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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. ROBERT MARRIOTT, 82-003337 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-003337 Latest Update: Jul. 09, 1984

Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent Robert Marriott has been a licensed real estate broker/salesman under the laws of the State of Florida, trading as Marriott Realty. In February of 1980, in his capacity as a real estate broker/salesman, Respondent obtained an offer to purchase commercial property in Miami from Orlando Villacis, a resident of Ecuador, as purchaser, for a total purchase price of $500,000. In conjunction with the offer, Villacis paid a $20,000 earnest money deposit to be held by Marriott Realty in escrow under the terms of the offer. Villacis' deposit check in the amount of $20,000 was deposited into the Marriott Realty escrow account on February 22, 1980. By March 11, 1980, Villacis' $20,000 had been withdrawn, leaving an escrow account balance of $40. This fact was never reported to Villacis. Having heard nothing definite from Respondent with regard to the offer, and because he spent most of his time out of the country, Villacis engaged the services of attorney Rafael Penalver. Prior to July 1980, Penalver contacted the Respondent and inquired as to the status of the offer. Each time, Respondent told him that the seller was still considering the offer. In July of 1980, Respondent told Penalver that the $500,000 offer had been rejected by the seller and recommended that Villacis present an offer for $570,000. Penalver prepared the offer in the amount of $570,000, again calling for a $20,000 earnest money deposit, which Penalver and Villacis assumed was still in the Marriott Realty escrow account. Receiving no response from Respondent on the second offer, Penalver attempted to contact Respondent by telephone on numerous occasions. When Penalver was successful, Respondent told him that the seller was reviewing the offer. In early September 1980, Respondent advised Penalver that the $570,000 offer had been rejected by the seller. By letter dated September 11, 1980, Penalver raised the offer to $600,000, set a deadline of September 19 for the acceptance of the offer, and directed Respondent to return the $20,000 immediately should the offer not be accepted. After September 19, having heard nothing from the Respondent, Penalver called him, at which time Respondent advised that the offer was being considered by the seller. Penalver then wrote a letter dated October 7, 1980, to Respondent demanding that Respondent deposit the $20,000 into Villacis' account. Again hearing nothing from Respondent, Penalver on numerous occasions attempted to contact him by telephone in order to again demand the immediate return of the $20,000 deposit. Being unsuccessful, Penalver wrote the Respondent on November 20, 1980, and January 22, 1981, both times demanding the return of the $20,000 earnest money deposit. After the letter of January 22, 1981, Respondent agreed to meet with Penalver in Penalver's office. On February 2, 1981, the Respondent and his wife met with Penalver. During that meeting, Respondent advised Penalver that the $20,000 was no longer available and that he and his wife had used the money to make mortgage payments and cosmetic improvements on their personal residence. Respondent challenged Penalver to sue him to get the money back. After discussing Respondent's position with Villacis, Penalver filed a civil action for return of the $20,000. In his Answer to the Complaint filed in that litigation, Respondent admitted that he had used the $20,000 deposit for mortgage payments and other personal household expenses and for payment of his IRS tax deficiency. Villacis obtained a Final Judgment in the civil action in the amount of $20,000 plus interest and costs on October 6, 1982. Respondent testified that he did not return the $20,000 earnest money deposit because, in approximately October 1980, Villacis verbally agreed to loan the $20,000 to Respondent. Villacis strongly denied making any offer of a loan to Respondent. The purported loan agreement would have occurred after Penalver had twice written Respondent regarding immediate return of the $20,000 and seven months after the $20,000 had disappeared from the escrow account. Further, after Penalver sent his November demand letter, Respondent wrote Villacis in December of 1980 asking that Villacis consider loaning Respondent the $20,000 in exchange for an unrecorded mortgage on Respondent's personal residence. Clearly, Respondent's testimony is not credible. As of the date of the formal hearing in this cause, the Final Judgment in favor of Villacis and against Respondent remained unpaid and Respondent had still not returned to Villacis the $20,000 earnest money deposit.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent guilty of the allegations contained within the Administrative Complaint filed against him and revoking his license as a real estate broker/salesman. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 30th day of April, 1984, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Tina Hipple, Esquire Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 David I. Schlosberg, Esquire 525 North 27th Avenue, Suite 100 Miami, Florida 33125 Frederick Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. STANLEIGH M. FRANKLIN, MARIA C. FRANKLIN, ET AL., 84-004414 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-004414 Latest Update: Jun. 05, 1985

Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Elliot Rosen Realty, Inc. was a licensed corporate real estate broker having been issued license number 0218821 by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate. Respondent Elliot Rosen held real estate broker's license number 0075258 issued by petitioner and was the qualifying officer of Elliot Rosen Realty, Inc. Respondents Stanleigh M. Franklin and Maria C. Franklin were licensed real estate salesmen in Rosen's office having been issued license numbers 0318042 and 0370308, respectively. The firm is located at 8120 Coral Way, Miami, Florida 33155. On an undisclosed date Robert W. and Carol A. Bush listed for sale with Elliot Rosen Realty, Inc., a residential property located at 8295 Southwest 153rd Street, Miami. The initial asking price was $119,000, but this was later reduced to $112,000. In April 1984, Joseph and Maria Yanes were in the process of selling their home and were consequently seeking to purchase a new residence. Both are educated persons, and Mr. Yanes has a college degree. Mr. Yanes read a real estate advertisement which advertised the Bush's property. They contacted Rosen Realty, Inc. and spoke with Maria Franklin. After inspecting the house with Maria, the Franklins met with the Yanes on April 15, 1985, for the purpose of preparing and executing an offer to purchase the house. Joseph Yanes made clear to Stanleigh Franklin that his primary concern was obtaining a mortgage with monthly payments that did not exceed $1000 per month. Otherwise, he would not be able to purchase the property. Stanleigh was familiar with a new mortgage loan program offered by a local lender (American International Mortgage Company) known as the "7.5 magnet mortgage" which offered a monthly payment for the first three years at a 7.5 percent interest rate. Stanleigh computed the principal and interest payments under this plan to be $711.55 per month. When estimated taxes and insurance were added in the total payment came to approximately $850 per month. He also advised that a mortgage insurance premium would be charged each month, which he estimated to be $50 to $60 per month. This still totaled less than the $960 or $970 which the Yanes stated their existing mortgage to be. The Yanes were told that because of the low interest rate (7.5 percent) during the first 36 months, there would be negative amortization during that period of time. In other words, the principal amount owed would actually increase rather than decrease during the first three years since interest on the note was accruing at a higher rate (13 percent). Finally, Franklin advised the Yanes that a 5 percent down payment was required with this type of mortgage and that their deposit should equal this amount to qualify for the loan. The Yanes did not indicate any dissatisfaction with this type of financing, or that they did not understand how the plan worked, particularly with respect to the negative amortization. They agreed to make an offer of $107,000 on the property, to give a $500 deposit that day, and an additional $4850 later on which equated to 5 percent of the purchase price. The contract itself made no reference to the 7.5 percent financing, but provided only that the buyers would obtain a new first mortgage for the balance owed on the $107,000 purchase price. Throughout these negotiations, there was no misrepresentation of facts by Franklin concerning the mortgage or amount of deposit required. The Yanes' offer was quickly presented by the Franklins to the sellers who accepted the offer within the next few days. The Yanes then gave an additional $4850 deposit around May 1 which was deposited in Rosen's escrow account. On May 7, they filed a loan application with American International Mortgage Company and gave a check in the amount of $185 to have an appraisal made and a credit report prepared. At that time, the loan officer explained to Joseph Yanes in detail how the magnet mortgage program worked and that there would be negative amortization under this plan. The meeting lasted for an hour and a half and Yanes did not express surprise at how the mortgage worked, or that he did not understand its concept. An appraisal was then made, and a credit check run on Mr. Yanes. However, the lender was unable to confirm any credit information on Mrs. Yanes because her employer refused to return the employment verification form. On June 20, 1984, the lender sent a denial notice to the Yanes because of its inability to obtain information regarding Mrs. Yanes. The Yanes made no other efforts to obtain financing on the property. After they executed the contract to purchase, the Yanes engaged counsel in early May to represent them at closing. Their attorney (Lisa Wilson) called all pertinent parties, including the Franklins and Rosen to learn the details of the mortgage. After having the details explained to them again, the Yanes advised counsel that they wished to cancel the contract. On May 23, 1984, Wilson sent a certified letter to Stanleigh Franklin advising that because the financing arrangements had been misrepresented to her clients they were cancelling the contract. She also demanded a return of their deposit plus interest. Just prior to the receipt of the certified letter, Joseph Yanes also telephoned Stanleigh Franklin and demanded a return of his deposit. This was the first time Franklin suspected the deal had gone awry. Shortly after this, the Yanes contacted petitioner to file a complaint against respondents. When Mr. Bush learned that the Yanes were not honoring the contract, upon advice of counsel, Bush made a claim on the $5,350 deposit for breach of contract. Faced with conflicting demands for the deposit, Rosen contacted petitioner to determine how the deposit should be disbursed. The matter was eventually referred by petitioner to its local office in Miami for investigation in October 1984. On November 27, 1984, counsel for petitioner advised Rosen that because of the pending complaint of the Yanes, petitioner could not issue an escrow disbursement order. However, he was told of the remaining two alternatives for resolving the dispute prescribed in Subsection 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes. A complaint for interpleader was later filed in circuit court by agreement of counsel for the Yanes, Bush, and Rosen. That complaint is still pending. Rosen, as broker, was never personally involved in the transaction until a complaint with petitioner was filed. He stood to gain no commission on the sale since the Franklins were working on a "100 percent basis" and were to receive the entire commission. Rosen has been licensed for some thirty-one years and has had no prior disciplinary action in all that time.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the administrative complaint be DISMISSED with prejudice. DONE and ORDERED this 5th day of June, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of June, 1985.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. JOHN R. PERRONI AND FLORIDA FIRST REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT, 82-000083 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-000083 Latest Update: Feb. 18, 1983

Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent Perroni was a licensed real estate broker having been issued license No. 0146232; Respondent Florida First Realty and Development, Inc., was a corporation licensed to conduct real estate business having been issued license No. 0215700 and branch office license No. 0215701; and Respondent Perroni was a duly licensed real estate broker and was the qualifying broker for Respondent Florida First, a licensed brokerage corporation. Respondents negotiated a contract on or about May 13, 1980, wherein Bernice Elstrom agreed to sell certain real property to Lorraine Baretela. Pursuant to that contract, Respondents accepted $300 from Baretela as an earnest money deposit. That contract for purchase and sale specified that the closing on that purchase and sale would take place on May 19, 1980, six days later. During those six days, Theresa McMullin, the salesperson employed by Respondents who obtained the contract between Elstrom and Baretela, arranged for the buyer's title insurance policy. The title search disclosed two outstanding liens against the property: one final judgment in the amount of $364.67 plus costs, and an outstanding 1979 tax bill of $38.44 plus interest and penalties. She advised both the seller and buyer of these outstanding liens, and the seller agreed to clear those liens and close on the transaction. During the same six days, Baretela had second thoughts about whether she wished to purchase the property. She appeared on several occasions at the property with her friends to obtain their opinions on whether she should buy the property. She consulted an attorney to ascertain if there was any way she could get out of her contract without forfeiting her $300 deposit. When McMullin told her of the two liens against the property, Baretela told McMullin she was glad there were liens against the property, since she did not wish to purchase it and believed that would allow her to void her contract. McMullin advised her that was not true, that the liens would be cleared prior to or at the closing, and that if Baretela refused to close an the contract, she would forfeit her $300 deposit. Baretela advised that she would rather lose her deposit than purchase property she decided she did not want, and Baretela and McMullin continued to look at other properties for Baretela to purchase. By Monday morning, May 19, McMullin had assisted the seller in clearing the liens on the property. She spoke to Baretela on the telephone and reminded Baretela that the closing was scheduled for that day. Baretela said she would not close. McMullin again reminded her that Baretela would lose her deposit if she did not close. On May 19, the seller was ready, willing, and able to convey clear title to the property. McMullin advised Respondent Perroni that there was a problem with the closing. Within a few days after May 19, Respondent Perroni, McMullin, and Baretela met at Respondent's office. Respondent advised Baretela that she could still close on the property and avoid forfeiting her $300 deposit. Baretela advised that she would rather forfeit her deposit money and that she would not close on the property. Baretela left the office, and no further contact was made by Baretela regarding her deposit money. Pursuant to the terms of the contract, Perroni disbursed one half of the $300 deposit to the seller and retained one half of the deposit. On or about November 26, 1980, Respondents negotiated a contract whereby Thomas A. and Linda Rupert agreed to purchase certain real property. Respondents accepted $500 from the buyers as an earnest money deposit on the transaction. The contract was expressly made conditional on the buyers applying for and obtaining either a mortgage insured by the FHA, under Section 235, or by the VA, in an amount not less than $40,000. On February 25, 1981, Carruth Mortgage Corporation, a company handling FHA funds, advised the buyers that they did not qualify for the required financing, since the buyers had insufficient liquid assets to close the loan. Linda Rupert contacted Larry Zimmerman, the employee of Respondents handling the transaction, and Zimmerman advised Perroni there was a problem with the transaction and requested Perroni to become involved. Perroni ran a preliminary qualification on the buyers and ascertained that the Ruperts could qualify for a $38,000 mortgage from FHA. He met with Linda Rupert and advised her that the Ruperts could still purchase the property by placing the $38,000 mortgage on the property, and Respondent offered her a $2,000 second mortgage to make up the difference. During that meeting, Rupert advised Respondent that she would have to talk to her husband about whether they wished to have two mortgages on the property, and Rupert also discussed with Respondent Perroni a refund of the $500 deposit. Perroni advised her that he would be willing to refund $370, but that he believed himself entitled to retain $130 for survey and other expenses he had incurred pursuant to the contract, which provided that in the event the buyer failed to qualify for the $40,000 mortgage, deposit moneys would be returned less expenses incurred on behalf of the buyer. Rupert advised she would not agree to reimburse Respondent for expenses incurred on her behalf, that she would discuss Respondent Perroni's offer of a second mortgage with her husband, and she would then contact Respondent to advise him of her decision. Rather than advising Respondent of the result of any discussions with her husband, Linda Rupert filed a complaint with some local citizens' dispute settlement program alleging that Respondent refused to return her money to her. Although that local agency scheduled a hearing regarding Rupert's complaint, Respondents were not notified of that hearing. When Respondents failed to appear at the citizens dispute hearing, Rupert went to the office of Congressman Skip Bafalis and spoke to one of the secretaries working there. When the secretary telephoned Respondent to inquire regarding Linda Rupert's deposit, this was the first contact that Respondents had regarding Linda Rupert's decision following her meeting with Respondent. Respondent assumed the telephone call meant the Ruperts did not want to buy the property by utilizing a second mortgage and accordingly refunded their $500 earnest money deposit. On or about July 8, 1980, Respondent Perroni entered into a contract with James D. Bell for the construction of a home on Bell's lot. The contract called for the construction to be financed by an FHA 235 loan. Respondents accepted $500 from Bell as a deposit on the construction of his home. Respondent Perroni, who is also a licensed certified contractor, explained to Bell, a carpenter-subcontractor by trade, and Bell's mother-in-law, who is in the real estate business and was involved throughout the dealings between Perroni and Bell, how the transaction would work. Since FHA does not finance the actual construction, Bell would deed his lot to Perroni. Perroni, as the contractor, would place a construction mortgage on that lot. When the house was completed, Perroni would deed back the house and the lot, and the construction mortgage would be replaced by the FHA mortgage. Bell and his mother-in-law agreed. On July 16, 1980, Bell gave Respondent Perroni a warranty deed for his lot for the purpose of constructing a new home on the property. Respondent Perroni provided Bell with a receipt of this deed stating that the title would be transferred back to Bell upon the completion of the home and closing. On September 12, 1980, Respondent Perroni placed a mortgage on Bell's lot to finance the construction of the home. On November 6, 1980, Bell was given notice that FHA 235 financing was not available. Respondent