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ELLIOT PINKNEY vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 75-001607 (1975)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 75-001607 Latest Update: Feb. 11, 1977

Findings Of Fact Negotiations for the purchase of right-of-way property for construction of Interstate Highway 95 in Palm Beach County, Florida, began on May 1, 1973. On that date the Applicant lived in an apartment at 27 S.W. 15th Avenue, Delray Beach, Florida with Ms. Willie Hendley, and seven children. The Applicant and Ms. Hendley began living together in approximately 1968. Ms. Hendley had five children at that time. The Applicant and Ms. Hendley had two more children between 1968 and 1973. This residence was located within the highway right-of- way. The Applicant was notified by the Agency that it would be necessary for them to relocate. The applicant, Ms. Hendley, and the seven children moved to a house at 230 N. W. 13th Avenue, Delray Beach, Florida, in approximately August, 1973. The Agency found the new living quarters inadequate under the regulations of the Federal Department of Transportation, which require that replacement housing must be decent, safe, and sanitary. An agent of the Agency informed the Applicant that in order to receive relocation benefits, the new residence would need to be made decent, safe, and sanitary, or the family would have to move to a new location that would meet the requirements. Several months after they moved to the house on N.W. 13th Avenue, the Applicant and Willie Hendley separated. The Applicant moved out of the house, and found a home on N. E. 9th Avenue. He anticipated that Ms. Hendley and the children would move into this home, but they did not. The Applicant stayed at this address for approximately one month. He then moved into a room at his sister's home where he stayed until the end of 1975. After they separated, Ms. Hendley and the children moved into a residence at 917 S. W. 3rd Ct., Delray Beach, Florida. This residence met the requirements of the Department of Transportation, and Ms. Hendley received relocation assistance benefits. The Applicant and Ms. Hendley and the seven children were displaced from their residence at 27 S. W. 15th Avenue, Delray Beach, Florida, as a result of the acquisition of right-of-way for Interstate Route 95. The Applicant was later displaced from the family household as a result of his separation from Ms. Hendley. There was no evidence offered at the hearing that the Applicant moved into living quarters that were comparable to the quarters at 27 S. W. 15th Avenue. That was a two bedroom apartment. The Applicant moved into a single room. The Applicant's displacement was in effect the result of his separation from Ms. Hendley, rather than the result of the acquisition of right-of-way.

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HERMAN A. BEYER vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 76-000037 (1976)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 76-000037 Latest Update: Feb. 11, 1977

The Issue Whether the Applicant is entitled to compensation in the amount of $2,500, to pay for "fill dirt" which was installed on the Applicant's real estate in relocating his homestead, after his former homestead was bought as right-of-way for Interstate Highway 75. This claim is under the guise of a relocation appeal, in accordance with the Uniform Relocation Assistance And Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 (42 USC, 4601 - 4655).

Findings Of Fact In November, 1974, the Florida Department of Transportation paid the Applicant $32,500 in a negotiated purchase for the Applicant's property which was located in the line of construction for Interstate Highway 75. This price was for a mobile home 24' wide and 40' long, with appurtenances to the mobile home, to include a screen room, privacy paneling and carport. Prior to the November, 1974 sale of the property to the Department of Transportation, the Applicant had purchased another parcel of land in late 1973 or early 1974. It was on this parcel of land that was purchased at that time, that the Applicant relocated his home. The amount of payment for the new lot was between $2,800 and $2,900. In order to comply with certain standards of the DeSoto County, Florida Health Department, ten inches of "fill dirt" were required to be implaced to have the septic tank meet requirements for a drain field. The cost of the application of the "fill dirt" was $2,500. The expenditure of $2,500 for "fill dirt" is the item of controversy between the Applicant and the Respondent. The Applicant is claiming that the $2,500 should be reimbursed to him as part of a relocation assistance payment. The Respondent denies that the $2,500 is a proper item of compensation under the governing law on relocation assistance payments. The Respondent's denial is based upon the fact that it believes that "fill dirt" is not a compensable item. More specifically, the Respondent regards the selection of this piece of property by the Applicant as being a matter of choice, which did not have to be made. The Respondent is persuaded that other parcels of property were available, which did not require "fill dirt" to be brought in, in order to comply with health requirements and the Applicant failed to purchase such a parcel, therefore, the Applicant must defray the expense of his selection, in terms of the $2,500 which was spent to bring the property up to health standards. The history of the payments that were made by the Respondent can be derived by the application of the formula utilized. The Respondent looked at three comparable pieces of land , one for $32,500, a second for $28,500 and a third for $32,900. The closest comparable to the home that the Applicant sold, was the comparable listed at $32,500. The Respondent compared these comparable figures with the so called, "carve out" figure of a typical mobile home with equipment, on a typical mobile home site, which would have been a price of $25,721. Based upon this figure for a "carve out", and taking the figure for the closest comparable $32,500, the amount of maximum relocation reimbursement would have been $6,779. This figure is arrived at by subtracting the amount of the "carve out" figure from the closest comparable. In fact the Respondent spent $27,372 for the land purchased and other compensable items, thus entitling him to $1,651 in relocation reimbursement, according to the Respondent's calculations. Although, in the course of the hearing the Applicant was questioned about taking $1,651 as settlement. The Applicant said that he was only interested in the $2,500 figure. It should be stated that the $1,651, is an amount which does not contemplate the payment for "fill dirt". It is in fact a figure arrived at for payment of other items considered to be compensable. The question then becomes one of whether or not the Applicant is entitled to a $2500 payment for "fill dirt" which is not associated with the $1,651 which the Respondent claims the Applicant is entitled to. One final factual comment should be made. That comment is that the Respondent's acquisition and relocation assistance officer, David Nicholson, saw the Applicant's new property after the twenty five hundred dollars worth of fill dirt had been installed. At that time, Mr. Nicholson said that the property appeared to meet the criteria for a decent, safe and sanitary dwelling. The witness, Nicholson had not seen the property prior to the installation of the "fill dirt". Consequently, the Respondent can not challenge the statement by the Applicant to the effect that the "fill dirt" was necessary in order to achieve a decent, safe and sanitary dwelling.

Recommendation It is recommended that the Respondent deny the payment of $2,500 to the Applicant for installation of "fill dirt" at the Applicant's present homesite. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of April, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Herman A. Beyer Post Office Box 382 Punta Gorda, Florida 33950 Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Office of Legal Operations Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304

USC (1) 42 USC 4623
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R. G. FURNITURE vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 91-006033F (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Sep. 23, 1991 Number: 91-006033F Latest Update: Nov. 09, 1992

Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Petitioner has been in the business of manufacturing and selling extruded aluminum patio furniture. Petitioner is owned by Robert L. Gass, Jr., who was also the owner of the real estate which Petitioner occupied as a tenant. It was necessary for the Department to acquire the real property owned by Gass and to relocate Petitioner as a result of a federally-funded highway construction project, I-595 in Broward County, Florida. Accordingly, Gass and Petitioner became entitled to benefits pursuant to the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970. Pursuant to a contract with the Department, employees of Kaiser Engineers were responsible for both the acquisition of real property and the relocation of personal property of businesses and persons displaced by the I-595 project. Some of Kaiser's employees were involved with acquisition (acquiring ownership of real property) and different employees were responsible for relocation assistance (relocating personal property). An appraisal of the land and improvements at the manufacturing site was performed on behalf of the Department. The Department's real estate appraiser called in a machinery and equipment appraiser to appraise certain "immovable business fixtures and special purpose process systems." The machinery and equipment appraiser prepared an appraisal containing 20 categories/items, consisting primarily of the components of Petitioner's painting machinery and assembly line. A three-page listing of those 20 categories/items was compiled and became entitled "Inventory." Gass and the Department entered into negotiations for the acquisition of his real property. Gass was concerned about the "down time" Petitioner would incur if Petitioner were required to disassemble, move, reassemble, and install its assembly line and painting system process. It was important to Gass that Petitioner have a replacement assembly line and painting system process operational before moving to the relocation site. Gass was aware of the relocation benefit under which a displaced business might be eligible to purchase new equipment and machinery and have it fully installed and operational before the business is physically relocated. On August 22, 1988, Gass entered into a Right-of-Way Purchase Agreement with the Department under which the Department purchased from Gass the real property which was Petitioner's manufacturing site. Exhibit "A" to the Right- of-Way Purchase Agreement was the Inventory of the 20 categories/items prepared by the machinery and equipment appraiser. Petitioner subsequently made application to the Department for relocation benefits to purchase replacement items for the categories/items contained in the Inventory. The Department denied that claim for relocation benefits, and Petitioner timely requested a formal hearing regarding the Department's determination. The matter was thereafter transferred to the Division of Administrative Hearings where it was assigned DOAH Case No. 90-8112. In that dispute, the Department took the position that the 20 items in the Inventory were immovable trade fixtures and, therefore, items of real property, that those items had been purchased by the Department as part of its acquisition of the real property, and that Petitioner was entitled to no relocation benefits relative to those items. Petitioner, on the other hand, contended that the Inventory items were personal property, that they were not converted into real property because the Right-of- Way Purchase Agreement referred to them, and that Petitioner, through Gass, had specifically reserved its right to receive relocation benefits regarding those items due to negotiated language which Gass had required and which was included in the Addendum to the Right-of-Way Purchase Agreement. The threshold issue to be adjudicated in the underlying proceeding was whether the items of property listed in the Inventory were items of personal property, as Petitioner contended, or trade fixtures and items of real property, as the Department contended. Expert real property appraisers and expert machinery and equipment appraisers testified in the evidentiary hearing. The one area of agreement among them was that whether a piece of equipment is considered real property or personal property is a "gray area." On September 12, 1991, a Recommended Order was entered in DOAH Case No. 90-8112. That Recommended Order determined that all of the items listed in the Inventory were items of personal property, that the Right-of-Way Purchase Agreement was ambiguous, and that Petitioner was entitled to relocation benefits for substitute personal property in the amount of $275,900. On December 10, 1991, the Department entered its Final Order essentially adopting the Recommended Order. The Final Order specifically held that all of the items listed in the Inventory were items of personal property and that Petitioner was entitled to relocation payments for substitute personal property in an amount not to exceed $275,900 upon submission of the appropriate documentation. At the time that the Department denied Petitioner's claim for relocation benefits regarding those items listed in the Inventory and advised Petitioner of its right to request an administrative hearing regarding that determination, the Department believed, in good faith, that it had purchased the 20 categories/items listed in the Inventory as part of its acquisition of the real property at Petitioner's manufacturing site. At that same time, the Department believed, in good faith, that the 20 categories/items listed in the Inventory were not items of personal property and that Petitioner was not, therefore, entitled to relocation benefits for that personal property. At the time, the Department's decision to deny Petitioner's claim for relocation benefits was substantially justified. At the time, the Department's determination had a reasonable basis in law and in fact. When the Department and Gass entered into the Right-of-Way Purchase Agreement and Addendum and attached the Inventory as Exhibit "A" thereto, the Department believed that it had paid Petitioner, through Gass, those monies to which Petitioner was entitled related to the 20 categories/items listed in the Inventory. The Department did not foresee that Petitioner would be entitled to additional payments regarding those same items because language added to the Department's standard form contract increased the ambiguity in that document so that there was never a "meeting of the minds" as to whether the 20 categories/items listed in the Inventory were agreed to be real property acquired by the Department in the Right-of-Way Purchase Agreement or were agreed to be personal property and the subject of relocation benefits. Accordingly, circumstances exist which would make the award of attorney's fees and costs in this proceeding unjust.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57120.6857.111
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RICHARD E. KIMBALL vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 81-001162 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-001162 Latest Update: May 03, 1982

Findings Of Fact On March 21, 1979, the Department of Transportation began negotiations to acquire real property in Dade County, Florida, for a right-of-way in connection with the expansion of I-95. In October of 1979, representatives of DOT found the Petitioner's trailer on land located on the right-of way. This trailer was not being used as a residence, but was used for storage of feed for horses being raised by the Petitioner. The Petitioner claimed to be occupying the property pursuant to a lease from the owner. The representatives of DOT advised the Petitioner that he must move the trailer off the property, but that he could file a claim for relocation benefits. Subsequently, the Petitioner presented DOT with a claim for the expenses of moving the trailer off the subject property. The Petitioner also submitted a lease dated May 1, 1979, from Henry Milander to the Petitioner, leasing the subject property for a term of two years, in support of his claim to be in lawful possession. This lease, however, was not executed by Henry Milander, but by Michael Manin, whose signature was neither witnessed nor notarized. The Petitioner subsequently submitted a power of attorney executed by Henry Milander to Michael Manin, dated approximately three years prior to the date of the Petitioner's lease. This power of attorney was witnessed, but was not notarized. Neither the lease nor the power of attorney had been recorded on the public records of Dade County. The DOT representatives conducted a title search, and found that the record owner of the subject property was Ruth Milander Tabrah, as trustee of a trust established by Henry Milander in 1955. This trust had not been terminated, and was in existence during the time periods relevant to this proceeding. Thereupon, the DOT advised the Petitioner that his claim for relocation benefits had been disallowed because his occupancy of the subject property was "inconsistent with the rights of the true owner". The Petitioner's request for a formal administrative hearing challenges the determination of DOT that he is not eligible for relocation benefits.

Recommendation From the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the claim of Richard E. Kimball for relocation assistance payments be denied. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered on this 15th day of April, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of April, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard E. Kimball 18930 S.W. 312 Street Homestead, Florida 33030 Charles G. Gardner, Esquire 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (2) 695.01695.03
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FORMAN'S DAIRY PALM NURSERY vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 89-000084 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 89-000084 Latest Update: Sep. 26, 1990

