The Issue The issues in this case are whether former Hillsborough County Administrator Patricia G. Bean (Respondent) violated section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes (2011),1/ and, if so, what penalty, if any, should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Beginning in 2003, and at all times material to this case, the Respondent was employed as the county administrator for Hillsborough County, Florida. In Spring 2006, various departments of the Hillsborough County government were engaged in reviewing their responsibilities and developing proposals to increase efficiencies and reduce costs for upcoming budget years. An "executive team" of county employees met periodically to determine which of the proposals met or exceeded efficiency goals that were targeted towards reducing costs while maintaining services. In the Summer or Fall of 2006, the Respondent, Deputy County Administrator Walter Hill, and County Budget Director Eric Johnson began to discuss ways to encourage and reward department directors who met efficiency goals. At that time, the county government had three existing "award" options that could be used to reward employees for exceptional service. One award consisted of a paper certificate called the "Extra Mile Award." There was no monetary gain associated with receiving an "Extra Mile Award." The second award (the "Productivity Award") included a monetary bonus and was available to most employees (with some exceptions) for exceptional performance. The third award was the "Discretionary 1% Merit Increase" available to senior management employees. This award consisted of a one percent "merit" salary increase over and above any regular pay raise that the employee would have received. The Respondent, along with Deputy County Administrator Hill and County Budget Director Johnson, decided to use the "Extra Mile Award" and the merit salary increase to reward department directors who met efficiency goals. The Respondent was responsible for the final determination as to which employees would receive awards. The "Extra Mile Certificate" awards were announced at a budget "kick-off" meeting on the morning of February 1, 2007. After the meeting, the Respondent issued a written congratulatory memo to each employee who received a certificate. She also used the memo to notify those employees who had been awarded the salary increase. The Respondent's department met the efficiency goals. At the time of the budget kick-off meeting, the Respondent believed that her employment contract with Hillsborough County precluded her from accepting it, and she excluded herself from the salary increase. The Charter of Hillsborough County provided that the "compensation" for the county administrator "shall be fixed by the Board of County Commissioners by ordinance" and that such compensation "may be set by contract if allowed by and pursuant to ordinance." The Respondent's employment contract with Hillsborough County established her initial salary as $179,000. According to Section 6 of the contract, the Respondent was entitled to receive the same "annual market equity increase" provided to "all other unclassified managerial employees of the County." The section also stated that additional salary or benefit increases could be granted by action of the BCC within 60 days of her annual performance evaluation. Hillsborough County Attorney Renee Lee and Director of the Hillsborough County Environmental Protection Commission Richard Garrity also met the efficiency goals, but their employment contracts with the county contained provisions similar to those of the Respondent, and, so, the Respondent excluded Ms. Lee and Mr. Garrity from receiving the salary increase. Both received the "Extra Mile Award" at the budget kick-off meeting. After the meeting had concluded, Ms. Lee sent an email addressed to the Respondent and Deputy County Administrator Hill wherein she asserted that the terms of her contract allowed her to receive "the award." In the email, Ms. Lee cited a provision in her contract that referenced entitlement to "such other benefits" as were made available to other county employees. Although there appears to have been some confusion regarding the names of the awards available to recognize county employees for their performance, it was clear that the reference to the "Extra Mile Award" in Ms. Lee's email referred to the salary increase. The Respondent's employment contract contained language similar to that cited in Ms. Lee's email, whereby the Respondent was entitled to the "benefits" available to other managerial employees in the county. As the county attorney, Ms. Lee reported directly to the BCC and, pursuant to the county charter, was the chief legal advisor for the BCC on all matters of county business, including personnel matters. The Respondent had no managerial authority over the county attorney at any time relevant to this proceeding. There is no evidence that the Respondent discussed the matter with Ms. Lee. After receiving Ms. Lee's email, the Respondent directed Deputy County Administrator Hill to contact Christina Swanson (director of the Employee Benefits Division in the county's Human Resources Department) and ask her to evaluate Ms. Lee's email. Deputy County Administrator Hill apparently did so, and Ms. Swanson thereafter asked Ms. Lee to provide a written legal opinion addressing whether the salary increase could be awarded under the terms of the contracts. On February 2, 2007, Ms. Lee issued a written legal opinion addressed to Ms. Swanson, stating that both Ms. Lee and the Respondent could receive the salary increases under the terms of their respective contracts. Although she had received a law degree, Ms. Swanson had not worked as a practicing attorney. The issues of the whether the salary increases underlying this case constituted a "benefit" of employment with Hillsborough County, and whether Ms. Lee's written legal opinion was correct, are not at issue in this proceeding. After Ms. Swanson received Ms. Lee's written legal opinion, the Human Resources Department processed the forms required to implement the salary increases for the Respondent and for Ms. Lee. The Respondent testified that she discussed the matter with Ms. Swanson after Ms. Lee issued the legal opinion. Ms. Swanson did not recall the conversation. In any event, the evidence fails to establish that the Respondent directed Ms. Swanson, or any other employee in the Human Resources Department, to process the paperwork required to implement the salary increases. On February 7, 2007, George Williams, the director of the county's Human Resources Department, signed the form ("Report of Change of Status"), approving the one percent salary increase awarded to the Respondent. The Respondent's hourly salary rate was increased from $101.82 to $102.84, effective January 7, 2007. The Respondent did not receive a copy of the form. Deb Dahma, a staff member in the Human Resources Department, signed the form approving the one percent salary increase awarded to Ms. Lee. The signature on that form was undated. There is no evidence that the Respondent directed either Mr. Williams or Ms. Dahma to sign the forms. The executed forms were sent to the county's payroll department, and their salary increases were implemented. On February 8, 2007, Ms. Lee authored another email to Ms. Swanson wherein she opined that, upon review of Mr. Garrity's contract, he was also eligible for the salary increase. There is no evidence that the Respondent participated in any effort to award the salary increase to Mr. Garrity, or that he accepted or received the salary increase. Both the Respondent and Ms. Lee accepted the salary increases. The county administrator's staff was responsible for preparation of agendas for BCC meetings. The Respondent participated in the preparation process and could direct placement of items on the agenda. The Respondent did not provide the BCC with an opportunity to consider the salary increases referenced herein and did not seek the explicit approval of the salary increases from the BCC either prior to or after they were implemented. The Respondent believed that the Human Resources Department, which handled