left at least a red mark somewhere on the student's body. Mr. Aimable, for example, could have studied such a mark or welt, not for a moment, but long enough to form a firm, lasting impression, one less subject to misinterpretation or distortion than the mental image left behind after catching a fleeting glimpse of activity that occurred unexpectedly in his field of vision, while focused on something else. Testimony about such an injury would have been compelling. But there was none. The Accusers' decision not to report the incident immediately because it was too "busy" in the office is inconsistent with the gravity of the alleged misconduct. But more than that, because Ms. Rodriguez and Mr. Aimable left the premises together before telling anyone about what they claim they saw, the two had ample opportunity to talk privately for a couple of hours——plenty of time to "get their story straight." One does not need to believe that the Accusers consciously intended to harm Blanc to realize that their discussing the incident (which they must have done——after all, they returned to the school on a Friday evening to make a report about it) likely helped them reach a consensus about what had happened, potentially corrupting their memories in the process. The Accusers' respective accounts are not, at bottom, independent accounts, and may, in fact, be dependent on one another.2 Indeed, in this case, one eyewitness might have been more persuasive than these two. Finally, it is significant that, while the incident took place in full view of more than two dozen responsible adults, not one of them intervened——and no one (besides the Accusers) even saw the altercation. To be sure, these facts cut both ways: nobody saw C. R. kick Blanc or intervened to help him either. Nevertheless, as between the competing scenarios, it seems more likely that C. R. was the attacker, rather than the other way around, for at least two reasons. First, C. R. had a history of assaultive behavior whereas Blanc did not. Second, if Blanc were inclined to hit C. R., he likely would have refrained from doing so in broad daylight before an audience of his peers. C. R., on the other hand, being severely autistic and physically aggressive in nature, would not likely have been deterred by the presence of witnesses. Taken as a whole, the evidence is insufficient to establish that, more likely than not, Blanc struck C. R. as alleged. Based on the evidence, the undersigned believes that, as between the two scenarios presented, the incident more likely occurred as Blanc described it; in other words, relative to Accusers' account, Blanc's is more likely true. Accordingly, the undersigned accepts and adopts, as findings of historical fact, the statements made in paragraphs 12 through 15 above. The upshot is that the School Board failed to carry its burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Blanc committed a disciplinable offense. Determinations of Ultimate Fact The greater weight of the evidence fails to establish that Blanc is guilty of the offense of violating the School Board's policy against violence and threatening behavior in the workplace. The greater weight of the evidence fails to establish that Blanc is guilty of the offense of unseemly conduct. The greater weight of the evidence fails to establish that Blanc is guilty of violating the School Board's Code of Ethics.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board enter a final order exonerating Blanc of all charges brought against him in this proceeding and awarding him the back pay, plus benefits if any, which accrued while he served the previously imposed suspension of 30 workdays. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of January, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January, 2009.
The Issue Whether just cause exists, pursuant to section 1012.33, Florida Statutes,2 to suspend Respondent from his employment as a teacher for ten days without pay. 1 All references to chapter 120 are to the 2019 version. 2 All references to chapter 1012 are to the 2018 version, which was in effect at the time of the alleged misconduct at issue in this proceeding.
Findings Of Fact Based on the credible and persuasive competent substantial evidence in the record, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Parties Petitioner, Miami-Dade County School Board, is charged with the duty to operate, control, and supervise free public schools in Miami-Dade County pursuant to section 1001.32, Florida Statutes (2018), and article IX, section 4(b) of the Florida Constitution. Respondent has been employed by Petitioner as a teacher since 2000. He has been employed as an art teacher at E.W.F. Stirrup Elementary School ("Stirrup") for the last 18 years, including when he is alleged to have engaged in the conduct that has given rise to this proceeding. Respondent is certified in art, graphic design, and vocational education. Notice of Specific Charges The Notice of Specific Charges ("NSC"), which constitutes the administrative complaint in this proceeding, alleges two instances of conduct on Respondent's part as the grounds for the proposed disciplinary action. Specifically, the NSC alleges that on or about September 27, 2018, Respondent told a female 5th grade student words to the effect of "get out here; I do not want you here," and forcibly pushed her away with his hand. The NSC also alleges that Respondent used profanity, spoken in Spanish— specifically, the words "mierda"3 and "pinga"4?while covering a class of kindergarten students. The complaint alleges that two adults witnessed Respondent's use of these words.5 This incident is alleged to have occurred on or about December 5, 2018. Based on this alleged conduct, the NSC charges Respondent with misconduct in office, pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-5.056(2), for having violated specified provisions of rule 6A-10.081, Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession; School Board Policy 3210, Standards of Ethical Conduct; and School Board Policy 3210.01, Code of Ethics. Evidence Adduced at the Final Hearing The September 27, 2018 Incident 3 Translated into English, "mierda" means "shit." 4 Translated into English, "pinga," as used in the context pertinent to this proceeding, means "fuck." 5 As more fully discussed below, the NSC does not allege that Respondent's use of these words was directed at any students, or that any students saw or heard Respondent use these words. On September 27, 2018, S.D., a minor, was a student in Respondent's 5th grade art class. S.D. testified, credibly, that on that day, Respondent told her to "get out of his way," then pushed her away by placing his hands on her shoulders. She testified that Respondent's words and actions made her feel "embarrassed, or, like, weird." S.D. acknowledged that she had gone up to Respondent and tried to talk to him while he was talking to the president of the Parent Teacher Association ("PTA"). She tried to get hand sanitizer and Respondent said to her "not now, go away" because he was talking to the PTA president at that time. Respondent characterized S.D. as a child who "has a reputation for basically not obeying anything." He testified that when S.D. approached his desk, he was in a discussion with the PTA president, and he told S.D. to "get out of here" and "sit down." He did not recall touching her. He stated that from where he was standing, he doubted that he could have reached her to push her away, and that had he pushed her, she