Findings Of Fact Silver Sand is in the aggregate business. A major portion of this business involves the trucking of sand, rock, and shell. Diesel fuel, a special fuel, is used in these trucking operations. Approximately fifteen percent of the trucking takes place off of highways and roads. Fuel utilized for off-road operations is not subject to the Florida excise tax on special fuel. To facilitate its trucking operations, Silver Sand purchases diesel fuel in bulk, and uses it in its own trucks and sells it to lease operators who are under contract to Silver Sand. Silver Sand holds a Florida Department of Revenue license which entitles it to purchase diesel fuel in bulk without paying the excise tax. The assessment period involved in this case is April, 1973 through December, 1973. During that period the United States was in the middle of a fuel crisis, and motor fuels, including diesel fuel, was difficult to obtain. During the relevant period Jeremiah J. Kelly, Jr., was Silver Sand's lease operations manager. He was responsible for obtaining diesel fuel. In April, 1973, a Mr. Carruthers, representing Handy Haul-It, approached Kelly and told him that Handy Haul-It could provide Silver Sand with diesel fuel. Kelly had the authority to negotiate diesel fuel purchases on behalf of Silver Sand. Kelly did not know where Carruthers or Handy Haul-It could get diesel fuel, and he assumed that Handy Haul-It was a fuel distributor. Carruthers told Kelly that he would need to have a "Purchaser's Blanket Resale and Exemption Certificate" issued by Silver Sand in order to obtain the fuel. Carruthers presented Kelly with such a certificate. The certificate was addressed to Radiant Oil. Kelly went to his superior, Kenneth Surbaugh, and asked whether he should issue the certificate. Surbaugh authorized Kelly to sign the certificate. Kelly signed the certificate that day, and left it on his desk. When he returned the following day the certificate was gone. Kelly did not write the name "Silver Sand Company" on the certificate, and did not date it. The name "Silver Sand Company" and the date were placed on the certificate after Kelly signed it. The certificate came into Carruthers' possession. The evidence did not reveal whether the certificate was delivered to Carruthers by anyone at Silver Sand, but Kelly did intend to deliver the certificate to Carruthers. A copy of the certificate was received in evidence as Respondent's Exhibit 1. The name Silver Sand Company is inserted as the purchaser, and it is dated January 1, 1973. The document was predated. It was actually signed during April, 1973. NCJ is in the business of distributing motor fuels, including diesel fuel. Joseph Capitano is the President and Chief Executive Officer of NCJ. During April through December, 1973, NCJ had a relative abundance of diesel fuel. In April, 1973, Bill Simms, a friend of Capitano who is also in the fuel distribution business, told Capitano that he had a customer who desired to purchase substantial quantities of diesel fuel. This customer was Carruthers. Simms introduced Carruthers to Capitano. Capitano told Carruthers that he would need a Purchaser's Blanket Resale and Exemption Certificate in order to sell him diesel fuel. Capitano gave Carruthers a certificate to be executed which would fulfill this function. This is the certificate that was signed by Kelly, and received in evidence as Respondent's Exhibit 1. Carruthers ultimately returned the form to Capitano. The form is addressed to Radiant Oil, not to NCJ. NCJ and Radiant Oil are separate entities. NCJ and Radiant Oil are separately registered with the Department of Revenue as motor fuel dealers. The corporations are somewhat related. Joseph Capitano's father owns Radiant Oil. NCJ leases office space from Radiant Oil, and the two corporations share clerical help. The companies use common gas tanks. The companies also utilize many of the same business forms. NCJ had on occasion utilized Radiant Oil's "Purchaser's Blanket Resale and Exemption Certificate" form for its use. NCJ was a new company, and did not have its own forms. Respondent's Exhibit 3 is a compilation of such forms which were used by NCJ during the relevant period. Some of these were Radiant Oil's forms. In utilizing Radiant Oil's forms, the name Radiant Oil Company was marked off and NCJ Investment Company was inserted. That was not done on the form signed by Kelly on behalf of Silver Sand. After Carruthers delivered the exemption certificate to Capitano Handy Haul-It proceeded to purchase fuel from NCJ and resell it to Silver Sand. The fuel was generally picked up at NCJ's tanks by Handy Haul-It's truck. Occasionally Handy Haul-It hired trucks from another common carrier to pick up the fuel. Handy Haul-It paid for the fuel by check made out on the account of Handy Haul-It. NCJ invoices reflected, however, that the purchaser was Silver Sand. Copies of these invoices were not mailed to Silver Sand, and never came into the possession of Silver Sand. No one at Silver Sand was aware of the existence of NCJ. Handy Haul-It purchased 1,753,027 gallons of special fuel from NCJ in this manner. Handy Haul-It did not pay the special fuel tax on any of the purchases. While NCJ was selling tax free based upon the Purchaser's Blanket Resale Exemption Certificate (Respondent's Exhibit 1) it did not place Silver Sand's dealer or distributor license number on many of the invoices. NCJ never made any inquiry of anyone at Silver Sand as to Carruthers' or Handy Haul-It's authority to purchase fuel on Silver Sand's behalf. 882,264 gallons of the special fuel purchased by Handy Haul-It from NCJ was delivered to Silver Sand. This fuel was delivered either in Handy Haul-It's own truck, or in a truck hired by Handy Haul-It. Silver Sand paid Handy Haul-It directly by check when it received each of the deliveries. Handy Haul-It delivered invoices to Silver Sand. The invoices do not reflect a separate itemization showing that motor fuel taxes were paid. The price paid for the fuel would indicate that the price included the tax. Carruthers represented to officials at Silver Sand that the price included the tax, and that he would pay the taxes. In its monthly reports to the Department of Revenue, Silver Sand did not report the purchases because it believed that it was not required to report purchases upon which taxes had been paid. The evidence at the hearing was insufficient to establish the ultimate destination of the fuel which Handy Haul- It purchased from NCJ but did not sell to Silver Sand. Handy Haul-It did make sales to several other trucking companies, including Keystone Trucking Company, Montgomery Trucking, Montgomery Hauling, Keys of the Coast, Florida Bulk Transport, Dirt Haulers, Inc., and Mid Florida Hauling. Handy Haul-It had purchased some fuel from sources other than NCJ, and it cannot be gleaned from the evidence whether the fuel purchased from NCJ was ultimately delivered to these other companies. It is clear from the evidence that the remaining fuel was not delivered to Silver Sand, and that Silver Sand was not aware that Handy Haul-It had purchased such additional quantities from NCJ in Silver Sand's name. Handy Haul-It was not licensed as a distributor or dealer of motor fuels by the Florida Department of Revenue. By agreeing to purchase diesel fuel from Handy Haul-It, Silver Sand authorized Handy Haul-It to obtain diesel fuel on behalf of Silver Sand. Handy Haul-It was therefore Silver Sand's agent for the purpose of obtaining fuel for Silver Sand. When Kelly signed the Purchaser's Blanket Resale and Exemption Certificate, he authorized Handy Haul-It to use Silver Sand's special fuel dealer's license to obtain diesel fuel tax free from Radiant Oil Company of Tampa, the addressee on the certificate. Silver Sand thus clothed Handy Haul-It and Carruthers with the apparent authority to purchase diesel fuel tax free utilizing Silver Sand's special fuel dealer license number from Radiant Oil Company of Tampa. NCJ knew, or should have known, that in making sales to Carruthers and Handy Haul-It, it was not dealing directly with Silver Sand. Although the exemption certificate had the name Silver Sand on it, and NCJ chose to address its invoices to Silver Sand, all of the purchases were made by Handy Haul-It and Carruthers. There was no evidence that Carruthers ever represented to NCJ that he had authority to speak for Silver Sand. NCJ took no action to inform itself as to Carruthers' authority to act on Silver Sand's behalf, other than to obtain the exemption certificate. The exemption certificate, however, was not made out to NCJ. The only authority of Handy Haul-It to act on Silver Sand's behalf that NCJ was entitled to rely upon was the authority to purchase fuel from Radiant Oil Company of Tampa. The authorization is very specific in this regard, and although it may be that Silver" Sand would gladly have executed an exemption certificate addressed to NCJ, it did not do that. The fact that the certificate was back-dated, and was issued to the wrong entity, should have caused NCJ to take action to contact Silver Sand. If NCJ had done that, Handy Haul-It would never have been in a position to purchase fuel from NCJ and to deliver it to someone other than Silver Sand. Indeed, it is possible that Handy Haul-It would never have been placed in the position of buying fuel under Silver Sand's license number at all. Knowing that it was dealing with an agent, NCJ should have sent copies of the invoices to the principal, Silver Sand. If NCJ had done that, Silver Sand would have been on notice that Handy Haul-It was purchasing considerable fuel in its name, and delivering it elsewhere. Silver Sand did not give Handy Haul-It the authority to obtain fuel for any purpose except delivery to Silver Sand. When Handy Haul-It utilized the exemption certificate to purchase fuel for purposes other than delivery to Silver Sand, it exceeded the scope of its authority. NCJ did not obtain special fuel taxes from Handy Haul-It on the sales which NCJ made to Handy Haul-It. NCJ did report the sales to the Department of Revenue. Silver Sand believed that it was paying special fuel taxes to Handy Haul-It. The fact that the price which Silver Sand paid to Handy Haul-It included the tax was not, however, placed on the invoices. Handy Haul-It did not pay any special fuel taxes.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED: That the assessment for Special Fuel Tax in the amount of $154,644.50 imposed against Silver Sand Company of Leesburg, Inc., by the Department of Revenue be upheld. CERTIFICATION I certify that the foregoing is the Final Order of the Department of Revenue adopted by the Governor and Cabinet on the 19th day of April, 1977. Harry L. Coe, Jr., Executive Director State of Florida, Department of Revenue Room 102, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Dated this 20th day of April, 1977.
