The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for disability retirement benefits should be reinstated.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Edna Shepherd is a member of the Florida Retirement System. In September 2001, Ms. Shepherd submitted an application for disability retirement benefits to the Division of Retirement. The application was not complete and several documents were needed to process the application. By letter dated September 27, 2001, the Division wrote Ms. Shepherd acknowledging receipt of the disability application and requesting additional information. Enclosed with the letter were two blank FR-13b forms (Physician's Statement Forms), which were necessary to complete the application. Petitioner did not respond to the September 27, 2001, letter, so the Division mailed another request on October 29, 2001. Again two blank FR-13bs were included with the letter. On November 29, 2001, the Division mailed a third request for information to Petitioner. Blank forms were also included with this letter. By letter dated January 3, 2002, the Division mailed a fourth request to Ms. Shepherd again requesting information necessary to complete her application for disability retirement benefits. After the Division did not receive a response to its previous letters mailed to Petitioner, it sent a letter dated February 4, 2002, by certified mail to Ms. Shepherd advising her that she had 21 days from the date of the letter to submit the necessary information or her application would be cancelled. Finally, after more than six months since submission of her application, the Division sent a letter dated March 25, 2002, by certified mail to Ms. Shepherd notifying her that her disability application was cancelled and giving her 21 days to request a hearing. She did receive this letter and this timely appeal followed. Petitioner's attorney made two submissions to the Division dated September 14, 2001, and February 22, 2002; however, they did not contain the requested physician statements. As of the hearing, the requested physician statements still had not been supplied to the Division. The applicant is responsible for ensuring the Division receives the information necessary to process an application for disability retirement benefits.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Division of Retirement issue a Final Order denying the request of Petitioner Edna M. Shepherd to reinstate her disability retirement application. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of September, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of September, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Leon M. Boyajan, II, Esquire 2303 West Highway 44 Inverness, Florida 34453-3809 Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Department of Management Services Office of the General Counsel 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Erin Sjostrom, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Monesia Taylor Brown Deputy General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner’s husband’s selection of Option 1 for his pension plan benefits could be changed.
Findings Of Fact Mrs. Renaud, who is deaf, was married to Mr. Renaud for approximately 40 years. Mr. Renaud was employed by the State of Florida as a correctional officer at all times relevant hereto. He entered the State retirement program (in the pension plan) in November 1994. Mr. Renaud was in the “special risk” category of retirement class based on his position as a correctional officer. On October 24, 2013, Mr. Renaud signed and submitted a “Florida Retirement System Pension Plan Application for Service Retirement” form to the Department, indicating his intent to retire. The application was signed and notarized; it designated Mrs. Renaud as the sole beneficiary of his retirement benefits. On the same day, Mr. Renaud signed an “Option Selection” form, wherein he designated which of four payment options he wanted to utilize for payment of his retirement income. He selected Option 1, which states: A monthly benefit payable for my lifetime. Upon my death the monthly benefit will stop and my beneficiary will receive only a refund of any contributions I have paid which are in excess of the amount I have received in benefits. This option does not provide a continuing benefit to my beneficiary. The form also contains the following statement: “I understand that I must terminate all employment with FRS employers to receive a retirement benefit under Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. I also understand that I cannot add service, change options or change my type of retirement . . . once my retirement becomes final. My retirement becomes final when any benefit payment is cashed, deposited or when my Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) participation begins.” The option selection form was signed by Mr. Renaud and notarized by a certified notary public. Inasmuch as Mr. Renaud selected Option 1, it was necessary that he and his designated beneficiary (Mrs. Renaud) also fill out form SA-1, the “Spousal Acknowledgement” form. On the acknowledgement form, Mr. Renaud indicated that he was married. Mrs. Renaud then signed the “spousal acknowledgement” portion of the form. The acknowledgement statement included this statement: “I, Vivian Renaud, being the spouse of the above named member [Mr. Renaud], acknowledge that the member has selected either Option 1 or 2.” Option 2 provides for continued benefits during the retiring person’s lifetime. However, benefits to the person’s spouse will continue for only a 10-year period. If the retiring person dies within the first 10 years of retirement, the spouse would only receive benefits for the balance of the 10-year period starting at the retirement date. The benefits under Option 2 are, therefore, limited in nature. The state retirement system requires a person selecting Option 1 or Option 2 to have their spouse acknowledge that selection choice because those benefits have finite ending dates, whereas retirement benefits under the other options continue as long as either the retiree or his/her beneficiary is living. By letter dated October 30, 2013, the Department acknowledged receipt of Mr. Renaud’s retirement application. The letter referenced the date the application was received (October 24, 2013) and the option Mr. Renaud had selected (Option 1). The letter was mailed to Mr. Renaud’s address of record, the same address he listed in his retirement application. The letter was sent to Mr. Renaud some 30 days before the first retirement benefit check was deposited in his account. Mrs. Renaud does not remember seeing the letter, but inasmuch as it was addressed to Mr. Renaud, her recollection of its receipt is not relevant. After Mr. Renaud’s death, his family found numerous un-opened letters in his car; the acknowledgement letter from the Department could well have been in that group. Mr. Renaud retired on November 1, 2013. His first payment of retirement benefits was transferred to his bank by way of electronic fund transfer, commonly referred to as direct deposit, on November 27, 2013. The gross amount of his monthly retirement benefit was $1,987.85; the net amount was $1,937.75 after $30.09 had been deducted for taxes. At that time, Mr. Renaud had not signed form W4P, the form which showed how many dependents the retiree was claiming for tax purposes. After later filling out that form (in which he indicated he would prefer to file as “single” for tax purposes), his monthly net benefit was reduced to about $1,735. Mr. Renaud received a direct deposit of retirement benefits on December 31, 2013; on January 31, 2014; and again on February 28, 2014. Mr. Renaud passed away on March 26, 2014, only five months after commencing his retirement. In accordance with the provisions of Option 1, Mr. Renaud’s retirement benefits ceased at that time. His beneficiary was entitled to payment for the entire month that he expired, but was not to be provided any further retirement benefits. Thus, a final payment was deposited in Mr. Renaud’s account on March 31, 2014. Mrs. Renaud was provided notice of the cessation of retirement benefits due to Mr. Renaud’s death. She timely filed a protest, seeking to have the payment of benefits reinstated. The Department denied her request, resulting in the instant matter. It is clear from the evidence that Mr. Renaud selected Option 1, Mrs. Renaud acknowledged that Mr. Renaud had selected either Option 1 or Option 2, and that retirement benefits were directly deposited to Mr. Renaud’s bank account for several months. Mr. and Mrs. Renaud’s signatures were duly notarized and have a presumption of legitimacy. Mrs. Renaud disagrees as to whether Mr. Renaud’s selection of Option 1 was legitimate, legal, or proper under the circumstances as she views them. First, Mrs. Renaud contends that Mr. Renaud was not mentally well at the time he signed the option selection form. The basis for her contention is that Mr. Renaud had experienced some seizure-related behavior during the year prior to signing the form. He had driven his car north on US Highway 301 one day in July 2012, “heading to work,” but ended up in Georgia without remembering why or how he got there. He later apparently lost his driver’s license because of the