likely would have fallen. No other witnesses testified at the final hearing regarding this incident. The December 5, 2018 Incident On Wednesday, December 5, 2018, Respondent was assigned to cover another teacher's kindergarten class starting at 9:00 a.m., so that the teacher who regularly taught that class, Ms. Rivero, could attend an exceptional student education ("ESE") meeting regarding one of her students. For the 2018-2019 school year, Respondent was assigned a full day of planning each Wednesday. In addition, Respondent was assigned one hour of planning every other day of the school week, per the Miami-Dade School District ("District") policy of providing teachers a minimum of one hour of planning per day.6 6 Respondent was assigned a full day of planning on Wednesdays in the 2018-2019 school year. This was not a function of his having an extraordinary workload; rather, it was because on Wednesdays, the language arts classes were scheduled back-to-back and students were dismissed early, so that it was infeasible to schedule art classes on Wednesdays. As a result of this scheduling, Respondent enjoyed nearly four more hours of planning per week than the minimum planning time to which he was entitled under the District's planning policy. According to Smith-Moise, if a teacher's schedule provides more than an hour of planning per day, that teacher may be requested, from time to time, to use that additional planning time for involvement in other school activities, including covering other teachers' classes as necessary. The administration at Stirrup generally attempts to schedule substitute teachers to cover classes when a teacher is called away from his or her class; however, on December 5, 2018, another teacher's class already was being covered by a substitute teacher. Because Respondent had planning that entire day, he did not have classes, so was available to cover Rivero's class. The length of ESE meetings varies, depending on the type of ESE service being delivered and whether the students' parents agree with the school district regarding the ESE services proposed to be provided. This particular meeting was an initial ESE team staffing meeting; these types of meetings often are relatively long compared to other types of ESE meetings. Respondent covered Rivero's class on December 5, 2018, from approximately 8:35 a.m. until shortly after 1:00 p.m., when a substitute teacher was called to cover the class for the remainder of the ESE meeting. During the time he was covering Rivero's class, Respondent called the Stirrup administration office multiple times, and also called and sent text messages to a fellow teacher, Yvette Mestre, asking how long the ESE meeting would take and when it would be over. In response to Respondent's calls, Smith-Moise twice left the ESE meeting to speak to Respondent in Rivero's classroom. Both times, when she entered the classroom, she observed Respondent disengaged from the students and talking very loudly on his phone. Respondent made clear to Smith-Moise that he was very frustrated at having his planning time taken to cover Rivero's class when he had other responsibilities to attend to.7 7 Respondent testified that he had a great deal of work to do on a large mural project for his own classes that needed to be completed under a tight deadline. Shortly after the beginning of the school day on December 5, 2018, Smith- Moise had taken a student from Rivero's class to Mestre's classroom because the student was misbehaving in Rivero's classroom. A short time thereafter, Respondent began sending text messages to Mestre, asking when the ESE meeting was going to be over. Mestre, who was occupied with teaching her own class, responded that she did not know, and suggested that Respondent contact the administration office. Around 10:30 or 11:00 a.m., Respondent began calling Mestre, again asking about the length of the ESE meeting. Mestre testified that "he seemed upset because he had stuff that he wanted to plan." Mestre again responded that she did not know and suggested that Respondent contact the administration office. At some point, Mestre went to Rivero's classroom to retrieve a lunchbox for the student from Rivero's class whom she was supervising. When she entered the classroom, she observed Respondent on his phone. Respondent told Mestre that he was on the phone with his United Teachers of Dade ("UTD") representative and that he was upset at having to cover Rivero's class because it was his planning day. Mestre went to the administrative office and reported to Smith-Moise that Respondent was upset and needed assistance in Rivero's classroom. Smith-Moise directed Mestre to take Acevedo Molina, an office assistant, to the classroom so that she (Acevedo Molina) could assist Respondent. According to Mestre, when they entered the classroom, Respondent initially thought Acevedo Molina was going to take over supervision of the class; however, when Mestre informed him that Acevedo Molina was there to assist him but would not be taking over supervision of the class, Respondent became very irate, raised his voice, and used the words "mierda" and "pinga" in speaking to them.8 Acevedo Molina confirmed that Respondent used these words when he spoke to her and Mestre. Mestre and Acevedo Molina were, respectively, "shocked" and "surprised" at Respondent's use of these words. 8 Mestre testified that Respondent said, translated into English, "[t]he school doesn't understand the shit that I do," and "they don't give a fuck what I do in this school." Respondent testified that he does not recall having said those words when he spoke to Mestre and Acevedo Molina that day. There is conflicting evidence whether Respondent used those words inside the classroom, such that they were said within earshot of the students, or outside of the classroom, where the students would not be able to hear or see him use the words. Mestre and Acevedo Molina both testified that they had entered Rivero's classroom and were inside the classroom with Respondent when he used the words. Respondent claims that he had to have stepped outside of the classroom into the corridor to speak to Mestre and Acevedo Molina, because the door was locked and they would have been unable to open it and enter the classroom on their own. In any event, it is unnecessary to determine whether Respondent used these words in the classroom within the students' earshot, because the NSC only charges Respondent with having said "mierda" and "pinga" while "covering a class of kindergarten students for another teacher," and that Respondent's use of these words was "overheard by two adult witnesses." The NSC does not allege that Respondent directed the words toward any students or that any students saw or heard him use these words.9 No direct or persuasive circumstantial evidence was presented showing that any students saw or overheard Respondent use those words. Although Mestre and Acevedo Molina testified that Respondent was inside the classroom when he said the words, both testified that the words were not directed toward the students, and neither testified that any students heard or saw Respondent say those words. Thus, even if the evidence conclusively established that Respondent was inside the classroom when he said those words—which it does not—that does not prove that any students saw or heard Respondent use those words. To that point, Smith-Moise 9 Trevisani v. Dep't of Health, 908 So. 2d 1008, 1009 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)(a