The Issue Whether American National can litigate its entitlement to a documentary stamp tax refund pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes (1987)? If so, whether American National is entitled to a refund of some or all of the $5,475 it paid in recording the first modification and consolidation of notes, mortgages and assignment of leases and rents executed by American National and General Electric Credit Corporation (GECC) on July 11, 1986?
Findings Of Fact Real estate in Escambia County which petitioner American National now holds as trustee (the property) once belonged to U.S.I.F. Pensacola Corporation (USIFP). On September 1, 1969, USIFP gave Town and Country Plaza, Inc. (T & P) a note for $1,500,000 and executed a mortgage on the property in favor of T & P as security for payment of the note. A separate $300,000 note was promptly repaid. On July 5, 1973, U.S.I.F Wynnewood Corporation (USIFW), USIFP's successor in title, gave U.S.I.F. Oklahoma Corporation (USIFO) a note for $625,000, and executed a mortgage on the property in favor of USIFO as security for payment of its note. On July 8, 1982, shortly after Trust No. 0008 acquired the property, Jacksonville National Bank, as trustee, gave First National Bank of Chicago (FNBC) two notes, each secured by a separate mortgage. One note was for $767,481.98, and the other was for $2,000,000. These two notes, along with the two notes originally given to T & P and USIFO, which were both subsequently assigned to FNBC, were the subject of the July 8, 1982, consolidation, modification and extension agreement. Documentary stamp tax owing on account of these notes (the consolidated notes) was eventually paid in its entirety. All four mortgages with which the property was encumbered when petitioner American National succeeded Jacksonville National as trustee were duly recorded, intangible tax having been fully paid upon recordation. In January of 1984, FNBC assigned the consolidated notes and the mortgages securing their payment to VPCO Properties, Inc., which itself assigned them later the same month to VPPI TCH, Inc. In July of 1986, GECC, the present holder of the consolidated notes acquired the notes and became the mortagee on the mortgages securing their payment. As of July 11, 1982, when American National, as trustee of Trust No. 0008, borrowed an additional $1,150,000 from GECC, the outstanding principal balance on the consolidated notes aggregated $3,650,000. On that date, GECC and American National, as trustee, executed the so- called first modification and consolidation of notes, mortgages and assignment of leases and rents, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, which recited the parties' understandings both with respect to the new borrowing and with regard to the existing indebtedness the consolidated notes reflected. In addition to signing Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, American National, as trustee, also executed and delivered to GECC a promissory note in the amount of $1,500,000. This note, which was not offered in evidence, has never been recorded, nor have documentary stamps ever been affixed to it. At GECC's insistence, American National paid a documentary stamp tax of $7,920 at the time Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 was recorded in Pensacola. Of this sum, $5,475 was paid on account of the indebtedness the consolidated notes evidenced; $1,725 was paid on account of the new borrowing; and $720 was paid because of the provisions in Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, contemplating an increase in the principal amount of indebtedness. Under the agreement certain interest payments can be deferred, not to exceed $480,000, any such deferments being added to principal. The agreement provides: Notwithstanding the foregoing, so long as Borrower is making all payments on this Note when due, without giving effect to grace periods or requirements of notice, if any, and is otherwise not in default, taking into account, applicable grace periods, if any, under the Mortgage and other Security Documents Borrower shall be entitled to defer payment, in any month, of interest in excess of interest computed at the "Applicable Base Percentage Rate" (hereinafter defined) so long as the total interest deferred under this paragraph ("Deferred Interest"), including any and all Deferred Interest which has been added to the principal balance hereof, as hereinafter provided, does not exceed the lesser of ten percent (10 percent) of the outstanding principal balance hereof, excluding any and all Deferred Interest which has been added to the principal balance hereof, or $480,000. Such Deferred Interest, including any and all Deferred Interest which has been added to the principal balance hereof, shall be due and payable when and to the extent that, in any subsequent month, the Contract Index Rate is less than the "Applicable Base Percentage Rate", with the balance of such Deferred Interest being payable as provided below or on the maturity hereof, whether by lapse of time, prepayment or acceleration. The "Applicable Base Percentage Rate" shall mean the following per annum rates of interest, computed as aforesaid, for the periods indicated: Applicable Base Period Percentage Rate Date of This Note June 30, 1987 10.0 percent July 1, 1987-June 30, 1988 10.5 percent July 1, 1988-June 30, 1989 11.0 percent July 1, 1989-June 30, 1990 11.5 percent July 1, 1990-Maturity Date (hereinafter defined) 12.0 percent Unless previously paid by Borrower, the outstanding balance of Deferred Interest not previously added to principal in accordance herewith, if any, shall be added to the principal balance hereof on the first day of each calendar quarter beginning with October 1, 1986, and shall accrue interest thereafter at the Contract Index Rate provided for principal, which interest shall be payable in the same manner as is applicable to interest on the original principal balance hereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Borrower may pay Deferred Interest at any time without penalty. Of the documentary stamp tax American National paid, $720 was on account of future advances that Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 was designed to secure, in the event GECC made them.