Findings Of Fact On February 27, 1980, Respondent converted one of its service station fuel tanks from gasoline to diesel. The tank was cleaned by Garrison Petroleum Equipment Company at Pinellas Park. Respondent paid $67.08 for this service. That same day, Respondent received 5,176 gallons of No. 2 diesel fuel from Jack Russell Oil Company, Inc., of Clearwater, a Union 76 dealer. On March 18, 1980, a standards inspector employed by Petitioner took samples from the Respondent's gasoline and diesel pumps. These samples were delivered to Petitioner's portable laboratory in Clearwater where they were analyzed. The gasoline was found to be satisfactory, but the diesel sample showed fuel contamination. The tests were conducted in accordance with the methods and standards established by Rule 5F-2.01(4)(b), Florida Administrative Code. Specifically, the "flash point" of the diesel sample was 88 degrees F, but must be 125 degrees F or above to meet the established standard. Petitioner's inspector then returned to the Pronto Car Wash station where he issued a stop-sale order to Respondent. Subsequently, the inspector accepted Respondent's cash bond in lieu of fuel confiscation. This procedure, agreed to by both parties, allowed Respondent to pay $865.36 to the State of Florida and retain the contaminated fuel. Respondent originally paid $5,286.25 for 5,176 gallons of diesel fuel. He had sold 736 gallons of this amount at the time of the stop-sale order on March 18, 1980. Total sales of this diesel fuel amounted to $865.36, which was the amount of bond demanded by Petitioner. Respondent paid $200 to Patriot Oil, Inc., to remove the contaminated fuel, but received a $3,225 credit for this fuel. Respondent does not deny that the fuel was contaminated, but seeks to establish that he acted in good faith. Respondent had the tank cleaned prior to the diesel changeover and dealt with established tank cleaning and fuel wholesaling companies. In addition, he kept the tank locked at all times after delivery of the fuel. Respondent does not contest forfeiture of his bond, but seeks refunds of state and federal taxes paid on the unsold fuel. However, Respondent was correctly informed that refund of tax payments will require him to communicate with agencies which are not parties to this proceeding.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter its order declaring forfeiture of Respondent's $865.36 bond posted in lieu of confiscation of contaminated diesel fuel. RECOMMENDED this 7th day of August, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephenson Anderson Pronto Car Wash 220 34th Street North St. Petersburg, Florida 33713 Robert A. Chastain, Esquire General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John Whitton, Chief Gasoline and Oil Section Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-8584
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent's proposed award of a portion of Bid No. 99-79 for retread tire services to Dave Howell Tires was arbitrary and capricious, as alleged by Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background Respondent, Escambia County Utilities Authority (Authority), is a local governmental body governed by Chapter 92- 248, Laws of Florida. The Authority manages and operates certain utility systems within Escambia County, Florida, and areas adjacent thereto. It is governed by a board consisting of five elected members. To assist it in carrying out its duties, the Authority has adopted the Escambia County Utilities Authority Code (Code), which contains various regulations, including Chapter 13, pertaining to Purchasing Procedures. Pertinent to this controversy are Sections 13-2(b)(1), 13-2(d), and 13-12, which authorize the Authority to accept or reject bids, to separate bids into more than one part, and to give preference to local vendors, respectively. By public advertisement made on September 16, 1999, the Authority solicited sealed proposals for Bid No. 99-79 for the supply of new truck tires and retread services for its sanitation truck fleet. The contracting period would run for two years. Such proposals were to be filed by interested vendors no later than 2:00 p.m., Thursday, September 30, 1999. The bid specification identified the new tires and retread services as separate items, meaning that each could be awarded to separate bidders, as authorized by Section 13-2(d) of the Code. The bid also provided that the Authority "reserved[d] the right to waive informalities in any bid; to reject any and all bids in whole or in part; and to accept the bid[s] that in its judgment is the lowest and most responsible." In response to that invitation, four vendors, including Petitioner, Eagle Tire & Service Center (Eagle), and Dave Howell Tires (Dave Howell), located in Milton and Pensacola, Florida, respectively, timely submitted sealed proposals. Eagle was found to have the lowest dollar bid for both items. On the retread portion of their responses, Eagle's bid was for $83,100.00, while Dave Howell's bid was for $83,934.36, or a difference of slightly more than $900.00. At issue in this case is the retread portion of the bid. In its proposal, Eagle offered to supply specially engineered Goodyear retreading from its facility in Atmore, Alabama, some 45 minutes north of Pensacola. On the other hand, Dave Howell, whose facility is located in Pensacola, offered to use Bandag rubber on its retreads, which is another widely- recognized retread brand. According to the Authority's director of sanitation, Jerry Moore (Moore), he saw no difference in the quality of the two products. Bid proposals are first reviewed by the department head who is directly affected by the solicitation; that individual makes a recommendation to the Finance Advisory Committee (Committee), which then presents its recommendation to the Authority. The Committee is made up of seven members, including two members of the Authority (Dale Perkins and George Watson) and five appointed citizens. In this case, the bids were opened and reviewed by Moore, the director of sanitation. On the afternoon of October 19, 1999, the Committee reviewed Moore's recommendation regarding the award of a contract. The Committee unanimously accepted Moore's recommendation that Petitioner, the lowest bidder, be awarded a two-year contract for both new and retread tire services. During the course of the Committee meeting, representatives of both Eagle and Dave Howell spoke to the Committee in support of their respective proposals. In addition, Dr. Larry N. Walker (Dr. Walker), a member of the Authority, appeared before the Committee to make comments favorable to Dave Howell. Among other things, Dr. Walker made the following statements: I come before you as something of a partisan today. I'm a friend of Dave Howell. I buy all my tires from his store. [B]ecause of conversations I've had with him and other input . . . this is one of those instances where we will actually come out ahead if we were to select the higher bid. I was not asked, t but it was] suggested by Mr. Howell that I call someone at the Escambia County School Board and ask them about their experience with Dave Howell Tires, his retreads, and I called Jerry Watson, one of the assistant superintendents, and Mr. Watson just was, was just very effusive in his compliments of the tires saying that their [tires were] far better than they had gotton before from the previous vendor. That they last much longer. They very seldom, that they don't start tearing up as quickly so that the, they say that when you have school bus tires starting to shred on the edges, the retread starts shredding and stuff, that, that you'll have parents calling, complaining, that, hey, the tires on my child's school bus look terrible. And said we don't, we just don't get those calls, and so in short he was very full of praise for the product produced by Dave Howell. It is a fact too that Dave Howell Tires is a local employer and contributes to our local economy and I think that's worth considering. I have had more than a few friends who submitted bids with ECUA contracts over the years and I've never stood up and made a speech like this before for any of them nor have I ever done it for Mr. Howell before. But in this particular instance when the dollar figures are this close, I think the points that, the points that I have raised have, have impressed me at any rate. [I]n short, this is a very close bid and I think there's some legitimate reasons for considering going with Mr. Howell's bid [which] is a better bid even though it's not the lowest. Despite the recommendation of Dr. Walker, the Committee rejected by a 5-2 vote a motion by Dale Perkins to award the retread portion of the contract to Dave Howell. When these comments were made, Dr. Walker was running for a term as County Commissioner. He had accepted a contribution of $300.00 from Dave Howell on August 1, 1999. In addition, Dave Howell made another $250.00 contribution on October 4, 1999. As required by law, all contributions were disclosed by Dr. Walker in his campaign treasurer's reports filed with the local Supervisor of Elections. The first contribution was disclosed by Dr. Walker in a quarterly report filed on October 13, 1999, or before the Committee meeting at which he spoke, while the second was disclosed in a later-filed quarterly report. During his appearance at the meeting, however, Dr. Walker did not disclose either contribution. On October 28, 1999, the Authority met to consider the award of a contract under Bid No. 99-79. At that meeting, Moore, speaking on behalf of the Committee, recommended that the contract for both items be awarded to Eagle. Dave Howell was also present at the meeting and was given an opportunity to make a brief presentation. He described his product (Bandag) as being "superior" to the other proposals, and pointed out that he did retreading for the Escambia County School Board (School Board). In addition, he mentioned the fact that he used a NDI (non-destruct imager) machine for scanning tire casings which would "save money" for the Authority. Finally, he pointed out that he was a local vendor who employed 39 persons, all of whom were residents of Escambia County. At the same meeting, Dr. Walker again spoke on behalf of Dave Howell saying that "Howell Tires has the . . . best bid"; that it would "better . . . to go with Dave Howell tires because I do believe that the tires, the retread tires are a better tire, that will give longer wear, have fewer failures and therefore that we will come out