respondent cannot be disciplined for offenses not factually alleged in the administrative complaint); Cottrill v. Dep't of Ins., 685 So. 2d 1371, 1372 (Fla 1st DCA 1996)(predicating disciplinary action on conduct never alleged in an administrative complaint or some comparable pleading violates the Administrative Procedure Act). See Hunter v. Dep't of Prof'l Reg., 458 So. 2d 842, 844 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)(administrative complaint seeking to impose discipline must state, with specificity, the acts giving rise to the complaint). testified that the school had not received any complaints about Respondent's use of those words from any of the students or their parents. The UTD Contract establishes a policy of imposing progressive discipline ("Progressive Discipline Policy") when "the Board deems it appropriate, and . . . the degree of discipline shall be reasonably related to the seriousness of the offense." Neither the Progressive Discipline Policy nor Petitioner's adopted policies articulate a disciplinary "scale" or penalty categories applicable to specific types of conduct. There is no competent substantial evidence in the record showing that Respondent previously has been subjected to disciplinary action by Petitioner. Petitioner did not present any competent substantial evidence establishing the factual basis for its proposal to suspend Respondent for ten days for the offenses charged in the NSC. Findings of Ultimate Fact As noted above, Petitioner has charged Respondent with misconduct in office under rule 6A-5.056(2) for having violated specified provisions of rule 6A-10.081, Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession; School Board Policy 3210, Standards of Ethical Conduct; and School Board Policy 3210.01, Code of Ethics. Whether an offense constitutes a violation of applicable statutes, rules, and policies is a question of ultimate fact to be determined by the trier of fact in the context of each violation. McKinney v. Castor, 667 So. 2d 387, 389 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)(whether particular conduct violates a statute, rule, or policy is a factual question); Langston v. Jamerson, 653 So. 2d 489, 491 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)(whether the conduct, as found, constitutes a violation of statutes, rules, or policies is a question of ultimate fact); Holmes v. Turlington, 480 So. 2d 150, 153 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)(whether there was a deviation from a standard of conduct is not a conclusion of law, but is instead an ultimate fact). Charged Conduct and Rule Violations The September 27, 2018 Incident Based on the foregoing, it is determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Respondent pushed S.D. on September 27, 2018. There was no justification for Respondent to place his hands on and push S.D., even if she interrupted him while he was speaking with another person. Respondent's conduct in pushing S.D. constituted misconduct in office, as defined in rule 6A-5.056(2). Specifically, Respondent's conduct did not comport with rule 6A-10.081(1)(a), which provides that his primary professional concern must be for the student, and requires him to exercise best professional judgment. In pushing S.D., he did not treat her as his primary professional concern, and he did not exercise best professional judgment. Additionally, Respondent's conduct did not comply with rule 6A-10.081(2)(a)1. or School Board Policies 3210 and 3210.01. Specifically, in pushing S.D., Respondent did not make a reasonable effort to protect her from conditions harmful to her mental and physical health and safety. Although S.D. was not physically injured, she was embarrassed by Respondent's conduct in pushing her. Respondent's conduct also did not comply with rule 6A-10.081(2)(a)5. or School Board Policies 3210 and 3210.01. Respondent's conduct in pushing S.D. was intentional and it exposed her to embarrassment. Because Respondent's conduct in pushing S.D. violated rules 6A- 10.081(1)(a)1. and (2)(a)1. and 5., and School Board Policies 3210 and 3210.01, it is found, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Respondent committed misconduct in office, pursuant to rule 6A-5.056(2). Pursuant to the UTD Progressive Discipline Policy, it is determined that Respondent's conduct in pushing S.D. was sufficiently serious to warrant suspending him without pay for five days. There was no justification for him having pushed her. Although S.D. was not physically injured as a result of Respondent's conduct, the potential existed for her to have been injured had she fallen, and, in any event, Respondent's intentional action subjected her to embarrassment. The December 5, 2018 Incident Based on the foregoing findings, it is determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Respondent used the words "mierda" and "pinga," which are profane words, when speaking to Mestre and Acevedo Molina on December 5, 2018. However, for the reasons discussed above, it is determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Respondent did not direct those words toward the students or that any students heard or saw him use those words.10 Respondent's use of profanity in speaking to Mestre and Acevedo Molina did not comport with rule 6A-10.081(1)(c). In using profanity toward his colleagues, Respondent did not strive to achieve and sustain the highest degree of ethical conduct. Mestre and Acevedo Molina both testified to the effect that they viewed his conduct as inappropriate in that professional setting. Respondent's use of those words when speaking to Mestre and Acevedo Molina did not comply with the requirement in School Board Policy 3210 to refrain from the use of profane or abusive language in the workplace. Respondent's use of those words when speaking with Mestre and Acevedo Molina also did not comply with the standard set forth in School Board Policy 3210.01, which requires the employee to show respect for other people. In sum, Respondent's conduct in saying "mierda" and "pinga" while speaking to Mestre and Acevedo Molina violated rules 6A-10.081(1)(c) and School Board policies 3210 and 3210.01. Accordingly, Respondent's conduct constituted misconduct in office under rule 6A-5.056(2). As discussed above, there is no competent substantial evidence establishing that Respondent has ever been subjected to discipline by Petitioner prior to this proceeding. Although Respondent's conduct in using profanity when speaking to two adult colleagues violates certain policies, in light of the UTD Progressive Discipline Policy, such violation is not sufficiently serious to warrant suspension without pay. Therefore, it is determined that, consistent with the concept of progressive 10 Further, as discussed above, the administrative complaint does not charge Respondent with using those words toward students or charge that any students saw or heard him use those words. discipline, Petitioner should issue a verbal reprimand to Respondent for his conduct in using profanity when speaking to his colleagues. Because Respondent was not charged with, and the evidence did not prove, that he directed profanity toward any students or that any students saw or heard him use profanity, Petitioner may not impose discipline on Respondent on that basis. Just Cause Based on the foregoing, it is determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that just cause exists to suspend Respondent. Recommended Penalty Based on the foregoing, it is determined that Respondent should be suspended for five days without pay for having pushed S.D. Based on the foregoing, it is determined that Respondent should be issued a verbal reprimand for using profanity when speaking to Mestre and Acevedo Molina and Respondent should receive five days of back pay for the balance of the ten-day period for which Petitioner proposed to suspend him.