Findings Of Fact The stipulated facts are as follow: The Petitioners are purchasers of subleasehold interests in Ocean Club III, a condominium in Indian River County, Florida. All of the Petitioners purchased their subleasehold interests from Dye and Reeves Development Company in 1973, except the Petitioner Helen Bane, who purchased her subleasehold interest from the Petitioner Richard Long in 1974. The duration of the subleases was approximately 98 years, and they were paid for with present consideration consisting of cash and mortgages. The document included as Exhibit "A", entitled Unit Sublease, represents the conveyance by which each of the Petitioners acquired his or her subleasehold. No documentary stamp taxes or surtaxes were paid on these conveyances. Prior to closing with the Petitioners, the attorney for the Dye and Reeves Development Company requested William Stanley, Chief of the Documentary Stamp Tax Bureau, Department of Revenue, to give an opinion on whether the Unit Sublease, Exhibit "A", requires documentary stamp taxes and surtaxes. Stanley, in a letter dated July 3, 1973, stated his opinion to be that no documentary stamp taxes and surtaxes were due. A copy of this letter is attached as Exhibit "B." On November 13, 1974, the Attorney General released an official opinion, AGO 074-350, which reversed the position earlier taken by Stanley regarding taxability of conveyances of subleasehold interests. The Department of Revenue has adopted this ruling as its own. Based upon the letter from Stanley, the Dye and Reeves Development Company assured the Petitioners that no documentary stamp taxes or surtaxes would be required on the Unit Sublease. The Petitioners had knowledge of the letter or its contents at the time they closed the transaction, but at the time of closing nevertheless requested an Indemnification Agreement, Exhibit "C" herein, in which Dye and Reeves agreed to bear the cost of documentary stamp taxes due upon the Sublease. Exhibits "A," "B," and "C" represent all the relevant documents in this litigation. The Department of Revenue has issued Proposed Notices of Assessment against the Petitioners based upon an alleged documentary stamp tax and surtax liability under the Unit Sublease. The Department of Revenue has not assessed any penalties against the Petitioners. The Petitioners are unable to recover the sums alleged to be due as to taxes and surtaxes from the Dye and Reeves Development Company because the Company has no assets. Petitioners are also barred by limitations from recovering the money from the estate of Mr. Dye, who is deceased. The Petitioners and the Department of Revenue's Tax Examiner have held an informal conference, in which the two parties were unable to resolve their differences concerning the aforementioned assessment. If the Petitioners are found to be liable for documentary stamp taxes and surtaxes, the following amounts represent the proper computation of their liability: NAME TAX SURTAX TOTAL EDWARD K. HALSEY 106.50 10.45 116.95 HELEN C. BANE 117.60 43.45 161.05 W.B. WHITAKER, et ux. 165.00 16.50 181.50 JAMES N. SKINNER 115.50 11.55 127.05 MARY GLENNAN 98.40 36.30 134.70 JOHN F. McFEATTERS, et ux. 127.50 46.75 174.25 ALLEN TOUZALIN 121.50 14.85 136.35 RICHARD LONG, et ux. 117.60 11.00 128.60 HOWARD BAIN, et ux. 103.50 7.70 111.20 JOHN MYLES DEWAR, et ux. 126.00 46.20 172.20 JOHN S. STEPHENS, et ux. 99.00 7.70 106.70 PHYLLIS T. HERMAN 103.50 10.45 113.95 CHARLES W. CHRISS, et ux. 96.00 7.15 103.15 KATHRYN LOCKWOOD, et ux. 97.50 35.75 133.25 KATHRYN LOCOD, et ux. 163.50 59.95 233.45 KATHRYN LOCKWOOD, et ux. 100.50 36.85 137.35 The sums stated above do not include any interest which may have accrued on the alleged liability. Pursuant to stipulation of the parties, the testimony of Howard W. Bain, a Petitioner, was offered on behalf of all of the Petitioners in this case. He testified that he purchased a unit at Ocean Club III from Dye and Reeves Development Company in early June, 1973. Prior to the closing of that purchase, he was advised by his attorney that the latter expected to be provided by the developer's attorney a letter from the Department of Revenue that would state documentary stamps were not payable on the purchase of the condominium unit. Bain would not have closed the purchase if he had had to pay documentary stamp taxes on the transaction. It was his understanding that if any taxes did become due and payable they would be paid by the developer incident to the indemnification agreement. He was unaware at the time that Dye and Reeves Development Company might go out of business in the future. (Testimony of Bain).