ahead . . . in the long run"; that "I do believe that this is the better contract and part of that comes from talking with Mr. Jerry Watson who . . . said the School Board is absolutely delighted with the retreads from Dave Howell Tires"; and that "Mr. Howell insists that [Eagle's machine] can't be as good as his [NDI machine]." At the Authority meeting, another member produced a letter dated October 26, 1999, drafted by School Board Deputy Superintendent Jerry Watson (Watson), which stated in part that Watson understood that Dave Howell's service to the School Board under an existing contract "has been excellent"; that the firm provided "dependable, quality service"; that Dave Howell "understands that safety is of utmost importance to [the School Board]"; and that he "would recommend the excellent service of Dave Howell Tires." As it turned out, the letter had been solicited from Watson by Dr. Walker at the suggestion of Dave Howell. The letter was read in full at the meeting at the urging of Dr. Walker. Thereafter, the Authority unanimously voted to split the contract and award the new tire business to Eagle and the retread portion of the contract to Dave Howell. A splitting of the contract was permissible under Section 13-2(d) of the Code. Eagle did not send a representative to the Authority meeting believing that after the unanimous vote by the Committee to award Eagle the contract, it had no reason to attend. Had a representative attended, however, he would have been given an opportunity to speak. Eagle later learned in a telephone call from Moore that the retread portion of the contract had been given to Dave Howell. This appeal ensued. In its timely-filed appeal, Eagle contends that the award of the retread part of the contract "was arbitrary, capricious, unlawful, contrary to the Authority's rules and regulations, contrary to the substantial weight of the evidence and applicable [Authority] bidding procedures, deprived [P]etitioner of his substantial rights, and was unconstitutional." More specifically, Petitioner contended that the contract was awarded to Dave Howell "based on improper, irrelevant, incompetent, and highly prejudicial procedures, statements, events, and the personal interest of one or more board members"; that the Authority "improperly applied a 'local preference' standard"; that a board member (Dr. Larry Walker) "improperly, unethically, and in direct violation of his oath of office and state law engaged in extensive ex parse communications, personal contacts, and financial transactions with and in behalf of Howell"; and that Dr. Walker did not disclose the fact that "Howell had paid a substantial sum of money to Walker for the latter's political campaign." More specific findings regarding these contentions are made below. Local vendor preference Section 13-12 of the Code prohibits favoritism for "local bidders" except in the narrowly defined circumstance where a "rapid response time" is needed in the case of a service contract. Bid No. 99-79 did not contain a local preference provision. While the Code does not define the term "local bidders," the evidence supports an inference that it applies to bidders who are located in Escambia County and the immediate area. During the discussions regarding Dave Howell at the Authority's meeting, Dr. Walker referred to Dave Howell as a local vendor, and another member, Dale Perkins, made reference to Dave Howell's local residency, the residency of his work force, and the taxes they presumably paid to Escambia County. A third member, Elvin McCorvey, also indicated that he was "inclined to agree . . . about doing business with the local vendor." In light of the foregoing comments, the Authority's General Counsel, Mr. Kievit, twice explained to the Authority members the local preference policy. Specifically, after two members expressed their desire to keep business "at home," Mr. Kievit cautioned the members against utilizing local vendor preference as a basis for awarding the contract in this instance. Testimony by Authority members at hearing confirms that this advice was accepted and that their decision was based on other criteria, including Dave Howell's "convincing" and uncontradicted presentation; his record of service with the School Board under an existing contract; the assertion that Bandag was a better product; the assertion that most private commercial waste haulers used Bandag tires; and an assertion that over time Dave Howell's NDI machine would save the Authority money. In short, it is fair to conclude that local preference played no role in the members' final votes on the matter. Finally, the member (Perkins) who had unsuccessfully moved that the Committee award the retread portion of the contract to Dave Howell, indicated at that time to the Committee members that his recommendation was not based on the local preference rule. While Petitioner asserts that Dave Howell received special preference as a "local vendor," the more persuasive evidence supports a finding that he did not. Conflict of Interest As noted in earlier findings, Dr. Walker made comments in support of Dave Howell at both the Committee and Authority meetings. This was after Dr. Walker had accepted two contributions totaling $550.00 from Dave Howell for his reelection bid. Except for filing his campaign treasurer's reports with the Supervisor of Elections, Dr. Walker had no other legal or ethical requirement regarding disclosure of contributions. In retrospect, however, Dr. Walker wishes he had done so to avoid any appearance of impropriety. Even so, merely because he had accepted a campaign contribution did not require that Dr. Walker abstain from voting on the contract or prevent him from advocating on behalf of a contributor/constituent. There is no evidence that Dr. Walker received any direct, personal, or financial gain as a result of his vote. Although members have rarely advocated the award of a contract to a particular vendor in prior years, there is no legal or ethical prohibition against a member doing so on behalf of a constituent. There is also no prohibition against a member investigating information about a bidder. In this case, before the contract was awarded, Dr. Walker made inquiry from both Dave Howell and the School Board regarding the quality of the Bandag product; he visited Dave Howell's facility; and he solicited a letter from a School Board representative regarding Dave Howell's service under an existing contract. While he made no similar inquiries regarding Eagle, and in fairness probably should have, Dr. Walker acknowledged that had Eagle contacted him, he would have been happy to meet with a representative of that firm to discuss its product. Finally, the evidence shows that Dr. Walker did not discuss the contract with, or personally solicit the vote of, any other member before the final vote was taken. Dr. Walker, who is the author of a treatise entitled The Florida Municipal Officials Manual, a publication widely used by elected and appointed municipal officials, municipal attorneys, and the Florida League of Cities, had no reason to disbelieve, or question the reliability of, the information he obtained from Dave Howell. Indeed, he simply relied on Dave Howell's representations in advocating on that vendor's behalf. Appearance by Dave Howell at the Authority Meeting As noted earlier, Dave Howell spoke at the Authority meeting on October 28, 1999. Eagle had no representative at that meeting. Eagle suggests that it was inappropriate for a vendor to appear at the meeting at which the contract was awarded; alternatively, Eagle suggests that the Authority should have given notice that vendors could appear and make presentations in support of their proposals. The evidence shows that while it is not a normal occurrence, several times a year a disappointed vendor will appear before the Authority and make a presentation. The Authority's policy is to allow any member of the public to speak, including disappointed bidders. Also, there is no requirement that the Authority inform all vendors that a disappointed bidder intends to make a presentation, or that the successful bidder should make an appearance on behalf of its proposal. Had an Eagle representative appeared at the meeting, he would have been allowed to give a presentation. The Authority violated no rule, Code provision, or statute by allowing Dave Howell to speak at the Authority meeting. Indeed, it is not unusual for a bidder to provide further information regarding its product to the Committee and Authority before a vote is taken, and such action by a bidder does not constitute a modification to its bid package. Was the Final Decision Arbitrary? In its proposed order, Eagle contends that there was no difference in quality between the retreads offered by either vendor. Thus, it argues that any assertion by the Authority members that their votes were based on Dave Howell providing a better quality product is simply a ruse for circumventing the local preference rule, and therefore its decision was not based on adequate facts. The record establishes that both products were of similar quality and reliability and met all specifications. Assertions by Dave Howell that his product was better, that his NDI machine was superior to his competitor's machine and would save the Authority money in the long run, and that virtually all private waste haulers used the Bandag product were not accurate. Indeed, the products were similar in quality, Eagle had a NOT scanning machine which was just as good as the NDI machine and would achieve the same savings, if any, and the amount of use of Bandag tires by other waste haulers was embellished. Moreover, School Board Deputy Superintendent Watson's assertion that Dave Howell provided a better product than did the predecessor contract holder is somewhat puzzling since the prior vendor also used the same Bandag retread. All of these representations were accepted by the Authority, primarily because they were unrebutted, and they formed the factual basis for awarding the contract to Dave Howell. Indeed, at hearing, each Authority member acknowledged that he had no independent knowledge of these matters and accepted without further question the representations made by Dave Howell and Walker. Because the Authority mistakenly relied on invalid assumptions, or representations which were either embellished or incorrect, as a basis for awarding the contract to someone other than the lowest bidder, its decision was not based on facts or logic and was therefore arbitrary.