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that, consistent with the foregoing, Petitioner enter a final order suspending Respondent from his employment as a teacher for five days without pay, issuing a verbal reprimand to Respondent, and awarding Respondent back pay for five days. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of June, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of June, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Christopher J. La Piano, Esquire Miami-Dade County School Board 1450 Northeast Second Avenue, Suite 430 Miami, Florida 33132 (eServed) Mark Herdman, Esquire Herdman & Sakellarides, P.A. 29605 U.S. Highway 19 North, Suite 110 Clearwater, Florida 33761-1526 (eServed) Cristina Rivera, Esquire Miami-Dade County School Board 1450 Northeast Second Avenue, Suite 430 Miami, Florida 33132 (eServed) Carlos M. Sanjurjo Apartment 214 14907 Southwest 80th Street Miami, Florida 33193 Alberto M. Carvalho, Superintendent Miami-Dade County Public Schools 1450 Northeast Second Avenue, Suite 912 Miami, Florida 33132 Matthew Mears, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 (eServed) Richard Corcoran, Commissioner of Education Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 (eServed)
The Issue Whether the employment of Petitioner, Cornelius B. Frankliln, was improperly terminated by Respondent, The School Board of Seminole County, in the summer of 1988.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, C.B. Franklin, began service with the School Board of Seminole County in the position of teacher in the 1951-52 academic year. In 1955, Petitioner was awarded a continuing contract of employment by Respondent in the position of teacher. Said continuing contract was in effect at all times relevant hereto. Petitioner was last employed by the School Board of Seminole County, Florida, as an Assistant Principal II at Sanford Middle School on an annual contract of employment, which terminated of June 10, 1989. During his employment at Sanford Middle School as an assistant principal from 1980 through 1988, Petitioner received satisfactory annual evaluations. In March, 1988, Owen McCarron, Assistant Superintendent, applied a "staffing formula" for each school in Seminole County. The staffing formula is not a school board rule but is a formula that the school board approves based upon student population to determine the number of teachers, secretaries, assistant principals, and others needed at each specific school. Mr. McCarron is responsible for the application of the formula. The application of the formula is not submitted to the school board for approval. Mr. McCarron made a mistake in the preparation of the staffing formula for 1988/89. The mistake made was that the number of assistant principals for Sanford Middle School would be reduced from two to one. Having been informed of a reduction, Dan Pelham, Principal, Sanford Middle School, determined that he would have to choose among the Assistant Principal II's employed and decided not to recommend the continued employment of Petitioner. Owen McCarron discovered the mistake and notified Dan Pelham, sometime in late March, 1989. However, Dan Pelham chose not to recommend the continued employment of Petitioner but rather to advertise the position as being vacant. When Mr. Pelham was notified the position was reinstated he considered it to be an "opportunity" to consider alternative persons for the position. Mr. Pelham's decision was based on Petitioner's performance as reflected by his annual evaluations and faculty input. Mr. Pelham held a conference with Petitioner on April 8, 1988, and Petitioner was advised that his contract as an assistant principal at Sanford Middle School would not be renewed for the school year 1988-89, because the School Board had reduced the number of assistant principal positions at Sanford Middle School from two (2) positions to one (1). Petitioner was offered a teaching position, under his continuing contract status, at Sanford Middle School as a peer counselor. The Respondent did not act to approve the reduction in positions, nor was the Respondent notified that Petitioner was not being recommended for reemployment. The School Board does not have a rule to govern how the decision is to be made upon a reduction in staff. At the time of the hearing and at all relevant times prior thereto, Petitioner held a valid Florida Department of Education certification in the teaching fields of health education, physical education and supervision and administration. On or about June 9, 1989, one day prior to the expiration of Petitioner's contract as Assistant Principal II, the Petitioner met with Dan Pelham and John Reichert, Director of Personnel. At that time, Petitioner was again advised by Mr. Pelham that he had not changed his decision not to renew Petitioner as an assistant principal, even though he had been advised that the position had been restored. The Petitioner was advised that he could apply for the vacant Assistant Principal II position but he would have to submit an application and a resume. The Petitioner responded that Dan Pelham was well aware of his qualifications, and that a copy of his resume was on file. At that time, Mr. Pelham offered Petitioner the peer counselor position, but salary was not discussed. Petitioner was given copies of documents containing the job information for the position of peer counselor. The position had not previously existed and had not been advertised. Petitioner was reassured that he had employment with the School Board as a teacher under his continuing contract status. At the same meeting, Mr. Reichert advised Petitioner to accept the teaching position, and at the same time apply for the assistant principal vacancy at Sanford Middle School. Petitioner applied for state retirement on June 27, 1988, and his retirement was accepted by the School Board of Seminole County thereafter, on July 13, 1988. Prior to the time Petitioner submitted his application for retirement, he was verbally offered a teaching position under his continuing contract status for the 1988-89 school year at Sanford Middle School. Petitioner is an experienced school administrator, holds a master's degree in [school] administration and supervision from Rollins College, in Winter Park, Florida. As a component of his master's degree requirement he had instruction in school law. Petitioner was aware that his employment as an assistant principal was on the basis of an annual contract of employment and that the position was not entitled to continuing contract status. Petitioner did not apply for the position of Assistant Principal II (secondary) at Sanford Middle School, after it was declared vacant and advertised (in the Spring of 1988), even though he was told that he would be considered for reappointment to the position if he did. Petitioner was aware that if he accepted the offered position of peer counselor his pay would resume in the Fall of 1988, along with all of the other teachers, and that he would be paid at the top of the teaching salary scale on the basis of his thirty (30) plus years of service. Petitioner did not respond, verbally or in writing, to the offered position of peer counselor subsequent to its offer and prior to his retirement. Mr. L. David Pelham, the principal of Sanford Middle School, was not obligated to reappoint Petitioner to the position of assistant principal, after June 10, 1988. However, Petitioner was entiled to a performance assessment prior to that date. Mr. Pelham recognized that Petitioner held continuing contract status and was entitled to be placed in a teaching position at Sanford Middle School for the 1988-89 school year and thereafter. Petitioner never discussed his decision to retire with Mr. Reichert or Mr. Pelham. Neither person had any communications with Petitioner after the June 9, 1988 meeting. Petitioner's annual contract of employment clearly put him on notice that neither he nor the school board owed the other any further contractual obligation after June 9, 1988 and that he had no expectancy of employment as an assistant principal after June 10, 1988.