The Issue Does correspondence dated August 18, 1997, from John M. Awad, Ph.D., District Administrator for District II, State of Florida, Department of Children and Family Services, directed to Theodore R. Buri, Jr., Regional Director, American Federation of State, County, and Municipal employees, AFL-CIO, identify Respondent’s agency policy? If yes, is that policy a “Rule” as defined in Section 120.52(15), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996)? If a “Rule," has Respondent promulgated the policy in accordance with Section 120.54, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996)? If the policy is a “Rule” that has not been promulgated, does a statutory basis exist for its promulgation?
Findings Of Fact The individual Petitioners are employed at the Florida State Hospital. This is a mental health facility operated by the Respondent. The individual Petitioners have contact with the clients who reside in the hospital. Because those individual Petitioners have client contact in performing their employment at the hospital, Respondent, as their employer, is responsible for screening the employees to ascertain whether those individual Petitioners have been convicted of or pled guilty or nolo contendere to certain offenses set forth in Sections 435.03 and 435.04, Florida Statutes (1995). Such a finding would disqualify the employees from working directly with the clients. The requirement for screening is in accordance with Section 110.1127(3), and Section 394.4572, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996). Florida Public Employees Council 79, American Federation of State, County, and Municipal employees, AFL-CIO (AFSCME), represents the individual Petitioners in collective bargaining between those Petitioners and the State of Florida. Each of the individual Petitioners received notification from Robert B. Williams, Hospital Administrator, Florida State Hospital, that each person had been declared ineligible to hold a position of “special trust” based upon certain offenses attributable to the Petitioners. The basis for the disqualifications was Chapter 435, Florida Statutes (1995). This meant that the individuals could not have client contact. As a consequence, Petitioners were told, through the correspondence notifying them of their disqualifications, that they could seek exemption from disqualification and/or contest the accuracy of the records declaring their disqualifications. All Petitioners sought relief from Respondent in accordance with Section 435.07(3), Florida Statutes (1995), by requesting exemption from disqualification before the Respondent. Bobby Jones, Clarence Cornell Simmons, Freddie Lee, and Frank Lawrence Dickens were denied exemption. Whether those Petitioners have contested the preliminary decision by Respondent denying their exemption through hearing procedures set forth in Chapter 120, Florida Statutes is not known. The other Petitioners were granted exemption from disqualification by action of the Respondent. Before Respondent made its preliminary determination on eligibility, on August 13, 1997, Theodore R. Buri, Jr., Regional Director of AFSCME Florida Council 79, wrote to Dr. John Awad, District Administrator, District II, Department of Children and Family Services. The purpose of the letter concerned the disqualification of the individual Petitioners to continue work in positions of “special trust” by having contact with clients at Florida State Hospital. That correspondence stated: The above referenced employees have been previously notified of disqualification, allegedly under the provisions of Chapter 435, Florida Statutes. These employees have notified Council 79, through their local union, that they are scheduled for a hearing on a possible exemption from the provisions of Chapter 435 on August 27, 1997. I have reviewed the documents of these individuals and I have found, without exception, that the charges which served as the basis of potential disqualification all occurred prior to October 1, 1995. As I am sure you are aware the provisions of Chapter 435, Florida Statutes, did not become effective until October 1, 1995. Further, the notations are consistent throughout Chapter 435, indicating that the provisions of Chapter 435 shall apply only to offenses committed subsequent to October 1, 1995. It appears that these, and other, employees are being improperly required by the Department to defend themselves against provisions of Florida Statutes which do not apply to them. I wish you would immediately review this concern with your legal department and direct Florida State Hospital to immediately make the affected employees whole and to terminate the pending actions against these employees. Your prompt attention in this matter is very much appreciated. On August 18, 1997, Dr. Awad responded to Mr. Buri’s inquiry through correspondence, in which Dr. Awad stated: The concerns expressed in your letter dated August 13, 1997, concerning background screenings were reviewed approximately a year and a half ago by an agency statewide workgroup, which included several background screening coordinators, District Legal Counsels, and attorneys from the General Counsel’s office. The legal research from that group resulted in the issuance of Agency policy addressing this