Perroni explained to Bell that the 235 program was simply between federal government budget years and that the program was being refunded so that if Bell would simply wait, the funds would be available within the next two or three months. Bell advised Respondent that he did not wish to wait for the FHA funds because he had located a friend of his who could pull the building permit so that Bell could build himself a more costly house for less money than Respondent could build for him. He demanded that Perroni deed the lot back to him and refund his $500. Perroni agreed to deed back the lot, but advised Bell that Perroni now had $2,000 in expenses from the transaction: $200 for perk and survey work, and $1,800 in costs to clear the construction mortgage. On November 25, 1980, Bell signed a release prepared by Perroni, Perroni gave Bell a quitclaim deed for the property, and Perroni paid $1,800 to clear the construction mortgage off the property. Perroni retained Bell's $500 deposit. At all times material hereto, Sheila D. Johnson was licensed as a real estate salesman. On July 1, 1980, she and Respondent Perroni entered into a contract whereby Florida First would open an office in Port St. Lucie, and Johnson would be the office manager and run the Port St. Lucie office. Under the terms of that agreement, Perroni and Johnson would each provide $3,500 to fund the new office, and thereafter all profits and all liabilities would be split between the two equally. Although all other salespersons in the Port St. Lucie office were covered by the standard commission agreement utilized by Florida First, the agreement between Perroni and Johnson makes no mention of any commissions to be paid to Johnson for sales made by her, but rather only specifies an equal split between Johnson and Perroni as to profits and losses of the company. Johnson commenced running the Port St. Lucie office. She maintained all records and was an authorized signature on all bank accounts for the company. Perroni continued to work out of Florida First's office in North Fort Myers and went to the Port St. Lucie office an average of once a week. During each of his visits, Perroni and Johnson would go through the bank accounts and other records of the Port St. Lucie office. Johnson kept no ledgers and had no central bookkeeping system. All salesmen kept their own records of commissions due or paid. All salespersons at the Port St. Lucie office were authorized to purchase lots for the 235 program with a price limit set by Perroni as to the maximum to be paid for any lot. Applicants for financing under the 235 program would then be matched with lots purchased by Respondents. By October, discussions took place between Perroni and Johnson whereby Perroni expressed his dissatisfaction with certain operational aspects of the Port St. Lucie office. He advised Johnson that certain expenses incurred by her were unreasonable and advised her of his displeasure with the fact that she had purchased lots for the 235 program from a personal friend of hers for more money than that authorized by Perroni. He provided Johnson with an accounting of office expenses in October. Perroni revoked Johnson's authorization to write checks on behalf of the company and removed the checkbooks from the office. He provided her with an accounting of the business expenses as of November 22, 1980. He subsequently gave her a copy of a computer printout showing business losses through December 1, 1980. Perroni temporarily closed the Port St. Lucie office in January, 1981. By letter dated January 5, 1981, he advised Johnson that he was declaring the July 1, 1980, agreement between them null and void effective January 1, 1981, due to her default in that agreement. He demanded reimbursement from her for business losses in the approximate amount of $10,000. By letter to Perroni dated January 10, 1981, Johnson demanded payment of total commissions due her on five transactions to be closed in the total amount of $1,737. She noted that $180 of that amount was past due. She also requested return of her initial investment pursuant to her attorney's advice. She sent a copy of her correspondence to the Port St. Lucie Board of Realtors and Florida Board of Real Estate. The letter contains no demand for an accounting. Thereafter, Perroni's attorney and Johnson's attorney engaged in demand letters between them. On April 3, 1981, and on June 15, 1981, attorneys for the Department of Professional Regulation sent letters to Perroni stating that the Department had received a complaint from Johnson that Perroni had failed to deliver commissions due to her. Four of the five transactions listed in Johnson's letter of January 10 were recited. No request for an accounting was contained in either letter. By letter dated July 8, 1981, Perroni responded to the Department explaining, essentially, that the agreement between Perroni and Johnson was in the hands of their attorneys and referred the Department to Perroni's attorney for details regarding the financial dispute between Perroni and Johnson. On September 24, 1981, the Department sent Perroni another copy of Johnson's January 10 demand letter. The Department requested Perroni to prepare an accounting of any commissions due to Johnson, with the accounting to be sent to Johnson and the Department, together with Perroni's explanation regarding Johnson's investment in the partnership. This letter constitutes the first demand for an accounting on commissions. By letter dated October 15, 1981, Perroni responded to the Department's demand for an accounting by listing the four transactions, advising that three of the four transactions had in fact closed, and reciting the commission to be paid on those three transactions. He advised that the records of the fourth transaction could not be located. Be briefly explained the terms of the agreement between him and Johnson, explained that litigation between him and Johnson would probably be necessary, and again referred the Department to his attorney for any information or documents that might be needed. This letter constitutes an accounting as requested by the Department. The transaction on which Perroni could not locate the file in order to ascertain any commission possibly due to Johnson was the Zdanowicz to McCloud transaction. McCloud is Johnson's mother. In her deposition, Johnson admitted removing from the Port St. Lucie office what she considered her "personal" files. Many of the records from the Port St. Lucie office have never been located, including the file on the James Bell transaction wherein Perroni placed his copy of the release signed by Bell. Perroni's records indicate that the total losses suffered at the Port St. Lucie office through January 1, 1981, amount to $32,492.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED THAT: A final order be entered finding Respondents not guilty of the allegations contained in all five counts of the Administrative Complaint and further dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against Respondents, John R. Perroni and Florida First Realty and Development, Inc. RECOMMENDED this 7th day of October, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of October, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce D. Lamb, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Alfred E. Johnson, Esquire 3443 Hancock Bridge Parkway #501 North Fort Myers, Florida 33903 Mr. Samuel R. Shorstein Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Staff Attorney Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Mr. Carlos B. Stafford Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 82-083 DPR NOS. 0005124 JOHN R. PERRONI AND 0012101 FIRST FLORIDA REALTY AND 0012012 DEVELOPMENT, INC., 0012023 0013742 Respondent. /