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the affirmative relief sought by the Petitioner should be DENIED. It is further RECOMMENDED that each party should bear their own costs and attorneys fees. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of October, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of October, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 89-2007 The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Findings of Fact Paragraphs 1 (1st three sentences), 2, 3, 4 (1st sentence), 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 (except the last 2 sentences) - Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 4 (2d sentence), 9,12 - Rejected as against the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 11 (except sentence 2)-Rejected as subservient. Respondents Findings of Fact Paragraph 1 through 26 - Accepted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert E. Hughes Superintendent of Schools c/o Seminole County School Board 1211 Melonville Avenue Sanford, Florida 32771 John D. Carlson, Esquire Gatlin, Woods, Carlson & Cowdery 1709-D Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Ned N. Julian, Jr., Esquire Stenstrom, McIntosh, Julian, Colbert, Whigham & Simmons, P.A. Post Office Box 1330 Sanford, Florida 32772-1330 Sydney H. McKenzie General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, PL-08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue Whether actions taken by the Hillsborough County School Board prior to December 1, 1974, were sufficient to achieve comparability pursuant to the provisions of Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, as amended. whether budgeting and establishing positions by the School Board is sufficient to meet the test of comparability.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, through its compensatory education section, has the responsibility of administering the Title I program, as called for in the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, as amended, and for dispensing federal-funds to the various school districts throughout the state of Florida. Petitioner, Hillsborough County School Board, is a large urban school district of over 100,000 children. It has some 11,000 employees and 6,000 instructional employees. Employees are allocated on the formula of a per pupil basis, and numerous adjustments must be made after the fall opening of the schools because of major shifts of pupils over a summertime. Allocations, in order to comply with Title I, is a task which requires a great deal of attention, particularly in the fall of the school year. The following sequence of events are pertinent: The Hillsborough County Title I application for FY '75 was approved initially on the basis of the assurance which was signed by the District School Superintendent indicating that comparability existed in the Hillsborough County Title I schools and would continue to be maintained throughout the 1974-75 school year. A memorandum dated September 27, 1974, was signed by Halley B. Lewis, Jr., Administrator, Compensatory Education, and was circulated to all local school districts in Florida confirming that the U.S. Commissioner of Education was designating October 1, 1974, as the date for collecting data on which a comparability report for FY '75 would be based. On October 7 and 8, 1974, the Compensatory Education Section in the Florida Department of Education sponsored a statewide meeting of Title I, ESEA personnel in Orlando. One of the sessions was devoted to comparability. On November 7 and 8, 1974, the Compensatory Education Section of the Florida Department of Education called a meeting for District School Superintendents, Finance Officers, Federal Program Directors and ESEA, Title I Coordinators from the eleven (11) most populous counties in Florida at the request of one (1) or more District School Federal Program Directors. One- half of the program--which amounted to one-half day--was devoted to comparability as outlined in Section 116.26 of the regulations as promulgated in the Federal Register, Volume 38, Number 124, for Thursday, June 28, 1973. On November 20, 1974, in a memorandum from Woodrow J. Darden marked "URGENT", the Respondent advised all Superintendents, the Finance Officers and Title I Coordinators that the comparability reports were due on or before December 1, 1974. A part of said memorandum stated: "If the comparability report submitted by your district did not meet the measures to determine comparability as outlined in the Federal Regulations, administrative or Board action for the purpose of reallocating resources should be taken on or before December 1, 1974, to bring the schools into compliance." On November 27, 1974, a letter from the Hillsborough County School District, dated November 26, 1974, and an original comparability report were received by the Compensatory Education Section of the Florida Department of Education. On December 2, 1974, a letter from Hillsborough County School District dated November 27, 1974, and a revised comparability report were received by the Compensatory Education Section in the Florida Department of Education. A letter, dated December 5, 1974, was forwarded to the Hillsborough County School District by the Compensatory Education Section requesting the dates that the personnel authorized by the School Board on November 26, 1974, reported for work. The Hillsborough County School District, in a letter dated December 10, 1974, submitted to the Compensatory Education Section a partial report detailing the beginning employment dates of some of the personnel authorized by the Hillsborough County District School Board on November 26, 1974, for the purpose of meeting comparability requirements. On December 13, 1974, Ralph D. Turlington, Commissioner of Education, Florida Department of Education, received a telegram from Robert B. wheeler, Acting Deputy Commissioner for School Systems, U.S. Office of Education: "This is to remind you that your agency is required under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act not to make any further payments as of December 1 to any local educational agency that has not as of that date complied with the comparability requirements in 45 CFR 116.26 and to notify each such agency not to obligate any Title I funds after that date. Compliance with this requirement is subject to Federal audit. Your continued cooperation is appreciated." The Hillsborough County School District, in a letter dated December 17, 1974, submitted