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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs. JOPEP HOMES, INC., 79-001424 (1979)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 79-001424 Latest Update: Oct. 09, 1979

Findings Of Fact On May 8, 1979, a representative of DOT observed a sign located on State Road 13, 1.8 miles north of the Duval-St. Johns line in Duval County, Florida. State Road 13 is a federal aid primary highway. The sign in question bore the following advertising copy: "Quail Ridge, New Homes, straight ahead to St. Augustine Rd., Right to Caron Dr." At the time the sign was initially observed it was constructed of new lumber, with fresh dirt around the holes in which the standards were placed which supported the sign. The sign was located within the corporate limits of tie City of Jacksonville, Florida, in an area which is zoned "Commercial Intensive". At the time the sign was initially inspected on May 8, 1979, no permit tag was affixed. In addition, the sign was located within two feet of another larger sign which had been properly permitted, was on the same side of the highway, and faced the same direction. The DOT representative, upon inspection of the sign, contacted Joseph Pepe, the President of Respondent to discuss the sign in question. Mr. Pepe admitted that his company owned and erected the sign with its own work crew. The sign was again inspected one day prior to the final hearing in this cause, and was still located in the same position and had no permit tag affixed to the structure.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57479.02479.07
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs. HENDERSON SIGNS, 81-000106 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-000106 Latest Update: Dec. 16, 1981

The Issue Based upon the testimony received the primary issue is whether the poles were erected before the highway, I-10, was opened to the public. If so, do such poles constitute a sign within the meaning of Section 479.23, Florida Statutes, for the purposes of "grandfathering" such a structure?

Findings Of Fact These double-faced, stacked signs are located 1.4 miles east of State Road 276 on I-10. These signs were inspected on October 22, 1980, by an inspector of the Department of Transportation, who observed that the signs' messages were visible from the main traveled way of I-10 and did not bear the permits required by Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. At the time of this inspection I-10 was open to the public and was a part of the interstate highway system. See DOT Exhibit 1 and DOT Exhibit 3. The signs were located in an unincorporated area of Jackson County, Florida, which does not have a zoning ordinance. (Transcript, page 39.) Prior to the date of the hearing, name plates identifying Henderson signs as responsible for the signs were attached to the signs. (Transcript, page 29.) The Department had notified Henderson Signs of the Notice of Violation, and Henderson Signs requested a formal hearing by letter of its Counsel dated December 19, 1980. See files, Cases Nos. 81-106T and 81-107T. The foregoing facts establish that the subject signs are signs regulated by the Department pursuant to Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, and that Henderson Signs had a substantial interest in the signs. Gene Henderson testified concerning the erection of the poles and the attachment of sign faces to the poles. According to Henderson, the sign poles were erected during the latter part of 1975, and the first sign face (Case No. 81-106T) advertising "Quality Inn" was affixed to the sign on January 15, 1977. On June 15, 1978, a second sign face was affixed to the sign poles in the opposite direction (Case No. 81-107T) advertising "Shell Food Store." W. B. Reddock, affiliated with Arrowhead Camp Grounds, appeared and testified. Although Reddock may have some interest in these signs, it is concluded that the signs are the responsibility of Henderson Signs, which erected the poles prior to the time I-10 was opened to the public. The Department introduced DOT Exhibit 3, which shows that the section of I-10 along which the subject signs are located was opened to the public on October 14, 1977. The Department introduced DOT Exhibit 8, an aerial photograph of the section of I-10 along which the subject signs are located. This photograph bears the number PD 2193 and is Sheet 4 of 28 sheets taken on November 14, 1977. The photograph's legend reflects it has a scale of one inch equal to 50 feet. The Department's engineer, who established that the scale was accurate, indicated by a red mark the measured location of the signs 1.4 miles east of SR 276 on I-10. The photograph was examined by the Department's engineer, who observed the presence of six poles at the location. No sign faces were attached to the poles on November 14, 1977, 30 days after the highway was opened to the public.

Recommendation Having considered the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties, and based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Department of Transportation enter its final order directing the removal of the subject signs within 30 days and without compensation to the signs' owner. DONE and ORDERED this 16th day of September, 1981, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of September,1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation Hayden Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Charles M. Wynn, Esquire 310 Jackson Street Post Office Box 793 Marianna, Florida 32446 Jacob D. Varn, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, MS 57 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (2) 479.01479.07
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs MAXMEDIA OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, 89-003819 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Jul. 18, 1989 Number: 89-003819 Latest Update: Oct. 27, 1989