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. C. H. CHAPMAN AND CHAPMAN REALTY CORPORATION, 80-001037 (1980)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 80-001037 Latest Update: Jun. 11, 1981

Findings Of Fact On May 18, 1978, the Respondents, C. H. Chapman and Chapman Realty Corporation (hereafter Respondents or Chapman) through a registered real estate salesman in the employ of the Respondents, negotiated and obtained a sales contract between Gerry and Ada Ball, as buyers or purchasers and Joseph Winston, as seller, for the sale of property located at 305 Ben Avon Drive, Tampa, Florida. Pursuant to the terms of the sales contract, the Respondents' salesman received a $1,000.00 deposit from the purchasers which was placed in the Respondents' trust account on May 5, 1978. Prior to the date of the scheduled closing, the purchasers inspected the property and requested the seller to make certain repairs and/or replacements to rectify defects which included wood borer damage, structural roof problems and an inoperable pool heater. The seller refused to make the repairs and/or replacements demanded and the offer was formally withdrawn by the purchasers on July 28, 1978, via letter to Chapman Realty requesting return of their $1,000.00 earnest money deposit. Prior to formal withdrawal of the offer, verbal demands were made by Mr. Hall upon Chapman Realty for the return of his deposit. The demand for repairs and/or replacements and withdrawal of the offer was predicated on a provision of the sales contract which provided: Buyers themselves, or at their expense may have property inspected to ensure that there are no structural, electrical or plumbing defects. If any are found, buyers have the right to withdraw their offer and have all of their earnest deposit refunded to them. Thereafter, Respondent Chapman disbursed the $1,000.00 as follows: $350.00 via check dated September 6, 1978, made payable to Robert A. Carbonell, an attorney-at-law in Florida. $500.00 via check dated January 9, 1979, made payable to purchasers Hall. $150.00 via check dated January 10, 1979, made payable to Robert A. Carbonell. Prior to any disbursal the Respondent Chapman discussed with Mr. Hall the possibility of placing the escrowed funds with the Clerk of the Circuit Court. Respondent Chapman contacted his attorney, Robert Carbonell, regarding the conflicting demands of the parties. Mr. Carbonell was introduced to Mr. Hall by the Respondent over the telephone. The Respondent met with Mr. Carbonell on a regular basis since Mr. Carbonell was employed by the Respondent to handle real estate transactions involving Chapman Realty. Respondent was never authorized by the purchasers to pay a fee to Mr. Carbonell directly from the $1,000.00 deposit held in trust. The $500.00 was paid directly by the Respondent to Attorney Carbonell from the Chapman Realty escrow account without oral or written authorization of the seller or the purchasers and in the absence of a settlement agreement between the Hall's and Mr. Winston. Although Mr. Carbonell and the Respondent Chapman believed that Mr. Carbonell was representing Mr. Hall, neither Mr. Hall nor the seller, Mr. Winston, were under the same impression. Both Mr. Hall and Mr. Winston believed that Mr. Carbonell was representing the Respondents rather than Mr. Hall. Such an impression was reasonable in light of Mr. Carbonell's regular employment by the Respondent, the absence of a written agreement between Mr. Hall and Mr. Carbonell coupled with the lack of discussion or agreement concerning fees and the potential conflicting positions which existed between the parties and the Respondents. If any fee were due to Attorney Carbonell for his efforts in securing the return of the $1,000.00 deposit, this was a matter between Mr. Carbonell and Mr. Hall. Neither Mr. Carbonell nor the Respondent Chapman discussed the amount of the fee with the Halls. Mr. Carbonell arrived at the amount he thought was reasonable, $500.00, and Respondent Chapman diverted such amount to Mr. Carbonell from the Respondent's escrow account.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Respondents', C. H. Chapman and Chapman Realty Corporation licenses to practice real estate be suspended until restitution is made to Gerry and Ada A. Hall, as follows: $500.00 plus interest at 12 percent accrued since July 28, 1978, and Interest on $500.00 accrued at 12 percent for the period from July 28, 1973 until January 9, 1979. Respondents' licenses to be reinstated upon submission and acceptance by the Board of Real Estate of satisfactory evidence of payment. DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of April, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of April, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Staff Attorney Department of Professional Regulation Staff Attorney 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dale W. Vash, Esquire DIXON, LAWSON & BROWN 620 Twiggs Street Tampa, Florida 33602

Florida Laws (1) 475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. ROBERT WATSON, JR., 81-001496 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-001496 Latest Update: Feb. 02, 1982

Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Robert Watson, Jr., is a real estate broker-salesman, having been issued license Number 0093690. He resides and has his business in Jacksonville, Florida. On or about September 1, 1978, the Respondent negotiated and drafted a contract for sale of a certain piece of residential real estate, the purchaser for which was one Mr. Lacy Cole. The Respondent was Mr. Cole's broker in that transaction. The Respondent informed Mr. Cole that he would have to pay a two- hundred-dollar deposit as prospective buyer pursuant to the deposit receipt, sales contract agreement drafted by the Respondent. Mr. Cole did not pay the entire two-hundred-dollar deposit, but he did pay the Respondent sixty-five dollars. The closing was held October 20, 1978, at which time Mr. Cole's attorney directed the Respondent to pay Mr. Cole a two-hundred-dollar refund as the contract for sale provided that financing would be through the Veterans Administration and that in such a Veterans Administration sponsored transaction the buyer is precluded from paying closing costs. Mr. Cole cashed the two- hundred-dollar check in good faith and later was informed that the Respondent had stopped payment on it, which resulted in Mr. Cole having to make the check good. The Respondent has failed to recompense Lacy Cole for the sixty-five- dollar deposit he had already paid pursuant to the contract for sale drafted by the Respondent. Mr. Watson has also never repaid the two hundred dollars which Mr. Cole had to expend in order to provide payment on the two-hundred-dollar check on which the Respondent had stopped payment. In response to the Petitioner's demonstration that the Respondent had obligated Mr. Cole for a two-hundred-dollar "binder or closing costs" which he was not obligated to pay under Veterans Administration policy, the Respondent stated that he wrote the contract with the two-hundred-dollar binder with the understanding that Cole would pay a portion of it at the first of each month until it was paid and that he only received a total of sixty-five dollars from Cole. The seller agreed to sell the property to Mr. Cole anyway. The Respondent maintained that he merely told Mr. Cole at the closing that he would write him a two-hundred-dollar check and deliver it to him at closing with the understanding that Cole would deliver it back to him immediately afterward to keep from confusing the attorney." The Respondent, however, failed to refute the showing by the Petitioner that the Respondent attempted to obligate that purchaser to pay two hundred dollars in "closing costs" which he was not legally obligated to pay and for which the seller of the property was responsible in the first place. The Respondent adduced no evidence contrary to that of Petitioner which established that, after being informed by the attorney that Mr. Cole was not responsible for any deposit or closing costs, the Respondent still retained the sixty-five dollars paid him as earnest money by Mr. Cole and, further, that after stopping payment on Cole's refund check, causing Mr. Cole to incur two hundred dollars additional expense for which he was not obligated, the Respondent failed to recompense Cole. There is thus no question that the Respondent misrepresented to his client, Mr. Cole, the obligations and expenses Mr. Cole would have to incur in order to purchase the property and thus, in effect, wrongfully obtained two hundred sixty-five dollars from Mr. Cole. On or about September 16, 1978, Mrs. Joanne Wesley deposited a ten- dollar check with the Respondent as a partial deposit for a down payment on a home. On or about September 20, 1978, she deposited an additional one-hundred- dollar check with the Respondent as further deposit on the same contract for sale and purchase which the Respondent had at that time not yet drafted. The Respondent never made an appropriate deposit of the above referenced checks in his escrow account, but, instead, cashed them for his personal use. On or about October 25, 1978, the contract for sale and purchase was finally drafted by the Respondent. On approximately December 4, 1978, Mrs. Wesley deposited with the Respondent an additional check for eight hundred fifty dollars as the final installment of her deposit money with regard to the proposed purchase of the home. On December 29, 1978, Mrs. Wesley learned that she had failed to qualify for FHA financing with regard to the above-referenced contract and, after looking at another home which was not to her liking offered to her by the Respondent as a "replacement dwelling," finally requested the refund of her total deposit of nine hundred sixty dollars. The Respondent then requested Mrs. Wesley to wait until January 2, 1979, for that refund and on January 2, 1979, tendered to her four hundred dollars cash as partial reimbursement. On January 3, 1979, the Respondent tendered to her an additional three hundred dollars cash and drew and delivered to her his escrow check, post-dated to January 10, 1979, in the amount of two hundred fifty dollars. That escrow account check was returned for insufficient funds. On February 1, 1979, Mrs. Wesley's attorney made demand on the Respondent for payment of the two hundred fifty dollars outstanding, represented by the invalid check. On approximately February 3, 1979, the Respondent ultimately paid the two hundred fifty dollars due Mrs. Wesley. Thus, at that point the Respondent had refunded nine hundred fifty dollars of the nine hundred sixty dollars in deposit money due Mrs. Wesley. The entire refund had become due on December 29, 1978, when it was learned that she could not qualify for FHA financing with regard to the proposed purchase, which qualification for financing was a condition precedent to performance of the contract. In his defense the Respondent stated that he attempted to arrange the purchase of another dwelling for Mrs. Wesley upon learning that she could not qualify for financing on the subject property and that he retained her deposit money in his escrow account for that reason and ultimately repaid it to her, although after over a month's delay. The Respondent contended that he had opened the subject account as a business account when he was doing appraisal work and had not considered it to be an escrow account and "did not know when they switched it over to escrow." The Respondent did acknowledge that he had used this escrow account as his business account and commingled personal and business operating funds in it and made withdrawals from time to time for business and personal reasons. With further regard to the Cole transaction, the Respondent contended that he felt it was customary for a veteran to pay two hundred dollars closing costs and even when he learned the veteran was not obligated to pay closing costs in such a transaction, that he still felt it was "customary as earnest money" even though the seller obviously was obligated to pay closing costs. The Respondent also testified that as of the time of the hearing and for an indeterminant period of tinge before the hearing, he had terminated active practice of real estate brokerage and was mostly performing appraisal work. There is thus no question that the Respondent informed Mr. Cole that he was obligated to pay two hundred dollars "earnest money" or "closing costs" and that his actions forced Mr. Cole to incur the two-hundred-sixty-five dollar expense described above, even after the Respondent was informed by the closing attorney that the purchaser was not obligated for those expenses. There is no question with regard to the Wesley transaction that he delayed an inordinate amount of time in refunding her deposit money after the condition of financial qualification for the purchase did not occur, and, further, that he commingled these purchaser deposit funds in his escrow account with personal and business funds and used a portion of them for personal purposes.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that the license of Robert Watson, Jr., as a real estate broker in the State of Florida be REVOKED. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of February, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of February 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Barry S. Sinoff, Esquire 2400 Independent Square One Independent Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Robert Watson, Jr. 9527 Abedare Avenue Jacksonville, Florida 32208 Frederick B. Wilsen, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Samuel Shorstein, Secretary Department of professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 C. B. Stafford, Executive Director Board of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802