seizures (although the testimony on that issue was not clear).1/ Mr. Renaud worked for approximately 15 more months after his inexplicable drive to Georgia. Mrs. Renaud also argued that Mr. Renaud’s signatures on the three different forms he signed on October 24, 2013, were not similar to each other, indicating in her mind that he was having some sort of medical or psychological difficulty at that time. Inasmuch as there could have been any number of reasons the signatures were different (whether he was in a hurry, what base existed under the paperwork, etc.), there is insufficient evidence to determine why the signatures did not match. Mrs. Renaud’s testimony regarding the signatures is not persuasive. Ed Renaud said Mr. Renaud had been forced to retire due to his medical condition, i.e., that he had lost his driver’s license due to having seizures and the Department of Corrections would not let him work if he could not drive. However, Ed Renaud also said Mr. Renaud was able to continue working even when he was “forced” to retire. Again, the testimony on these facts was not clear. Mrs. Renaud said she should have been provided an interpreter on the day she signed the acknowledgement form. She did not state whether she requested an interpreter or whether the agency employee who provided her the form was aware of her disability.2/ Again, no one from Mr. Renaud’s employer, the Department of Corrections, testified at final hearing as to what happened on the day the forms were signed. Mrs. Renaud stated that she could read and write English, so she knew what she was signing.3/ She did claim to be confused as to whether her husband had selected Option 1 or Option 2, but candidly admitted that Mr. Renaud never told her one way or the other which option he had chosen. He only told her that he would “continue to provide for her in the future.” She believed the amount which was to be deposited in their account each month under Option 2 would be approximately $1900. The first check was in that approximate amount (due to the fact that Mr. Renaud had not established the amount of taxes to be deducted from his check at that time). The next five checks were in a lesser amount, approximately $1700. There is no evidence that Mrs. Renaud questioned the amount of the later checks. However, once the first check had been deposited in Mr. Renaud’s bank account, he would not have been allowed to change his option anyway. Lastly, Mrs. Renaud said her husband’s medical and mental condition was not conducive to making the option selection in October 2013. However, there was no competent evidence to support her claim. There was no direct testimony as to Mr. Renaud’s condition on the day he signed, nor as to whether he was or was not capable of understanding what he was signing. The only statement about his condition that day was that he wanted to park the car far enough away from the building that his co-workers could not see that Mrs. Renaud had driven the car. Ed Renaud also pointed out the issue of Mr. Renaud’s three signatures that day looking different from each other, but his lay opinion is not evidence upon which a finding of fact can be made as to Mr. Renaud’s mental condition. On October 24, 2013, Mr. Renaud had not been adjudged mentally incapacitated and no guardian had been appointed. Ed Renaud said that Mr. Renaud still believed he could perform his work assignments at that time and did not want to retire. But, other than his wife, no one provided any evidence that Mr. Renaud did not understand what he was signing. Mrs. Renaud, however, could not say which option he had selected because he never told her. Her subsequent presumption that Mr. Renaud did not intend to choose Option 1 is not persuasive. It should be noted that selection of Option 1 by Mr. Renaud set his average pre-tax monthly benefit at around $1,900.00; had he chosen Option 2, the benefit would have been around $1,700. Thus, there was incentive to “roll the dice” and select Option 1, hoping that he would survive long enough to provide for his wife. In this case, sadly, that gamble did not pay off. The facts of this case are sad in that Mr. Renaud had every intention of providing for his wife financially as long as she lived. However, he either made a mistake when he selected his payment option or he attempted to tempt fate and hope for the best. In either case, once he made his selection and began receiving benefits, the die was cast. Based upon the facts as presented, there is no basis for overturning the Department’s denial of Mrs. Renaud’s requested amendment of the payment option.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Management Services denying Petitioner's request for entitlement to her husband’s retirement benefits following his untimely death. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of June, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of June, 2015.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner, a surviving beneficiary, is entitled to change the Florida Retirement System retirement benefits 1 All references to chapter 120 are to the 2019 version. payment option selected by her now-deceased spouse, a member of the Florida Retirement System.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, is the state agency charged under chapter 121, Florida Statutes (2002),2 with administering the Florida Retirement System ("FRS"). Petitioner is the spouse of James L. Williams, now deceased, who was employed by the School District of Palm Beach ("District) for 38 years, and was a member of the FRS. Williams retired from his employment with the District on August 23, 2002. At that time, he executed the Florida Retirement System Application for Service Retirement Form, Form FR-11. On Form FR-11, he designated Petitioner as his primary beneficiary and Jones as his contingent beneficiary. Williams signed this form, and his signature was notarized. Also on August 23, 2002, Williams executed the Florida Retirement System Option Selection for FRS Members Form, Form FRS-11o. On that form, he selected FRS retirement benefits payment Option 2, and designated that choice by writing an "X" on the line next to Option 2. Option 2 was described on Form FRS-11o as: A reduced monthly payment for my lifetime. If I die before receiving 120 monthly payments, my designated beneficiary will receive a monthly benefit in the same amount as I was receiving until the monthly benefit payments to both of us equal 120 monthly payments. No further benefits are then payable. 2 All references to chapter 121 are to the 2002 version of the Florida Statutes, which was in effect at the time that the retirement benefits application and option selection forms that have given rise to this proceeding were executed. Form FRS-11o contained a section, immediately below the description of Option 2, that was required to be completed by the spouse of a married FRS member who had selected Option 1 or Option 2. On August 23, 2002, Petitioner completed, signed, and dated that section, confirming that she was the legal spouse of Williams and acknowledging that she was informed that Williams had selected either Option 1 or Option 2. The purpose of that section on Form FRS-11o is to inform the spouse of the FRS member that, by the member's selection of either Option 1 or Option 2, the surviving spouse is not entitled to receive a continuing benefit for the rest of his or her life. The last sentence on Form FRS-11o, immediately above the space for the FRS member's signature, states in pertinent part: "[m]y retirement becomes final when any payment is cashed . . . [or] deposited." DeVonnia Jones was present with Williams at the time he was given Form FR-11 and Form FRS-11o to execute. Jones testified that when Williams arrived at the District office on August 23, 2002, Form FR-11 and Form FRS-11o already had been filled out by District staff, and were presented to him by his supervisor, who informed him that he needed to retire or he would be terminated. According to Jones, Williams did not wish to retire at that time. Jones asked District staff how much more Williams' monthly benefits would be if he did not retire for another year or two, and was told that Williams' benefits would be between $25 and $30 more per month. According to Jones, "my dad basically shed a couple tears. He was not comfortable, but he went ahead and signed it because I told him to, because they made it seem like he wasn't going to be eligible to get what he was supposed to get." Williams signed and dated Form FRS-11o on August 23, 2002, and his signature was notarized. On August 28, 2002, Respondent sent Williams a document titled "Acknowledgement of Service Retirement Application." This document stated, among other things, that Williams had selected FRS Option 2, and that his retirement was effective September 2002. At the bottom of this document was a standalone paragraph, in bold face type, that read: "ONCE YOU RETIRE, YOU CANNOT ADD ADDITIONAL SERVICE OR CHANGE OPTIONS. RETIREMENT BECOMES FINAL WHEN ANY BENEFIT PAYMENT IS CASHED OR DEPOSITED!" Also on August 28, 2002, Respondent sent Williams a document titled "Florida Division of Retirement Estimate of Retirement Benefit (Estimate only, subject to final verification of all factors)." This document provided information regarding the