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Maxmedia Outdoor Advertising, Inc., owns and maintains a V- shaped sign located on State Road 551 (Goldenrod Road) in Orange County, Florida, north of State Road 50. State outdoor advertising sign permits were obtained for both sides of the "V" in May 1986. The applications for permit stated that the sign was 15 feet from the right-of- way. Sometime prior to June 1, 1989, Department of Transportation (DOT) Outdoor Advertising Inspector, Michael Dollery, inspected the sign in question. He found that no state permits were displayed and that the sign encroached on the state right-of-way. A follow-up inspection was conducted on September 15, 1989, and the same findings were made. In determining that the sign encroached on the right-of-way, the inspector utilized a DOT right-of-way survey map (Petitioner's Exhibit #4), prepared in 1987, approved on 5/12/88, and updated most recently on 5/8/89. The inspector also located a right-of-way survey marker in the field and photographed the sign in relation to the marker. Both the survey and photograph plainly indicate that approximately five feet of both sides of the "V" extend into the right-of-way. Since the sign has two sides and two permits, separate violation notices were issued. The two violation notices are the subject of Division of Administrative Hearings cases #89-3819T and #89-3820T. Respondent does not contest the DOT survey and did not object to its admissibility. He did not produce his own survey nor any basis for his contention that the sign was proper at the time of erection. In DOAH Case #89-3821T, the sign at issue is located within the incorporated limits of the City of Lake Mary in Seminole County, Florida, at an interchange of 1-4 and Lake Mary Boulevard. The sign is owned and maintained by Respondent, Maxmedia. It is "V" shaped, with the apex of the "V" pointing at Lake Mary Boulevard. It is within 660 feet of the interstate (I-4) and is approximately 850 feet from a 2-faced permitted billboard located across Lake Mary Boulevard. The sign is 20 feet high. DOT has no record of a permit for this sign, nor was one displayed at the time of inspection. DOT's District Outdoor Administrator claims that the sign is visible from the main travel-way of 1-4. DOT issued its notice of violation only for the west face of the sign, since that is the side which faces the interstate. As depicted on a DOT right-of-way survey (Petitioner's Exhibit #8), the offending face of the sign runs lengthwise, parallel to 1-4. Respondent claims that the sign was purposefully built only 20 feet high, instead of the more common 50 feet, so that it would not be visible from 1-4. The sign was placed to be read from Lake Mary Boulevard. Respondent submitted a series of photographs taken from 1-4 and from Lake Mary Boulevard, including the portion of Lake Mary Boulevard overpass over 1-4. The sign is distinctly lower than the other signs which are visible from 1-4. The sign is visible from Lake Mary Boulevard but is obscured by the tree line when viewed from 1-4. Even assuming that the subject sign structure could be viewed from 1-4, a passer-by on 1-4 would have to quickly turn and crane his neck to read the sign, given its parallel orientation. Respondent claims that the placement of the sign was based on a consultation, on-site, with DOT's former District Supervisor, Oscar Irwin, who concurred that the sign would not be an "Interstate 4 reader." The sign was permitted by the City of Lake Mary on October 17, 1984. According to the federal highway system map of Seminole County (Petitioner's Exhibit #6) Lake Mary Boulevard is not part of the federal-aid primary highway system.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered requiring that the sign in Cases #89-3819T and #89-3820T be removed, and dismissing the notice of violations in Case #89- 3821T. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 27th day of October, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Attorney Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Mac Davidson Maxmedia Outdoor Advertising Post Office Box 847 Winter Park, Florida 32790 Ben G. Watts, P.E., Interim Secretary Attn: Eleanor F. Turner, M.S. 58 Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Bldg. 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thomas H. Bateman, III General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Bldg. 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458

Florida Laws (5) 120.57479.02479.07479.11479.16
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs OLAN Q. NOBLES, 14-004928 (2014)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Oct. 20, 2014 Number: 14-004928 Latest Update: Jul. 31, 2015

The Issue As to DOAH Case Nos. 14-4926 and 14-4927, the issues are whether the billboards identified in the notices of violation are located on the premises of Respondent's business and, thus, exempt from licensure; and, if not, whether the billboards are eligible for licensure pursuant to section 479.07, Florida Statutes, or, alternatively, the "grandfather" provision set forth in section 479.105, Florida Statutes. With respect to DOAH Case No. 14-4928, the issue is whether Respondent engaged in, or benefitted from, the unpermitted removal, cutting, or trimming of vegetation.

