The Issue This is a rule challenge proceeding pursuant to Section 120.56(4), Florida Statutes, in which the Petitioners and the Intervenor assert that they are substantially affected by an agency statement that violates Section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes. The subject matter at issue here concerns the method of determining the order of layoff of some of the Respondent's employees.
Findings Of Fact Stipulated facts In 1996, the federal government modified and/or reformed welfare to require eligible participants to obtain employment. The Florida Legislature enacted Chapter 414, Florida Statutes, also known as the WAGES law, which required the Respondent to provide certain services to applicants for and participants in the WAGES program, including work activities, training, and other job-related services, which the Respondent termed "front-end services." Those services were primarily provided by Career Service employees of the Respondent. In 1998, the Florida Legislature amended portions of the WAGES law to require that local WAGES coalitions, instead of the Respondent, provide those front-end services to WAGES participants, effective October 1, 1998. As a direct result therefor, the Respondent was required to lay off approximately 700 career service employees. As a part of the implementation of the announced layoff of employees, Respondent requested approval of a method of determining the order of layoff, pursuant to Rule 60K- 17.004(3)(g), Florida Administrative Code, which provides: (g) Agencies shall then choose and consistently apply one of two methods, or another method as approved by the Department of Management Services, in determining the order of layoff. These methods are commonly referred to as "bumping." Option 1: The employee at the top of the list shall have the option of selecting a position at the bottom of the list based on the number of positions to be abolished, e.g., 20 positions in the affected class, 5 positions to be abolished. The employee at the top of the list can select any of the positions occupied by the 5 employees at the bottom of the list. The next highest employee on the list then has the option of selecting any of the positions occupied by the 4 remaining employees at the bottom of the list with the process continuing in this manner until the 5 employees at the top of the list have exercised their option. Option 2: The employee at the top of the list has the option of selecting any position occupied by any employee on the list with fewer retention points in the class. The next highest employee and remaining employees shall be handled in a similar manner until the list is exhausted. Rather than selecting Option 1 or Option 2, set forth in the published rule, the Respondent requested approval of an alternative method of determining the order of layoff. By letter dated August 17, 1998, the Department of Management Services (DMS) approved the method of determining order of layoff set forth in its correspondence. The method of determining the order of layoff is described by DMS in its approval letter as: The option you have chosen will allow adversely affected employees to select any position in the affected class and series, in the competitive area approved in our August 5, 1998 letter. Neither the Respondent's request for approval of the alternate method of determining the order of layoff, nor DMS' approval of that method, have been adopted in substantial conformity with Section 120.54, Florida Statutes. The Respondent's request for approval of the alternate method of layoff was intended to apply solely to the layoff occasioned by changes in the WAGES law. Facts based on evidence at hearing Florida Public Employees Council 79, AFSCME, is the certified bargaining agent for approximately 67,000 career service employees of the State of Florida. As such, it represents the employees of the Department who were affected by the subject layoff. The individual Petitioners, Betty Hall, Diana Lomas, Mercedes Valdez, and Elizabeth Judd, are members of the AFSCME collective bargaining unit. The challenged bumping procedure was not reached by collective bargaining. Under the alternative layoff method approved for the Respondent by DMS, employees with the greater number of retention points received enhanced bumping rights, permitting them to "bump" employees with fewer retention points in the same class and in the class series. Conversely, by this alternative procedure, employees with fewer retention points were accorded diminished protection against bumping. These employees could be bumped not only by employees with greater retention points in the class, but also by employees with greater retention points in other classes in the class series. For example, Consuelo Casanovas, from Petitioners' Exhibit 8, who was adversely affected in her position of Employment Security Representative I, was accorded bumping rights to positions in her class and to positions in the other two classes in the class series, Customer Services Specialist and Interviewing Clerk. Had the Respondent elected Option 1 or Option 2 in the published rule, Rule 60K-17.004(3)(g), Florida Administrative Code, Ms. Casanovas would not have had the right to bump to positions in the other two classes, and persons in those other two classes would not have been subject to bumping by Ms. Casanovas.1