amount of the monthly benefits Williams would receive for the four options offered under the FRS. A statement in bold face type at the bottom of the document read: "Comments: You have chosen Option 2. Your option selection cannot be changed after you cash or deposit any benefit payment." Had Williams wished to change his retirement benefits payment option, he could have done so up to the time he cashed or deposited a retirement benefits payment. Williams began receiving his monthly FRS retirement benefits payments from Respondent on October 4, 2002. He cashed or deposited the first FRS benefits warrant (Warrant #0618275) that he received. Thereafter, Williams received monthly FRS retirement benefits payments until his death on April 26, 2010. Williams received a total of 92 monthly benefits payments before his death. All of the FRS retirement benefits payment warrants issued to Williams were deposited or cashed. On May 17, 2010, Respondent contacted Petitioner to inform her that she needed to complete a Florida Retirement System Pension Plan Application for Beneficiary of Monthly Retirement Benefits Form, Form FST- 11b, in order for her to receive monthly FRS retirement benefits payments as Williams' beneficiary. In the contact letter, Respondent informed Petitioner that "you will receive the same gross monthly benefits to which the member was entitled through August 31, 2012." Petitioner completed Form FST-11b on June 25, 2010, and began receiving FRS monthly benefits payments on June 30, 2010. Petitioner received a total of 28 FRS retirement monthly benefits payments. The last warrant issued to Petitioner (Warrant #0375196) was issued on August 31, 2012. All of the warrants issued to Petitioner were cashed or deposited. In sum, Williams and Petitioner collectively received a total of 120 FRS retirement monthly benefits payments, pursuant to Option 2. All of the warrants issued to Williams, and then to Petitioner, as his beneficiary, were deposited or cashed. Petitioner testified that beginning in 2003, she made numerous attempts, over a period of years, to contact the District and Respondent regarding changing the FRS retirement benefits payment option that Williams had selected on August 23, 2002. During this time, Williams and Petitioner continued to cash or deposit the benefits payment warrants they received from Respondent. In this proceeding, Petitioner does not claim that Williams accidentally selected Option 2, or that he intended to select another option, when he signed Form FRS-11o on August 23, 2002. Rather, she asserts that at the time Williams retired, he suffered from confusion and memory loss such that he did not understand the option he chose—effectively, that he lacked the mental capacity to have chosen Option 2 as his retirement benefits payment option. Alternatively, Petitioner contends that because Williams was forced to retire under threat of termination from his employment, he was under duress when he chose Option 2 on Form FRS-11o. On these grounds, Petitioner asserts that she should be permitted to change Williams' choice of retirement benefits payment option.3 3 Here, Petitioner, has requested that she be allowed to "change" Williams' choice of Option 2 on the FRS retirement option selection forms. She did not identify, or present evidence, Petitioner's impassioned testimony at the final hearing shows that she fervently believes her husband was wrongly treated by the District when it required him to retire in 2002, against his desire to continue to work.4 However, as was explained to Petitioner at the final hearing, the purpose of this proceeding was not to determine whether the District wrongly forced Williams out of his employment; rather, it is to determine whether there is any factual or legal basis for changing the retirement benefits option that Williams selected when he executed Form FRS-11o nearly 18 years ago. The evidence does not support Petitioner's argument that Williams lacked the mental capacity to adequately understand the option that he chose on Form FRS-11o. Although Petitioner testified that Williams had been treated by a neurologist, no direct medical evidence was presented establishing that Williams was mentally incapacitated at the time he executed Form FRS-11o. Additionally, at the time Williams signed the form, he was accompanied by his daughter, who, after speaking to District staff regarding his options, advised him to sign the form. Petitioner herself also was present at the District office and signed Form FRS-11o, expressly acknowledging that she understood Williams had chosen Option 2. Thus, to the extent that Williams may not, on his own, have fully appreciated his choice of options on Form FRS-11o—and there is no competent direct evidence showing that to be the case—both his daughter and wife were present with him when he executed Form FRS-11o, his daughter told him to sign the form, and his wife expressly acknowledged that she understood his choice of Option 2. These circumstances do not support a finding that Williams lacked the mental capacity to understand, or did not adequately regarding which specific option she would choose, if permitted to change Williams' selected FRS benefits option. 4 The evidence indicates that the District required Williams to retire because he began having difficulty with his job as a mail carrier. According to Petitioner, Williams had an accident in a District vehicle and did not report the accident to the District, and that when he was transferred to the mail room, he had difficulty remembering to do certain required tasks. understand, the consequence of choosing Option 2 when he executed Form FRS-11o. The evidence also does not support a finding that Williams' choice of Option 2 should be changed, due to duress. There is no direct evidence establishing that Williams was under duress when he chose Option 2. Although Jones testified, credibly, that her father was upset about being forced to retire when he wanted to continue working, her testimony that he was under duress was based on her subjective conclusion. Furthermore, even if Williams was emotionally distressed when he signed the FRS benefits options forms, there is no evidence showing that as result of such distress, he chose Option 2 instead of a different option. It also is noted that Form FR-11 and Form FRS-11o both expressly informed Williams that once his retirement became final—which would occur when any benefit payment was cashed or deposited—his retirement benefits option selection would become final and could not be changed. Further, Williams received two more pieces of correspondence from Respondent—both containing statements in bold face type—expressly informing him that once any FRS retirement benefits payments were cashed or deposited, his retirement benefits option choice could not be changed. As noted above, Williams could have changed his FRS benefits option at any time before he cashed or deposited a benefits payment; however, he did not do so. Thus, pursuant to the express terms of Form FR-11 and Form FRS-11o, when Williams cashed or deposited the first benefits payment, his selection of Option 2 became final and could not be changed. In sum, the evidence does not establish any factual basis for permitting Petitioner to change Williams' selection of Option 2 as his FRS retirement benefits payment option.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Management Services, enter a final order denying Petitioner's request to change the FRS retirement benefits payment option selected by her husband, an FRS member, when he retired. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of March, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Ladasiah Jackson Ford, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Deloris Williams 1219 West Ninth Street Riviera Beach, Florida 33404 (eServed) Nikita S. Parker, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) David DiSalvo, Director Division of Retirement Department of Mangement Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 (eServed) Sean Gellis, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Mangement Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Petitioner's request for retirement credit should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner previously worked for the Sheriff's Office for DeSoto County, Florida. It is undisputed that the Sheriff's Office is a qualified Florida Retirement System ("FRS") employer and that Petitioner was, during all times relevant hereto, an FRS eligible employee. In the instant case, it is undisputed that in October 2006, Petitioner sustained a work-related injury while in the course and scope of her employment with the Sheriff's Office. Petitioner, from the time of her injury through approximately September 11, 2007, received temporary total disability workers' compensation benefits for her employment- related injuries. The precise dates when these benefits were received by Petitioner are not at issue in the instant dispute. On September 12, 2007, Petitioner returned to work at the Sheriff's Office with light-duty work limitations. Also on this date, Petitioner resumed receiving payroll wages from the Sheriff's Office. Petitioner continued to receive temporary partial disability wage payments through December 2008 and received