Conclusions For Petitioner: John C. Barrett, Esquire 5 Calle Traviesa, Pensacola Beach Pensacola Beach, Florida 32561 For Respondent: Robert W. Kievit, Esquire Michael J. Stebbins, Esquire Kievit, Kelly & Odom 15 West Main Street Pensacola, Florida 32501
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made. On September 15, 1960, Earman Oil Company, Inc., was granted License Number 1748 (the "Special Fuels Dealer's License") authorizing it to operate as a User-Dealer of special fuels in the State of Florida. On the face of that License was the following notation: This license is NOT TRANSFERRABLE but will continue in full force and effect until cancelled or revoked as provided by law. The Special Fuels Dealer's License also contained a notation that provided as follows: This license must be returned to RAY F. GREEN, Comptroller, when a licensee terminates his operation as a User-Dealer. On April 1, 1967, Earman Oil Company, Inc., was issued State License Number 375 (the "Motor Fuels Distributor's License") by the Florida Revenue Commission, authorizing Earman to engage in the business of distributing motor fuels in the State of Florida. On the face of that License was the following notation: This license is not transferrable or assignable, and must be displayed conspicuously at all times at the Distributor's office or principle place of business. A Special Fuels Dealer's License and a Motor Fuels Distributor's License entitle a holder to purchase diesel fuel and gasoline for distribution without paying local option taxes pursuant to Chapter 336, Florida Statutes, motor fuel retail sales tax pursuant to Chapter 212, Part II, Florida Statutes and motor fuels tax pursuant to Chapter 206, Part I, Florida Statutes. A holder of such licenses is obligated to collect the taxes upon resale to customers and to remit those taxes to the state. If the resale is to another distributor who holds a valid license, the sale can be made tax free provided the seller follows the procedures set forth in the statutes and applicable DOR rules. In order to obtain either of the licenses during all times pertinent to this case, a company was required to have been in operation for at least one year and had to meet certain other requirements, including the posting of a bond. Sometime in 1983, Barkett, a licensed dealer of special and motor fuels in the state of Florida, purchased Florida Coast Oil Company, Inc. ("Florida Coast"), another licensed dealer of special and motor fuels in the State of Florida. The evidence did not establish the specific terms and details of that acquisition. The licenses held by Florida Coast which enabled it to purchase motor fuels on a tax exempt basis were not cancelled or revoked following Barkett's acquisition of the company. Barkett apparently acquired all of the stock of Florida Coast and Florida Coast continued in operation under that same name. Many, if not all, of the officers and directors of Barkett at this time also became officers and directors in Florida Coast. The evidence was conflicting and confusing as to the status of Earman Oil during 1980-1984. After review of all the evidence, it is concluded that Florida Coast acquired Earman Oil Company in 1980. The evidence did not establish the specific terms and details of that transaction. Apparently, this acquisition was also a stock purchase arrangement and Earman Oil Company initially remained in existence following its acquistion by Florida Coast. However, on August 31, 1981, Earman Oil Company was officially merged into Florida Coast. Harry Barkett, the president of Barkett and Florida Coast (after its acquisition by Barkett in 1983,) testified that the Department was advised of Florida Coast's acquisition of Earman Oil Company and Florida Coast was told by DOR that it could continue to use the licenses issued to Earman Oil Company in order to purchase motor fuels on a tax exempt basis. However, it does not appear that Mr. Barkett had any interest in Florida Coast at the time of the acquisition of Earman and no explanation was provided as to how he learned of DOR's alleged approval of the continued use of Earman's licenses. This contention is discussed in more detail in Findings of Fact 24 below. On September 10, 1984, Florida Coast sold certain assets to Alfred Vittorino. Vittorino had previously worked as a manager for Barkett. The sales agreement provided that the assets being sold included ll rights to operate as Earman Oil Company including but not limited to all rights to the stock, licenses, permits or trademarks that are titled to Earman Oil Company that are required to operate the business. The parties have stipulated that on September 12, 1984, a Certificate of Incorporation for a new Earman Oil Company, Inc., was filed with the Office of the Secretary of State for Florida and that Alfred Vittorino was the president and sole stock holder for that company. The licenses issued to the original Earman Oil Company could not legally be transferred or assigned to the new company. Moreover, the new company could not qualify for new licenses on its own since it had not been in operation for at least one year. There is no dispute that at the time Vittorino acquired the assets from Florida Coast and began operating under the name Earman Oil Company, the Special Fuel Dealer's License and the Motor Fuel Distributor's License previously issued in the name of Earman Oil Company were delivered to Vittorino by Florida Coast. Harry Barkett, who was the president of both Barkett and Florida Coast at the time of the sale to Vittorino, testified that Vittorino told him that he would take whatever steps were necessary to get the licenses reissued and/or obtain new licenses so that Earman could continue to purchase fuel on a tax exempt basis. Earman Oil Company never applied for new licenses after its acquisition by Vittorino. Instead, the company merely obtained and used the old licenses. Since the Special Fuel Dealer's License and the Motor Fuel Distributor's Licenses issued to the original Earman Oil Company has never been cancelled, "Earman Oil Company" was still registered with DOR as a distributor of motor fuel and a dealer of special fuels and it remained registered during the entire period in question, September 1984 to April 1985. Although Harry Barkett testified that he believes DOR was notified of Florida Coast's sale of Earman's assets to Vittorino, DOR has no record of the sale and/or the transfer of the licenses of Earman Oil Company to Vittorino. No persuasive evidence was presented to establish that DOR was fully advised as to the terms of the sale and the status of the companies at the time of the sale. The contention that DOR approved the transfer of the licenses to the new company established by Vittorino is rejected. After Vittorino purchased the above described assets from Florida Coast, Earman Oil Company began engaging in the business of selling motor fuel and special fuels to its customers. During the period from September 1984 through April 1985, Earman Oil Company purchased gasoline and diesel fuel from Barkett and other companies and sold that fuel to, among others, Miami Petroleum Oil Company, Inc., an unlicensed distributor of gasoline and diesel fuel. During that period, the invoices for the sales by Barkett to Earman Oil Company indicated that the sales were tax exempt and there is no indication that taxes were being collected from Earman. Barkett did not obtain an affidavit or "resale" certificate from Earman Oil Co. prior to selling tax exempt. However, Barkett filed tax returns with DOR indicating that the sales were tax exempt. Barkett contends that its typical procedure for selling tax exempt to a customer is to obtain the customer's license number and verbally confirm the validity of that number with the Department. Petitioner contends that it followed this procedure prior to selling tax exempt to Earman Oil Company and that the Department confirmed that the license numbers provided by Earman Oil Company were valid. While Petitioner contends that it contacted the Respondent in order to verify that Earman Oil Company was in possession of a valid license, there is no written evidence of any such communication. The applicable statutes and regulations require a distributor to obtain an affidavit or a "resale certificate" in order to sell fuel tax exempt. There is no provision in the rules or the statutes for verbal confirmation of licensure status. From September 1984 through April 1985, Earman Oil collected motor fuel taxes under Chapters 206 and 212, Florida Statutes, from its customers, but never remitted those taxes to the state. There is no evidence that any of the taxes collected by Earman Oil were transferred to Barkett. Earman Oil Company filed tax returns with DOR indicating that it had not collected any taxes. Criminal charges were subsequently brought against Vittorino for failure to remit collected motor fuel taxes for the period September 1984 through April 1985. Vittorino was found guilty by a jury of failure to remit collected motor fuel taxes and was initially sentenced to nine years in prison, which was subsequently reduced to six years on appeal. As of the date of the hearing in this administrative proceeding, the state has not collected any of the outstanding taxes from Vittorino or Earman Oil. Petitioner contends that during the trial of Vittorino, the State of Florida maintained that Earman Oil Company held valid licenses as a distributor of motor fuel and as a dealer of special fuels during the period September 1984 through May 1985. The transcript of that criminal proceeding confirms that this was one theory advanced by the prosecution during that case. However, there was considerable confusion during that trial as to the licensure status of Earman. Ultimately, Vittorino was convicted of failure to remit collected motor fuel taxes. It was not an essential element of this offense for Earman to be a valid license holder. DOR conducted an audit of Barkett (Audit Number 86-17412886) for the period September 1984 through April 1985. The Department's audit indicated that Barkett sold 9,548,414 gallons of motor fuel on a tax free basis to Earman Oil Company during the period from September 1, 1984 through April 30, 1985. During the audit, the auditor requested Barkett to provide resale certificates or affidavits from Earman Oil Company to substantiate the basis for the tax exempt sales. Barkett was unable to produce any such resale certificates or affidavits. As a result, DOR concluded that Barkett was responsible for collecting and remitting to the state taxes on all the sales made during this period by Barkett to Earman. Barkett contested the results of the audit and the Department's Notice of Decision issued on August 4, 1988. Barkett timely petitioned for reconsideration of that decision on September 2, 1988. The Department issued its Notice of Reconsideration on January 19, 1989. In its Notice of Reconsideration, the Department determined that the balance due for the Local Option Tax pursuant to Chapter 336, Florida Statutes, was $540,173.68, which consisted of $381,936.56 tax, $95,484.14 penalty and $62,752.98 interest (with interest accruing at the rate of $125.50 per day from June 6, 1986, until date of payment.) The Department also determined that the balance due for motor fuel retail sales tax pursuant to Chapter 212, Part II, Florida Statutes, was $769,747.50, which consisted of $544,259.60 tax, $136,064.90 penalty and $89,423.00 interest (with interest accruing at the rate of $178.93 per day from June 6, 1988 until date of payment.) Finally, the Department determined that the balance due for motor fuels tax pursuant to Chapter 206, Part I, Florida Statutes, was $540,173.68, which consisted of $381,936.56 tax, $95,484.14 penalty, and $62,752.98 interest (with interest accruing at the rate of $125.57 per day from June 6, 1986 until date of payment.) 