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Forman's Dairy Palm Nursery (the "Nursery"), is located in Broward County, Florida and is primarily engaged in the business of raising and wholesaling palm trees. The area in which the Nursery is located was originally settled by the parents of Hamilton Forman and Charles Forman in approximately 1910. The Forman property was developed into a diversified agricultural enterprise which consisted of approximately seven hundred acres. The Nursery was incorporated and began operations in approximately 1956 and is authorized to undertake a wide range of business ventures. The evidence did not establish the initial size of the Nursery or the ownership of the land on which the Nursery has conducted operations. Hamilton Forman is the president of the Nursery and is responsible for filing the tax returns and maintaining the other financial records of the corporation. The Nursery is one of many business ventures in which he is engaged. He owns fifty percent (50%) of the Nursery. His brother, Dr. Charles Forman, owns the other fifty percent (50%) of the Nursery. Charles Forman has been more involved in the agricultural and operational aspects of the Nursery. In approximately 1970, a portion of the Forman property was transferred to one of Hamilton Forman's sons for the purpose of establishing a cemetery. (This property will hereinafter be referred to as the "Cemetery.") Approximately thirty acres of land which had previously been part of the Nursery was conveyed for the establishment of the Cemetery. The Cemetery was subsequently conveyed to an unrelated conglomerate which continues to operate the Cemetery on property immediately adjacent to the Nursery. (The company which acquired the Cemetery will be referred to as the "Cemetery Company".) When the property was transferred for purposes of establishing the Cemetery, a deed reservation was inserted in the conveyance which allowed the Nursery to continue to use a portion of the property conveyed (approximately ten acres) until such time as the Cemetery needed it. (This provision will hereinafter be referred to as the "Deed Reservation.") Pursuant to this Deed Reservation, the Cemetery Company can regain use of the property at any time with a one year notification requirement. The specific provisions of the Deed Reservation were not established. Thus, the exact terms under which the Nursery continued to occupy the property are not clear and there is no evidence as to what rights the Nursery has under the Deed Reservation. Although it appears that approximately ten acres were originally subject to the Deed Reservation, it is unclear how much of the property currently occupied and utilized by the Nursery is actually owned by the Cemetery Company subject to this Deed Reservation. The property owned by the parents of Hamilton and Charles Forman abutted a road for a distance of approximately seven thousand feet. The road has been at its current location since prior to 1926. The road ultimately became State Road 84. There have been ongoing discussions and negotiations regarding the development of a limited access highway in the State Road 84 corridor for over twenty years. Hamilton Forman has closely followed the various proposals during this time period and has supported the development of such a highway The proposals came to fruition with the current on-going construction of the Interstate 595 ("I-595") expressway in the area of the State Road 84 corridor. The I-595 project is a federally assisted highway project undertaken by DOT. The evidence did not establish when the I-595 project was finally approved to begin acquisitions and construction, but the project was the culmination of years of effort. In approximately 1984 or 1985, DOT sent notices to all of the land owners in the area of the proposed limited access highway advising them of the potential need to acquire property for the I-595 project. When the location of the project changed, new notices were sent out in late 1985 or 1986. During this time period, DOT representatives approached Hamilton Forman and the Nursery regarding the acquisitions that were necessary for the I-595 project. Shortly thereafter, a portion of the property occupied by the Nursery was sold to a third party for the construction of a mini-warehouse. (The property sold for the warehouse will hereinafter be referred to as the "DiMar Property.") The transfer of the DiMar Property was completed on March 6, 1986. Hamilton Forman and Miles Austin Forman were the transferors in that transaction. The DiMar Property consisted of just under four acres. The Nursery occupied approximately three and one half of those acres. At the time of the sale of the DiMar Property, Hamilton Forman anticipated that the I-595 project would impact upon the operation of the Nursery and he recognized the possibility that the Nursery might not be able to continue to operate profitably because of that impact. No evidence was presented regarding the effect the transfer of the DiMar Property had on the profitability or sales of the Nursery or how the nursery stock located on the property was disposed of. The transfer of the DiMar property took place prior to the valuation dates for the acquisitions of property in the area by DOT for the I-595 project. Shortly after the transfer of the DiMar Property, DOT began acquiring property in the vicinity of the Nursery for the right-of-way for I-595. The evidence did not establish the exact acreage occupied by the Nursery either before or after the sale of the DiMar property. It appears that after the sale of the DiMar property but prior to any acquisitions for the I-595 project, the area occupied by the Nursery was somewhere between fifteen and eighteen acres. The direct acquisition of property required for the I-595 project included approximately two hundred feet along the southern frontage of State Road 84 which was being utilized by the Nursery. In total, approximately 2.75 acres of land that was occupied by the Nursery along this frontage was acquired for the I-595 project. (The acquisitions of property on which the Nursery was conducting operations will be referred to as the "Taking".) All of the property occupied by the Nursery and acquired as part of the Taking was actually owned by either the Cemetery (and occupied by the Nursery in accordance with the Deed Reservation discussed in Findings of Fact 5 above) or by Di-Mar. The evidence did not establish the terms under which the Nursery was occupying the property owned by DiMar. DOT paid the Nursery for the palm trees and nursery stock located within the area of the Taking. DOT also acquired approximately two acres from the Cemetery that was occupied and being held in reserve for expansion by the Cemetery Company. Prior to the acquisitions of property described in Findings of Fact 14 and 15, the Cemetery had direct access and egress to State Road 84. Because of the planned acquisitions, DOT recognized that a new access to State Road 84 was necessary for the Cemetery. In order to provide this new access for the Cemetery, DOT acquired an additional one half acre of land that was owned by the Cemetery Company but occupied by the Nursery pursuant to the Deed Reservation. (This half acre will be referred to as the "Trapezoidal Area.") The location and design for a new driveway-access to State Road 84 were negotiated with and approved by the Cemetery Company. (This new driveway will be referred to as the "Access Loop.") There is no indication that the Nursery was consulted or provided any input regarding its needs with respect to the Access Loop. The Respondent has completed construction of the Access Loop. It was anticipated that the Access Loop would be connected with the interior roadways of the Cemetery. The Respondent has paid a sum of money to the Cemetery Company as a "Cost To Cure" to enable the Cemetery Company to connect its internal roads with the Access Loop. As of the date of the hearing, the Cemetery Company had not connected its internal roads with the Access Loop. As part of the Cost To Cure, the Respondent paid the Nursery for the trees and Nursery stock located within the Trapezoidal Area where the new Access Loop was built. After the sale of the DiMar Property, the subsequent Taking for I-595 and the acquisition of the Trapezoidal Area for the new driveway, the Nursery continued its operations in an area of approximately twelve to fifteen acres. The evidence did not establish the ownership of the property on which the Nursery has continued operations. However, it is clear that at least a portion of the property, and perhaps as much as ten acres, are owned by the Cemetery Company and subject to the Deed Reservation. By letter dated March 31, 1988, the Cemetery Company advised Hamilton C. Forman that it was reclaiming approximately five acres of the land occupied by the Nursery pursuant to the Deed Reservation. (These five acres will be referred to as the "Reclaimed Land.") The letter states that the Reclaimed Land was necessary because of the taking by DOT of the Cemetery property as set forth in Findings of Fact 15 above. The letter purports to serve as the one year notification required by the Deed Reservation. The Reclaimed Land is among the Nursery's moot productive acreage. The evidence did not establish when, or if, this property was vacated by the Nursery and turned over to the Cemetery Company. No competent evidence was presented to establish when the Cemetery Company would have exercised its rights under the Deed Reservation if no portion of the Cemetery had been taken for the I-595 project. While Hamilton Forman testified that the Cemetery Company would not have needed the property occupied by the Nursery for approximately four or five years from the date it acquired the Cemetery (which was sometime in 1985 or 1986), his testimony is clearly hearsay which is not corroborated by otherwise competent evidence. The amount of land being reclaimed by the Cemetery Company (five acres) exceeds the amount of land acquired by DOT that was actually being utilized and occupied by the Cemetery at the time of acquisition (approximately two acres.) At the time the Forman property was developed, a system of underground water culverts and Sewell locks were established in order to control the surface water in the area and provide irrigation to the farm lands. These drainage and irrigation facilities (including the Sewell locks) were constructed several years prior to the establishment of the Nursery and they provide irrigation and drainage control on both sides of State Road 84. The nearby North New River Canal provides the source of water. The Formans have vested rights to draw water from the North New River Canal and to discharge water below the Sewell locks. The evidence did not establish the terms or duration of these vested rights but it appears that they will continue for a another sixty (60) to seventy (70) years. The Tindall Hammock Irrigation Soil Conservation District ("Tindall Hammock") was created in 1951. Charles Forman is the chairman of Tindall Hammock and Hamilton Forman is a director. Hamilton Forman was also one of the organizers of Tindall Hammock. 