Findings Of Fact Respondent, Richard C. Lightner, was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0408120. The last license issued to Respondent was as a broker, with a home address of 1221 Duval Street, Key West, Florida 32040. Respondent, or a representative on his behalf, did not appear at the hearing to refute or otherwise contest the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: The Department enter a Final Order revoking Respondent's Real Estate brokers license. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 29th day of July, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of August, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Raymond O. Bodiford, Esquire 515 Whitehead Street Key West, Florida 33040 Darlene F. Keller, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 William O'Neil General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= FLORIDA STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION REAL ESTATE COMMISSION DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE Petitioner vs. Case No. 0154510 DOAH No. 87-3668 RICHARD C. LIGHTNER III Respondent /
Findings Of Fact John M. Stroud is a registered real estate saleman holding registration number 0172065 issued the Florida Real Estate Commission. On December 17, 1976, John M. Stroud was arrested for burglary and committed to the custody of the sheriff of Brevard County for the offense of burglary. On December 15, 1976, Stroud had his completed application notarized by R. Jack Simpson. Stroud's application was initially received by the Florida Real Estate Commission on January 5, 1977, and was returned to Stroud because he had not enclosed the fee required. It was resubmitted with the fee and received by the Florida Real Estate Commission on January 14, 1977.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer RECOMMENDS: That the registration of John M. Stroud be revoked. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of December, 1977 in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of December, 1977. COPIES FURNISHED: David T. Young, Esquire 1197 So. U.S. Highway 1 P.O. Box 563 Rockledge, Florida 32955 Bruce I. Kamelhair, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789
Findings Of Fact The Defendants are registered with the Florida Real Estate Commission as brokers. The Defendant Mershon is the President of the Defendant Orlando Metro Realty, Inc. During May, 1971, the Defendant Mershon, acting as a real estate broker, negotiated a sale of land from Carolina Caribbean Corporation to Edye Lynn. The property is located in North Carolina, and the contract for sale was signed in an airplane between North Carolina and Florida. For reasons that are not relevant to this proceeding, Ms. Lynn became disenchanted with the transaction. The Defendant Mershon agreed to assist her in finding a purchaser. On January 23, 1972, Charles Schiller Martin, signed a contract to purchase Ms. Lynn's property. The Defendants acted as brokers in securing the purchaser. The contract was signed in North Carolina. The contract was received in evidence, and is marked as Exhibit number 1 to each of the four depositions. Mr. Martin deposited the sum of $500 with the Defendant when he signed the contract. A copy of the cancelled check from Mr. Martin to the Defendants was received in evidence and is marked as Exhibit number 2 to each of the depositions. Ms. Lynn accepted Mr. Martin's offer. Mr. Martin submitted the contract to his attorney, George W. English III. On March 7, 1972 Mr. English wrote to Henry J. Prominski, an attorney who represented Ms. Lynn, requesting that several items respecting the property be forwarded to him. This letter was received in evidence and is marked as Exhibit number 5 to each of the depositions. On March 22, 1972, Mr. English wrote to Mr. Prominski informing him that Mr. Martin wished to cancel the contract to purchase. A copy of this letter was received in evidence, and is marked as Exhibit number 3 to each of the depositions. Mr. English advised Mr. Martin that marketable title could not be delivered, primarily because there were deed restrictions applying to the property which were not mentioned in the contract for sale. Assessments for water, sewer, and road grading were cited by Mr. English as particularly onerous. The March 22 letter was followed on April 25, 1972, with another letter. This letter was received in evidence, and is identified as Exhibit number 4 to each of the depositions. Mr. English never made any direct demand upon Mr. Mershon for return of the $500 deposit to Mr. Martin. He did make a demand upon Mr. Prominski. It is Mr. English's legal opinion that the seller could not deliver marketable title to the buyer. Mr. Prominski, representing the seller, is of the opinion that marketable title was available to be delivered to the buyer. Mr. Prominski stated that his client did not default in her obligations under the contract. Mr. Mershon opted to construe the purchase contract between Mr. Martin and Ms. Lynn as breeched by Mr. Martin. He forwarded $250 of the deposit to Ms. Lynn and retained $250 for himself. He explained his action in this regard in a letter to Mr. Prominski dated September 13, 1972. This letter was received in evidence, and is marked as Defendants' Exhibit number 1. This arrangement was apparently satisfactory to Ms. Lynn, and Mr. Prominski communicated Ms. Lynn's approval through a letter dated October 11, 1972. This letter was received in evidence, and is marked as Exhibit number 8 to each of the depositions. Approximately three weeks prior to the time that Mr. Martin signed the contract to purchase the Lynn property, Mr. Mershon delivered copies of various reports to Mr. Martin, including the restrictions that would apply to the property, and the contract to purchase from Carolina Caribbean Corporation which had been executed by Ms. Lynn. At approximately the time that Mr. Martin signed the contract, Mr. Mershon advised him that title insurance was available. The Defendants acted as brokers in many transactions in the development in which the property involved in this case is located. They had obtained title insurance on many similar lots. Only in this case was there any objection to title. Prior to his distributing $250 of the $500 deposit to Ms. Lynn and his retaining the remaining $250, Mr. Mershon consulted with attorneys for Carolina Caribbean Corporation who advised him that the Martins had defaulted in their obligations. Mr. Mershon personally spent approximately $1,000.00 in transporting Mr. Martin from Florida to North Carolina. Defendants did not seek the advice of the Florida Real Estate Commision respecting the disposition of the deposit monies, did not submit the issue to arbitration, did not interplead the parties, and did not otherwise seek an adjudication in a proper court. No evidence was offered with respect to standards for determining the marketability of real property in North Carolina. No evidence was offered respecting the marketability of title to the land in this case, other than the opinions of Attorney English, Attorney Prominski, and Defendant Mershon.
