Findings Of Fact Timothy M. Gray applied for an instructional position with the Pinellas County School Board in May 1984 and accepted an annual contract to teach at Safety Harbor Middle School for the school year starting in the fall of 1984. He taught a course to eighth grade classes called Power and Transportation, which is predominantly a shop course. Gray was certificated to teach industrial arts in 1980. The charges involved in these two cases stem from inappropriate remarks Gray allegedly made to various students in his class or in the school. Gray denies making the improper remarks attributed to him. Specifically, Respondent is alleged to have made inappropriate remarks of a sexual nature to Paul Bartolo and Mark Fulghum while driving them home from a school detention period that caused them to miss their bus. Respondent admits that he gave these 14- and 15- year-old boys a ride home after their detention. He lived in the same direction as the two boys and giving them a ride home was not out of his way. Both of these boys were discipline problems. During the school year Paul served about 15 detentions and was suspended twice. Both were in Respondent's Power and Transportation class and both had been placed on detention by Respondent. During the ride home Paul was in the front seat of Respondent's car and Mark was in the rear seat. Both boys testified that during the ride home an extensive conversation ensued and that Respondent, after answering a question regarding his marital status in the negative, continued with he liked snatch. Respondent admits the conversation and his attempts to reach these boys to improve their attitudes toward school but denies ever using the word "snatch." During discussions with girls on the school bus and at school regarding Respondent and his comments, Paul and Mark told the girls that Respondent said he liked snatch. At this time a lot of rumors were being circulated among the eighth graders in Respondent's classes about the way he looked at them and comments he had made they deemed inappropriate. The prime mover of this group was Dana Shaver, who testified only by deposition in these proceedings. Dana urged Paul and Mark to report Respondent's remarks to the principal. In a deposition (Exhibit 1) Dana testified that Gray had seen her at the beach over the weekend and told her in class Monday that he had seen her at the beach in her bikini and that she did not have much of a tan for a beach girl. This embarrassed Dana and she hung her head and did not hear Respondent say she would look better without it (bikini) on. This was later reported to Dana by an anonymous girlfriend. Respondent admits he saw Dana and another girl at the beach but denies saying anything more to her than she did not have as good a tan as he did. Dana's parents requested she be moved from Respondent's class in Power and Transportation (which she did not like) because of her being "embarrassed" by Respondent. Evidently, no embarrassment was involved discussing use of the word "snatch" with boys in her class. Kera Lampman is a bright 13-year-old who was in Respondent's Power and Transportation class. She testified that Respondent told her she had a nice butt and that she could get straight A's in his class. Respondent denies ever using the word "butt" to Kera but does not deny the remarks about her grades as Kera is a straight-A student. Respondent also testified that he was trying to get Kera moved to a more challenging class when he was suspended. Alissa Lanier, a 14-year-old student at Safety Harbor Middle School, testified that while walking from the bus drop to the entrance door immediately before classes started in the morning she heard someone say, "You've got a nice ass." When she turned around she saw Respondent some 20 feet away. She had never talked to Respondent, was not in his class, and testified Respondent was the only person on the ramp besides her. Respondent not only denies making such a remark but also testified that he frequently has bus ramp duty before school starts and he has never been in the area between the bus stop and school entrance doors shortly before school was due to start when the area was not crowded with students. The testimony that this area would be crowded immediately prior to school starting is deemed more credible. Respondent's denial that he made any comment to any girl he did not even know is more credible than is the testimony that this remark was heard from someone 20 feet distant in the bus ramp area immediately prior to school starting. Shelly Evans, a 14-year-old girl in Respondent's class heard Respondent say he had seen Kera and Dana at the beach and they looked great in their bikinis. During the period when others were reporting Respondent's actions she too reported this comment to the principal. One witness testified that Respondent looked at her in a strange way in class; that it appeared to her that he was staring. Such discussion and remarks including comments about bodies were being circulated among students at Safety Harbor Middle School and was brought to the attention of the principal who interrogated some of the students. The principal was told substantially what was testified to at these proceedings. During the investigation which followed Respondent denied using the words "snatch," "butt," or "ass," while talking to any of the students. Respondent, before coming to Safety Harbor Middle School, had worked in a Y conservation program involving young men. This age group was doubtless older