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida. The Respondent has adopted a "Departmental Forms Index", which, if it ultimately becomes effective, would be codified into Chapter 10-2.80, Florida Administrative Code. The proposed rule purports to set out a list of all forms used by the Respondent in its dealings with the public. By its terms, the rule will not be published in the Florida Administrative Code. Instead, the index would be referenced in the Code as follows: The Departmental Forms Index is hereby incorporated by this rule and made a part of the rules of the Department. Copies of this document and any amendments thereto are available at no more than cost pursuant to the Florida Administrative Code 10-2 and may be obtained from the Office of Assistant Secretary for Administrative Services. The complete Departmental Forms Index would thus not appear in the Florida Administrative Coda. Copies of the index could be obtained from the Department by request at a cost of ten cents per page. The Index would not otherwise be available to members of the public, and no general distribution of the proposed rule will be made. The Petitioner, Norma Richardson, is a recipient of benefits under the "Aid to Families with Dependent Children" program and the food stamp program. Both of these programs are administered by the Respondent. Forms are routinely used in the Respondent's dealings with the Petitioner Richardson. Forms are utilized to advise her of any action intended by the Respondent, to solicit information, to apply for further benefits, and for many other purposes. As a recipient of benefits under the programs, the Petitioner Richardson has an interest in having the Forms Index available to her. If the Forms Index were published in the Florida Administrative Code she could obtain access to it at various libraries. If the Index is published by reference, obtaining access to it would be more difficult, and, could cost her ten cents per page. The Petitioner Florida Project Directors Association is an association composed of the directors of legal services programs in Florida. The Association has represented its members in this proceeding. The Association, and its members, are subscribers to the Florida Administrative Code. The Association's members represent many persons in connection with welfare disputes with the Respondent. The Departmental Forms Index contains forms which the Association's members would need to utilize in representing its clients. If the Index were published in the Florida Administrative Code, the Association's members would have the Index available to it, and any amendments to the Index would regularly be distributed. If the Index is published only by reference, the Associations members would need to purchase copies from the Respondent, and would not regularly receive amendments without making specific requests therefor and paying for them. It is not a matter of mere speculation that the Association's members will be representing clients who have disputes with the Respondent. One of the Association's members, Legal Services of Greater Miami, Inc., employs forty lawyers and several paralegals, and has represented welfare recipients in many cases.
The Issue Does correspondence dated August 18, 1997, from John M. Awad, Ph.D., District Administrator for District II, State of Florida, Department of Children and Family Services, directed to Theodore R. Buri, Jr., Regional Director, American Federation of State, County, and Municipal employees, AFL-CIO, identify Respondent’s agency policy? If yes, is that policy a “Rule” as defined in Section 120.52(15), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996)? If a “Rule," has Respondent promulgated the policy in accordance with Section 120.54, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996)? If the policy is a “Rule” that has not been promulgated, does a statutory basis exist for its promulgation?
Findings Of Fact The individual Petitioners are employed at the Florida State Hospital. This is a mental health facility operated by the Respondent. The individual Petitioners have contact with the clients who reside in the hospital. Because those individual Petitioners have client contact in performing their employment at the hospital, Respondent, as their employer, is responsible for screening the employees to ascertain whether those individual Petitioners have been convicted of or pled guilty or nolo contendere to certain offenses set forth in Sections 435.03 and 435.04, Florida Statutes (1995). Such a finding would disqualify the employees from working directly with the clients. The requirement for screening is in accordance with Section 110.1127(3), and Section 394.4572, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996). Florida Public Employees Council 79, American Federation of State, County, and Municipal employees, AFL-CIO (AFSCME), represents the individual Petitioners in collective bargaining between those Petitioners and the State of Florida. Each of the individual Petitioners received notification from Robert B. Williams, Hospital Administrator, Florida State Hospital, that each person had been declared ineligible to hold a position of “special trust” based upon certain offenses attributable to the Petitioners. The basis for the disqualifications was Chapter 435, Florida Statutes (1995). This meant that the individuals could not have client contact. As a consequence, Petitioners were told, through the correspondence notifying them of their disqualifications, that they could seek exemption from disqualification and/or contest the accuracy of the records declaring their disqualifications. All Petitioners sought relief from Respondent in accordance with Section 435.07(3), Florida Statutes (1995), by requesting exemption from disqualification before the Respondent. Bobby Jones, Clarence Cornell Simmons, Freddie Lee, and Frank Lawrence Dickens were denied exemption. Whether those Petitioners have contested the preliminary decision by Respondent denying their exemption through hearing procedures set forth in Chapter 120, Florida Statutes is not known. The other Petitioners were granted exemption from disqualification by action of the Respondent. Before Respondent made its preliminary determination on eligibility, on August 13, 1997, Theodore R. Buri, Jr., Regional Director of AFSCME Florida Council 79, wrote to Dr. John Awad, District Administrator, District II, Department of Children and Family