25. Tindall Hammock is the owner of some of the drainage facilities in the area of the Nursery. The Sewell locks are owned and controlled by the Central and Southern South Florida Flood Control District (the "Flood Control District.") Tindall Hammock has recently negotiated with the Cemetery Company regarding the relocation of a portion of the drainage facilities. As a result of the discussions between Tindall Hammock and the Cemetery Company, two easements have been granted to Tindall Hammock dated May 5, 1989. Tindall Hammock and the Cemetery determined the size and location of both of the drainage easements without any input from DOT. There are two separate areas involved in the relocation of the drainage facilities. The first consists of roughly .34 acres and runs approximately two hundred and sixty-six feet by fifty-six feet from the western border of the Nursery along the northern boundary of the Nursery following the line of the taking for the I-595 project. (This parcel will hereinafter be referred to as "Relocated Drainage Facility No. 1"). The second drainage easement also runs along the northern border of the Nursery following the boundary of the I-595 Taking. It starts from a point on the eastern boundary of the Nursery bordering the Cemetery, runs to the west for a short distance and then cuts diagonally through the existing Nursery to a point close to the southern border of the Nursery. (This easement will hereinafter be referred to as the "Relocated Drainage Facility No. 2"). Relocated Drainage Facility No. 2 is almost entirely included within the area of the Reclaimed Land. A new drainage ditch is proposed to be constructed in the area of Relocated Drainage Facility No. 2 to replace a drainage ditch which previously ran along the eastern edge of the Nursery and served as the boundary between the Cemetery and the Nursery. The proposed new drainage ditch will enable the Cemetery to make more efficient use of the Reclaimed Land. Tindall Hammock submitted a claim to DOT for the cost of the easements and for relocating the drainage facilities thereon. Tindall Hammock contended that the relocations were due to the I-595 project. DOT denied most of the claim. A portion of the relocated drainage facilities was necessary to replace and relocate drainage facilities that were within the area of the Taking and to replace drainage to the North New River Canal underneath State Road 84 which was severed as part of the construction of I-595. Therefore, DOT did construct or pay for the relocation of a culvert in the Trapezoidal Area and a drainage ditch in the area of Relocated Drainage Facility No. 2. DOT has not paid to relocate any other drainage facilities because it determined that the relocations were not the result of the acquisitions for the I-595 project. Tindall Hammock has not appealed DOT's denial of the claim regarding the rest of the relocated drainage facilities. Other than the facilities constructed or paid for by DOT, no new drainage facilities have been constructed in the area of Relocated Drainage Facility No. 2. It is not clear whether any new facilities have been erected in the area of Relocated Drainage Facility No. 1. The Nursery has been compensated by DOT for the palm trees or nursery stock that was located in the areas where the new drainage facilities have been built as set forth in Findings of Fact 27. Prior to this hearing, the Nursery had not sought payment for the palm trees or nursery stock located in the other areas of the Relocated Drainage Facilities No. 1 and No. 2. The evidence in this case failed to establish that the relocation of the drainage facilities was necessitated by the I-595 project except in those areas where DOT has already constructed or paid for the relocation. Throughout its existence and up until the construction of I-595, the Nursery had direct access to State Road 84. Prior to the Taking, the Nursery had two means of access from State Road 84: one was used primarily for an entrance and the other was used primarily for exiting. These access points were shared with the Cemetery. Prior to the I-595 project, the Nursery's two access points on State Road 84 were approximately six hundred feet apart. Both of these access points allowed persons entering or leaving the Nursery to turn either east or west and both access points provided direct access from east bound or west bound State Road 84 through median openings. After the Taking, the new Access Loop was constructed in the Trapezoidal Area to funnel traffic into the Cemetery as set forth in Findings of Fact 16. The evidence did not establish when this new Access Loop was constructed. The nature of the wholesale palm tree business requires large trucks and/or semi-tractor/trailers to remove the trees from the site. As a result of the Taking and the construction of the Access Loop, access to the Nursery has been significantly altered. The new Access Loop was not designed to accommodate the large trucks and semi-tractor/trailers that typically frequent the Nursery. Access to the Nursery is still possible off the new Access Loop. However, entry to the Nursery is much more difficult for large trucks and semi-tractor/trailers. After the Taking, large trucks and semi-tractors/trailers have a much more difficult time negotiating the turn within the Nursery to properly exit out onto the frontage road. While the new driveway makes access to the Nursery more difficult and causes some internal circulation problems, the Petitioner has not established that a more appropriate access cannot be designed within the remainder of the property. A redesign of the internal traffic circulation system for the Nursery may be necessary. No evidence was presented to demonstrate the viability, cost or effect of such a redesign. However, it appears that this access problem can be cured relatively easily. The new Access Loop was constructed on land now owned by the Respondent. It is not clear what rights, if any, the Nursery will have to the Cost To Cure roadways that are to be constructed to connect the Access Loop to the internal Cemetery property. At this point, the only access that the Nursery has to State Road 84 is off of the Access Loop constructed by Respondent. Prior to the Taking, Nursery customers had direct access to the Nursery from State Road 84. Now, customers are required to take a very circuitous route to reach the Nursery. After the construction of I-595, State Road 84 has become a frontage road adjacent to the interstate. In the after condition, the Nursery has direct access to only the east bound frontage road. In sum, prior to the acquisition, the Nursery had direct frontage on a major arterial road. It now has restricted access on the east bound portion of a frontage road. Only those travelers on the east bound frontage road will be able to access the Nursery in substantially the same manner as they did prior to the acquisitions. While it is clear that access to the Nursery has become more difficult, the evidence did not establish that the Nursery will not be able to operate profitably solely as a result of these conditions. Hamilton Forman testified that, until the I-595 project, the Nursery has been profitable during all of its years of operations. However, no competent evidence was introduced to show the profits that have been earned. No financial records of the Nursery were produced and some of the overhead and other records of the Nursery are shared with other businesses in which Hamilton Forman is involved. The gross sales of the Nursery have declined by approximately fifty percent from the year 1985 to 1988. Gross sales for the year 1985 were $174,364.95. Gross sales for the year 1986 were $163,484.41. Gross sales for the year 1987 were $144,573.87. Gross sales for the year 1988 were $87,116.00. Gross sales for the first nine months of 1989 were $43,909.00 which if annualized would result in total sales for the year of $58,647.00. The overhead costs involved in operating the Nursery have remained relatively constant throughout this time and the Nursery has not significantly changed its advertising efforts during this time period. Some of the lost sales may be attributable to a third party vendor who purchased the trees acquired by DOT following the acquisitions detailed in Findings of Fact 14 and 15. This third party vendor sold the trees which had been acquired from the Nursery at a significant discount over the prices that the Nursery was selling similar stock. The evidence did not establish the time frame during which this vendor was in business. Thus, it is not possible to determine the extent to which the Nursery's drop in sales was attributable to this third party vendor. Petitioner contends that its drop in sales is mainly attributable to the more difficult access to the Nursery. However, Petitioner's own witnesses regarding the value of the nursery stock have testified to the unique types and sizes of the palm trees at the Nursery. The uniqueness of the product sold by the Nursery should help insulate it from problems associated with more difficult access. Moreover, it is clear that a number of other factors have contributed to the decrease in sales including the loss of the DiMar Property, the competition from the purchaser of the palm trees acquired by DOT in the area of the Taking and the temporary disruption that has occurred because of the ongoing construction that has been taking place in the area for several years. After the Nursery learned it would have to turn over approximately five acres to the Cemetery Company as set forth in Findings of Fact 20 above, the Nursery submitted a claim to Respondent for the loss of its palm trees in this area (the "Claim"). The Nursery's Claim also sought reimbursement for all the remaining trees in the Nursery on the grounds that the Nursery could no longer continue to operate after it turned over the Reclaimed Land. Most of the palm trees in the remaining areas of the Nursery are planted in the ground rather than in pots. The value of the palm trees in the ground is approximately the same as the cost to move the trees. Moving the trees would stunt the growth of the trees for a period of eight months to a year after the move. In addition, it is reasonable to expect that a significant number of the trees would be unable to survive a move. The Petitioner has presented two valuations of the Nursery stock currently found within the entire remaining area occupied by the Nursery. The first valuation is dated May 2, 1988 and it includes a total of 6,739 trees which are valued at a total of $289,215.50. The second valuation is dated November 17, 1989 and includes 11,404 trees with a total value of $453,510. The Petitioner has not separated out the value of the trees in any specific area of the Nursery. No acceptable explanation was given for the great disparity between these two valuations completed only one and a half years apart. Therefore, the valuations are rejected. The Respondent has not presented any contrary evidence regarding the value of the trees located in the Nursery. DOT denied Petitioner's Claim on the grounds that the Taking by DOT of the property occupied by the Nursery did not necessitate the relocation of the entire Nursery operation. In making this determination, DOT refused to consider the effect on the Nursery of losing the five acres being reclaimed by the Cemetery Company. DOT has not made a specific assessment of what impact the Taking and the development of the new Access Loop has had on the business of the Nursery. DOT has concluded that the displacement of the Nursery in the area of the Taking (approximately 2.75 acre) in the Trapezoidal area (approximately .5 acres) and in the area of the new drainage ditch (less than .5 acres) do not necessitate the move of the entire Nursery operation. There is a great deal of conflicting evidence regarding the amount of land actually occupied by the Nursery. After thoroughly reviewing this evidence, it is concluded that, including the five acres being reclaimed by the Cemetery Company, the Nursery has approximately twelve to fifteen acres of land in which to carry out its operations. Petitioner has not presented sufficient evidence to establish that this area would be inadequate to continue profitable operations. The evidence presented at the hearing did establish that the economies of scale will no longer be favorable enough to allow the Nursery to continue to operate at a profit if and when it turns over the Reclaimed Land to the Cemetery Company. However, the evidence did not establish that the Nursery would be unable to operate at a profit if the Cemetery Company had not reclaimed the approximate five acres pursuant to the Deed Reservation. In evaluating relocation claims, DOT first determines whether a claimant has been "displaced" in the area of the taking. Prior to evaluating the Claim which is the subject of this proceeding, DOT had determined that the Nursery was displaced in the area of the Taking, in the Trapezoidal Area and in a small portion of the area of Relocated Drainage Facility No. 2 where the new drainage ditch was constructed. Based upon this determination, the Nursery was deemed eligible for relocation, cost reimbursement or reimbursement for actual direct loss of tangible personal property with respect to the palm trees located in those areas. The palm trees in those areas were considered moveable personal property by DOT because the intention was to sell the trees for transplantation off-site. Thus, the trees were deemed eligible for relocation, cost reimbursement or, if the Nursery elected not to move the trees, they were to be treated under the relocation guideline known as "Reimbursement for Actual Direct Losses of Tangible Personal Property." The Nursery stock was processed through relocation procedures and was handled separate and apart from the realty and improvement acquisitions. However, DOT denied the Nursery's subsequent Claim for relocating the palm trees in the remaining area of the Nursery on the grounds that the Nursery was not a displaced person in those areas. In applying the Relocation Act, DOT will, in certain instances, reimburse a claimant for relocating personal property not within the area of the take. DOT has not adopted any rules setting forth the factors that will be considered in determining whether the agency will pay for relocation costs of personal property that is not relocated within the area of the take. Among the factors that are considered when determining whether a displacee is entitled to relocation assistance for a partial taking include whether there has been a total severance of access, whether internal traffic flow in the remainder has been substantially impaired and such internal traffic control was an essential part of the business operation, whether a process system has been disrupted and there is no adequate space on the remainder to put that process system back into operation and whether the visibility of the business had been significantly impaired and the business is largely dependent on impulse buyers as opposed to destination shoppers.