than the 13-15 year olds in the eighth grade class Respondent taught at Safety Harbor Middle School and were less impressionable than eighth grade students. Hearing from one of her teachers that rumors were going around the school regarding Gray's language in the presence of students, Mrs. Raymond, Principal of Safety Harbor Middle School obtained the name of one or more students reported to be aware of such language and called them into her office. After obtaining statements from these students, who appeared as witnesses in these proceedings, Mrs. Raymond confronted Gray, who denied making inappropriate comments. Nevertheless, she recommended his immediate suspension with pay pending the next meeting of the School Board, who was authorized to suspend Gray without pay. Upon her recommendation, Gray was immediately suspended.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's furlough should be revoked based on his failure to comply with the terms of the furlough agreement which he executed on April 6, 1981. Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Samuel Grant, is a seventeen (17) year-old male who was furloughed to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, Youth Services Division, on April 14, 1981. At that time he agreed to abide by a furlough agreement which required, inter alia, that he (1) obey all laws; (2) not change or leave his residence, employment, or school, or leave the county without the consent of his counselor or other authorized HRS representatives; (3) that he keep in contact with his counselor and (4) that all instructions of his counselor be carried out. Additionally, he agreed to abide by a 9:00 P.M. curfew on week days and an 11:30 P.M. curfew on weekends; attend community mental health for counseling; attend school or find gainful employment and make weekly contact with his counselor on Wednesdays of each week. (Petitioner's Exhibit 2.) On September 8, 1981, the Youth Services Division revoked Petitioner's furlough agreement based on the following facts: (1) Petitioner failed to obey laws and he gambled for his income; (2) failed to follow instructions of his parents and counselor; (3) continuously violated his curfew and (4) failed to attend school or maintain employment. (Petitioner's Exhibits 1 and 3, and Testimony of Jesse Morris, Petitioner's counselor while furloughed at the Belle Glade Youth Center.) The evidence herein also reveals that Petitioner was expelled from school because he possessed marijuana and his mother testified herein that he violated his curfew on numerous occasions. Petitioner's mother indicated that he spent nights away from home on a number of occasions and that he was afforded an opportunity to work with his father, a contractor, who extended a job offer to Petitioner. Petitioner has repeatedly run afoul of criminal laws from December, 1978, through October, 1980, including, but not limited to: (1) unauthorized use of a motor vehicle; (2) malicious mischief; (3) resisting arrest with violence; (4) possession of burglary tools, night prowling, and (5) burglary and grand larceny. Petitioner does not dispute the above findings; offered that he felt that he was not breaking the law and that he did not consider that it was "right" for him to attend school. He offered no explanation as to his failure to accept the offer of employment extended by his father.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Respondent's Order of September 8, 1981, revoking Petitioner's furlough, and ordering him to be reassigned to another program or facility as soon as practical, be SUSTAINED. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of February, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Samuel L. Grant c/o Florida School for Boys Route 7, Box 250 Okeechobee, Florida 33472 K. C. Collette, Esquire Department of HRS 111 Georgia Avenue Third Floor West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
Findings Of Fact Outdoor Advertising Art, Inc. is the owner of a 12 x 40 foot sign located on State Road 540 in Polk County. The records of the Department of Transportation show the last valid permit for this sign was issued in 1973. The Respondent forgot to renew the permit for 1974 due to clerical error of its staff although it received notice as required by statute from the Department of Transportation. On October 2, 1975, Outdoor Advertising Art, Inc. attempted to obtain a permit for this sign for the year 1974 and 1975, and tendered a check to Department of Transportation in the amount of $20. In doing so, the Respondent relied upon what it stated the policy of the Department had been regarding renewal of delinquent permits; however, it did not fail to renew in reliance on this policy but through its own oversight. The Department of Transportation denied the permit on the sign which did not conform to the existing rules and regulations adopted by the State of Florida as part of the federal highways beautification program. Testimony was received that delinquent applications have been allowed to be filed by the Department of Transportation, but not in District I of the Department of Transportation.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, this Hearing Officer recommends that the sign be removed. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of January, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: John J. Rimes, Esquire Office of Legal Operations Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 William D. Rowland, Esquire Post Office Box 539 Winter Park, Florida 32789
