The Issue Whether Petitioner, a health care provider, filed a timely, valid petition with Respondent to challenge Intervenors’ disallowance of payment for certain dates of service to a workers’ compensation claimant.
Findings Of Fact At the times relevant to this proceeding, Intervenors had accepted that the claimant had suffered a compensable injury under the Florida workers’ compensation laws and had paid benefits to and on behalf of claimant. The date of the compensable injury was July 8, 1994. On September 30, 2004, Mr. Spangler, as counsel for the carrier, prepared the Notice that was received by Petitioner on October 4, 2004. The Notice provided, in part, as follows: The purpose of this letter is to inform you of the findings from the Carrier’s utilization review investigation. Based upon the opinions of Carrier Medical Consultants, the Carrier has concluded that there has been overutilization and/or misutilization since the treatment has been excessive and not medically necessary. Additionally, it appears that some bills may not have been timely submitted to the Carrier. . . . Accordingly, the Carrier has decided that specific dates of service will be disallowed and they are as follows: 04/26/04, 06/01/04, 07/12/04 Based upon its utilization review investigation, the Carrier also believes that the treatment rendered on the following dates [sic] was also excessive, and neither reasonable nor medically necessary. Nevertheless, the Carrier has agreed to reimburse for these specific dates [sic] of service which are as follows: 08/17/04 As the health care provider, you have certain rights and responsibilities under Florida Statutes and Florida Administrative Code. This office sent you a very detailed letter that explained the requirements and procedures under the utilization review provisions of Section 440.13(7), Florida Statutes. Please note the under Section 440.13(7)(a), Florida Statutes, “Any health care provider . . . who elects to contest the disallowance . . . of payment by a carrier under 440.13 subsection (6) must, within 30 days after receipt of notice of disallowance petition the agency to resolve the dispute.” The 30 days begin to run from the date this letter is received. Additionally, please find enclosed the Explanation of Benefits regarding these dates of service. Please reference our previous correspondence forwarded to you or contact the undersigned if you have any questions concerning this matter. Enclosed with the carrier’s letter of September 30, 2004, was the Explanation, which consisted of two pages. The carrier’s Notice was a “disallowance of payment” within the meaning of Section 440.13(7), Florida Statutes, and a “reimbursement decision” within the meaning of Florida Administrative Code Rule 59A-31.002. Petitioner mailed a letter to Respondent dated October 25, 2004, that was received by Respondent’s mailroom and delivered to Ms. Reynolds on November 1, 2004. Ms. Reynolds testified that the envelope for the letter reflected that it was mailed on October 29, 2004, in Miami. The two-page letter, which has been redacted to protect the privacy of the claimant, stated the following: I am a Board Certified physician in the field of psychiatry. I have been the treating physician, under the worker’s compensation law, for the above noted patient for many years. I undertook [her/his] treatment on September 19, 2000, at the request of the carrier, following retirement of [her/his] original treating physician. At the that time [she/he] was already adjudicated permanent total disability and it [sic] was already determined to be suffering from severe depression, on various medications and needing continued follow-up care. I was advised by the patient’s attorney that the carrier was trying to close the case including closing the medical. The patient however is in need of continued medical care and has no viable alternative source therefore. I then received various communications from the insurance carrier’s attorney pointing out their rational [sic] for disallowance of medically necessary services. In my field the doctor-patient relationship is of course particularly important and it would be most detrimental to the patient and, at least at this point, I declined to follow a course of curtailing needed services. I then received the enclosed communication disallowing payment for 4 [sic] recent visits per the enclosure. The letter advises to challenge the same it is necessary to “petition” the agency within 30 days of notification. My office was unable to determine to whom I was supposed to respond and in what form. I accordingly incredibly was required to seek the assistance of an attorney to simply try to top [sic] track down whom I was supposed to contact and in what manner. The attorney advises me that after his personal efforts for in excess of two hours, multiple calls including office of employee assistance, AHCA itself several times, Division of Worker’s Compensation and several faxed letters that he was provided the above address. I am further advised that there is no form for this petition, but a responding letter will serve as the petition. Before my addressing the 4 [sic] bills I would suggest it imperative that you need to address a requirement that the carrier in any disallowing communication be required to advise as to whom is to be contacted if objection is made and that a letter will suffice. Given the diagnosis of the patient, Major Depressive Disorder, Recurrent, Severe, With Psychotic Features, it is the accepted guidelines of treatment based on research and practice to combine the use of individual psychotherapy and psychotropic medication for maximum results. This patient’s care has been minimized to 6 visits a year and I don’t see how she can be treated with less frequency and time than that. The minimum time that can be given with this frequency