Recommendation That Petitioners L.L. Lockwood and Kathryn H. Lockwood, his wife; Howard H. Bain and Mary C. Bain, his wife; Richard H. Long and J. Ann Long, his wife; Edward K. Halsey; Mary Glennan; W.B. Whitaker; Allen Touzalin; and John F. McFeatters and Emily J. McFeatters, his wife, be relieved from any liability from documentary stamp tax or surtax under Chapter 201, F.S. That Petitioners Helen C. Bane, James M. Skinner, John Myles Dewar, et ux., John S. Stephens, et ux., Phillis T. Herman, and Charles W. Chriss, et ux., be held liable for the payment of documentary stamp tax, surtax, and interest thereon, pursuant to Chapter 201, Florida Statutes, in the amounts set forth in the foregoing Findings of Fact. DONE and ORDERED this 9th day of December, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of December, 1976.
The Issue Whether Documentary Stamp Taxes pursuant to Section 201.08(1), Florida Statutes, are due on that part of a written obligation to pay money which purports to renew, extend, restate, modify and consolidate the borrower's pre- existing debt to the same lender, where another part of the written obligation to pay money makes a new or additional loan to the borrower.
Findings Of Fact On October 1, 1981, a "Consolidated and Restated Revolving Loan Agreement" ("Agreement") was executed by Flagship National Bank of Miami ("Bank" or the "lender"), Petitioner (or the borrower), and Alberto Vadia and Rosario Vadia (the guarantors). The Documentary Stamp Tax consequences of this Agreement (and the obligation to pay money which it evidences) are what is at issue here. By this Agreement, the Bank extended a loan, which Petitioner promised to repay, in the principal amount of $1,900,000.00, of which $818,624.69 remained outstanding under previous loans which the Bank had extended to Petitioner under 1971, 1975, and 1978 loan agreements. The balance of the loan -$1,081,375.31 - was a new or additional loan. The Agreement, in pertinent part, provides: Bank, Borrower and Guarantors desire to enter into this Consolidated and Restated Revolving Loan Agreement and the various documents and instruments incorporated herein by reference to increase the maximum principal amount of the loan to One Million Nine Hundred Thousand Dollars ($1,900,000) and extend the term thereof, secured and guaranteed in the same manner as the prior loans and to consolidate into one document the 1971 Agreement, the 1975 Agreement and the 1978 Agreement. This Consolidated and Restated Revolving Loan Agreement and the documents and instruments incorporated herein by reference constitute a complete restatement, modification, amendment and consolidation of the prior agreements to reflect the parties present intentions and agreements regarding such existing debt and the readvance of a previously amortized portion thereof back to Borrower, and not a novation or substitution of a new debt or obligation for an existing debt or obligation. * * * Such advances as Bank shall elect to make pursuant to the credit facility herein agreed to (and all unpaid sums remaining from the 1971, 1975 and 1978 Agreements which indebtedness shall be represented and renewed by such Note) shall be evidenced by a Consolidated Master Revolving Credit Note in the form attached hereto as Exhibit "C," pursuant to which Borrower promises to pay Bank the sums set forth therein together with interest thereon in accordance with the repayment schedule set forth therein, all as more fully set forth therein, the provisions of which Note are incorporated herein by reference. (e.s.) Documentary Stamp Tax in the amount of $1,622.10 has been paid on that portion of the Agreement representing a new loan or advance. (This represents tax at a rate of $.15 per hundred dollars on $1,081,375.31.) Documentary Stamp Tax has not been paid on that portion of the Agreement which restated, renewed, modified, and consolidated the existing debt or outstanding loan balance of $818,624.69 from the previous 1971, 1975 and 1978 loan agreements. The Department claims Petitioner is obligated to pay Documentary Stamp Taxes in the amount of $1,227.90 (at the rate of $.15 per $100 of amount loaned), plus penalty and interest, on the amount of the outstanding loan balance of $818,624.69 from the 1971, 1975 and 1978 agreements. Petitioner claims that the Documentary Stamp Tax does not apply to the outstanding loan balances carried forward from the three prior agreements or notes. (Petitioner, however, no longer maintains that it is entitled to a refund of Documentary Stamp and Intangible Tax previously paid, as alleged in its initial request for hearing.)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department enter a final order assessing Documentary Stamp Tax in the amount of $1,227.90, plus penalties and interest authorized by statute. DONE and ENTERED this 14th day of March, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of March, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Francis Marion Pohlig, Esquire 2121 Ponce de Leon Boulevard Suite 240 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 Linda S. P. Lettera, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs Tax Section, Capitol Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
The Issue Whether American National can litigate its entitlement to a documentary stamp tax refund pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes (1987)? If so, whether American National is entitled to a refund of some or all of the $5,475 it paid in recording the first modification and consolidation of notes, mortgages and assignment of leases and rents executed by American National and General Electric Credit Corporation (GECC) on July 11, 1986?