personnel matters, would seek any approval of the salary increases required from the BCC, but the Human Resources Department did not bring the matter to the BCC for review. Although the BCC approved the Respondent's salary, including the increase underlying this case, during the Respondent's subsequent performance review, the evidence fails to establish that the BCC was advised that the salary included an increase that had not been approved by the BCC. At some later point, the Respondent's salary increase apparently became a matter of conflict with the BCC, and her salary was reduced to negate the one percent increase. The Respondent reimbursed Hillsborough County for the funds she received through the salary increase. The Respondent's employment as the Hillsborough County administrator was eventually terminated. An investigation of the circumstances of the raise that was conducted by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement resulted in no criminal charges being filed against the Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Ethics enter a final order and public report finding that Patricia G. Bean did not violate section 112.313(6) and dismissing the complaint filed in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of May, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of May, 2012.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Jerry O. Bryan began working for the State Road Department in 1968. In 1983, he started his most recent assignment with the agency, now called the Florida Department of Transportation, as an engineering technician III, in a career service position. An employee handbook respondent was furnished in 1983 had this to say about "JOB ABANDONMENT": After an unauthorized leave of absence for three consecutive workdays, the Department will consider you to have abandoned your position and resigned from the Career Service. It is very important that you coordinate any personal absences with your immediate supervisor, in accordance with our current leave policy. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, at page 43. Perhaps with this in mind, respondent requested leave without pay when he learned he faced six months' incarceration, as a result of his criminal conviction for cultivating marijuana on federal property. Respondent's supervisor, Robert Edward Minchin, Jr. denied his request for leave without pay, in accordance with a DOT policy against granting leave to DOT employees who are incarcerated. Mr. Bryan did not request annual leave, although some 220 hours' entitlement had accumulated. Asked whether he would have granted Mr. Bryan's leave request absent "a policy of not authorizing leave while someone was incarcerated," Mr. Minchin answered in the negative, saying Mr. Bryan "was going to be needed during ... [the time] he would be out. T.22. At no time did petitioner ever take disciplinary action against respondent, who received satisfactory or higher job performance ratings, the whole time he worked for petitioner. Aware that Mr. Bryan did not desire or intend to resign, relinquish or abandon his career service position, Mr. Minchin took steps to remove him from the payroll solely on grounds that he was absent without authorized leave for three consecutive workdays.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That petitioner reinstate respondent and award back pay, but without prejudice to instituting any appropriate proceedings before the Public Employees Relations Commission. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of November, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of November, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerry O. Bryan Federal Prison Camp Post Office Box 600 Eglin AFB, Florida 32542-7606 William A. Frieder, Esquire Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Robert Scanlon, Esquire Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Aletta Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
The Issue Whether Respondent resigned from her position in Career Service by abandonment while employed by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services.
Findings Of Fact Prior to August 7, 1989, Gladys Dozier was employed by HRS as a clerk typist. On this date she was absent without authorized leave. On August 7, Respondent called her supervisor to tell her that she wasn't feeling well and would be late coming in. She came in at 9:57 a.m., and at 11:15 a.m. told her supervisor she wasn't feeling well and needed to go home. She left work around 11:20 a.m. On August 8, Respondent again called her supervisor to advise her that she wasn't feeling well but would come in later that morning. Respondent did not come to work that day and was not authorized leave. On August 9, Respondent again called in to say she wasn't feeling well and would not be in for the remainder of the week, but would report to work on August 14, 1989. She was then advised that she needed to bring in a medical statement from her doctor that she was unable to come to work those days she had missed. On August 11, 1989, Respondent again called the office and was reminded that she needed a medical statement for the time she had been absent. By certified letter dated August 15, 1989, and received by Respondent on August 16, 1989, Respondent's immediate supervisor, Mary Simmons, advised Respondent that she was expected at work not later than August 17, 1989, that the medical statement she had sent to the office August 14, 1989 was insufficient to justify more than one day's absence and that if she did not return to work by August 17, 1989, action would be taken to terminate her employment with HRS. Respondent did not return to work. By certified mail dated September 6, 1989 Respondent was advised that she had been absent from work without approved leave since August 14, 1989 and that pursuant to Rule 22A-7.010(2)(c), Florida Administrative Code, she is deemed to have abandoned her position with HRS and to have resigned from the career service system as of the close of business September 7, 1989. Thereafter Respondent submitted her undated letter which was received at the Division of Administrative Hearings on October 26, 1989, and these proceedings followed.
Recommendation It is recommended that the appeal of Gladys Dozier from the determination by HRS that she abandoned her position with the department be dismissed and her resignation from the Career Service be affirmed. ENTERED this 17th day of January, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of January, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas C. Caufman, Esquire Aletta Shutes Department of Health and Secretary Rehabilitative Services Department of Administration 701 94th Avenue North 435 Carlton Building St. Petersburg, FL 33702 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Gladys Dozier Augustus D. Aikens, Jr. 2032 Quincy Street General Counsel St. Petersburg, FL 33711 Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building William A. Frieder, Esquire Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Sam Power Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 John Miller General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700