of visits is at least 45-60 minutes to obtain results. An alternative would be twice a month visits of 25 minutes, which will be more costly. If any additional information is needed to expedite my petition please advise. It is undisputed that three forms completed and signed by Petitioner were enclosed with the letter of October 25, 2004. Each form was captioned “Workmen [sic] Compensation Report” (the Report forms) and were, respectively, for the dates of service April 26, 2004; June 1, 2004; and July 12, 2004, that are at issue in this proceeding (the dates of service).3 The three Report forms were the only enclosures with the letter of October 25 received by Ms. Reynolds on November 1, 2004. Ms. Febus typed and mailed the letter of October 25. Ms. Febus testified that in addition to the three Report forms, she also included with the October 25 letter a “Health Insurance Claim Form” for each date of service, the Notice, and the two- page Explanation. The original of each of the Health Insurance Claim Forms was mailed to the carrier and constituted a billing for the services rendered to the claimant by Petitioner on each respective date of service. Petitioner introduced as part of its composite exhibit a copy of his file copy of each Health Insurance Claim Form. Each of the Health Insurance Claim Forms introduced by Petitioner (the three forms Ms. Febus testified she enclosed with the October 25 correspondence) reflects that Petitioner signed the form on December 22, 2004 (block 31 of each form), and that the claimant signed a release of medical information on December 22, 2004 (block 12 on each form). These three Health Insurance Claim Forms were the only billings that Petitioner alleged was enclosed with the October 25 correspondence. Ms. Febus’ testimony was based on her memory. She did not note on the letter the list of enclosures (other than a reference to the Notice) and she did not keep a file copy of her complete submission package. The mailing of the October 25 correspondence was by regular mail, not certified mail. A notation on the bottom of Petitioner’s letter reflects that a copy was mailed to the carrier’s adjuster, to Mr. Spangler, and to Mr. Keyfetz. Each of these mailings was by regular mail. There was no evidence as to what enclosures were included with any of these mailings and there was no indication on the letter whether the copies included the enclosures. On November 1, 2004, after her review of the October 25 correspondence, Ms. Reynolds telephoned Petitioner’s office and talked to Ms. Febus. Ms. Reynolds believed the correspondence constituted an inquiry, not a petition to resolve a disputed disallowance. Ms. Reynolds and Ms. Febus discussed the applicable statute and rule and they discussed the required contents of a petition to resolve a disputed disallowance. Ms. Reynolds and Ms. Febus did not discuss the enclosure that had been received with the October 25 correspondence. On November 1, 2004, Ms. Reynolds followed up her conversation with Ms. Febus by sending her an e-mail. Ms. Reynolds’ e-mail provided, in part, the following: This is a continuation of our telephone conversation of today regarding the 10-25-04 letter from Dr. Merayo. Attached are 2 documents which may assist to orient you to 2 sections of the Florida WC Law which may impact the issues which are spoken to in the letter. Please feel free to call me for further discussion regarding Florida’s WC Law and the medical issues that you may have questions [sic]. The 2 sections of the law that I immediately wish to draw your attention to are: ss. 440.13 and subsection 7(a) and ss. 440.192 F.S. The second section deals with the CLAIMANT’S benefits under Fla. WC Law ... these issues, when impacted, are decided by a Judge of Compensation Claims, following the submission of a proper request by the CLAIMANT. THE FIRST SECTION, ss. 440.13(7), F.S., addresses the way a dispute is submitted to this Agency (using the address below). Should you have further questions, do not hesitate to contact me. Ms. Reynolds attached to her e-mail copies of Sections 440.192 and 440.13(7), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 59A-31.002. Section 440.192, Florida Statutes, pertains to disputes between a claimant and a carrier that are resolved by a Judge of Compensation Claims. Those provisions are not relevant to the issues in this proceeding. Section 440.13(7), Florida Statutes, pertains to reimbursement disputes between a provider and a carrier and provides in relevant part, as follows: UTILIZATION AND REIMBURSEMENT DISPUTES.- Any health care provider, carrier, or employer who elects to contest the disallowance or adjustment of payment by a carrier under subsection (6) must, within 30 days after receipt of notice of disallowance or adjustment of payment, petition the agency to resolve the dispute. The petitioner must serve a copy of the petition on the carrier and on all affected parties by certified mail. The petition must be accompanied by all documents and records that support the allegations contained in the petition. Failure of a petitioner to submit such documentation to the agency results in dismissal of the petition. The carrier must submit to the agency within 10 days after receipt of the petition all documentation substantiating the carrier's disallowance or adjustment. Failure of the carrier to timely submit the requested documentation to the agency within 10 days constitutes a waiver of all objections to the petition. Within 60 days after receipt of all documentation, the agency must provide to the petitioner, the carrier, and the affected parties a written determination of whether the carrier properly adjusted or disallowed payment. The agency must be guided by standards and policies set forth in this chapter, including all applicable reimbursement schedules, practice parameters, and