workers' compensation medical benefits through October 2010. When Petitioner returned to work on September 12, 2007, she was still receiving medical treatment from the workers' compensation physician and attended regular sessions with the physician throughout the duration of her employment with the Sheriff's Office. The visits to the workers' compensation physician often occurred during times when the Sheriff's Office scheduled Petitioner to work, thus, resulting in her absence from work on these days. The Sheriff's Office terminated Petitioner's employment on December 12, 2007. Between the dates of September 12, 2007, and December 12, 2007, Petitioner was on the Sheriff's Office payroll and received wages as follows: For the period September 23, 2007, through October 6, 2007, she received payroll wages for 14 days; For the period October 7, 2007, through October 20, 2007, she received payroll wages for five days; and For the period October 21, 2007, through December 12, 2007, she received payroll wages for 14 days. No evidence was presented at the hearing explaining Petitioner's work schedule for the period September 13, 2007, through October 5, 2007. Between the dates of September 12, 2007, and December 12, 2007, Petitioner worked and received payroll wages from the Sheriff's Office for a total of 34 days. Although the 34 days that Petitioner worked were dispersed throughout the months of September, October, November, and December, Petitioner, nevertheless, received a paycheck from the Sheriff's Office for wages for each pay period following her return to work. There was no testimony offered at the hearing as to the total number of days that Petitioner was scheduled to work between September 12, 2007, and December 12, 2007. However, Petitioner testified that any scheduled work days that she missed during this period occurred as a result of her having to attend medical appointments with the workers' compensation physician. Respondent offered no evidence to the contrary as to this point. Given the severity of Petitioner's work-related injury, which apparently resulted in her being away from work for nearly a year, coupled with the fact that she continued to receive workers' compensation medical benefits through October 2010 (some four years after the date of her injury), the undersigned accepts as credible Petitioner's testimony that any scheduled work days that she missed between September 12, 2007, and December 12, 2007, resulted from her having to attend medical appointments with the workers' compensation physician. On April 4, 2008, Petitioner submitted correspondence to the Division and stated therein the following: Sir, I am writing this email in regards to my retirement. Under the florida [sic] retirement system, a member is entitled to retirement credit for periods of eligible workman [sic] comp[ensation]. The member must return to FRS covered employment for one month. Creditable workman [sic] comp[ensation] includes all periods that workman [sic] comp[ensation] are made. FRS employers are required by Section 121.125, Florida Statutes, and Section 60S-2012, Florida Administrative Code, to report the period covered by workman [sic] comp[ensation] on the monthly retirement report. D.C.S.O. stated I worked intermittently but where is it written in the Florida State Statutes or Administrative Code, how many days during the month you are allowed to miss and it would not be credible service or considered a break in service. [sic] Sir, I was still active [sic] employed with D.C.S.O. upon returning to work on Sept[ember] 12, 2007. The days I missed was [sic] due to medical appointmentts [sic] for my workman's [sic] comp[ensation] injury I sustained at D.C.S.O. I always provided documentation from the physician. I was not terminated until December 13, 2007 when Capt. McClure of D.C.S.O. called me at 8:21 A.M. [sic] on my scheduled day off. The three months I was allowed to work and the period on workman [sic] comp[ensation] should be credible service towards retirement. Sir, my question is when the other employees at D.C.S.O. take off more than a couple of days, during the month, for various reasons, without medical documentation[,] do[es] it count for credible service towards retirement or is it a break in service. [sic] On April 7, 2008, Doug Cherry, on behalf of the Division, responded to Petitioner's inquiry of April 4, 2008, and stated the following: Ms. Leonard, as I explained in our phone conversation, for periods of workers' compensation (temporary partial or temporary total) to be eligible for retirement credit there must be a return to active employment for one complete calendar month. The attached letter from the Sheriff of DeSoto County shows that from your scheduled date of return in September 2007, your employment was not active for the required month. This letter states you worked intermittently until your termination of employment in December 2007. To satisfy the one calendar month of active work, you needed to be consistently working through October 31, 2007. You indicated in our conversation that the information from the Sheriff was incorrect. If so, you would need to contact that office to resolve any discrepancy. I [have] also attached the appropriate Florida Statute (121.125) and the Florida Administrative Code (60S-2.012) which states [sic] this requirement. The law does not provide for exceptions or a combination of active and non-active employment during the one calendar month. Regarding your question about active members taking off days during the month, the requirements for earning service credit are different than the eligibility requirement for periods of workers' [sic] compensation. In your own account, you did earn credit for the months of September, October, November and December 2007 for the time you did work and earn salary. However, as stated above, for the period of workers' compensation to be creditable for retirement, the requirement is active employment for the full calendar month, not to earn service credit after such period. You also indicated that you were going to provide your attorney with this information. If your attorney would like to give me a call (850-488-9623), I will be glad to discuss this issue with him or her. I hope this information will help clarify this issue for you. On January 7, 2011, Respondent wrote Petitioner and informed her of the following: Dear Ms. Leonard: This will respond to your request for retirement credit for the period of time you received Workers' Compensation (WC), that was submitted to the State Board of Administration (SBA). Because this is an issue of creditable service, the SBA forwarded the request to the Division of Retirement since the Division is the proper agency to address such an issue. Information you and your agency provided indicates that you were out on WC October 2006 through September 2007 at which time your employer, the DeSoto County Sheriff's Office, sent you a letter dated September 6, 2007 requiring you to return to work within two weeks or be terminated from employment. The Division has not received any documentation from the Workers' Compensation carrier to substantiate the actual periods of WC or the date maximum medical improvement was reached. Therefore, this letter cannot address periods of possible eligibility for retirement credit but will address whether your employment from September 2007 met the return to work requirement for such eligibility. The Sherriff's [sic] office provided us with documentation of your time worked in September, October, November, and December 2007. During these months, you worked intermittently and did not have a full calendar month of active employment before your employment was terminated by your employer on December 12, 2007. * * * You did not consistently work during any of those calendar months until your employment was terminated by your employer on December 12, 2007. Therefore, starting in September 2007, you did not meet the return to actively performing service requirement of the above provision to establish eligibility for possible retirement credit. Petitioner's failure to return to active employment status was the only reason given by the agency when denying Petitioner's claim. Andy Snuggs has worked as a benefits administrator for the Division for approximately the last 20 years. The Division offered, and the undersigned accepted, Mr. Snuggs as an expert in matters related to the Act. Mr. Snuggs testified that in the exercise of the agency's discretion, the agency defines the phrase "active employment," as it relates to section 121.125, to mean that an employee must work each scheduled work day in a regularly established position for at least one calendar month following the employee's return to work and that no allowances are made for any absences, excused or otherwise. Mr. Snuggs did not offer any testimony explaining why the Division selected the particular definition that it did for the term "active."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order determining that Petitioner, Irene Leonard, met the return-to-work requirements necessary to receive retirement credit for workers' compensation payment periods. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of September, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of September, 2011.