Services. The purpose of the letter concerned the disqualification of the individual Petitioners to continue work in positions of “special trust” by having contact with clients at Florida State Hospital. That correspondence stated: The above referenced employees have been previously notified of disqualification, allegedly under the provisions of Chapter 435, Florida Statutes. These employees have notified Council 79, through their local union, that they are scheduled for a hearing on a possible exemption from the provisions of Chapter 435 on August 27, 1997. I have reviewed the documents of these individuals and I have found, without exception, that the charges which served as the basis of potential disqualification all occurred prior to October 1, 1995. As I am sure you are aware the provisions of Chapter 435, Florida Statutes, did not become effective until October 1, 1995. Further, the notations are consistent throughout Chapter 435, indicating that the provisions of Chapter 435 shall apply only to offenses committed subsequent to October 1, 1995. It appears that these, and other, employees are being improperly required by the Department to defend themselves against provisions of Florida Statutes which do not apply to them. I wish you would immediately review this concern with your legal department and direct Florida State Hospital to immediately make the affected employees whole and to terminate the pending actions against these employees. Your prompt attention in this matter is very much appreciated. On August 18, 1997, Dr. Awad responded to Mr. Buri’s inquiry through correspondence, in which Dr. Awad stated: The concerns expressed in your letter dated August 13, 1997, concerning background screenings were reviewed approximately a year and a half ago by an agency statewide workgroup, which included several background screening coordinators, District Legal Counsels, and attorneys from the General Counsel’s office. The legal research from that group resulted in the issuance of Agency policy addressing this and other statewide issues. In response to a question similar to that raised in your letter, Agency policy is that although Section 64 of Chapter 95-228, Laws of Florida, states that “this act shall take effect October 1, 1995, and shall apply to offenses committed on or after that date,” it applies only to the new criminal offense of “Luring or enticing a child” created by Section 1 of the law and does not apply to screening provisions. Therefore, in accordance with established principals [sic] of statutory construction, a person being rescreened after 10-1-95, must meet the requirements of the law in effect as of the date of the rescreening, which includes the broadened offenses, just as a new job applicant must meet such requirements. If you have any further questions concerning this matter, you may wish to have your attorney discuss this with the Agency’s General Counsel. The exemption hearings before Respondent were held on August 27, 1997, leading to the grant of exemptions for some Petitioners, and denial for others. Through their Petition to determine the invalidity of a “Rule," Petitioners allege and request the following relief: Although Chapter 435 of the Laws of Florida concerning employment screening specifically states that it applies to offenses committed on or after October 1, 1995, the Respondent applies employment screening to all employees and to all offenses regardless of the date of the offense. The Respondent articulated this policy of application in correspondence addressed to Theodore R. Buri from John Awad dated August 18, 1997,. . . The Respondent’s policy, as more fully described above, is a 'Rule' within the meaning of Section 120.52(16), Florida Statutes, because it is an 'agency statement of general applicability that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy or describes the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of the agency.' Id. This rule should be declared an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority for the following reasons: The above described rule has not been adopted in substantial compliance with Section 120.54, Florida Statutes; The Respondent has no statutory or rule authority to adopt the above described rule as applied to offenses predating October 1, 1995, thus the rule violates Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. The rule imposes a civil penalty against the individually named Petitioners for which there is no specific statutory authority. The rule is arbitrary and capricious as applied to offenses predating October 1, 1995, and thus violates Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. The rule adversely affects the Petitioners' substantial interest in continued employment in a position of 'special trust.' The rule is an unconstitutional impairment of the contract of employment. It unfairly burdens the Petitioners and others similarly situated with the duty to timely request and prove by clear and convincing evidence that [sic] either an entitlement to an exemption from disqualification or that the records are inaccurate. It is an oppressive and unreasonable condition of employment. As a penalty attached to an offense committed prior to October 1, 1995, the Rule is unlawful as an ex post facto law. The immediate removal from a position of trust before an employee may be heard denies the employee due process. The rule attacks a protected property and liberty interest of the individually named Petitioners and those similarly situated. The Agency’s actions against the Petitioners based on the Rule stigmatizes the employee. Petitioners also request that they be granted costs and attorneys fees pursuant to Section 120.595(3) and (4), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996). Chapter 95-228, Laws of Florida, referred to by Dr. Awad in his August 18, 1997, correspondence to Mr. Buri, created Chapter 435, Florida Statutes.