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of facts and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Petitioner's claim for relocation expenses related to the Nursery stock outside the area of the Taking which has not previously been compensated. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 26th day of September, 1990. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of September, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 89-0084 Both parties have submitted Proposed Recommended Orders. The following constitutes my rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law includes seven main sections. Section I is an Introduction, Section II is entitled stipulated Facts, Section III is entitled DOT Admissions, Section IV is entitled Unrebutted Facts in Evidence of the Petitioner, Section V is entitled Disputed Facts, Section VI is entitled Statutes regarding Eligibility for Relocation Assistance, Section VII is entitled Federal Case Law on Relocation-Assistance Eligibility and Section VIII is entitled Proposed Conclusions of Law. All of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law have been considered in the preparation of this Recommended Order. This Appendix will deal only with the factual proposals set forth in Sections III, IV and v. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact "DOT ADMISSIONS" Paragraph Number in Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact Petitioner's Section in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or "III. DOT Admissions" Reason for Rejection Rejected as overly broad and constituting a conclusion of law rather than a finding of fact. While this proposed finding may be true in some instances, the DOT statement which is relied upon for this proposal was limited to a specific factual setting. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. The subject matter is addressed in part in Findings of Fact 48. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 14 and 47. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 30 and 48. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 16 and 17. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 26, 27, 28 and 30 31 Subordinate to Findings of Fact 30, 42 and 47. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 13 and 18. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 14 and 15. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 16 and 30. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 16. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 30. No competent evidence was presented to establish the acreage involved in this "Cost To Cure" area. The evidence did establish that DOT did compensate the Nursery for some trees that were located outside the area of the Taking. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 8 and 9. Rejected as irrelevant. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 20 and 21. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 27. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 14, 17, 30 and 47. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 28, 30, and 47. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 28, 30, and 47. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 32, 33, and 34. Rejected as irrelevant. This subject is addressed to some degree in Findings of Fact 35. Rejected as vague and ambiguous. Rejected overly broad. Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law rather than a finding of fact. Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law rather than a finding of fact. Rejected as vague and ambiguous. This subject is addressed to some degree in Findings of Fact 48. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 46 and 47. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 48. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 48. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 48. Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law rather than a finding of fact. This subject area is related to Findings of Fact 48. Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law rather than a finding of fact. This subject area is related to Findings of Fact 48. Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law rather than a finding of fact. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact Rejected as overly broad. 37.-38. Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law rather than a finding of fact. Rejected as constituting a hypothetical based upon facts not in evidence. Rejected as irrelevant. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 46. Rejected as constituting argument rather than a Finding of Fact. This subject matter is addressed in Findings of Fact 38. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as vague. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 46. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 47. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 46 and 48. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 48. 50.-52. Rejected as unnecessary and as constituting legal interpretations rather than findings of fact. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 48. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 48. Rejected as irrelevant. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 48. Rejected as constituting argument and legal interpretations rather than a finding of fact. This subject area is addressed in Findings of Fact 48. Rejected as vague and ambiguous. The subject area is addressed in Findings of Fact 45, 46 and 47. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 46. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 34 and 46. Rejected as vague and ambiguous and irrelevant. "UNREBUTTED FACTS AND EVIDENCE Paragraph Number in Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact Petitioner's Section in the Recommended Order Where Accepted "IV Unrebutted Facts or Reason for Rejection and Evidence Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 4, 5 and 6. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 20. Rejected as vague, overly broad and irrelevant. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact Subordinate to Findings of Fact 26. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 26. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 31, 36 and 37. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 34 and 37. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 37. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 46. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 2. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 23. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact Subordinate to Findings of Fact 38. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 4. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 3. Rejected as irrelevant and not necessary. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 5 and 6. 19.-23. The gross sales figures are adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 38. The labor costs are rejected as being irrelevant. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 39. Rejected as irrelevant and not established by competent substantial evidence. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 31-41. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 33-34. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 33-34 and 35 Subordinate to Findings of Fact 46. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 39. Addressed in part in Findings of Fact 41. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 33. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 44. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 44. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 33, 34 and 35. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 46. 37-39. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 43. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 20 and 22. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 20 and 22. "DISPUTED FACTS" Paragraph Number in Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact Petitioner's Section in the Recommended Order Where Accepted "V Disputed Facts" or Reason for Rejection and Evidence Rejected as irrelevant. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 26, 27 and 30. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 46. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 14, 15, 16 and 22. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 14. The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 2. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 23. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 3. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 3. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 3. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 3 and 38. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 7. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 31. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 26 and 27. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 25. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 24 and 25. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 24. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 4. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 7. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 7. Rejected as vague and irrelevant. This subject matter is covered in Findings of Fact 7. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 4. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 4, 5 and 6. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 4, 5 and 6. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 9 and 10. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 10 and 12. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 13 and 18. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 15. Rejected as vague. This subject matter is addressed in Findings of Fact 14. Rejected as vague. This subject matter is addressed in Findings of Fact 36 and 37. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 16. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 16. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 13 and 18. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 25 and 26. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27, 28 and 30. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 26 and 27. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 29. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 26. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 20. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 38. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 38 and 46. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 21. 41.-44. Rejected as irrelevant and not established by competent substantial evidence. Rejected as vague and irrelevant. Rejected as vague and irrelevant. Rejected as vague and irrelevant. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 19. Rejected as irrelevant. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 46. Rejected as vague and irrelevant. Rejected as vague. Rejected as constituting argument rather than a finding of fact. Rejected as constituting argument rather than a finding of fact. No proposal submitted. Rejected as constituting argument rather than a finding of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Charles R. Forman Atkins, Krehl & Forman 320 Northwest Third Avenue Post Office Box 159 Ocala, Florida 32678 H. Collins Forman, Jr. Watson, Clark & Purdy Post Office Box 11959 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33339 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Robert Scalan, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458

