The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of sex in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes, when it terminated his employment.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a large corporate employer with corporate headquarters outside the State of Florida. Pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent has a large manufacturing facility located in Palm Beach County, Florida. Petitioner is a male who was employed by Respondent at its Palm Beach facility between August 1978 and February 1993. Petitioner is a college graduate who subsequently earned a Master's degree in Business Administration (MBA). Respondent first employed Petitioner as a Financial Trainee, which is designated as a Grade 41 on the system by which Respondent designated pay ranges and relative job responsibilities. Respondent promoted Petitioner to a position referred to as Financial Analyst in 1979, which is a Grade 43 position. Respondent promoted Petitioner in 1981 to a position referred to as Senior Analyst, which is a Grade 45 position. Respondent promoted Petitioner in 1984 and assigned him to its Saudi Arabia Program as the Continental U.S. International Administrator, which is a Grade 46 position. Respondent laterally transferred Petitioner in 1986 from the Financial Department into the Human Resources Department to a position designated as Personnel Representative, which is also a Grade 46 position. Respondent promoted Petitioner in January 1989 to a position designated as Senior Resources Representative, which is a Grade 48 position. Respondent informed Petitioner on February 12, 1993, that his employment would be terminated, effective February 28, 1993. Petitioner's base annual salary at the time his employment was terminated was $56,484.00. As of the formal hearing, Petitioner was working for his wife's appraisal company in a nonpaying job. Karen Roberts is a female who has been employed by Respondent at its Palm Beach County facility since June 1980. Ms. Roberts is also a college graduate who subsequently earned an MBA. In addition, Ms. Roberts has been designated as a Certified Compensation Professional by the American Compensation Association. Ms. Roberts first began her employment with the Respondent as a Financial Trainee, Grade 41. She was transferred out of the Finance Department into the Human Resources Department in July 1984 as a Human Resources Representative, which is a pay grade 45. She was promoted to Senior Human Resources Representative in October 1992, which is a pay grade 48. Respondent's upper management determined in 1992 that it was necessary to reduce the number of its employees as part of an overall restructuring of its operations. The reduction in force, which was to be the largest separation of employees that Respondent had ever experienced, was for valid business considerations which are not at issue in this proceeding. The management group set the target for the number of employees in each department of the Palm Beach facility whose employment would be terminated. The management group decided that the Human Resources Department of the Palm Beach facility, of which Petitioner was a part, would be reduced by between 20-25 employees in February 1993. That decision by the management committee is not being challenged in this proceeding. William Panetta was, at the times pertinent to this proceeding, the Respondent's Vice President of Human Resources for the West Palm Beach facility. The management group informed Mr. Panetta in the fall of 1992 of the upcoming reduction in force and gave to him the targets that had been set for the various departments for the West Palm Beach facility. Soon thereafter, Mr. Panetta began meeting with the heads of major departments to devise a procedure for making the reductions in force. Among the senior staff who met with Mr. Panetta was John Roberson, who was manager of Human Resources for non-engineering personnel. Petitioner worked in Mr. Roberson's department from the time he was transferred to its Human Relations Department in 1986 until the termination of his employment in 1993. Mr. Roberson was Petitioner's second line supervisor. At different times, Bob Vogel, Charles Wilson, and John Hopkins served as Petitioner's direct supervisor. Mr. Roberson was asked by Mr. Panetta to prepare a draft of a proposal for the procedure to be followed in carrying out the reduction in force. This draft was to include a method to identify those employees whose employment would be involuntary terminated. Pertinent to this proceeding, Mr. Roberson's draft included a provision for selecting among multiple incumbents when some job positions or functions were being eliminated. In that situation, Mr. Roberson proposed that seniority be the primary factor and that relative performance of the incumbents be considered only if the more senior employee was ranked as a low performer on his or her annual evaluation. Respondent annually evaluated employees such as Petitioner as being either a "T" (top), a "M" (middle), or an "L" (low). The employees were also given annual evaluations by their supervisors called Performance Management Reports, which rated the employees on a scale ranging between unsatisfactory to exceptional. During his entire tenure with Respondent, Petitioner was rated at least as being fully competent on his Performance Management Reports and, at different times, as being either in the "T" or the "M" category. The procedure drafted by Mr. Roberson was never intended to be the final procedure that would be followed in accomplishing the reduction in force. In late 1992, Mr. Panetta presented Mr. Roberson's draft to the senior staff for comment and revision. The senior staff determined that Mr. Roberson's draft overemphasized seniority and was too inflexible. It was determined that such emphasis on seniority would hamper management's efforts to retain the most qualified employees. The Human Resources Department assigned to each of Respondent's major departments a Personnel Support Representative to assist with employee relations and to provide administrative support in personnel matters. As part of the procedure followed for the 1993 layoffs, the Personnel Support Representative for each department reviewed the candidates for layoffs with the Department Head to determine whether the selection was fair and properly documented. The Personnel Support Representative was to provide support only. Each Department Head had the responsibility for determining the employees within a department to be laid off. During the same time period that senior staff was trying to develop the procedure that would be followed for layoffs, Mr. Roberson met with the Personnel Support Representatives and discussed with them the drafted procedure he had prepared. He informed them that the draft was not the final product and asked for discussion. Mr. Roberson discussed with the Personnel Support Representatives the final policies that senior staff adopted before final selections were made and informed them that rigid adherence would not be given to seniority. Respondent has never used seniority as the controlling factor in any previous layoff. The senior staff decided that it would consider the following criteria to determine which of its qualified employees to layoff: documented poor performance, the elimination or consolidation of different positions, relative performance among the candidates, and seniority. Mr. Panetta determined that those employees of the Human Resources department should be "generalists" who are capable of performing a wide range of responsibilities as opposed to specialists. Respondent's plan was to either eliminate functions that had been performed by specialists or to consolidate those functions with other specialized functions. The employees in Human Resources who would still be employed would be required to take on new responsibilities and to perform tasks that had previously been performed by specialists. In the Human Resources department, an employee would have to assume responsibilities in labor relations, employee relations, and compensation. Mr. Panetta decided after conferring with Mr. Roberson that the Management Training, Placement and Compensation section in the Human Resources department for non-engineering personnel would be eliminated. Senior Human Resource Representatives and Human Resource Representatives were candidates for layoffs and were put into a resource pool. The employees in the resource pool were thereafter considered for other positions by comparing their qualifications with those of employees whose positions were not being eliminated. If an employee in the resource pool was considered to be more qualified than an employee whose position was not being eliminated, the more qualified person in the resource pool would be retained to fill the existing job and the incumbent employee would have his employment terminated. Petitioner and Karen Roberts were assigned to the compensation function at the time of the layoffs, but their positions were eliminated as a result of the layoffs. Petitioner and Karen Roberts were placed in the resource pool. Dave Swanson was employed as a Personnel Support Representative in the Human Resources Department prior to the reduction in force. Mr. Swanson's position was not eliminated, but it was determined that there were employees in the resource pool, including Petitioner and Karen Roberts, who were more qualified than Mr. Swanson. Respondent selected Ms. Roberts to fill the position that had been filled by Mr. Swanson. Petitioner's employment with Respondent was terminated. Petitioner asserts that Respondent discriminated against him on the basis of his sex in deciding to retain the employment of Ms. Roberts and to terminate his employment. There is no assertion by Respondent that Petitioner was an incompetent employee. To the contrary, Respondent considered Petitioner to be a competent employee, which is why he was a candidate to fill Mr. Swanson's former position. At the time of the layoffs, John Hopkins was the Manager of Technical Development and Compensation and the direct supervisor of Petitioner and Ms. Roberts. While Mr. Panetta had the ultimate responsibility for deciding whether Petitioner or Ms. Roberts would be retained in Mr. Swanson's former position, he relied heavily on Mr. Roberson's recommendation in making that decision. Mr. Roberson in turn relied on his own knowledge of the respective performances of these two employees and on information that had been given him by Mr. Hopkins. Mr. Hopkins believed that Ms. Roberts was a more valuable employee than Petitioner. Mr. Hopkins testified that Petitioner failed to timely complete certain assignments, that certain aspects of his performance was not satisfactory, and that he had experienced problems working with others. Mr. Hopkins received separate complaints from Joe Bressin, who was in charge of Executive Compensation, and Henry Ugalde, who was in charge of the Equal Employment Opportunity function, that Petitioner had not rendered satisfactory assistance to them. Petitioner did not meet all of the interim deadlines for preparation of a negotiations book that was being complied for use in labor negotiations. Several of Petitioner's supervisors met with him during his tenure with Respondent to discuss his perceived deficiencies and to review his assignments. Mr. Roberson was aware of these deficiencies at the time he recommended to Mr. Panetta that Ms. Roberts be selected to fill Mr. Swanson's former position. Mr. Hopkins considered Ms. Roberts to be a "solid performer" who was enthusiastic, worked well with others, and was capable of performing a wide range of tasks. Ms. Roberts prepared a book for other employees in the compensation function that detailed the procedures involved in performing hourly compensation duties relative to collective bargaining agreements. In addition, Ms. Roberts was chosen by Mr. Panetta to assist Respondent's negotiating team during negotiations with the labor unions for the 1992-1993 labor contract. Ms. Robert's worked on a complex computer program that computed the costs to Respondent of various collective bargaining proposals. Ms. Roberts was chosen for this assignment because Mr. Hopkins believed her to be the best employee to assume this responsibility. Mr. Hopkins selected her because of her competence, her enthusiasm, her ability to maintain confidential information, and her willingness to work irregular hours. Gender was not a factor in selecting Ms. Roberts for this assignment. Ms. Roberts performed with distinction the duties that had been assigned to her as a member of the negotiating team, thereby favorably impressing Mr. Roberson and Mr. Panetta. Mr. Roberson was aware of Ms. Roberts' job performance at the time he recommended to Mr. Panetta that she be selected to fill Mr. Swanson's former position. Mr. Roberson and Mr. Panetta did not rely heavily on their most recent job evaluations, which were the only documents they reviewed, nor did they consider it significant that Petitioner was in a position that is designated as pay grade 48 when his last evaluation was written and that Ms. Roberts was in a position designated as pay grade 46 when her last evaluation was written. 1/ Mr. Roberson and Mr. Panetta considered the responsibilities and job duties of these two positions to be identical. The relative job performances of Petitioner and Ms. Roberts were evaluated by Mr. Roberson and Mr. Panetta taking into consideration the future demands of the job and were based, in large part, upon direct experience with the two employees. There was no written documentation of their rationale for selecting Ms. Roberts to fill Mr. Swanson's former position. Petitioner established that Mr. Roberson occasionally made comments about attractive female employees and that he seemed to prefer the company of certain female employees, one of whom was Ms. Roberts, at social events. While due consideration has been given this evidence, it is found that the greater weight of the evidence established that Respondent had legitimate, nondiscriminatory business considerations for the employment decision that was at issue in this proceeding. These considerations were not shown to be pretextual. Petitioner failed to establish that Respondent discriminated against him on the basis of his sex by its decision to replace Mr. Swanson with Ms. Roberts instead of with Petitioner. The petition Petitioner filed before the Florida Commission on Human Relations contains an allegation that Respondent discriminated against him on the basis of age. Petitioner abandoned that allegation at the beginning of the formal hearing. The petition Petitioner filed before the Florida Commission on Human Relations also contains an allegation that Respondent discriminated against him by failing to rehire him or recall him after his employment had been terminated. There was no evidence to support that allegation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order that adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained herein and that dismisses the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of January, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of January, 1995.