Findings Of Fact The Division of Retirement will make no Findings of Fact relating to whether Petitioner's disability was in-line-of-duty. Accordingly, for the reasons mentioned previously, all findings contained in paragraphs 5, 6, 7, and 8, of the recommended order are rejected. However, the Division accepts the remaining Findings of Fact contained in the recommended order. As taken from the order these findings are: Herman Williams was an employee of the Department of Transportation and a member of the Florida Retirement System. The Division of Retirement approved payment of regular disability benefits to Herman Williams. Herman Williams is currently receiving and accepting these benefits. Herman Williams is an illiterate Seminole Indian, 62 years of age. Williams' duties with the Department of Transportation were driving a mowing tractor and cleaning out roadside ditches. Williams worked for the Department of Transportation approximately 21 years 11 months prior to being placed on the retired roles [sic]. On May 1, 1975, Williams was driving his tractor in the course of his regular employment at the Department of Transportation when the power steering of the tractor malfunctioned causing the front wheels to swerve violently, wrenching the steering wheel in Williams' hands and nearly throwing him from the tractor. Repairs had to be made to Williams' tractor by a Department of Transportation mechanic because the tractor was inoperative. The mechanic discovered a loose nut in the power steering assembly when he exchanged the power steering unit in Williams' tractor with another from the maintenance yard. When the new unit was installed in Williams's tractor it functioned normally. When the power steering from Williams' tractor was installed in the other tractor, it also functioned normally. The mechanic stated that the loose nut which he had discovered could cause the tractor to swerve violently in the manner Williams' had described. On the afternoon of May 1, 1975, Williams reported this instant [sic] to his supervisor, David McQuaig. Mr. McQuaig inquired as to any injuries to Williams and the tractor. Williams reported to McQuaig that the tractor had not been harmed and that he was only sore and stiff. No report of injury was prepared by McQuaig whose duty it was to file such reports. Williams' condition did not materially improve after seeking medical treatment by Dr. Albritton. Williams remained on sick leave until August 11, 1975, when it was exhausted. Williams then took annual leave from August 12, 1975 until September 23, 19975, when his retirement became effective. When the Petitioner's sick leave was exhausted, he was contacted by his supervisor in the Department of Transportation. He suggested that Williams could retire on disability if two physicians would state that he was disabled. This letter was read to Williams by his son, Eddie, because Williams is illiterate. Retirement application forms were provided Williams by the Department of Transportation. The physician report forms were completed by Dr. Albritton and Dr. Wilkerson. The statement of disability by employer form was completed by Williams' supervisor, David A. Young, Maintenance Engineer, for the Department of Transportation. Young stated that he completed the Statement of Disability by Employer, indicating that the application was for regular disability benefits because he had determined that no workman's compensation claim had been made by Williams and because Dr. Wilkerson's medical report had stated that the injuries occurred at Williams's home. The determination that the application was for regular disability benefits was solely Young's. The Application for Disability Retirement signed by Williams was prepared by personnel at the Department of Transportation District Office. This form was signed by Herman Williams; however, this form does not make provision for the member to state the nature of the disability benefits sought. Eddie Williams, son of Herman Williams, took his father to sign the forms at the Department of Transportation office. These forms were not explained to Williams, nor did Eddie Williams read them. Herman Williams was also unaware that such a benefit existed. Herman Williams stated he sought disability benefits based upon his injury on the job. Disability retirement was not discussed between Herman Williams and David Young. Based upon the application submitted in his behalf, the Division of Retirement made a determination that Williams was entitled to regular disability benefits. Williams was unaware that he was not receiving the in-line-of-duty benefits until his son inquired as to how much money he was receiving. When he was advised, he told his father that it appeared to be too little money. At this point Eddie Williams discovered that the application had been for regular disability.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer RECOMMENDS: That the administrator permit the applicant to file an amended application for disability in-line-of-duty retirement, and, further, that said application be approved. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of December, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: J. W. Chalkley, III, Esquire Post Office Box 1793 Ocala, Florida 32670 Douglas Spangler, Jr., Esquire Asst. Division Attorney Division of Retirement 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF RETIREMENT DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION HERMAN H. WILLIAMS, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 77-982 STATE OF FLORIDA, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, Respondent. / FINAL AGENCY ORDER A petition for formal proceedings having been duly filed, and a request for hearing officer having been duly made, a hearing was held in the above-styled cause pursuant to the provisions of Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, before the Honorable Stephen F. Dean, Hearing Officer, in Ocala, Florida, on September 15, 1977. The Petitioner requested relief from the Division's determination that Petitioner was not entitled to resubmit an application for disability retirement requesting in-line-of-duty disability retirement benefits because he had previously applied for and accepted regular disability retirement. The purpose of the hearing was to determine the factual basis for Petitioner's claim that he should be allowed to apply for in-line-of-duty disability retirement benefits. APPEARANCES AT THE HEARING: Eric E. Wagner, Esquire J. W. Chalkey, III, Esquire Law Offices of Eric E. Wagner, P.A. Post Office Box 1763 Ocala, Florida 32670 For the Petitioner E. Douglas Spangler, Jr., Esquire Assistant Division Attorney Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C-Box 81 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 For the Respondent The Hearing Officer entered his Recommended Order on December 8, 1977, in which he sustained Petitioner's assertion and concluded, on the basis of the findings made as a result of the hearing, that Petitioner should be entitled to resubmit his application and request in-line-of-duty disability benefits. In addition to this determination, the Hearing Officer found that Petitioner was in fact entitled to in-line-of-duty disability retirement benefits. In making this latter conclusion, both as a matter of fact and of law, the Hearing Officer went beyond his scope of authority. As will be developed more fully herein, the Hearing Officer was without jurisdiction to consider the issue of whether Petitioner was in fact entitled to the in-line-of-duty benefits. Therefore, so much of the recommended order as purports to address this issue is of no effect, being the result of a hearing that did not comply with the essential requirements of law.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner has enough creditable service in the Florida Retirement System (FRS), within the meaning of Subsection 121.021(17)(a), Florida Statutes (2009),1 to be "vested" and, therefore, eligible for a retirement benefit.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is not currently an employee of any FRS employer. Petitioner was an employee of several different FRS employers during the 1970's and 1980's. Petitioner proved that he had creditable earnings from three FRS employers. The creditable earnings were from Hillsborough County from October 1977 through April 1978, Pasco County from August 1987 through December 1987, and Hernando County from March 1988 through August 1989. Petitioner has 3.09 years of creditable service in the FRS. The creditable service is not sufficient to vest Petitioner and does not entitle Petitioner to retirement benefits. Petitioner was employed with the City of Largo, Florida, for some time. However, that municipality was not an FRS participating employer during the period of employment. Petitioner worked for the U.S. Postal Service for some time. That agency is not an FRS participating employer. Petitioner was a student on work study at both the University of Florida and Florida State University. Paid student positions at state universities were not positions which were included in the FRS during that time. Petitioner also seeks to purchase his military time of approximately 22 months. Members of the FRS are allowed to purchase certain military service after they vest in the FRS. A preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner has sufficient years of service to vest in the FRS and then purchase military service. Petitioner was employed in some state positions prior to 1975. Until 1975, the FRS was a "contributory" system. Employers withheld contributions to the retirement system from the wages of participating members and forwarded the withheld amounts to the Division. It is undisputed from Petitioner's testimony that no retirement contributions were ever withheld from his wages during the period that FRS was a contributory system.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for retirement benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of April, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of April, 2010.