The Issue The sole issue posed herein is: Whether or not the transfer to Petitioner by individuals Hugh P. Conser, Stewart L. Krug and Sidney Barbane1 of certain real property located in Pinellas County, Florida, on or about October 26, 1974, constitutes a conveyance subject to the Documentary Stamp Tax Act, pursuant to Chapter 201, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On or about October 26, 1974, the Petitioner received title to certain real property located Pinellas County, Florida, from Stewart L. Krug, Sidney Barbanel and Hugh P. Conser, the principals in KBC Development Corporation, which was recorded in Official Records Book 4229, page 1052, Public Records of Pinellas County, Florida. The only consideration, as evidenced by the deeds filed in the case, is that the conveyance was for "good and valuable consideration and ten dollars". This other good and valuable consideration, according to Petitioner and the other record evidence, consisted of the issuance of all one hundred shares of the authorized stock of KBC Development Corporation, Petitioner, as evidenced by the Minutes of the Shareholders Meeting of such corporation which was held on July 18, 1973. (See the minutes reflected in an attachment to Petitioner's Exhibit Number 1.) The issued stock had a par value of $5.00. The corporate entity, KBC, as Petitioner, was formed for the purpose of taking title to the property in question and, as evidenced by the record, had no other assets when the subject property was conveyed. On May 6, 1975, the Florida `Department of Revenue, Respondent, recorded in the office of the Circuit Court of Pinellas County, Florida, a warrant for collection of delinquent documentary stamp taxes in connection with the above-referenced transaction in the amount of $27,599.70, plus an identical amount of penalty, for a total sum of $55,212.40. Said warrant is recorded in O.R. Book 4286, page 31, Public Records of Pinellas County, Florida. Following a conference with the Department of Revenue, the taxes were paid by the Petitioner under protest. That payment set the stage for the Petitioner's filing of the claim for refund with the Respondent, the Comptroller of the State of Florida, pursuant to Florida Statutes section 215.26. The Petitioner argues that the only taxable consideration resulting from the subject conveyance was the par value of the stock, of which amount sufficient documentary stamps were affixed to the deeds in question. In support of this position, the Petitioner cites the fact that there are no income tax returns filed by the corporation, FIG; no business activities pursued by the corporation; no bank account of the corporation; and no assets held by the corporation, except as agents for the three individuals, Krug, Barbanel and Conser, all of which were acknowledged by all of the mortgagees. Additionally, the Petitioner urges that the bank and lending institutions involved regarded and held each individual personally liable for the indebtedness in connection with the loans advanced for the property in question. Finally, the Petitioner urges that, based on the conveyance in question, there was no shift in the economic burden to the corporation and, therefore, no taxable transaction occurred when the property in question was conveyed from the individuals, Krug, Barbanel and Conser, to FIG Development Corporation.
Conclusions The documentary stamp tax provided by Florida Statutes section 201.02 is an excise tax imposed on particularly described transactions, and in the case of instruments relating to realty, is based upon the total consideration involved in the transfer or conveyance. Thus, the key point in determining whether documentary stamps are to be affixed to an instrument transferring an interest in realty is in the presence or absence of consideration for the transfer. Rule 12A-4 .14, Florida Administrative Code, describes conveyances not subject to the documentary stamp tax as those "conveyances of realty without consideration, including. . .a deed to or by a trustee not pursuant to a sale . . . ." The facts of this case clearly do not illustrate an express or resulting trust relationship between KBC Development Corporation and its principals, Stewart L. Krug, Sidney Barbanel and Hugh P. Conser. When KBC took title to the property from Krug, Conser and Barbanel, the consideration was $10.00 and other valuable consideration and, based on the face of the instrument, the conveyance was not made to KBC subject to payment of any mortgages, etc., by KPC (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1). Section 201.02(1), Florida Statutes (1975). See Florida Department of Revenue v. De Maria, 338 So.2d 838 (Fla. 1976). Additionally, the facts herein reveal that the banks and lending institutions involved in the transaction required the personal guarantees of the individuals, Krug, Barbanel and Conser. No evidence was introduced indicating that Petitioner, KBC Development Corporation, was anything more than an entity whereby the lending institutions had advanced funds for the primary mortgages to Continental Investment and Development Company, which was in no way related to the present corporation, KBC, and that the corporate entity was used to protect the lending institutions from any possible violations of usurious transactions. As stated, the personal endorsements and/or guarantees of the individuals, Barbanel, Krug and Conser, were required by the lending institutions before the primary mortgagee, Continental Investment and Development Company, would be released. Krug, Barbanel and Conser were no more nor less obligated to pay and perform under the obligation, after the conveyance than before. Although there was a change in the form of the obligation, there was no change in the substance. See e.g., Straughn v. Story, 334 So.2d 337 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) cert. discharged 348 So.2d 954 (1977). (See Petitioner's Exhibits 2, 3 and 4.) For all of these reasons, it is the considered opinion of the undersigned that the Respondents have failed to demonstrate that the consideration for the conveyances in question were anything more than the par value of the stock and, accordingly, documentary stamp taxes should only be assessed in the amount of $4.10. Accordingly, I shall recommend that the excess assessments which Petitioner paid under protest be refunded.