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R. G. FURNITURE vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 90-008112 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Dec. 27, 1990 Number: 90-008112 Latest Update: Feb. 05, 1992

Findings Of Fact Petitioner R. G. Furniture is in the business of manufacturing and selling extruded aluminum patio furniture. Petitioner is owned by Robert L. Gass, Jr., who was also the owner of the real estate which Petitioner occupies as a tenant. For purposes of this administrative proceeding and for purposes of relocation assistance benefits, the parties have stipulated that R. G. Furniture, Medallion Furniture, Mar-Tec Furniture, R. G. Cushion Co., Robert L. Gass, Jr., and all other related entities, corporations, or persons shall be treated as one party so that there will be no duplicity of claims made or of benefits paid. The patio furniture, umbrellas, and related items are both sold and manufactured by Petitioner on-site. Straight tubes of aluminum are cut to size, bent into shape, welded, finished, and electrostatically painted. Strapping is then applied, and the furniture is then fitted with custom-made cushions. After this process is completed, the furniture is shipped to the customer or sold on the showroom floor. The furniture moves through the system on an overhead conveyor through each stage of the fabrication process. The paint system is extremely complex and critical to the operation of the plant. As the furniture goes through the paint machine, a dry, powdered paint is applied through an electrostatic process which bonds positive and negative charges, after which the dry paint is melted in an oven and cured. Gass was the fee owner of the real property on which Petitioner, a company owned by him, operates. On September 3, 1987, the Department notified Gass that his real property was needed for a new highway, I-595 in Broward County, Florida. The project requiring acquisition of the real property and the relocation of Petitioner is a federally-funded highway construction project. The September 3, 1987, letter also notified Gass of a prenegotiation meeting. Pursuant to a contract with the Department, employees of Kaiser Engineers were responsible for both the acquisition of real property and relocation of personal property of businesses and persons being displaced by the I-595 project. Their duties included advising displacees regarding their rights, negotiating settlements, and approving payment of claims. Some of Kaiser's employees are involved with acquisition (acquiring ownership of real property) and different employees are responsible for relocation assistance (relocating personal property). An appraisal of the land and improvements at the manufacturing site was performed on behalf of the Department. The Department's real estate appraiser called in a machinery and equipment appraiser to estimate the then-current replacement cost new, market value in-place, and salvage value of certain "immovable business fixtures and special purpose process systems". That appraisal was performed by Gary Maehl as of December 19, 1987. The appraisal prepared by Maehl for Kaiser Engineers contained 20 categories/items, consisting primarily of the painting machinery and the assembly line. Although the cover sheet to Maehl's full report is entitled "Immoveable Business Fixtures and Special Purpose Process Systems," there is no evidence that Gass ever saw more of the report than the 3-page listing of the 20 items which was entitled "Inventory." The components of the 20 categories/items are all movable. They are either freestanding or are attached to the building by nuts and bolts. Seventeen of the 20 items are easily movable. The component parts of the painting system and assembly line are bolted together. Those parts are bought and sold new and used on the open market. Even the freight elevator is movable. At all times material hereto, Gass has intended to continue in the furniture manufacturing business at a replacement site. It is not disputed that the painting machinery and assembly line are necessary to the operation of the furniture factory. Gass began receiving correspondence and informational packets from Kaiser Engineers regarding various relocation benefits to which he and his businesses would be entitled as eligible displacees. By March 9, 1988, Gass had been notified of his company's eligibility for relocation benefits, and negotiations for the acquisition of his real property had begun. Using its standard form Right-Of-Way Purchase Agreement, the Department made a written offer to Gass to acquire his property, one of the largest properties involved in the I-595 project. Gass, through his attorney, rejected that offer. One of Gass' concerns involved the "down time" he would incur in his business if he were required to disassemble, move, reassemble and install his assembly line and painting system process. The disassembly, moving, reassembly, and installation would take from 3 to 6 months, or more, essentially putting him out of business for an extended period of time. One of the relocation benefits for which a displaced business may be eligible involves the concept of substitute personal property. Under that concept, a business may purchase new equipment and machinery, such as an assembly line or specialized process, and have it fully installed and operational before relocating the business. At that time, the old machinery and equipment is shut down, and the business moves to the relocation site ready to continue production with its operational replacement equipment. In that manner, a business suffers only the disruption involved in the physical move of its other personal property and its employees. It was important to Gass that he have a replacement assembly line and painting system process operational before moving to the relocation site. On August 22, 1988, Gass entered into a Right-Of-Way Purchase Agreement with the Department to which was attached an Addendum required by him. The Addendum was specifically incorporated by reference. The Agreement also required a higher purchase price than the Department's first offer to Gass. Although the Department contends that the Agreement is used only to purchase real property, paragraph III. (c) of the Department's standard form agreement contains the following language: "All personal property included in the purchase price shall be delivered to PURCHASER in the same condition existing as of the date of this agreement." The Addendum also contained, in part, the following language: Seller shall retain title to all movable items and all items of personal property not identified as fixtures in the attached Exhibit "A". Seller retains his right to relocation benefits under the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, as amended, and PURCHASER agrees to pay said benefits upon receipts [sic] of appropriate application from Seller. Exhibit "A" was the listing of 20 items prepared by appraiser Gary Maehl. The total purchase price for the land, improvements thereon, and the 20 items on the Maehl inventory was $3,985,000. The parties to the Agreement added a footnote to specify that the total purchase price included all costs and attorneys fees in settlement in lieu of condemnation. Terry E. Morris, the land acquisition director of Kaiser Engineers, who personally handled the acquisition of the manufacturing site since the parcel was one of the largest properties involved in the project, designated $477,000 of the purchase price to be for the items listed on the Maehl inventory. This figure represents their depreciated value in-place. Gass netted $88,000 from the transaction. Although R. G. Furniture has not yet moved to its replacement site, Gass made application to the Department for relocation benefits to purchase replacement items for the items contained in the Maehl inventory, primarily those items needed to begin assembling and installing a new assembly line and painting system process. The Department's denial of that claim is the subject of this proceeding. Although relocation benefits are usually not payable prior to the relocation, except in cases of justified hardship, the concept of substitute personal property would embody payment prior to relocation, and the parties have stipulated that the issue of eligibility regarding the items listed in the Maehl inventory only is ripe for adjudication. The relocation benefit involving substitute personal property is computed using two different formulas. One of those formulas contemplates that the property being replaced will be sold, and the sales price will be deducted from the cost of purchasing and installing the replacement equipment. There is no prohibition against the Department being the purchaser of the property which is being replaced. Petitioner is an eligible displacee. It is an on-going business being displaced as a result of a federally-funded highway project. All of the items listed in Maehl's inventory are items of personal property. Petitioner is entitled to relocation benefits for substitute personal property for those items. At the time of the final hearing in this cause, the cost of substitute items including installation at the replacement site was $752,900. The estimated cost of moving and reinstalling the replaced items, with no allowance for storage, is $494,100.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Petitioner entitled to relocation benefits for substitute personal property and paying Petitioner the sum of $275,900 as partial payment of the relocation benefits to which Petitioner is entitled. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of September, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of September, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's second through fourth, eleventh, and twelfth unnumbered paragraphs have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's first, fifth through tenth, and thirteenth through eighteenth unnumbered paragraphs have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting conclusions of law, argument of counsel, or recitation of the testimony. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1, 2, 4-8, and 10-13 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 3, 9, 14, 15, 19, 20, 23, and 24 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting conclusions of law, argument of counsel, or recitation of the testimony. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 17, 18, 21, and 22 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of credible evidence in this cause. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 16 and 25 have been rejected as being unnecessary for determination of the issues herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Ben G. Watts, Secretary Florida Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, M.S. #58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Attn: Eleanor F. Turner Charles G. Gardner Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, M.S. #58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 J. Philip Landsman, Esquire Margaret Z. Villella, Esquire Platt, Haas & Landsman, P.A. Broward Financial Centre 500 East Broward Boulevard, Suite 1850 Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33394