Findings Of Fact Real estate in Escambia County which petitioner American National now holds as trustee (the property) once belonged to U.S.I.F. Pensacola Corporation (USIFP). On September 1, 1969, USIFP gave Town and Country Plaza, Inc. (T & P) a note for $1,500,000 and executed a mortgage on the property in favor of T & P as security for payment of the note. A separate $300,000 note was promptly repaid. On July 5, 1973, U.S.I.F Wynnewood Corporation (USIFW), USIFP's successor in title, gave U.S.I.F. Oklahoma Corporation (USIFO) a note for $625,000, and executed a mortgage on the property in favor of USIFO as security for payment of its note. On July 8, 1982, shortly after Trust No. 0008 acquired the property, Jacksonville National Bank, as trustee, gave First National Bank of Chicago (FNBC) two notes, each secured by a separate mortgage. One note was for $767,481.98, and the other was for $2,000,000. These two notes, along with the two notes originally given to T & P and USIFO, which were both subsequently assigned to FNBC, were the subject of the July 8, 1982, consolidation, modification and extension agreement. Documentary stamp tax owing on account of these notes (the consolidated notes) was eventually paid in its entirety. All four mortgages with which the property was encumbered when petitioner American National succeeded Jacksonville National as trustee were duly recorded, intangible tax having been fully paid upon recordation. In January of 1984, FNBC assigned the consolidated notes and the mortgages securing their payment to VPCO Properties, Inc., which itself assigned them later the same month to VPPI TCH, Inc. In July of 1986, GECC, the present holder of the consolidated notes acquired the notes and became the mortagee on the mortgages securing their payment. As of July 11, 1982, when American National, as trustee of Trust No. 0008, borrowed an additional $1,150,000 from GECC, the outstanding principal balance on the consolidated notes aggregated $3,650,000. On that date, GECC and American National, as trustee, executed the so- called first modification and consolidation of notes, mortgages and assignment of leases and rents, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, which recited the parties' understandings both with respect to the new borrowing and with regard to the existing indebtedness the consolidated notes reflected. In addition to signing Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, American National, as trustee, also executed and delivered to GECC a promissory note in the amount of $1,500,000. This note, which was not offered in evidence, has never been recorded, nor have documentary stamps ever been affixed to it. At GECC's insistence, American National paid a documentary stamp tax of $7,920 at the time Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 was recorded in Pensacola. Of this sum, $5,475 was paid on account of the indebtedness the consolidated notes evidenced; $1,725 was paid on account of the new borrowing; and $720 was paid because of the provisions in Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, contemplating an increase in the principal amount of indebtedness. Under the agreement certain interest payments can be deferred, not to exceed $480,000, any such deferments being added to principal. The agreement provides: Notwithstanding the foregoing, so long as Borrower is making all payments on this Note when due, without giving effect to grace periods or requirements of notice, if any, and is otherwise not in default, taking into account, applicable grace periods, if any, under the Mortgage and other Security Documents Borrower shall be entitled to defer payment, in any month, of interest in excess of interest computed at the "Applicable Base Percentage Rate" (hereinafter defined) so long as the total interest deferred under this paragraph ("Deferred Interest"), including any and all Deferred Interest which has been added to the principal balance hereof, as hereinafter provided, does not exceed the lesser of ten percent (10 percent) of the outstanding principal balance hereof, excluding any and all Deferred Interest which has been added to the principal balance hereof, or $480,000. Such Deferred Interest, including any and all Deferred Interest which has been added to the principal balance hereof, shall be due and payable when and to the extent that, in any subsequent month, the Contract Index Rate is less than the "Applicable Base Percentage Rate", with the balance of such Deferred Interest being payable as provided below or on the maturity hereof, whether by lapse of time, prepayment or acceleration. The "Applicable Base Percentage Rate" shall mean the following per annum rates of interest, computed as aforesaid, for the periods indicated: Applicable Base Period Percentage Rate Date of This Note June 30, 1987 10.0 percent July 1, 1987-June 30, 1988 10.5 percent July 1, 1988-June 30, 1989 11.0 percent July 1, 1989-June 30, 1990 11.5 percent July 1, 1990-Maturity Date (hereinafter defined) 12.0 percent Unless previously paid by Borrower, the outstanding balance of Deferred Interest not previously added to principal in accordance herewith, if any, shall be added to the principal balance hereof on the first day of each calendar quarter beginning with October 1, 1986, and shall accrue interest thereafter at the Contract Index Rate provided for principal, which interest shall be payable in the same manner as is applicable to interest on the original principal balance hereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Borrower may pay Deferred Interest at any time without penalty. Of the documentary stamp tax American National paid, $720 was on account of future advances that Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 was designed to secure, in the event GECC made them.