and other statewide issues. In response to a question similar to that raised in your letter, Agency policy is that although Section 64 of Chapter 95-228, Laws of Florida, states that “this act shall take effect October 1, 1995, and shall apply to offenses committed on or after that date,” it applies only to the new criminal offense of “Luring or enticing a child” created by Section 1 of the law and does not apply to screening provisions. Therefore, in accordance with established principals [sic] of statutory construction, a person being rescreened after 10-1-95, must meet the requirements of the law in effect as of the date of the rescreening, which includes the broadened offenses, just as a new job applicant must meet such requirements. If you have any further questions concerning this matter, you may wish to have your attorney discuss this with the Agency’s General Counsel. The exemption hearings before Respondent were held on August 27, 1997, leading to the grant of exemptions for some Petitioners, and denial for others. Through their Petition to determine the invalidity of a “Rule," Petitioners allege and request the following relief: Although Chapter 435 of the Laws of Florida concerning employment screening specifically states that it applies to offenses committed on or after October 1, 1995, the Respondent applies employment screening to all employees and to all offenses regardless of the date of the offense. The Respondent articulated this policy of application in correspondence addressed to Theodore R. Buri from John Awad dated August 18, 1997,. . . The Respondent’s policy, as more fully described above, is a 'Rule' within the meaning of Section 120.52(16), Florida Statutes, because it is an 'agency statement of general applicability that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy or describes the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of the agency.' Id. This rule should be declared an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority for the following reasons: The above described rule has not been adopted in substantial compliance with Section 120.54, Florida Statutes; The Respondent has no statutory or rule authority to adopt the above described rule as applied to offenses predating October 1, 1995, thus the rule violates Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. The rule imposes a civil penalty against the individually named Petitioners for which there is no specific statutory authority. The rule is arbitrary and capricious as applied to offenses predating October 1, 1995, and thus violates Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. The rule adversely affects the Petitioners' substantial interest in continued employment in a position of 'special trust.' The rule is an unconstitutional impairment of the contract of employment. It unfairly burdens the Petitioners and others similarly situated with the duty to timely request and prove by clear and convincing evidence that [sic] either an entitlement to an exemption from disqualification or that the records are inaccurate. It is an oppressive and unreasonable condition of employment. As a penalty attached to an offense committed prior to October 1, 1995, the Rule is unlawful as an ex post facto law. The immediate removal from a position of trust before an employee may be heard denies the employee due process. The rule attacks a protected property and liberty interest of the individually named Petitioners and those similarly situated. The Agency’s actions against the Petitioners based on the Rule stigmatizes the employee. Petitioners also request that they be granted costs and attorneys fees pursuant to Section 120.595(3) and (4), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996). Chapter 95-228, Laws of Florida, referred to by Dr. Awad in his August 18, 1997, correspondence to Mr. Buri, created Chapter 435, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The School Board of Pinellas County is a public employer within the meaning of Florida Statutes Section 447.203(2). The Charging Party is an employee organization within the meaning of Florida Statutes Section 447.203(10). During December, 1975, the Charging Party filed a representation petition with the Public Employees Relations Commission seeking to represent a unit of employees of the Public Employer. Proceedings were conducted in accordance with the petition, and on February 2, 1976, the Public Employees Relations Commission, through its chairman, issued a Direction Of Election. A copy of the Direction was received into evidence at the hearing in this case as Respondent's Exhibit 1. The appropriate collective bargaining unit is therein described as follows: "Included: All eligible employees of the Pinellas County School Board employed in the ground maintenance, transportation, plant operations, warehouse and food-service departments. Excluded: All other non-instructional, instructional, and clerical employees; and all managerial/confidential employees of the Pinellas County School Board. See Attachment A." The election as conducted on or about March 11, 1976, and a majority of the employees in the unit described in the Direction of Election voted in favor of representation by the Charging Party for purposes of collective bargaining. The Public