Recommendation The Hearing Officer would, based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, recommend that no action be taken because Dr. Evangelakis has not suffered a demotion or other personnel action appealable to the Career Service Commission. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of August, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of August, 1976. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas E. Whitney, Esquire HRS, Legal Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32301 E. Leonard Fleet, Esquire 4001 Hollywood Blvd. Hollywood, Florida 33021 Mrs. Dorothy Roberts Appeals Coordinator Division of Personnel & Retirement Department of Administration 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding is whether Petitioner was the subject of unlawful employment practices by her employer because of her race and age.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a 28-year-old African-American female. Respondent operates one of the State’s largest psychiatric hospitals. In April 2004, Respondent had at least 3 openings for a full-time Secretary Specialist at different units of the hospital. In April 2004, Petitioner along with two other female applicants were contacted and asked if they were interested in being considered for three Secretary Specialist positions with Respondent. The positions’ duties involved, among other things, typing medical records and compiling reports on the units’ patients and recording, transcribing and disseminating all staff meetings held on these units. Petitioner and the two other women indicated that they would like to be considered for the positions. One of the women who applied for the positions was an older, white female who had worked at the hospital for at least 10 years. No evidence demonstrated the actual age of this older woman or how much older she was than Petitioner. The evidence also did not demonstrate if her work history extended beyond 10 years outside the hospital. The other applicant, like Petitioner, was a beginning employee at the hospital. Other than the fact she met the minimum qualifications for the positions, the evidence did not establish her race, age, or work experience. Petitioner’s application was not introduced into evidence. At the time, Petitioner had about 6 years of work experience as an office manager and /or an executive secretary. The experience does not appear to be in the medical or psychiatric field. As can be seen from a review of the evidence and pleadings in this case, Petitioner’s writing skills are very poor and are replete with poor grammar and incorrect word usage to the point of being almost incomprehensible. Therefore, the quality of her executive secretary skills are questionable. As part of her application packet, Petitioner submitted several educational/professional credentials to Respondent. The credentials consisted of certificates in the areas of Office Supervision II and III and Post Secondary Office Supervision and Administration. Petitioner claims that these credentials entitled her to a higher salary than she would have received as a beginning employee or at the least allowed her to negotiate for a higher salary. However, no evidence was offered that supported Petitioner’s contention that such credentials entitled her to a higher salary or that she lost her opportunity to negotiate for a higher salary. The fact that the position may have been advertised as “open-competitive” does not mean that an applicant is entitled to or will receive a higher salary offer. The classification only enables an employer or employee to negotiate a salary based on qualifications. The employer and employee are not required to negotiate and either may elect not to negotiate. Indeed, negotiation may be non-existent based on budget considerations and the availability of other applicants willing to work for less pay. At some point, an interview was scheduled for Petitioner by Deborah Joyce. In setting up the interview, Ms. Joyce advised Petitioner that the starting salary for the position was $766.52 every two weeks. Petitioner indicated that she wished to be interviewed for the positions. All three womens’ application packets were reviewed by a hiring committee. All three women were offered employment as Secretary Specialists at different units. Petitioner and the other beginning applicant were offered employment at $766.52 every 2 weeks. The older, white woman was allegedly offered employment at a higher salary than the two beginning employees. However, there was no evidence that demonstrated how much the older woman’s salary was, whether it differed from Petitioner’s and its relationship to the salary she had been receiving in her then current position at the hospital. Petitioner did not introduce into evidence the pay scale for the position to which she applied. Some evidence suggests that the offered salary was the beginning and lowest salary for that position. Petitioner testified that the offered salary was at the low-end of the scale for the position that she applied for. Her testimony in that regard is accepted. Petitioner was informed by telephone of the Respondent’s offer of employment to work on the unit known as Cypress Village. The telephone call was made by Lela Parker- Clark, a black female and the medical unit’s specialist (MUS). The unit’s treatment and rehabilitation director (UTRD) was Sateria Gunter, a black female. Ms. Gunter and Ms. Parker-Clark would be Petitioner’s supervisors. The evidence indicated that both women had been working on the unit for several years and apparently had done various routines and reports in the same manner for some time. No evidence was offered as to the actual age of Ms. Gunter or Ms. Parker-Clark, other than they were both older than Petitioner and had possibly worked their way up to their administrative positions from direct care staff. Because the offered salary was not what Petitioner desired, she inquired further of Ms. Parker-Clark about the salary. Petitioner learned that her educational credentials had been lost and possibly had not been reviewed by the committee. Ms. Gunter indicated that she would have the committee review its offer if Petitioner would fax her the documents. Petitioner faxed the documents to a fax machine at the hospital. It is unclear whether the documents were received and reviewed by the committee or whether the committee was made aware of Petitioner’s additional educational documents. The evidence conflicts on this point. At the time of the hearing, neither the original nor faxed documents were in Petitioner’s personnel file. Indeed, only copies of later-supplied documents that were specially marked by Petitioner are in Petitioner’s personnel file. In any event, the salary offer was not changed. No one from the committee testified at the hearing regarding the documents reviewed by the committee or otherwise made known to the committee. No evidence was offered that demonstrated that such added credentials would have made a difference in the salary offered to Petitioner. Petitioner offered no evidence that Respondent elected to negotiate any salaries with any of the people it hired as Secretary Specialists. The fact that a white, 10-year employee of Respondent may have been offered a higher salary than Petitioner does not demonstrate that the salary was negotiated or that Respondent otherwise discriminated against Petitioner based on her race or age since the employee in question was already an employee with more years of experience at the hospital. Without such evidence, it is impossible to determine whether the absence of the documents was deliberate or unintentional, motivated by Petitioner’s race or age or even caused an adverse impact in the conditions or terms of Petitioner’s employment. Ms. Gunter informed Petitioner that the position was still available at the original salary offer of $766.52. Instead of attempting to negotiate further by declining the offer, Petitioner accepted employment and began working at the unit on May 21, 2004. Petitioner accepted the offer because she needed the income. There was no evidence that demonstrated Petitioner, who is a competent adult, was somehow coerced into her decision to accept the offer by Respondent. In the beginning, the relationship between Ms. Gunter, Ms. Parker-Clark and Petitioner was reasonably good. However, once Petitioner began to question the manner in which Ms. Parker-Clark did things the relationship deteriorated. Ms. Parker-Clark became abrasive and, Petitioner claims, more strict regarding Petitioner’s leave than with co-workers. She would belittle Petitioner in front of co-workers. Ms. Parker- Clark had the security desk record when Petitioner arrived at work. Based on the recorded time, both women claimed Petitioner was falsifying her timesheet and forced her to change her claimed time on several occasions. Many of the accusations arose from the fact that Petitioner was often late because of difficulties with her daughter, who had learning disabilities. Additionally, Petitioner sometimes arrived early and sometimes stayed late; that, in Petitioner’s view, made up her time. However, per hospital