The Issue The issue in this unadopted-rule challenge is whether Respondent, in connection with the administration of the stamp tax, has formulated a statement of general applicability for allocating undifferentiated, lump-sum payments made in purchase- and-sale transactions involving joint real estate/personal property transfers; which meets the statutory definition of a rule but has not been adopted pursuant to the rulemaking procedure; and, as used by Respondent, has the effect of creating an entitlement to collect tax on 100% of the undifferentiated consideration.
Findings Of Fact On February 23, 2015, Petitioner 1701 Collins (Miami) Owner, LLC ("Taxpayer"), a Delaware limited liability company, entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement ("Agreement") to sell a going concern, namely a hotel and conference center doing business in Miami Beach, Florida, as the SLS Hotel South Beach (the "Hotel Business"), to 1701 Miami (Owner), LLC, a Florida limited liability company ("Purchaser"). Purchaser paid Taxpayer $125 million for the Hotel Business. The Hotel Business comprised two categories of property, i.e., real estate ("RE") and personal property ("PP"). The PP, in turn, consisted of two subcategories of property, tangible personal property ("TPP") and intangible personal property ("ITPP"). It is undisputed that the property transferred pursuant to the Agreement included RE, TPP, and ITPP. The sale closed on June 5, 2015, and a special warranty deed was recorded on June 8, 2015, which showed nominal consideration of $10. Pursuant to the Agreement, Taxpayer was responsible for remitting the documentary stamp tax and the discretionary surtax (collectively, "stamp tax"). Stamp tax is due on instruments transferring RE; the amount of the tax, payable per instrument recorded, is based upon the consideration paid for RE. Stamp tax is not assessed on consideration given in exchange for PP. The Agreement contains a provision obligating the parties to agree, before closing, upon a reasonable allocation of the lump-sum purchase price between the three types of property comprising the Hotel Business. For reasons unknown, this allocation, which was to be made "for federal, state and local tax purposes," never occurred. The failure of the parties to agree upon an allocation, if indeed they even attempted to negotiate this point, did not prevent the sale from occurring. Neither party declared the other to be in breach of the Agreement as a result of their nonallocation of the consideration. The upshot is that, as between Taxpayer and the Purchaser, the $125 million purchase price was treated as undifferentiated consideration for the whole enterprise. Taxpayer paid stamp tax in the amount of approximately $1.3 million based on the full $125 million of undifferentiated consideration. Taxpayer paid the correct amount of stamp tax if the entire consideration were given in exchange for the RE transferred to Purchaser pursuant the Agreement——if, in other words, the Purchaser paid nothing for the elements of the Hotel Business consisting of PP. On February 6, 2018, Taxpayer timely filed an Application for Refund with Respondent Department of Revenue (the "Department"), which is the agency responsible for the administration of the state's tax laws. Relying on a report dated February 1, 2018 (the "Deal Pricing Analysis" or "DPA"), which had been prepared for Taxpayer by Bernice T. Dowell of Cynsur, LLC, Taxpayer sought a refund in the amount of $495,013.05. As grounds therefor, Taxpayer stated that it had "paid Documentary Stamp Tax on personal property in addition to real property." Taxpayer's position, at the time of the refund application and throughout this proceeding, is that its stamp tax liability should be based, not on the total undifferentiated consideration of $125 million given in the exchange for the Hotel Business, but on $77.8 million, which, according to the DPA, is the "implied value" of——i.e., the pro-rata share of the lump-sum purchase price that may be fairly allocated exclusively to——the RE transferred pursuant to the Agreement. Taxpayer claims that, to the extent it paid stamp tax on the "implied values" (as determined in the DPA) of the TPP ($7 million) and ITPP ($40.2 million) included in the transfer of the Hotel Business, it mistakenly overpaid the tax.1/ On February 23, 2018, the Department issued a Notice of Intent to Make Refund Claim Changes, which informed Taxpayer that the Department planned to "change" the refund amount requested, from roughly $500 thousand, to $0——to deny the refund, in other words. In explanation for this proposed decision, the Department wrote: "[The DPA] was produced 3 years after the [special warranty deed] was recorded. Please provide supporting information regarding allocation of purchase price on or around the time of the sale." This was followed, on April 2, 2018, by the Department's issuance of a Notice of Proposed Refund Denial, whose title tells its purpose. The grounds