Employer thereafter filed objections to the conduct of the election (Respondent's Exhibit 4). The chairman of the Public Employees Relations Commission entered a report on objections on March 31, 1976 (Respondent's Exhibit 5). The chairman dismissed the objections on the grounds that they were not timely filed. On May 12, 1976, the Public Employees Relations Commission certified the Charging Panty as the exclusive bargaining agent for the unit of employees described in the Direction of Election and in the Erratum issued by the chairman of the Commission on February 26, 1976 (Respondent's Exhibit 3). The Public Employer filed a request for review of the chairman's dismissal of the objections (Respondent's Exhibit 6). By decision issued September 7, 1976, the Commission dismissed the objections (Respondent's Exhibit 7). The Public Employer thereafter filed a Petition For Re-Hearing. Further proceedings respecting certification of the bargaining unit were not made a part of the record in this case; however, it is assumed for the purposes of this Recommended Order that the Public Employer is in the process of appealing the Commission's decisions. Following the election, on April 2, 1976, the Charging Party wrote to the Public Employer requesting that negotiations be opened (General Counsel's Exhibit 1). The Public Employer responded by letter dated April 27, 1976 (General Counsel's Exhibit 2), as follows: "As you know, the school board, through the superintendent and my office, has taken appropriate steps to appeal certain procedures relating to the election held in the above matter. Until that procedure has been finalized before the Commission, we will not be in a position to enter into negotiations. It is further noted that you have not received an official notice that you are now the bargaining agent on behalf of a segment of the supporting services of the school board. Until such time as all the proper procedures have been taken before the Commission and a final determination has been made by the courts of the State of Florida, and you have been recognized by the school board as the bargaining agent on behalf of the supporting services employees, we would respectfully deny your request at this time." Following its certification as the collective bargaining representative, by letter dated May 17, 1976, the Charging Party again requested that negotiations be opened (General Counsel's Exhibit 3). Further requests were made by letters dated August 5, 1976, and August 26, 1976 (General Counsel's Exhibits 4, 5). The Public Employer has not responded either in writing or verbally to the requests to open negotiations, other than through its letter of April 27, 1976. The Public Employer has refused to enter into collective bargaining negotiations with the Charging Party, and continues to refuse to enter into negotiations until a final determination is made by the courts respecting the Charging Party's certification, and until the school board has recognized the Charging Party.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Public Employees Relations Commission enter an order requiring the School Board of Pinellas County to recognize the Pinellas County Custodial Union, #1221 as the exclusive bargaining agent of the unit of employees certified by the Public Employees Relations Commission; that the School Board of Pinellas County cease and desist from refusing to engage in collective bargaining negotiations with the Pinellas County Custodial Union, #1221; that the School Board of Pinellas County forthwith enter into good faith collective bargaining negotiations with the Pinellas County Custodial Union, #1221; and that the School Board of Pinellas County advise the Public Employees Relations Commission in writing of what steps it has taken to comply with the final order of the Public Employees Relations Commission between 30 and 45 days following entry of an order by the Commission. RECOMMENDED this 16th day of December, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. G. STEVEN PFEIFFER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: B. Edwin Johnson, Esquire Post Office Box 4688 Clearwater, Florida 33518 Austin Reed, Esquire Public Employee Relations Commission Suite 300 - 2003 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Edward Draper 5400 West Waters Avenue Tampa, Florida
Findings Of Fact On October 23, 1978, Petitioner was hired as secretary to W. J. Crist, president of Hygroponics, Inc. On February 26, 1979, W. J. Crist evaluated Petitioner's overall job performance as "good." With respect to cooperation, the Petitioner was rated in the category of "cooperates very well," the highest rating possible for that category of performance. With respect to job knowledge, she was rated as showing "unusual capacity," also the highest rating possible for that category of performance. On March 5, 1979, Petitioner received an increase in salary from $4.18 per hour to $4.51 per hour, based in part upon her increased responsibilities and in part upon demonstrated merit. Following is Hygroponics, Inc.'s office staff organization chart dated May 2, 1979: HYGROPONICS, INC. OFFICE STAFF ORGANIZATION CHART | President | /| W. J. Crist |\ / | | \ / | \ \ \ | Purch. Agent | | Controller | \ | Technical Service | | Dick Destival | | James Jobe |" \ | Dick Jeffery | | | | | "" \ | | " / | | " "\ | " / | | " \" | " / | | " \ " | " / | | " \ " | " / | | " \ " | " / | | " \ " | " / | | "\ "| | Marsha | | Liz | | Nell | | Arlene | | Carolyn | | Betsy | | | | | | | | | | | | | /|\ Direct lines of authority. Answerable to this person at all times " Indirect lines of authority. Answerable for secondary duties and when direct lines are not available. The above organizational chart does not include the company's chief executive officer. On occasion, members of the company's secretarial staff went directly to the chief executive officer with employment-related problems. In September, 1979, after James Jobe, the controller referenced in the above chart, left the company's employ, W. J. Crist, the company president, advised Petitioner that she was to become office manager. After that time, Petitioner assumed many of the duties of office manager. Petitioner inquired when she would receive a raise commensurate with her increased responsibilities, and was advised that this would be accomplished after the company hired a new controller. Emmett Singleton was hired to fill the position of controller on October 29, 1979. On December 11, 1979, Petitioner formally became acting office manager. On that date Petitioner was evaluated by Emmett Singleton, who rated Petitioner highest in the areas of decision-making and ability to organize, and lowest in the areas of acceptability and responsibility. Specifically, Singleton made the following comments concerning Petitioner's job performance: "Has difficulty in establishing satisfactory relationships with people"; "Average leader, conventional in manner and enthusiasm, conveys ideas but does not motivate group"; "Has problem with admitting an error or fault"; "Reluctant to accept job responsibilities. Supervision and follow-up often required"; "Considers job an eight to five task with scheduled breaks reguardless [sic] of status of workload"; "Employee is preoccupied with the position rather than a concern for getting the job done"; and, "Employee resents being monitored or controlled. Sometimes uncooperative and slow to respond to direction." In addition, members of the company management group, other than Emmett Singleton, commented on this evaluation that Petitioner "alienates co-workers," "Has experienced confusion in the scheduling of grower school," and expressed concern with Petitioner's "attitude." The controller noted on the evaluation form that he planned ". . .to work closely with [Petitioner] for the next 60 days and make an assessment during this time as to whether on [sic] not suited for office manager." Finally, Mr. Singleton noted on Petitioner's performance review form that Petitioner ". . .is classified as Acting Office Manager and is on probation with reguard[sic] to classification. No change in rate of pay is being made at this time. Employee will be reevaluated in 60 days on or about 2/10/80." In order to improve her skills in the area of acceptability and responsibility, Petitioner requested that Mr. Singleton issue a memorandum clarifying the lines of her authority especially since her subordinates had not been advised that she had been given supervisory responsibility over them. Her request was denied at that time because Singleton wanted to first determine whether she could handle the position. On January 12, 1980, Singleton reevaluated Petitioner's job performance. According to Singleton's rating, Petitioner had improved in the areas of acceptability and responsibility, which had been her weak points in the evaluation performed one month earlier. On this same day, Petitioner was reclassified from acting office manager to office manager, and received an increase in pay to $821.60 per month, retroactive to November 1, 1979. Petitioner also assumed the duties of payroll clerk and accounts payable in addition to the duties of office manager. Shortly after receiving this promotion, Petitioner advised employees of Hygroponics, Inc., that she was pregnant. W. J. Crist and Emmett Singleton acknowledged her pregnancy, and the latter inquired concerning her intentions regarding her employment. Petitioner responded that she intended to continue working for the company, and to return to work after the birth of her child. Hygroponics, Inc., had no maternity leave policy. No other female employee had ever given notice of pregnancy and stated her intention to return to work following childbirth. However, at least two other employees had become pregnant during the term of their employment with Hygroponics, Inc. One of these employees, in fact, suffered two miscarriages during her term of employment, and continued working with the company. Another female worker became pregnant, gave birth to a child, and returned to work without ever advising the company or the company ever being aware that she had been pregnant until after she had returned to work. On January 30, 1980, Petitioner submitted a memorandum to Eugene Crist, the company's chief executive officer. The memorandum suggested changes regarding the responsibilities of certain of the office personnel under her supervision. Petitioner had previously discussed these suggested changes with Emmett Singleton, her immediate supervisor, who advised her that he thought