The Issue Whether the Respondent, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes (Respondent or Division), acted arbitrarily or capriciously in denying Christian Welvaert’s (Petitioner or Welvaert) application to be licensed as a yacht and ship salesmen under Chapter 326, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency charged with regulating and licensing of yacht and ship brokers under Section 326.002(2), Florida Statutes. On October 16, 2001, Welvaert submitted to the Division his application for licensure as a yacht and ship salesman. Licensure is a privilege granted to individuals who affirmatively demonstrate good moral character. The Division is authorized to, and does in fact investigate an applicant's criminal background if one exists. This is done so that the state may determine if the individual's criminal history is of a nature which would warrant denial of licensure. To facilitate the state's investigation, applicants are asked to fully disclose any criminal history. It is required that this question, and all the questions on the application, be answered truthfully. Welvaert falsely stated on his application that his only criminal background was "traffic offense." A Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) background check revealed that Welvaert had been arrested on several occasions on charges relating to possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia; domestic battery and resisting an officer without violence; probation violation by possessing drug paraphernalia and cannabis; and driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Welvaert did not offer any evidence to contradict the FDLE's findings in any material way. He asserted that he never violated probation, claiming that he didn’t know when his court date was because he had moved. This experience did not teach Welvaert the importance of attending to his legal affairs. In this case, he blamed his landlady for his failure to respond to the Division's Request for Admissions, which was properly served upon him at the address he had on file in this case. Welvaert stated, "I thought the person, the landlady I was staying with, I thought she was going to call me or tell me if I had something this important in the mail. I guess she didn't." Petitioner testified that he has "changed his life around" and is now rehabilitated. While he did not unequivocally deny the drug charges, he implied that he "just [took] the time" on the advice of the presiding judge. He further stated, "It was at someone's house. I was in a college town at the time." Nothing in Welvaert's testimony constitutes a legally or factually sufficient excuse for his failure to disclose his criminal background.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's application to be licensed as a yacht and ship salesman’s be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of November, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of November, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. Garwood, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Christian P. Welvaert 7 Kenmore Lane Boynton Beach, Florida 33435 Ross Fleetwood, Division Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
Findings Of Fact On or about September 30, 1980, petitioner mailed its application to respondent for registration of the trademark "Cachet". Accompanying the application were a check for fifteen dollars ($15.00) and shoe insoles stamped "Cachet", each bearing an escutcheon and the legend "MADE IN SPAIN". On October 14, 1980, respondent returned petitioner's application, declining to register "Cachet" as a trademark in the absence of consent by Cachet, Inc., an unrelated active Florida corporation for profit with a Miami address, duly registered with respondent. Cachet, Inc. has not registered any trademark with respondent, and does not sell shoes. Ms. Nettie Sims, chief of respondent's bureau of corporate records and an employee of respondent for 27 years, testified that this action was in keeping with respondent's policy going back as far as she could remember.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is and has been at all times material hereto a licensed veterinarian in the State of Florida, having been issued license number VM 0001124. Respondent was a licensed veterinarian in the State of New York, having been issued license number 772918-0 or 002193. On March 27, 1978, Respondent pled not guilty to an eleven-count indictment filed against him in the County Court for Nassau County, New York. He was found guilty and convicted after a jury trial of two counts of Fraudulent Entries and Practices in Contests of Speed involving a race horse running under an assumed name. On November 3, 1978, he was fined $1,000.00 and sentenced to one year's imprisonment at the Nassau County Correctional Center. The New York State Education Department, Office of Professional Discipline, State Board for Veterinary Medicine, is the agency of that state charged with regulating the practice of veterinary medicine in the State of New York. That agency initiated disciplinary proceedings against Respondent charging him with having violated Education Law Section 6509(5)(a), which prohibits being convicted of committing an act constituting a crime under New York State law. Although a hearing on that charge was available to Respondent, Respondent voluntarily chose to waive his right to a hearing and surrender his license. On May 5, 1982, Respondent signed his sworn Application