The Issue Whether petitioner taxpayer is liable for delinquent sales tax, penalties, and interest under Chapter 212, Florida Stat utes, as alleged by respondent Department in its notice of proposed assessment.
Findings Of Fact The Taxpayer Taxpayer is a family-operated Florida corporation which has engaged in retail sales at the Tampa Port Authority since 1975 or 1976; it is a licensed dealer registered with the Department. (Testimony of Roberts, Marylis.) Taxpayer's Sales During Audit Period From June 1, 1977, through July 31, 1980 (the audit period covered by the Department's proposed assessment), Taxpayer had gross sales in the approximate amount of $691,013.46. (Testimony of Roberts; Exhibit 2.) During that period, Taxpayer filed the required DR-15 monthly sales tax reports and paid taxes on all retail sales transactions which took place on the premises of its store located at 804 Robinson Street, (Tampa Port Authority) Tampa, Florida. (Testimony of Roberts.) During the same audit period -- in addition to sales on its store premises -- Taxpayer sold goods to merchant seamen on board foreign vessels temporarily docked at the Port of Tampa. These vessels operated in foreign commerce, entering the port from and returning to international waters outside the territorial limits of the United States. Taxpayer did not report these sales on its monthly sales tax reports; neither did it charge or collect sales tax from the on-board purchasers. (Testimony of Marylis.) Taxpayer failed to charge or collect sales tax in connection with its on-board sales because it relied on what it had been told by Department representatives. Prior to forming Taxpayer's corporation Thomas Marylis went to the local Department office to obtain a dealer's certificate. While there, he asked Manuel Alvarez, Jr., then the Department's regional audit supervisor, whether he was required to collect sales tax on ship-board sales. Alvarez replied that he didn't have to collect sales taxes on sales made to seamen when he delivered the goods to the ship. 1/ (Testimony of Marylis.) The on-board sales transactions took place in the following manner: Taxpayer (through its owner, Thomas Marylis) would board the foreign vessel and accept orders from the captain, chief mate, or chief steward. (Earlier, one of these persons would have taken orders from the rest of the crew.) If individual crewmen tried to place orders, Marylis would refer them to the captain, chief mate, or chief steward. After receiving orders from one of these three persons, Marylis would return to Taxpayer's store, fill the order, and transport the goods back to the vessel. Whoever placed the order would then examine the goods and give Marylis the money /2 collected from the crew. (Testimony of Roberts, Marylis.) The goods sold in this manner were ordinarily for the personal use of individual crew members; typical items were: shoes, underwear, working clothes, small radios, watches, suitcases, soap, paper towels, and other personal care products. (Testimony of Marylis.) Department Audit of Taxpayer In 1980, the Department audited Taxpayer's corporate books to determine if sales tax had been properly collected and paid. Taxpayer could produce no dock or warehouse receipts, bills of lading, resale certificates from other licensed dealers, or affidavits verifying that its on-board sales were made to out-of-state purchasers for transportation outside of Florida. (Testimony of Roberts, Marylis.) Due to Taxpayer's failure to supply documentation demonstrating that its ship-board sales from June 1, 1977, to July 31, 1980, were exempt from sales tax imposed by Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, the Department issued a proposed assessment on September 23, 1980. Through that assessment, the Department seeks to collect $21,201.01 in delinquent sales tax, $5,131.39 in penalties, and $3,892.18 in interest (in addition to interest at 12 percent per annum, or $6.97 per day, accruing until date of payment). (Exhibit 5.) Informal Conference with Department; Alvarez's Representations to Taxpayer In October 1980 -- after the audit -- Taxpayer (through Marylis) informally met with Manuel Alvarez, the Department's regional audit supervisor, to discuss the tax status of the shipboard sales. Specifically, they discussed the Department auditor's inability to confirm that Taxpayer delivered the items to the ships, as opposed to the buyers picking up the goods at the store. Alvarez told him: [I]f the buyers would come and just pick them up and take them. And I [Alvarez] think I told him that, if that was the case, it was taxable. But, if they just placed their orders there -- like we have had other ship supplies -- and they them- selves, or one of their employees, would take the items aboard ships, that would be an exempt sale. I did make that state ment. If we had any type of confirmation to that effect, when it comes to that. (Tr. 61.) 3/ (Testimony of Alvarez.) Alvarez then told Marylis to obtain documentation or verification that the sales were made on foreign vessels, i.e., proof that Taxpayer delivered the goods to the vessels. He assured Marylis that if he could bring such verification back, such sales "would come off the audit." (Tr. 62.)(Testimony of Alvarez.) Alvarez was an experienced Department employee: he retired in 1980, after 30 years of service. It was Alvarez's standard practice -- when dealing with sales tax exemption questions -- to reiterate the importance of documentation. He would always give the taxpayer an opportunity -- 30 days or more -- to obtain documentation that a sale was exempt from taxation. (Testimony of Alvarez.) Taxpayer's Verification In response to the opportunity provided by Alvarez, Taxpayer (through Marylis) obtained affidavits from numerous captains of foreign vessels and shipping agents. Those affidavits read, in pertinent part: I, [name inserted] , am the Captain aboard the vessel [name inserted] from [place of origin]. I am personally aware that Speros International Ship Supply Co., Inc. sells various commodities, supplies, clothing, and various sundry items to for eign ship personnel by delivering the said items to the ships docked at various termi- nals inside the Tampa Port Authority and other locations in Tampa, Florida from [date] to the present. (Testimony of Marylis; Exhibit 8.) Moreover, in an attempt to comply with the tax law and avoid similar problems in the future, Taxpayer printed receipt books to be used in all future on-board sales. The receipts reflect the type of goods sold, the date of delivery to the vessel, the foreign vessel's destination, and the total purchase price. Also included is a signature line for the individual who delivers and receives the goods. (Testimony of Marylis; Exhibit 7.)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Department's proposed assessment of Taxpayer for delinquent sales tax, penalties, and interest, be issued as final agency action. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 17th day of February, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of February, 1982.