Findings Of Fact I. DOAH Case Nos. 14-4926 & 14-4927 The Parties The Respondent in these proceedings is I-10 Pecan House, Inc. ("Pecan House"), an entity currently owned and managed by Olan Q. Nobles. As discussed in greater detail below, Pecan House is a small country store that has conducted business in Jefferson County, Florida, for nearly 40 years. The Department is the state agency responsible, inter alia, for the regulation of outdoor advertising signs located within 600 feet of, and visible from, interstate highways. The Events In or around 1976, Erma Jean Walker (Mr. Nobles' sister) and her husband, Lyman Walker, III, purchased three tracts of land that are relevant to this proceeding. The first such parcel, upon which the Walkers quickly constructed an open- air market, comprises one acre and is located on State Road 257, immediately north of the intersection of that roadway and I-10. The second relevant parcel, .18 acres in size and located a short distance to the southeast of the first tract, is situated adjacent to the westbound lanes of I-10. Upon their acquisition of this parcel, the Walkers constructed a billboard that advertised the open-air market and the related business activities conducted on the third parcel. The third parcel, which is roughly 2.3 acres in size and likewise adjoins the westbound lanes of I-10, is located less than 1000 feet to the east of the second tract. It is upon this tract that, in mid-to-late 1976, the Walkers built a concrete structure to be used for the purpose of manufacturing candy and jelly——products the Walkers offered for sale at the nearby open-air market. By the end of 1976, the Walkers also constructed (upon the third parcel) a billboard advertising the open-air market and jelly/candy manufacture. Although the billboards referenced above were visible from I-10 and located within 600 feet of the roadway——and, thus, within the Department's "controlled area"——the Walkers did not apply for outdoor advertising permits. This is because, as the Department concedes, the billboards were exempt from licensure from 1976 until the mid-1990s (or perhaps later, as Mr. Nobles asserts) under the "on premises" exemption set forth in section 479.16, Florida Statutes. Under the definition of "premises" in effect during that period, the land upon which a sign was located did not need to be contiguous to the advertised business in order for the exemption to apply. For reasons that will soon be apparent, it is necessary to inject a third billboard into this discussion: in 1993, the Walkers constructed on the third tract of land a "double-stack" billboard, which is situated less than 200 feet and 1000 feet, respectively, from the signs erected in 1976 upon the third and second tracts. Although the double-stack billboard would have ostensibly satisfied the on-premises exemption, the Walkers nevertheless applied for——and were granted——an outdoor advertising permit. For all that appears, the Department has never initiated any proceedings to revoke the permit, which remains valid to this day. In 1995, Mrs. Walker transferred control of Pecan House to Mr. Nobles, who until that time had assisted the Walkers on an as-needed basis. Soon thereafter, Mr. Nobles upgraded the open-air market (on the first parcel) to a secure building and, of particular relevance here, ceased all manufacturing activities at the concrete building (on the third parcel). At or around that time, the Legislature amended the definition of "premises" to include a contiguity requirement.3/ This is significant, for the second and third parcels——the locations of the two billboards at issue herein——are not contiguous to the first parcel but, rather, are separated by a tract in which neither the Walkers nor Mr. Nobles holds a leasehold or ownership interest. Further, there is no recorded easement connecting Mr. Nobles' three parcels. Thus, although the two billboards constructed in 1976 lost their on-premises status in the mid-1990s, this fact apparently went unnoticed by the Department for roughly 13 years. Then, in March of 2008, the Department issued notices of violation in connection with both billboards. Among other things, the notices alleged that "outdoor advertising permit[s] [were] required, but ha[d] not been issued" for the billboards, which Mr. Nobles was instructed to remove within 30 days. A short time thereafter, an inspector or other agent of the Department conducted, in Mr. Nobles' presence, an examination of the 1976 billboards and Pecan House's business operations. At the conclusion of her inspection, the Department employee erroneously opined that, in fact, there was "no problem"4/ with the billboards in question, which Mr. Nobles reasonably took to mean that the signs continued to satisfy the on-premises exemption and, thus, were exempt from licensure. The reasonableness of this understanding was bolstered by the fact that, subsequent to the inspection, Mr. Nobles heard nothing more from the Department concerning the March 2008 notices of violation.5/ More than four years later, on December 17, 2012, the Department issued new notices of violation in connection with the 1976 billboards: notice 1352, relating to the billboard constructed upon the third parcel, which presently reads "Exit Now" and bears a Shell gasoline logo (hereinafter "Exit Now"); and notice 1487, relating to the billboard erected upon the second parcel, which presently reads "Welcome to Big O's / We Appreciate Your Business" (hereinafter "Big O's"). The parties thereafter engaged in settlement negotiations, in the course of which Mr. Nobles' counsel struggled mightily to convince the Department that the billboards continued to satisfy the on-premises exemption. When the Department rejected this argument, Mr. Nobles applied for an outdoor advertising permit for each billboard. The applications were ultimately denied, prompting the Department to refer the matters to DOAH for further proceedings. Based upon the evidence adduced at final hearing, it is evident that the billboards in question no longer meet the on-premises exemption and, thus, are subject to removal unless the signs meet either the current statutory requirements for a permit or, alternatively, the "grandfather" provision set forth in section 479.105, which authorizes licensure if the billboards satisfy earlier statutory criteria and certain other conditions. Eligibility for Licensure – "Exit Now" Beginning first with the "Exit Now" billboard, the record makes pellucid that the current statutory requirements for licensure cannot be satisfied. Among other things, the sign is located a mere 190 feet from the permitted, double-stack billboard erected in 1993, a distance far less than the minimum spacing requirement of 1500 feet. See § 479.07(9)(a)1., Fla. Stat. As for the potential applicability of the grandfather provision to the "Exit Now" billboard, it is critical to observe that the Department's delay of nearly five years (March of 2008 through December of 2012) in pursuing removal has placed Mr. Nobles at a significant disadvantage. In particular, had the Department moved forward in 2008——instead of inexplicably abandoning the action, which, along with the statements of its inspector, led Mr. Nobles to believe, incorrectly, that no permit was required——Mr. Nobles likely would have applied for a permit,6/ which the Department would have evaluated pursuant to the version of the