to Surrender License. In that sworn application, Respondent stated that he admitted guilt to the charges against him, that he understood the Board of Regents (of the State Education Department) had discretion whether or not to accept Respondent's application to surrender his license on the terms and conditions proposed by Respondent and that such applications were not automatically granted, and that he would agree to an order accepting his application for surrender with the provision that he not apply for restoration of his license for at least one year. On June 25, 1982, the Board of Regents voted to grant Respondent's application for permission to surrender his license on the terms proposed by him. Pursuant to that vote, on June 28, 1982, the Commissioner of Education of the State of New York entered an Order granting Respondent's application to surrender his license, cancelling Respondent's registration to practice, and prohibiting Respondent from applying for restoration of his license for at least one year. On October 15, 1982, the Probable Cause Panel of the Florida Board of Veterinary Medicine determined probable cause, and an Administrative Complaint was filed against Respondent. On October 5, 1983, the Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings assigned to conduct the formal proceedings against Respondent in that case dismissed the Amended Administrative Complaint in that case due to alleged defects in the probable cause determination. On December 2, 1983, the Probable Cause Panel determined probable cause a second time, an Administrative Complaint was filed, and this proceeding ensued.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against him, imposing an administrative fine in the amount of one thousand dollars against him to be paid to the Executive Director of the Board of Veterinary Medicine within thirty days of entry of the Final Order, and placing Respondent on probation for a period of two years. DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of January, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of January, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: James Gi1lis and William Furlow, Esquires Department of Professional Regulation 130 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, Fl. 32301 Paul Lambert, Esquire 1114 E. Park Avenue Tallahassee, Fl. 32301 Fred Roche Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 N. Monroe St. Tallahassee, Fl. 32301 Jane Raker Executive Director Board of Veterinary Medicine 130 N. Monroe St. Tallahassee, Fl. 32301
The Issue Pursuant to the order of the First District Court of Appeal dated October 18, 2005, the issue before the Division of Administrative Hearings is a determination of the amount of attorneys' fees and costs to be awarded for the administrative proceeding in Department of Health v. Anthony Glenn Rogers, M.D., DOAH Case No. 02-0080PL, and for the appellate proceeding styled Anthony Glenn Rogers, M.D. v. Department of Health, Case No. 1D04-1153 (Fla. 1st DCA Oct. 18, 2005).
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine, and the Board of Medicine ("Board") within the Department is the entity responsible for entering final orders imposing disciplinary action for violations of the laws regulating the practice of medicine. See §§ 455.225 and 458.331(2), Fla. Stat. On January 4, 2002, the Department of Health filed an Administrative Complaint charging Dr. Rogers with violations of Section 458.331(1)(m), (q), and (t), Florida Statutes (1998).3 The matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings, which assigned the matter DOAH Case No. 02-0080PL. The case was heard on May 7, 2002, by Administrative Law Judge Michael J. Parrish. Judge Parrish entered his Recommended Order on February 21, 2003, in which he found that the Department had failed to prove violations of Section 458.331(1)(q) and (t), Florida Statutes (1998), and recommended dismissal of those charges. Judge Parrish found that the Department had proven a violation of Section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes (1998), failing to keep medical records as required by rule, and he recommended that Dr. Rogers be required to pay a $1,000.00 administrative fine and attend a Florida Medical Association record-keeping course as the penalty for the violation. The Board entered its Final Order on February 17, 2004, in which it adopted its own findings of fact and conclusions of law; found Dr. Rogers guilty of all three charges in the Administrative Complaint; and imposed a penalty on Dr. Rogers consisting of a $10,000 administrative fine, completing of a drug course sponsored by the University of South Florida, completion of a Florida Medical Association record-keeping course, and two years' probation, during which he was not permitted to practice medicine unless his practice was monitored quarterly by a physician approved by the Board. Dr. Rogers appealed the Board's Final Order to the First District Court of Appeal, challenging the Board's determination that Dr. Rogers had violated Section 458.331(1)(q) and (t), Florida Statutes (1998). Dr. Rogers filed a motion for attorneys' fees and costs based on Section 120.595(5), Florida Statutes. In addition, Dr. Rogers filed a Motion for Stay of Final Order, which the Board opposed. The district court denied the motion for stay in an order entered April 2, 2004, and Dr. Rogers proceeded to comply with the terms of the two-year probationary period imposed by the Board, as well as fulfilling the other requirements