her suggestions were a good idea. At the time the memorandum was submitted to the company's chief executive officer, W. J. Crist, the president of the company, was out of the state. On January 30, 1980, Eugene Crist showed the memorandum to Emmett Singleton. The memorandum was then returned to Petitioner by the company's chief executive officer with a notation that the matters contained in the memorandum should be handled through Singleton. Two days later, on February 1, 1980, Singleton asked Petitioner for the memorandum. When Petitioner could not locate the memorandum, and offered to discuss the details of it with Singleton, Singleton advised her that there was no basis for conversation if she could not produce the memorandum. As noted above, Singleton had seen and read the memorandum two days previously when it was shown to him by Eugene Crist. Upon W. J. Crist's return to Florida, Singleton advised him that Petitioner had submitted a memorandum directly to the company's chief executive officer, and that when Singleton asked Petitioner to see the memorandum, she advised him that she had misplaced it. On February 8, 1980, W. J. Crist circulated a memorandum to the Hygroponics, Inc., executive staff concerning Petitioner's ". . .insubordination, poor attitude [and] defiance of executive orders. This memorandum provided, in part, as follows: It is my understanding that Carolyn recently drafted a memorandum on her proposed changes in office duties for many people, changes in accounting procedures, etc. I have been informed that she: "by-passed you, her immediate superior and by-passed me, her next-in-line superior." and delivered this memo directly to Gene, our CEO. Then when Gene informed her to "discuss the memo directly with you," she advised you "she did not even have the memo anymore." I find these actions, on Carolyn's part very distressing and feel we must take disciplinary actions with her. So - what are the problems. Her "uncooperative" and "attitude" problems outlined in your personnel evaluation of her on December 11, 1979 (which she acknowledged) when you put her "on probation," the first time, still persist. She demonstrated anything but teamwork in by-passing her two immediate superiors and going directly to our CEO. This is very bad for an employee to do but even worse for her since she is suppose [sic] to be a leader of our people in her slot as Office Manager. Her disregarding Gene's directive to discuss the memo with you was corrected only by your insistance[sic] that the two of you discuss it. Her statement to you that "she no longer had the memo" is also distressing. Has she destroyed it? This additional negative certainly weakens her argument that "she went directly to Gene because he was going out.[sic] (Original emphasis.) The above-referenced memorandum solicited the views of the company's executive staff as to whether to terminate Petitioner, discipline her in some fashion, or give her an opportunity to resign. The decision was unanimous among all five members of the executive staff to terminate Petitioner. No member of the executive staff questioned Petitioner before concurring in the decision to discharge her. Such a memorandum of concurrence was not the company's standard practice in discharging employees, which generally was for the discharge decision to be made by the employee's supervisor alone. Hygroponics, Inc., was, at all times material to this proceeding, a rather small organization, numbering at the most approximately fifty employees. As a result, many of the internal functions of the company were informal in nature. For example, there were no strict lines of authority for secretarial staff to air grievances or make suggestions. There was, however, a generalized procedure for employees to approach their immediate supervisor with any employment-related problems. There is no direct substantive evidence in the record in this cause from which it can be concluded that Petitioner was terminated from her employment because she was either female or pregnant. Further, whatever circumstantial evidence there is in this record to support such a contention is overcome by Respondent's demonstration that Petitioner was at best an employee of average ability who management viewed at times to be a problem employee. It appears, therefore, that the reason for Petitioner's discharge was an accumulation of events, culminating in her memorandum of January 30, 1980, being submitted to the company chief executive officer, and not for any reason relating to her sex.