Findings Of Fact On October 23, 1978, Petitioner was hired as secretary to W. J. Crist, president of Hygroponics, Inc. On February 26, 1979, W. J. Crist evaluated Petitioner's overall job performance as "good." With respect to cooperation, the Petitioner was rated in the category of "cooperates very well," the highest rating possible for that category of performance. With respect to job knowledge, she was rated as showing "unusual capacity," also the highest rating possible for that category of performance. On March 5, 1979, Petitioner received an increase in salary from $4.18 per hour to $4.51 per hour, based in part upon her increased responsibilities and in part upon demonstrated merit. Following is Hygroponics, Inc.'s office staff organization chart dated May 2, 1979: HYGROPONICS, INC. OFFICE STAFF ORGANIZATION CHART | President | /| W. J. Crist |\ / | | \ / | \ \ \ | Purch. Agent | | Controller | \ | Technical Service | | Dick Destival | | James Jobe |" \ | Dick Jeffery | | | | | "" \ | | " / | | " "\ | " / | | " \" | " / | | " \ " | " / | | " \ " | " / | | " \ " | " / | | " \ " | " / | | "\ "| | Marsha | | Liz | | Nell | | Arlene | | Carolyn | | Betsy | | | | | | | | | | | | | /|\ Direct lines of authority. Answerable to this person at all times " Indirect lines of authority. Answerable for secondary duties and when direct lines are not available. The above organizational chart does not include the company's chief executive officer. On occasion, members of the company's secretarial staff went directly to the chief executive officer with employment-related problems. In September, 1979, after James Jobe, the controller referenced in the above chart, left the company's employ, W. J. Crist, the company president, advised Petitioner that she was to become office manager. After that time, Petitioner assumed many of the duties of office manager. Petitioner inquired when she would receive a raise commensurate with her increased responsibilities, and was advised that this would be accomplished after the company hired a new controller. Emmett Singleton was hired to fill the position of controller on October 29, 1979. On December 11, 1979, Petitioner formally became acting office manager. On that date Petitioner was evaluated by Emmett Singleton, who rated Petitioner highest in the areas of decision-making and ability to organize, and lowest in the areas of acceptability and responsibility. Specifically, Singleton made the following comments concerning Petitioner's job performance: "Has difficulty in establishing satisfactory relationships with people"; "Average leader, conventional in manner and enthusiasm, conveys ideas but does not motivate group"; "Has problem with admitting an error or fault"; "Reluctant to accept job responsibilities. Supervision and follow-up often required"; "Considers job an eight to five task with scheduled breaks reguardless [sic] of status of workload"; "Employee is preoccupied with the position rather than a concern for getting the job done"; and, "Employee resents being monitored or controlled. Sometimes uncooperative and slow to respond to direction." In addition, members of the company management group, other than Emmett Singleton, commented on this evaluation that Petitioner "alienates co-workers," "Has experienced confusion in the scheduling of grower school," and expressed concern with Petitioner's "attitude." The controller noted on the evaluation form that he planned ". . .to work closely with [Petitioner] for the next 60 days and make an assessment during this time as to whether on [sic] not suited for office manager." Finally, Mr. Singleton noted on Petitioner's performance review form that Petitioner ". . .is classified as Acting Office Manager and is on probation with reguard[sic] to classification. No change in rate of pay is being made at this time. Employee will be reevaluated in 60 days on or about 2/10/80." In order to improve her skills in the area of acceptability and responsibility, Petitioner requested that Mr. Singleton issue a memorandum clarifying the lines of her authority especially since her subordinates had not been advised that she had been given supervisory responsibility over them. Her request was denied at that time because Singleton wanted to first determine whether she could handle the position. On January 12, 1980, Singleton reevaluated Petitioner's job performance. According to Singleton's rating, Petitioner had improved in the areas of acceptability and responsibility, which had been her weak points in the evaluation performed one month earlier. On this same day, Petitioner was reclassified from acting office manager to office manager, and received an increase in pay to $821.60 per month, retroactive to November 1, 1979. Petitioner also assumed the duties of payroll clerk and accounts payable in addition to the duties of office manager. Shortly after receiving this promotion, Petitioner advised employees of Hygroponics, Inc., that she was pregnant. W. J. Crist and Emmett Singleton acknowledged her pregnancy, and the latter inquired concerning her intentions regarding her employment. Petitioner responded that she intended to continue working for the company, and to return to work after the birth of her child. Hygroponics, Inc., had no maternity leave policy. No other female employee had ever given notice of pregnancy and stated her intention to return to work following childbirth. However, at least two other employees had become pregnant during the term of their employment with Hygroponics, Inc. One of these employees, in fact, suffered two miscarriages during her term of employment, and continued working with the company. Another female worker became pregnant, gave birth to a child, and returned to work without ever advising the company or the company ever being aware that she had been pregnant until after she had returned to work. On January 30, 1980, Petitioner submitted a memorandum to Eugene Crist, the company's chief executive officer. The memorandum suggested changes regarding the responsibilities of certain of the office personnel under her supervision. Petitioner had previously discussed these suggested changes with Emmett Singleton, her immediate supervisor, who advised her that he thought her suggestions were a good idea. At the time the memorandum was submitted to the company's chief executive officer, W. J. Crist, the president of the company, was out of the state. On January 30, 1980, Eugene Crist showed the memorandum to Emmett Singleton. The memorandum was then returned to Petitioner by the company's chief executive officer with a notation that the matters contained in the memorandum should be handled through Singleton. Two days later, on February 1, 1980, Singleton asked Petitioner for the memorandum. When Petitioner could not locate the memorandum, and offered to discuss the details of it with Singleton, Singleton advised her that there was no basis for conversation if she could not produce the memorandum. As noted above, Singleton had seen and read the memorandum two days previously when it was shown to him by Eugene Crist. Upon W. J. Crist's return to Florida, Singleton advised him that Petitioner had submitted a memorandum directly to the company's chief executive officer, and that when Singleton asked Petitioner to see the memorandum, she advised him that she had misplaced it. On February 8, 1980, W. J. Crist circulated a memorandum to the Hygroponics, Inc., executive staff concerning Petitioner's ". . .insubordination, poor attitude [and] defiance of executive orders. This memorandum provided, in part, as follows: It is my understanding that Carolyn recently drafted a memorandum on her proposed changes in office duties for many people, changes in accounting procedures, etc. I have been informed that she: "by-passed you, her immediate superior and by-passed me, her next-in-line superior." and delivered this memo directly to Gene, our CEO. Then when Gene informed her to "discuss the memo directly with you," she advised you "she did not even have the memo anymore." I find these actions, on Carolyn's part very distressing and feel we must take disciplinary actions with her. So - what are the problems. Her "uncooperative" and "attitude" problems outlined in your personnel evaluation of her on December 11, 1979 (which she acknowledged) when you put her "on probation," the first time, still persist. She demonstrated anything but teamwork in by-passing her two immediate superiors and going directly to our CEO. This is very bad for an employee to do but even worse for her since she is suppose [sic] to be a leader of our people in her slot as Office Manager. Her disregarding Gene's directive to discuss the memo with you was corrected only by your insistance[sic] that the two of you discuss it. Her statement to you that "she no longer had the memo" is also distressing. Has she destroyed it? This additional negative certainly weakens her argument that "she went directly to Gene because he was going out.[sic] (Original emphasis.) The above-referenced memorandum solicited the views of the company's executive staff as to whether to terminate Petitioner, discipline her in some fashion, or give her an opportunity to resign. The decision was unanimous among all five members of the executive staff to terminate Petitioner. No member of the executive staff questioned Petitioner before concurring in the decision to discharge her. Such a memorandum of concurrence was not the company's standard practice in discharging employees, which generally was for the discharge decision to be made by the employee's supervisor alone. Hygroponics, Inc., was, at all times material to this proceeding, a rather small organization, numbering at the most approximately fifty employees. As a result, many of the internal functions of the company were informal in nature. For example, there were no strict lines of authority for secretarial staff to air grievances or make suggestions. There was, however, a generalized procedure for employees to approach their immediate supervisor with any employment-related problems. There is no direct substantive evidence in the record in this cause from which it can be concluded that Petitioner was terminated from her employment because she was either female or pregnant. Further, whatever circumstantial evidence there is in this record to support such a contention is overcome by Respondent's demonstration that Petitioner was at best an employee of average ability who management viewed at times to be a problem employee. It appears, therefore, that the reason for Petitioner's discharge was an accumulation of events, culminating in her memorandum of January 30, 1980, being submitted to the company chief executive officer, and not for any reason relating to her sex.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the State of Florida, Commission on Human Relations, dismissing the Petition for Relief, and denying the relief requested therein, with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of March, 1983, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM E. WILLIAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of March, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. White, Jr., Esquire 229 McKenzie Avenue Panama City, Florida 32401 John F. Daniel, Esquire Post Office Box 2522 Panama City, Florida 32401 Dana Baird, Esquire Florida Commission on Human Relations 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Suite 100, Montgomery Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard E. Williams Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Suite 100, Montgomery Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact The Petition herein was filed by Petitioner with PERC on December 29, 1975. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 1). The hearing in this case was scheduled by Notice dated January 22, 1976. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 2). The City of Sunrise is a Public Employer within the meaning of Florida Statutes s447.002(2). (Stipulation, Transcript page 7) 1/ The Petitioner is an association which is seeking to represent public employees in matters relating to their employment relationship with a public employer. The Petitioner requested recognition from the Public Employer as the exclusive bargaining representative for employees in the Public Employer's Utilities Department. The request was denied by the Public Employer. There is no contractual bar to holding an election in this case. (Stipulation, TR 7, 8). There is no pertinent collective bargaining history that will affect this case. (Stipulation, TR 8). PERC has previously determined that the Petitioner is a duly registered employee organization. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 3). No evidence was offered at the hearing to rebut the administrative determination previously made by PERC. PERC has previously determined that the Petitioner filed the requisite showing of interest with its petition. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 4). No evidence was offered at the hearing to rebut the administrative determination previously made by PERC. The Public Employer operates under the form of government commonly referred to as the "strong Mayor-Council form of government". The City Council serves as the legislative body of the Public Employer, and the Mayor is the Chief Executive Officer. Public Employer's Exhibit 1 accurately describes the organization of the Public Employer. The Public Employer is roughly divided into twelve different departments, excluding the Police and Fire Departments. Each department is headed by a department head who answers to the Mayor. The Public Employer employs approximately 200 persons, approximately 25 percent of whom are clerical employees. There are approximately 55 to 60 persons in the bargaining unit proposed by the Petitioner, 12 to 15 of whom are clerical employees. The department heads are generally responsible for the day-to-day functioning of their department. The department heads will initiate hiring, firing, discipline, and promotion of employees; however, such action must be approved by the Mayor. Respecting hiring and firing, the Mayor goes against the recommendations of the department heads approximately 30 to 40 percent of the time. With respect to disciplinary action, the department head submits recommendations to the Mayor in the form of a memorandum. In the Water and Sewer Department the recommendation would go from the Director of the Utilities Department to the City Engineer to the Mayor. The department head will make all decisions respecting shift changes, lunch hours, and vacations; however, an aggrieved employee can always go to the Mayor. The department heads regularly evaluate employees in their department, and make recommendations respecting merit pay increases based upon the evaluations. The Mayor has a practice of always approving recommendations for merit pay increases if money is available in the budget. The Mayor is responsible for preparing a proposed budget to be submitted to the City Council. The department heads provide the Mayor with information respecting the budgetary needs of their departments. The department heads meet on a monthly basis as a group to discuss safety programs. Safety policies are formulated at these meetings. The department heads are responsible for granting leave time; however, this responsibility is apparently delegated to the chief operator in the Water and Sewer Department. Public Employer's Exhibit 2 is a computer read-out of all of the Public Employer's employees other than those in the Police and Fire Departments. Those employees who the Public Employer considers to be managerial, confidential, or professional employees within the meaning of the Public Employees Relations Act are designated respectively on the exhibits by the hand written letters "M", "C", or "P". The hand written numbers on Public Employer's Exhibit 2 refer to the page number where the job description of the employee appears in Public Employer's Exhibit 3. Public Employer's Exhibit 3 is a compilation of the job descriptions of all of the Public Employer's employees other than those in the Police and Fire Departments. The descriptions were prepared in January, 1976, and accurately describe the duties, responsibilities, and day-to-day activities of the employees. All employees of the Public Employer other than those in the Police and Fire Departments are compensated under the same pay plan, and receive the same benefits. All employees are given eleven paid holidays, ten paid sick days, and ten paid vacation days annually. All employees participate in the same hospitalization and pension plans. All employees are issued uniforms and safety equipment by the city; however, clerical employees are responsible for maintaining their own uniforms. Christmas parties and other social functions for the employees are open to all employees of the city. There are no functions open to the employees of only one department. Transfers of employees from one department to another are fairly common. Job openings and promotions in a department are always advertised and made available to employees in all departments before they are advertised or made available to non-employees. The departments of the Public Employer generally work together. Many employees in the Public Works Department have the same job description as employees in the Utilities Department. When necessary, employees in one department will assist in performing the functions of another department. The Utilities Department is divided into the Gas Department, the Water and Sewer Field Maintenance Department, and the Water and Sewer Treatment Plants. These departments produce services for a fee to the inhabitants of the City of Sunrise, as do the Spring Hill Country Club and the Recreation Department. Employees in the Water and Sewer Departments are on duty 24 hours daily. Each employee works a fixed 8-hour shift. Most other employees of the Public Employer work a day-shift only. Employees in the Water and Sewer Department do not generally work in one place. Clerical employees generally work full time at City Hall. It is apparent that transfers between manual positions and clerical positions are rare, and have probably never occurred. The work performed by clerical employees is different than the work performed by employees in the Water and Sewer Departments. The only testimony presented at the hearing respecting the desires of the employees was that employees in the Water and Sewer Departments would like to have their own bargaining unit. The Utilities Department is separately budgeted, and the only employee who testified expressed an interest in using the revenue of the department for the benefit of the employees in the department. All employees of the Public Employer are eligible for membership in the Petitioner. DONE and ORDERED this 6th day of April, 1976 in Tallahassee, Florida. G. STEVEN PFEIFFER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675
Findings Of Fact The following quoted provisions of the joint stipulations of fact entered into by the parties, as attached to this recommended order, constitutes the underlying evidential facts to be considered by the undersigned in deliberating the charges in this case. The exhibits mentioned in the quoted provision may be found as a part of the attached joint stipulations of fact and exhibits, which have been made a part of the record herein. The quotation is as follows: JOINT STIPULATIONS OF FACT The charge herein attached as cumulative exhibit #1 was filed by the Charging party on October 21, 1976 and a copy was simultaneously served on Respondent. Pursuant to Florida Administrative Rule 8H-4.03 a copy of the charge is hereby attached. The trial and presentment of the above-captioned cause was assigned to Rodney W. Smith, attorney for the Charging Party on or about February 25, 1977. Respondent is a public employer within the meaning of F.S. 447.203(2) and has its principal place of business in the City of Jacksonville, Duval County, Florida where it is engaged in the business of operating a consolidated municipal government. Respondent is created directly by the legislature of the State of Florida so as to constitute a consolidated government administered by individuals who are responsible to public officials and/or the general electorate. Charging Party is now and has been at all times material herein an employee organization within the meaning of 447.203(l0) of the Act. On March 4, 1976 Respondent filed a PETITION FOR CERTIORARI with the opinion that said petition would stay the "proposed CERTIFICATION ORDER by the Public Employees Relations Commission until final determination of the case was resolved. On or about May 18, 1976 the Public Employees Relations Commission issued a CERTIFICATION ORDER certifying the Charging Party as the exclusive bargaining representative for the Public Employees in the following unit: INCLUDED: Firefighters Lieutenants Captains Employed by the City of Jacksonville Fire Department EXCLUDED: All officers above the rank of captain employed by the City of Jacksonville Fire Department and all other employees of the City of Jacksonville On or about June, 1976 the Respondent filed an APPEAL of the above- stated certification order by PETITION FOR REVIEW in the First District Court of Appeal in and for the State of Florida. At no time was a stay of the certification order sought or obtained by the Respondent. Although the CERTIFICATION ORDER was challenged by PETITION FOR REVIEW, the Charging Party has been the certified representative for purposes of collective-bargaining of all public employees in the unit described in the above paragraph since May 18, 1976. It has been the continuous policy, and most recently by special ordinance, for the City of Jacksonville to extend dues- deductions to firefighters, lieutenants and captains authorizing such deductions since on or about 1969. This policy of extending dues-deductions to captains, lieutenants and firefighters has continued at all times until October 15, 1976. On October 15, 1976 the biweekly paychecks of the captains (sic) and lieutenants employed by the, Respondent did not reflect the usual dues- deduction. The Charging Party was notified of the City's intention to discontinue dues-deductions for the employees "in the ranks of lieutenants and captains during contract negotiations in late September, 1976. On or about October 18, 1976 agents for the City, including Dave Thompson, Administrative Aide for the Public Safety Department and John Waters, Director of Department of Public Safety informed Robert Carver, President of the Charging Party, that the Respondent would not extend dues-deductions to the captains or lieutenants since the Respondent did not feel these positions were properly included in the certified bargaining unit. The action of the Respondent in discontinuing the dues-deductions on October 15, 1976 was resultant from the attached cumulative exhibit B, Memorandum of September 24, 1976 from John M. Waters to Jack Parker, City Accountant for the City of Jacksonville, which directs that positions above the rank of firefighter are to no longer receive dues-deductions. The Director of Employee Relations and chief negotiator for the Respondent, William Davis, was officially notified of the proposed discontinuation on September 29, 1976 by action of the attached cumulative exhibit c." The act complained of by the Charging Party, is the act of the Respondent in discontinuing the dues-deductions for the ranks of lieutenant and captain effective October 15, 1976. (The facts that led up to that action are established in the stipulations of fact entered into by the parties.) In the mind of the Charging Party the discontinuation of the dues-deductions on October 15, 1976, constituted: (1) an interference with the rights of employees as described in 447.501(1)(a), F.S.; (2) a unilateral change during the bargaining process in violation of 447.50l(1)(c), F.S.; and (3) a specific refusal to comply with the provisions of 447.303, F.S. The Respondent disputes and joins issue with that claim. To resolve the conflict, the case is best discussed by dividing the consideration into two broad categories. The first category is concerned with the question of whether the Respondent's initial petition for writ of certiorari filed with the First District Court of Appeal, State of Florida, on March 4, 1976, and/or the Respondent's appeal of the Public Employees Relations Commission's certification order, which was filed with the First District Court of Appeal, State of Florida; imposed an automatic stay of the effect of the proposed certification order by the Public Employees Relations Commission, and/or a stay of the certification order of May 18, 1976, entered by the Public Employees Relations Commission. Any stay of the proposed certification