protocols of treatment, in rendering its determination. If the agency finds an improper disallowance or improper adjustment of payment by an insurer, the insurer shall reimburse the health care provider, facility, insurer, or employer within 30 days, subject to the penalties provided in this subsection. The agency shall adopt rules to carry out this subsection. The rules may include provisions for consolidating petitions filed by a petitioner and expanding the timetable for rendering a determination upon a consolidated petition. ... Florida Administrative Code Rule 59A-31.002, provides as follows: In those instances when a provider does not agree with a carrier’s reconsidered reimbursement decision, the Agency will, upon request, provide for a settlement of such reimbursement dispute through a review process conducted by the Agency’s Bureau of Managed Care. The provider, the carrier or the employer may request a resolution to a reimbursement dispute from the Agency. A valid Request for Resolution of Disputed Reimbursement must: Be in writing and specify the specific service(s) and policy being disputed. Include copies of the following: All bills submitted or resubmitted that are related to the services in question and their attachments. All applicable Explanations of Medical Benefits. All correspondence between the carrier and provider which is relevant to the disputed reimbursement. Any notation of phone calls regarding authorization. Any pertinent or required health care records or reports or carrier medical opinions. The Agency’s response to a valid disputed reimbursement request will: Be within 60 days of receipt. Establish the proper reimbursement amount, including over and under payments. Identify the basis for the decision. Be sent to the provider, carrier and employer. Be in writing. Provide for reconsiderations through physicians and peer review before an appeal [sic] pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. Requests for Resolution of Disputed Reimbursement will be returned as not valid when: The required documentation is not included with the request. The date of the request for a reconsideration exceeds the time requirements as specified in this section. . . . The next communication between Petitioner and Respondent was in the form of a letter dated December 22, 2004, from Mr. Keyfetz on behalf of Petitioner to Respondent. After referencing the reimbursement dispute, the letter provided as follows: I am in receipt of copy of responsive petition by Dr. Merayo dated October 25, 2004, in connection with the above matter. Dr. Merayo advises he has received no response thereto let alone the required response within 10 days receipt by the carrier. It is provided: Failure of the carrier to timely submit the requested documentation to the agency within 10 days constitutes a waiver of all objections to the petition. We await your written determination, which is now due regarding the carrier disallowance of these amounts. The letter from Mr. Keyfetz dated December 22, 2004, prompted a letter from Mr. Spangler on behalf of the carrier dated December 30, 2004. After receiving a copy of Mr. Spangler’s letter, Mr. Keyfetz wrote a second letter to Respondent on January 5, 2005, that attempts to refute Mr. Spangler’s letter and again demands a written determination of the disputed reimbursements. On January 26, 2005, Ms. Reynolds responded to Petitioner with copies to Mr. Keyfetz and Mr. Spangler. This is to acknowledge not only your letter of October 25, 2004, but also the correspondence recently received from [Mr. Keyfetz and Mr. Spangler]. At issue is the acknowledgment of correspondence sent by you to this office dated October 25, 2004, received by this office on November 1, 2004. This correspondence was a two-page letter with reference to a disallowance of payment for treatment rendered to the claimant: [name redacted]. Attachments to this letter were 3 progress reports dated: 08-12-04, 06-01- 04, and 04-26-04, from the Merayo Medical Arts Group and signed with your apparent signature. The progress reports show [claimant’s] Date of Accident (D/A) as 07- 08-1984. On November 1, 2004, in response to this correspondence, I telephoned your office and spoke with Vinette, who identified herself as a representative of your office staff. It was during this telephone conversation, I clarified the definition of a disallowance, denial and a payment made at a different amount from that which was billed. Each of these circumstances has specific procedures, which must be met in order to address a disagreement concerning the carrier’s action. I followed this conversation with an e- mail sent, at Vinette’s direction to ... I have attached a copy of this e-mail and the attachments contained in this e-mail to this letter. I have had no follow-up communication from your office following this action. No file was established in this office. This correspondence was handled as an inquiry. However, subsequent to this action, on December 27 [, 2004] and on January 10, 2005, letters were received from [Mr. Keyfetz] regarding your original October 25, 2004, correspondence. [Mr. Spangler], the carrier’s representative, sent a letter dated December 30, 2004. This is to inform you that this office cannot address the issues brought forward except to clarify to you sections of Chapter 440, which may be of import to your quest for assistance.[4] * * * You failed to comply with these requirements as a contested disallowance or adjustment of payment by the carrier. I have dismissed this correspondence as an invalid submission of a reimbursement dispute.[5]
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order dismissing the October 25 correspondence as an invalid petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of September, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September, 2005.