USC (1) 49 CFR 24 Florida Laws (2) 120.57120.68
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GERALD J. CAREY, II vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 10-009282 (2010)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Sep. 23, 2010 Number: 10-009282 Latest Update: Mar. 23, 2011

The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to reimbursement for expenses incurred in relocating and reestablishment of his small business pursuant to section 421.55, Florida Statutes (2009),1/ as implemented by Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-66.007, which, in turn, incorporates by reference the provisions of 49 Code of Federal Regulations Part 24, Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition for Federal and Federally-Assisted Programs (effective October 1, 2006),2/ and the Florida Department of Transportation Right of Way Manual 9.3.15, and, if Petitioner is entitled to reimbursement, the amount owed to him.

Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence and witnesses' testimony, the undersigned found the following facts: The Department is the state agency that has responsibility for paying certain relocation and reestablishment expenses of businesses that have been displaced because of a public transportation project. See § 421.55, Fla. Stat. Sometime in 1999 to 2000, Mr. Carey purchased eight rental units in Hillsborough County, Florida, as an investment property. Mr. Carey managed the rental property and testified that he would advertise vacancies through "word of mouth." The record shows that these rental units were rented weekly and included written and verbal leases. In 2005, the Department informed Mr. Carey that his rental property would be subject of an eminent domain taking and informed Mr. Carey about the law authorizing the Department to pay certain expenses in relocating and reestablishing a small business. On December 6, 2005, Mr. Carey filled out a Business Survey Questionnaire for the Department, stating his desire to relocate his rental business. The Department acquired Mr. Carey's property on April 18, 2009. By mid July 2009, Mr. Carey contacted Mr. Nappi to determine whether or not he was still eligible to receive relocation and reestablishment reimbursement for his small business. Mr. Nappi determined that Mr. Carey remained eligible to apply for reimbursement and informed him of that fact. On August 28, 2009, Mr. Carey purchased a replacement property located at 19002 Apian Way, Lutz, Florida, for $300,000.00. The replacement property contained a house that had been the homestead property of the prior owner. Mr. Carey credibly testified that the purpose of purchasing this replacement property was "to get back into the rental business" and that he advertised the replacement property for rent by "word of mouth." Receipts introduced into evidence show that Mr. Carey began making repairs and purchasing materials as early as the first week in September. Mr. Carey testified, on cross-examination, that he could not remember the exact date when he listed the replacement property for sale, or the exact date when he entered into a contract for the sale of the replacement property. Mr. Carey testified that he would speculate that the contract for sale of the replacement property occurred in early October 2009. On October 15, 2009, Mr. Nappi went to the replacement property with Mr. Carey to review the work that Mr. Carey had already begun on the replacement property and to discuss the expenses eligible for reimbursement. In reviewing Mr. Carey's claimed expenses, Mr. Nappi found that the following expenses would be eligible for reimbursement: (1) the drywall work detailed in Exhibit A; (2) $561.00 worth of the receipts of materials purchased from Home Depot; and (3) the painting expenses detailed in Exhibit C. Mr. Nappi also testified that in reviewing the claimed expenses that Mr. Carey would be eligible for reimbursement of a portion of the replacement property's ad valorem taxes. According to Mr. Nappi, Mr. Carey would have been eligible to receive the difference of the amount of the property taxes between the acquired property and the replacement property in the amount of $849.56. The only expenses that Mr. Nappi identified as not being reasonable were for hauling away yard waste contained in Exhibit D. According to Mr. Nappi, the Department questioned the amount of the charges and determined that an appropriate amount would be $1,200.00 as opposed to the $2,450.00 sought by Mr. Carey. Consequently, the majority of the expenses claimed by Mr. Carey were eligible items for reimbursement. On November 4, 2009, the Department sent Mr. Carey a letter denying his eligibility to receive reimbursement for expenses in relocating and reestablishing his small rental business. The Department denied Mr. Carey's eligibility because the updated TRIM notice for the property tax, that Mr. Carey provided the Department, showed the replacement property was homestead property. Because the replacement property was homestead, the Department reasoned that Mr. Carey had not reestablished a small business. Mr. Carey informed Mr. Nappi that the replacement property was not homestead property and that the TRIM notice was wrong. In response, on November 9, 2009, Mr. Nappi wrote the Hillsborough County Tax Collector to determine whether or not Mr. Carey's replacement property was homestead property. On November 23, 2009, while the Department waited for a response from the Hillsborough County Tax Collector, Mr. Carey closed on the sale of the replacement property for $332,500.00. Mr. Carey did not inform the Department that the replacement property had been sold. In February 2010, the Hillsborough County Tax Collector informed the Department that the replacement property was not homestead. Also, the Department learned for the first time that Mr. Carey had sold the replacement property. After learning that Mr. Carey had sold the replacement property, Mr. Nappi contacted his supervisor Elbert Johnson (Mr. Johnson). Mr. Nappi informed Mr. Johnson that "it did not appear that the reestablishment status of the landlord had been in fact established[,]" and the claim would be denied. Mr. Nappi testified the Department attempted to determine whether or not Mr. Carey had reestablished his rental business by examining Mr. Carey's efforts to rent the replacement property. Mr. Nappi directed a right-of-way specialist for the Department to contact realtors, who were associated with the property, to determine if Mr. Carey had listed the property for rent; to contact the local newspaper to learn if the property had been advertised for rent; and to conduct an internet search of the property. According to Mr. Nappi, the realtor indicated that she was not aware of whether or not Mr. Carey listed the property for rent and learned nothing from the newspaper or internet search. Mr. Nappi admitted that the Department did not contact Mr. Carey to ask him about his efforts to rent the property. The Department did not contact Mr. Carey or ask him to provide any information about his efforts to rent the property. Consequently, the Department did not have before it any information concerning Mr. Carey's efforts as to "word of mouth" advertising of the property. Mr. Knight, the state administrator of Relocation Assistance, testified that asking Mr. Carey about his efforts to rent the property would have been helpful information to have in considering the reimbursement. However, Mr. Knight acknowledged that Mr. Carey's selling of the home prior to determination of whether or not he was entitled to reimbursement made the issue moot. In the Department's estimation, Mr. Carey had simply "flipped a house" and had not reestablished his business. On March 25, 2010, the Department informed Mr. Carey that it was denying his application for reimbursement because he was not eligible because he had not reestablished his small rental business at the replacement property.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order affirming its denial of Mr. Carey's application for reimbursement of reestablishment expenses. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of February, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S THOMAS P. CRAPPS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of February, 2011.

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RICHARD M. SELLARS, D/B/A DURABLE CONCRETE vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 81-000254 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-000254 Latest Update: Dec. 04, 1981