grandfather provision in effect at that time. This is significant, for the 2008 codification of the grandfather provision, which remained unchanged until July 1, 2014, did not preclude licensure in situations where a billboard had previously enjoyed on-premises status or some other recognized exemption from the permitting requirement. Further, the pre-July 1, 2014, grandfather provision was quite favorable in that it allowed a potential licensee to demonstrate that the billboard would have met the criteria for licensure in effect "[a]t any time during the period in which the sign has been erected." § 479.105(1)(e)2., Fla. Stat. (2013)(emphasis added). The current version of the grandfather provision is quite a different animal. For one thing, grandfather status can only be granted if the billboard at issue "has never been exempt" from permitting. § 479.105(1)(c)2., Fla. Stat. (2014) (emphasis added). For another thing, the current grandfather provision looks not at "any" time in which the sign has been erected but, rather, at the criteria in effect during the initial seven years in which the sign was subject to the Department's jurisdiction. § 479.105(1)(c)2.b., Fla. Stat. (2014). As Mr. Nobles readily acknowledges, his effort to obtain a permit for the "Exit Now" billboard is a nonstarter under the 2014 version of the grandfather provision, whose plain language prohibits the issuance of a permit where, as here, the sign was previously exempt from licensure. This does not end the matter, however, for the undersigned finds that the Department's unjustified delay in pursuing removal——along with its agent's erroneous statement that the billboard was legal, upon which Mr. Nobles relied——requires that the "Exit Now" application be evaluated under the version of the grandfather provision that was in effect from 2008 until July 1, 2014. Pursuant to the pre-2014 codification of section 479.105, "grandfathering" was authorized if the owner could demonstrate: 1) that the sign in question had been unpermitted, structurally unchanged, and continuously maintained at the same location for at least seven years; 2) that, at any time during the period in which the sign has been erected, the sign would have satisfied the criteria established in chapter 479 for issuance of a permit; 3) that the Department did not file a notice of violation or take other action to remove the sign during the initial seven-year period in which the sign was unpermitted, structurally unchanged, and continuously maintained at the same location; and 4) that the sign is not located on a state right-of-way and is not a safety hazard. § 479.105(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (2013). Upon such a showing, the Department was authorized to treat the sign as conforming or nonconforming and issue a permit. Turing to the merits, the first prong is easily satisfied, as the "Exit Now" sign has been unpermitted, structurally unchanged, and continuously maintained at the same location for 39 years, far longer than the seven-year period the statute requires. The third prong is also met, for the record makes clear that the Department took no action to pursue removal during the initial seven-year period, i.e., 1976 through 1983, in which the sign was unpermitted, structurally unchanged, and continuously maintained. In addition, the Department stipulates that the sign neither poses a safety hazard nor is located upon a state right-of-way, thereby satisfying the fourth prong.7/ This leaves only the second prong, which asks if the sign would have met the criteria for licensure at any time after it was erected. The selection of any time period subsequent to 1993 would surely doom the application, as the sign would be unable to satisfy the minimum spacing requirement due to its close physical proximity to the double-stack billboard——which, as noted previously, was issued a permit in 1993 and remains licensed. Prior to 1993, however, there does not appear to be any spacing conflict that would preclude licensure in this instance.8/ With the spacing concern resolved (and the relevant period of inquiry narrowed to "any" time between 1976 and 1993), the undersigned turns to the only other criterion for licensure that appears to be in dispute: section 479.111(2), Florida Statutes, which authorizes the issuance of a permit only if the sign is located in "commercial-zoned and industrial-zoned areas or commercial-unzoned or industrial-unzoned areas." Unfortunately, this issue cannot be resolved on the instant record, for there is a dearth of persuasive evidence concerning the zoning designation of the third parcel (the location of the "Exit Now" sign) during the critical period of inquiry. Indeed, the record contains only the Department's speculative assumption that, because the area is presently unzoned, it therefore must have been unzoned at all times in the past.9/ Further, even accepting the Department's assumption at face value, it is impossible to determine whether the business activities conducted on the parcel from 1976 until the mid- 1990s——namely, the manufacture of candy and jelly and the sale of pecans——would satisfy the use test at any time between 1976 and 1993.10/ Under ordinary circumstances, such an absence of evidence would necessitate an adverse result for the permit applicant. Owing, however, to the unusual history and posture of this case, as well as the undersigned's conclusion that the pre-2014 grandfather provision should govern, it is recommended that the Department reevaluate Mr. Nobles' application to determine if the third parcel could have satisfied the requirements of 479.111(2) at any point between 1976 and 1993. Eligibility for Licensure – "Big O's" The undersigned turns next to the "Big O's" sign, which, like the "Exit Now" billboard, is unable to satisfy current licensing criteria due, among other reasons, to its close proximity to the double-stack billboard.11/ Further, as with the "Exit Now" billboard, the fact that the "Big O's" sign was previously exempt from licensure (owing to its on-premises status from 1976 through the mid-1990s) renders it ineligible for licensure under the 2014 codification of the grandfather provision. However, in sharp contrast to the "Exit Now" billboard, the "Big O's" sign is positioned within 500 feet of an interstate exit ramp, thereby constituting a safety hazard. This distinction is fatal to Mr. Nobles, as every codification of the grandfather provision from the mid-90s (when the sign lost its on-premises status) onward has prohibited the licensure of billboards that present a safety issue. The short of it, then, is that the sign was no more eligible for licensure in the past than it is today, which obviates the need for any further analysis under the pre-2014 version of the grandfather provision. For the reasons articulated above, Mr. Nobles has failed to prove that the "Big O's" sign is exempt from licensure by virtue of the "on-premises" exception. Further, the evidence conclusively demonstrates that, due to safety concerns, the sign would not have been eligible for licensure at any point in time. Accordingly, the undersigned is constrained to recommend the sign's removal pursuant to section 479.105. II. DOAH Case No. 14-4928 As noted earlier in this Order, DOAH Case No. 14-4928 involves an allegation that Mr. Nobles engaged in——or benefitted from——the unpermitted removal, cutting, or trimming of vegetation. The