The Issue The issue for consideration herein is whether the Respondent, Department of Labor and Employment Security, erred in awarding the contract in response to its Proposal No. 91-064-AS to some firm other than the Petitioner. By Petition And Notice Of Protest dated July 10, 1991, the Petitioner herein, Toplis & Harding, Inc., (Toplis), formally notified the Respondent, Department of Labor and Employment Security, (Department), that it was protesting the bid tabulation in this procurement as scored by the Department, and the following day, July 11, 1991, filed its Formal Notice of Protest regarding the same matter. Thereafter, by letter dated July 17, 1991, the Department forwarded the file to the Division of Administrative Hearings for appointment of a Hearing Officer, and by Notice of Hearing dated July 19, 1991, the undersigned set the case for hearing in Tallahassee on July 29, 1991, at which time it was heard as scheduled. At the hearing, Petitioner presented the testimony of Robert L. Russell, its head of risk management, and introduced Petitioner's Exhibits 1 through 4. Petitioner's Exhibits 5 - 7 for Identification were offered but not received into evidence. Respondent presented the testimony of Ann Lee Clayton, Director of the Department's Division of Worker's Compensation but introduced no exhibits. No transcript was presented. Only the Department submitted Proposed Findings of Fact which have been incorporated in this Recommended Order. Petitioner submitted a written summation and final argument which has been carefully considered in the preparation of this Recommended Order.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations herein, the Respondent, Department, was the state agency responsible for the administration of the Florida Worker's Compensation Act. One division of the Department deals with the regulation of worker's compensation self insurers and self insurance funds. Petitioner is a 75 year old insurance adjusting and service company consisting of nearly 400 employees and 31 offices in the United States. For the purpose of this procurement, Toplis is the head of a joint venture also utilizing the services of the Fred R. White companies of Dallas, a subcontractor, and Florida agent Lee A. Black. In January, 1991, Toplis broadened its service base to include risk management consulting which is the primary function of Mr. Fred White, head of the Fred R. White companies, mentioned above as one of the partners in the joint venture. The other party, L. A. Black & Associates, is an agency for Travelers, Hartford, and Lloyds of London in Florida and is a certified minority business enterprise in this state. On April 15, 1991, Ann Clayton became the Director of the Respondent's Division of Worker's Compensation and after reviewing the administrative function of that division, determined there was a need for a study of the solvency and liquidity of self insurers and self insurance funds under the jurisdiction of the Division as well as the different ways in which those funds are regulated by the Division. In furtherance of this decision, she appointed Joe Mastrovito, Chief of the Bureau of Self Insurance, to prepare a request for proposals for such a study. The RFP in issue here, developed as a result of those directions, was distributed on June 5, 1991, and required proposals in response thereto by July 3, 1991. At paragraph 2.8 of the RFP, the proposer was required to show evidence: ... that the contract team includes individuals or firms which, by virtue of education, experience, certification and/or licensure, provides expertise in the areas of law, actuarial science, government, accounting, business management, and insurance (including claims, underwriting, and risk management). The provision went on to require that the contractor designate in the technical proposal at least one individual within the contract team with expertise in each of the above areas. The contractor was required to provide resumes for each designated team member which was to include information concerning education, experience, and current employment. This requirement for a recitation of contractor qualifications was also contained in paragraph 3.3, PROPOSAL FORMAT, of the RFP, where the foregoing request for a recitation of qualifications was repeated almost verbatim. Six firms, including Petitioner, submitted timely proposals in response to the RFP. The responses were evaluated by a team composed of Ms. Clayton and Mr. Mastrovito, as well as an actuary and an attorney, both of whom were also from the Department. This committee determined that Petitioner's proposal was nonresponsive in that the resumes of Joyce Armstrong, Fred White, and Lee Black did not support the qualifications listed for them in the RFP in the areas of economics, actuarial science, and government, respectively. Specifically, with regard to Ms. Armstrong, designated by Petitioner as its expert in the area of economics, her resume included with the RFP reflects that she "studied" economics at Southern Illinois University in 1976, but no employment in the field of economics, either before or after that date, was listed. Mr. White's expertise in actuarial science, was claimed on the basis of his resume statement that he is currently completing requirements for membership in his accrediting