Findings Of Fact Arrowhead Country Club (Arrowhead) is a business entity owned by Can Am Company, Ltd., a limited partnership, which held at all times pertinent to this case a beverage license issued by the Division of Beverage. Can Am Company, Ltd. entered into a lease with EST Corporation (EST) to lease the restaurant and lounge at Arrowhead to EST. Subsequently, RST applied for its corporate charter but was unable to use the name RST. It amended its corporate name to Wilval Corporation (Wilval). RST/Wilval continued to operate the restaurant and lounge under the terms of its lease. EST/Wilval obtained a sales tax number, collected tax, and remitted taxes for several months, May through October, 1978. Thereafter, RST/Wilval failed to remit sales taxes to the Department of Revenue. RST/Wilval also began to fall behind on its payments to Arrowhead under its lease. This resulted in Arrowhead taking certain charges in payment for monies due under the lease and collecting them from club members. Arrowhead remitted the four percent lease tax but not the sales tax on these collections. Testimony was submitted by the Department's auditor that there was no evidence of collusion between RST/ Wilval and Arrowhead or indication that they did not deal at arm's length with one another. The Department audited RST/Wilval and determined that, although the first few months of records were complete, its total records were incomplete. An estimate of sales taxes due was based upon estimates of the sales based upon the records of Arrowhead on the restaurant and lounge operations for the preceding year adjusted for price increases. These estimates, when compared against the records which were maintained by RST/Wilval in its first months of operation, show a close correlation. Based upon these estimates, the sales taxes assessed against RST/Wilval were $7,965.14. This assessment was presented to Ralph Williams, the manager of the RST/Wilval operation. Williams, an officer of the corporation, advised that RST/Wilval was unable to pay the taxes. The Department of Revenue then filed a warrant for collection of delinquent taxes, and the Sheriff of Broward County attempted to levy on the warrant. Williams tendered to Arrowhead a Notice of Termination of the Lease and vacated the premises on March 26, 1979. When the Sheriff attempted to levy the warrant, he found that Williams had left the location and the property on the premises belonged to Arrowhead. On Nay 18, 1979, the Department presented a jeopardy assessment to Arrowhead, which led to the instant controversy.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the Hearing Officer recommends that the sales taxes due not be assessed against Arrowhead Country Club. DONE and ORDERED this 30th day of April, 1980, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Linda C. Procta, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Louis J. Pleeter, Esquire 6200 Stirling Road, Davie Post Office Box 8549 Hollywood, Florida 33024
Findings Of Fact Allis-Chalmers Corporation (ACC), Petitioner in Case 82-2774, is a Delaware corporation commercially domiciled in West Allis, Wisconsin. ACC operates in Florida at the following locations: U.S. Highway 1 opened 2/1/77 Grant (Industrial Pump Division) 5200 Kennedy Blvd. closed 10/30/78 Tampa (Industrial Pump Division) 406 Rio Street opened 11/1/78 101 Federal Place opened 5/1/80 Tarpon Springs (Cement & Mining System Division) (The locations listed are those operating during the audit period. Other locations closed prior to or opened after the audit period.) ACC makes sales of tangible personal property to Florida customers directly from the locations at (b) and (c) and also makes sales to Florida customers from these two locations where the property is shipped from out-of-state locations to the Florida customers. ACC is a diversified company which manufactures and markets the following items: (a) agricultural equipment; (b) hydropower equipment; (c) coal gasification systems; (d) ore conveyors, crushers and screening equipment; (e) bulk material-handling equipment, such as ship self-unloaders; (f) stackers and reclaimers for steel mills; (g) compressors and pumps; (h) cement and asphaltic concrete production equipment (i) valves for units larger than household or commercial plumbing installations; (j) systems for the direct reduction of iron ore; (k) kilns and coolers; (l) lawn and garden equipment; and (m) lift trucks and industrial tractors. The amount in dispute is as stated in the Petition and is not an issue in these proceedings. The only issue is the method of computing the intangible taxes. ACC contends the tax base should be the net accounts receivable based on sales transacted in Florida divided by sales transacted everywhere else. The department contends the ratio should be Florida-destination sales divided by sales everywhere else. The issue is the "business situs" of the intangibles. Allis-Chalmers Credit Corporation (ACCC), Petitioner in Cases 82-2816 and 82-2817, is a Wisconsin corporation doing business in Florida. It is the wholly-owned subsidiary of ACC and its principal business is financing the sale or lease of equipment by ACC dealers. Case 82-2816 involves an income tax assessment against ACCC for the years 1977-1979. The item in dispute involves treatment given to "waiver interest" in arriving at the ratio by which federal income tax is multiplied to determine state income tax due. This issue applies to the denominator of that equation, hence the higher the figure the lower the tax. On occasion ACC, as a marketing tool, agrees to forego interest on either retail or wholesale financing for a period of perhaps six months. If these notes are assigned to ACCC, ACC must pay the waived interest to ACCC that its dealer or the dealer's customer would otherwise have paid. This is charged to ACC at the rate of one and one-half times the cost of funds to ACCC plus the actual cost of insurance. This rate is one percent to three percent per annum less than ACCC would charge the original debtors for the same period. The difference takes into account the elimination of bad debts and the simplified collection from one source instead of many. Therefore, as contended by ACCC, this "waiver interest" is thus already net of the "expenses of the recipient related thereto." The department contends that "waiver interest," and ACCC's explanation thereof, merely reflects the fact that a reduced rate of return "interest" is charged by ACCC with respect to the higher quality risk attendant to its relationship with its parent, ACC. As to ACCC's interest expense as a cost carrying the underlying receivables, the department contends that the ratio of ACCC's interest expense as applied is an appropriate adjustment as none is reflected elsewhere as a cost of carrying "waiver interest" generating receivables. As to the related bad debt expense, the department contends it merely applied the overall bad debt information ACCC used in determining its underlying federal taxable income and, that in its use of such data, the department did not find evidence wherein ACCC in its determination of its federal bad debt expense, distinguished between classes of risks which may be in its aggregate receivables, including the receivables giving rise to the "waiver interest." Thus, the department contends that directly related expense includes interest expense and bad debt expense. By the department's calculation, "waiver interest" as an item in the sales denominator has been reduced by 61 percent to 70 percent in various years to reflect these two categories of directly related expense as mandated by Section 214.71(3)(b) Florida Statutes, and Section 220.44, Florida Statutes. The issue is what constitutes directly related expense to inter-company income. There is no dispute on the numbers. Either the return numbers or the audit numbers on this item will prevail. Case 82-2817 involves an intangible tax assessment against ACCC for the years 1979-1981. During the audit period ACCC was represented in Florida by one employee whose duties were to call on ACC Florida dealers to persuade these dealers to use ACCC for financing sales they made, to keep these dealers supplied with necessary forms, and to give advice to these dealers if complicated or difficult financing situations arose. This representative worked out of the Atlanta office but lived in Florida, the state for which this representative was responsible. Buyers of ACC equipment with good credit ratings can generally obtain bank financing at better rates than are offered by ACCC. The dealer is not required to assign conditional sales contracts to ACCC (via ACC) but is encouraged to do so. The sales contracts for Florida buyers of equipment delivered to Florida are the intangibles upon which the tax here involved was based. When a dealer sells a piece of equipment on which