order and subsequent certification order by the Public Employees Relations Commission must have been effectuated by the filing of the initial petition for writ of certiorari on March 4, 1976, and the appeal of June, 1976, because the facts establish that no specific request was ever made of the First District Court of Appeal or the Public Employees Relations Commission to grant a stay. To that end, the Respondent contends that it could justifiably rely on the Florida Appellate Rule to grant an automatic stay in both the initial petition for writ of certiorari of March 4, 1976, and the appeal of June, 1976 Pertinent provisions of Rule 5.12 state: "Rule 5.12 Supersedeas Bond not Required of the State and its Political Subdivisions and their Boards, Commissions, etc.; Security when Required When Security Not Required. When the state or any of its political subdivisions, or any officer, board, commission or other public body of the state or any of its political subdivisions, in a purely official capacity, takes an appeal or petitions for certiorari, the filing of the notice of appeal or the petition for certiorari as the case may be shall perfect the same and stay the execu tion or performance of the judgment, decree or order being reviewed and no supersedeas bond need be given unless expressly required by the court. Court May Require Bond. The court may, on motion for good cause shown, require a super sedeas bond or other security, in such amount, form and manner as it may prescribe as a condition for the further prosecution of the appeal or certiorari." On the face of the language of Florida Appellate Rule 5.12, it would appear that the Respondent is correct in its assumption of having an automatic stay; however, there is a subsequent appellate decision which defeats the Respondent's right to rely on the theory it offers as standing for the proposition that an automatic stay is granted. That case is Panama City v. Florida Public Employees Relations Commission, 333 So.2d 470, (1st DCA 1976, Fla.). The decision in this case was initially rendered on May 5, 1976, and a rehearing denied on June 29, 1976. The effective date of the decision is July 14, 1976. The Panama City case, supra, concerns the determination by the Public Employees Relations Commission of an appropriate bargaining unit and direction of an election. Those actions by PERC were not found to be final orders and in discussing the position of that Petitioner requesting a writ of certiorari, the Court stated that a stay of the effect of the enforcement of the agency action does not transpire merely by filing the petition for writ of certiorari. Under the ruling, in the decision, the stay may be granted by the agency or by the Court upon appropriate terms and in keeping with the authority of 120.68(3), F.S. That section of Chapter 120 indicated the following: "(3) The filing of the petition does not itself stay enforcement of the agency decision, but if the agency decision has the effect of suspending or revoking a license, supersedeas shall be granted as a matter of right upon such conditions as are reasonable, unless the court, upon petition of the agency, determines that a supersedeas would constitute a probable danger to the health, safety, or welfare of the state. The agency may grant, or the reviewing court may order, a stay upon appropriate terms, but, in any event, the order shall specify the conditions upon which the stay or supersedeas is granted." Moreover, in the opinion of the Court in the Panama City case, under Florida Appellate Rule 5.5, the Petitioner for writ of certiorari shall apply to the agency for supersedeas to forestall the terms of the agency action. Through its memorandum the Respondent in this cause has concluded that there is a distinction in the facts of the Panama City case and the facts sub judice, in that the Panama City case dealt with determination of an appropriate bargaining unit and direction of an election which were interlocutory matters, whereas the question here deals with a certification order which is final agency action on the part of the Public Employes Relations Commission. As an adjunct to this argument, Respondent indicated that it is the June, 1976, appeal taken by the Respondent, challenging the Public Employees Relations Commission order of certification, that becomes the focal point of the inquiry upon the subject of an automatic stay. This latter phase of the argument is accepted and it is the June, 1976, appeal that should be addressed. With that fact in mind, the language of the Court's opinion in the Panama City case on a petition for rehearing clarifies any distinction which might be drawn between the right to stay in an interlocutory situation, and the right to a stay of final action by an agency. The Court, in its discussion on rehearing, stated that the PERC order certifying an employee organization's exclusive collective bargaining representative of employees is a final order, which is subject to judicial review, together with all prior interlocutory orders. The Court goes on to say that if PERC refuses to stay any bargaining pending the Court review, the Court would have authority to grant that relief, in A order to make the Court's jurisdiction effective. For this proposition it cites to Article V, Section (4)(b) 3, Florida Constitution. A close analysis of the Court's statement on the rehearing in the Panama City case, supra, points out that the party who takes an appeal of the final order of certification by the Public Employees Relations Commission should look to the Public Employees Relations Commission to grant a stay prior to turning to the Court for such relief. This is in keeping with the requirements of 120.68(3), F.S. It can be seen by an examination of the facts stipulated to in this cause that the Respondent has failed at any point to request of the Public Employees Relations Commission that the effect of the order of certification be stayed pending the outcome of the consideration of the appeal on its merits. Consequently, in keeping with the decision of the Panama-City case, supra, the effect of the certification order is not stayed and any action which the Respondent took in derrogation of the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Panama City, supra, subsequent to July 14, 1976, the date the decision became binding, may constitute an unfair labor practice. See also, Duval Cty School Bd v. Fla. Pub. Emp. etc., 346 So.2d 1086 (1st DCA 1977, Fla.) Having determined that the effect of the certification order of the Public Employees Relations Commission has not been stayed, consideration of the effect of the Respondent's action which discontinued the dues-deduction after October 15, 1976 for those ranks of lieutenant and captain can be made. It is clear from the facts In the record that it had been the practice of the employer to authorize the dues-deduction for lieutenants and captains since 1969 and there is no showing that the employees in those ranks who requested the dues- deduction ever asked that the deductions be discontinued. The conclusion on the part of the Respondent that the dues-deduction should be discontinued was a unilateral action, premised upon Respondent's individual evaluation of the propriety of including lieutenants and captains in a unit with firefighters. In view of the history of the dues-deduction process for lieutenants and captains in the City of Jacksonville, and the outstanding unit certification by PERC which includes such employees, it is concluded that deductions should have been continued beyond October 15, 1976. This is authorized under the opinion of United Faculty of Palm Beach Jr. College, Case No. 8H-CA- 754-1158. The failure to continue this deduction program beyond October 15, 1976 constituted an action by the Respondent in regard to conditions of employment and was per se a violation of the duty to collectively bargain. See 447.309(1), F.S., and NLRB v. Katz, 396 U.S.736 (1962). This responsibility on the part of Respondent to continue the dues-deduction has now been specifically established in 447.303, F.S., as amended at 77-343, Laws of Florida which reads: "Any employee organization which has been certified as a bargaining agent shall have the right to, upon request, have its dues and uniform assessments deducted and collected by the employer from the salary of those employees who authorized the deductions, set dues and uniform assessments In a related argument, the Respondent attempts to suggest that the Public Employees Relations Commission has unilaterally expanded and redefined the bargaining unit that had been previously agreed to between the City of Jacksonville and Local 1884 IAFF. Specifically, the Respondent claims that the City of Jacksonville and Local 1884 IAFF had agreed that only fire privates be included in the unit in 1973-1974 and 1974-1975, and that thereafter the Commission expanded and redefined the bargaining unit to include firemen and fire officers. Although this may be a fact, this fact is not in evidence through the stipulation of facts and in view of the limitations imposed by the agreement of the parties through their stipulation, the above-referenced information may not be utilized in reaching conclusions in this case. However, assuming arguendo the propriety of those facts, they would not seem to promote a different result in this cause. This conclusion is drawn from an examination of Clearwater Firefighters Association; Local 1158, IAFF and City of Clearwater, Case No. 8H- RC-766-1O68, 77E-377, reported at 3 FPER 177 (1977) and City of Titusville v. PERC, 3,30 So.2d 733 (1st DCA 1976, Fla.) Even though the Commission and the Court seemed to be stating that the Public Employees Relations Commission may not extend the unit which has voluntarily been recognized by the parties, or offered for recognition by the Petitioner for unit determination, these cases demonstrate that each case that occurs should be examined on an individual basis. Applying that process, it would be necessary to request the Public Employees Relations Commission to reconsider their position in the instant case on the question of the appropriateness of the inclusion of lieutenants and captains in the certified bargaining unit, and that decision could be subject to appeal to the appropriate appellate court. Because a determination has not been rendered on the merits of excluding lieutenants and captains from the certified bargaining unit, either by the Public Employees Relations Commission or an appellate court, the certification order remains in effect and all rights and entitlements for ,the unit employees remain in force and effect until amended by a Perc order. Consequently, the act of discontinuing the dues-deduction for lieutenants and captains in the bargaining unit after October 15, 1976, constituted a specific refusal to comply with the provision of 447.303, F.S.; an interference with the rights of employees in violation of 447.501(1)(a), and an unilateral change during the bargaining process, in violation of 447.501(1)(c) , F.S.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Respondent, City of Jacksonville, be required to reinstate the dues-deduction authorizations of those lieutenants and captains in the certified bargaining unit. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of November, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Rodney W. Smith, Esquire Post Office Box 508 Gainesville, Florida 32602 Robert G. Brown, Esquire Assistant Counsel Office of General Counsel City Of Jacksonville 1300 City Hall Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Leonard A. Carson, Chairman Public Employees Relations Commission Suite 300 2003 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FLORIDA Exhibit A STATE OF FLORIDA