were the same as before: "[The DPA] was produced 3 years after the document was recorded." Taxpayer timely filed a protest to challenge the proposed refund denial, on May 31, 2018. Taxpayer argued that the $125 million consideration, which Purchaser paid for the Hotel Business operation, necessarily bought the RE, TPP, and ITPP constituting the going concern; and, therefore, because stamp tax is due only on the consideration exchanged for RE, and because there is no requirement under Florida law that the undifferentiated consideration exchanged for a going concern be allocated, at any specific time, to the categories or subcategories of property transferred in the sale, Taxpayer, having paid stamp tax on consideration given for TPP and ITPP, is owed a refund. The Department's tax conferee determined that the proposed denial of Taxpayer's refund request should be upheld because, as he explained in a memorandum prepared on or around December 27, 2018, "[t]he taxpayer [had failed to] establish that an allocation of consideration between Florida real property, tangible personal property, and intangible property was made prior to the transfer of the property such that tax would be based only on the consideration allocated to the real property." The Department issued its Notice of Decision of Refund Denial on January 9, 2019. In the "Law & Discussion" section of the decision, the Department wrote: When real and personal property are sold together, and there is no itemization of the personal property, then the sales price is deemed to be the consideration paid for the real property. [2] Likewise, when the personal property is itemized, then only the amount of the sales price allocated for the real property is consideration for the real property and subject to the documentary stamp tax. The first of these propositions will be referred to as the "Default Allocation Presumption." The second will be called "Consensual-Allocation Deference." The Department cited no law in support of either principle. In its intended decision, the Department found, as a matter of fact, that Taxpayer and Purchaser had not "established an allocation between all properties prior to the transfer" of the Hotel Business. Thus, the Department concluded that Taxpayer was not entitled to Consensual-Allocation Deference, but rather was subject to the Default Allocation Presumption, pursuant to which the full undifferentiated consideration of $125 million would be "deemed to be the consideration paid for the" RE. Taxpayer timely requested an administrative hearing to determine its substantial interests with regard to the refund request that the Department proposes to deny. Taxpayer also filed a Petition to Determine Invalidity of Agency Statement, which was docketed under DOAH Case No. 19-3639RU (the "Rule Challenge"). In its section 120.56(4) petition, Taxpayer alleges that the Department has taken a position of disputed scope or effect ("PDSE"), which meets the definition of a "rule" under section 120.52(16) and has not been adopted pursuant to the rulemaking procedure prescribed in section 120.54. The Department's alleged PDSE, as described in Taxpayer's petition, is as follows: In the administration of documentary stamp tax and surtax, tax is due on the total consideration paid for real property, tangible property and intangible property, unless an allocation of consideration paid for each type of property sold has been made by the taxpayer on or before the date the transfer of the property or recording of the deed. If the alleged PDSE is an unadopted rule, as Taxpayer further alleges, then the Department is in violation of section 120.54(1)(a). The questions of whether the alleged agency PDSE exists, and, if so, whether the PDSE is an unadopted rule, are common to Taxpayer's separate actions under sections 120.57(1) and 120.56(4), respectively, because neither the Department nor the undersigned may "base agency action that determines the substantial interests of a party on an unadopted rule." § 120.57(1)(e)1., Fla. Stat. Accordingly, the Rule Challenge was consolidated with Taxpayer's refund claim for hearing. It is determined that the Department, in fact, has taken a PDSE, which is substantially the same as Taxpayer described it. The undersigned rephrases and refines the Department's PDSE, to conform to the evidence presented at hearing, as follows: In determining the amount stamp tax due on an instrument arising from the lump-sum purchase of assets comprising both RE and PP, then, absent an agreement by the contracting parties to apportion the consideration between the categories or subcategories of property conveyed, made not later than the date of recordation (the "Deadline"), it is conclusively presumed that 100% of the undifferentiated consideration paid for the RE and PP combined is attributable to the RE alone. According to the PDSE, the parties to a lump-sum purchase of different classes of property (a "Lump—Sum Mixed Sale" or "LSMS") possess the power to