The Issue The issue in this matter is whether Petitioner is entitled to retroactive disability retirement benefits from June 1, 1999, through April 30, 2001.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was a bus driver employed by the Lee County School Board. He has a tenth-grade education and is of normal intelligence. Petitioner had worked for Lee County Schools for over eight years when he had a work related injury in March 1997. Upon settlement of his claim for workers' compensation, he resigned his position with Lee County Schools on June 22, 1999. On April 20, 2001, Petitioner, for the first time, sought information regarding disability retirement benefits from his personnel office and met with Griffin for that purpose. At that time, Petitioner had 8.33 years of creditable service. After meeting with Petitioner, Griffin sent an e-mail to Mark Sadler (Sadler), who at that time served as the Disability Administrator for the Division. During the e-mail exchange, in-line-of-duty disability benefits were not mentioned. Regular disability benefits under the FRS require that a member be "vested." In this case, that required a member, including Petitioner, to have ten years of creditable service (it has since been changed by the Legislature to six years). In-line-of-duty disability benefits, on the other hand, were available from the first day of employment. On August 1, 2001, Petitioner contacted the Division to inquire about benefits. As a result of the call, the Division sent a disability handbook and application to Petitioner on August 14, 2001. The disability handbook contains a description of all disability benefits available to members, as well as requirements for obtaining those benefits. On January 25, 2002, the Division received an application for in-line-of-duty disability benefits from Petitioner. After receiving and reviewing the relevant materials, the Division approved his application for benefits and added him to the retired payroll effective February 1, 2002. Shortly after being approved, Petitioner requested the Division to re-establish his effective date of retirement to April 1, 2001, based on the e-mail exchange between Griffin and Sadler. After reviewing Petitioner's file, the Division determined that he had attempted to apply on April 20, 2001, and accordingly re-established his effective retirement date as May 1, 2001, the first day of the following month. Shortly after the Division changed his effective retirement date to May 1, 2001, Petitioner then requested the Division to re-establish it as June 1, 1999, to correspond with his resignation. Howell again reviewed his file. Since there was no evidence of any earlier attempt to apply for benefits, the Division correctly determined that Petitioner's May 1, 2001, effective date was accurate. On July 23, 2003, the Division issued the Final Agency Action denying his request for a June 1, 1999, effective retirement date, and Petitioner timely appealed. According to the rules adopted by the Division, when a member applies for retirement benefits more than 30 days after his or her termination, the effective retirement date is established as the first day of the month following receipt of the application by the Division. The Lee County School System does not routinely provide termination or worker's compensation information to the Division, unless it is in connection with an application for benefits. Since Petitioner made no application for benefits, the Division was not aware that Petitioner's employment was terminated as of June 22, 1999, until the e-mail exchange in April 2001.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Retirement enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for an effective retirement date of June 1, 1999. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of March, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM R. PFEIFFER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of March, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: William C. Strickland 8230 Ebson Drive North Fort Myers, Florida 33917 Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Alberto Dominguez, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Sarabeth Snuggs, Interim Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
The Issue Whether deceased retiree's prior selection of Option One retirement benefit pay-out and his receipt and negotiation of retirement several checks should now be set aside, due to his wife's alleged forgery of her signature on the Spousal Acknowledgement (Form FR-11).
Findings Of Fact 1. Irvin M. Carpenter was born November 16, 1934, and died of cancer on November 18, 1997. Mr. Carpenter was employed by the Hillsborough County Aviation Authority as a police officer on September 10, 1984, and attained the rank of police sergeant at the time of his retirement. Mr. Carpenter was a member of the Florida Retirement System. 2. On January 20, 1991, Irvin M. Carpenter and Susan Ann Prescott were married. Susan Ann Carpenter is now, and has been at all time pertinent to these proceeding, employed by the Hillsborough County Aviation Authority as a police officer. Susan Carpenter is a member of the Florida Retirement System. 3. In October of 1996, Irvin Carpenter and Susan Carpenter separated and continued to live separately. Dissolution of marriage proceedings were initiated but was not finalized at the time of Irvin Carpenter's death in November 1997. At all times pertinent to these proceedings, Irvin Carpenter and Susan Ann Carpenter were husband and wife. 4. On July 8, 1997, Irvin Carpenter executed a Florida Retirement System form styled "Application for Service Retirement" (Form FR-11). This form provides the retiree with information pertaining to the four options by which his retirement benefits can be paid. One full page of the form provides an explanation of each option. By use of this form, Irvin Carpenter selected Option One retirement benefit payout plan. The explanation of Option One on Form FR-11 is as follows: Option 1: A monthly benefit payable for my lifetime. Upon my death, the monthly benefit will stop and my beneficiary will receive only a refund of any contributions I have paid which are in excess of the amount I have received in benefits. This option does not provide a continuing benefit to my beneficiary. 5. The FR-11 also contained the following information in bold lettering: THIS SECTION MUST BE COMPLETED IF YOU SELECT OPTION 1 OR 2 MARRIED YES[ ] NO [ ] IF YES, YOUR SPOUSE MUST SIGN BELOW: SPOUSAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT : I, (Signature) Susan A. Carpenter,’ being the spouse of the above named member, acknowledges that the member has elected either Option 1 or 2. (Signature Irvin Carpenter 11-27-96 Signature of Spouse Date If your spouse does not sign, you must attach a signed statement explaining why your spouse did not acknowledge your selection. 6. The "yes" or "no" blocks requesting marriage status were blank on the FR-11 submitted by the retiree to the Agency. The Spousal Acknowledgement block contained the signature of "Susan Ann Carpenter." Susan Carpenter alleged this signature to be a forgery. 7. The form FPR-11 also contained the following statement in capital letters: I UNDERSTAND I MUST TERMINATE ALL EMPLOYMENT WITH FRS EMPLOYERS TO RECEIVE A RETIREMENT BENEFIT UNDER CHAPTER 121, FLORIDA STATUTES. I ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT I CANNOT ADD ADDITIONAL SERVICE, CHANGE OPTIONS, OR CHANGE MY TYPE OF RETIREMENT (REGULAR, DISABILITY AND EARLY) ONCE MY RETIREMENT BECOMES FINAL. MY RETIREMENT BECOMES FINAL WHEN ANY BENEFIT PAYMENT IS CASHED OR DEPOSITED. 8. Between the date of his retirement and the date of his death, Irvin Carpenter received, cashed, or deposited a minimum of three retirement checks from the Florida Retirement System, pursuant to his selection of Option One benefit payout plan. 9. After the death of Mr. Carpenter, the Agency, by letter dated November 24, 1997, addressed to: FAMILY OF IRVIN M. CARPENTER, 3602 W. Tampa Circle, Tampa, Florida 33629, informed the family of the retirement benefit due beneficiaries for November and the income tax deduction therefrom. 