The Issue The issue in Count I is whether Section 475.42(1)(j) absolutely prohibits a broker or salesman from filing a lien or other encumberance against real property to collect a commission. The issue in Count II is whether the Respondents violated a lawful order of the Commission by failing to remove the motion of lis pendens contrary to Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes.
Conclusions Section 475.42(1)(j), Florida Statutes, provides as follows: "No real estate broker or salesman shall place, or cause to be placed, upon the public records of any county, any contract, assignment, deed, will, mortgage, lien, affidavit, or other writing which purports to affect the title of, or encumber, any real property, if the same is known to him to be false, void, or not authorized to be placed of record, or not executed in the form entitling it to be recorded, or the execution of recording thereof has not been duly authorized by the owner of the property, maliciously or for the purpose of collecting a commission, or to coerce the payment of money to the broker or salesman or other person, or for any unlawful purpose." Clearly the Respondents placed or caused to be placed the notice of lis pendens in question. A notice of lis pendens is clearly an "other writing which purports to effect the title of, or encumber, any real property." The Florida Real Estate Commission argues that this provision is an absolute bar to the filing of any lien for the purpose of collecting a commission. The Respondents argue that this provision is not an absolute bar and there are circumstances when a broker may file a notice of lis pendens. They also assert that the notice of lis pendens falls within the exception because the Circuit Court refused to remove the notice of lis pendens upon motion of the property owner. Lastly, it is argued that the notice was filed by counsel for the Respondents in good faith on an action at law and that this mitigates their action even if there was a violation. The language of Section 475.42(1)(j) cannot be read to absolutely prohibit a broker from obtaining a lis pendens. When given this construction, it effectively denies brokers and salesmen access to the courts for redress of injury as provided in Article I, Section 21 of the Florida Constitution. Section 475.42(1)(j) is a complex provision which is subject to two interpretations. One interpretation would prohibit a broker or salesman from filing an encumberance if the same were known to him to be false, void or not authorized by law; if not authorized to be upon the public records; if not executed in the form entitling it to be recorded; if the execution of recording thereof has not been duly authorized by the owner of the property; if maliciously (filed); if for the purpose of collecting a commission, if to coerce payment of money to the broker or salesman or other person; or if for any other unlawful purpose. This first interpretation would consider each clause a separate limitation on filing an encumberance. The facts analyzed under this interpretation do not show any knowledge by Respondents that the lis pendens was false, void or not authorized to be filed or not on a form entitling it to be recorded. The facts do not show that Respondents filed the lis pendens maliciously, for the purpose of collecting a commission, or for the purpose of coercing payment of money to the broker or salesman, or for any unlawful purpose. The nature of lis pendens would not require the owner's authorization of execution for recording. The facts show that the lis pendens was filed by Respondent's attorney in conjunction with a suit brought by the Respondents against Perrin. The record also shows that the circuit court determined that the lis pendens was recordable when it denied the motion to remove it. The notice of lis pendens was neither malicious, coercive or for the purpose of collecting the commission. The notice was for the purpose of perfecting the claim against the property for execution of the judgment if the Respondents prevailed in the suit. Executing on a judgment is different from collecting the commission or coercing payment. Under this interpretation the Respondents have not been shown to violate Section 475.42(1)(j). A second interpretation would read the clause, ". . . if the same is known to to him to be false, void, or not authorized to be placed of record, or not executed in the form entitling it to be recorded, or the execution of recording thereof has not been authorized by the owner of the property. . ." as the first of two criteria to be met to establish a violation. The second criteria would consist of proof that the encumberance was recorded maliciously or for the purpose of collecting a commission, or to coerce payment of money to the broker or salesman, or for any unlawful purpose. Again the facts do not show there was knowledge by the Respondents of the falsity, or impropriety of the notice of lis pendens, as stated above. Again the facts show that the lis pendens was filed in conjunction with a law suit pending between the Respondent and the property owner, and that the court before which the action was pending refused to remove it. The file of the notice by Respondent's counsel was a legitimate method of perfecting the Respondent's claim should they prevail and obtain judgment. The facts do not indicate that the filing of the notice was malicious, coercive or for the purpose of collecting a commission. Under either interpretation, Respondents did not violate the statute. COUNT II The Respondents are charged in Count II with violation of Section 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes, which provides that the registration