policy, such early arrival or late stay was not credited unless pre-approved by Petitioner’s supervisor. Outside of Petitioner’s claims of forced time-sheet changes based on time she had to take to deal with her daughter’s disability or disallowed overtime, etc., there was no evidence that other similarly-situated employees were treated differently than Petitioner. In fact, the only testimony regarding Ms. Parker-Clark’s and Ms. Gunter’s treatment of other employees was that there were some employees they treated well and some employees they did not treat well and that there may have been ongoing “management problems” on the unit. There was no evidence that such treatment was based on the race or age of the individual employee. Petitioner assumes and asserts that she was entitled to family medical leave, credit for overtime for staying late or more flexible hours. However, she offers no proof that she was entitled to such. Without such evidence Petitioner cannot show that she has suffered an adverse impact in the terms or conditions of her employment. Petitioner also claims she received unwarranted disciplinary actions. Again there was no evidence offered that such discipline was unwarranted. Indeed Petitioner admits that actions she received written reprimands for occurred. Around September 28, 2004, relationships between Ms. Parker-Clark and Petitioner came to a head when Petitioner came to the conclusion that Ms. Parker-Clark had never placed her educational credentials in her personnel file. Petitioner based this conclusion on the fact that, while training herself to use the new computerized personnel system, Peoples First, adopted and, at the time, being implemented, by the State, she discovered that her educational credentials were not listed on the system. Petitioner was training herself because Ms. Parker– Clark refused to train her. Petitioner contacted the personnel office for the hospital and was told that her file was not in their office because it had been sent to Peoples First to be scanned into the system. Unfortunately, the Peoples First system is known for glitches and errors in its records. Petitioner met with Ms. Gunter and Ms. Parker-Clark in a very heated meeting to discuss the lack of information on the Peoples First system and her feelings that Ms. Parker-Clark had intentionally lost the educational documents. Petitioner also voiced her opinion that she was entitled to an increased salary based on her credentials. Petitioner was not satisfied with the response from Ms. Gunter in the meeting. Around October 5, 2004, Petitioner met with Ennis Harris, the assistant administrator of the hospital, over her “issues” with Ms. Parker-Clark and what she should do. Mr. Harris suggested she apply for a transfer to another unit. On October 7, 2004, Petitioner, applied for a transfer to the position of Internal Senior Clerk on another unit. He also indicated that he would approve flex-time for her if Petitioner requested it and that she might be entitled to leave under the Family Medical Leave Act. Around October 13, 2004, Petitioner requested flexible working hours. As promised, Mr. Ennis approved her schedule. At about the same time, Petitioner requested transfer to a Senior Clerk position on another unit. On October 18, 2004, Petitioner requested that her salary be increased by 16 1/2 percent and that she receive such increased pay from the beginning of her employment. There was no evidence that demonstrated the basis for a 16 1/2 percent increase or that such an increase was warranted. On October 21, 2004, the increase was denied by Ms. Gunter. On October 27, 2004, Petitioner grieved Ms. Gunter’s decision. Personnel policy requires that a grievance be filed within 14 days of the act that caused the grievance. The human resources manager returned the grievance without action because 14 days had passed since Petitioner began employment on May 21, 2004, and Petitioner had the opportunity to decline the offered salary if she so desired. On November 1, 2004, Petitioner’s request for transfer was declined because of personnel rules based on the Union contract with the State that prevented transfer of a probationary employee to a higher position. On November 10, 2004, Petitioner appealed the return of her grievance and appealed or grieved the denial of her requests for salary increase and transfer to the hospital administration. The denial was upheld. During this review, Ms. Gunter claimed that Petitioner’s educational/professional certificates had been reviewed by the committee and claimed that the documents in Petitioner’s file were the actual documents reviewed and considered. However, the documents were the certificates that had been specially marked by Petitioner and later placed in her file. Ms. Gunter was unaware of the special demarcation of the documents. Claims of dishonesty were now mutual. Eventually, Petitioner did not wish to deal with Ms. Parker-Clark, unless her job duties required such. Petitioner complained to various administrators of the facility often about her treatment on the unit. Mr. Harris told her that the salary issue was dead and all options to have her salary increased had been explored. On November 22, 2004, Petitioner submitted a letter of resignation at a future date not expected to go past December 13, 2004. In that letter, Petitioner requested overtime hours with pay to complete her job assignments. The same date, Ms. Gunter denied the requested overtime and requested Petitioner to supply a date certain for her resignation. On November 23, 2004, she filed complaints that Ms. Gunter and Ms. Parker-Clark discriminated against her based on her race and age with the hospital’s equal employment office and similar complaints at PERC. On December 7, 2004, Petitioner forwarded an e-mail to the hospital attorney that stated she was leaving early and did not know when she would be back because she was tired of the harassment she was receiving on the unit. Sometime after that e-mail, Petitioner met with the hospital attorney. The hospital did not want to lose Petitioner as an employee and in an effort to help Petitioner, on December 9, 2004, the administration transferred Petitioner to another unit where she has performed well. Even though Petitioner had been requesting a transfer, it is this transfer that Petitioner alleged as a discriminatory action by the hospital. On this point Petitioner’s claim of discrimination has no merit and was clearly not demonstrated by the evidence. Petitioner has also been approved for a promotion at a higher salary, but the promotion has not yet taken effect. The promotion has been on hold because the hospital administrator retired and his replacement had recently taken over prior to the hearing. No evidence demonstrated that the delay was due to any unlawful employment practice. There was no evidence offered regarding a paycheck discrepancy around December 10, 2004. Ultimately, Petitioner’s case rests on assumption and speculation about others’ intentions and terms of employment that she claims she was entitled to. The problem is that there was no or insufficient evidence offered to demonstrate such unlawful intentions or entitlement. Indeed, assuming that Petitioner’s treatment was unjustified, it is more likely that Ms. Gunter and Ms. Parker-Clark engaged in such treatment because Petitioner was a new employee who questioned the old way of doing things and did not hesitate to go around them when she felt a need to do so. Assumptions and speculations are not enough. Therefore, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of September, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of September, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Viritti Jackson 2173 West 15th Street Jacksonville, Florida 32209 Scott D. Leemis, Esquire Northeast Florida State Hospital 7487 South State Road 121 Macclenny, Florida 32063 Carolyn Dudley, Assistant Staff Director Department of Children and Family Services Building 6, Room 123 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 3239-9070 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent has complied with the Final Order of the Florida Commission on Human Relations.