1/ As part of its reconsideration, the Department deleted the fraud penalties that had previously been assessed against Barkett. Barkett timely filed a challenge to the Department's conclusions in the Notice of Reconsideration. 2/ During the late 70's and early 1980's, Barkett Oil acquired a number of different oil companies (including Florida Coast, which had previously acquired Earman). Several of the companies that were acquired by Barkett held licenses from the Department that enabled them to purchase motor fuels on a tax exempt basis for resale. Barkett contends that it notified the Department of each of those acquisitions and was never instructed that it had to reapply for a license to purchase tax exempt. Barkett suggests that these prior experiences justified its conclusion that Earman Oil Company could continue to purchase tax exempt following the sale and transfer of licenses to Vittorino. However, the circumstances and terms of the prior acquisitions by Barkett were not established in this case. It is not clear whether those transactions were stock purchase agreements or simply the acquisition of assets. Furthermore, the evidence regarding the notification supposedly given to the Department was vague and unconvincing. Although Petitioner contends that it notified the Department that Earman Oil Company had been sold to Vittorino, there is no written evidence of any such communication. It is not clear who at the Department was notified of the sale nor is it clear what information was provided regarding the sale. In sum, Petitioner's contention that Respondent should be estopped from claiming that Earman Oil Company did not hold a valid Distributor's License and/or Special Fuel License is rejected. There was insufficient persuasive evidence to establish that an authorized representative of the Department who was provided with full disclosure of the facts surrounding the transfer to Vittorino advised Petitioner that it could sell tax exempt to Earman Oil Company.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered upholding the assessments set forth in the Notice of Reconsideration. RECOMMENDED this 10th day of February, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of February, 1992.
The Issue Whether or not Sohio, a subsidiary of BP Oil Company, Inc., is liable for the payment of certain local option gas taxes to the Department of Revenue under the facts of this case.
Findings Of Fact This cause was initiated by the Petition for Formal Hearing filed with the Department of Revenue on or about February 2, 1989. This petition was in response to the Department's assessment of February 29, 1988. During the period from January 1, 1986 to December 31, 1987, Petitioner Sohio made sales of gasoline to various customers including 290,698 gallons of gasoline to Enos Ying (Ying), and 634,555 gallons of gasoline to Basil Roberts (Roberts). Petitioner's sales to Ying and to Roberts occurred at their respective places of business in Broward County, Florida, which imposed a six cent per gallon local option gas tax, pursuant to Chapter 336, F.S. during 1986 and 1987. At all times material, Petitioner was licensed in the State of Florida as a "refiner". Petitioner collected motor fuel tax under Chapter 206, F.S., but did not collect or remit local option gasoline tax under Chapter 336, F.S., with regard to its sale of gasoline to Ying and to Roberts. Petitioner did not obtain resale certificates or affidavits from Ying or Roberts covering its sales to them. On November 1, 1985, the Department of Revenue published an "Important Notice to all Retail Gasoline Dealers" which stated that: Effective January 1, 1986, Sections 336.021 and 336.025, Florida Statutes, requires (sic) the Retail Gasoline Dealer to collect and remit the local option gas tax and the voted gas tax on the sale of motor or special fuel at the retail level within a county which imposes one of the above taxes. On January 17, 1986, the Department of Revenue issued an "Important Notice to Motor Fuel Wholesalers, Importers or Distributors Concerning 1986 Licenses" and a list of retail service stations licensed for 1986 as of January 10, 1986, which notice stated: Those accounts that are unlicensed in 1986 will be receiving notification concerning their account and should secure their licenses immediately in order to prevent further complications, On the reverse side of the aforesaid notice, it was stated, Those accounts that are licensed in 1986 are responsible for remitting the local option gas taxes under Chapter 336, Florida Statutes. If you sell to an unlicensed retail dealer, the wholesaler, importer or refiner is responsible for collecting and remitting the local option taxes due under Chapter 336, Florida Statutes. Evidence should be obtained from the retail dealers as to his (sic) current status with the Department prior to selling to the account on a tax-free (Chapter 336, F.S.) basis. No rules or regulations of the Respondent Department under Chapter 336, F.S. or which make specific reference to Chapter 336, F.S. were promulgated by the Department during the period in question. On February 29, 1988, the Respondent issued a notice of delinquent local option gas tax, penalty and interest due and assessed against Petitioner in the amount of $1,302,545.13 (tax of $956,420.65, penalty of $229,806.11 and interest of $116,318.37) regarding sales made by the Petitioner to its customers including Ying and Roberts. A schedule describing the items forming the basis of the assessment was enclosed therewith, which schedule described the transaction subject to the assessment as being sales made to unlicensed retail dealers. The Respondent has never pursued collection of the tax, penalty and interest at issue from either Ying or Roberts. Petitioner did not know or have reason to know whether or not Ying or Roberts had paid the tax in question. On March 17, 1988, Petitioner filed a protest with the office of the General Counsel of the Florida Department of Revenue objecting to the entire assessment on the grounds Petitioner was not liable for the local option tax in regard to the subject transactions and in the alternative, that the retail dealers involved were either listed by the Department of Revenue as being licensed or had filed returns and previously paid their tax. By letter dated April 5, 1988, Petitioner was informed by Christine F. McCann, Special Programs Analyst, Bureau of Enforcement of the Florida Department Revenue, that the above referenced assessment had been revised downward to reflect the liability of $253,260.11 (tax of $182,813.42, penalty of $45,370.91, and interest of $25,075.78) on the grounds that the Petitioner had identified certain dealers as being licensed by the Department, who were part of a transaction for which the Respondent sought to tax Petitioner. As a result of an informal conference held on May 27, 1988, a Notice of Reconsideration was issued on December 7, 1988 which further reduced the assessment against Petitioner to a total of $80,463.39 (tax of $57,769.38, interest of $8,251.61 and penalty of $14,442.40) on the grounds that the Petitioner either identified additional dealers as being licensed by the Department or demonstrated that the retail dealers though not licensed by the Department, had paid the tax in question in regard to the subject transactions. The assessment as revised by the Department's Notice of Reconsideration continues to be in error in that it yet includes certain retail dealers although not licensed and other than Ying and Roberts, who have already paid the tax in question and therefore the assessment should be revised downward further. After the above-referenced adjustment, there remains and is now in controversy in this case the following amounts: SALES TO YING SALES TO ROBERTS Tax $17,436.48 Tax $38,073.30 Penalty 4,359.13 Penalty 9,518.37 Interest to Interest to 4/20/89 4,073.15 4/20/89 9,679.30 TOTAL $25,868.76 $57,270.97 GRAND TOTAL $83,139.73 as of 4/20/89. Should the Respondent prevail in this matter, interest will continue to accrue until the tax is paid. During the course of the informal protest procedures before the Department of Revenue, Petitioner established that all the sales which were the subject of the original notice, except those to Ying and to Roberts, were either to licensed gasoline retailers or to unlicensed gasoline retailers who had collected and remitted the local option tax due. Upon the testimony of Charles (Chuck) M. Reed Jr., Retail Marketer, who has been a dealer lease and supply agent for Ying and for Roberts from Gulf BP, parent corporation of Petitioner Sohio, it is found that Sohio's customary sales both to Ying and to Roberts were made exclusively by filling underground gasoline tanks at the respective establishments of Ying and of Roberts on delivery by the truckload of no less than 7,100 gallons and no more than 8,402 gallons at a time. Also upon the basis of his testimony and the photographs he took which were admitted in evidence, it is found that Ying and Roberts made retail sales to the general motoring public. More specifically, signs posting product affiliation and prices [see Section 206.01 (7) F.S.] which were observed by Mr. Reed identified each of these establishments as retail outlets. The sales agreements between Petitioner and Ying and between Petitioner and Roberts are also clearly in support of this finding. It is also proper to infer from Mr. Reed's testimony that he watched a majority of the gasoline gallons sold to Roberts and to Ying pumped into their respective underground tanks and then observed