a final report to the Compensatory Education Section detailing the actual beginning employment dates of personnel authorized by the Hillsborough County District School Board on November 26, 1974, for the purpose of meeting comparability requirements. The Director of the Elementary and Secondary Education Division in the Florida Department of Education notified the Hillsborough County School District that ESEA, Title I funds were being withheld from December 1 through December 16, 1974. A letter from the Compensatory Education Section was sent to the Hillsborough County School District on December 20, 1974, for the primary purpose of reaffirming the necessity to maintain comparability. The Compensatory Education Section of the Florida Department of Education, in a letter dated January 3, 1975, notified the Hillsborough County School District of accounting procedures to be followed for the period of suspension of ESEA, Title I funds from December 1, 1974 through December 16, 1974. The Hillsborough County School District sent a letter dated January 8, 1975, to Commissioner Ralph D. Turlington, Florida Department of Education, along with the documentation they used as a basis for requesting "a special hearing to appeal withholding ESEA, Title I funds for Hillsborough County schools from December 1, 1974 through December 16, 1974." On January 24, 1975, the Commissioner of the Florida Department of Education wrote the district school superintendent in Hillsborough County granting their request for a hearing to appeal the withholding of Title I, ESEA funds. Petitioner, Hillsborough County School Board, applied for and received Title I funds for the school year 1974-75. It became apparent from the memorandum marked "URGENT" from the Department of Education, dated November 20, 1974, that some reallocation was necessary. On November 26, 1974 the Hillsborough County School Board authorized additional positions budgeting funds for the positions and on November 22, 1974 filed its report choosing the option to hire additional people into the Title I schools rather than shifting personnel who were already working in the non-Title I schools. By letter dated December 18, 1974, the Respondent notified Petitioner funds were being withheld for the period of December 2 through December 16, 1974, for the reason that the additional personnel required were not hired and all did not report to work until December 16, 1974. Some $63,000 of additional local funds were required to hire the additional personnel. Funds withheld from Petitioner in excess of $153,000 are Involved in this hearing. Petitioner contends: That it acted in good faith. That the Board action on November 26, 1974, budgeting, approving and establishing the additional positions was compliance both with the federal statutes and regulations and with the requirements of the memorandum from Mr. W. J. Darden of the Department of Education dated November 20, 1974. Respondent contends: That comparability is a continuous state of being, that it not only must be achieved, but must be maintained throughout the year; That upon collection of the data on October 1, it is incumbent upon the school board not only to approve and establish the additional positions but also to see that the persons are hired and in place, on the job, on or before the filing of the report on December 1. The Respondent's position is that the last person necessary to achieve comparability was not in place on the job in Hillsborough County until December 16, 1974, and therefore it had no alternative but to withhold the funds during the period December 2, 1974 through and including December 16, 1974. The statute under consideration is 20 USCA Sec. 241(e): "(a) A local educational agency may receive grant under this subchapter for any fiscal year only upon application therefore approved by the appropriate State educational agency, upon its determination (consistent with such basic criteria as the Commissioner may establish)--... (3) That ... (c) state and local funds be used in the District of such agencies to provide services in project areas which, taken as a whole, are at least comparable to services being provided in areas in such districts which are not receiving funds under this subchapter: . . . Provided further, That each local educational agency receiving funds under this subchapter shall report on or before July 1, 1971 and on or before July 1 of each year thereafter with respect to its compliance with this clause; ..." The regulation under consideration which was promulgated to implement the statute is 45 CFR 116.26, a part of which reads: "(a) A State educational agency shall not approve an application of a local educational agency for a grant under section 141(a) of the Act, or make payment of title I funds under a previously approved application of such agency, unless that local educational agency has demonstrated, in accordance with paragraph (c) of this section, that services provided with State and local funds in title I project areas are at least comparable to the services being provided with State and local funds in schools serving attendance areas not designated as title I project areas. Such approval shall not be given unless the local educational agency also provided the assurances and the additional information required by paragraph (e) of this section with respect to the maintenance of comparability. For the purpose of this section, State and local funds include those funds used in the determination of fiscal effort in accordance with 116.45." 116.26(c) "If any school serving a title I project areas is determined not to be comparable under this paragraph, no further payments of title I funds shall be made to the local educational agency until that agency has taken the action required by paragraph (k)(1) of this section to overcome such lack of comparability." Regulation Sec. 116.26(k)(1) in part reads: "that such local educational agency has allocated or reallocated sufficient addi- tional resources to title I project areas so as to come into compliance with such requirements and has filed a revised comparability report reflecting such compliance..." The Hearing Officer further finds: That both Petitioner and Respondent have demonstrated a dedication and concern for the schools within their respective jurisdictions; That both Petitioner and Respondent have been diligent in trying to act within the provisions of the subject statute and regulations; That the personnel of both the Petitioner and Respondent are familiar with the requirements of the statute and regulation but the federal requirements are subject to different interpretations by reasonable persons. There was no meeting of the minds of the parties from the federal, state and local governmental units as to the required method of compliance with the laws.