Findings Of Fact On July 9, 1990 after an evidentiary hearing on the Petitioner’s charge of racial discrimination, a Recommended Order was issued in favor of Petitioner. On June 18, 1992, after reviewing Respondent’s exceptions to the Recommended Order and after argument of Respondent’s counsel at a hearing before the Commission, the Florida Commission on Human Relations entered a Final Order in favor of the Petitioner, Ronnie Wideman. The Final Order stated in part: That the Respondent cease and desist from engaging in unlawful employment practices of this nature; That Respondent offer to promote Petitioner to the next available Quality Support Process Engineer or substantially similar position; That Respondent pay Petitioner back pay and benefits to which he would have been entitled had he received the Quality Support Process Engineer position; That Respondent pay Petitioner reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in litigating this claim, and That the Respondent notify the Commission in writing within 20 calendar days of the date of filing this Order of the steps that have been taken to comply with this Order. The Final Order was received by Respondent, filed and forgotten. The person who was responsible for filing and notifying the Pensacola plant of the Order’s requirements was the same person who failed to show for the original hearing in 1990. No appeal of the Final Order was filed by the Respondent. There was no attempt by Respondent to comply with the provisions of the Final Order, including the reporting, promotional and salary requirements of the Final Order. There are two relevant categories of jobs at Respondent’s facilities. There are hourly paid or non-exempt jobs and salaried administrative or exempt jobs. The exemption refers to whether the job is exempt from the union contract and collective bargaining. All of the salaried jobs at Respondent’s facilities are graded based on job responsibilities. The grades range from Grade 8 to Grade 25. The grade of a position relates to a salary structure for each grade. The salary structure provides for a range of salaries divided into thirds. A salary range for a grade often overlaps the salary range for the adjoining grade levels. The salary grade schedules for 1988-1996 are contained in Appendix 1 of this Recommended Order. Petitioner has been continuously employed with Respondent since 1976. He has been employed as a “paper tester/technician” since before the original charge of discrimination was filed in this case and held such a position at the time of the final hearing in 1990. The actual position title has varied over the years and has been assigned to different work sections over the years. However, Petitioner’s work in his job has remained essentially one of testing the quality of the paper Respondent makes and entering the data in the computer for analysis. Although he has never been promoted to the position of shift supervisor, Respondent has at various times filled some of the duties of the shift supervisor’s position, Grade 14. Petitioner has been and continues to be considered a competent and capable employee by Respondent. The position of “paper tester/technician” was throughout the time period involved in the original charge of discrimination to the present an hourly-paid position. Hourly paid employees can be required to work overtime and are paid for overtime work at the rate of the employee’s hourly rate plus one-half the hourly rate. Hourly employees receive pension benefits through a non-contributory plan. Hourly employees also can participate in 401-K retirement plans. The hourly employee’s contributions to a 401-K plan are matched at .50 cents on the dollar by the Respondent. However, the maximum amount an hourly employee can contribute to that employee’s 401-K plan is capped at $800.00. Since 1988, Petitioner’s hourly rate of pay has been, as follows: Ronnie Wideman SSN 250-94-9677 Position Effective Date Hourly Rate of Pay Paper Test 3B 08/01/88 $13.39* Paper Test 4B 03/23/89 13.90* Paper Test 4B (GWI) 07/01/89 14.25* Paper Test 4B (GWI) 07/01/90 14.54* Paper Test 4B (GWI) 07/01/91 14.90* Paper Test 4BC 05/09/92 15.46* Paper Test 4BC (GWI) 07/01/92 15.85* Paper Test 4BC (GWI) 07/01/93 16.25* Central Lab D 12/13/93 16.67 Paper Test 4BC 05/10/94 16.25* Paper Test 4BC (GWI) 07/01/94 16.66* Central Lab D 07/18/94 17.09 Central Lab 2D 08/26/94 17.29 Paper Test 4BC 04/05/95 16.66* Paper Test 4BC (GWI) 07/01/95 17.16* Central Lab 2D 01/23/96 17.81 Central Lab 3D 03/04/96 18.04 Central Lab 4D 05/10/96 18.24 Central Lab 4D (GWI) 07/01/96 18.79 Central Lab Family E 10/03/96 19.71 Petitioner also received at various times throughout the time period shown above an additional $.73 cents an hour for every hour worked as a Continuous Process Allowance for the difficulties of maintaining a four-shift job schedule necessitating working approximately 2300 hours per year. The pay periods during which Petitioner received the added Continuous Process Allowance are marked with an asterisk. The position of Quality Support Process Engineer was the position to which Respondent unlawfully failed to promote Petitioner and formed the basis of the original charge of discrimination. In 1988, when Petitioner should have been promoted, there were two openings for a quality support process engineer. The grade level was not advertised, but Respondent was told by a lab technician that the salary would range from $40,000.00 to $45,000.00 per year. The $40,000.00 range would have caused the position to fall within the grades 11, 12, 13 or 14. 11. The position of Quality Support Process Engineer was a salaried position with an annual salary based on the position’s grade level and the employee’s credentials and experience. As a salaried employee, the employee does not receive overtime pay, but still may be expected to work overtime in order to perform all the responsibilities of the position. Salaried employees receive pension benefits and can make up to a 6 percent contribution to that employee’s 401-K retirement plan which is matched at .50 cents on the dollar by Respondent. There is no cap on the amount of the contribution other than the 6 percent contribution. The position involves the supervision of the work of the “paper testers/technicians” and the laboratory in which the paper testing is performed. The position also involves attempting to resolve poor paper quality issues, as well as coordinating paper quality problems or issues with senior and field engineers and customers. Respondent prefers a person with a science degree to fill this position, but, as is obvious from the promotions described later, also recognizes a person’s knowledge gained through work in the paper field. In the past, Respondent has promoted employees to the position of Quality Support Process Engineer or similar position’s based on field experience absent a scientific degree. The position has had various titles and been housed in different areas due to Respondent’s reorganization of the various processes of papermaking. Those processes are cutsize, offset, market pulp and pulp. Essentially, Respondent has reorganized its work force at least twice. Beginning in 1991, The technical (paper testers) department and the quality departments were combined into a centralized technical department. The reorganized department still had people which performed quality process engineer functions, shift supervisors and paper testers. In fact, the functions of each person’s job didn’t substantially change. In 1995, the centralized department was eliminated and the technicians, quality support and supervisors were distributed between the various systems of cutsize, offset, market pulp and pulp. At about the same time, the shift supervisor positions were eliminated. The people who filled those positions remained, but transferred to more defined quality support positions under a new engineer grade system. In August of 1988, Charles C. “Red” Bradford (white male) was promoted to one of the two Quality Support Process Engineer positions. Mr. Bradford had been employed at Champion since 1956. Considerably longer than Petitioner. For a year prior to his promotion, Mr. Bradford had worked as the shift supervisor. Prior to shift supervisor, he had been a paper tester along with Petitioner. Upon promotion he received a salary of $45,500.00, even though he did not have a college degree. The position carried a grade level of 14. Mr. Bradford’s promotion was not discriminatory because of his greater experience in papermaking. At the same time, Kathy Dyess (white female), who was hired in 1983 performed the duties of an administrative clerical secretary but had a college degree in biology, was promoted to the second opening for Quality Support Process Engineer. She received a salary of $26,500.00 The position carried a level of Grade 10. Her promotion was discriminatory because of her lesser qualifications for the position when compared to Respondent’s. Because she had fewer qualifications for the position her starting position and subsequent work history since 1988 cannot be used to establish the salary Petitioner should have had if he had been promoted instead of Ms. Dyess. Clearly, Petitioner was entitled to make more than Ms. Dyess given his greater qualifications. Promotions which occurred in later years to substantially similar quality support positions given to David Currey and William Findley reflect a salary and grade level of Neither David Curry, nor Charles Findley had a college degree in the hard sciences, David Currey was hired as an hourly employee in 1971, four years before Petitioner, but is the most similar to Petitioner. Charles Findley was hired as an hourly employee in 1959 and is more similar to Red Bradford based on his greater number of years of experience. Both Mr. Currey and Mr. Findley were shift supervisors prior to their promotions to positions similar to Quality Support Process Engineer. Thus, except for Kathy Dyess’ promotion to Quality Support Process engineer, the evidence demonstrates that the position of Quality Support Process Engineer to which Petitioner should have been promoted carried a grade level of 14 and in 1988 a salary range of $35,800.00 to $57,400.00.1 Moreover, what is very clear from the evidence is that even though Mr. Curry had considrably less work experience at Champion, both men received salaries around the mid-range of the grade 14 salary range throughout the years they were grade level 14 employees. As senior and junior employees the difference between their salaries varied but fell around $2300.00. Therefore, in 1988 Petioner was entitled to receive compensation approximately $2300.00 less than the compensation received by Mr. Bradford. Petitoner’s increase in salary should have been to an hourly rate based on an annual salary of $43,200.00 for a 40 hour work week and 52 weeks in a year, i.e. an hourly rate of $20.77. In the years following 1988, Petitioner should have received increases in his salary based on a mid-range performance rating of 3, utilizing the upper percentage increase for that performance rating. Generally, both Mr.Curry and Mr. Findley received slightly more than the highest percentage rate for their performance rating. The current equivalent positions to the Quality Support Process Engineer are spread over a grade 10 Assistant Engineer, grade 11 Associate Engineer, grade 12 Engineer, grade 13 Process Engineer and grade 14 Senior Process Engineer. The evidence demonstrated that both Findley and Curry were brought into the new job classifications at level 14 around 1995. Given the fact that David Curry’s career tract is simmilar to what Petitioner’s would have experienced if he had received the promotion he was entitled to, he would have in 1995 received a similar position to grade 14 Senior Process Engineer and is entitled to receive a salary within that range for 1995. However, by 1995, Findley and Curry both had the opportunity to increase their skills and maintain their salary grade level under the 1995 engineer grade positions. Had Petitioner been promoted in 1988, he to would have had the requisite experience and skills to qualify for a grade level 14 as defined in 1995. For that reason Petitioner is entitled to receive an equivalent level of pay. The issue is different as to what level of position would be substantially equivalent to what he should have received in 1988. The best evidence, reflects that such a position would fall into the Grade 12 Engineer category. The evidence did not show that such a position with the Grade 14 level of salary was offered to Petitioner, but were only discussed. Petitioner, therefore, remains entitled to the first available Engineer position or its substantial equivalent, but at the salary he should have received if he had been able to pursue a normal course of employment. Finally, Petitioner has had to pay attorney fees and costs for the original 1990 proceeding and this motion proceeding in the amount of $4,482.30 for attorney fees and $1,023.73 in costs. The costs for mail fees and car rental have been disallowed. These fees and costs are reasonable and Petitioner is entitled to receive them from Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is
Findings Of Fact Petitioner filed his petition and request for formal hearing approximately December 1, 1992. The attachments thereto suggest that he began requesting redress June 19, 1992. The agency referred his December 1, 1992 petition to the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to Section 120.57(1) F.S. The Petitioner alleges that Petitioner's substantial interests are adversely affected by his employing agency paying other employees similarly situated more than Petitioner is paid. The Petition's attachments also obliquely put at issue the agency's refusal to process a special pay increase request for an individual exception in Petitioner's pay rate to the Department of Administration (now Department of Management Services). Such an application was refused by the agency approximately May 21, 1990. (See Petition attachments and Petitioner's Exhibit P-6.) Petitioner has not formally petitioned to invalidate any agency rule. Petitioner was hired by the Department of Corrections on April 6, 1965 in the position of guard. On September 1, 1965, he was promoted to Road Prison Officer I (RPO I), and his salary was increased. On October 27, 1989, he was promoted to Correctional Officer II (CO II). At the time of his promotion to CO II, his biweekly salary was $1,029.07. The maximum biweekly salary for that class was $1,004.14. Salary ranges for a job-class are posted on the job vacancy notice for that position. Petitioner had constructive, if not actual, knowledge of the pay grade range (maximum and minimum) at the time he accepted his October 27, 1989 promotion to CO II. Petitioner remained in the CO II class as of the date of formal hearing, however CO II is now known as Correctional Officer-Sergeant. The Petition herein has not affirmatively put at issue the Respondent agency's failure to promote Petitioner since 1989, however it is noted that at all times material, Petitioner met or exceeded all job performance requirements of a CO II. Petitioner, like all other employees similarly situated, has received salary adjustments and pay raises as appropriated by the legislature since October 27, 1989, even though he exceeded the maximum salary for the class he was occupying at the time. The testimony is clear that, as a CO II, Petitioner's salary is negotiated with the Respondent agency by a bargaining representative of the Police Benevolent Association, and that Petitioner was aware, at least by May 21, 1990, when he was denied an individual pay adjustment above the maximum for his pay grade, that he could file a grievance. He has never done so. From the foregoing, the only reasonable inference is that Petitioner has, at all times material, been