the buyer wants financing by ACCC, the dealer has the retail customer fill out the purchaser's statement and execute three additional forms that are provided by ACCC. Under his franchise agreement with the parent corporation, the dealer is required to use appropriate precautions in conducting financing transactions, to warranty the truth and completeness of statements in the documents and their enforceability, and to repurchase the paper on demand in the event of default. The dealer forwards the executed documents to ACCC's Atlanta branch office for review and approval before any extension of credit to the customer. In Atlanta ACCC's branch manager, acting under a power of attorney from the parent corporation, accepts the document on behalf of the parent corporation, and tenders them to himself as agent for ACCC. If the paper meets the ACCC requirements as to form, terms, execution and credit-worthiness, as defined in the Master Credit Agreement between the parent corporation and ACCC, he then accepts the documents on behalf of ACCC. In some instances he conducts a supplemental credit inquiry by mail or telephone to assure ACCC's requirements are met. His acceptance of the documents for ACCC constitutes in effect the purchase and receipt of the obligation. The customer receives his financing, and the appropriate credits are transferred from ACCC to the parent corporation to the dealer's inventory account. The dealer receives an additional credit as an incentive to recommend ACCC's financing services to his customers. ACCC files the signed financing statement with the Florida Secretary of State to protect its security interest under U.C.C. Article 9, and pays the appropriate filing fee. ACCC also files continuation statements in the event the account is extended or refinanced beyond five years. The customer makes his installment payments reflecting the base price plus a time-price differential or finance charge by mailing the payments to ACCC's Atlanta lock box. ACCC furnishes him coupon books or reminder notices by mail. In the event a customer account becomes overdue, ACCC takes limited enforcement action by issuing dunning letters. ACCC, through its Florida Finance Representative, contacts the delinquent customer by telephone or in person, and arranges in appropriate cases for extensions or refinancing of the initial obligation, using printed forms with ACC's name prominently displayed thereon. In the event the customer defaults, ACCC has authority to repossess and resell the security, to sue on the note, or to amend, extend, renew or release the customer's obligations. In practice ACCC rarely, if ever, exercises these powers, but simply resells the paper to the parent corporation which takes the actions described above. The agreement between Allis-Chalmers and its dealers is that of buyer and seller and this agreement specifically provides the dealer is not an agent of Allis-Chalmers and is without authority to bind the company. In Case 82-2817 Petitioner contends that no tax is due because it is not transacting business within the state. The department contends that tax is due because the original contracts, which have been assigned once or twice depending upon whether they were wholesale or retail, have acquired a business situs in the state since they arose from, or are issued in connection with, the sale of tangible personalty in this state. In the event the department prevails, the parties have stipulated to the manner in which the modified tax shall be computed, for this case only. This stipulation is not material to the issues involved and is not replicated herein.
The Issue Whether the agency has an unpromulgated statement of general applicability that imposed a requirement not specifically required by statute or by an existing rule, and which has been utilized against Petitioners to their detriment.
Findings Of Fact On March 24, 1994, the Department of Revenue (Department) issued a Notice of Reconsideration (NOR) that claimed the Petitioners, Terry and Donna Ernst, had willfully failed to collect sales tax. Petitioners' assertion of an exemption in connection with the sales tax assessment was denied. The NOR provided that the Petitioners are the president and vice- president of Hussh, Inc., a retail apparel store in Palm Beach, Florida and that such company made sales to customers for delivery in the store and for shipment outside of the State of Florida. At issue were the alleged shipments to out of state destinations. Pertinent to this case is the language in the NOR found at page two which provided: Due to the inadequacy and volume of Hussh's records, the auditor sampled the available records, and assessed Hussh for asserted out of state sales that were improperly documented. According to the auditor, many of the sales receipts or invoices of asserted out of state shipments were missing the top portion of the invoice. Significantly, this portion of the invoice would contain the names, addresses, and asserted export destination information on each sale. Other invoices were stamped, "out of state shipped," but no destination information was present on the invoice. [Emphasis added.] The Petitioners maintain that the portions of the NOR emphasized in the foregoing paragraph constitute an agency statement of general applicability and is, therefore, an unpromulgated rule. The Department does not have a rule which lists all documentation which might establish an exemption for sales tax assessment. Similarly, the Department does not have a rule that lists the type of documentation which would be inadequate to establish an exemption for sales taxes. The Department's existing rule, Rule 12A-1.064, Florida Administrative Code, provides, in part: (1)(a) Sales tax is imposed on the sales price of each item or article of tangible personal property, unless otherwise exempt, when the property is delivered to the purchaser or his representative in this state. However, the tax does not apply to tangible personal property irrevocably committed to the exportation process at the time of sale, when such process has been continuous or unbroken. (b) Intent of the seller and the purchaser that the property will be exported is not sufficient to establish the exemption; nor does delivery of the property to a point in Florida for subsequent transportation outside Florida necessarily constitute placing the property irrevocably in the exportation process. Tangible personal property shall be deemed committed to the exportation process if: The dealer is required by the terms of the sale contract to deliver the goods outside this state using his own mode of transportation. The dealer must retain in his records trip tickets, truck log records, or other documentation reflecting the specific items and export destination; The dealer is required by the terms of the sale contract to deliver the goods to a common carrier for final and certain movement of such property to its out of state destination. Sales by a Florida dealer are exempt when the dealer delivers the merchandise to the transportation terminal for shipment outside this state and secures a dock or warehouse receipt and a copy of the bill of lading. On shipments to points outside the United States, a shipper's export declaration shall also be obtained; [Emphasis added.] Rule 12A-1.093, Florida Administrative Code, requires taxpayers to maintain and preserve records. This rule provides, in part: (2) Each dealer defined in Chapter 212, F.S., each licensed wholesaler, and any other person subject to the tax imposed by Chapter 212, F.S., shall keep and preserve a complete record of all transactions, together with invoices, bills of lading, gross receipts from sales, RESALE CERTIFICATES, CONSUMER EXEMPTION CERTIFICATES and other pertinent records and papers as may be required by the Department of Revenue for the reasonable administration of Chapter 212, F.S., and such books of account as may be necessary to determine the amount of tax due thereunder. The terms "bill of lading," "dock or warehouse receipt," and "invoice" are common terms used in the business community. Each connotes that, at the minimum, certain information will be retained on the face of the document. For example, according to Petitioners' witness, the minimum information expected on a bill of lading would be: the name of the person that the item is being shipped to, the item being shipped, the cost of the shipment, and the terms of the shipment with the value of the item being shipped. Similarly, the minimum information which is expected on an "invoice" would be: a description of the item sold, the amount of the sale, and the name of the person to whom the item was sold. The terms "bill of lading," "dock or warehouse receipt," and "invoice" are not defined by rule. The Department determined whether an exemption was documented based upon the results of this audit.