10. By letter to the Agency dated July 13, 2000, Susan Carpenter stated: My Husband, Irvin M. Carpenter, DOB 11/16/34, SSN 263-42-0146, retired from the Tampa International Airport Police Department on 07/31/1997. At the time of his retirement, we were separated but still Married. He passed away less than three months later in November 1997. I inquired as to any benefits and informed by the Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, the parent organization of the Tampa International Airport Police Department, that he had changed his beneficiary to his daughter, Anita Carpenter. Just recently, I became aware of the Florida Retirement System provisions concerning retirement options. I ama police officer with the Tampa International Airport Police Department and these matters were covered in a pre-retirement briefing conducted by Human Resources. It is my understanding that if you are married and select option 1 or 2, the spouse must acknowledge that selection in writing. Since I had not signed any such acknowledgement, it occurred to me that my deceased husband's remaining options both provide for the joint annuitant. I posed this question to the HCAA Human Resources and was informed that my deceased husband did not retire. The Department announced his retirement, his name was added to the plaque listing retired officers and Department personnel files indicate a retirement date of 07/31/1999. I questioned my police captain and Chief of Police and both of them were emphatic that my husband retired on 07/31/1999. With my superiors providing information contrary to Human Resources, I have some doubt as to the status of my deceased husband with regards to the Florida Retirement System. Please confirm the status of Irvin M. Carpenter. Did he retire from FRS? If not, what was his status at the time he passed away? I am sure you understand the significance of my determining the correct status. Thank you for any assistance you can provide. 11. The Agency denied Susan Carpenter's request to void Irvin Carpenter's selection of Option One retirement pay-out. The Agency's letter of November 15, 2000, asserted the position that the selection cannot be changed since the retirement checks were cashed or deposited and cited the following portions of Section 121.091(6) (a), Florida Statutes: "The spouse of any member who elects to receive the benefit provided under subparagraph 1. or subparagraph 2. shall be notified of and shall acknowledge any such election." The law does not require the spouse to agree with the members' retirement option selection. The Form FR-11, Application for Service Retirement, submitted by Irvin Carpenter included Susan Carpenter's signature acknowledging that she was aware of the Option 1 selection. We receive numerous applications monthly and we do not investigate to determine if each signature is authentic. Although Mrs. Carpenter contends that her signature was forged, once a member cashes or deposits a check the option selection cannot be changed. The statutes do not require the spouse to agree with the members option selection, only to be made aware. Your request to void the Option 1 selection is denied. 12. Susan Carpenter denies having signed the Form FR-11, Application for Service Retirement submitted by Irvin Carpenter. Susan Carpenter alleges that the signature, "Susan Ann Carpenter," appearing on the Form FR-11 is a forgery. 13. During the final hearing and in the presence of the undersigned, Susan Carpenter signed "Susan A. Carpenter" three times, Petitioner's Exhibit F. At the request of the undersigned Susan Carpenter signed "Susan Ann Carpenter" once. A review of the four signature samples provided by Susan Carpenter, the sample signature, "Susan Ann Carpenter," proved to the satisfaction of the undersigned evidence of the genuineness of the written signature in dispute. Accordingly, and as a finding of fact, the Form FR-11 signature "Susan Ann Carpenter" is not a forgery. 14. Susan Carpenter's assertion that the Agency is under legal obligation to contact each spouse or otherwise verify the signature of each spouse on the Form FR-11ls received in the Agency's normal course of business is without foundation in law and in fact. 15. Only the circuit court has jurisdiction and authority in dissolution of marriage cases to enter final orders determining property rights of marital assets. Petitioner proffered no such order as evidence. Accordingly, all testimony and evidence based on alleged spousal rights and entitlements pursuant to Chapter 61, Florida Statutes, are not considered
Conclusions For Petitioner: Scott W. Fitzpatrick, Esquire Southeast Building, Suite 1500 St. Petersburg, Florida 33703 For Respondent: Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building Cc 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact an Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order denying Susan Carpenter's request to change the retirement option 13 selected by Mr. Irvin Carpenter, including benefits due, and denying all such other relief. lo& DONE AND ENTERED this = day of July, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division _of Administrative Hearings this J2% day of July, 2001.
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner, as a surviving spouse, is entitled to a continuing benefit from the Florida Retirement System (FRS) based on the retirement account of her deceased husband, George S. Bohler. More specifically, it must be determined whether the forgery of the spousal acknowledgement form renders the member's election of the "Option 1" retirement benefit payment, which precludes a survivor's benefit for his spouse, invalid and void.
Findings Of Fact George Bohler, the FRS member at issue, was employed, at times pertinent, as a Professor of Economics at Florida Community College in Jacksonville. The College is an FRS employer and Mr. Bohler was a member of the FRS retirement system. The Division of Retirement is an administrative agency charged with regulation and operation of the Florida retirement system, including calculation of and determination of entitlement to retirement benefits, under various options and member circumstances. On March 22, 1999, Mr. Bohler filed a completed Florida Retirement System Application for service retirement and the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP). This was accomplished through his filing of "Form DP-11." The Form provides a retiree with information pertaining to four options by which his retirement benefits may be paid. One full page of that form provides an explanation of each option. Mr. Bohler selected Option 1, a retirement benefit pay-out plan which provides the highest monthly benefit. The Option 1 selection provides that this highest monthly benefit is payable for the lifetime of the retiree only. Upon his death, the benefit would stop and his beneficiary, here his spouse, the Petitioner, would receive only a refund of any contributions the member might have paid into the FRS which exceeds the amount he had received in benefits. Option 1 provides no continuing or survivor benefit to a beneficiary or surviving spouse. The DP-11 Form filed with the retirement application contained an apparent spousal acknowledgement purportedly signed by Deborah T. Bohler, the spouse of member George Bohler. It appears to acknowledge that the member had elected either Option 1 or Option 2, which provide no survivor/spouse benefit. The DP-11 Form indicated to the Division that the member was married. The parties have stipulated, however, that the Petitioner's signature on the FRS application for service retirement and the DROP program was actually forged. George Bohler, the member, was an FRS member from August 19, 1968, to March 31, 2005. He received FRS retirement benefits based upon the above-referenced application from the Division from April 1, 2000, to October 31, 2007. The Form DP-11 contained a statement to the effect that the retiree member understood that he could not add additional service, change options, or change his type of retirement once his retirement became final. Mr. Bohler began participation in the DROP program on April 1, 2000. Thereafter, his last date of employment was March 31, 2005, and he passed away on October 18, 2007. He received FRS benefits from April 1, 2000, until October 31, 2007. For 28 years, until his death on that date, Mr. Bohler was legally married to the Petitioner, Deborah Bohler, during which time they were never separated or divorced. On March 10, 1999, Mr. Bohler executed the FRS Application for Service Retirement and the DROP program. He had his signature notarized as required for that form. Joint Exhibit 1, in evidence. Mr. Bohler designated the Petitioner as his primary beneficiary on the DROP Application. He elected to begin participation in the DROP program as of April 1, 2000, and to retire from state employment effective March 31, 2005, which he did. There are four options which an FRS member may select for his or her retirement benefits to be paid to the member or to the survivors/beneficiaries. Mr. Bohler selected "Option 1" on his DROP Application form. This results in a significantly higher retirement monthly benefit than does Options 3 or 4, which have survivorship rights. The acknowledgement section on the DROP Application form requires that a member's spouse be notified and must acknowledge a member's selection of Option 1 or Option 2 by signing that DROP Application form, so that the FRS is thus informed that the spouse made a knowing, intelligent waiver of survivorship rights to benefits. The spousal acknowledgement provision or section does not require that the member's spouse's signature be notarized. The form also does not require a member to swear under