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to credit for her answers to questions 55 p.m. and 56 p.m. on the Fundamentals of Engineering portion of the engineering licensure examination given on April 15, 2000.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence received at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The examination for licensure of an engineer in the State of Florida is administered by the Florida Engineers Management Corporation, a not-for-profit corporation, created under Section 471.038, Florida Statutes. A written examination is authorized by Rule 61G15-21.001, Florida Administrative Code. Respondent contracts with the National Council of Examiners for Engineering and Surveying to provide engineering licensure examinations. This practice is approved by Section 455.217, Florida Statutes, and Rule 61G1 5-21.005, Florida Administrative Code. The National Council of Examiners for Engineering and Surveying develops standardized tests given for licensure throughout the United States and ensures that the questions are not ambiguous through a number of methodologies. A candidate for licensure as an engineer intern must attain a "scaled" score of 70 to pass the examination. On the examination taken by Petitioner, the minimum "raw" score required to attain a "scaled" score of 70 was 107; Petitioner's "raw" score was 105. Petitioner had initially challenged five questions; at the hearing, Petitioner withdrew her challenge to three questions; the two remaining challenged questions (55 p.m. and 56 p.m.) were "ethical" questions, i.e., they dealt with questions of engineering ethics. The challenged questions were multiple-choice questions. The test gives the following directions: "Each of the questions or incomplete sentences below is followed by four suggested answers or completions. Select the one that is the best in each case and then fill in the corresponding space on the answer sheet." (Emphasis added.) The challenged question 55 p.m. deals with an engineer hired to prepare a report on the design, manufacture, and assembly of a structure. The report contains references to "shoddy workmanship." Petitioner states that while she agreed that answer A [the graded "correct" answer] is correct, she believed that the inclusion of the word "also" in answer B included answer A in answer B by reference and therefore she chose B as her answer. Petitioner acknowledges that the word "also" in answer B could be referring to language in the question rather than in answer A. Answer A specifically refers to "engineering issues" which the engineer is "qualified to assess"; answer B indicates that the references to "shoddy workmanship" are "personal opinions" and "not professional opinions". An engineer is obligated by his license not to give an opinion for which he does not have expertise. An engineer should not render a personal opinion in a report in which the engineer gives a professional opinion. The challenged question 56 p.m. deals with an engineer who lacks expertise dealing with space frames but designed structures which included same. Regarding challenged question 56 p.m., the Petitioner acknowledged that answer A (the graded "correct" answer) could have been the correct answer as well as the answer she chose, answer D. Answer D indicates that the engineer was unethical because he did not refer that matter to the Registration Board. An engineer should not contact the Registration Board and report to the Board that someone has asked him to do something unethical; it is incumbent upon an engineer to practice engineering ethically without the input of the Board. In both instances in answering the challenged questions the Petitioner failed to provide the "best" answer and at hearing acknowledged that the graded "correct" answer by the National Council of Examiners for Engineering and Surveyors was a "correct" answer even though she chose a different answer.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Engineers Management Corporation enter a final order denying Petitioner's challenge to questions 55 p.m. and 56 p.m. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of December, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of December, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Yvette Bowman 3401 North Lakeview Drive Apartment 216 Tampa, Florida 33618 Douglas D. Sunshine, Esquire Florida Engineers Management Corporation 1208 Hays Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Barbara D. Auger, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Dennis Barton, Executive Director Board of Professional Engineers Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1208 Hays Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Natalie A. Lowe, Esquire Vice President for Legal Affairs Florida Engineers Management Corporation 1208 Hays Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Prior to April 21, 1976, Gordon C. Barton had been employed by the City of Eustis Police Department for approximately six (6) years. At the time of his discharge in May, 1976, he had attained the rank of sergeant. As a sergeant, he was responsible for one of three patrol shifts, each consisting of three patrolmen. The City of Eustis Police Department consists of twenty-one (21) certified law enforcement officers and other support personnel. Authority over the department rests in the city manager under the city charter, while administration of the police department is the responsibility of the chief of police. The procedures governing, the employment relationship between and employee of the city and the city are set forth in the city charter (Respondent's Exhibit 14), the rules and regulations governing conduct, duties and procedures of Eustis Police Department (Respondent's Exhibit 13), and city ordinance 409 (Union's Exhibit 2). In February, after some discussion with his patrol sergeants, the chief of police had adopted a modification of the department's radio procedures. In early March, 1976, after some experience with the new procedures, Sergeant Barton discussed the subject of problems arising out of the change in radio procedures with Assistant Chief Horner. Horner suggested that Barton reduce