Florida Laws (4) 120.57455.227475.25475.42
# 5
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. CARL A. PERRY, 81-001765 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-001765 Latest Update: Mar. 11, 1982

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Carl A. Perry, is licensed by Petitioner as a real estate salesman. At all times material hereto, he was employed by F.E.C. Real Estate Corporation. On September 23, 1979, Respondent negotiated and procured a contract whereby Ronald Joeckel and his wife were to buy and Lynn C. Burdeshaw and his wife were to sell certain real property owned by the Burdeshaws and located in Pompano Beach, Florida. In order to secure that Deposit Receipt Contract, the Joeckels gave Respondent on that date a $100 deposit. The Deposit Receipt Contract required an additional deposit of $1,900, and on October 11, 1979, Respondent received a $1,900 check from the Joeckels. The check was dated October 20, 1979. Respondent did not give this check to his employer until November 23, 1979. When F.E.C. Real Estate Corporation deposited the check for $1,900 in its trust account, the check was dishonored by the bank upon which it was drawn for the reason that the Joeckels did not have sufficient funds to cover the check. Instead of advising the Burdeshaws that the Joeckels' $1,900 check was dishonored, Respondent contacted Ronald Joeckel on several occasions. Joeckel each time advised Respondent that he would cover the check, and Respondent relied upon that information and believed that the Joeckels would fulfill their contract for the purchase of the Burdeshaws' property. Respondent was in error; the Joeckels breached the Deposit Receipt Contract, and the Burdeshaws sold their property to another purchaser soon thereafter. Respondent's employer, F.E.C. Real Estate Corporation, was not the listing broker for the Burdeshaws' property. Shell Coast Realty held that listing. Other than this Administrative Complaint, Respondent has had no other complaint made against him.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED THAT: A final order be entered reprimanding Respondent, Carl A. Perry, for his conduct, admonishing Respondent, Carl A. Perry, to abstain from similar conduct, and placing him on probation for a period of one year. RECOMMENDED this 21st day of December, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of December, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: William R. Scherer, Esquire Grimmett, Conrad, Scherer & James, P.A. 707 Southwest. Third Avenue Post Office Box 14723 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33302 Mr. Carl A. Perry c/o F.E.C. Real Estate Corporation 4634 North Federal Highway Lighthouse Point, Florida 33064 Mr. Samuel R. Shorstein Secretary, Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Carlos B. Stafford Executive Director Board of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 =================================================================

Florida Laws (1) 475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. JAMES REINLIE, JR., 82-000876 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-000876 Latest Update: Jun. 30, 1983

The Issue The Administrative Complaint presents essentially the same factual allegations in its various counts supporting different legal violations. These factual allegations are summarized as follow: Reinlie represented to Estelle Pitts that if she put up the earnest money deposit for her son, William Lambert, on the commercial property that Lambert wanted to purchase in the form of notes secured by mortgages on her house: (1) the mortgages and notes would not be a lien on her property; (2) the mortgages and notes would not be recorded; (3) the mortgages and notes would be returned to her when Lambert obtained financing for the property he desired to purchase; (4) the mortgages and notes merely showed good faith on Lambert's part regarding his offer to purchase; (5) Lambert's contract for purchase was contingent upon the sale of commercial property which he owned in South Florida; and (6) even if the sale to Lambert did not go through, Mrs. Pitts would not be responsible for the mortgages and notes. Contrary to his representations, Reinlie recorded the various mortgages and notes executed by Estelle Pitts. Contrary to his representations, Reinlie advised Estelle Pitts that she would be responsible for the mortgages and notes, and that if said notes were not satisfied "foreclosure proceedings would be initiated." Petitioner called Estelle Pitts, who testified concerning the representations made by Reinlie. Reinlie testified, denying that he had made said representations. William Lambert was the only other person present when most of these alleged representations were made. Lambert, who had suffered a physically debilitating stroke, could not attend the hearing, and his deposition was received into the record. Lambert's recollection of the events was wholly supportive of neither his mother's nor Reinlie's recollection of the events. None of the witnesses were disinterested: Reinlie's license was in jeopardy; Mrs. Pitts' home was in jeopardy; and Lambert is Mrs. Pitts' son. The conflicts in testimony can only be resolved from extrinsic facts and the credibility of the witnesses. Having considered the facts, the testimony of Reinlie is deemed more credible. Both parties submitted post hearing proposed findings of fact in the form of a proposed recommended order. To the extent the proposed findings of fact have not been included in the factual findings in this order, they are specifically rejected as being irrelevant, not being based upon the most credible evidence, or not being a finding of fact.