them pumping gasoline out of those tanks into motorists' cars via the traditional hose arrangements found in commercial gasoline stations, that it was the same Sohio gasoline which was pumped and sold by Ying and Roberts at retail. It was not necessary for Mr. Reed to physically observe the gasoline coursing through the hoses or account specifically day by day from delivery in bulk by Sohio to dispensation one car gasoline tank at a time by Ying and by Roberts in light of the exclusivity clauses of their contracts with Sohio. Therefore, Sohio established that the gasoline it sold to Ying and to Roberts was resold by Ying and by Roberts to the general motoring public. Ying and Roberts therefore fall in the category of being gasoline retailers unlicensed by the Department of Revenue, of whom it is undetermined whether they submitted their county local option gas tax due and from whom Petitioner Sohio, licensed as a refiner, did not obtain resale certificates or affidavits covering Sohio's sales to them. Petitioner did not establish that Ying and Roberts had collected and remitted the local option gasoline tax in controversy. There is no statute or rule which precludes Petitioner selling to an unlicensed dealer. Respondent Department of Revenue requested that Petitioner Sohio provide information which would indicate whether Ying and Roberts had collected and remitted the local option gasoline tax. Since all of the revisions and reductions of the original assessment against Petitioner as set out above were done by the Respondent based on information supplied by the Petitioner, the Respondent anticipated that Petitioner also would be able to provide information on Ying and Roberts. Respondent could have searched its records to find out if Ying and Roberts had paid their tax, and then gone directly to Ying and Roberts to find out why they did not pay the tax, if that were the case. However, due to the agency's search system which is geared to retailer license numbers, Department of Revenue employees asserted that such a search is probably impossible and certainly is impractical. All retail gasoline dealers are required to be licensed in order to sell gasoline. Accordingly, income tax forms are mailed by the agency only to those retail dealers who have obtained a license, despite the assertion in the agency's Notice described in Finding of Fact 8 that unlicensed retailers who had paid their tax without such a number/license were traceable. The problem appears to be that Petitioner sold to persons (unlicensed retailers Ying and Roberts) who had no vehicles (respective retail license numbers) by which to submit the local option gas tax. Instead of pursuing Ying and Roberts for payment of the county local option gas tax, the agency chose to come back against Petitioner for either the certificates or affidavits specifically required with regard to collection and remittance of the state motor fuel tax under Section 206.425 F.S., or for other proof of Roberts' and Ying's compliance concerning the county local option gas tax. According to Mr. Zych, Administrator of the Disposition Section of the Office of the General Counsel and superior to Ms. McCann, the agency would have accepted properly executed retail certificates if Petitioner had gotten them. Without such proof forthcoming from Petitioner, the agency held Petitioner liable for the local option gas tax imposed by the statute upon the retailer. So far as Ms. McCann, Respondent's Special Program Analyst, was concerned, this election to proceed against Sohio was completely in the discretion of her superior. There is no rule that requires Petitioner to get an exemption certificate or affidavit before they sell to a retail dealer.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order rescinding its Notice of Assessment against Petitioner with regard to its sales to Ying and Roberts and letting Petitioner go hence without ay. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of June, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of June, 1989. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-0638 The following constitutes specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, upon the parties respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Petitioner' s PFOF: All of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are accepted, but those not adopted have not been adopted because they are unnecessary, subordinate to the facts as found or mere legal argument. Respondent ` s PFOF: 1.-6. Accepted. 7. Accepted as modified to conform to the record and the natural inferences of the evidence of record. 8.-11. Accepted but not necessarily adopted as subordinate and unnecessary to the facts as found. 12. Accepted. 13.-15. Accepted but not necessarily adopted as subordinate and unnecessary to the facts as found. Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the competent substantial evidence and the natural logical inferences there from. Accepted but not adopted because not dispositive of any material issue of fact in dispute in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark A. Taylor, Esquire Excise Tax Analyst Ira L Smith, Esquire Director, Ad Volorem Tax Division BP America, Inc. 200 Public Square 38-3600-L Cleveland, Ohio 44114-2375 Lealand McCharen Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Tax Section, The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050 William D. Townsend General Counsel Department of Revenue 203 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Katie D. Tucker Executive Director 102 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100
The Issue Was the amendment to Section 12B-5.01, Florida Administrative Code adopted on November 8, 1978, adopted in violation of the procedural requirements of Section 120.54, Florida Statutes? Is the amendment to Section 12B-5.01, Florida Administrative Code an invalid exercise of the Department's delegated legislative authority?
Findings Of Fact Miami Tiresoles, Inc. sells both new and retreaded tires for cars and trucks. The company also sells gasoline and diesel fuel. It is licensed by the Department as a dealer in special fuels. As far as this case is concerned special fuel is number 2 diesel oil. Unless an exemption is met each gallon of special fuel sold by MTS is taxed by the Department at a rate of 8 cents per gallon. The Department has given MTS a revised notice of proposed assessment of tax for the sale of special fuel in the amount of $4,551.88 plus a penalty of $455.48 and interest in the amount of $735.11 (through April 21, 1980). The tax figure on the assessment appears to reflect a typographical error. The Department's records (Exhibit A) indicate that for the period in question 2/ MTS sold 56,936 gallons of special fuel subject to tax according to the Department's interpretation of the law. If a tax at a rate of 8 cents per gallon is due, then the amount due should be $4,554.88 and not $4,551.88. The correct tax figure is reflected on the Department's work sheets but was probably misread when the figure was transferred to the revised Notice of Assessment issued on April 21, 1980. The foregoing assessment is based on MTS' invoices which reflect sales of special fuel to customers in amounts of more than 110 gallons at one time. Those sales were made to MTS customers who have filed with MTS a document called "Purchaser's Exemption Certificate". A typical example of such a certificate states: PURCHASER'S EXEMPTION CERTIFICATE The undersigned hereby certifies that the motor duel (sic) and/or special fuel pur- chased on 1-19-79 is for the following purpose as checked in the space provided. (X) Purchased for home, industrial, com- mercial, agricultural or marine purposes for consumption other than for the propul- sion of a motor vehicle. ( ) Purchased at bulk plant or terminal in volumes of not more than 110 gallons for delivery into a receptacle not connected to the fuel supply system of a motor vehicle for consumption other than for the pro- pulsion of a motor vehicle. Purchaser is aware that if this exemption if (sic) falsely claimed, or if this certi- ficate is not rescinded at the time he fails to quality (sic) for the exemption, he shall be liable for the taxes imposed under Chapter 206, F.S. Furthermore, by issuing this certificate the purchaser also certifies that he does not have any motor vehicles which use special fuel for propulsion. This certificate is to continue in force until revoked by written notice to MIAMI TIRESOLES, INC. Purchaser: Trade Name: A ACME SANDBLASTING, INC. Street Address: 9521 W. Oakmont Dr., Hialeah, Fla. 33015 BY: /s/ The industrial customers of MTS (that is those who have filed an exemption certificate) are engaged in the construction business. They use the diesel fuel to operate bulldozers, front-end loaders, back hoes, sandblasters and similar equipment. None of the fuel is used for the operation of motor vehicles on the public highways of Florida. All the fuel in question is sold on the premises of MTS. At the time of sale it is placed either in the fuel tank of a particular piece of equipment such as a back hoe, or it is placed in a fuel storage tank mounted on the back of a truck. The storage tanks are not connected so they can provide fuel for the propulsion of the truck. They are used to transport fuel to the purchaser's particular job site. The storage tanks have a capacity of between 100 to 300 gallons. MTS does not have delivery trucks of its own and has no facilities for taking fuel to its customers job sites. A single invoice of MTS which indicates a sale of 110 gallons of special fuel to an individual customer is frequently the result of a sale where multiple fuel tanks are filled at one time. For instance, the customer may have a back hoe sitting on the rear of a flat-bed truck. He will fill the fuel tank in his back hoe and then perhaps fill an additional 55 gallon drum or two which would be on the truck. This would occur all in one transaction. The reason why the Department seeks to tax special fuel sold by MTS to its industrial customers in an amount exceeding 110 gallons is because the fuel was placed in the customers' own fuel tanks on the premises of MTS and not on the premises of the customer or at the customer's job site. The amendment to Section 12B-5.01, Florida Administrative Code challenged by Petitioner here was adopted by the Governor and Cabinet, sitting as the head of the Department of Revenue, on November 8, 1978. No hearing was held on the amendment's adoption because no person requested one. Notice of the Department's intent to adopt the rule was given in the October 13, 1978 issue of the Florida Administrative Weekly. At the time the notice was published a copy of the amendment was