his comments to writing because the chief was out of town and that Horner would present the matter to the chief upon his return. Barton authored the memorandum to the chief on March 3, 1976. The memorandum expressed concern with the safety and efficiency of the modified radio procedures. On the date the memorandum was prepared, Barton showed the memorandum to the sergeant relieving him who expressed to Barton the fact that he concurred in Barton's observations and wished to co-sign the memorandum. Barton assented to this and eventually the signatures of thirteen (13) additional police officers were placed on the back of the memorandum. On March 12, 1976, Sergeant Barton was called into Chief Burrows' office. Burrows asked Barton to express his views concerning the modified communications procedure. Sergeant Barton explained the problems that he and other were having with it. The chief criticized Barton for having publicized the contents of the memorandum by making it available to other officers for their signature. The chief's criticism of Barton for having allowed others to sign the memorandum caused an emotional exchange between the men. In late March, the chief learned from other police officers in the department that Sergeant Barton had solicited fellow police officers who were on duty in behalf of the West Central Florida Police Benevolent Association. In late March, the chief advised the city manager and city attorney that he desired to discharge Barton. He was requested by the city manager and city attorney to provide them with information on Barton's conduct upon which the termination was to be based. The chief prepared a memorandum to the city manager (General Counsel's Exhibit 3), and several meetings were held between the chief, city manager, and city attorney. Their evaluation of the grounds asserted by the chief for Barton's discharge resulted in a letter of discharge dated April 20, 1976, which was signed and delivered to Barton by the chief of police, prepared by the city attorney, and approved by the city manager. This letter was delivered to Barton on April 21, 1976, while Barton was waiting to go on duty at 3:00 P.M. When asked for some justification of his termination, Barton was told by Burrows that if Barton requested in writing the grounds for the discharge that Burrows would look it over. Notations on the memorandum prepared by the chief and submitted to the city manager and city attorney and the testimony of the city manager indicate that four of the paragraphs in the letter of discharge relate to the memorandum authored by Barton and signed by his fellow officers. Police Chief Burrows freely admitted that the preparation and submission of the memorandum signed by the police officers was one of she reasons for the termination of Barton. The City of Eustis is a public employer as defined by Chapter 447, Florida Statutes. The Charging Party, West Central Florida Police Benevolent Association, is a labor organization as defined under the act. The Charging Party was not the "organization", however, with which the public employer interfered. The organization which was interfered with was the group which signed the memorandum. It was not the group which was interfered with which brought the unfair labor practice charge.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Public Employees Relations Commission enter its order directing the following: That the City of Eustis offer Gordon C. Barton immediate and full reinstatement to his former position of employment, or if such employment no longer exists, to reemploy Barton in a substantially equivalent position without prejudice to his seniority or rights or privileges, and to make him whole for any loss of earnings he may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against him. Such back pay shall include interest at a rate of 6 percent per annum and computed quarterly and in accordance with the formula set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1949); Pasco Classroom Teacher's Association, PERC Case No. 8H-CA-754-1037 (Order No. 76U-875) (April 1, 1976); and Post at its facilities, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are usually posted, on forms to be provided by PERC, a notice stating that all public employees have the right to form, join, and participate in, or to refrain from forming, joining, or participating in any employer organization of their own choosing and may not be discharged or otherwise discriminated against because of their exercise of these rights. DONE and ORDERED this 8th day of June, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: C. Anthony Cleveland, Esquire Public Employees Relations Commission Suite 300, 2003 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Norman F. Burke, Esquire Van Den Berg, Gay & Burke, P.A. 16 South Magnolia Avenue Post Office Box 793 Orlando, Florida 32801 Ben R. Patterson, Esquire 1215 Thomasville Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303
Findings Of Fact After the motion for continuance was again denied, petitioners declined to offer any evidence and petitioners announced that they would be pursuing certain supposed federal remedies.
The Issue May Petitioner proceed to a hearing on the merits of her charge of employment discrimination or does the untimeliness of her Petition for Relief bar her claim?
Findings Of Fact On March 10, 1997, Petitioner filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission), alleging that Respondent Department of State had discriminated against her because of her race (Black) when it had discharged her on October 1, 1996. The Commission concluded its investigation into the matter, and on January 31, 2000, the Commission issued its "Determination: No Cause." A "Notice of Determination: No Cause" was mailed by the Commission to Petitioner on January 31, 2000. It contained the following statements: Complainant may request an administrative hearing by filing a PETITION FOR RELIEF within 35 days of the date of this NOTICE OF
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief in this cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of July, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of July, 2000.