Findings Of Fact For a period of 24 years, Petitioner, Richard M. Sellars, owned and operated a business under the name of Durable Concrete Products at 1331 - 26th Avenue East, Bradenton, Florida. The business site was leased by Petitioner from Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company and was used by Petitioner for a concrete products manufacturing plant, principally manufacturing concrete storm sewers and concrete slabs. The manufacturing facilities at Durable Concrete were located on a triangular-shaped tract of land fronting on 26th Avenue East. The premises were fenced for security. Access to the plant was through a gate and driveway on 26th Avenue East. The flowage of products, materials, and equipment was past the office building and around to the side of the property. The office was utilized for usual administrative and clerical activities and as a checkpoint for trucks entering and leaving the premises. Raw materials were placed on the rear of the property. A materials silo was used for sand and gravel storage and transfer to the concrete mixer, weighing approximately eight tons, which was housed in an open steel unit or shell. Neither the mixer nor the steel shell was attached to the land. Some of the equipment stood on concrete slabs specifically constructed by Petitioner. The manufacturing process for the concrete pipe involved the mixing of raw materials into the rear of the concrete mixer, the pouring of the mix into molds that were in turn moved by a monorail approximately 60-80 feet long into the open air where the pipes were taken from the molds and transported to various drying and storage areas located throughout the premises. The concrete pipe was moved over an extended system of constructed shell roadways by large forklifts. The manufacture of concrete slabs was performed at several different locations to the west of the concrete mixer and office building. Concrete was moved from the mixer to various forms by forklifts. The concrete was poured into forms and allowed to dry. These forms were then removed, creating concrete slabs that were then stockpiled in several separate locations. Throughout the site, various pipes and slabs were stored for individual projects or as inventory for future sales. It was commercially necessary that Petitioner have immediately available several different types of pipe that are not standard sizes and therefore being continuously produced. In approximately 1970, Petitioner learned that Respondent was locating the route of a proposed limited access highway through the immediate area in which his leasehold was located. Although the exact location of the route remained undetermined, Petitioner regularly conferred with county officials to discover the location of the proposed construction. Petitioner determined that he could not continue in business at his site when the highway was constructed and began to seek an alternative location for his business. In late 1972 or 1973, Petitioner located the closest suitable site with zoning appropriate for a concrete manufacturing plant and purchased two adjacent five-acre sites. Petitioner purchased the property to protect himself from the anticipated expropriation of his leasehold when the highway was ultimately constructed. Prior to Respondent's acquisition of the right-of-way, Petitioner's business had prospered. It was located at an advantageous location and was well suited for Petitioner's business activities. The property was properly zoned, commercially accessible, and economical in that the rental to the Railroad was less than the taxes assessed upon Petitioner's replacement site. He had no desire to move his business location. Respondent formally located and designated the highway route and project location on November 12, 1976. On May 1, 1978, Petitioner and the Railroad entered into their next lease agreement. On May 22, 1978, the Respondent commenced formal negotiation with the Railroad for the acquisition of Railroad property, including the Petitioner's leasehold. Petitioner was officially notified of these negotiations on October 16, 1979, upon receipt of the Respondent's form notice. On November 19, 1979, the Secretary of the Florida Department of Transportation, by Resolution, directed the commencement of condemnation of certain lands, part of which included the Petitioner's leasehold. On December 4, 1979, the Railroad gave the Petitioner 30 days' notice that his lease was cancelled because the property was being acquired by the Respondent. On November 12, 1980, Petitioner was directed by Respondent to vacate the right-of-way acquired by Respondent by December 13, 1980. Petitioner's actual move from the site was completed by March 2, 1981. The right-of-way acquired by Respondent included Petitioner's property fronting on 26th Avenue East, his fence, driveway, office building, and yard improvements. A part of the monorail and slab area were also taken. The acquisition amounted to approximately 40 percent of the leasehold. Additionally, the acquired area had been used for storage of inventory products, and the taking required moving a large number and variety of these items. Respondent's own appraiser Klusza determined that the taking rendered the balance of the property entirely useless and adversely affected the interior flow of products and movement of equipment. Additionally, the remainder of the leasehold not acquired by Respondent was, after Respondent's taking, landlocked, i.e., there was no available route for ingress to or egress from the remainder of Petitioner's leasehold after acquisition by Respondent of the right-of-way for the limited access highway. Petitioner requested relocation assistance from Respondent's representatives. He secured two bids or estimates for relocating his plant from certified movers approved by the Respondent. The Meade House Moving, Inc., estimate was prepared May 21, 1980, and totaled $69,500-72,500. This estimate included moving the office building at a cost of $4,500. The R. E. Johnson & Son, Inc., estimate was prepared June 2, 1980, and totaled $70,285. This estimate included moving the office building at a cost of $5,450. These estimates were submitted to the Respondent's representative but were rejected as they included property located outside the acquired right-of-way. Respondent's representative made a physical inventory of the concrete pipe located in the acquired right-of-way. Petitioner was then allowed to solicit estimates from three qualified movers for moving the items on the inventory only. These estimates were prepared by Jan Guidry Trucking in the amount of $9,772.88, Gould Trucking, Inc., in the amount of $10,000, and Burns Equipment Company for $9,780. On March 27, 1981, Respondent's representative delivered to Petitioner a completed application and claim for reimbursement of moving costs. This application accepted the lowest of the three estimates as the basis for payment to Petitioner for his self-move of the designated items, in accordance with Respondent's standard policy of permitting the direct payment to a displaced occupant for a self-move equal to the amount of low bid of at least two certified movers. Petitioner did not sign or submit that application for benefits. Between February, 1980, and March, 1981, the Petitioner moved his manufacturing plant to his new location. This move was made as a result of Respondent's construction project and the expropriation proceeding brought by the State of Florida. Petitioner was unable to feasibly continue to operate at his prior site due to the acquisition of the right-of-way. Even had Petitioner been able to "re-arrange" the manufacturing shed, monorail, and other equipment, the amount of land remaining after Respondent acquired the right-of-way was not sufficient for Petitioner's needs for flowage of products or storage of inventory. The taking of 40 percent of his leasehold destroyed the utility of his improvements, severely limited the area in which he would have to operate, and rendered his continued operation impossible without regard to the desires of his landlord. In other words, it was not his landlord's cancellation of the lease which caused Petitioner to move but rather the acquisition of part of his leasehold for the highway project. The disassembly and reassembling of Petitioner's equipment, and the disconnection and reconnection of the electrical and plumbing facilities to the plant equipment were not improvements to his operation. These changes constituted the duplication of the plant and its necessary connections equivalent to his former location. The actual cost to Petitioner for the relocation of his business was $75,997.50. This total included moving the office building at a cost of $6,400. The office building constituted real property, even though Petitioner's lease with the Railroad required him to move the building at the time of vacating the premises. Reimbursement or payment for moving the office building is not authorized, but Petitioner is entitled to benefits for the remainder of the equipment and property set forth on the respective bids or estimates. Petitioner is a displaced person as defined by the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 and applicable federal and state regulations thereunder. The project for which Petitioner's leasehold was acquired in part was a federally financed project for which relocation assistance for displaced persons is mandated under the Act. At the time the property was acquired, Petitioner was an initial occupant as defined under the appropriate guidelines established by the Respondent's right-of-way manual. Where a displaced person elects to make a self-move, as opposed to utilizing a commercial mover, that person, under the various applicable statutes and regulations, is entitled to receive as direct payment the lowest of the actual cost of the move or the lower of any two bids secured from qualified movers for moving the property, as well as removal and reinstallation expenses at the new business site. The lower of the two qualified bids submitted, after excluding the cost for moving the real property and after taking the low of $15,000 on the Meade bid that provided a $15,000-18,000 range for moving hundreds of concrete pipes, is the Johnson & Son bid in the amount of $64,835. Each of these bids itemized the property that was to be moved from the former leasehold to the new business location and included the cost for the removal and reinstallation of the equipment.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED THAT: A final order be entered finding Petitioner entitled to relocation benefits for moving his business from the entire leasehold, finding the cost of moving the office building to be ineligible for reimbursement, and determining Petitioner entitled to the amount of $64,835 as direct payment for his self- move. RECOMMENDED this 13th day of November, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of November, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald B. Hadsock, Esquire 1806 Manatee Avenue, West Bradenton, Florida 33505 Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Room 562 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Jacob D. Varn Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, MS 57 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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RICHARD S. AND JANE E. LIMEGROVER vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 76-000383 (1976)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 76-000383 Latest Update: Oct. 20, 1976

The Issue Whether applicant is eligible for relocation assistance monetary benefits pursuant to Public Law 91-646 and Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970. Although notice of hearing was provided to Mr. and Mrs. Limegrover on March 26, 1976, they did not appear at the time of hearing. Upon telephonic inquiry on June 8th by a representative of the Department of Transportation, Mr. Limegrover advised that he had received the notice and although he had intended to call the Department of Transportation concerning the matter, he had forgotten to do so. He stated that he desired a continuance of the case. His request was objected to by counsel for the Department of Transportation. The request for continuance was denied as being untimely and good cause not having been shown therefor. The hearing was conducted as an uncontested proceeding.

Findings Of Fact By letter of October 20, 1975, Mr. and Mrs. Richard Limegrover of Courtly Manors Mobile Home Park, Hialeah Gardens, Florida, were advised by the Florida Department of Transportation that it was in the process of acquiring right-of-way for State Road #25 (U.S. 27) in their area, and that the mobile home lot the Limegrovers occupied as tenants would be required for construction of the facility. The letter provided the Department's assurance that they would not be required to move until at least 90 days had elapsed from the date of receipt of the letter, and that they would receive a further notice specifying the actual date by which the property must be vacated at least 30 days prior to the date specified. The letter concluded by an expression of the Department's desire to assist in relocation and to answer any questions concerning such matters. On December 8, 1975, a further letter was sent to the Limegrovers by the Department of Transportation assuring the addressees that the prior letter had not been a notice to move and that no one at the Courtly Manors Mobile Home Park would be required to move until negotiations with the owner had been completed or monies placed with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Dade County by court order. It further stated that in the interim period relocatees living within Courtly Manors who were eligible and decided to move on their own initiative would be assisted by the Department in their relocation. Limegrover called Mr. Carl Moon, Right-of-Way Agent, Department of Transportation, Ft. Lauderdale, on December 11, requesting assistance in arrangements for moving his mobile home. Moon discovered that Limegrover wanted to move before January 1, 1976, as he had reserved a lot in another mobile home park. However, Limegrover told him that when he advised his current landlord on December 11 of the projected move on December 30, the landlord stated that in the absence of 30 days notice, Limegrover must forfeit his $90.00 security deposit. Limegrover told Moon that he felt the Department of Transportation should pay the $90.00 security deposit since he was being forced to move by that agency. Moon told him that he was not required to move that soon, but Limegrover was unwilling to wait, fearing that he would not be able to find a satisfactory place later on. Accordingly, Moon assisted him in his moving arrangements and Limegrover was paid for his moving expenses in the amount of $640.00 and smaller sums for reinstallation of his telephone and disconnection and reconnection of his gas equipment. Inasmuch as the Department of transportation declined to pay the $90.00 representing alleged forfeiture of the security deposit, Limegrover filed this relocation appeal. (Testimony of Moon, Exhibits 1 & 2).

Recommendation That the appeal of Richard and Jane Limegrover, in the amount of $90.00, be denied. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of July, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Phillip Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Room 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida Richard S. and Jane E. Limegrover Lot F4, Haven Lakes Mobile Home Park 11201 S.W. 55th Street Miramar, Florida 33025

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