control the amount of stamp tax by agreeing upon a distribution of the consideration between RE and PP, or not, before the Deadline.2/ If they timely make such an agreement, then, in accordance with Consensual-Allocation Deference, which is absolute, the stamp tax will be based upon whatever amount the parties attribute to the RE. If they do not, then, under the Default Allocation Presumption, which is irrebuttable, the stamp tax will be based upon the undifferentiated consideration. The Department has not published a notice of rulemaking under section 120.54(3)(a) relating to the PDSE. Nor has the Department presented evidence or argument on the feasibility or practicability of adopting the PDSE as a de jure rule. It is determined as a matter of ultimate fact that the PDSE has the effect of law because the Department, if unchecked, intends consistently to follow, and to enforce compliance with, the PDSE. Because, in the Department's hands, the PDSE creates an entitlement to collect stamp taxes while adversely affecting taxpayers, it is an unadopted rule.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is liable for documentary stamp taxes and interest to the Respondent totaling $80,405.54, plus additional interest accruing from the date of the assessment, as reflected in the Notice of Proposed Assessment dated January 24, 2011.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order finding that Jorge Ramos does not owe documentary stamp taxes on the October 18, 2007, Warranty Deed and withdrawing the assessment in the amount of $80,405.54, plus interest at $11.89 per day from January 25, 2011. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of June, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JUNE C. McKINNEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of June 2012.
Findings Of Fact Stewart executed a mortgage note dated February 3, 1972 in the amount of $2,943,400 payable to City National Bank of Miami. This note was secured by a mortgage executed by Stewart as mortgagor to City National Bank of Miami as mortgagee of same date. This mortgage was recorded on February 8, 1972 at which time documentary stamp tax and intangible taxes were paid. The note was designated a mortgage note in the face amount of $2,943,400 and taxes paid were predicated on this sum. The mortgage provided, inter alia, in item 24 thereof: "That the funds to be advanced herein are to be used in the construction of certain improvements on the land herein described, in accordance with a building loan agreement between the mortgagor and the mortgagee dated February 8, 1972, which building loan agreement (except such part or parts thereof as may be inconsistent herewith) is incorporated herein by reference to the same extent and effect as if fully set forth and made a part of this mortgage; if the construction of the improvements to be made pursuant to said building loan agreement shall not be carried on with reasonable diligence, or shall be discontinued at any time for any reason other than strikes or lockouts, the mortgagee, after due notice to the mortgagor or any subsequent owner, is hereby invested with full and complete authority to enter upon said premises, employ watchmen to protect such improvement from depredation or injury, and to preserve and protect the personal property therein, and to continue any and all outstanding contracts for the erection and completion of said building or buildings, to make and enter into any contracts and obligation wherever necessary, either in its own name or in the name of the mortgagor, and to pay and discharge all debts, obligations, and liabilities incurred thereby. All such sums so advanced by the mortgagee (exclusive of advances of the principal of the indebtedness secured hereby) shall be added to the principal of the indebtedness secured hereby and shall be secured by this mortgage and shall be due and payable on demand with interest at the rate of the same rate as provided in the note secured hereby, but no such advances shall be insured unless same are specifically approved by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development acting by and through the Federal Housing Commissioner prior to the making thereof. The principal sum and other charges provided for herein shall, at the option of the mortgagee or holder of this mortgage and the note secured hereby, become due and payable on the failure of the mortgagor to keep and perform any of the covenants, conditions, and agreements of said building loan agreement. This covenant shall be terminated upon the completion of the improvements to the satisfaction of the mortgagee and the making of the final advance as provided in said building loan agreement;" Prior to the completion of the project for which the note and mortgage were executed and before the full amount stated in the note had been advanced Stewart went into receivership. No advances were made under the note and mortgage subsequent to December, 1974, and only $1,935,378 