relevant facts are recounted below. On January 21, 2013, Mr. Nobles executed a lease agreement with Michael McDougal, who owns a parcel of land adjacent to the eastbound lanes of I-10, approximately .6 miles from County Road 257. In relevant part, the terms of the lease authorized Mr. Nobles to place on the property a pickup truck, attached to which was a billboard that advertised the I-10 Pecan House. Shortly thereafter, in late January 2013, Mr. Nobles relocated the truck to a position on Mr. McDougal's property a short distance to the south of the fence line that separates the parcel from the Department's right-of-way. But trouble soon followed: in late February or early March, the Department received several reports of unusual vegetation removal in the general area of Mr. Nobles' truck sign. In response, the Department requested one of its contractors, Metric Engineering, Inc. ("Metric"), to conduct a field inspection of the area. The inspection was performed on or about March 12, 2013, by Bill Armstrong, a certified arborist employed by Metric. During the course of his inspection, Mr. Armstrong observed, first, an area that the Department had previously cleared to facilitate the installation of a new fence, which had yet to be installed. This particular area, which ran along the length of the fence line and had been cleared within the preceding six months, had a width (as measured from the fence toward the roadway) of approximately 12 feet. Immediately beyond this 12-foot zone, however, Mr. Armstrong noticed evidence of other activity that had occurred much more recently. Specifically, Mr. Armstrong observed, on the side of the fence immediately opposite Mr. Nobles' truck, an area 120 feet in length (parallel to the fence line) and approximately 25 feet in width that had been cleared of vegetation. Within this 120 by 25 foot area, Mr. Armstrong discovered 30 tree stumps, which, upon close examination, exhibited signs of having been recently cut. Such indications included the presence of sawdust; the fact that the stumps were bright in color and relatively clean; and the observation of fresh debris at both ends of the swath. These findings were recorded in a report dated March 25, 2013, which Metric promptly forwarded to Morris Pigott, the Department's Project Manager of Vegetation and Resource Management. Several weeks later, Mr. Pigott conducted his own site visit, during which he examined the particular area that had concerned Mr. Armstrong. Consistent with the findings contained in Metric's report, Mr. Pigott observed, within the 120 by 25 foot area, numerous, freshly-cut tree stumps. Mr. Pigott further concluded, quite reasonably, that this activity had not been performed by the Department or one of its contractors, for the stumps had not been cut to ground level, the vegetation immediately to the east and west of the area was "very dense," and the area had not been "grubbed."12/ (As explained during the final hearing, "grubbing" involves the removal of the top six inches of surface material, an action designed to prevent regrowth.) To cinch matters, Mr. Pigott observed that the selective clearing of the 120 by 25 foot area had enhanced the visibility of Mr. Nobles' truck-mounted billboard for eastbound traffic. Thereafter, on April 14, 2013, Mr. Pigott cited Mr. Nobles for violating section 479.106(7), which provides that any person who engages in or benefits from the unauthorized removal of vegetation shall be subject to an administrative penalty. Mr. Pigott further notified Mr. Nobles that, pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.057, the Department intended to assess mitigation in the amount of $8,304.25. Mr. Nobles promptly denied any and all involvement in the removal, claiming that a road crew had cleared the vegetation two years earlier. In response, Mr. Pigott contacted Mr. Armstrong, disclosed Mr. Nobles' explanation, and asked that a follow-up inspection be performed. Mr. Armstrong conducted his second inspection on August 8, 2013. At that time, Mr. Armstrong observed that Mr. Nobles' truck-mounted billboard was still present, and that the stumps within the 120 by 25 foot area had sprouted and grown to a height of two to three feet. Samples of the sprouts were collected, which Mr. Armstrong later examined for evidence of internodes——i.e., rings that denote growth, with one ring forming during each growing season. Due to the absence of internodes, Mr. Armstrong concluded that the stumps were in their first growing season, thereby eliminating any possibility that the vegetation had been cleared several years earlier.13/ Finding that the evidence proves clearly and convincingly that Mr. Nobles benefitted from the unauthorized vegetation removal, the undersigned turns finally to the question of mitigation. As noted above, the Department seeks mitigation in the amount of $8,304.25, a figure derived from Mr. Armstrong's use of the formula referenced in rule 14-10.057. It is at this juncture that the Department's case falters. Although Mr. Armstrong offered credible testimony concerning the number and species of trees (water oaks, Florida maples, and the like) that were removed from the area, the record evidence regarding their market value consists entirely of hearsay. Indeed, the Department called no witness who possessed any firsthand knowledge as to the market value of the trees; instead, it presented only the testimony of Mr. Armstrong, who explained that he had telephoned three nurseries, obtained price quotes over the phone, averaged the three figures, and plugged the averages into the formula. To be clear, the undersigned has no quarrel with either the formula or Mr. Armstrong's initial reliance upon the price quotes. The problem is that, in the absence of a stipulation from Mr. Nobles concerning the amount of mitigation, the Department was obligated to adduce at least some non-hearsay evidence of the market values——the starting point of the calculations. Inasmuch as the record is devoid of such evidence, the Department's request for mitigation must be denied.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: DOAH Case No. 14-4926 RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order finding that the billboard identified in Notice of Violation 1487 ("Big O's") is illegal and subject to removal pursuant to section 479.105, Florida Statutes. It is further recommended that the Department enter a final order denying the related application for an outdoor advertising permit. DOAH Case No. 14-4927 RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation take no further action on Notice of Violation 1352 until such time that it reevaluates (under the pre-July 1, 2014, codification of section 479.105) the related application for an outdoor advertising permit. If the application is granted, the Department should enter a final order dismissing Notice of Violation 1352. In the event, however, the application is once again denied, the Department should afford Respondent a point of entry into the administrative process. DOAH Case No. 14-4928 RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating section 479.106, Florida Statutes, and imposing an administrative fine of $1,000.00 DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of May, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S EDWARD T. BAUER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of May, 2015.