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence received at the hearing, the following facts are found: The City of Madison employs approximately 60 full time employees who serve under the general supervision of the City Manager, who has identical fringe benefits as all other employees. The City Commission employes the City Manager and is the ultimate authority and decision making body. The City Commission is composed of elected officials who serve without compensation. A representation petition was filed seeking a certificate of representation by Local Union 2865, AFL-CIO as the exclusive bargaining agent for all full time employees of the City of Madison except for professional employees, managerial employees and confidential secretarial employees. The Public Employer refused to grant the request. A consent election was rejected. A Motion to Dismiss and/or Strike Petition for Certification was entered into evidence over the objection of the Petitioner and a Motion to Quash said Motion to Dismiss and/or Strike Petition for Certification was denied. Testimony was taken as to whether there was such solicitation by managerial employees to initiate the showing of interest. Testimony was taken and final action on the Motion is referred to PERC for action. If the Motion to Dismiss is denied, the determination must be made as to whether the hereinafter enumerated job positions as set forth in Exhibit 3 should be considered managerial and excluded from the unit. No agreement was reached on such employees. Each employee whose job description is set forth in Exhibit 3 works a standard 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. five day work week, but each is expected to get their respective job done and in the event of an emergency work overtime. The City Commission sets the wages and each reports directly to the City Manager. Each has the same fringe benefits except those who need a truck and radio are furnished one for job use only. Each such employee hears grievance matters on those under him and if the problem cannot be worked out, the parties go to the City Manager who acts as final arbitrator and who acts on a recommendation for termination. Each such employee submits a budget and then sits with the City Manager in making up the budget and keeps with the administration of the budget. Each of the following persons have been funded with the job description and entered in Exhibit 3 and testimony from the City Manager indicates that a meeting for clarification and explanation was planned and thereafter a meeting of these nine employees on a monthly basis. The City Manager stated that in the event of a bargaining situation he would call together these employees for indirect and direct input but that he would prefer not to try to negotiate a contract himself inasmuch as this would put him in conflict with employees and that he would rely on these persons for input and any mollification of policy or procedures. (a) Special Project Supervisor. This work involves the direction of a maintenance or construction crew performing road and utility construction and maintenance work. This employee may hire, promote, demote and assign work and is responsible for directing a crew of skilled and unskilled workers in routine maintenance or construction of streets, roadways and utilities. Duties include inspecting equipment and machinery used to ensure proper operation and checking street and roadway utilities for defects or problems. At times this employee may serve as relief equipment operator. He may also perform other duties as required by the City Manager. Four persons work under the Special Project Supervisor but he may obtain help from other departments when necessary. (h) Fire Chief. This employee is directly responsible for protection against fire and for firefighting activities within the jurisdiction. This employee may hire, promote, demote or assign work and is responsible for directing and supervising skilled and unskilled firefighters in the routine maintenance of facilities and equipment. He coordinates the activities of firefighters, inspects station house and equipment, responds to fire alarms and other rescue activities. This employee may also perform other duties as required by the City Manager. (c) Construction Supervisor. This employee directs one or more departments and/or construction crews engaged in the construction of city streets, roadways, bridges and related facilities. The employee may hire, promote, demote and assign work. The work involves the supervision of several types of heavy equipment operators as well as the skilled and unskilled labor activities. The employee may perform other duties as required by the City Manager. (d) Executive Secretary. Excluded as managerial employee. (e) Gas Supervisor. This employee directs the maintenance and construction crew performing gas and utility maintenance and construction. The employee may hire, promote, demote, assign work and is responsible for directing and supervising a crew of skilled and unskilled workers in the routine maintenance of gasolines, services and utilities. Duties include inspecting equipment and checking for defects and when necessary serving as relief operator and supervising the moving of right of ways. This employee may perform other duties as required by the City Manager. (f) Sewage Plant Supervisor. This employee directs the maintenance and construction crew performing sewage plant lines and utility maintenance. The employee may hire, promote, demote, assign work and is responsible for directing and supervising a crew of skilled and unskilled workers in the routine maintenance or construction of sewer or water related facilities. Other duties include inspecting the equipment and machinery used to ensure proper operation and checking for defects or other problems. This employee may perform other duties as required by the City Manager. (g) Water Supervisor. This employee directs the maintenance and construction crew performing water, sewer and utility maintenance. The employee may hire, promote, demote, assign work and is responsible for directing and supervising the crew of skilled and unskilled workers in the routine maintenance and construction of water and sewer facilities and ocher utility services. Duties include inspecting equipment, serving as relief operator when necessary, supervising the moving of right of ways. The employee may perform other duties as required by the City Manager. (h) Grounds Keeper. This is work directing small crews engaged in the care and maintenance of grounds and yards. The employee may hire, promote, demote, assign work and is responsible for the overall maintenance of the grounds and yards in the City. The employee may perform other duties as required by the City Manager. (i) Shop Superintendent-Mechanic. Excluded as a non-managerial employee. (j) Warehouse Supervisor. This employee is involved in the record keeping, inventory control and the operation of the purchasing department. The duties are in general, a bookkeeper and storekeeper. He performs other duties when required by the City Manager. (k) Police Chief. This employee is responsible for the direction and administration of law enforcement activities. He may hire, promote, demote, assign work and is responsible for directing and supervising skilled and unskilled police officers and other activities involved in law enforcement. He is responsible for inspection of the stationhouse and equipment. He responds to calls for assistance. Other duties may be required by the City Manager or Mayor in case of Marshall Law. In accordance with Florida Statute 447.307(3)(a), and Florida Administrative Rule 8H-3.23, no recommendations are submitted. DONE and ENTERED this 30 day of April, 1976. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Richard Cox, Esquire Michaels and Patterson 2007 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David Bembry, Esquire Davis, Browning and Hardee Post Office Box 652 Madison, Florida Ben Patterson, Esquire Michaels and Patterson 2007 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Edward B. Browning, Jr., Esquire Davis, Browning and Hardee Post Office Box 652 Madison, Florida Chairman Public Employee Relations Commission Suite 300, 2003 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Thee PBA filed it's petition with PERC on April 17, 1975. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 1). The FOP filed it's petition with PERC on April 28, 1975. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 5). The hearing in these cases was scheduled by notice dated June 6, 1975. The two cases were consolidated for the purposes of the hearing by agreement of the parties. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 2, TA 4). The City of Tampa is a Public Employer within the meaning of Florida Statute s447.002(2). (Stipulation TA 5). The Hillsborough County Police Benevolent Association is an Employee Organization within the meaning of Florida Statutes 447.002(10). (Stipulation TA 5). The Florida State Lodge, Fraternal Order of Police is an Employee Organization within the meaning of Florida Statutes 447.002(10). (Stipulation TA 5). The PBA and the FOP have requested recognition as the exclusive bargaining agent of employees described in their respective petitions, and these requests have been denied by the Public Employer. (Stipulation TA 6). There is no contractual bar to the holding of an election in this case. (Stipulation TA 6). There is no bargaining history between the Public Employer and any members of the proposed bargaining units. (Stipulation TA 7). The PBA is properly registered with PERC. (Stipulation TA 7, Hearing Officer's Exhibit 3). The FOP is properly registered with PERC. (Stipulation TA 7, Hearing Officer's Exhibit 7). PERC has previously determined that the PBA filed the Requisite Showing of Interest with it's petition. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 4). No evidence was offered at the hearing to rebut this administrative determination. PERC has previously determined that the FOP filed the Requisite Showing of Interest with it's petition. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 8). No evidence was offered at the hearing to rebut this administrative determination. The parties stipulated and agreed that the position of Police Legal Advisor, the Chief of Police, the Assistant Chiefs of Police, or lieutenant colonels, and police majors should be excluded from any collective bargaining unit ultimately certified by PERC. (TA 8 - 10). The City of Tampa Police Department is organized into seven divisions consisting of Police Headquarters, two Uniform Districts, a Detective Division, a Tactical Division, a Services Division and an Administrative Division. Police Headquarters is commanded by the Chief of Police. A total of 12 sworn personnel work at headquarters. These are two lieutenant colonels or deputy police chiefs, an administrative sergeant, two administrative corporals, the Criminal Intelligence Unit, the Internal Affairs Unit, and the Police Legal Officer. The two Uniform Districts are organized in the same manner. Uniform District 1 covers roughly the western geographic half of the city, and Uniform District 2 covers the eastern half of the city. Each uniform district is commanded by a police major. The districts are divided into three shifts, each of which is commanded by a shift commander who holds the rank of police captain. There is a field commander who generally holds the rank of lieutenant and five to seven squads on each shift. The squads are commanded by a police sergeant and consist of one police corporal and nine police officers. Two of the police officers are designated field instructors. There are approximately 210 sworn personnel in each uniform district. The Detective Division is commanded by a police major. The function of the Detective Division is to conduct latent criminal investigations. There are four bureaus in the division. The Homicide Bureau, the Burglary Bureau and the Larceny Bureau are each commanded by a captain, with a sergeant as second in command. The Juvenile Bureau is commanded by a captain with a lieutenant second in command. One sergeant in the Juvenile Bureau commands the Missing Persons, Social Welfare, Police Athletic League, and Community Relations sections. Another sergeant commands the ten detectives who are assigned to the juvenile section. There are 82 sworn personnel in the Detective Division. The Tactical Division is commanded by a police major. It is composed of 3 major subdivisions: the Vice Control Bureau, the Police Air Service, and the Selective Enforcement Unit. The Vice Control Bureau is commanded by a captain with a lieutenant second in command. The Vice Control Bureau is divided into two squads, one responsible for lottery and beverage investigations, and one for narcotics investigations. Each of the squads is commanded by a sergeant. The Police Air Service is commanded by a police flight supervisor who is roughly equivalent in rank to a police captain. The assistant flight supervisor is second in command, and is roughly equivalent in rank to a police sergeant. The Selective Enforcement Unit is commanded by a captain with a lieutenant second in command. There are approximately 83 sworn personnel in the Tactical Division. The Services Division is commanded by a police major. Two bureaus compose the Services Division: the I.D. and Records Bureau and the Communications and Maintenance Bureau. Each bureau is commanded by a captain with a lieutenant as second in command. There are 42 sworn personnel in the Services Division. The Administrative Division is commanded by a major. Two bureaus comprise the division: Personnel and Training, and Budget Research. Each bureau is commanded by a captain. A bureau sergeant and a range sergeant command the two sections of the Personnel and Training Bureau. The Budget and Research Bureau has two sections: Property and Research commanded by a sergeant, and Payroll and Accounting which is staffed entirely by civilians. There are 27 sworn personnel in the Administrative Division. The majors who command the two Uniform Districts, the Detective Division and the Tactical Division, answer directly to the operation's lieutenant colonel, who answers to the Chief of Police. The majors who command the Services Division and the Administrative Division answer to the administrative lieutenant colonel, who answers to the Chief of Police. There are approximately 665 sworn personnel in the City of Tampa Police Department. The Chief of Police is the top management official in the City of Tampa Police Department. His responsibilities include, inter alia, establishing standards of conduct for police officers; supervising preparation of the departmental budget, and administering departmental expenditures in accordance with budget provisions; interpreting departmental rules, regulations, and policies to employees; and supervising the selection and