set forth in the Board's Final Order of February 17, 2004. In an opinion issued on October 18, 2005, the First District Court of Appeal reversed the Board's Final Order with respect to its determination that Dr. Rogers had violated Section 458.331(1)(q) and (t), Florida Statutes (1998), and remanded the matter to the Board for entry of a Final Order consistent with its opinion. The district court held in its opinion that the Board had erroneously re-weighed the evidence and had rejected findings of fact in the administrative law judge's Recommended Order that were supported by competent substantial evidence. The district court also entered on October 18, 2005, the order granting Dr. Rogers's motion for attorneys' fees and costs that is the subject of this proceeding. The district court's mandate issued on February 23, 2006, and, on April 21, 2006, the Board entered a Final Order on Remand adopting the findings of fact and conclusions of law in Judge Parrish's Recommended Order, finding that Dr. Rogers had violated Section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes (1998), and imposing a $1,000.00 administrative fine on Dr. Rogers and requiring him to attend a medical record-keeping course. Based on the Amended Affidavit of C. William Berger filed August 24, 2006, the total number of hours Mr. Berger spent in representing Dr. Rogers in the administrative proceeding in DOAH Case No. 02-0080PL is 79.75, a total that the Department does not challenge. Mr. Berger's billing rate was $300.00 per hour, a rate that the Department accepts as reasonable. The total amount of attorney's fees paid to Mr. Berger for his representation of Dr. Rogers through the administrative proceedings before the Division of Administrative Hearings was, therefore, $23,925.00. Dr. Rogers was ultimately found to have violated one count of the three-count Administrative Complaint filed against him by the Department, the count in which the Department alleged that Dr. Rogers had violated Section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes (1998), by failing to keep adequate medical records related to the patient that was the subject of the charges against him. Mr. Berger did not record in his billing statements the amount of time he spent researching this charge, preparing for hearing on this charge, or addressing this charge in the Proposed Recommended Order he filed in 02-0080PL. It is reasonable that Mr. Berger spent 10 percent of the hours included in his billing statements preparing Dr. Rogers's defense to the charge that he failed to keep adequate medical records.4 Accordingly, Mr. Berger's attorney's fees will be reduced by 10 percent, or by $2,392.50, for a total of $21,532.50. In reaching the percentage by which Mr. Berger's fees should be reduced, consideration has been given to the amount of the fees in relationship to the failure to prevail on the medical-records violation, to the seriousness of the alleged violations on which Dr. Rogers prevailed before both the administrative law judge and on appeal,5 and the penalty ranges that the Board could impose for the violations with which Dr. Rogers was charged.6 Based on the Supplemental Affidavit of Lisa Shearer Nelson Regarding Attorneys' Fees and Costs filed September 5, 2006, Ms. Nelson claimed that she spent a total of 187.1 hours "from the issuance of the final order of the Board of Medicine through the appeal and remand and initial preparation of the petition for attorney's fees and costs." Ms. Nelson's billing statements reflect that she represented Dr. Rogers during the appellate proceedings before the First District Court of Appeal in Case No. 1D04-1153 and before the Board on remand from the district court. Ms. Nelson's billing rate was $250.00 per hour, a rate that the Department accepts as reasonable. The total amount of attorney's fees paid by Dr. Rogers to Ms. Nelson for her representation was, therefore, $46,775.00. A review of the billing statements attached to Ms. Nelson's supplemental affidavit reveals that the final billing statement, dated June 9, 2006, was for "preparation of petition for fees and costs; preparation of affidavit re same." Dr. Rogers was billed for 1.9 hours in this billing statement, for a total of $475.00. Because the work done by Ms. Nelson reflected in this billing statement did not involve the appellate proceeding arising out of the Board's Final Order of February 17, 2004, the hours claimed by Ms. Nelson are reduced by 1.9 hours, for a total of 185.2 hours. Accordingly, Ms. Nelson's attorney's fees for her representation of Dr. Rogers on appeal total $46,300.00. The total costs identified in Mr. Berger's Amended Affidavit and in the billing statements attached to the Amended Affidavit is $4,462.55. This amount is reduced by $1,000.00 attributable to a retainer paid to a Dr. Spanos, who was initially retained as an expert witness but who ultimately did not testify on Dr. Rogers's behalf. The total allowable costs for the administrative proceeding, therefore, are $3,462.55. The total costs identified by Ms. Nelson in her Supplemental Affidavit and in the billing statements attached to the Supplemental Affidavit is $1,005.01. The total costs for both the administrative and the appellate proceedings are, therefore, $4,467.56. Dr. Rogers submitted an affidavit in which he claimed that he expended total costs of $154,807.23 in fulfilling the terms of the penalty assessed against him in the Board's Final Order of February 17, 2004, which was reversed by the district court.