Florida Laws (11) 120.569120.57120.68479.01479.02479.07479.105479.106479.111479.1690.704 Florida Administrative Code (1) 14-10.057
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs. FLORIDA MOTOR COURT, 76-000421 (1976)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 76-000421 Latest Update: Feb. 11, 1977

Findings Of Fact Respondent is owner of a certain sign located on U.S. 27 South, 3 8/10 miles south of the junction of State Road 261 with copy "Florida Motor Court." The area on which the sign is located is property zoned agriculture by Leon County, Florida Zoning Board. Respondent admits that he is the owner of the subject sign, that he obtained no permit and that the sign is located at the place described in paragraph (1). Respondent contends that he needs this sign for his business and that he owns the land upon which the sign is built, that he bought the land for the special purpose of building a sign to advertise his business. Petitioner contends that the sign violates Chapter 479.07, Florida Statutes, because it has no permit tag attached and that no permit can be issued inasmuch as the setback from the highway violates Chapter 479.111, Florida Statutes. The Respondent, Mr. Carrin, has requested and been granted numerous continuances for the purpose of either selling his property or getting the area rezoned so that his sign could be permitted. He has not sold the property and the zoning is still agriculture.

Recommendation Remove subject sign if same has not been removed by Respondent within ten days after the entry of a final order. DONE and ORDERED this 12th day of July, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Office of Legal Operations Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 W. P. Carrin, Sr. Florida Motor Court U.S. 27 South Tallahassee, Florida 32304

Florida Laws (2) 479.07479.111
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs. D AND H OIL COMPANY, 76-000580 (1976)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 76-000580 Latest Update: Jun. 15, 1977

The Issue Whether a sign owned by D & H Oil Company located along Interstate 10 approximately 1.1 miles East of State Road 81 bearing the copy "Spur" is in violation of the setback requirements set out in Section 479.11(1), Florida Statutes, and in violation of the permit requirements set out in Section 479.07(1) and (6), Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Respondent D & H Oil Company's sign is located forty- three (43) feet from the nearest edge of the right-of-way of Interstate 10 (I-10) and no permit is affixed to the subject sign. The sign in question is located within the extension of the city boundaries of Ponce de Leon, Florida as extended by ordinance drawn in 1970 and duly filed in 1975. The Town of Ponce de Leon adopted the comprehensive zoning ordinance which authorized use of business signs in commercial areas. An area north of I-10, Section 27, Township 4 North, Range 17 West was designated a commercial area. The Respondent D & H Oil Company constructed their sign in this zoned area which was within forty-three (43) feet of the nearest edge of the right-of- way of I-10, and applied to the Petitioner Florida Department of Transportation for a permit for the subject sign. The Petitioner denied the request for the reason that the sign was erected in violation of the setback requirements of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. The Respondent D & H Oil Company did not obtain a permit before erecting the sign and it is within the area presently described as the Town of Ponce de Leon, Florida. The Ordinance filed with the Secretary of State in December of 1975 authorized use of business signs in commercial areas. The area north of I-10 in Section 27, Township 4 North, Range 17 West was designated as a commercial area, together with other areas along the highway, and the sign of Respondent is erected within that area. The areas zoned commercially by the Town of Ponce de Leon stretches several miles along both sides of the right-of-way of I-10 and contains no commercial or industrial structures other than outdoor advertising signs. The Town of Ponce de Leon has not submitted to the Administrator of Outdoor Advertising, State of Florida Department of Transportation, its zoning regulations which control outdoor advertising, and the State of Florida Department of Transportation has not notified the Federal Highway Administrator that there has been established within such area regulations which are enforced with respect to the size, lighting and spacing of outdoor advertising signs consistent with the intent of the Highway Beautification Act of 1965 and customary use. Customary use is use consistent with that use regulated statewide by Chapter 479, Florida Statutes.