subject to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement for State of Florida career service employees which provides for a grievance procedure. The terms of the collective bargaining agreement are not in evidence, however. As of the date of formal hearing, Petitioner also has filed no action before the Public Employees Relations Commission. The maximum authorized annual salary for a Correctional Officer- Sergeant as of the date of formal hearing was $29,479.84. At the present time, six employees ranked as Correctional Officer-Sergeant receive salaries in excess of Petitioner's salary. These employees in the same class are James Vaughn, Charles Williams, John C. Norman, Glynn H. Dunham, James Newsome and James Hamilton. Some of these employees have been employed by Respondent fewer years total than Petitioner. James Vaughn was promoted to CO II (now Correctional Officer-Sergeant) on April 19, 1974; Charles Williams on November 28, 1975; John C. Norman on February 20, 1976; Glynn H. Dunham on November 9, 1975; James Newsome on January 9, 1976; and James Hamilton originally on December 1, 1975 and then after a separation from employment, rehired as a CO II on January 1, 1985. As of January 1, 1987, all six of these employees were granted an across the board pay raise which equalized their salaries. The excess raise was given to the employees in a lump sum payment. Employees working in certain geographical regions of the state were granted a set pay adjustment for that region, up to $5,000. This amount may cause an employee's salary to exceed the maximum of the pay range for the CO II class. The Petitioner does not work in one of these geographic regions. By the time Petitioner was promoted to the position of CO II on October 27, 1989, the other six employees were earning $1,120.04, biweekly. Although their salaries exceeded the maximum salary for that class ($1,004.14), their pay raises were appropriated by the legislature across the board, regardless of whether the maximum range would be exceeded. Petitioner was also being paid in excess of the maximum for his class (RPO I) and in excess of the promotional class (CO II). Petitioner's biweekly salary at that time was $1,029.07. He also was given a raise in salary whenever it was authorized by a legislative appropriation bill. (See Finding of Fact 5). In early 1993, Petitioner brought to Respondent agency's attention that another employee, Richard E. Cobb, was making a salary in excess of what was permissible. Once the Department became aware of the error, it forwarded the information to the State of Florida, Office of the Comptroller for review. The error was corrected, and Richard E. Cobb's salary was reduced prospectively and the retroactive recovery of the overpayment was begun through deductions to Mr. Cobb's salary. Petitioner also complained about employee Blendage Weeks being promoted on September 1, 1989 with a 3.5 percent pay raise. Mr. Weeks is not a similarly situated employee because he is in a different job class than Petitioner. Also, although Petitioner believed that Mr. Weeks was given a raise in excess of the maximum for his class (Correctional Officer Chief I), in fact, the evidence shows that Mr. Weeks received a raise that brought him up from his then salary of $1,209.55 biweekly to the maximum for his class of $1,253.31 biweekly. 17. Rule 60K-2.002(5), F.A.C. (formerly 22A-2.001) provides: An employee shall not be paid in excess of the maximum of the salary range for a class, unless such payments are authorized by these rules or legislation. 18. Rule 60K-2.004(1)(b), F.A.C. (formerly 22A-2.004) provides: The agency head is authorized to grant a promotional appointment to an individual at a base rate of pay from the minimum to the maximum of the salary range for the class to which promoted provided such increase does not exceed 10 percent of the employee's base rate of pay prior to promotion. Pursuant to the foregoing rules, promotional pay raises are treated differently than legislatively appropriated pay raises and the agency may grant a promotional pay raise as long as it does not exceed the maximum of the salary range for the class into which the employee is being promoted. Petitioner does not fall into any of the protected classes governed by Section 760.10, F.S. and has filed no charge of discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the relief sought be denied and the petition therefore dismissed. RECOMMENDED this 21st day of December, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The De Soto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of December, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-7417 The following constitute specific rulings, pursuant to S120.59(2), F.S., upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF). Petitioner's PFOF: 1-2 Accepted, except as to month and day. Accepted as to content of Rule 60K-2.002(5) [not 60K-1.002(5)] F.A.C. The remainder of PFOF 3 is not properly cited. Accepted. Accepted as to what the salaries are and their names. The remainder of PFOF 5 is rejected as mere argument. Respondent's PFOF: 1-7,9-11,14-15 Accepted. 8,12 Accepted as modified to more accurately reflect the record evidence. 13 Covered in FOF 8; otherwise rejected as immaterial. Rejected as mere argument. Covered except as cumulative; see FOF 16. Rejected as evidentiary rulings or cumulative; see FOF 12. COPIES FURNISHED: Brian T. Hayes, P.A., Esquire 245 East Washington Street Monticello, Florida 32344 Laura S. Leve, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Harry K. Singletary, Secretary Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Louis A. Vargas, Esquire General Counsel Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500
Findings Of Fact The findings of fact in the recommended order are supported by competent, substantial evidence. They are adopted with modification together with the following supplemental findings of fact and as such both constitute the complete set of findings of fact for purposes of this final order. Albury also engages in the private practice of law as a member of a law firm. He devotes a majority of his working hours in that practice and is prohibited from representing other school boards because of his work relationship with the Monroe County School Board (the School Board). Until 1980 or 1981, Albury utilized his private law office and his private secretary to perform his duties as school board attorney. There is no evidence that this was for the convenience of the School Board, and it was a known fact that he performed his work from his private law office. The new school board office was renovated in 1980 or 1981, but no office was set up for Albury until late 1983. At that time, one room was made available to both the school board members and to Albury as school board attorney who jointly shared the one room. Prior to late 1983, that room was used by a school board employee who retired in mid-1983. Albury spends very little time in this office since a majority of his duties are performed elsewhere. Until relatively recently, Albury's private secretary did most of his secretarial work in connection with his school board representation. She was a long time employee and very familiar with his working habits, etc. When he left his employment, his new secretary who was less familiar with his habits and school board matters did less work in this area. Consequently, Albury used any one of three school board secretaries for assistance. He does not supervise any of the three secretaries and must request permission from their supervisors before having them perform work for him.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Division enter a final order declaring Hilary U. Albury eligible for membership in the Florida Retirement System both before and after July 1, 1979. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of May, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of May, 1984.