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Petitioner be refunded the amount of taxes and penalties it paid to the Respondent, Department of Revenue, under protest, over and above the amount it should have paid on the par value of the stock of KBC Corporation when the abovedescribed conveyance was made during October, 1974. RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of April, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building MAILING ADDRESS: 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Donald R. Hall, Esquire Goza, Hall & Peacock, P.A. 100 North Belcher Road Clearwater, Florida 33518 Cecil L. Davis, Jr., Esquire Assistant Attorney General The Capitol, Room LL04 Tallahassee, Florida 32304 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA KBC DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 76-1596 GERALD LEWIS, as COMPTROLLER OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, AND DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Respondents. / NOTICE TO: DONALD R. HALL, ESQUIRE ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER GOZA, HALL & PEACOCK, P.A. 100 NORTH BELCHER ROAD CLEARWATER, FLORIDA 33518 CECIL L. DAVIS, JR., ESQUIRE ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENTS ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL THE CAPITOL LL04 TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32304 You will please take notice that the Governor and Cabinet, acting as head of the Department of Revenue at its meeting on the 12th day of June, 1979, approved the Respondent's Substituted Order, in lieu of the Division of Administrative Hearing's Recommended Order dated April 3, 1979. A copy of the Respondent's Proposed Substituted Order is attached. This constitutes final agency action by the Department of Revenue. JOHN D. MORIARTY, ATTORNEY DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATION DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE STATE OF FLORIDA ROOM 104, CARLTON BUILDING TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32301 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice was furnished by mail to Donald R. Hall, Esquire, Goza, Hall & Peacock, P.A. 100 North Belcher Road, Clearwater, Florida 33518, Attorney for Petitioner; by hand delivery to Cecil L. Davis, Jr., Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, The Capitol LL04, Tallahassee, Florida 32304, Attorney for Respondents and James E. Bradwell, Esquire, Hearing Officer, Division of Administrative Hearings, Department of Administration, Room 530, Carrolton Building, Tallahassee, Florida 32304, this 14th day of June, 1979. JOHN D. MORIARTY, ATTORNEY Attachment STATE OF FLORIDA
Findings Of Fact The facts in this case are undisputed. On April l6, 1976, petitioner Arthur J. Coyle and his wife Katie Coyle, became the sole shareholders of Sara- Wolf, Inc., a Florida Corporation, whose assets consisted of an apartment building in Miami Beach, Florida. Thereafter, the Coyles decided to transfer the corporate assets to themselves as individuals. They were advised by their attorney that, in view of the 1975 decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Florida Department of Revenue v. DeMaria, 321 So 2d 101 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975) in a similar factual situation, no state documentary stamp tax would be due on the transaction. Therefore, relying upon that judicial decision, petitioner and his wife proceeded to execute a quit claim deed of the corporate real estate to themselves on May 13, 1976, and file the same in the public records of Dade County, Florida, on May 18, 1976, with payment of only nominal documentary stamp tax. The decision of the District Court of Appeal had been stayed by the Supreme Court on December 8, 1975. Subsequent to the decision of the Supreme Court in the DeMaria case on October 14, 1976, which quashed the lower court's decision, respondent issued a notice of proposed assessment of documentary stamp tax in the amount of $526.50 based on a taxable consideration of $175,500, less 30 cents tax paid, for a total tax due of $526.20 plus a like amount as a penalty, and $42.00 in interest, for a total asserted liability of $1,094.40. (Testimony of petitioner, Exhibits 1-3)
Recommendation That the proposed assessment of $1,094.40 against petitioner Arthur J. Coyle and Katie Coyle is valid and should be enforced. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of May, 1977 in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Robert A. Glassman, Esquire 903 Biscayne Building 19 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33130 Edwin J. Stacker, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Findings Of Fact By Deposit Receipt dated June 12, 1975 (Exhibit 1) Kenneth H. Maxwell and Janet A. Maxwell contracted to purchase a lot for $7,000 from D & D Builders of Ft. Lauderdale, Inc. (D & D) with house to be built thereon for $29,900 in accordance with described plan. $3,690 was paid as earnest money deposit on this contract. It was intended that Maxwell would obtain a construction loan from the lending institution and before making the loan the lender required the value and plan number of the house to be included on the deposit receipt contract. The property was deeded to the Maxwells by Warranty Deed dated July 14, 1975 (Exhibit 2) and documentary stamp taxes in the amount of $21 was attached thereto. This is the correct amount for a $7,000 consideration for such a transfer. On July 15, 1975 a mortgage deed was executed by the Maxwells to the First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Highlands County to secure a loan in the amount of $33,200 and intangible taxes were paid thereon. At the time D & D and the Maxwells entered into their contract it was intended that Maxwell, who taught construction at a local junior college, would build his own house. When Maxwell attempted to get a building permit the county would not issue one because he was not a licensed contractor. He then arranged for D & D to pull the permit and for the bank to make the draws payable to D & D who would disburse the funds to the subcontractors, suppliers, and Maxwell. On July 15, 1975 the lender disbursed a check to D & D for $3,310 which, when added to the $3,690 initially paid by the Maxwells, completed the $7,000 payment for the lot to the seller D & D. Thereafter Maxwell constructed his house. D & D made the draws and disbursed the funds to suppliers, subcontractors, and to Maxwell. Exhibit 5 shows 8 checks were made payable to Maxwell totaling some $4,400. D & D did not supervise construction, received no compensations for its services, and acted only as a conduit for the construction loan.