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent is guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against her, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken, if any.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Anne E. Carr is and has been at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0268356. In 1988 Helen B. Moser and her husband, John J. Moser, Jr., obtained their real estate salesman licenses. In 1989 they became real estate brokers. Upon becoming licensed brokers, they decided that they would like to open their own real estate office. They began contacting various real estate brokers seeking advice on how to open and operate a real estate business. Respondent was one of the brokers the Mosers contacted for advice. She and the Mosers already knew each other from previous professional activities. At the time, Respondent was the broker and sole stockholder of Carr Real Estate, Inc. She also was spending a substantial amount of time selling luxury condominiums for a particular developer, which required her to be on-site at the development. Respondent suggested to the Mosers that they join Carr Real Estate, Inc., and run the office for her rather than opening their own office, which would give them immediate access to her listings and many clients and allow her to devote her time to sales for the large real estate development. The Mosers agreed that was a good opportunity for all concerned and joined Carr Real Estate, Inc., as broker/salesmen in October of 1989. The Mosers began running the business for Respondent at her request, providing Respondent with monthly accountings. During 1990 the Mosers earned approximately $90,000 as a result of the listings they took over from Respondent and as a result of the listings Respondent referred to them. Throughout that year Carr Real Estate, Inc., remained a major presence in the Highland Beach area where Respondent was well known both for her flamboyant fashions and her ability to list and sell luxury ocean-front and water-front properties. During the first week of December 1990 Respondent advised the Mosers that due both to financial problems she was experiencing and pressure on her from the developer to devote full time to his sales she would be closing the business on December 31 unless the Mosers wanted to purchase the company from her. They advised Respondent they were interested in doing so and that they would draft the documents for Respondent's signature. Many discussions took place between Respondent and the Mosers over the next several weeks formulating the terms of the sale of the business, and the Mosers submitted to Respondent a number of drafts of documents. While the negotiations were on-going, Respondent filled out and executed on December 12, 1990, the documents necessary for her to file for personal bankruptcy. On December 15 she faxed written instructions to her attorney to not file the bankruptcy petition because she was selling her company. On December 20, 1990, Respondent and the Mosers executed a Purchase and Sale Agreement and a Bill of Sale. It is noted that those documents also involved the sale of Respondent's interest in two other corporations to the Mosers but that portion of the transaction raises no issues involved in this proceeding. The Purchase and Sale Agreement provided that its effective date would be January 1, 1991. The Agreement specifically represented that Carr Real Estate, Inc., was being sold free of any liabilities and encumbrances and that the corporation did not own any tangible assets. The Agreement further provided that Respondent would indemnify the Mosers from all obligations and liabilities incurred by Carr Real Estate, Inc., prior to January 1, 1991. The Agreement provided for no money to change hands as a result of the Mosers' purchase of Respondent's business; rather, the purchase price for the corporation was five percent of all sales commissions received by the corporation for a period of two years. On December 29, 1990, Respondent executed the Seller's Affidavit given to her by the Mosers. The portion of the Seller's Affidavit pertinent to this dispute is that Respondent attested that there were no actions or proceedings then pending in any state or federal court in which "the Affiant or Corporations" are parties, including bankruptcy. It was very clear in Respondent's mind that what she was selling under the Purchase and Sale Agreement and the Bill of Sale and what she was attesting to in the Seller's Affidavit was in regard to the corporation and not her personally. It never occurred to Respondent that she was representing to the Mosers that she personally had no bills and no assets. Respondent had no intention of defrauding the Mosers. Supporting this intent is the clear language contained in the Purchase and Sale Agreement, the Bill of Sale, and the Seller's Affidavit that she would personally indemnify and hold harmless the Mosers from any liabilities incurred by the corporation prior to the effective date of the sale. In mid-January 1991, approximately two weeks after the effective date of the sale, the Mosers discovered that a bankruptcy petition had been filed on behalf of Respondent as an individual. Although that petition did not involve the corporation, John Moser immediately contacted Respondent who did not know that her attorney had filed the petition contrary to Respondent's instructions. On January 23, 1991, Respondent wrote to Helen Moser apologizing for the erroneous filing of her bankruptcy petition and assuring her that it would be corrected. Respondent immediately contacted her attorney to ascertain how the petition could be dismissed. She was advised by her attorney that the only way she could dismiss the petition was to not attend the first meeting of creditors which would cause the petition to automatically be dismissed. Respondent did fail to attend the first meeting of creditors. Due to her failure to attend, her bankruptcy petition was dismissed. She immediately contacted Helen Moser to advise her of the dismissal. On February 1, 1991, John Moser called Respondent to inform her that a statement for a monthly automobile lease payment in the name of Carr Real Estate had been received. Respondent immediately sent the Mosers a note indicating that she had contacted G.M.A.C. but that company refused to allow her to transfer responsibility for her automobile lease payments from the corporation to herself. She acknowledged that she was responsible for any of the lease payments and requested that the Mosers acknowledge that the automobile was not an asset of the corporation. At the time Respondent knew that she was responsible for the lease payments because she signed the lease agreement as an individual. Respondent's contact with G.M.A.C. was unnecessary since her automobile had been leased to her as an individual in June of 1988, a date which preceded the existence of Carr Real Estate, Inc. The automobile was insured in Respondent's individual name and was registered in the name of G.M.A.C. at Respondent's address. The Bill of Sale executed by Respondent and the Mosers does not list the automobile as an asset of the corporation that was conveyed. The automobile leased by Respondent was not an asset of the corporation. The only relationship between Respondent's leased automobile and Carr Real Estate, Inc., concerns the deduction of automobile expenses as business expenses on the tax return for Carr Real Estate, Inc. On February 6, 1992, Helen Moser asked Respondent for a copy of the 1990 corporate tax return for Carr Real Estate, Inc., and Respondent provided a copy to her that same day. The return had been prepared in August or September of 1991 by Mary Dorak, a person enrolled with the Internal Revenue Service. It contained an entry entitled "loan from shareholder" in the sum of $107,060. Respondent had been the sole shareholder of the corporation. On February 26, 1992, the Mosers obtained an opinion letter from an attorney advising them that the corporation was not liable to Respondent for any debts. Neither the Mosers nor