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the State of Florida, Commission on Human Relations, dismissing the Petition for Relief, and denying the relief requested therein, with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of March, 1983, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM E. WILLIAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of March, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. White, Jr., Esquire 229 McKenzie Avenue Panama City, Florida 32401 John F. Daniel, Esquire Post Office Box 2522 Panama City, Florida 32401 Dana Baird, Esquire Florida Commission on Human Relations 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Suite 100, Montgomery Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard E. Williams Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Suite 100, Montgomery Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact The matters of fact being stipulated to by the parties are as follows: The City of Panama City has enacted a "local option" ordinance pursuant to Section 447.603, Florida Statutes. The City Ordinance No. 933 created the Panama City Public Employees Relations Commission ("PC-PERC") to exercise jurisdiction over labor relations matters arising between public employers and public employees of the City of Panama City in lieu of the State Public Employees Relations Commission ("PERC"). This ordinance was approved by the State of Florida Public Employees Relations Commission pursuant to Section 447.603, Florida Statutes following an order of the First District Court of Appeal in City of Panama City v. Florida Public Employees Relations Commission, 364 So.2d 109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) directing PERC to do so. On June 6, 1979 PERC issued an order to PC-PERC pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 38D-23.01(2), the subject of this proceeding. The order relies on language in the Rule in question, which provides that "upon failure of the local commission . . . to timely submit such modifications, the commission shall revoke approval of the local commission and shall assume jurisdiction over all matters in dispute pending before the local commission". Thus, whereas the order is directed to the local commission, the penalty for failure to comply with the order is revocation of approval of the City's local option ordinance itself. Ordinance No. 933 gives the PC-PERC the sole power to adopt rules. Section 1.004(1) provides that the Commission "shall adopt, promulgate, amend or rescind such rules and regulations as it deems necessary and administratively feasible to carry out the provisions of this ordinance " Ordinance No. 933 further makes the local commission an independent body, providing at Section 1.003(1) that "the Commission in the performance of its duties and powers under this ordinance shall not be subject to the control, supervision or direction by the City Manager or City Commission." The City has no control whatsoever over whether, or to what extent, the Panama City Public Employees Relations Commission complies with PERC's order of June 6, 1979. That order, which is pursuant to Rule 38D-23.01, purports to provide for the revocation of approval of the local commission created by the City's ordinance within ninety (90) days unless PC-PERC complies with it. By request dated August 17, 1979, the Petitioner filed a Request to Take Official Notice of certain orders of the Public Employees Relations Commission and of certain sections of Panama City Ordinance No. 933. Respondent having been noticed of that request and entering no opposition thereto and, further, Respondent having referred in its brief herein to certain of the orders for which official notice was requested (PERC Order dated July 23, 1979, Page 1 of Respondent's brief) the Request to Take Official Notice is granted, and those items 1-11 in that request are admitted into evidence and made a part of the record of this proceeding. By order of the Public Employees Relations Commission dated July 23, 1979, the order of that same Commission dated June 6, 1979, and referred to in paragraph 1(b) above was vacated to allow the City of Panama City to make certain alleged necessary amendments to its local option ordinance and for such amendments to be approved by the Public Employees Relations Commission. By order dated July 19, 1979, the Public Employees Relations Commission notified the City of Panama City that Chapter 447, Park II, Florida Statutes had been substantially amended and that the City's local option ordinance must be amended and submitted to PERC for review and approval within ninety (90) days. The order further noted that "[f]ailure by the City to timely submit modifications for review and approval by the Commission may subject the local option to revocation of approval and jurisdiction." Finally, the order recited Florida Administrative Code Rule 38D-23.01(2) as the authority for the foregoing requirement. That is the same rule being challenged in this proceeding.
Findings Of Fact Prior to April 21, 1976, Gordon C. Barton had been employed by the City of Eustis Police Department for approximately six (6) years. At the time of his discharge in May, 1976, he had attained the rank of sergeant. As a sergeant, he was responsible for one of three patrol shifts, each consisting of three patrolmen. The City of Eustis Police Department consists of twenty-one (21) certified law enforcement officers and other support personnel. Authority over the department rests in the city manager under the city charter, while administration of the police department is the responsibility of the chief of police. The procedures governing, the employment relationship between and employee of the city and the city are set forth in the city charter (Respondent's Exhibit 14), the rules and regulations governing conduct, duties and procedures of Eustis Police Department (Respondent's Exhibit 13), and city ordinance 409 (Union's Exhibit 2). In February, after some discussion with his patrol sergeants, the