societies, but the resume reflects no prior work experience in that field. A similar situation pertains in the case of Mr. Black, designated by Petitioner as its expert in the area of government. Here, Petitioner's narrative indicates that Mr. Black held a "senior position" with the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, yet his resume makes no reference to any government service or experience. At the hearing, Petitioner attempted to introduce affidavits from Mr. Black, Mr. White, and Ms. Armstrong in an effort to bolster their credentials. However, these affidavits, which were objected to by Respondent, were not received into evidence and were not considered by the undersigned. The evaluation committee also failed two of the other five offerors as being unresponsive to the RFP and a second two of the five as having a conflict of interest which disqualified them from award. Only Sterling Partners, Inc. was considered both responsive to the RFP and without a conflict of interest. Both of these categories are "pass/fail" criteria. It was only after an offeror passed both of those that its response was scored on the basis of the other factors for evaluation. Since Petitioner and the other four disqualified submittors did not pass the first two qualifications, they were not scored on the technical proposals or price. Only Sterling Partners, Inc. was, receiving 83 out of a possible 100 points. Since Sterling Partners, Inc. was the only offeror to survive the evaluation process, the team recommended a contract be issued to it.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying the protest of Petitioner herein, Toplis & Harding, Inc. as to Proposal # 91-064-AS. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Florida this 12th day of September, 1991. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of September, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Edward A. Dion, Esquire Department of Labor and Employment Security Suite 307, Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0657 Robert L. Russell, Esquire ARM, Risk Management Consultant Toplis & Harding, Inc. 222 South Riverside Plaza Chicago, Illinois 60606 Thomas Jones, Esquire Holland & Knight Post Office Drawer 810 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Frank Scruggs, Secretary Department of Labor and Employment Security 303 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Stephen Barron General Counsel DLES 307 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152
The Issue Should discipline be imposed by Petitioner against Respondent's licenses as a life agent (2-16), life and health agent (2-18), and health agent (2-40), held pursuant to Chapter 626, Florida Statutes (2004)?
Findings Of Fact Respondent in accordance with Chapter 626, Florida Statutes (2005), currently holds licenses as a life agent (2- 16), life and health agent (2-18), and a health agent (2-40). On June 24, 2003, in an Administrative Complaint brought by Petitioner against Respondent, also under Case No. 64776-03-AG, accusations were made concerning violations of Chapter 626, Florida Statutes (2003). On October 4, 2004, the parties resolved the earlier case through a settlement stipulation for Consent Order. On October 20, 2004, the Consent Order was entered. In pertinent part the Consent Order stated: The Settlement Stipulation for Consent Order dated October 11, 2004, is hereby approved and fully incorporated herein by reference; * * * (c) Respondent agrees that he has a continuing obligation for claims, which may not have arisen or otherwise be known to the parties at the time of the execution of the Settlement Stipulation for Consent Order and this Consent Order Respondent shall be responsible for satisfying claims that were covered under the Plans sold by Respondent, up to the amount covered by such Plan, less any applicable deductibles or co-payments. Respondent may attempt to negotiate with the providers for compromised amounts, but any such compromise must result in the release of the consumer from any responsibility for the amounts that would have been covered under the terms of such Plan, less any applicable deductibles or co-payments; * * * (f) Within ninety (90) days following the issuance of this Consent Order, the Respondent shall complete the Section 626.2815(3)(a), Florida Statutes, continuing education requirement relative to unauthorized entities; * * * Within thirty (30) days of the issuance of this Consent Order, Respondent agrees to pay to the Department, a fine, in the amount of ONE THOUSAND AND 00/100 ($1,000.00) DOLLARS. Within ninety (90) days following the issuance of this Consent Order, Respondent shall satisfy any unpaid claims for persons insured under the Local 16 Plans he sold, including claims which may not have arisen or otherwise be known to the parties at the time of the execution of the Settlement Stipulation for Consent Order and this Consent Order. Respondent shall only be responsible, however, for satisfying claims that were covered under the Plans sold by Respondent, up to the amount covered by such Plan, less any applicable deductibles or co- payments. Respondent may attempt to negotiate with the providers for compromised amounts, but any such compromise must result in the release of the consumer from any responsibility for the amounts that would