of a registrant may be suspended for up to two years for violation of a lawful order of the Commission. Clearly, the facts reveal that the Respondents had a substantial interest involved in the litigation with Perrin. The order, of the Florida Real Estate Commission to remove the notice of lis pendens substantially affected their rights in this litigation. Therefore, any final order directing Kay to remove the notice of lis pendens should have issued after an opportunity for hearing pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. The evidence reveals that the Florida Real Estate Commission did not notice a hearing under Section 120.57, and therefore its order cannot be "lawful." The provisions of Section 475.25(1)(d) require that registrants not violate lawful orders. The Respondents have not violated Section 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes, by not removing the notice of lis pendens as directed by the order of the Florida Real Estate Commission.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Hearing Officer recommends that no action be taken against the Respondent, Sam Kaye and Sam Kaye, Inc. DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of September 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce I. Kamelhair, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 William E. Boyes, Esquire Cone, Owen, Wagner, Nugent, Johnson & McKeown, P.A. Post Office Box 3466 West Palm Beach, Florida 33402
Findings Of Fact The Respondent was at all material times registered with the Florida Real Estate Commission as a real estate broker, holding registration certificates numbered 001709, and 0141291. The Respondent served as the real estate broker for an entity known as "Rent-A-Home, Inc." Rent-A-Home had an office in St. Petersburg and an office in Clearwater. A Mr. Richard Gindin was the Respondent's partner in Rent-A-Home. Gindin was not at any material time registered with the Florida Real Estate Commission as either an active or non-active real estate broker or real estate salesman. During October, 1974, the Respondent took part in a real estate transaction between a Mr. and Mrs. Garrett, and a Mr. and Mrs. Churches. On October 7, 1974, the Churches signed an option to purchase certain property owned by the Garretts in Pasco County. The transaction was undertaken under the auspices of Rent-A-Home. Lena Biggan was the sales person who actually negotiated the contract. A copy of the option agreement was received into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 3. The Churches delivered a cashier's check in the amount of $1,500 to the Respondent as set out in the agreement. A copy of the cashier's check was received into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 5. Five Hundred dollars of the $1,500 was to be used as the real estate commission. The remainder was to be distributed to the Garretts. On the same day that the contract was executed, the Respondent deposited $1,400 of the $1,500 in his personal checking account at the Liberty National Bank of St. Petersburg (See: Petitioner's Exhibits 6,7). He retained $100. On the same day the Respondent issued checks from the same account in the amount of $1,000 to Cecil D. Garrett, in the amount of $166.63 to Lena Biggan, and in the amount of $166.63 to Richard Gindin. The check issued to Lena Biggan constituted her share of the $500 real estate commission. This check was received into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 9. The check issued to Gindin was received into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 8. There was no direct testimony that the check issued to Gindin constituted his share of the real estate commission. The circumstances of the check, however, clearly indicate that that was the intention. The check to Biggan bore No. 563. The check to Gindin was the very next check in the Respondent's checkbook, No. 564. The next check issued from the Respondent's checkbook, No. 565, was the $1,000 check to the Garretts. The check to Biggan, and the check to Gindin were in the same amount, approximately one third of $500. It is indicated on each check that it was for a "comm.". There was direct testimony from Ms. Biggan that her check was for her share of the commission on the Garrett/Churches transaction. It is evident that Gindin's check was for the same purpose. Prior to the Garrett/ Churches transaction, Gindin approached the Respondent with respect to forming "Rent-A-Home". Gindin told the Respondent that he would form a corporation, and he asked the Respondent to pay one third of the $500 legal fee which was required for forming a corporation. When the Respondent gave Gindin the check which has been received into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 9, the Respondent thought that he was paying one third of the necessary attorney's fee rather than giving a commission to Gindin in connection with the Garrett/Churches transaction. In fact Gindin never used the money to form a corporation, and he kept it as if it was a real estate commission. When the Respondent delivered the check to Gindin he did in fact share a real estate commission with Gindin, a person who was not registered as a real estate broker or salesman. The Respondent thought that the check was being delivered for a legitimate purpose; however, the circumstances of the transaction were such that the Respondent should have known that Gindin was regarding the check as his share of a real estate commission. In approximately January, 1975, the Respondent disassociated himself from Rent-A-Home. Gindin has apparently left the State of Florida, and has not been seen by the Respondent since January, 1975.