chief of police had adopted a modification of the department's radio procedures. In early March, 1976, after some experience with the new procedures, Sergeant Barton discussed the subject of problems arising out of the change in radio procedures with Assistant Chief Horner. Horner suggested that Barton reduce his comments to writing because the chief was out of town and that Horner would present the matter to the chief upon his return. Barton authored the memorandum to the chief on March 3, 1976. The memorandum expressed concern with the safety and efficiency of the modified radio procedures. On the date the memorandum was prepared, Barton showed the memorandum to the sergeant relieving him who expressed to Barton the fact that he concurred in Barton's observations and wished to co-sign the memorandum. Barton assented to this and eventually the signatures of thirteen (13) additional police officers were placed on the back of the memorandum. On March 12, 1976, Sergeant Barton was called into Chief Burrows' office. Burrows asked Barton to express his views concerning the modified communications procedure. Sergeant Barton explained the problems that he and other were having with it. The chief criticized Barton for having publicized the contents of the memorandum by making it available to other officers for their signature. The chief's criticism of Barton for having allowed others to sign the memorandum caused an emotional exchange between the men. In late March, the chief learned from other police officers in the department that Sergeant Barton had solicited fellow police officers who were on duty in behalf of the West Central Florida Police Benevolent Association. In late March, the chief advised the city manager and city attorney that he desired to discharge Barton. He was requested by the city manager and city attorney to provide them with information on Barton's conduct upon which the termination was to be based. The chief prepared a memorandum to the city manager (General Counsel's Exhibit 3), and several meetings were held between the chief, city manager, and city attorney. Their evaluation of the grounds asserted by the chief for Barton's discharge resulted in a letter of discharge dated April 20, 1976, which was signed and delivered to Barton by the chief of police, prepared by the city attorney, and approved by the city manager. This letter was delivered to Barton on April 21, 1976, while Barton was waiting to go on duty at 3:00 P.M. When asked for some justification of his termination, Barton was told by Burrows that if Barton requested in writing the grounds for the discharge that Burrows would look it over. Notations on the memorandum prepared by the chief and submitted to the city manager and city attorney and the testimony of the city manager indicate that four of the paragraphs in the letter of discharge relate to the memorandum authored by Barton and signed by his fellow officers. Police Chief Burrows freely admitted that the preparation and submission of the memorandum signed by the police officers was one of she reasons for the termination of Barton. The City of Eustis is a public employer as defined by Chapter 447, Florida Statutes. The Charging Party, West Central Florida Police Benevolent Association, is a labor organization as defined under the act. The Charging Party was not the "organization", however, with which the public employer interfered. The organization which was interfered with was the group which signed the memorandum. It was not the group which was interfered with which brought the unfair labor practice charge.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Public Employees Relations Commission enter its order directing the following: That the City of Eustis offer Gordon C. Barton immediate and full reinstatement to his former position of employment, or if such employment no longer exists, to reemploy Barton in a substantially equivalent position without prejudice to his seniority or rights or privileges, and to make him whole for any loss of earnings he may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against him. Such back pay shall include interest at a rate of 6 percent per annum and computed quarterly and in accordance with the formula set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1949); Pasco Classroom Teacher's Association, PERC Case No. 8H-CA-754-1037 (Order No. 76U-875) (April 1, 1976); and Post at its facilities, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are usually posted, on forms to be provided by PERC, a notice stating that all public employees have the right to form, join, and participate in, or to refrain from forming, joining, or participating in any employer organization of their own choosing and may not be discharged or otherwise discriminated against because of their exercise of these rights. DONE and ORDERED this 8th day of June, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: C. Anthony Cleveland, Esquire Public Employees Relations Commission Suite 300, 2003 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Norman F. Burke, Esquire Van Den Berg, Gay & Burke, P.A. 16 South Magnolia Avenue Post Office Box 793 Orlando, Florida 32801 Ben R. Patterson, Esquire 1215 Thomasville Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303