The Issue The issue here concerns the propriety of the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Revenue's assessment of tax under authority of Sections 201.01 and .08, Florida Statutes, in the amount of $11,557.20 and penalty of $577.86 against the Petitioner, Landmark Bank of Brevard. The specific nature of the assessment is one pertaining to items identified as detachable "Promissory Notes" which are attached to documents entitled "Trust Receipts."
Findings Of Fact The facts in this case reveal that the Petitioner Landmark Bank of Brevard, hereafter referred to as the "Bank," made loans to several motor vehicle dealers in Brevard County. The borrowers were Carl Schmidt Motors, Inc.; Bennie C. Chapman, who does business as Chapman Auto Sales; and Harley Davidson of Melbourne, Inc. The arrangements for the loans were on the basis that the dealers would apply with the Bank to receive moneys which would be used to "floor plan" automobiles and motorcycles being sold through their retail outlets. The applications were processed through the loan committee and when the loans were approved a Promissory Note was signed by the appropriate persons acting in behalf of the dealers. (Copies of the notes executed were attached to the Petition for Formal Hearing and acknowledged to be correct through the answer filed in behalf of the Respondent and the notes as attached to the Petition are being provided with this Recommended Order together with those exhibits offered in behalf of the parties.) The notes allow for the single disbursement of a stated amount of money, with the repayment of principal and payment of interest being due by one payment for which demand is made within a period as short as several months or as long as one year depending on the note conditions. Collateral is provided, according to the terms of the notes, either by the lease and rental autos listed on separate documents entitled "Trust Receipts," which Trust Receipts are held by the Bank or otherwise described as such motor vehicles as were then owned by the dealers at the time the execution of the note or as would thereafter be acquired. These notes, meaning the initial Promissory Notes, had Documentary Stamps placed and canceled in the monthly journal of the Bank at the time of the execution of the Promissory Notes, in an effort by the Petitioner to comply with Section 201.08, Florida Statutes. The amount of Documentary Stamps utilized was in keeping with the face amount of the loan proceeds reflected on the Promissory Notes. Therefore, when the Promissory Notes are examined an impression is created that a single disbursement of loan proceeds has been made for which Documentary Stamp tax has been collected. In reality, the arrangement between the dealers and the Petitioner was to the effect that the full amount of the loan proceeds would not be assigned to the account of the dealers upon execution of the note. What would happen, is that the dealers would be allowed to make "draws" against the loan proceeds on the basis of surrendering the title of a used motor vehicle which they had acquired or having the manufacturer of a new motor vehicle submit the Manufacturer's Certificate of Origin to the Bank. In turn, moneys were advanced to the dealer equal to the value of the used unit or commensurate with the amount reflected on the Manufacturer's Certificate of Origin if a new unit. These titles and Manufacturer's Certificates of Origin were held as collateral and the dealers would take possession of the actual vehicles to be placed in the dealer's inventory until a retail purchase had been made. The vehicles for which the Petitioner had received title or the Manufacturer's Certificate of Origin were then listed on documents called "Trust Receipts." The "Trust Receipts" would show the vehicle description, make, serial number and price as described in the Manufacturer's Certificate of Origin or title. These descriptions were placed on individual "Trust Receipts" based upon the date the evidence of ownership was submitted from the dealer of the Bank. That is to say, if four Manufacturers' Certificates of Origin or titles were submitted to the Bank at one time, then four of the vehicles would be listed on a single "Trust Receipt" as opposed to listing the four new units on a "Trust Receipt" that already had a unit or units listed from another visit by the dealer. Examples of the various "Trust Receipt" documents may be found in the Respondent's Composite Exhibit 3 admitted into evidence which contains copies of the "Trust Receipt" examples. The "Trust Receipt" documents had attached to them an item entitled "Promissory Note," which item could be detached from the body of the "Trust Receipt." Some examples in the Respondent's Composite Exhibit 3 have the "Promissory Note" affixed, reflecting a date and money amount equal to the amount arrived at by totaling the value related to the various units shown in the "Trust Receipt." These examples also list the borrower's name and are signed by Margy Driggers, the Assistant Cashier of the Petitioner. Some are signed by Margy Driggers, with the initials "P.O.A." placed in front of or after her title as Assistant Cashier. One other example is the same as above but without the initials "P.O.A." There is also an example signed by Bennie C. Chapman, one of the dealers who borrowed money. The Chapman example reflects the amount of value shown in the "Trust Receipt," to which the "Promissory Note" is attached and it has a date, but does not reflect the amount of interest to be paid if this is indeed a Promissory Note. There was another category of "Trust Receipt" and attached "Promissory Note" reflecting motor vehicles for which money had been loaned and this was a type in which no entries had been made on the "Promissory Note"; however, an example of this type was not provided through the Respondent's Exhibit 3. Both parties acknowledged that the initials "P.O.A." stand for power of attorney. They disagree on the question whether a power of attorney had been granted to the Petitioner to act in behalf of the subject dealers. The Petitioner through its witnesses claim that the designation "P.O.A." is simply an extension of a long standing policy of the Bank which predates the current Assistant Cashier and has no meaning. Therefore, no power of attorney has ever been granted from the dealers to the Bank to execute promissory notes on behalf of the dealers. The Respondent through its auditor, whose investigation led to the assessment in dispute, claims that Margy Driggers, the Assistant Cashier, told him that "P.O.A." means power of attorney and that she had the ability to sign for Carl Schmidt. (Carl Schmidt Motors, Inc.) None