development of new patrolmen. The Chief of Police has ultimate responsibility for hiring, firing, and promoting employees within the Police Department. The Chief conducts staff conferences on an as needed basis. Lieutenant colonels and majors attend these conferences. The staff formulates policy for the Chief's approval. It is anticipated that the staff would formulate collective bargaining procedure in the event that a bargaining unit is established, and will ultimately administer any collective bargaining agreement that is formulated. The parties stipulated and agreed that the Chief of Police should be excluded from any collective bargaining unit ultimately certified PERC. The two lieutenant colonels are also referred to as deputy chiefs of police. The administrative lieutenant colonel supervises the support functions of the department. The operations lieutenant colonel supervises the field activities. The lieutenant colonels make inspections of assigned operations to ascertain level of performance, review employee problems and insure that necessary steps are taken to maintain high morale, receive and dispose of complaints and report thereon to the Police Chief and review expenditures and assist the Chief in preparation of the annual budget estimates. The lieutenant colonels serve on the Police Chief's staff. At the hearing the parties stipulated and agreed that lieutenant colonels should be excluded from any collective bargaining unit ultimately certified by PERC. Police majors command the major divisions of the Police Department other than the Police Headquarters Division. Police majors are commonly referred to as the chief law enforcement officers. The major has the primary responsibility for the planning, coordination, and direction of activities and functions assigned to his division. He has supervisory control and direction of all members and employees assigned to his division. The major is required to make or cause to be made, inspections of all units, personnel, equipment and facilities under his command. The major is required to investigate, or cause to be investigated, any cases of apparent or alleged misconduct of his personnel and to prepare a report for review by the Chief of Police and the lieutenant colonel. The major takes whatever immediate disciplinary action is required. The major is responsible for making personnel assignments within his division. The major is charged with responsibility for preparing an annual budget estimate for his division, and he exercises control over disbursements of budgeted funds within his division. The major is required to report in writing to the Chief of Police any probationary officers who for any reason appear unfit or unqualified for police service, and to make recommendations concerning their continued employment. Majors serve on the Police Chief's staff. At the hearing the parties stipulated and agreed that majors should be excluded from any collective bargaining unit ultimately certified by PERC. Police captains plan, direct and coordinate the activities of a bureau, or are in command of a police shift. The police captain is responsible for directing and training personnel under his command, and assumes responsibility for occurrences on the shift. It is the police captain's duty to assure adequate performance by all assigned personnel. The captain assists in the selection and development of new patrolmen, and participates in the police training program. The captain recommends disciplinary action. He is responsible for the care and maintenance of all equipment, materials and facilities assigned to his command. Captains generally work at Police Headquarters, and have field duties only under unusual circumstances. Police captains can modify deployment of personnel under their command without further authority. Police captains attend the Chief's staff conferences in the absence of a major, or for special reporting purposes. The day-to-day activities undertaken by captains within the Police Department vary according to the particular assignment; however, the captains are interchangeable with one another. Standard Operating procedure Bulletins outlining the particular duties assigned to each police captain have been promulgated. These bulletins accurately describe the duties, responsibilities, and day-to-day activities of each police captain. These bulletins were received into evidence as Public Employer's Exhibits #12, 25, 29, 40, 47, 53, 55, 61, and 65. The Public Employer contends that police captains are managerial employees. The PBA is not seeking to include captains within it's proposed bargaining unit. The FOP is seeking to include police captains in a collective bargaining unit with lieutenants and sergeants. Police lieutenants are frequently referred to as field commanders, or field supervisors. They serve as supervisors in one of the major administrative functional areas. Police lieutenants exercise immediate supervision over uniform sergeants and patrolmen, and are responsible for overseeing activities in the field. A lieutenant in one of the Uniform Districts would supervise from 3 to 6 sergeants, and from 30 to 60 police officers. A police sergeant's reports and recommendations respecting disciplinary action are submitted to the captain through the lieutenant. The lieutenant can make independent recommendations respecting disciplinary action. A police lieutenant would typically spend from 1 to 3 hours weekly on discipline problems. When circumstances such as a large number of calls in a given zone warrant it, a lieutenant can make immediate decisions respecting the deployment of squads. The lieutenant is responsible for coordinating the activities of squads, and generally will make recommendations to the shift commander respecting deployment of personnel. The police lieutenants evaluate police sergeants, but not at regularly scheduled times. Lieutenants can place material in a sergeant's personnel file. Lieutenants wear a different uniform than officers with lower ranks. Lieutenants wear white shirts and blue slacks while other uniform personnel wear blue shirts and blue slacks. Lieutenants serve as captains during the latter's absence. In the Uniform Districts, this regularly occurs at least two days per week. In the absence of both the captain and a major, the lieutenant would serve as district commander. The lieutenant in the Services Division, I.D. and Records Bureau, serves as the bureau chief for an average of 5 to 6 weeks per year. The day-to-day activities of lieutenants will vary depending on the assignment; however, lieutenants are interchangeable with one another. Standard Operating Procedures Bulletins respecting lieutenants assigned to various bureaus and divisions have been promulgated. These bulletins accurately describe the duties, responsibilities, and day-to-day activities of the lieutenants. These bulletins were received into evidence as Public Employer's Exhibits #13, 14, 30, 48, 54, and 56. The Public Employer contends that lieutenants should not be included in a collective bargaining unit with rank and file personnel, but could be included in a unit of supervisory personnel with police sergeants. The PBA does not contend that lieutenants should be included in it's proposed unit. The FOP contends that lieutenants should be included in a unit of supervisory personnel including captains, lieutenants, and sergeants. Police sergeants serve as the immediate supervisors of police corporals, field instructors, officers, and detectives. Sergeants command squads within the department. The rank of sergeant is the first rank which is viewed by the department as an actual promotion. The ranks of corporal, field instructor, detective, and officer are viewed as assignments, although corporals, field instructors and detectives receive more pay than officers. Corporals and field instructors do frequently act as sergeants. Sergeants have close working relationships with the personnel in their squads, but do not perform precisely the same functions. On a typical day the sergeant will call the roll, read directives to the officers, check crime reports, perform additional administrative duties, then go into the field in a patrol car. The sergeant continues to supervise the officers, but he may perform some of the same duties that officers perform. Sergeants make the determination of which personnel within a squad perform which functions. Sergeants spend more time in the field than in their offices, but they answer far fewer calls and make far fewer arrests than do the officers. Sergeants wear a uniform consisting of blue slacks and a blue shirt. This is the same uniform worn by corporals, field instructors, and officers; however, sergeants wear gold badges and hat insignias rather than the silver worn by the lower ranking personnel. In the Detective Bureau sergeants serve as acting captain for approximately two to two and one half months per year. Sergeants occasionally serve as division commander within the detective division. A sergeant in the Detective Division does not investigate offenses. He examines reports of investigations, and if not satisfied instructs the detective as to what additional steps should be pursued. Sergeants regularly evaluate corporals, field instructors, officers, and detectives on forms which have been adopted by the department. The sergeant maintains a pending evaluation file for personnel under his supervision. An evaluation rendered by a sergeant cannot be changed, although the sergeant's recommendations may not be followed. Lieutenants, captains, and majors can make notations on the evaluation, but cannot change it. The sergeant's evaluation is reviewed with the officer. The sergeant and the lieutenant generally confer about the evaluation. The division commander, or major, reviews the evaluations and frequently discusses them with the officers who have been evaluated. Evaluations play some part in determining promotions. Promotions are determined 70 percent on the basis of a civil service test, 10 percent on the basis of seniority, and 20 percent on the basis of findings of an evaluation board appointed by the Chief. Sergeants can serve on the evaluation board, and the sergeant's evaluations are among the items considered by the board. In a sergeant's absence, a corporal would perform the evaluation. Disciplinary action against corporals, field instructors, officers or detectives is initiated by sergeants. The sergeant will make an initial determination as to whether disciplinary action is necessary. The sergeant might frequently counsel the officer rather than initiate disciplinary action. The sergeant will investigate the incidence and ultimately will make recommendations which go into the personnel file, and could be used in consideration of promotion. A sergeant's recommendations respecting discipline are not changed, although they are not necessarily followed. If an officer is tardy in arriving at work, the sergeant can send him home without pay and then initiate disciplinary action. The officer could lose a vacation day and the month's sick day. A sergeant can relieve an officer of duty for performing duties improperly or for being incapable of performing duties without prior authority. The sergeant would then initiate disciplinary action. The sergeants serve as the first step in the department's grievance procedure. If a sergeant does not resolve a grievance within 48 hours of submission, he will forward it up the chain of command. The sergeant's comments in a grievance matter become part of the grievance file. The sergeant's recommendations respecting grievances are not changed although they are not necessarily followed. Granting or denying unscheduled time off is initially the responsibility of the police sergeant. The police sergeant determines when comp time and vacation days can be taken, and this determination is not reviewable unless a grievance is initiated. Extra duty work is work which an officer can perform while off duty for extra pay. The sergeant authorizes or refuses requests for extra duty. Without prior approval, a sergeant can require that officers work overtime. The sergeant makes recommendations respecting which officers in his squad are assigned the designation field instructor. The sergeant's recommendation has always been followed in the recollection of each witness who testified. In a squad within the Uniform Districts, sergeants, corporals, field instructors and one other officer are permitted to use a department car. The sergeant makes the determination of which officer is permitted use of a car. Requests for transfer are submitted to sergeants. The sergeant makes the initial recommendation respecting request for transfer, and his recommendation is generally followed although the request is sent up the chain of command. Sergeants make recommendations respecting discharge and suspension, but they do not make the final decision. The day-to-day activities of a police sergeant will vary depending upon the particular assignment. Standard Operating Procedure Bulletins respecting each assignment which a sergeant might be given have been promulgated. These bulletins accurately describe the duties, responsibilities, and day-to-day activities of the assignments. These bulletins were received in evidence as Public Employer's Exhibits #15, 16, 26, 32, 36, 41, 49, 57, and 62. The Patrol and Traffic