their accountant ever contacted Dorak or Respondent about the information contained in that tax return. Instead, the Mosers filed an amended corporate tax return for 1990 for Carr Real Estate, Inc. They removed the automobile as a corporate asset while leaving the shareholder's loan because it benefited them tax-wise. Instead of amending the return, the Mosers could have filed a 1991 return showing Respondent's stock exchange for the basis that was left of the stock in the corporation because the transaction took effect on January 1 of that year. Doing so would have caused no adverse tax consequences to the Mosers. Respondent typically provided Dorak with a listing of Respondent's income and expenses for the year and would then simply sign the return after Dorak had prepared it without reviewing the return first. Without any input from Respondent, Dorak had listed the automobile and some personal debts of Respondent on the 1990 corporate tax return because Respondent could take advantage of certain business deductions. That action had no adverse tax consequences for the Mosers. The Mosers never requested a tangible property tax return which would have reflected if there were any assets in the corporation. Had they made this request, they would have been told that there was none in existence because the corporation had no assets. At the time that Respondent and the Mosers executed the Purchase and Sale Agreement, the Bill of Sale, and the Seller's Affidavit in December, all three believed that the corporation had no assets or liabilities and that any assets and liabilities of Respondent were hers personally. As of January 1, 1991, the effective date of the sale, the corporation had no assets or liabilities. There were no tax consequences to the Mosers because of the listing of the shareholder loan in the 1990 corporate tax return because in that Subchapter S corporation the person ultimately adversely affected by the sale would be Respondent since she owned all of the shares in 1990. On the other hand, the filing of an amended 1990 corporate tax return by the Mosers without Respondent's knowledge and consent has resulted in adverse tax consequences to her, an unnecessary result. In November 1988 Respondent was involved in the sale of a condominium unit owned by Mr. and Mrs. Roy Heinz. Due to extended negotiations, the buyer's decision to not purchase the unit, and instructions from Heinz who was her client, Respondent delayed in placing the buyer's deposit check in her escrow account. Petitioner filed an Administrative Complaint against Respondent only and not also against Carr Real Estate, Inc., since that corporation was not yet in existence. After a formal evidentiary hearing, a Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings specifically cleared Respondent of any intentional wrongdoing and of any culpable negligence. Respondent was found guilty, however, of what was specifically characterized to be a technical violation of failure to immediately place the deposit check into her escrow account. The minimum penalty permissible was assessed against Respondent. Respondent was also dismissed from the civil lawsuit filed by Roy Heinz which emanated out of the same circumstances for which the administrative action was brought. The Mosers knew about the disciplinary action and the civil lawsuit pending against Respondent individually prior to their execution of the December 1990 documents transferring Carr Real Estate, Inc., from Respondent's ownership to theirs effective January 1, 1991. The "Roy Heinz matter" was specifically raised by John Moser during the negotiations among the Mosers and Respondent. In April of 1991 Respondent sent Helen Moser a copy of the Recommended Order finding Respondent not guilty of any dishonest conduct or culpable negligence, and Helen Moser failed to even read the entire Order since she considered it unimportant and because she knew the transaction involved occurred prior to the formation of Carr Real Estate, Inc. The Mosers continue to operate Carr Real Estate, Inc. The business has been diminishing, however, since 1991 due to the reduction in the number of salespersons affiliated with the business, John Moser's inability to attract listings and retain clients, and the amount of time the Mosers have been devoting to John Moser's computer business. Respondent's actions and/or inactions have not been the cause of the decline in Carr Real Estate, Inc.'s, business. Moreover, the Mosers have not been harmed financially or in any other way due to any statements contained in the Purchase and Sale Agreement, Bill of Sale, or Seller's Affidavit executed by Respondent. The sale of Carr Real Estate, Inc., by Respondent to the Mosers benefited all three of them. In her negotiations surrounding that sale, Respondent agreed to the terms desired by the Mosers, acted honestly, and did not knowingly or intentionally misrepresent any material fact. Those misrepresentations alleged by the Mosers and Petitioner to be contained in the closing documents, such as any statement that Respondent personally had no assets or liabilities, were not material to the sale and purchase of the corporation.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent not guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against her and dismissing that Administrative Complaint. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of December 1994, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of December 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-4, 6-11, 13, 15, 18, and 19 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 5, 16, and 17 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the credible evidence. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 12 and 14 have been rejected as being subordinate. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-29, 31, and 33-36 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 30 has been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the credible evidence in this cause. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 32 has been rejected as not constituting a finding of fact but rather as constituting argument of counsel. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack McRay, Esquire Acting General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Theodore R. Gay, Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation 401 Northwest 2nd Avenue, Suite N-607 Miami, Florida 33128 Harold M. Braxton, P.A. Suite 400, One Datran Center 9100 South Dadeland Boulevard Miami, Florida 33156-7815
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to a waiver of the bond requirement set forth Section 559.927, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Ladatco is a "seller of travel" as that term is defined in Section 559.927(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Ladatco deals exclusively in wholesale travel packages. Ladatco primarily packages and sells tours of Central and South America to retail travel agents. Until the last few years, the retail travel agents handled virtually all of the ticketing involved in the packages. Changes in the industry have resulted in Ladatco becoming more involved in the ticketing aspect as part of the services it provides in assembling the packages. However, Ladatco has very little direct contact with consumers. Ladatco originally began operations in 1967 as a subsidiary of another company. Ladatco has been conducting business in its current corporate form since 1976. Michelle Shelburne has been working for the company since 1969. She has been the president of Ladatco for at least the last ten years and she owns fifty percent (50 percent) of the outstanding stock. Annie Burke and Rosa Perez are the other officers of the company and they each own approximately twenty two and half percent (22 1/2 percent) of the stock. Both Burke and Perez have worked for Ladatco since approximately 1970. The remaining five percent of the outstanding stock is owned by an attorney who has represented Ladatco since 1967. Ladatco has seven other full time employees