oath that the spouse was notified. The parties have stipulated that the Petitioner's apparent signature shown on Mr. Bohler's retirement application form was forged. The Petitioner had no knowledge that her name had been placed on the form by some other person, nor did she have any knowledge that Mr. Bohler had selected Option 1 prior to his death. The Petitioner first learned that her husband had selected Option 1 when she contacted the Respondent, after his death, to request that his retirement benefits now be paid to her. She believed that she was entitled to survivorship benefits. Her husband never informed her that he had selected a retirement option which would not pay her survivorship benefits, nor had they discussed the matter before or since his retirement. In their marital and family relationship, the Bohlers had divided certain duties in such a way that Mr. Bohler, the FRS member at issue, handled all financial matters himself. The Petitioner, Mrs. Bohler, dealt with any tax issues or filings the couple was required to make during the years of their marriage. The Petitioner is a certified public accountant. The Petitioner was simply aware that her husband received retirement benefits, and knew the amount of them, but did not know that they represented benefits for Option 1 rather than Option 3 or 4. The Petitioner's signature on the spousal acknowledgment section of the DROP Application form is stipulated to have been forged. The fact of the forgery, and the Petitioner's un-refuted testimony, establishes that she was never notified, nor did she ever acknowledge that her husband had selected Option 1. She was not aware that an attempt to waive or extinguish her survivor's benefits had been made. She believed, during his lifetime, that she was to be accorded survivor benefits. Testimony presented by the Respondent shows that the Respondent Division will not accept a retirement application form, or process it, if a member fails to complete the spousal acknowledgement section or, alternatively, to submit a signed statement explaining why that section is left blank, or the signature of the spouse has not been obtained. The fact that the Division will not accept a retirement or DROP Application form or process the related benefits if the acknowledgement section is unsigned or blank establishes the mandatory nature of the requirement that a spouse acknowledge a member's election to receive benefits under an option which would preclude a spouse's survivorship benefits. The acknowledgement is thus not an optional requirement. In fact, the legislature clearly placed that requirement in the statute, Section 121.091(6)(a), Florida Statutes, as a mandatory requirement so a spouse would know of any such attempt to waive the spouse's survivorship rights and benefits. It is an acknowledgement that the spouse has a vested or property right in such benefits, which must be knowingly and intelligently waived. The Statute says, in fact, that the spouse of any member "shall be notified of and shall acknowledge any such election." Therefore, obtaining a spouse's signature is not the only desired result set forth by the legislature (and under the rule adopted pursuant thereto) because it requires actual notification of the spouse, not merely the obtaining of a spouse's signature, whether genuine or forged. Actual notification is what must be accomplished. The required notification and indeed the obtaining of the Petitioner's signature was not accomplished in the facts of this case. In light of these facts, the act of declaring and accomplishing retired status, and selection of the related benefit option, was never completed. The Option selection was obviously a nullity and void ab initio because the mandatory condition precedent never was accomplished by the member.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the State of Florida, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, awarding the Petitioner retirement benefits based upon her status as a surviving spouse and joint annuitant, in the manner described above, adjusted to reflect re-calculation and recoupment of overpayment based upon the amount of benefits already paid from the subject retirement account pursuant to Option 1. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Elizabeth Regina Stevens, Esquire Department of Management Services Office of the General Counsel 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32327 T. A. Delegal, Esquire Delegal Law Offices, P.A. 424 East Monroe Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 John Brenneis, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue The issue in this case is who is entitled to payment of remaining retirement benefits due to James E. Brandon, deceased.
Findings Of Fact James E. Brandon was employed by the Hillsborough County Parks and Recreation Department and was a participant in the Florida Retirement System (FRS). Mr. Brandon had a long standing relationship with Dennis A. Barga. In February 1995, James E. Brandon applied for FRS disability benefits due to a medical condition. On the application for disability benefits, James E. Brandon designated Dennis A. Barga as his primary beneficiary. The application for disability benefits was approved in June 1995, with an effective retirement date of March 1, 1995. James E. Brandon elected to receive benefits under "Option 2" of the FRS, which provides for a lifetime benefit to the covered employee. Option 2 also provides that, if the covered employee does not survive for the ten years following retirement, payment is made to a designated beneficiary for the remainder of the ten year period. James E. Brandon died on August 28, 1995, of the condition which resulted in his disability. James E. Brandon did not personally receive any of his disability benefits. By letter dated September 29, 1995, the Division notified Mr. Barga that he was entitled to receive the remaining benefit payments for the ten year period. At the end of September, the Division sent two checks to the home of James E. Brandon. One check covered the initial benefits period from March 1995 through August 1995. The second check was for the September 1995 benefit. The checks were not returned to the Division and apparently were cashed or deposited. On October 10, 1995, the Division was notified by William Brandon that his brother, James E. Brandon, had completed a form amending his designation of beneficiary and that the form had been filed with the Division. The Division searched its files and located a form, FRS M-10, which was apparently filed on July 25, 1995, by James E. Brandon, and which amends his prior designation to identify sequential beneficiaries. The amended beneficiaries, in order, are William W. Brandon, III, Daniel A. Brandon, and Victoria Weaver Stevens. The Brandons are family members of the deceased. Ms. Stevens is a long-time family friend and was also employed by the Hillsborough County Parks and Recreation Department. FRS Form M-10 is the form adopted by the Division for use by a non-retired FRS participant in designating a beneficiary. Form M-10 does not require execution before a notary public. FRS Form FST-12 is the form adopted by the Division for use by a retired participant in designating a beneficiary. Form FST-12 requires execution before a notary public. The amendment of the beneficiaries should have been executed on a Form FST-12. The Form M-10, which was filed on July 25, 1995, was provided to James E. Brandon by the human resources office of the Hillsborough County Parks and Recreation Department. The form was obtained by Victoria Weaver Stevens apparently at the request of the deceased. The filing of the improper form was through no fault of James E. Brandon. The Petitioner suggests that the signature on the Form M-10 is a forgery. There is no credible evidence to support the assertion. The evidence establishes that the deceased sometimes included his middle initial in his signature, and other times did not. The Petitioner suggests that during the last weeks of the deceased's life, he was overmedicated, was often unaware of his surroundings, and was likely manipulated into changing the designated beneficiaries. There is no credible evidence that James E. Brandon was mentally incapacitated and unable to understand the import of his decisions at the time the amendment was filed with the Division.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Division of Retirement enter a Final Order dismissing the Petition of Dennis A. Barga. DONE AND ORDERED this 31st day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. _ WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Paul A. Rowell, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 David T. Weisbrod, Esquire 601 North Franklin Street Tampa, Florida 33602 Stanley N. Danek, Esquire Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Thomas Frost, Esquire 7901 Fourth Street North Suite 315 St. Petersburg, Florida 33702