Conclusions For Petitioner: C. William Berger, Esquire One Boca Place, Suite 337W 2255 Glades Road Boca Raton, Florida 33486 For Respondent: John E. Terrel, Esquire Michael D. Milnes, Esquire Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by filing the original Notice of Appeal with the agency clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings and a copy, accompanied by filing fees prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal, First District, or with the District Court of Appeal in the Appellate District where the party resides. The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Jo Nees, is a 52 year old caucasian woman who appears to be her age. Ms. Nees first moved to Destin, Florida in or about April, 1982, and upon arrival in the area, submitted an application for employment to the Delchamps store which was accepted, but about which she never heard anything from store personnel. Ms. Nees lives in the Destin East Mobile Home Park with Mr. Emerson, a gentleman with whom she has shared the mobile home for several years. In January or February, 1985, Ms. Nees went to the Delchamps store in Destin, where, she alleges, she spoke with the store manager, Mr. Owens, and asked him for an application for employment. At this point, according to Ms. Nees, he refused, indicating he preferred people younger than Petitioner. She concluded from their discussion that he felt that due to the large number of customers during the crowded summer tourist season, she would not be able to keep up and used the term, she contends, "older people." As a result she became quite upset with Mr. Owens and after this colloquy, she paid for her groceries and left. Ms. Nees contends that the conversation referenced above was overheard by the assistant manager, Mr. Few, and the cashier, Kathy Richardson. Though the cashier did not say anything at the time, she was present at the check-out counter where the conversation took place and must have heard it. The assistant manager, Mr. Few, in Ms. Nees' recollection, tried to smooth things over and calm her down. At approximately 4:30 a.m. in November, 1985, just before Thanksgiving, Ms. Nees was again in the Delchamps store. Mr. Few, she contends, came up to her and spoke to her by name. However, as she was checking out a few moments later, and he was manning the cash register, he advised her that if she filed any sort of complaint against the company, he would not know her. Ms. Nees continued to patronize the Delchamps store after the conversations with Mr. Owens because it is the only major supermarket in the area and she prefers to use it because of the quality of the product and the price. At no time has she been offered an application for employment by the store, nor has she been offered employment. As of the hearing, Ms. Nees had a job at a convenience and package store in Destin where she has worked since May, 1985. At the time she applied for a position with Delchamps she had been unemployed since December, 1984, when she left her prior job as manager of a local motel because of poor wages. In May, 1985, she was earning $4.20 an hour on a 40-hour week. Though complaining about the fact that she was not offered employment or even given an application in January, 1985, Petitioner is nonetheless satisfied that at that time, no employment was available at the Delchamps store. She contends, however, that they could have accepted her application and hired her even though she was not needed so that she would be available later on when the busy season came. At the time of the application, the period was one of low employment in the area. Ms. Nees has also filed a discrimination complaint against the neighboring Eckerd's Drug Store for failure to hire her, also on the basis of age. At the hearing, Petitioner testified that she had applied to Delchamps only once, yet on cross examination it appears she applied once and requested an application a second time. The EEOC form 5 filed in April, 1985, reflects that she applied three times for a position at Delchamps. Ms. Nees explains that the information contained on the form 5, though it bears her signature, was given over the telephone to the clerk at the Commission office and that she only applied once and requested an application form a second time. Inasmuch as Ms. Nees' testimony indicates that she applied in January or February, it is quite possible that in recounting the story over the telephone, the clerk misunderstood her comment and put down that she applied in both January and February, 1985, and that Ms. Nees failed to catch the mistake when she signed the form. This is, however, de minimus. What is more significant is the fact that none of the other parties involved identified by Ms. Nees, have any recollection of the situation being as she describes it. According to Mr. Owens, Ms. Nees at no time ever asked for