and operates out of an office building that is owned jointly by Shelburne, Perez and Burke. Under Section 559.927(10)(b), Florida Statutes, a seller of travel is obligated to post a performance bond or otherwise provide security to the Department to cover potential future claims made by travelers. The security required by this statute is for the benefit of consumers and may be waived by the Department in certain circumstances. On or about May 27, 1994, Ladatco submitted an Application for Security Waiver (the "Application") pursuant to Section 559.927(10)(b)5, Florida Statutes. In lieu of audited financial statements, Ladatco submitted a copy of its 1993 income tax return with the Application. Line 30 of that income tax return reflects a net loss for tax purposes of $100,722. In reviewing an application for a bond waiver, the Department looks at the taxable income on the income tax return. It is the Department's position that if a company shows a loss for tax purposes, it is lacking in financial responsibility and is ineligible for a bond waiver. Based on this policy, the Department denied Ladatco's Application by letter dated August 2, 1994. The certified public accountant who has handled all outside accounting services for Ladatco since 1977 testified at the hearing in this matter. He submitted a history of operations for the company from 1985 through 1993. The accountant explained that, in 1986, Ladatco acquired a very expensive computer system with customized software. The cost of this system was depreciated over a five year period. In addition, until 1991, the company operated out of a building that it owned. The building was sold to the individual principals of the company in 1991. During the years the company owned the building, a significant amount of depreciation was generated for tax purposes. The large depreciation expenses for the years 1986 through 1991 generated losses for tax purposes which have been carried over for future years. Thus, while the company's operations for 1993 generated a profit of $65,000, the loss carry over resulted in a net loss for income tax purposes. The current year forecast for the company, based upon existing bookings, projects a net income in excess of $64,000 for the year ending December 31, 1994. In sum, an isolated look at the taxable income loss reflected on the 1993 income tax return does not provide an accurate picture of the financial responsibility of this company. This closely owned company has been in business for approximately twenty eight (28) years. The three principals in the company have all been with the firm for more than twenty four (24) years. The company has demonstrated a great deal of stability and, while profitability has fluctuated from year to year, the company has continually met its obligations for more than a quarter century. There is every indication that it will continue to do so in the future. Ladatco has maintained a bond with the Airline Reporting Corporation ("ARC") for approximately two and a half years. The amount of the bond varies from year to year, but is generally in the vicinity of $35,000. The statute provides that a company which has successfully maintained a bond with the ARC for three years is entitled to a security waiver. While the ARC bond only protects the airlines and not the travelers, Ladatco will qualify for a waiver under this provision in approximately May of 1995. There is no indication of any unresolved complaints against Ladatco nor is there any evidence of civil, criminal or administrative action against the company.
Recommendation Based upon the forgoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a Final Order granting Ladatco's application for security waiver pursuant to Section 559.927(10)(b)5, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 16th day of December 1994. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of December 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Only the Respondent has submitted proposed findings of fact. The following constitutes my ruling on those proposals. Adopted in pertinent part Finding of Fact 6 and also addressing the Preliminary Statement and in the Conclusions of Law. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in substance in Finding of Facts 7 and 8. COPIES FURNISHED: Michelle D. Shelburne, President Ladatco, Inc. d/b/a Ladatco Tours 2220 Coral Way Miami, Florida 33145 Jay S. Levenstein, Senior Attorney Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Room 515, Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue The parties stipulated that the following legal issues were presented on the facts: When the taxpayer fails to claim the tax credit for sales tax on bad debts charged off during the month for which the return is filed as permitted by Section 212.17(8) Florida Statutes, may the taxpayer claim a refund of the overpayment pursuant to Section 215.26, Florida Statutes? Does claiming a bad debt credit on a return for a month later than the month in which the charge-offs were made constitute an "application for refund" within the meaning of Section 215.26(2), Florida Statutes? STIPULATIONS The parties entered into a written stipulation of the issues, of the facts, and stipulated to the introduction into evidence of the attachments to the written stipulation of facts and the Exhibits 1 through 6. The following are the pertinent findings of fact in this case.
Findings Of Fact Causeway Lumber Company, Inc., (Causeway) is a Florida corporation engaged in the sale of lumber and building materials. During the years 1973- 1977 it operated two yards; one at 2701 South Andrews Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Broward County, and one and 400 Northwest 2nd Avenue, Boca Raton, Palm Beach County. Because it operated in two counties, separate tax returns were filed for the Fort Lauderdale yard and the Boca Raton yard. Causeway uses the accrual method of accounting, the specific charge-off method of writing off bad debts, and its fiscal year ends March 31. Causeway did not collect the sales tax on credit sales at the time such sales were made, but billed sales tax to its customers as part of the credit sales. Although the sales taxes were not received by Causeway at the time the credit sales were made, Causeway reported and paid the sales tax on credit sales on the return for the month in which the sale was made as required in Section 212.06, Florida Statutes. In March of 1974, 1975, and 1976 the accounts receivable were reviewed and the account deemed worthless were written off as uncollectable and so reported on the corporation's income tax returns for those years. Causeway attempted to take as a credit in September of 1976 all of the bad debts written off in March of 1974, 1975 and 1976. The taking of this credit was questioned by the Comptroller, and Causeway paid the taxes due on the September 1976 sales tax remittance and then filed an application for refund on January 20, 1978, pursuant to provisions of Section 215.26, Florida Statutes. The Comptroller denied the application for refund stating as the grounds that there was no authority in Section 212.17, Florida Statutes, for a refund. Causeway's two outlets overpaid sales taxes in the following amounts in the years indicated: 1974 1975 1976 Boca Raton $ 1,072.51 $ 9,208.17 $ 30,477.11 Ft. Lauderdale 3,323.15 10,237.33 10,004.22 $ 4,395.66 $ 19,445.50 $ 40,481.33
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Hearing Officer recommends to the Comptroller that the taxpayer be refunded the taxes overpaid in 1975, and 1976, in the total amount of $59,926.83. DONE and ORDERED this 9th day of October, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of October, 1978. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard W. Roe 2900 East Oakland Park Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33306 Harold F. X. Purnell Assistant Attorney General The Capitol, Room LL04 Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Eugene J. Cella General Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 =================================================================