Recommendation Require the Respondent D & H Oil Company to remove the subject sign unless it can show within thirty (30) days from date hereof that the area in which the sign is located is in a zoned commercial and industrial area certified by the Florida Department of Transportation to the Federal Highway Administrator that there has been established with such area regulations which are enforced wish respect to the size, lighting and spacing of outdoor advertising signs consistent with the intent of the Highway Beautification Act of 1965 and with customary use. DONE and ORDERED this 29th day of October, 1976 in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: George L. Waas, Esquire Office of Legal Operations Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 James E. Moore, Esquire Post Office Box 746 Niceville, Florida Mr. O. E. Black, Administrator Outdoor Advertising Section Florida Department of Transportation Hayden Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Mr. J. E. Jordan District Sign Coordinator Post Office Box 607 Chipley, Florida 32428

Florida Laws (4) 479.02479.07479.11479.16
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs. MILLER OIL COMPANY, INC., 75-001415 (1975)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 75-001415 Latest Update: Oct. 06, 1976

The Issue Whether Respondent has violated Section 479.07(1)(4)(6) and 479.11(1), Florida Statutes. Respondent is a corporation and did not have counsel present at the hearing. In the light of Rule 14-6.03, Florida Administrative Code, which provides that all entities created by law shall be represented by counsels Mr. Miller was not permitted to represent the corporation at this hearings however, he was advised that if he so desired he could testify as a witness. He elected to do so during the proceedings. At the hearing Petitioner's representative moved to withdraw the allegation of a violation with regard to Respondent's sign on Interstate Highway I-10 located 1.8 miles east of State Road 81 on the north side. The amendment of the petition was granted.

Findings Of Fact The sign in question is on Interstate Highway I-10, .9 miles east of State Road 81 on the north side, and 18 feet from the I-10 right-of-way fence which in turn is located within 6 inches of the right-of-way. The text of the sign provides directions to a Fina gasoline station. The outdoor advertising inspector of District III has observed Mr. Miller at this station in the past. The inspector established the precise location of the sign and took a photograph thereof on December 10, 1975. The sign is not in a zoned or unzoned commercial or industrial area as evidenced by observation of the inspector and a sketch of the area prepared by him together with a general highway map of the Florida State Road Department establishes that the sign is not located within the city limits of Ponce de Leon, Florida, or any other incorporated city or town. No state permit tag issued by the Department of Transportation was affixed to the sign at the time of its inspection on December 10, 1975. Although Respondent has previously submitted an application for a permit it was not issued because the sign was in violation of existing law and regulations as determined by the Department (Testimony of Williams, Jordan; Exhibits 1, 2 & 3) Respondent's service station is south of Interstate Highway I-10 and at the time it was leased the land owner informed the Respondent's representative that its location was within the city limits of Ponce de Leon. In like manner, Respondent learned by hearsay that the area that he leased for his sign was also in the city limits. Respondent was under the impression that the problem was that his sign was located in an unzoned area. Mr. Miller testified that Exhibit 1 accurately depicted his sign and that Exhibit 2, its location and conceded that he had applied for a permit which was denied and that he presently did not have a permit for the sign which was built in the spring of 1975 (Testimony of Mr. Miller).

Florida Laws (3) 479.07479.11479.111
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs. T AND L MANAGEMENT, INC., 84-003870 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-003870 Latest Update: Nov. 07, 1985

Findings Of Fact The Respondent, T & L Management, Inc., was issued permits numbered AK081-12 and AK082-12 on or about August 30, 1983. These permits were for the erection of signs on the north side of I-10, approximately .4 mile west of SR 297, in Escambia County, Florida. They were issued because of the proximity of a welding business adjacent to the proposed sign location. The Respondent submitted the applications for these permits, and designated on the applications that the sign location would be in a commercial or industrial unzoned area within 800 feet of a business. On each of these applications the Respondent certified that the signs to be erected would meet all requirements of Chapter 479 of the Florida Statutes. Prior to the issuance of these permits, the subject site was inspected by the Department's outdoor advertising inspector, who approved the applications because of the existence of what she believed to be a welding shop nearby the proposed sign location. This inspector was looking for a welding shop because she had been informed that a welding shop was located there. What she saw was some welding being done on the property where the welding business was supposed to be. This could be seen from the interstate. Apparently because the inspector expected to find a welding business near the proposed sign site, she concluded that such a business existed there, and the applications were approved. However, the occupant of the subject property has lived there for 37 years, and he has never operated a welding business. He has only done welding on this site once since 1980, when he welded a bumper onto a truck in his barn. The photographs which were received in evidence show his property, and the general appearance of this area is residential or rural in nature, and not commercial. It is visible to traffic on I-10. The Department's inspector testified that she used a pair of binoculars to enable her to see a small sign reading "welding" on the property where she saw welding being done. However, the property owner denied that any such sign was on his property. Other witnesses presented by the Respondent also testified that they saw welding being done, but this issue has been resolved by accepting the testimony of the witness who lived on the property and who did the welding on the one occasion, as being the more credible and trustworthy evidence. The adjacent property is leased by Pensacola Outdoor Advertising. This property has a building on it which bears a small sign reading "Pensacola Outdoor Adv." and the telephone number. This building was leased by Pensacola Outdoor Advertising in 1984, and was not used for any business purpose when the permit applications were submitted. This property is also visible from I-10. When the Respondent applied for the subject permits there was no business activity being conducted within 800 feet of the proposed sign location. Therefore, the Department's inspector made a mistake in approving the Respondent's applications for this site. In October of 1984 the Department issued its violation notices advising the Respondent that the subject sign permits were being revoked.