Findings Of Fact The following Findings of Fact are based upon the prehearing stipulation of the parties: At all times in question, the Respondent, James Reinlie, Jr., was a registered real estate broker in the State of Florida and is the holder of license number 0112757. The parties were duly noticed pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 120, Florida Statutes (1981). William C. Lambert, Estelle Pitts' son, did not have the necessary money with which to furnish a deposit to the sellers of the Robin Hood Motel at the time the contract for sale and purchase and the addendums thereto were executed. A contract for sale and purchase was executed on August 11, 1979, and August 13, 1979, between Irene B. Smith, seller, and William C. Lambert, Sr., buyer, for the purchase of the Robin Hood Motel, located at 1150 North Atlantic Avenue in Daytona Beach, Florida. Respondent Reinlie was a co-broker on that contract. On August 13, 1979, an addendum to the contract for sale and purchase was executed between Irene B. Smith, seller, and William C. Lambert, Sr., buyer. On January 7, 1980, and January 8, 1980, a second addendum was executed under the original contract for sale and purchase between Irene B. Smith, Gilbert Brown and Liselotte M. Brown, sellers, and William C. Lambert, Sr., buyer. On August 13, 1979, a mortgage deed and mortgage note were executed by Estelle Pitts and Linda L. Smith (Mrs. Pitts' daughter) as mortgagor, to B.I.C. Realty, Inc., escrow account, as mortgagee, said note in the principal amount of $5,000 and secured by a first mortgage on 900 West New York Avenue, Deland, Florida, also known as: . . . the east 60' of the north 150' of Lot 1, Block I, Stetson Home Estates MB 10, page 79, Volusia County, Florida; Said property is the residential home of Estelle Pitts with title in the names of Estelle Pitts and Linda L. Smith. On October 16, 1979, a second mortgage was executed by Estelle Pitts and her daughter, Linda L. Smith, dated November 1, 1979, and secured by a mortgage note in the amount of $5,000 on the residential home of Estelle Pitts, said property being described in detail in paragraph 7 above. On October 16, 1979, a third mortgage was executed by Estelle Pitts and her daughter, Linda L. Smith, dated November 1, 1979, and secured by a mortgage note in the amount of $5,000 on the residential home of Estelle Pitts, said property being described in detail in paragraph 7 above. On August 17, 1979, Respondent Reinlie took the first mortgage deed and mortgage note to The Abstract Corporation and instructed that it be recorded in the public records of Volusia County, Florida, said first mortgage deed and mortgage note in the amount of $5,000 dated August 11, 1979, and executed August 13, 1979. On November 29, 1979, Reinlie took the second mortgage deed and note to The Abstract Corporation and instructed that it be recorded in the public records of Volusia County, said second mortgage deed and note in the amount of $5,000 dated November 1, 1979, and executed October 16, 1979. On December 4, 1979, Reinlie took the third mortgage deed and note to The Abstract Corporation and instructed that it be recorded in the public records of Volusia County, said third mortgage deed and note in the amount of $5,000 dated December 1, 1979, and executed October 16, 1979. On May 2, 1980, Estelle Pitts notified Reinlie that she wanted the aforesaid mortgages and notes returned to her immediately. On May 14, 1980, Reinlie notified Mrs. Pitts that he would not return the mortgages and notes and had been advised by the "former" owners of the Robin Hood Motel that they desired to pursue their full deposit, plus expenses, under the contract and, if necessary, would foreclose the mortgages and notes in order to enforce their legal rights. On May 19, 1982, Reinlie executed three satisfactions of mortgages on the three mortgages and notes referred to in paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 above upon the advice of counsel. The following Findings of Fact are based upon testimony and evidence adduced at the hearing: Reinlie did not state to Mrs. Pitts that the mortgages would not be recorded and would not be a lien on her property. (See Lambert deposition, pages 11 and 12.) William Lambert was aware that the mortgages and notes were to be recorded and would be a lien on his mother's property. Mrs. Pitts did not understand the transaction and the terms thereof, although Lambert explained it to her. (See Lambert deposition, page 13.) The contract for purchase was not contingent upon the sale of Lambert's motel in Hollywood, Florida. Lambert signed the contract and was presumably aware of its terms. Reinlie did not represent to Mrs. Pitts that the contract for purchase was contingent upon the sale of her son's motel in Hollywood. (See transcript, page 20.) It was Lambert's intent to replace the mortgages on his mother's home with cash he would obtain from the sale of his motel in Hollywood. By substitution of the cash for the mortgages and notes, it was Lambert's understanding that his mother's home would not be "used," i.e., that her home was not in danger of foreclosure. However, Lambert realized that the money would have to be substituted for the mortgages and notes. Lambert felt that he could sell his Hollywood motel prior to the closing date on the Robin Hood Motel. Had Lambert sold his motel in Hollywood prior to said closing, the mortgages and notes on his mother's house would have been cancelled, i.e., "returned" to her. Lambert initially advised Reinlie that his mother owned her home free and clear. At that time, both Lambert and Reinlie were seeking the means for Lambert to come up with the earnest money deposit, which does show a "good faith offer." Reinlie suggested the use of Mrs. Pitts' home to secure the deposit. Lambert discussed this matter with his mother, who agreed and executed the various mortgages and notes. Reinlie did not make the primary approach to Mrs. Pitts, and it was Lambert who primarily explained the transaction to her. Both Lambert and Mrs. Pitts stated that they failed to understand the terms and effect of the mortgages and notes. The addendum to the contract provides that the buyer will provide the seller within five days of the date of the contract a mortgage title binder showing the $5,000 deposit mortgage to be a first mortgage. Their failure to understand the transaction was not due to any misrepresentations or lack of explanation to them by Reinlie. The original closing date was set for late October 1979. When Lambert was unable to sell his Hollywood motel, Reinlie arranged for extensions of the closing date, the first until early December, and the second until January 1980. The considerations for these two extensions were the second and third mortgages and notes. After these were prepared, without signatures, they were delivered to Lambert, who in turn returned each of the executed documents to Reinlie shortly before Reinlie recorded them. Reinlie was not present when said mortgages and notes were executed. Around Thanksgiving 1979, when it became evident that Lambert was having difficulty closing, Reinlie suggested that the contract, which was similar to an option, be sold. Although the contract would have had to be discounted, it would have reduced the potential loss. Reinlie attempted unsuccessfully to do this. Reinlie's suggestion of this course of action did not assure the sale of the contract. (See transcript, page 91.) By late January 1980, when Lambert could not close, Reinlie attempted to obtain an additional extension, which the sellers refused to grant. At that time, the contract for purchase was in default. In the spring of 1980, the sellers made demand upon Reinlie for their deposit money. Reinlie advised both Lambert and Mrs. Pitts of the sellers' demand and sought to obtain mortgage financing for Mrs. Pitts in lieu of initiating a foreclosure action. Mrs. Pitts did not elect to borrow the money. Lambert tendered $5,000 to Reinlie in order to settle the matter, which was rejected by the sellers. The sellers renewed their demand that Reinlie pay them their escrowed deposit. In a meeting with the sellers, Rein lie pointed out that if he foreclosed the mortgages there would be additional delay and legal costs. Because the notes had an interest rate of ten percent and were secured by the mortgages, Reinlie suggested that nothing be done during the life of Mrs. Pitts, but a claim be made against her estate. The sellers determined that this was a better approach than forcing Reinlie to foreclose on the mortgages. Thereafter, all of the parties determined that they desired to settle the matter. Reinlie advised the sellers that he would release the mortgages and notes to Mrs. Pitts if they, in turn, would release him from his obligation to pay them the escrowed money. This was finally done and the matter resolved on that basis.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that the Respondent, James Reinlie, Jr., did not violate Sections 475.25(1)(b), (d) or (j), Florida Statutes, it is recommended that the charges filed against him in the Administrative Complaint be dismissed. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 25th day of May, 1983, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of May, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: John G. DeLancett, Esquire James R. Mitchell, Esquire 801 North Magnolia Avenue, Suite 402 Post Office Box 6171-C Orlando, Florida 32853 Irving Gussow, Esquire Highway 17-92 Post Office Box 965 Fern Park, Florida 32730 Frederick Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harold Huff, Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 William M. Furlow, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 =================================================================

Florida Laws (3) 120.57475.25475.42
# 8
FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs LORI WALK AND STARS AND STRIPES REALTY, INC., 90-002468 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Hollywood, Florida Apr. 25, 1990 Number: 90-002468 Latest Update: May 08, 1991

The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondents are guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against them, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against them, if any.

Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent Lori Wilk has been a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0349551. The last license issued was as a broker in care of Stars and Stripes Realty, Inc. At all times material hereto, Respondent Stars and Stripes Realty, Inc., has been a corporation registered as a real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0253076. At all times material hereto, Respondent Wilk has been licensed and operating as a qualifying broker and officer of Respondent Stars and Stripes Realty, Inc. Gwendolyn Taylor-Herbert, as owner, had listed for sale certain real property with Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate, Inc./Gil Amara. Respondents obtained LPS Investments, Inc., as purchaser pursuant to a sales contract which was accepted by the seller on March 14, 1989. LPS Investments is owned by Leo and Patricia Scarola. Patricia Scarola was a former salesperson for Respondents. That Contract for Sale And Purchase of Real Property provided that a total of $500 as deposit monies was to be held in escrow by Stars and Stripes Realty. Respondent Wilk executed the portion of the Contract which acknowledged receipt of the first $100 of the deposit monies. Respondents' escrow account deposit slips reveal the first $100 was deposited into Respondents' escrow account. No proof of receipt of the additional $400 exists among the escrow account deposit slips admitted in evidence; however, Respondent Wilk's testimony is accepted that Respondents received in trust a total earnest money deposit in the sum of $500. Thereafter, LPS Investments, Inc., refused to close, alleging misrepresentation by the seller of the property. Although the property had been advertised as a "handyman special" and the Contract provided that the property was accepted in an "as is" condition, the Scarolas who never saw the property before they entered into the Contract to purchase it discovered that it would cost more to improve the property than they had guessed. They decided not to close. Rather, Pat Scarola instructed Respondents to transfer the $500 earnest money deposit to another piece of property not involving Gwendolyn Taylor- Herbert. Without the prior knowledge or consent of the seller or of the listing broker, Respondents transferred the Scarolas' earnest money deposit to another transaction for the benefit of the purchaser (LPS Investments, Inc.) and not involving the same seller. This was done without even considering whether the seller or the seller's agent might have an interest in the deposit. At no time prior to the time that the Respondents' transferred the deposit to a different property did the Respondents give the listing broker or the seller an opportunity or notice to make a demand upon the Respondents for the deposit. After the transfer, and after the contract failed to close, the seller and the seller's agent made a demand that the $500 deposit be accounted for and delivered. It was not. On June 1, 1989, Respondents obtained an offer from Herb Sider, as purchaser, for the property owned by Gwendolyn Taylor-Herbert. That offer was accepted by the seller. The Contract for Sale and Purchase of Real Property provided that a total deposit of $1,000 was to be held in escrow by Stars and Stripes Realty. Respondent Wilk executed that portion of the Contract acknowledging that the first $100 of the earnest money deposit had been received by Respondents. That representation was false. Sider never gave Respondents the earnest money deposit specified in the Contract, and Respondents failed to advise anyone that the representation in the Contract was false. Although Respondent Wilk testified that she would "normally" keep $100 of Sider's money in her escrow account to be applied to the various contracts that he entered into through her, there is no evidence that there was $100 in Respondents' escrow account at the time or that it was available to be applied to this Contract. Rather, Respondent Wilk's testimony is accepted that she never received either the initial $100 or the additional $900 deposit monies from Sider for this property. Herb Sider refused to close. The seller, Gwendolyn Taylor-Herbert, agreed to lower the sales price, and a modified contract was executed between Taylor-Herbert and Sider. Thereafter, Sider again refused to close. At no time did Respondents notify anyone that they did not have an earnest money deposit in escrow for the Taylor-Herbert/Sider transaction. Diane Quigley, branch manager of Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate, Inc., sent a letter dated July 11, 1989, to the Respondents transmitting release of deposit receipt forms and instructing Respondents to release the $500 earnest money deposit of LPS Investments, Inc., and the $1,000 earnest money deposit of Herb Sider to the seller Gwendolyn Taylor-Herbert. Respondents ignored that demand letter. By letter dated August 25, 1989, Quigley again wrote to Respondents demanding the release of the Sider and the LPS Investments, Inc., deposits to the seller. That letter referred to the July 11th letter which Respondents had ignored and the numerous phone calls placed by Quigley to Respondents which had not been returned. On September 13, 1989, Respondents for the first time notified Petitioner of possible conflicting demands. That letter misrepresented the facts of the situation and suggested that the seller and buyer might still be able to strike a deal. On October 3, 1989, Respondents again wrote to the Florida Real Estate Commission advising that "there is now a conflicting demand" on the deposits relative to the Gwendolyn Taylor-Herbert property. Respondents' letters reveal a lack of understanding of the basics of a real estate contract. Neither letter advised the Commission that Respondents did not have any of the monies in escrow at any rate. On December 27, 1988, Respondent Wilk made an offer to purchase real property from Bel-Properties, Inc., which offer provided that $100 earnest money deposit would be held in escrow by Stars and Stripes Realty, Inc., and an additional $2,050 earnest money deposit would be placed in the Stars and Stripes escrow account within 72 hours of acceptance. Respondent Wilk executed the portion of the Contract for Sale and Purchase of Real Property acknowledging that the initial $100 deposit had been received. That representation was false. The Contract which she prepared listed as the buyer "Lori Wilk, a lisenced [sic] real estate broker, and/or assigns." The offer was accepted by the seller on December 30, 1988. In connection with that offer, Respondent Wilk represented that she was the purchaser when, in fact, she was acting on behalf of the actual purchaser HBS Investments, Inc., a corporation owned, controlled, and operated by Herb Sider. Immediately upon the acceptance of Respondent Wilk's offer, she assigned the sales contract to HBS Investments, Inc. At no time did Respondent Wilk or HBS Investments, Inc., place the $2,150 earnest money deposit in the escrow account of Stars and Stripes Realty, Inc., as represented by Respondent Wilk to the seller and as required by the Contract. Further, at no time did Respondents advise the seller that they did not have an earnest money deposit in the Stars and Stripes escrow account. On November 28, 1988, Respondent "Wilk, a lisenced [sic] real estate broker, and/or assigns" made an offer to purchase real property from Darlene Farris. Farris accepted that offer on December 6, 1988. That Contract for Sale and Purchase of Real Property provided that an initial deposit of $100 had been placed in the escrow account of Stars and Stripes Realty and that an additional earnest money deposit of $1,900 would be placed in escrow within 72 hours of acceptance. Respondent Wilk executed the portion of the Contract acknowledging that she had received the initial $100 earnest money deposit. That representation was false. In fact, Respondent Wilk never placed any of the $2,000 earnest money deposit in her escrow account and never advised the seller or the seller's listing broker that no earnest money deposit had been made. On or about February 2, 1989, Respondents solicited and obtained Willy Pearson as a tenant for the Farris property. Respondents represented to Pearson that the lessor was HBS Investments, Inc. Respondent Wilk prepared a Memorandum to Enter Into a Lease acknowledging the receipt of $550 as a deposit from Pearson, although Respondent Wilk only received $250 from Pearson. When Respondent Wilk received half of the rental deposit, she gave Pearson both a receipt and immediate possession of the property. Respondents obtained the tenant without the prior knowledge and consent of Darlene Farris, owner of the property. Further Respondents did not notify Farris or Farris' broker that Respondents had rented Farris' property until sometime after Respondents had received the $250 deposit from Pearson and had given him possession of Farris' property. Neither Respondent Wilk nor HBS Investments, Inc., ever closed on the Farris property. Further, Respondent Wilk never obtained authority from Darlene Farris to obtain or place a tenant in Farris' property.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered finding Respondents guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against them and revoking the licenses of Respondents Lori Wilk and Stars and Stripes Realty, Inc. RECOMMENDED this 8th day of May, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of May, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-2468 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 2-21 and 23-28 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 1 has been rejected as not constituting a finding of fact but rather as constituting a conclusion of law. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 22 has been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues under consideration in this cause. Respondents' proposed findings of fact numbered 2-9, 19, and 23 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondents' proposed finding of fact numbered 1 has been rejected as not constituting a finding of fact but rather as constituting a conclusion of law. Respondents' proposed findings of fact numbered 10, 15, and 27 have been rejected as being contrary to the weight of the credible evidence in this cause. Respondents' proposed findings of fact numbered 11, 12, 14, 16-18, 20-22, 24, 25, 28, and 30 have been rejected as not been supported by the weight of the credible, competent evidence in this cause. Respondents' proposed findings of fact numbered 13, 26, and 29 have been rejected as being irrelevant to determination of the issues involved in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Legal Section - Suite N-308 Hurston Building - North Tower 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802-1900 Monte K. Rassner, Esquire Rassner, Malove, Rassner, Kramer & Gold Plaza 7000, Suite 500 7000 Southwest 62nd Avenue South Miami, FL 33143 Darlene F. Keller, Division Director Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street P.O. Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802-1900 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre, Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
# 9
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. MICHAEL WILLIAM KARPAN, LAVERNE PARISO, ET AL., 76-001363 (1976)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 76-001363 Latest Update: Apr. 18, 1977