available for inspection and copying by the public. The notice published in the Florida Administrative Weekly stated: DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, DIVISION OF MISCELLANEOUS TAX, MOTOR FUEL TAX Rule 12B-5.01 TITLE: Specific Exemption PURPOSE AND EFFECT: To amend the rule which implements Subsection 206.87(4)(a) & (b), F.S. to clarify interpretation of the law. SUMMARY: Provides specifically the requirements necessary in order for the licensed dealer of special fuel to make an exempt sale for home, industrial, commercial, agricultural, or marine purposes and exempt sales of not more than 110 gallons at his place of business, and by cross reference, the records needed to be maintained by the licensed dealer to substantiate the sale. SPECIFIC LEGAL AUTHORITY UNDER WHICH THE ADOPTION IS AUTHORIZED AND THE LAW BEING IMPLEMENTED, INTERPRETED OR MADE SPECIFIC: SPECIFIC AUTHORITY: 206.14(1), 206.59, FS. LAW IMPLEMENTED: 206.87(4)(a)(b), FS. ESTIMATE OF ECONOMIC IMPACT ON ALL AFFECTED PERSONS: There will be no significant economic impact. IF REQUESTED, A HEARING WILL BE HELD AT: TIME: 10:00 A.M. PLACE: The New Capitol, Lower Level 3 DATE: November 9, 1978 A COPY OF THE PROPOSED RULE AND THE ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT MAY BE OBTAINED BY WRITING TO: L. N. Thomas, Chief, Motor Fuel Tax Bureau, Department of Revenue, Carlton Building, Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Individual notices of the proposed rule making were not sent to licensed special fuel dealers in Florida. On October 10, 1978, the Department sent the following items to the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee: A copy of the proposed amendment to Rule l2B-5.01. The notice to appear in the Florida Administrative Weekly. The Economic Impact Statement. The "Summary and Justification Sheet" (apparently the Department's term for the facts and circumstances justifying the proposed rules). The following shows how the Department's amendment adopted on November 8, 1978, changed Section 12B-5.01, Florida Administrative Code. Words stricken were deleted; words underlined were added. 12B-5.01 Specific Exemptions. (1) - (2) - No change. HOMES, INDUSTRIAL. COMMERCIAL, AGRICULTURAL OR MARINE. Any sale of special fuel by a licensed dealer, regardless of quantity, when such fuel is to be consumed exclusively for home, industrial, commercial, agricultural, or marine purposes, is exempt from tax, provided the sale is made by a licensed dealer who delivers the fuel into the customer's storage facility, which must be located on the customer's premises, place of business, or job site. (Cross Reference - Rule 12B-5.03(1). (7)(b) - (6) - No change. (7) SALES OF 110 GALLONS OR LESS. A licensed dealer may deliver, at his place of business, tax free, not more than 110 gallons of special fuel to a person who is not a licensed dealer of special fuel, provided the fuel is placed into a receptacle which is furnished by the purchaser and which is not connected to the fuel supply system of a motor vehicle. (Cross Reference - Rule 12B-5.03(1), (7)(b) Any licensed dealer of special fuel who, at his place of business, delivers more than 110 gallons of special fuel to a person who is not a licensed dealer of special fuel, shall be liable for and shall pay to the state taxes, penalties and interest on the total quantity sold even though the fuel may not be ultimately used to propel a motor vehicle on the highway.
The Issue The issue presented for decision herein is whether or not Petitioner's Antiknock (octane) Index number of its petroleum product was below the Index number displayed on its dispensing pumps.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received, and the entire record compile herein, I make the following relevant factual finding. Rafael Ruiz is the owner/operator of Coral Way Mobil, an automobile gasoline station, situated at 3201 Coral Way in Coral Gables, Florida. Ruiz has operated that station in excess of ten (10) years. On or about May 13, 1987, Respondent, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, received a customer complaint alleging that the fuel obtained from Petitioner's station made her automobile engine ping. Respondent dispatched one of its petroleum inspectors to Petitioner's station at 3201 Coral Way on May 14, and obtained a sample of Respondent's unleaded gasoline. Inspector Bill Munoz obtained the sample and an analysis of the sample revealed that the produce had an octane rating of 86.9 octane, whereas the octane rating posted on the dispenser indicated that the octane rating of the product was 89 octane. On that date, May 14, 1987, Respondent issued a "stop sale notice" for all of the unleaded product which was determined to be 213 gallons. Petitioner was advised by Inspector Munoz that the unleaded produce should be held until he received further instructions from the Respondent respecting any proposed penalty. On May 15, 1987, Petitioner was advised by John Whittier, Chief, Bureau of Petroleum Inspection, Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, that the Antiknock Index number of the sampled product was 2.1 percent below the octane rating displayed on the dispenser and that an administrative fine would be levied in the amount of $200 based on the number of gallons multiplied times by the price at which the product was being sold, i.e., 213 gallons times 93.9 cents per gallon. Petitioner did not dispute Respondent's analysis of the product sample, but instead reported that he had been advised that three of the five tanks at his station were leaking and that this is the first incident that he was aware of wherein the product tested below the octane rating displayed on the dispenser.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, enter a Final Order imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $200 payable by Petitioner to Respondent within thirty (30) days after entry of the Respondent's Final Order entered herein. RECOMMENDED this 7th day of October, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of October, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Rafael E. Ruiz c/o Coral Way Mobil 3201 Coral Way Miami, Florida 33145 Clinton H. Coulter, Jr., Esquire Senior Attorney Office of General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Room 514, Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Honorable Doyle Conner Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Robert Chastain, Esquire General Counsel Department of Agriculture, and Consumer Services Room 513, Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 2399-0800
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to a refund of motor fuel taxes paid for motor fuel exported from Florida when Petitioner was not licensed as an exporter at the time of the transactions.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida corporation engaged in the business of purchasing and reselling motor fuel. Petitioner, whose principle place of business is 1201 Oakfield Drive, Brandon, Florida 33509, does business within and without the State of Florida. Petitioner currently has a Florida Fuel Tax License, which is number 59-2150510. On April 5, 2004, and May 7, 12, and 13, 2004, upon Petitioner's orders, Kenan Transport loaded diesel fuel at the Marathon facility in Jacksonville, Florida, and delivered the fuel to Petitioner's Kingsland, Georgia, location. Daniel Way, the driver employed by Kenan Transport, delivered the April 5, 2004; May 7, 2004; May 12, 2004; and May 13, 2004, fuel loads to Petitioner's Kingsland, Georgia, location. 6. For the April 5, 2004; May 7, 2004; May 12, 2004; and May 13, 2004, fuel deliveries to Petitioner's Kingsland, Georgia, facility, Petitioner paid a total of $8,775.16 in Florida fuel taxes. The amount of Florida fuel taxes paid for each delivery was as follows: $2,192.99, for the April 5, 2004, delivery; $2,187.77, for the May 7, 2004, delivery; $2,187.20, for the May 12, 2004, delivery; and $2,187.20, for the May 13, 2004, delivery. At the time the four fuel deliveries noted in paragraphs 4 and 5 above were made to Petitioner's Kingsland, Georgia, facility, Petitioner did not have an exporter fuel license. Petitioner obtained an exporter fuel license that became effective December 1, 2004. The parties stipulated to the findings in paragraphs 1 through 9. Petitioner asserts that the Department should refund the fuel taxes it paid because, in the four transactions, Petitioner's account was mistakenly billed for the fuel. Gowan Oil Company (Gowan) is a distributor based in Folkston, Georgia, and has contracts with many fuel terminals in Jacksonville. Pursuant to an arrangement between Petitioner and Gowan, Petitioner did not usually buy fuel from any of the terminals in Jacksonville. Instead, Petitioner bought fuel for its truck stop in Georgia from Gowan, since Gowan could buy fuel at the Jacksonville terminals for less than Petitioner could. Depending on the price of fuel on a particular day, Petitioner would call Kenan Transport and tell the company to pick up fuel from a particular terminal in Jacksonville. The instructions relative to the above transactions were for the driver to pick up BP fuel and to put it on Gowan's account. Notwithstanding the specific instructions given to the driver, he made two mistakes with respect to the four fuel purchases. He not only mistakenly picked up the wrong fuel, Marathon fuel, but he also put the fuel he picked up on Petitioner's account, not on Gowan's account. The mistake made by the Kenan Transport driver is a common mistake made by transport drivers, who are "hauling out of multiple terminals every day." Drivers have loading cards for all of the accounts on which they pick up fuel. When picking up fuel, the driver should use the loading card which corresponds to the account for that particular load. In the four transactions that are at issue in this proceeding, the driver "loaded" the card for Petitioner's account, not the card for Gowan's account. Petitioner did not have an export license at the time of the transactions. Therefore, Marathon properly billed Petitioner for the Florida fuel taxes on the fuel that was picked up in Jacksonville, Florida, charged on Petitioner's account, and delivered to Petitioner's truck stop in Kingsland, Georgia. Petitioner tried unsuccessfully to have Marathon bill the subject fuel purchases to Gowan. If Gowan had been billed, it would not have been required to pay Florida fuel taxes on the four fuel purchases because it had an export license.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for a refund of fuel taxes. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of April, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of April, 2006.