of the dealers were presented in the course of the hearing to state their position on the granting of power of attorney to the Petitioner for purposes of executing the item known as "Promissory Note" attached to the various "Trust Receipts," and there are no written documents which would demonstrate the granting of a power of attorney to the Bank. Moreover, nothing in the original Promissory Notes executed by the dealers leads to the conclusion that the item known as "Promissory Note" attached to the "Trust Receipt" may be executed by a Bank official through power of attorney for the dealer. Consequently, no power of attorney has been shown to be granted from the dealers to Margy Driggers or any other employee of the Petitioner, on the subject of executing "Promissory Notes" attached to the "Trust Receipts." When the items were filled out, copies of the "Trust Receipts" and attached "Promissory Notes" were forwarded to the several dealers. When a dealer sold one of the automobiles for which the Petitioner held the title or Manufacturer's Certificate of Origin as security, then the dealer paid an amount equal to that amount reflected in the "Trust Receipt" document and an entry was made in the date paid column of that document which showed that amount of debt had been satisfied by the dealer. During the operative period of the initial Promissory Note, meaning that period between the time of the execution of the note and the time the note was due as reflected on the face of the note, the dealer could borrow an amount not to exceed the face amount of the loan proceeds and if some portion of that amount was retired, then an additional amount could be borrowed, which effectively meant that in the active life of the loan as shown by the initial Promissory Note more money could be borrowed during the life of the note than the amount reflected on the face of the Promissory Note. For example, hypothetically the Promissory Note could entitle the dealer to borrow $19,959.00 on May 10, 1976, to be repaid by May 10, 1977. That dealer could then borrow $19,959.00 between those dates and pay back that amount of money with interest and borrow an additional $5,000.00 to be paid back before the expiration date of the loan and in actuality would have borrowed $24,959.00, ostensibly under the terms and conditions of the initial note. These additional amounts of loan proceeds cannot be seen by examining the initial Promissory Notes; they can only be discovered by adding the individual amounts reflected in the "Trust Receipts" and comparing the total to what is shown by adding the loan amounts depicted in the initial Promissory Notes. This is in fact what was done by the auditor in conducting the audit and it is the differential between the amounts shown in the "Trust Receipt" aggregate as contrasted to the initial Promissory Note aggregate for which the Respondent claims Documentary Stamp tax is owed. The Respondent would have the Documentary Stamp tax applied to some combination of the so-called "Promissory Notes" attached to the "Trust Receipts" equal to an amount representing the differential spoken to before. The Respondent did not establish which "Trust Receipts" with attached "Promissory Notes" would be subject to the assessment of Documentary Stamp tax. Through this process, the Respondent in its Revised Notice of Assessment is claiming tax of $11,557.20 and a penalty of $557.86. (A copy of this notice may be found as Respondent's Exhibit 4 admitted into evidence.)
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the proposed assessment for Documentary Stamp tax and penalty made by the Department of Revenue, State of Florida, against the Petitioner, Landmark Bank of Brevard, a banking corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Florida, formerly Landmark Bank of Melbourne, N.A., be DISALLOWED. 1/ DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of April 1980 in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of April 1980.
Findings Of Fact On or about January 31, 1974, the Petitioner purchased a certain tract of property from Rio Branco Corporation. As a part of the purchase price, the Petitioner executed a secured promissory note, and a purchase money mortgage. A copy of the mortgage and the promissory note were received in evidence as Joint Exhibit 1. Although the promissory note is in the form of a direct obligation for the Petitioner to pay the face amount of the note to Rio Branco Corporation, its obligations were limited. The note provides in Paragraph 12 as follows: "Mortgagor, (Petitioner] assumes no corporate liability for the payment of the debt evidenced by this note and mortgage. Mortgagee [Rio Branco Corporation] waives any corporate liability and agrees to look solely to the property securing such debt for payment thereof." Petitioner apparently defaulted on the mortgage and the promissory note, and a foreclosure suit was initiated by Rio Branco Corporation. Petitioner was named as the defendant in this suit which was filed in Sarasota County, and given case number CA-75-1107. Prior to the completion of the foreclosure action, Petitioner executed a quitclaim deed conveying its interest in the subject property back to Rio Branco Corporation. The quitclaim deed was executed in lieu of foreclosure. A copy of the quitclaim deed was received in evidence as Joint Exhibit 2. The Petitioner stipulated that, it executed Joint Exhibit 2 in order to prevent any deficiency from being entered following a judicial sale in connection with the foreclosure proceeding. Despite the stipulation it is apparent that Rio Branco Corporation could not have enforced any such deficiency against the Petitioner due to the above quoted provision of the promissory note. The quitclaim deed was apparently recorded by a representative of Rio Branco Corporation. Through a proposed notice of assessment dated September 9, 1976, the Respondent is seeking to impose documentary stamp taxes, documentary surtaxes, penalties and interest in the total amount of $745.13 upon Petitioner. It is not clear whether the Respondent is also seeking to impose the same taxes upon the grantee of the quitclaim deed, Rio Branco Corporation. Respondent contends that the Petitioner is liable for the documentary stamp taxes on the quitclaim deed, and that the amount of consideration for the deed is the amount of mortgage debt extinguished as a result of execution of the deed. Petitioner contends that as the grantor of the instrument, it has no responsibility for paying documentary stamp taxes, and that further no consideration was given for the deed as a matter of law since no debt which the Petitioner could have been forced to pay was extinguished.