Findings Of Fact Scorpio, Inc. was incorporated to do business in this State on September 18, 1973 and was registered as a corporate real estate broker on 4/8/74 with certificate to expire 3/31/75. Laverne Pariso was a registered real estate broker and Active Firm Member for Scorpio, Inc. from 4/8/74 to expiration date of license 3/31/75. Michael W. Karpan was a registered real estate salesman from 10/1/74 to 9/30/76 the expiration date of his registration and was employed by Scorpio, Inc. About the time Scorpio, Inc. was registered as a corporate broker the real estate market was not conducive to the success of housing developments and, since the registration of Scorpio, Inc. was obtained to facilitate sale of the developed property and no development was started, Scorpio, Inc. did no business of the type for which it was registered. No listings were obtained, no sales were made, and no effort was put forth to do either. An escrow account was opened with an initial $50 deposit but during the time the registration was effective no deposits were made to, or withdrawals from, this escrow account. Ardina E. Karpan, the mother of Michael W. Karpan, owns all of the stock of Scorpio, Inc. Laverne Pariso, the APM, left the employ of Scorpio, Inc. in March, 1975 but did not notify the FREC or take steps to place her registration in an inactive status. Applications were made for renewal of the broker's license of neither Pariso nor Scorpio, Inc. when due, 3/31/75. By Corporate Resolution dated February 1, 1974 Scorpio, Inc. authorized the establishment of an escrow account at the Barnett Bank of Miami. An initial deposit of $50 was made to this account on February 6, 1974. The resolution authorizes Laverne Pariso and Michael W. Karpan or Ardina Karpan to sign checks on this account and notes that two signatures are required. The resolution further provided authorized signers "are both Laverne Pariso and Michael William Karpan, Jr., both signature are required". Scorpio, Inc.'s primary business was the management of shareholder's investments and real estate holdings. In May, 1975 Michael Karpan was approached by a business associate, whose daughter was a creditor of Chandelier of the Virginia Playhouse d/b/a Track and Turf Lounge, to assist in the negotiations for the sale of the business in order to pay off the creditors and salvage his daughter's loan. The purchaser was already at hand and Karpan was selected to hold funds advanced pending the closing of the deal. After the principals had agreed on the basic price to be paid for the business an earnest money deposit of $5,000 was given by the buyer to Karpan on or about May 21, 1975 and the agreement was memorialized in a letter of May 21, 1975 from Karpan, on Scorpio, Inc. letterhead to the buyer, Walker (Exhibit 25). Nowhere on this letter is reference made to either Karpan or Scorpio, Inc. being associated with real estate sales. The $5,000 received from Walker was deposited in Scorpio, Inc's escrow account on deposit slip dated May 21, 1975 and the bank statement (Exhibit 10) shows $5,000 deposited in this account 5/30/75. No other agreement between the parties was reduced to writing and signed by the buyer and seller. At no time during the negotiations did Karpan hold himself out to be a real estate salesman or broker or indicate he expected a commission for his services if the sale was consummated. On May 29, 1975 Karpan borrowed $5,000 from the Barnett Bank and used the $5,000 in the escrow account as cash collateral for the loan. The signature of Pariso was not on any paper to authorize the withdrawal of this money from the escrow account. The loan was placed in the regular account of Scorpio, Inc. c/o Michael Karpan and one check dated 5/30/75 in the amount of $3,699 was drawn on the account payable to the Intercontinental Bank of Miami and used to make interest payment owed by the Chandelier of the Virginia Playhouse. $1,301 was delivered to the manager of Track and Turf Lounge by Karpan (Exhibit 4). Karpan contends that the buyer, Walker, authorized him to make whatever payments were necessary out of the $5,000 deposit to insure that the liquor license would not be lost or the Track and Turf Lounge be placed out of business before the deal was consummated. Following the delivery of the $5,000 to Karpan the buyer brought his attorney into the proceedings. The property on which the Track and Turf Lounge is located was owned by D. Mitchell Investments, Inc. The lease arrangements (or lack thereof depending on which witness is more credible) were such that the sale could not be consummated. By letter dated June 12, 1975 the buyer, through his attorney, demanded return of the $5,000 deposit given to Karpan. No evidence was presented as to the date the $1,301 was given to Roy O'Nan, the manager at Track and Turf. The letter evidencing such payment is dated well after the transaction had fallen through and demand for return of the $5,000 had been made. A suit was subsequently filed by Walker and a default judgment was obtained against Scorpio, Inc. after a Motion to Strike Defendant's, Scorpio, Answer because Scorpio, Inc. was delinquent in paying the annual $5.00 filing fee required of Florida corporations, was granted. At the time the transactions here being contested occurred the registration of Laverne Pariso and Scorpio, Inc. had expired. Since Karpan can only work under the supervision of a broker, his license too was not operative. Ms. Pariso renewed her license as a broker-salesman with another realty office in September, 1975 but no evidence was presented that Scorpio, Inc. ever applied for registration renewal. During the period between March and September, 1975 Ms. Pariso did no real estate work. Numerous discrepancies appeared between the testimony and documents. Although the authorization for withdrawing funds from the escrow account provided that the signature of Pariso and Michael Karpan or his mother was required the bank apparently interpreted that to require any two of the signatures and then authorized one first deposit placed in the escrow account after the initial deposit to be withdrawn with only Karpan's signature. Several witnesses alluded to Track and Turf leasing the premises which they occupied but evidence was presented that no lease payments were to be made until 1978. Certainly the inability of the "tenant" to transfer the "lease" was a major factor in the failure of the sale to transpire. The sale here involved was the sale of a business as contrasted to the sale of real property.

Florida Laws (2) 475.01475.25
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