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact: The Board is responsible for the operation of the public schools within the Dade County School District. Teachers assigned to the various schools are recommended to the Superintendent for employment or contract renewal by their respective principals. The Superintendent, in turn, presents a recommendation regarding the teacher's employment to the Board. At all times material to the disputed facts of this case, Respondent was a teacher employed by the Board and assigned to a public school within the district. Teachers employed by the Board are evaluated pursuant to the Teacher Assessment and Development System (TADS). This system records deficiencies which may have been observed during the evaluation review and provides a prescription (a plan) for performance improvement. At all times material to this case, the TADS method was employed to evaluate the Respondent's performance. Respondent began employment with the Dade County public schools in September, 1961, and taught until February 13, 1963. She returned to teaching in March, 1982, and was employed pursuant to a professional service contract. During the 1986-87 school year, Respondent was assigned to a second grade class at Ojus Elementary School (Ojus). Jeanne Friedman was the principal at Ojus and was primarily responsible for Respondent's TADS evaluation. At the conclusion of the 1986-87 school year, Respondent was given an annual evaluation. This evaluation found the Respondent deficient in four of the seven areas of evaluation. Specifically, Respondent was found to be in need of remediation in the following categories: knowledge of the subject matter, classroom management, techniques of instruction, and teacher-student relations. A prescription was devised to assist Respondent improve in the areas deemed to be deficient, and she was informed that should she not improve in the areas noted by the end of the next year, that she would not be recommended for employment for the 1988-89 school year. The evaluation for the 1986-87 school year was predicated on observations which had been conducted on December 5, 1986, January 22, 1987, and March 2, 1987. On December 5, 1986, Jeanne Friedman conducted a TADS evaluation of the Respondent. Ms. Friedman met with Respondent on December 11, 1986, to review the evaluation and to assist in the implementation of the prescription. On December 18, 1986, a conference for the record was held to address the Respondent's performance and her future employment status. At this meeting, Respondent was reminded of the suggestions given to correct the deficiencies noted in the evaluation conducted December 5, 1986. Those deficiencies were related to Respondent's preparation and planning. On January 22, 1987, Respondent was evaluated in follow-up to the December review. This observation was discussed with the Respondent on January 23, 1987. Respondent's prescription for the deficiencies noted in this evaluation required corrections to be implemented by February 2, 1987. The deficiencies were in the area of preparation and planning. On March 2, 1987, Respondent was evaluated by Jeanne Friedman and Emilio Fox. The evaluations were performed during the same class period, language arts, but the evaluators did not communicate with one another nor compare their notes regarding Respondent's performance. Both evaluators found the Respondent to be deficient in three of the areas of evaluation: preparation and planning, knowledge of subject matter, and techniques of instruction. Respondent had failed to follow the lesson plan book for the entire class time, had failed to plan the activity which was conducted, wrote several erroneous items on the class board, and did not explain the nature of the lesson to the class. Several of Respondent's errors were brought to her attention by the students (second graders). Margaret Roderick and Leeomia Kelly evaluated Respondent on April 27, 1987. These TADS assessments found Respondent deficient in the areas of knowledge of subject matter, classroom management, techniques of instruction, and teacher-student relationships. On May 29, 1987, a conference for the record was held regarding Respondent's poor performance year. At that time, Respondent was advised that if she failed to remediate the areas noted to be deficient by the end of the 1987-88 school year, she would not be recommended for continued employment. At her request, Respondent was assigned to a kindergarten class at Ojus for the 1987-88 school year. Approximately 30 students were initially enrolled in Respondent's section. A second kindergarten section was taught by Ms. Kramer. A TADS evaluation conducted by Leeomia Kelly on September 17, 1987, found Respondent to be acceptable in all categories reviewed. After this evaluation, several parents wrote to Ms. Friedman asking that their children be moved from Respondent's class to Ms. Kramer's section. The number of students enrolled in Respondent's class dropped to approximately 23. On October 22, 1987, Jeanne Friedman conducted an observation of the Respondent's class. This evaluation found the Respondent deficient in the area of classroom management. Ms. Friedman met with Respondent on October 23, 1987, to go over the prescription for improvement and outlined a time deadline for each suggested resource. A second evaluation conducted on November 30, 1987, also found the Respondent deficient in the area of classroom management. On December 11, 1987, a conference for the record was conducted to review Respondent's performance. Respondent was reminded that a failure to correct deficient areas would result in termination of employment. Doretha Mingo and Leeomia Kelly conducted evaluations of Respondent on March 1, 1988. These evaluators found Respondent deficient in the areas of classroom management, techniques of instruction, and teacher-student relationships. On March 9, 1988, a conference for the record was held to summarize Respondent's work performance. At that time Respondent was given an annual evaluation which found her to be unacceptable in the following areas of performance: classroom management, techniques of instruction, and teacher- student relationships. Respondent was notified at this conference that the principal would be recommending nonrenewal of the employment contract. Respondent was observed on April 13, 1988, by Ms. Friedman and Michael Conte. Both evaluators found Respondent to be deficient in the areas of classroom management and techniques of instruction. In each of the TADS reviews given to Respondent, conclusions of deficiency were based upon objective observations made during the class period. For example, students found to be off task were observed to be disregarding Respondent's instructions and findings of inadequate planning were based upon inadequacies found in Respondent's plan book (not describing the lesson taught or incompletely stating the subject matter). In each instance, Respondent was given a prescription as to how to correct the noted deficiency. Respondent was given copies of the evaluations at the time they were reviewed with her. Further, Respondent was given copies of the memoranda kept regarding the conferences for the record. Resources were offered to Respondent to assist her to make the corrections required. On April 25, 1988, Respondent was notified that the subject of her continued employment would be raised at the Board meeting to be conducted April 27, 1988. Respondent was advised that the Superintendent intended to recommend nonrenewal of Respondent's contract which, if accepted, would preclude future employment. This letter was written by Patrick Gray, Executive Assistant Superintendent. The Board accepted the Superintendent's recommendation and acted to withhold a contract from Respondent for the 1988-89 school year. On April 28, 1988, Patrick Gray wrote to Respondent to advise her of the Board's action. In each of the years for which she received unacceptable evaluations, Respondent's students performed satisfactorily on school-administered standardized tests. Such tests were not, however, gauged to measure the subject matter which Respondent had been responsible for teaching in those years. During the 1987-88 school year Respondent failed to correct the deficiencies in performance which had been identified during the 1986-87 school year. Respondent repeatedly failed to perform the duties which were expected of her despite many attempts to assist her with any remediation needed. Further, by her failure to remediate in the areas of classroom management and techniques of instruction, Respondent failed to communicate with her students to such an extent that they were deprived of a minimum educational experience.