Findings Of Fact The facts in this case are derived from the exhibits submitted into evidence at the hearing and the testimony of petitioner H.R. Thornton, Jr. The pertinent documents show that a portion of a lot located in the toxin of St. Cloud, Florida, owned by Garold D. Doak, Sr. and Susan E. Doak, his wife, was mortgaged by the Doaks to Peachtree Mortgage Corporation on December 28, 1972, in the amount of $16,850.00. On January 4, 1973, Peachtree Mortgage Corporation assigned the Mortgage to the Hamilton Federal Savings and Loan association of Brooklyn, New York. On February 6, 1976, a lis pendens was filed against the property by the assignee of the mortgage in the Circuit Court of the Ninth Judicial Circuit of Osceola County, Florida, incident to an action to foreclose the mortgage. On March 15, 1976, the Doaks executed quitclaim deeds on the property to Stephene J. Houseman. On April 6, 1976, a final judgement of foreclosure was entered in the Circuit Court of the Ninth Judicial Circuit in favor of Hamilton Federal Savings and Loan Association of Brooklyn, New York. (Exhibit 1-6) On April 27, 1976, Houseman executed a quitclaim deed on the property to petitioners. On April 30, 1976, the Thorntons conveyed their interest in the property by warranty deed to Jaiies Francis Wiczorek and Shirley Lillian Wiczorek, his wife. The deed recited that it was subject to the outstanding mortgage to Hamilton Federal Savings and Loan Association with a principal balance of sec. 16,224.52 which the grantees agreed to assume and pay. The deed further recited a consideration of $4,000.00 and documentary stamp tax in an appropriate amount was paid based on a consideration which included the cash payment and the mortgage amount. On July 30, 1976, the mortgage in question was satisfied. (Exhibits 8-10) Only minimal documentary stamp tax of thirty cents was paid on the quitclaim deed from Houseman to petitioners. Respondent issued a notice of proposed assessment of additional documentary stamp tax in the amount of $48.60, surtax in the amount of $17.60, penalties in like amounts, and interest thereon, for a total of $158.51, on March 21, 1977. The proposed assessment was based on consideration stated to be the existing mortgage on the property in the amount of $16,224.52. On April 29, 1977, petitioners filed their petition for an administrative hearing, challenging the proposed assessment on the grounds that there was no evidence to show the taxable consideration as found by respondent. By an amended and revised notice of proposed assessment, dated April 29, 1977, the amount for documentary surtax, penalty and interest thereon was deleted leaving only the sums relating to documentary stamp tax, penalty, and interest in the amount of $102.30. (Exhibit 8) Petitioner H.R. Thornton, Jr. took the quitclaim deed in question to cancel a $100.00 debt owed him by Houseman. He had no intent to make the mortgage payments or payments or pay any other consideration for the transfer. (Testimony of Thornton)
Recommendation That petitioners be held liable for payment of documentary stamp tax, penalty and interest under Chapter 201, Florida Statutes, as modified herein with respect to the penalty. Done and Entered this 29th day of August, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel C. Brown, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 H. R. Thornton, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 345 St. Cloud, Florida 32769
Findings Of Fact On January 15, 1975, Gerardo Benesch, Jitka Benesch, H. Albert Grotte, Regina Grotte, Milorad Dordevic, Catalina Dordevic, Milodrag Savovic and Marina Savovic executed an agreement associating themselves in a general partnership, Andean Investment Company. The stated purpose of the partnership was to engage in the business of real estate development, selling, renting, and dealing generally in real estate of all kinds. It was recited in the agreement that, by forming the partnership, the parties wished to reduce their prior expense of managing separate properties through separate managerial agreements. To this end, they transferred certain real estate by quit-claim deed to the partnership, and these properties represented its capital. The agreement provided in Article IV that the net profits or net losses of the partnership would be distributed or chargeable, as the case might be, to each of the partners in percentage proportions based on the amount of their investment in the partnership. The property consisted of warehouses located in Deerfield Beach and Fort Lauderdale, Florida, from which rentals were derived (Petition and Exhibits thereto). All of the properties were encumbered by mortgages of varying amounts and all but two of the quit-claim deeds transferred title subject to the mortgage thereon. Two deeds provided specifically that the partnership assumed the existing mortgage. Although Petitioner's counsel states that this was not intended and was a "scrivener's error", Petitioner partnership has, in fact, made the mortgage payments on all of the properties since their transfer under the aforesaid deeds (Composite Exhibit 1, Stipulation). Petitioner paid only minimal documentary stamp tax on the deeds. Respondent thereafter issued four proposed Notices of Assessment of Documentary Stamp Tax, Surtax, and Penalty against the Petitioner on January 6, 1976, in the total amount of $3,797.00. The tax was computed under Rule 12A-4.13(10)(c), F.A.C., based on transfers of realty (Composite Exhibit 2, Testimony of Dahlem). At the hearing, Petitioner disputed the manner in which Respondent had computed the documentary stamp tax in that each assessment dealt with a husband and wife who held individual percentage interests in the net worth of the partnership. Respondent's computation did not take into consideration the double interest in each assessment. The parties therefore agreed that a recomputation would be made by Respondent and submitted as a late-filed exhibit. This was done and the new computation reflects a total tax liability, including surtax and penalty, in the total amount of $4,053.40 (Composite Exhibit 3).