The Issue Whether Olin Scott Stoutamire is required to repay monies paid to Olin Scott Stoutamire as salary, which is alleged by the Department of Transportation (DOT) to be excess salary.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an agency of state government. The Respondent is a career service employee of the Petitioner, and is employed at a site located away from the Petitioner's District Office in Chipley, Florida. The Respondent is the Project Manager of the Petitioner's Thomasville Road and Interstate 10 Intersection Improvement Project in Tallahassee, Florida. The Respondent is paid less than other Petitioner's Construction Project Managers because the Respondent has less tenure. The Respondent's supervisor told Respondent that he would try to correct what appeared to be a salary inequity. The Petitioner initiated a raise for Respondent equal to 5 percent of the Respondent's base rate of pay. The proposed 5 percent salary increase was initiated by his supervisor completing and submitting an "Employee Action" form. The form provides the employee's identification, position, and includes the employee's current base pay rate and the calculated pay rate after the proposed increase becomes effective. The Respondent's base rate of pay and the resulting calculations as to the proposed resulting pay increase were incorrect on the Employee Action form submitted to the Petitioner's Personnel Office (Personnel) in Chipley, Florida. Personnel detected the supervisor's error, but then committed its own error, resulting in an $80 bi-weekly overpayment. The Respondent noticed the apparent overpayment and inquired of his supervisor if there had been a mistake. Respondent told his supervisor that he did not want the State to seek reimbursement for a large amount at a later date. The Respondent's supervisor told Respondent that the payment was correct and to accept it. The Respondent asked him to check and be certain because he did not want to have to repay the money. A short time later, the Respondent's supervisor told Respondent to accept the total amount of the warrant as being correct. His supervisor mentioned other pay increases for which the Respondent was being considered during the same time that the 5 percent pay increase was being processed. The Respondent thought that his supervisor had checked with personnel, and that his pay was correct. The Petitioner did not become aware of the error until an overpayment of $1,200 had accumulated. The Petitioner's Office of Financial Services requested reimbursement in the amount of $771.15 as payment in full within ten days or a payment of $117.00 biweekly pursuant to Sections 110.205(2) and 216.251, Florida Statutes and Chapter 60L-8, Florida Administrative Code. The Respondent's salary was immediately adjusted to show the correct amount. The Respondent contends he did his best to determine if he was being overpaid and was assured the payment was correct. The Respondent changed his budget and spent the money in reliance upon the assurance that the payment to him was correct. The Respondent concedes that Petitioner's records reflect an error and an overpayment. However, the Respondent does not believe he should have to repay the money immediately or in amounts greater than he received the overpayment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Respondent repay $40 per pay period to the Department beginning on the effective date of the next annual pay raise and continuing each month thereafter until the overpayment is repaid. The Department refer the case to the Department of Banking and Finance if an agreement cannot be reached. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of July, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 1997. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 34399-0458 Olin Scott Stoutamire 63 Graham Trail Crawfordville, Florida 32327
Findings Of Fact For calendar year 1989 and until November 11, 1990, petitioner worked for respondent. As of January 5, 1989, having exhausted accumulated leave balances, petitioner was not entitled either to sick leave or to annual leave. After January 5, 1989, and until her employment with respondent ended on November 11, 1990, petitioner earned 192 hours of sick leave and 192 hours of annual leave. During the pay period ended January 19, 1989, she took 1.75 hours of leave. During the pay period ended February 2, 1989, she took 3.5 hours of leave. During the pay period ended February 16, 1989, she took 1.5 hours of leave. During the pay period ended March 2, 1989, she took 18.25 hours of leave. During the pay period ended March 16, 1989, she took 16 hours of leave. During the pay period ended March 30, 1989, she took 1.5 hours of leave. During the pay period ended April 13, 1989, she took 36 hours of leave. During the pay period ended April 27, 1989, she took 22 hours of leave. During the pay period ended May 11, 1989, she took 20.75 hours of leave. During the pay period ended May 25, 1989, she took 6 hours of leave. During the pay period ended June 8, 1989, she took 8.75 hours of leave. During the pay period ended June 22, 1989, she took 17.25 hours of leave. During the pay period ended July 6, 1989, she took 16 hours of leave. During the pay period ended July 20, 1989, she took 1 hour of leave. During the pay period ended August 3, 1989, she took 9 hours of leave. During the pay period ended August 17, 1989, she took 10 hours of leave. During the pay period ended August 31, 1989, she took 4 hours of leave. During the pay period ended September 14, 1989, she took 12 hours of leave. During the pay period ended September 28, 1989, she took 8.5 hours of leave. During the pay period ended October 12, 1989, she took 10.5 hours of leave. During the pay period ended October 26, 1989, she took 8.5 hours of leave. During the pay period ended November 9, 1989, she took 26.25 hours of leave. During the pay period ended November 23, 1989, she took one hour of leave. During the pay period ended December 7, 1989, there was no leave taken. During the pay period ended December 21, 1989, she took .5 hours of leave. During the pay period ended January 4, 1990, she took 18 hours of leave. During the pay period ended January 18, 1990, she took 10.5 hours of leave. During the pay period ended February 1, 1990, she took 1.5 hours of leave. During the pay period ended February 15, 1990, she took 1.5 hours of leave. During the pay period ended March 1, 1990, she took 3 hours of leave. During the pay period ended March 15, 1990, she took 27 hours of leave. During the pay period ended March 29, 1990, she took 11.5 hours of leave. During the pay period ended April 12, 1990, she took 36 hours of leave. During the pay period ended April 26, 1990, she took 24 hours of leave. During the pay period ended May 10, 1990, she took 34.25 hours of leave. During the pay period ended May 24, 1990, she took .5 hours of leave. During the pay period ended June 7, 1990, she took 2 hours of leave. During the pay period ended June 21, 1990, she took 27.5 hours of leave. During the pay period ended July 5, 1990, there was no leave taken. During the pay period ended July 19, 1990, she took 8 hours of leave. During the pay period ended August 2, 1990, she took 26 hours of leave. During the pay period ended August 16, 1990, she took 31 hours of leave. During the pay period ended August 30, 1990, she took 8 hours of leave. During the pay period ended September 13, 1990, she took 16 hours of leave. During the pay period ended September 27, 1990, she took 24.5 hours of leave. During the pay period ended October 11, 1990, she took 13.25 hours of leave. Because petitioner's time sheets were not always processed in a timely manner, leave balances stated on contemporaneous print outs were not always accurate. (In 1989, respondent had no official mechanism for notifying employees that time sheets were missing.) After petitioner's situation came to the attention of payroll specialists at HRS, a manual audit was performed. For the period ending March 30, 1989, petitioner had an annual leave balance of 6.5 hours. During the next pay period, she used the entire balance, but at the end of the pay period, at the close of business on April 13, 1989, four more hours of annual leave were credited, all of which she used before the succeeding period ended. During the period ended May 25, 1989, she was also out on leave two hours for which she was not entitled to pay. In all, the audit established that respondent had taken some 563 hours of leave after January 5, 1989. This exceeded paid leave she was entitled to by 179 hours. Nothing in the evidence suggests she was docked for more than 135.25 hours' pay.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That respondent deny petitioner's request for refund. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of April, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Sam Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Linda Harris, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Robert L. Powell, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Ruby Bush 3111-21 Mahan Drive, #113 Tallahassee, FL 32308