Florida Laws (6) 120.57479.01479.02479.08479.11479.111
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs. PETERSON OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, 85-003017 (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-003017 Latest Update: Oct. 23, 1986

Findings Of Fact In March of 1984 the Respondent applied to the Department for a permit to erect a sign facing east at the location in question in this proceeding. The actual location proposed was 350 feet from the right-of-way of U.S. 17/92/441, adjacent to Oak Ridge Road, in Orange County, Florida. U.S. 17/92/441 is a federal-aid primary highway. Oak Ridge Road is a non-controlled road. There is another sign owned by the Respondent located 20 to 25 feet from the subject sign, but there is no evidence in the record to show which direction this other sign faces, or whether the two signs are on the same side of the highway. By memorandum dated April 5, 1984, the Department returned the Respondent's application for the reason that the sign location requested "is not on a federal-aid primary highway", and the Respondent "need only comply with local regulations". This memorandum stated further that "a state sign permit is not required" to locate a sign at the subject site. The application submitted by the Respondent in March of 1984 was returned with the notation on it that the proposed sign "need only comply with local regulations". Based upon the Department's response to its permit application, the Respondent erected its sign at the location where its application sought a permit. The sign that was erected is visible to traffic on U.S. 17/92/441, although it is parallel to U.S. 17/82/441 and at right angles to Oak Ridge Road. The notice of violation issued for the subject sign in July of 1985 seeks removal of this sign for not having the permit which the Respondent had applied for in 1984. The parties stipulated that it was the position of personnel of the Fifth District of the Department of Transportation prior to May of 1985 that state permits for outdoor advertising structures were not required when such structures were to be erected on a non-controlled highway, although said structures might be within 660 feet of a federal- aid primary highway. It was as a result of this erroneous interpretation of the applicable statutes and rules that the Respondent's application for a permit was returned in April of 1984 with the notation on it that a permit was not required. This erroneous interpretation allowed the Respondent's sign to be built.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the charges against the Respondent, Peterson Outdoor Advertising Corporation, in the violation notice issued on July 26, 1985, be dismissed, and that the sign which is the subject of this proceeding be given the classification of non-conforming sign. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered on this 23rd day of October, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of October, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Haydon Burns Building, MS-58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802-2151 Thomas Drawdy Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 A. J. Spalla General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================

Florida Laws (9) 120.57120.6835.22479.01479.07479.105479.11479.111479.16
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RALPH KAZARIAN ADVERTISING AGENCY vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 78-000644 (1978)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 78-000644 Latest Update: Sep. 28, 1978

The Issue Whether the signs of the Petitioner should be removed for violations of Section 479.07(2) and 14-10.04(2), no current permit and the violation of Section 479.07(2) and 14-10.06(3), a spacing violation.

Findings Of Fact An alleged violation of Chapter 479, Section 335 and 339.31, Florida Statutes, and notice to show cause was sent to the Petitioner on the 13th day of February, 1978 alleging that a sign owned by Petitioner located on a roof top thirty (30) feet east of Mills Avenue and State Road 50 with copy reading "WFTV Eyewitness News" is in violation of Section 479.07(2), having no current permit visible. A second sign located on the same roof top, 30 feet east of Mills Avenue and State Road 50 with copy "B.J. 105 Radio Station", was in violation of Section 479.07(2) as having no current permit visible and also in violation of Section 479.02(2), Rule 14-10-06(3), Florida Administrative Code, violation of a spacing requirement. An application was made by Petitioner for a permit but was denied by the Respondent for the two subject signs. The sign with the copy "B.J. 105 Radio Station" is less than 500 feet from a permitted billboard and has no current permit tag attached thereto. The sign with the copy "WFTV Eyewitness News", has no current permit tag attached thereto. The subject signs advertise off-premise businesses and must have permits from the Respondent, Department of Transportation. No permits have been issued for either of the subject signs. Petitioner has agreed that any improper use of the sign will be discontinued and contemplates an "on-premise or on-site" sign which the Respondent has agreed is a proper use and not in violation of the statutes and rules.

Recommendation Remove the signs of Petitioner within 30 days from the date hereof unless such signs are permitted by the Respondent after a change in the copy on the sign structures. DONE AND ORDERED this 18th day of August, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce E. Chapin, Esquire 201 East Pine Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Philip Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (2) 479.02479.07
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