Divisions referenced in Public Employer's Exhibit #15 have been merged into the two Uniform Districts since the time that that bulletin was prepared. The sergeant assigned to the personnel and Training Bureau no longer performs the functions set out in paragraph 6 of Public Employer's Exhibit 62. The Public Employer contends that sergeants should not be included in any unit of lower ranking personnel, but could be included within a unit consisting of lieutenants and sergeants. The PBA contends that sergeants should be included within the unit described in it's petition. The FOP contends that sergeants should be included within a unit consisting of captains, lieutenants, and sergeants. The position of police corporal is not considered a permanent assignment. Police corporals serve as acting sergeant in the absence of the police sergeant. Standard Operating Procedures Bulletins respecting various assignments that a corporal might receive in the department have been promulgated. These bulletins accurately describe the duties, responsibilities, and day-to-day activities of police corporals. The bulletins were received in evidence as Public Employer's Exhibits #17, 18, 33, 38, and 50. The Public Employer, the PBA, and the FOP are in agreement that corporals should be included in any non-supervisory collective bargaining unit that might be certified by PERC. A police sergeant is assigned to the position of administrative sergeant. The administrative sergeant answers directly to the Chief of Police. Four police corporals are assigned the position of administrative corporal. One administrative corporal answers directly to the administrative lieutenant colonel, one answers directly to the operations lieutenant colonel, and two answer directly to the two majors assigned to the Uniform Districts. The administrative sergeant and the administrative corporals perform duties assigned by their supervisor. Generally all of the files, information, and correspondence available to the supervisor is available to the administrative sergeant and administrative corporal. This would include personnel files. The administrative sergeant and the administrative corporals occasionally investigate citizen complaints, and perform research respecting proposed changes in procedure. The administrative sergeants and corporals handle escort work, screen personnel coming into their supervisor's office, and receive telephone calls and correspondence. The person presently serving as administrative sergeant has been assigned to that position for some time. The administrative corporals are rotated. It is anticipated by the Chiefs the lieutenant colonels, and the majors, that the administrative sergeants and corporals will not reveal information that is available to them. The Police Air Service is commanded by a police flight supervisor. The police flight supervisor is roughly equivalent in rank to a police captain. The second in command is the assistant flight supervisor. The assistant flight supervisor is roughly equivalent in rank to a police sergeant. Standard Operating Procedure Bulletins respecting the positions of police flight supervisor and assistant police flight supervisor have been promulgated. These bulletins accurately describe the duties, responsibilities, and day-to-day activities of the police flight supervisor and the assistant flight supervisor. These bulletins were received in evidence as Public Employer's Exhibits #43, 44, and 46. The Criminal Intelligence Unit is headed by a police sergeant, who reports directly to the Police Chief. The Internal Affairs Unit is headed by a police lieutenant who answers directly to the Police Chief. The Criminal Intelligence Unit conducts investigations dealing with subversive activities and organized crime. The Internal Affairs Unit conducts investigations involving misconduct on the part of police personnel. When the need arises the personnel in the Criminal Intelligence Unit will assist the Interal Affairs Unit, and vice versa. Information gathered by these units are not distributed to anyone without the consent of the Police Chief. Personnel are assigned to these units by the Chief of Police on a rotating basis with the recommendation of the sergeant or lieutenant. It is probable that any investigations of illegal strike activity would be conducted by one of these units. There are approximately 151 unsworn personnel employed by the City of Tampa Police Department. Neither Employee Organization sought inclusion of unsworn personnel in their proposed bargaining units. The Public Employer agreed that unsworn personnel should not be included in any collective bargaining unit consisting of sworn personnel. Very little testimony was presented at the hearing respecting unsworn personnel. ENTERED this 5th day of January, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. G. STEVEN PFEIFFER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675
The Issue The issues for determination are: Whether Respondent violated section 112.3135, Florida Statutes,1/ by voting on the appointment and/or advocating for the appointment of her relative to a position within her agency and/or her agency voting to appoint and/or advance her relative and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty? Whether Respondent violated section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, by using her position to appoint her relative to the position of City of Midway Mayor Pro Tem and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty? Whether Respondent violated section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, by using a City of Midway-owned vehicle and/or City of Midway-issued gasoline credit card for personal use and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty? Whether Respondent violated section 112.3148(8), Florida Statutes, by failing to report the gift of the personal use of the City of Midway-owned vehicle and/or the City of Midway-issued gasoline credit card and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty?
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent served as a member of the Midway City Council (City Council). She was initially appointed to the City Council in 2000 and served until 2003. She was subsequently elected to the City Council in 2015 and served until May of 2019. Respondent became the Mayor of the City of Midway in May of 2017. As a member and/or mayor of the City Council, Respondent is subject to article II, section 8, Florida Constitution, and the requirements of part III, chapter 112, Florida Statutes, Code of Ethics. In January 2018, Respondent attended and received ethics training from the Florida League of Cities. That training included information on and examples of nepotism, misuse of position, and the receipt and disclosure of gifts. It also included information about the Commission issuing advisory opinions and how to contact the Commission. Nepotism Allegation The form of government the City of Midway (the City) provided under its Charter is the "Council-Manager Government,” under which all powers of the City are vested in an elected council. The City Council consists of five citizens who are residents of the City and electors eligible to vote in the City elections. From its members, the City Council elects a Mayor and Mayor Pro-Tem. The election of the Mayor and Mayor Pro-Tem occurs at the first regular council meeting after the City election. According to the Midway City Charter, the Mayor presides at all meetings of the City Council and performs other duties consistent with the office as imposed or designated by the City Council. The Mayor has a voice and vote in the proceedings of the City Council. The Mayor is referred to as Mayor-Councilmember in the execution of any legal instruments or writing or when functioning to meet other duties arising from the general laws of Florida or from the City Charter. The Mayor is recognized as the head of City government for all ceremonial purposes, for service of process, execution of contracts, deeds and other documents. The Mayor may take command of the police and govern the City by proclamation during the times of grave public danger or emergency and the Mayor has the power during such times to appoint additional temporary officers and patrolmen. The power and duties of the Mayor-Councilmember are such as they are conferred upon him/her by the Midway City Charter and no other. The Midway City Charter provides that the Mayor shall: “(a) See that all laws, provisions of this charter, and acts of the council, subject to his/her direction and supervision are faithfully executed; (b) Submit the annual budget message; (c) Summon the appropriate law enforcement officers to suppress civil disturbances and to keep law and other during times of emergency; (d) Make such other reports as the council may require concerning the operations of city departments, offices, and agencies subject to his/her direction in time of emergency; (e) Attend, preside, and vote at all council meetings; (f) Sign contracts on behalf of the city pursuant to the provisions of applicable ordinances; (g) Be recognized as the city official designated to represent the city in all agreements with other governmental entities or certifications to other governmental entities as approved by the vote of the city council; (h) Annually prepare a state of the city message, set forth the agenda for all meetings of the council, name committees of the council, make recommendations of members for city boards to the city council; (i) Perform such other duties as specified in this charter or may be required by council.” The population of the City is less than 4,000 residents. The City Council has land use and/or zoning responsibilities. In April 2016, there was a vacancy on the City Council caused by a Councilmember departing prior to the end of that Councilmember’s term. Respondent’s first cousin, Sam Stevens, wanted to be appointed to the City Council to fill the vacant seat. Prior to any action on the matter, Respondent telephoned Commission legal staff member, Grayden Schafer, Esquire, and inquired whether she would be in violation of the anti-nepotism statute if the Council appointed her first cousin to serve the unexpired remainder of a departing Councilmember's term. Following his telephone conversation with Respondent, on April 21, 2016, Attorney Schafer sent an e-mail to Respondent at rangewanda@yahoo.com, summarizing Respondent’s inquiry and the advice he provided. The last page of that e-mail (Schafer’s E-mail) states: a public official can be held in violation of the anti-nepotism provision if the appointment is made by the collegial body on which she serves, even if she did not participate in the appointment. Given the foregoing, it appears that you can be held in violation of the anti-nepotism statute not only if you directly participate or advocate for your first cousin's appointment but also if the City Council decides on its own to appoint him, regardless of whether you vote or participate. According to Respondent, she did not receive the Schafer E-mail in 2016 and did not see it until after the filing of the complaints initiating this case against Respondent. Regardless of the timing of Respondent’s receipt of Schafer’s E-mail, the evidence is persuasive that the topic was discussed between Respondent and Attorney Schafer, and that, as a result of her telephone conversation with Attorney Schafer in April 2016, Respondent understood that, because of her kinship with Sam Stevens, she could not vote to appoint or advocate to appoint Sam Stevens to the City Council. She also was aware that, even if she recused herself from voting or participating in the discussion to appoint Sam Stevens to the City Council, if the City Council voted to appoint her first cousin to the vacant seat, she would be in violation of the anti-nepotism provision. After her conversation with Attorney Schafer, in April 2016, Respondent advised the City Council of her research and that she had contacted the Commission to inquire as to whether she could vote to appoint her cousin to the City Council. She explained that she could not and would have to resign if he was appointed, even if she did not participate in the vote. Sam Stevens was not appointed to fill the vacant City Council seat in 2016. The next year, Sam Stevens was elected to the City Council during the April 2017 municipal election. He was not elected or appointed by the City Council, but rather was elected by City citizens voting in the election. The following month, at its May 4, 2017, meeting, the City Council considered the issue of electing a Mayor and Mayor Pro-Tem as provided by the City Charter. At that meeting, Councilman Colston asked if it was legal for relatives to vote for each other. The minutes of the City Council for that date indicate that “Interim City Attorney Thomas explained he had heard the rumor and did research and it is legal.” Contrary to the City Council minutes, in his deposition testimony, City Attorney Thomas denied that he gave that advice, but rather explained that he opined that Respondent and Councilman Sam Stevens could serve together on the City Council, but could not promote or advocate for one another. Despite his denial, during his interview with the Commission’s investigator, City Attorney Thomas “recalled researching the matter and advising Respondent that it was not