Recommendation That Petitioner's request for relief from tax liability be denied, and that Petitioner's liability for documentary stamp tax, surtax, and penalties in the total amount of $4,053.40 be sustained. DONE and ORDERED this 26th day of May, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: E. Wilson Crump, II, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Tax Division, Northwood Mall Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Allan F. Meyer, Esquire Suite 1500 Post Office Box 14310 Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33302 Zayle A. Bernstein, Esquire Post Office Box 14310 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33302
Findings Of Fact Prior to the bankruptcy of Recreation Corporation of America (RCA), Drexel Properties (Drexel), predecessor in interest to Petitioner Sheridan Ventures, Inc., engaged in negotiations with RCA and Fidelco Growth Investors (Fidelco) for the purchase of some eighty-three acres of land owned by RCA that was located in Hollywood and Dania, Florida. Fidelco held a mortgage on the property in the amount of $2,400,000.00. On January 20, 1976, a bankruptcy judge in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida issued an amended order in Case No. 75-16-BK-JE-H, authorizing the trustee in bankruptcy of the estate of RCA, bankrupt, to accept the offer of Drexel to purchase the trustee's equity in the real property of the bankrupt for the sum of $15,000.00, subject to the first lien of Fidelco, taxes, interest, certain costs, and two subordinate liens in the amounts of $5,939.92 and $2,691.50. On January 28, 1976, the trustee executed a Bankruptcy Trustee's Deed conveying the property in question to Petitioner, subject to the Fidelco lien and taxes. Petitioner recorded the aforesaid deed in Broward County on February 27, 1976, and state documentary tax stamps in the amount of $45.00 were paid. (Testimony of Mehallis, Exhibits 1-2, Exhibit D to Petition) Respondent issued a proposed notice of assessment of documentary stamp tax, penalty, and interest in the total amount of $14,807.52 on September 7, 1976, based on a taxable consideration of $2,415,000.00. This sum represented the $15,000.00 cash paid by Petitioner and the $2,400,000.00 existing mortgage on the property. In this assessment, Petitioner was credited with the $45.00 previously paid for documentary tax stamps. An informal conference was held on September 21, 1976, after which a revised assessment in an increased amount was withdrawn when both parties agreed that the subordinate liens had been satisfied out of the $15,000.00 cash given for the deed. Subsequently, Respondent issued Revised Assessment No. 2, dated September 22, 1976, reflecting a sum due of $7,653.30 payable for documentary stamp tax, a like sum as a penalty, and interest for six months and five days in the amount of $471.83, for a total of $15,778.43. It was stipulated by the parties at the hearing that this amount is correctly computed and is the proper amount payable if the Petitioner is deemed liable therefor. (Exhibits A, C, E to Petition, Exhibit 3) At the time Petitioner purchased the trustee's interest in the property, it had no intention of paying Fidelco's full lien because the amount of that mortgage exceeded the fair market value of the land. It intended to use the trustee's deed as a negotiating tool to get a better arrangement with Fidelco. Consequently, it made no payments on the mortgage and, on April 7, 1976, Fidelco filed foreclosure proceedings in the Broward County Circuit Court. Petitioner interposed set-off and a counter claim in an amount exceeding $500,000.00 based on funds it had previously advanced to RCA under a prior contract. (Testimony of Mehallis) A real estate appraisal of the property established its fair market value to be $1,120,000.00 as of January, 1976. (Testimony of Lukacs)
Recommendation That Petitioner be held liable for the proposed assessment of documentary stamp tax, penalty, and interest under Chapter 201, Florida Statutes, in the amount of $15,778.43. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of April 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 COPIES FURNISHED: Edwin J. Stacker, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Brian C. Deuschle, Esquire Spear, Deuschle and Curran, P.A. 5554 North Federal Highway Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33308
Findings Of Fact The parties in the person of their counsel have stipulated to the evidential facts which shall serve as the basis for the determination of the matters in dispute. The stipulation of facts and its attendant exhibits are attached to this Recommended Order and made a part thereof. As can be seen in the examination of the stipulated facts and supporting exhibits, the amount of $940.80 tax due and $940.80 for penalty is the total amount pertaining to certain notes, including notes in the names of Newth and Smith, copies of which notes appear as Exhibits C and D to the stipulated facts. A review of the total audit, Exhibit A in the stipulated facts, reveals that the amount in issue on the notes of Newth and Smith totals $885.75 alleged tax due and $885.75 alleged penalty due. The balance of the $940.80 documentary stamp tax and $940.80 in penalty pertaining to notes of other named individuals have been conceded by the Petitioner as due and owing and are not in controversy through this hearing process. The original notes on the accounts of Newth and Smith were issued in 1969. The Newth note was drawn on September 17, 1969, and the Smith note on April 14, 1969. At the time the notes were issued, national banks were immune from state and local taxes whose categories were not within the purview of Section 5219 of the Revised Statutes (12 USCA Sec. 548). Documentary stamp taxes were not one of the classes of taxes enumerated in Section 5219. Consequently, no documentary stamp taxes could be imposed against the notes drawn on accounts in the First National Hank of Pompano Beach because in 1969 it was a national bank, a status which it has continued to hold through the time of these proceedings. The prohibition against documentary stamp taxes being imposed by a state government on transactions between a national bank and its customers existed until December, 1969, at which point Public Law 91-156 was enacted, on December 12, 1969, and it