The Issue The Petitioner and Respondent have agreed by stipulation that the following four issues of law are to be determined by the Hearing Officer: Whether Red Lobster must pay four percent sales tax on ad valorem taxes paid directly to a governmental taxing unit on leases in which it is set forth that Red Lobster, the Lessee, will, in addition to the rental payments, be obligated to pay the ad valorem taxes. Whether certain waitress uniforms and denominators purchased from vendors outside the State of Florida by Red Lobster and shipped to Red Lobster Headquarters within the State of Florida for storage purposes and subsequently transshipped for use in Red Lobster locations outside the State of Florida are subject to Florida sales or use tax. Whether those automobiles purchased by Red Lobster's parent company, General Mills, Inc., outside the State of Florida and on which a sales tax was paid in the state in which purchased and then leased to Red Lobster for use in the State of Florida for periods in excess of twelve months are subject to a Florida sales or use tax on the rental payments. Whether Red Lobster is obligated to pay an amount of sales tax determined by the Bracket System as set forth in Florida Statutes or is obligated to pay all sales tax actually collected so long as the sales tax collected equals or exceeds 4 percent of gross sales.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent Department of Revenue assessed certain sales and use tax against Petitioner Red Lobster Inns of America, Inc., for a three-year period commencing February 1, 1971 through January 31, 1974. The Petitioner filed a petition for hearing to the Division of Administrative Hearings pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, contesting the imposition of said sales and use taxes by Respondent. Each of the issues will be treated separately. ISSUE I Whether Petitioner must pay 4 percent sales tax on ad valorem taxes paid directly to a governmental unit on leases in which it is set forth that Red Lobster, the Lessee, will, in addition to the rental payments, be obligated to pay the ad valorem taxes. Two kinds of leases are involved here. One type (Exhibit "A") provides the payment of "all real estate taxes" shall be "as additional rent" and a second type (Exhibit "B") provides that "The lessee shall be responsible for the payment of all real estate taxes" without labeling such payments as additional rental. In both types of leases, the ad valorem tax payments on the leased real estate are the obligation of Red Lobster, Lessee. The Petitioner, Lessee, paid the sales tax on the amount it considered "rent" paid but did not pay the sales tax on the monies paid the Lessor for the payment of the ad valorem taxes on the leased property. The Respondent Department of Revenue contends: that all the monies paid by Petitioner as Lessee, including the amount paid for the payment of ad valorem taxes, constitute consideration for the lease and thus constitute rent for purposes of Chapter 212. Petitioners contend: that these payments for ad valorem taxes are not "total rent charges for such real property" under Section 212.031(c); that to require that sales and use tax be paid on ad valorem tax payments is double taxation; that the imposition of a sales and use tax on an existing ad valorem tax constitutes a pyramiding of taxation contrary to Section 212.031(2)(b). Petitioner further contends that the rule 12A-1.70(3) exceeds the statutory authority of Section 212.031, Florida Statutes, inasmuch as the statute states a tax is levied on the "rent charged" whereas the rule states that the tax shall be paid "on all considerations." The lease between the parties marked for identification as Exhibit "A" provides in pertinent part on page 1, Section 2, Demise of Premises: "In consideration of the rents and covenants herein stipulated to be paid and performed by Lessee, Lessor hereby demises and lets to Lessee . . . the parcel of land . . . together with all buildings, structures and other improvements constructed thereon . . ." On page 5, in Section 9, Taxes and Other Charges: "(a) Lessee also agrees . . . to pay and discharge as auditional rent, punctually as and when the same shall become due and payable without penalty, all real estate taxes, personal property taxes, business and occupation taxes, occupational license taxes . . . and all other governmental taxes which at any time during the term of the lease shall become due " Clearly, the payment of taxes was understood by both parties as being part of the rent in Exhibit "A" contracts. The lease between the parties marked for identification as Exhibit "B" does not specifically provide that the payment of taxes is part of the rent. However, it speaks to the issue on page 1 providing: "That for and in consideration of the covenants and agreements herein contained and in consideration of the rents herein reserved to be paid by lessee to lessors, the parties hereto do hereby mutually covenant and agree . . . ." to do certain things and includes the specific requirement on page 3: "9. The lessee shall be responsible for the payment of all real estate taxes, both city and county, assessed against the demised premises and shall pay the same before the taxes become delinquent." It is apparent that the payment of real estate taxes is a part of the "total rent charges for such real property" in Exhibit "B" contracts. Designation by the Lessor as to the method of distributing the gross sum of rent does not relieve the Lessee from his payments to the Lessor or change the fact that it is for rent due and for the "return . . . which the tenant makes to the landlord for the use of the demised premises." 52 CJS, Section 462, p. 344. Thus, there is no pyramiding or double taxation. Inasmuch as the payment of ad valorem taxes is a part of the rental agreement between the parties, sales tax would be due on the amount paid by Lessee for ad valorem taxes regardless of whether the Lessee or the Lessor performed the transmittal duties of paying the taxes. The acceptance by the Lessee of the onerous duties of timely paying the numerous taxes, charges, assessments and other impositions is a valuable consideration and a part of the rent charge itself. The statute supports the assessment of Respondent. The contention that the rule is invalid is not well taken inasmuch as the rule is presumed valid for the purpose of this hearing. Thus, the Hearing Officer determines that the Petitioner Red Lobster Inns of America must pay the 4 percent sales tax on the ad valorem taxes paid directly to a governmental taxing unit. ISSUE II Whether the waitresses' uniforms and denominators (a counting device) purchased from vendors outside the State of Florida by Petitioner and shipped to Petitioner's headquarters in Florida for storage purposes and thereafter shipped for use in Red Lobster Inn locations outside the State of Florida are subject to Florida sales or use tax. The Respondent Department of Revenue sought to impose a use tax upon the uniforms and denominators which were purchased outside the state, sent in and then sent out again. The Petitioner Red Lobster Inns does not contest the assessment of sales or use tax on the uniforms and denominators that were used and consumed in this state. However, it contests the assessment on the items that were bought outside the state, sent in to Florida and then sent out of state in the same condition. Red Lobster uses uniforms both within and without the state and also denominators both inside and outside the state. The Respondent Department of Revenue contends: that the sales and use tax is properly applied inasmuch as the uniforms and denominators came to rest in the State of Florida, were delivered and stored and therefore became part of the mass property in the state. It contends that they were used in that a right of ownership was exercised. The Petitioner Red Lobster Inns contends: that the tax is not due on the items that were brought in and transshipped out again; that the goods never actually came to rest because the storage time was very short and was in fact part of the shipment process; that the uniforms and denominators were reshipped without having been used or consumed in this state. Section 212.05, Sales, storage, use tax.