an application, nor did he ever make to her the comments that she attributes to him. When he saw her at the investigation conducted by CHR, he recalled having seen her previously as a customer in the store, but at no time did she ever discuss employment with him, either alone or in the presence of Mr. Emerson, who, she claims, was a witness to the entire situation. Delchamps' policy is to accept an application form from anyone who asks for it and keep it on file. When employees are needed, people from the filed applications are called and interviewed, and selections are made. It is not company policy to take on as full-time employees, people who have not worked within the company before. Instead, people are hired on a part- time basis and then promoted to full-time positions from part- time status when openings occur. During the winter months, Mr. Owens has a staff of between 70 and 75 people. During the tourist season, that figure increases up to 120. Mr. Few, present at the discussion with Mr. Owens, does not recall any meeting between Nees and Owens and denies age discrimination. He agrees he saw her at the delicatessen counter early one morning as she alleges and greeted her. She seemed to be complaining to the counter clerk about Delchamps employment policy. When she got to the check-out counter he was manning, he offered her an application form in the hope it would put an end to the matter. She refused to accept it, however, and left after paying for her purchases. Kathryn Guidas, the cashier at the time of the alleged conversation between Ms. Nees and Mr. Owens, recalls seeing Petitioner in the store numerous times as a customer, but did not hear any conversation between Petitioner and Mr. Owens regarding employment. In fact, she has never seen Petitioner and Mr. Owens together. She has been asked for application forms by customers from time to time. When this happens, she refers them to either the manager or his assistant. Petitioner has not, to the best of her knowledge, ever asked her for an application form. On one occasion, Mr. Emerson mentioned that he had filed an employment discrimination complaint against the company and expected to hear something soon, but made no mention of any discrimination complaint by Petitioner. In her testimony at the prior inquiry, Ms. Nees identified Vicky White as an employee who was present at the conversation she claims to have had with Mr. Owens. Ms. White has worked in the Destin store as a clerk in the bakery and deli for approximately 10 years, but denies having ever seen Petitioner prior to the hearing. Neither does she know Mr. Emerson and she denies she has ever discussed company hiring policy with either Petitioner or Emerson. She has never been present at any conversation between Owens and Nees. In light of the above, it is most likely that Ms. Nees did not ask for an application at all. It would have been unnecessary for Owens to deny her one in light of the policy when, if she was not wanted, she need not have been called in for an interview. Ms. Nees would like to be compensated for the time she was improperly denied employment by Delchamps and would like to be offered a permanent job at the store. She is concerned, however, that if offered a job as a result of a settlement, she would be discharged shortly thereafter: a result that she does not desire. If she is to be hired, she would like to be assured that she can keep the job and not face layoff as retribution for her actions here. In her post hearing submission, she reiterates her desire for a settlement and a job because she is, apparently, no longer working at the convenience store and the Delchamps store is only two blocks from-her residence. Based on all the evidence, considering the inherent probabilities and improbabilities of the testimony, it is obvious that Ms. Nees is anxious to be employed by Delchamps and/or to receive compensation from them. She has, however, scant evidence to establish that she was discriminated against because of her age. She admits that there were no openings at the time of her alleged conversation with Mr. Owens, and that she also filed a discrimination complaint against Eckerd' s, again knowing that no vacancies existed. When Ms. Nees was not hired, it was clearly for undisclosed reasons other than her age and there is no evidence of any discrimination by Respondent
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Relief filed by Jo Nees be denied. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Florida this 9 day of May, 1986. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of May, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Jo Nees Box 89 Destin East Mobile Home Park Destin, Florida 32541 William C. Tidwell, Esquire Post Office Box 123 Mobile, AL 36601 - Donald A. Griffin, Executive Director Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303