amended Section 5219 of the Revised Statutes (12 USCA Sec. 548) and subsequent to that amendment, Title 12 USCA Sec. 3548 allowed state governments to tax national banks. In particular, the language of that latter provision provided: For the purpose of any tax law enacted under the authority of the United States or any State, a national bank shall be treated as a bank organized and existing under the laws of the State or other jurisdiction within which its principal office is located. This meant that transactions between the customers of a national bank and that bank with took place subsequent to the implementation of Title 12 USCA Sec. 3548 could be taxed pursuant to Chapter 201, Florida Statutes, by the process of a documentary stamp tax being levied. (The exhibits attached to the statement of facts show that Newth renewed his note with the Petitioner on April 20, 1971, and again on December 31, 1975. Smith renewed his note on June 12, 1973, and on December 31, 1975. Through the renewal process, documentary steep taxes were not paid on $683,000.00 involving the note of Newth and on $15,500.00 involving the note of Smith.) The Petitioner claims that it need not pay the documentary stamp tax and penalty on the Newth and Smith notes, because it is except from the payment of such tax. While the Petitioner agrees with the Respondent that Subsection 201.08(1), Florida Statutes, calls for the payment of documentary taxes on promissory notes and the renewal of those promissory notes, Petitioner believes that Section 201.09, Florida Statutes, exempts it from the necessity to pay documentary stamp taxes and related penalties in the matter of the renewal of the Newth and Smith notes which took place on December 31, 1975. The provision of Section 201.09, Florida Statutes, states: 201.09 Renewal of existing promissory note; exemption.--Then any promissory note is given in renewal of any existing promissory note, which said renewal note only extends or continues the identical contractual obligations of the original promissory note and evidences part or all of the original indebtedness evidenced thereby, not including any accumulated interest thereon and without enlargement in any way of said original contract and obligation, such renewal note shall not be subject to taxation under this chapter if such renewal note has attached to it the original promissory note with canceled stamps of fixed thereon showing full payment of the tax due thereon. Petitioner reads this provision to mean that the prohibition against the State of Florida levying taxes on the transactions that took place on the Newth and Smith notes in 1969, under the protection afforded by Section 5219 of the Revised Statutes (12 USCA Sec. 548); was tantamount to a declaration that full payment of the tax due thereon had been rendered and when the State attempted to impose the documentary stamp tax on the renewals which took place on December 31, 1975, Section 201.09, Florida Statutes, exempted the Petitioner from the payment of that tax. Under this theory, it was only necessary to attach the original promissory note issued in the Newth and Smith matters in 1969 to the renewal notes of December 31, 1975, and even though canceled stamps were not affixed to the 1969 notes, this could be analogous to attaching promissory notes with canceled stamps to renewal note documents. The analogy is supported in the mind of the Petitioner because both in the instance of the latter promissory notes with documentary stamp taxes attached and in the cases of Newth and Smith where original promissory notes were attached without canceled stamps attached; the key point was that under the hypothetical situation of documentary stamp taxes affixed to the original notes or the actual situation in the Newth and Smith cases, both had the real effect or effect in law of providing full payment of taxes due thereon. The perception of the Petitioner does not comport with the basis for the exemption created by Section 201.09, Florida Statutes. That exemption only applies when tax has actually been paid on the original promissory note, which did not occur here, and that failure to pay tax on the original promissory notes precludes any claim for exemption when the notes were renewed. There exists one further possibility open to the Petitioner in its efforts to resist the payment of the documentary stamp tax rate penalty on the notes of Newth and Smith. That possibility resides in the idea that the prohibition against taxing the notes when they were drafted in 1969, such prohibition appearing in the guise of Section 5219 of the Revised Statutes (12 USCA Sec. 548); it would continue to exist for the life of the note making all renewals exempt from taxation. That interpretation does not pass muster when viewed in the light of Title 12 USCA Sec. 3548, which removed future transactions from their exempt status and made them subject to tax by the Respondent. This change in position allowed Subsection 201.08(1), Florida Statutes, to be imposed on the renewals to the promissory notes, which occurred on December 31, 1975. In summary, Petitioner having failed to demonstrate its entitlement to the exemption set out in Section 201.09, Florida Statutes, it is liable in the lull amount claimed for the payment of documentary stamp taxes and penalties in a like amount in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 201, Florida Statutes, on all transactions addressed in the audit, which is Exhibit A to the statement of facts.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Petitioner, First National Bank of Pompano Beach, be required to pay documentary stamp taxes in the amount of $940.80 and penalties in the amount of $940.80 related to the transactions on these promissory notes set out in the stipulation of facts offered by the parties. DONE AND ORDERED this 15th day of June, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of June, 1979. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce Culpepper, Esquire 716 Barnett Bank Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Barbara Staros Harmon, Esquire Assistant Attorney General The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John D. Moriarty, Esquire Department of Revenue Room 104, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER =================================================================