-- provides: "It is hereby declared to be the legislative intent that every person is exercising a tangible privilege who engages in the business of selling tangible personal property at retail in this state, or who rents or furnishes any of the things or services taxable under this chapter, or who stores for use or consumption in this state any item or article of tangible personal property as defined herein and who leases or rents such property within the state . . . . * * * (2) At the rate of 4 percent of the cost price of each item or article of tangible personal property when the same is not sold but is used, consumed, distributed or stored for use or consumption in this state." Section 212.06(6), Sales, storage, use tax; collectible from dealers; dealers defined; dealers to collect from purchasers; legislative intent as to scope of tax, provides: "(6) It is however, the intention of this chapter to levy a tax on the sale at retail, the use, the consumption, the distribution, and the storage to be used or consumed in this state of tangible personal property after it has come to rest in this state and has become a part of the mass property of this state." The Petitioner was correct in paying the tax on the waitresses' uniforms and the denominators that were used and consumed in this state. Those uniforms and denominators that were temporarily stored in this state and sent outside the state in the same condition were not a part of the mass property of this state, had not come to rest in this state nor became a part of the mass property of this state. They were not used or consumed in this state. The use and consumption of the uniforms and denominators were subsequent to their shipment outside of the state and therefore no use tax is due on those items reshipped to other states. ISSUE III Whether those automobiles purchased by Red Lobster's parent company, General Mills, Inc., outside the State of Florida and on which a sales tax was paid in the state in which purchased and then leased to Red Lobster for use in the State of Florida for periods in excess of twelve months are subject to Florida sales or use tax on the rental payments. The Petitioner contends: that it is entitled to the exemption in Rule 12A-1.07(13)(b) because the purchase of the automobiles was made out of state and sales tax was paid out of state. The Respondent Department of Revenue contends: the exemption of the rule applies only when the sales tax was paid to the State of Florida. Section 212.21(2), Declaration of legislative intent.-- provides in pertinent part: "(2) It is hereby declared to be the specific legislative intent to tax each and every sale, admission, use, storage, consumption or rental levied and set forth in this chapter, except as to such sale, admission, use, storage, consumption or rental, as shall be specifically exempted therefrom by this chapter, subject to the conditions appertaining to such exemption." Section 212.07(9), Sales, storage, use tax; tax added to purchase price; dealer not to absorb liability of purchasers who cannot prove payment of the tax; penalties; general exemptions:-- provides in part: "(9) Any person who has . . . leased tangible personal property, . . . and cannot prove that the tax levied by this chapter has been paid to his vendor or lessor shall be directly liable to the state for any tax, interest, or penalty due on any such taxable transactions." Rule 12A-1.07(13)(b) provides: "When the term of a lease or rental to one lessee or rentee is for a period of 12 or more months, the lessor-owner may pay the tax on the acquisition of the vehicle. In such cases, the rental to the initial lessee and the renewals thereof to the same lessee are not subject to the rental tax. Rentals of the same vehicle to subsequent lessees by the owner are taxable." Clearly, it appears from the foregoing that the rule made pursuant to the authority of the legislature does in fact state that the tax may be paid "on the acquisition of the vehicle" and that the lessee is then not subject to the rental tax. The rule is presumed to be valid. Thus, in answer to the question in Issue III, the answer is that the rental cars are not subject to the Florida sales or use tax on the rental payments having been specifically exempted. ISSUE IV Whether Red Lobster is obligated to pay an amount of sales tax determined by the Bracket System set forth in Florida Statutes or is obligated to pay all sales tax actually collected so long as the sales tax collected equals or exceeds 4 percent of gross sales. The Respondent Department of Revenue contends: that the Petitioner must collect and pay the tax according to the Bracket Method provided in the statutes. The Petitioner contends: that it does not have to be governed by the Bracket Method as long as Petitioner pays 4 percent of its gross sales to the State of Florida and that the Bracket System is merely a convenience method. Section 212.12(1), Dealer's credit for collecting tax; penalties for noncompliance; powers of Department of Revenue in dealing with delinquents; brackets applicable to taxable transactions; records required, providing for the Bracket System.-- clearly states in pertinent part: "(10) . . . Notwithstanding the rate of taxes imposed upon the privilege of sales, admissions and rentals, and communication services, the following brackets shall be applicable to all 4 percent taxable transactions: On single sales of less than 10 cents no tax shall be added. On single sales in amounts from 10 cents to 25 cents, both inclusive, 1 cent shall be added for taxes. On sales in amounts from 26 cents to 50 cents, both inclusive, 2 cents shall be added for taxes. On sales in amounts from 51 cents to 75 cents, both inclusive, 3 cents shall be added for taxes. On sales in amounts from 76 cents to $1, both inclusive, 4 cents shall be added for taxes. On sales in amounts of more than $1, 4 percent shall be charged upon each dollar of price, plus the above bracket charges upon any fractional part of a dollar." It is self-evident that the foregoing statute does in fact require the Bracket Method to be used inasmuch as it dictates that is shall be applicable to all 4 percent taxable transactions. The tax is increased when the Bracket Method is used. In summary, the findings of the Hearing Officer are: On Issue I, Petitioner Red Lobster Inns of America must pay ad valorem tax on the full amount of the consideration as set forth in its various leases. On Issue II, the waitresses' uniforms and denominators which were reshipped in the same condition outside the state were not subject to Florida sales and use tax. On Issue III, the automobiles on which a sales tax was paid to the state in which they were purchased and then leased to Red Lobster for use in this state for periods in excess of twelve months are not subject to the Florida sales and use tax on rental payments. On Issue IV, Petitioner Red Lobster Inns of America is obligated to pay an amount of sales tax determined by the Bracket System as set forth in Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Affirm the position of the Respondent Department of Revenue on Issue I. Affirm the position of the Petitioner Red Lobster Inns of America on Issue II. Affirm the position of the Petitioner Red Lobster Inns of America on Issue III. Affirm the position of the Respondent Department of Revenue on Issue IV. DONE and ORDERED this 16th day of March, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of March, 1977. COPIES FURNISHED: Terrell Griffin, Esquire 515 Pan American Building 250 North Orange Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Charles E. DeMarco, Esquire Staff Attorney Red Lobster Inns of America, Inc. Post Office Box 13330 Orlando, Florida 32801 Caroline C. Mueller, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 =================================================================