have been covered under the terms of such Plan, less any applicable deductibles or co- payments; Within one hundred (100) days following issuance of this Consent Order, the Respondent shall provide proof to the Department that the full amount of claims or losses under all contracts or health plans solicited or sold by Respondent on behalf of Local 16 have been paid or satisfied. Failure of the Respondent to comply with this paragraph shall constitute a material breach of this Consent Order, unless otherwise advised in writing by the Department; Respondent in the future shall comply with all the terms and conditions of this Consent Order; and, shall strictly adhere to all provisions of the Florida Insurance Code, Rules of the Department, and all other laws of the State of Florida. The Respondent shall give the Department full and immediate access to all books and records relating to the Respondent's insurance business, upon request; If, in the future, the Department has good cause to believe that the Respondent has violated any of the terms and conditions of this Consent Order, the Department may initiate an action to suspend or revoke the Respondent's license(s) or appointments, or it may seek to enforce the Consent Order in Circuit Court, or take any other action permitted by law; Respondent paid the $1,000.00 administrative fine required by the Consent Order, but the payment was 20 days late. Respondent completed the continuing education on unauthorized entities. He completed the course on June 3, 2005, beyond the deadline called for in the Consent Order by a number of months. Respondent took the course at Florida Community College in Jacksonville, Florida, an institution that he was familiar with. He took the course to be completed on June 3, 2005, because it was the earliest course available at that school. Respondent was unfamiliar with other schools who may have offered the course at a time that would meet the due date set forth in the Consent Order. Consistent with the expectations in the Consent Order, Petitioner's employees have reviewed their files to determine whether Respondent has satisfied unpaid insurance claims in relation to the insurance plan for Local 16. Those employees involved in that review are Kerry Edgill, a legal assistant in the Legal Division in charge of complaint settlements and Pamela White who works with the Division of Consumer Services as a senior management analyst. Neither employee found any evidence that Respondent had satisfied the unpaid insurance claims as called for in the Consent Order. In correspondence from Respondent to Petitioner's counsel in this case, dated December 6, 2004, there is no indication that the unpaid insurance claims have been satisfied. Respondent in his testimony explained the extent to which he had attempted to determine who had outstanding unpaid insurance claims. Respondent went to the location where Local 16 union members were employed. His contact with union members had to be outside the building proper. He spoke to several members at that time. This contact took place on June 1, 2005. Respondent identified the persons contacted as James, Luther, Gregory, and Michael. Michael's last name may have been Williams, as Respondent recalls. Of the persons Respondent spoke with on June 1, 2005, none of them had an unpaid insurance claim which needed to be satisfied. Respondent provided correspondence to a person or persons whose name(s) was or were not disclosed in the testimony. The June 6, 2005, correspondence was addressed to the Amalgamated Transit Union, in reference to insurance claims for Local 16. Respondent's Exhibit Numbered 17 is a copy of that correspondence. In the body of the correspondence it stated: June 6, 2005 Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1197 P.O. Box 43285 Jacksonville, FL 32203 Re: Claims for Local 16 To union members and trustees, This letter is to follow up me meeting members at the station on June 1, 2005 to discuss any issues or concerns that you may be or have had relating to the unpaid claims with Local 16 National Health Fund. Although, I feel I am not responsible for the issue I would gladly help assist with resolving any problems or concerns that you may have. Should any members have any correspondents that need immediate attention please forward them to me at: David Bright, P.O. Box 441963, Jacksonville, FL 32222. Should you need to speak to me I can be reached at 904-207-0141. Thanks for your cooperation in this long due matter! In relation to what Respondent refers to as accounts for Local 16 which he was servicing, that refers to insurance coverage, it involved a couple of hundred insureds. Respondent in his testimony acknowledged that union members had insurance claims that were unpaid.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered finding Respondent in violation of Sections 626.611(7) and (13), and 626.621(2) and (3), Florida Statutes (2004), finding no violation of Section 626.611(9), Florida Statutes (2004), or 626.9521, Florida Statutes (2004), and suspending Respondent's respective licenses as a life agent (2-16), life and health agent (2-18), and health agent (2-40), for a period of six (6) months. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of October, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of October, 2005.