The Issue Petitioner's liability for proposed assessment of fuel tax and penalty pursuant to Chapter 206, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Barkett Oil Company, Miami, Florida, is a distributor of motor fuel and a dealer in special fuel licensed by Respondent. During the period 1971 through 1974, it held three licenses for motor fuel and three for special fuel. It owned over 100 fuel service stations during that period. At the time petitioner obtained its licenses, it provided Respondent with a list of its stations' fuel storage tank capacities. However, over the years and prior to 1971, the fuel capacity of 12 stations was increased by the addition of tanks in the total amount of some 57,000 gallons, but Petitioner did not advise Respondent of such changed capacity. (Testimony of Barkett, Respondent's Exhibit 3). In May 1974, D. L. Hunt, Respondent's auditor, conducted an audit of Petitioner's business for the period April 1971 through March 1974. Petitioner made most of its existing records available to the auditor, including purchase and sale invoices, and monthly tax reports which had been timely filed with Respondent during the audit period. Petitioner used Respondent's standard forms for the monthly tax returns which reflected an inventory of fuel at the beginning of the month plus gallons acquired during the month, less nontaxable sales. These computations resulted in net gallonage subject to fuel tax on which the tax was remitted, less a collection fee. Petitioner's standard business practice had been to conduct its monthly inventory in the morning of the last day of the monthly period. However, by this method, sales and deliveries which were made during the remaining portion of the day, and fuel contained in its trucks were reflected in the next month's report. Once the inventory was made, Petitioner recorded the "stick" measurements of fuel on hand at the various stations in its computer and discarded the individual station inventory records. State tax returns were then prepared using the figures derived from the computer "print-out." (Testimony of Hunt, Barkett, Petitioner's Exhibit 1,3). During the course of his audit, Mr. Hunt ascertained that the recorded purchases and sales as reflected on the monthly tax returns were correct. However, he noted that fuel on hand at the end of each month apparently exceeded Petitioner's storage capacity. He therefore asked for inventory records in the form of tank readings, but was informed that they had been destroyed and he was not informed that the readings from the "stick" measurements had been processed by computer and that this stored information was available. Hunt therefore made audit findings that the amount of gallonage on hand at the end of each month over and above Petitioner's storage capacity was taxable, even though there was no showing that the fuel had actually been sold. He also predicated penalties against Petitioner for late payment of tax because sales made during the latter half of the last day of the reporting month were carried over to next month's report. Additionally, he found that certain untaxed sales should have been taxed. In February 1975, a proposed assessment of tax and penalties was issued in the total amount of $375,543.27. A number of informal conferences were held by the parties which resulted in certain adjustments to the proposed assessment, primarily consisting of tax exempt sales. As a result of these conferences, the asserted tax was reduced to $245,652.96, with penalties of $39,405.04, for a total amount of $285,058.00. Thereafter, further reductions were made in the assessment, as reflected in a letter from Respondent's counsel to Petitioner's counsel, dated July 22, 1977. This letter stated that the remaining assessment consisted of tax due in the amount of $27,216.05, with penalties of $63,269.22, for total amount due of $90,485.27. The letter explained that the differences in the penalties consisted of instances where the tax had not been timely paid on fuel which had been sold. For instance, as to license No. 391, the letter showed that although only $2,378.46 in additional tax was due, penalties over the audit period amount to $38,769.19. (Testimony of Hunt, Barkett, Petitioner's Exhibit 2, Respondent's Exhibits 1-2, 5, Hearing Officer's Exhibit 1). During the course of informal negotiations, Petitioner's counsel, by letter of April 17, 1978, to Respondent's counsel, provided a corrected list of the capacity of twelve of its stations. Respondent's auditor Hunt had checked four of these stations, but was unable to determine the existence of additional tanks at those locations. He also declined to accept the computer printout sheets as a basis for determining inventory because the actual tank reading reports were not available. At the hearing, Petitioner's president, Harry Barkett, established that additional tanks had existed at the four locations during the audit period. (Testimony of Hunt, Barkett, Petitioner's Exhibit 4-8, Respondent's Exhibit 3, 4). A certified public accountant retained by Petitioner testified that he had audited Petitioner's books and had personally reconciled inventory amounts for the fiscal year 1972-73. He further testified that Petitioner's accounting procedures were proper and that even if inventory had been overstated, it had no effect on sales, and that any unreported sales during one monthly period would be overstated in the following month, which would balance out any prior underpayments. He had never found any discrepancy in Petitioner's fuel reports and found no accounting reason for retaining "stick" readings after the information had been placed in the computer. (Testimony of Pfeiffer).
Recommendation That Respondent proceed to collect the amount of $5,707.50 from Petitioner for unpaid fuel tax under Chapter 206, Florida Statutes, but that the remainder of the proposed assessment be withdrawn. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of October 1979 in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of October 1979. COPIES FURNISHED: Maxie Broome, Jr., Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Milton J. Wallace, Esquire 2138 Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33137
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was acquired by Mr. Farish in November 1985. The Petitioner is a Georgia corporation. In December 1985, the Petitioner bid on a federal contract to provide fuel to federal installations in the southeastern United States. The Petitioner was awarded a contract to provide fuel oil for off-road use at Patrick Air Force Base, which is located in Florida. The Petitioner requested an application from the Department of Revenue for a special fuel license. The Petitioner was sent a motor fuel license application instead of a special fuel license application. The Petitioner filed the motor fuel license application with the Department of Revenue. The Petitioner subsequently filed a special fuel license application. It was received and validated by the Department of Revenue on June 24, 1986. The Petitioner was informed on July 9, 1986, that in order to receive the license, the Petitioner needed to file a copy of a certification to do business in Florida, which could be obtained from the Secretary of State's office. On or about January 9, 1987, the Petitioner forwarded to the Department of Revenue the certification from the Secretary of State's office needed to complete the Petitioner's license application. The Petitioner's special fuel license was issued and became effective January 9, 1987. The Petitioner began purchasing and selling special fuel in Florida on or about April 1, 1986. Between April 1, 1986 and January 9, 1987, the Petitioner paid $7,995.86 in Florida fuel tax liability for purchases of special fuel in Florida. On or about February 25, 1987, the Petitioner filed an application for special fuel tax refund in the amount of $7,995.86. The Respondent denied the tax refund application filed by the Petitioner by Order dated March 18, 1987.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order denying the Petitioner's application for refund be issued by the Respondent. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of August, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE No. 87-1641 Only the Respondent filed a proposed Recommended Order containing proposed findings of fact. The Respondent failed to number its proposed findings of fact. The Respondent has, however, only proposed essentially 3 proposed findings of fact: that the Respondent denied the Petitioner's claim for refund and the justification therefore, the Petitioner made four admissions and the Petitioner is a Georgia corporation. The Respondent's first proposed finding of fact has been accepted in paragraph 12, the second proposed finding of fact has been accepted in paragraphs 6-8 and the third proposed finding of fact has been accepted in paragraph 1. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Gerald Lewis, Comptroller Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0305 James E. Farish, Jr. President Lincoln Oil Co., Inc. Post Office Box 2904 Gainesville, Georgia 30503-0294 Edwin A. Bayo, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Tax Section The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