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the School Board of Dade County enter a final order sustaining the decision to terminate Respondent's employment by the nonrenewal of her contract. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 20th day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of March, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-2798 RULINGS ON PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT: Paragraphs 1 through 3 are accepted. The first 3 sentences of paragraph 4 are accepted. The last sentence is rejected as irrelevant commentary. Paragraphs 5 through 12 are accepted. The first two sentences of paragraph 13 are accepted. The last sentence is rejected as irrelevant commentary. Paragraphs 14 through 19 are accepted. With the deletion of the phrase "sometime in February, 1988," and the following qualification, paragraph 20 is accepted. The opinions expressed by the parents were based upon the observations made and not necessarily the comment of their children. The parents drew the conclusions based upon their observation but no conclusion is reached by the undersigned as to the accuracy of those conclusions. It will suffice for the purposes herein that the-parents believed their conclusions to be correct. No time was clearly established for the parental comments regarding Respondent's ability or performance. Paragraph 21 is accepted. With regard to paragraph 22, with the following qualification, it is accepted. The opinion expressed by Conte that students "were not comprehending what they were doing or what they were supposed to be doing ..." Such comments have not been considered as Mr. Cote's ability to read the minds of the children. Rather, such comments have been read to more accurately mean: based upon his experience and expertise, "the students did not appear to comprehend, etc." The last sentence of paragraph 22 is rejected as argument. Paragraphs 23 through 25 are accepted. Paragraphs 26 through 28 are rejected as irrelevant, argument, conclusions of law or comment not appropriate for a finding of fact. Paragraphs 29 and 30 are accepted. RULINGS ON RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AS SET FORTH IN THE AMENDED RECOMMENDED ORDER (HAVING PRESUMED IT SUPERSEDED THE EARLIER FILED RECOMMENDED ORDER): Paragraph 1 is accepted as to Respondent's age but the balance is rejected as unsupported by the record. The weight of the evidence established Respondent has not taught for 32 years. She has been a teacher by profession that long but not working all that time. Paragraphs 2-4 are accepted. Paragraph 5 is rejected as argument or a conclusion of law not accurate under the facts of this case. Paragraph 6 is accepted to the extent the subject matter is qualified and addressed in finding of fact paragraph 22, otherwise is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence or irrelevant to the conclusions reached herein. Paragraphs 7 and 8 are rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence presented. Paragraph 9 is accepted. Paragraph 10 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Frank Harder Twin Oaks Building, Suite 100 Dr. Joseph A. Fernandez 2780 Galloway Road Superintendent Miami, Florida 33165 School Board of Dade County 1450 Northeast 2nd Avenue William DuFresne Miami, Florida 33132 DuFRESNE AND BRADLEY 2929 South West Third Avenue, Suite One Miami, Florida 33129 Mrs. Madelyn P. Schere Assistant School Board Attorney School Board of Dade County Board Administration Building, Suite 301 1450 Northeast 2nd Avenue Miami, Florida 33132
The Issue Whether revocation of Respondent's state certification requires his dismissal by the Pinellas County School Board and, if so, has Respondents' certificate been revoked for these purposes by the Education Practices Commission.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto Respondent was employed on the instructional staff of the Pinellas County School system under a Professional Services Contract. On October 23, 1985, Respondent was issued a Florida Department of Education Teacher's Certificate valid through June 30, 1990. By Administrative Complaint dated October 31, 1988, the Commissioner of Education alleged Respondent violated Sections 231.28 (1)(a), (c), (e), (h), and (2), Florida Statutes, and Rule 6B-1.006(5)(a), (f), (g), and (h), Florida Administrative Code. These allegations constitute grounds for revocation of Respondent's certificate. Respondent waived formal hearing, and requested informal proceedings before the EPC. These informal proceedings resulted in a Final Order filed February 17, 1989 in which Respondent's teaching certificate was revoked for three years. The action of the EPC was announced orally at the informal hearing on January 26, 1989, and on February 3, 1989, Respondent filed a Motion to Rescind Election of Rights previously waiving formal proceedings and to set aside agency action. On February 22, 1989, Respondent filed a motion with EPC for a stay pending final review in which he requested the action of the EPC revoking his certificate be stayed pending action by the EPC on his February 3rd motion. On February 23, 1989, an order was entered by the EPC granting the stay pending reconsideration of the order revoking Respondent's teaching certificate On May 30, 1989, the EPC entered an order denying Respondent's demand for reconsideration and affirming it's final order revoking Respondent's certificate. An appeal from that order had previously been filed with the Second District Court of Appeals, but jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals had been relinquished to allow the EPC to reconsider. On July 25, 1989, Respondent filed in the Second District of Appeals a Motion to Stay the revocation of his certificate pending review by the court of his appeal. By order entered August 9, 1989, the Second District Court of Appeals denied the motion to stay the revocation of Respondent's certificate pending appeal of the EPC order.
Recommendation It is recommended that a Final Order be entered dismissing Lloyd Crossman from the instructional staff of the Pinellas County School system. ENTERED this 13th day of October, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. K.N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of October, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce Taylor, Esquire Post Office Box 4688 Clearwater, Florida 34618-4688 Robert F. McKee, Esquire Post Office Box 75638 Tampa, Florida 33675-0638 Dr. Scott N. Rose, Supt. Pinellas County Schools 1960 East Druid Road Clearwater, Florida 33546 Karen Barr Wilde, Exec. Dir. Education Practices Commission 301 Florida Education Center 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Martin B. Schapp, Administrator Professional Practices Services 319 West Madison Street, Room 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Sydney H. McKenzie General Counsel The Capitol, PL-08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