a voting conflict for her to vote to appoint her cousin to serve as mayor pro tem." Considering the conflicting evidence, it is found that the preponderance demonstrates that the City Attorney advised that it was not a voting conflict for relatives to vote for each other for Mayor and Mayor Pro-Tem. Respondent did not reveal her 2016 conversation with Attorney Schafer to the City Council on May 4, 2017, nor did she provide a copy of Schafer’s E-mail dated April 21, 2016, to either the City Council or the City Attorney prior to the City Council’s votes for Mayor and Mayor Pro-Tem. However, at the May 4, 2017, City Council meeting, a citizen confronted Respondent with a copy of Schafer’s E-mail, reading portions of Schafer’s E-mail aloud. Respondent testified that she did not acknowledge an ethical dilemma regarding Attorney Schafer’s opinion because she believed it addressed appointment as opposed to election, and her cousin had been elected a year later, not appointed. Schafer’s E-mail does not address the situation in which both Respondent and her first cousin are elected members of the City Council and whether Respondent can vote to elect him as the Mayor Pro-Tem in that context. At that meeting, Respondent nominated herself to serve as Mayor. Her nomination was seconded by Councilman Smith. Respondent was elected as Mayor when the City Council voted three to two for Respondent to serve as Mayor with Councilman Smith, Councilman Sam Stevens, and Respondent voting “yes,” and Councilman Ronald Colston and Councilwoman Carolyn Francis voting “no.” Respondent, as the Mayor, received an $800 stipend, which is $100 more than the other councilmembers. At that same May 4, 2016, meeting, Councilman Colston nominated Councilwoman Francis to serve as Mayor Pro-Tem. That nomination failed two to three, with Respondent, Councilman Smith, and Councilman Stevens voting “no.” Councilman Smith then nominated Councilman Stevens to serve as Mayor Pro-Tem. The City Council voted three to two for Councilman Stevens to serve as Mayor Pro-Tem with Respondent, Councilman Stevens, and Councilman Smith voting “yes,” and Councilman Ronald Colston and Councilwoman Carolyn Francis voting “no.” According to the City Charter, the Mayor Pro-Tem: “shall preside over the meetings of the council during the absence of the mayor- councilmember, and in general in the absence or the incapacity of the mayor- councilmember, he/she shall do [sic] perform those acts and things provided in this Chapter to be done by the mayor- councilmember. Nothing contained herein shall be construed as to preclude the member succeeding himself or herself as Mayor- Council member.” The City provides no additional compensation for a Councilmember serving as Mayor Pro-Tem. Vehicle Use and Gift Disclosure The City has two vehicles. One is a white Ford Taurus that has air conditioning (Vehicle). The other is a white Ford Taurus with a red stripe that does not have air conditioning. Respondent was given a 2002 MPV Mazda Van by her daughter, Temika Smith, on Mother’s Day in 2016. While serving as Mayor, Respondent had use of the Vehicle for personal use. Respondent began using the Vehicle in September or October 2017 following a hurricane and had access to the Vehicle until she stopped using it in May of 2019. During this time, the Vehicle was generally parked on property adjacent to Respondent’s residence. While Respondent had a set of keys to the Vehicle, there was another set of keys at the City Hall. In addition to Respondent’s access, other city employees or city council members could use the Vehicle. Former City Manager Steele used the Vehicle on occasion during the time that Respondent had access to the Vehicle. When former City Manager Steele wanted to use the Vehicle, she would pick it up from Respondent’s residence and return it to City Hall. Respondent used the Vehicle for a variety of City- related purposes. She used it to travel to Florida League of Cities’ conferences. In addition, she used the Vehicle to attend events in Midway, in Gadsden County, and in Tallahassee, including meetings with the City’s lobbyist and members of the Florida Legislature, as part of her duties and responsibilities as Mayor. Respondent was also observed driving the Vehicle to meetings at the City Hall. Respondent’s personal use of the Vehicle included, but was not limited to, traveling roundtrip between Midway and Tallahassee. She may have had her daughter in the Vehicle on two or three occasions, and on occasion, drove the Vehicle to her daughter’s house in Tallahassee. On one of the occasions when Respondent drove the Vehicle to her daughter’s house in Tallahassee, which occurred on March 15, 2018, Respondent had a run-in with a Midway resident who had followed Respondent to her daughter’s house. The Midway Resident took pictures of the Vehicle at Respondent’s daughter’s house and also the Mazda MPV van, which was without a license plate. On that occasion, Respondent had gone to check on the house because her daughter was out of town. At the final hearing, Respondent admitted that there was a time when the Mazda MPV was in the shop a lot, and, since she had access to the Vehicle, she turned in the Mazda’s tag to save on insurance payments. On another occasion in 2018, Respondent was stopped by a Gadsden County Deputy Sheriff in Midway after midnight for having a tag light out and the incorrect tag on the Vehicle. Respondent had been returning from Tallahassee. No citation was issued with respect to that stop. Other examples presented at the hearing illustrating Respondent’s use of the Vehicle included her transporting a child from Midway to Florida High in Tallahassee, taking a Midway resident from Midway to Tallahassee to drop him at his place of employment, and taking an individual to Liberty County to retrieve that person’s vehicle left when evacuating because of a hurricane. While providing such accommodations is not listed within Respondent’s responsibilities as Mayor or Councilmember, arguably, they served a public purpose. While Respondent had access and use of the Vehicle, the City did not have a vehicle-use policy. The evidence indicates that former City manager Ford also used a City-owned vehicle for personal use. Former City Manager Steele could not recall if any other city employees or city council members had used the Vehicle. Respondent testified that employees of the City’s public works department might also have used the Vehicle. City Councilman Ron Colston testified that he never used the Vehicle. At the May 3, 2018, Midway City Council meeting, Councilman Colston publicly requested that Respondent stop driving the Vehicle, stating that citizens had approached him with concerns about Respondent driving the Vehicle. Minutes of that City Council meeting indicate that Councilman Coston commented that he had received some calls from citizens concerned with Respondent driving the City-owned vehicle and suggested that she should park the Vehicle because of the number of complaints and that it is a liability. In response to that comment, City Attorney Thomas suggested that the City Council come up with some policy and procedures on the use of City vehicles. Respondent did not stop driving the Vehicle at the time of Councilman Colston’s request. By the end of October 2018, the Vehicle needed a tune-up and to have its brakes checked. In October 2018, Respondent started using a rental car when she got a job with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for debris monitoring. Respondent was not reimbursed by FEMA for the rental. In January 2019, Respondent purchased a new vehicle, a 2019 Mitsubishi G4 Mirage. At the time of the final hearing in this case, the City was in the process of developing a policy regarding the use of City vehicles and City Fuel Cards. Respondent did not report the use of the vehicle on her income taxes and did not file a gift disclosure to report her personal use of the City-owned vehicle as a gift. Fuel Card Use and Gift Disclosure Respondent used a City-issued Pilot Travel Center credit card for gasoline for the Vehicle. City-issued Pilot Travel Center credit card #007 (City Fuel Card) was assigned to the Vehicle. The City Fuel Card was the only one numbered #007 and it remained in the Vehicle. While some of the fuel purchases charged to the City Fuel Card were related to City business, Respondent acknowledged that fuel was also purchased using the City Fuel Card during her personal use of the Vehicle. Records of City Fuel Card #007 from November of 2017 through December of 2018 show the following charges: November 2017: -November 1, 2017– 623 Quincy FL- $33.67 -November 5, 2017- 425 Midway FL- $20.71 -November 5, 2017- 4556 Wildwood FL- $20.00 -November 8, 2017- 4556 Wildwood FL- $18.30 -November 9, 2017- 623 Quincy FL- $24.72 -November 13, 2017- 623 Quincy FL- $21.77 -November 13, 2017- 623 Quincy FL- $35.42 -November 20, 2017- 623 Quincy FL- $42.68 -November 20, 2017- 623 Quincy FL- $30.78 -November 27, 2017- 623 Quincy FL- $32.00 Respondent traveled on City business to and from Orlando, Florida, from November 5 through November 8, 2017. As to the multiple charges on November 13, 2017, and November 20, 2017, Respondent explained that she traveled on City business because “we were giving out turkeys during that time.” December 2017: -December 2, 2017– 623 Quincy FL- $30.91 -December 12, 2017– 623 Quincy FL- $34.06 -December 15, 2017– 425 Midway FL- $30.27 -December 22, 2017– 425 Midway FL- $27.03 January 2018: -January 9, 2018– 425 Midway FL- $33.82 -January 17, 2018– 425 Midway FL- $22.03 -January 18, 2018- 4556 Wildwood FL- $18.00 -January 21, 2018- 4556 Wildwood FL- $8.20 -January 22, 2018- 425 Midway FL- $15.50 -January 23, 2018- 425 Midway FL- $8.57 -January 24, 2018- 425 Midway FL- $10.01 -January 26, 2018- 425 Midway FL- $24.00 Respondent traveled on City business to and from Orlando, Florida, during the period from January 18 through 22, 2018. February 2018: -February 2, 2018– 425 Midway FL- $34.26 -February 15, 2018– 425 Midway FL- $32.00 -February 22, 2018– 425 Midway FL- $30.01 March 2018: -March 14, 2018- 425 Midway FL - $31.00 -March 28, 2018– 425 Midway FL - $32.07 April 2018: -April 7, 2018– 425 Midway FL - $25.00 -April 17, 2018– 425 Midway FL - $35.44 -April 28, 2018– 425 Midway FL - $7.52 66. May 2018: -May 14, 2018– 425 Midway FL - $37.01 -May 20, 2018– 425 Midway FL - $29.02 -May 26, 2018– 425 Midway FL - $41.00 67. June 2018: -June 1, 2018– 4556 Wildwood FL- $25.03 -June 2, 2018– 4556 Wildwood FL- $18.02 -June 4, 2018– 425 Midway FL- $20.00 -June 9, 2018– 425 Midway FL- $31.00 -June 15, 2018– 425 Midway FL- $28.04 -June 29, 2018– 425 Midway FL- $33.00 Respondent traveled on City business to and from Orlando, Florida during the period from May 31, 2018, through June 2, 2018. 68. July 2018: -July 18, 2018- 425 Midway FL- $35.06 August 2018: -August 3, 2018– 425 Midway FL- $21.08 -August 14, 2018- 622 St. Lucie FL- $20.01 -August 14, 2018- 091 Jacksonville- $24.00 -August 19, 2018- 624 Dade City FL- $27.02 -August 20, 2018- 425 Midway FL- $19.33 -August 24, 2018- 425 Midway FL- $33.01 Respondent traveled on City business to and from Hollywood, Florida during the period from August 14 through 18, 2018. September 2018: -September 4, 2018– 425 Midway FL- $37.00 -September 13, 2018– 425 Midway FL- $35.50 -September 29, 2018– 425 Midway FL- $36.01 October 2018: -October 10, 2018– 623 Quincy FL- $39.07 November 2018: -November 21, 2018– 623 Quincy FL- $33.07 December 2018: -December 5, 2018– 623 Quincy FL- $18.80 In addition to the fact that some of Respondent’s use of the City Fuel Card to put fuel in the Vehicle included her personal use of the Vehicle, Respondent used the City Fuel Card to purchase gasoline for the Vehicle when she was using the Vehicle for travel on City business, including travel to Florida League of Cities’ conferences in November of 2017, as well as while traveling on City business in and around Midway and Gadsden County, and to and from Tallahassee. Respondent also used the City Fuel Card to pay for gasoline while traveling on City business to attend Florida League of Cities’ conferences in a rental vehicle. These conferences occurred January 18 through 22, 2018; May 31 through June 2, 2018; and August 14 through 18, 2018. There was no evidence presented that Respondent used the City Fuel Card to purchase anything other than fuel for the Vehicle or fuel for a rental car while on business for the City. As the City Fuel Card was kept in the Vehicle, other City Council members or City employees would have had access to the City Fuel Card when they were driving the Vehicle. Respondent did not file a gift disclosure to report her use of the City Fuel Card to put gasoline in the Vehicle on those occasions when she used the Vehicle for personal use.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order and Public Report be entered finding that Respondent, Wanda Range, violated section 112.3135, Florida Statutes, and recommending the imposition of a nominal civil penalty of $1.00 for that violation, and further finding that Respondent Wanda Range did not violate sections 112.313(6), or 112.3148(8), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Order Finding Probable Cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of November, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of November, 2019.