had been disbursed to Stewart prior to foreclosure. On March 17, 1976 Stewart requested a refund in the amount of $1512 for documentary stamp taxes and $2016 for intangible taxes paid on the difference between $2,943,400 and $1,935,378.29. By letters dated June 16 and 17, 1976, each of the refund requests was denied by the Comptroller on the ground advanced by Department of Revenue that the claims were barred as not being timely filed. Vanguard executed a note in the amount of $2,000,000 payable to the Chase Manhattan Bank secured by a building loan mortgage from Vanguard as mortgagor to Chase as mortgagee. This mortgage was recorded and documentary stamp taxes and intangible taxes were paid on April 19, 1973. Other than the amount of the note and the total advanced prior to Vanguard going into receivership, the basic facts were the same as in Stewart. At the time of the last payment in May, 1975 Vanguard had received $1,388,008 of the $2,000,000 evidenced by the note. Vanguard's application for refund of $1224 for intangible taxes paid was denied by the Comptroller for the same reason Stewarts was denied. Here the application dated April 19, 1976 was postmarked in Miami on April 20, 1976 and received by Respondent on April 22, 1976. Worthington executed a building loan note dated October 25, 1972 in the amount of $2,750,000 payable to Trustees of C. I. Mortgage Group which was secured by a mortgage loan of same date. Worthington also went into receivership in December, 1974 after $1,962,750 had been advanced. Application for refund of documentary stamp taxes in the amount of $1180.80 and intangible taxes in the amount of $1574.50 filed March 17, 1976 was denied by the Comptroller on the grounds that the application was not timely filed. All of the above loans, for which the mortgages were recorded, were construction loans and provided for periodic payments to the mortgagor as the construction progressed. Provided the mortgagor complied with the terms of the building agreement the mortgagee was legally required to advance funds when due. In determining valuation for the purpose of computing the intangible taxes due clerks of the circuit court follow 199.122(7) F.S. which provides that obligations for payment of money secured by a mortgage shall be valued at the principal amount of indebtedness evidenced by such transactions. Accordingly in the cases at hand the clerks would have refused to record the mortgages unless the intangible taxes and documentary stamp taxes computed using the principal amount of the obligation were paid. An application for refund of the intangible tax representing the difference between the face amount of the mortgage to secure future advances, and the amount advanced, will be disapproved by the Department of Revenue so long as advances on the face amount of the loan are still being made.
Findings Of Fact Prior to the bankruptcy of Recreation Corporation of America (RCA), Drexel Properties (Drexel), predecessor in interest to Petitioner Sheridan Ventures, Inc., engaged in negotiations with RCA and Fidelco Growth Investors (Fidelco) for the purchase of some eighty-three acres of land owned by RCA that was located in Hollywood and Dania, Florida. Fidelco held a mortgage on the property in the amount of $2,400,000.00. On January 20, 1976, a bankruptcy judge in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida issued an amended order in Case No. 75-16-BK-JE-H, authorizing the trustee in bankruptcy of the estate of RCA, bankrupt, to accept the offer of Drexel to purchase the trustee's equity in the real property of the bankrupt for the sum of $15,000.00, subject to the first lien of Fidelco, taxes, interest, certain costs, and two subordinate liens in the amounts of $5,939.92 and $2,691.50. On January 28, 1976, the trustee executed a Bankruptcy Trustee's Deed conveying the property in question to Petitioner, subject to the Fidelco lien and taxes. Petitioner recorded the aforesaid deed in Broward County on February 27, 1976, and state documentary tax stamps in the amount of $45.00 were paid. (Testimony of Mehallis, Exhibits 1-2, Exhibit D to Petition) Respondent issued a proposed notice of assessment of documentary stamp tax, penalty, and interest in the total amount of $14,807.52 on September 7, 1976, based on a taxable consideration of $2,415,000.00. This sum represented the $15,000.00 cash paid by Petitioner and the $2,400,000.00 existing mortgage on the property. In this assessment, Petitioner was credited with the $45.00 previously paid for documentary tax stamps. An informal conference was held on September 21, 1976, after which a revised assessment in an increased amount was withdrawn when both parties agreed that the subordinate liens had been satisfied out of the $15,000.00 cash given for the deed. Subsequently, Respondent issued Revised Assessment No. 2, dated September 22, 1976, reflecting a sum due of $7,653.30 payable for documentary stamp tax, a like sum as a penalty, and interest for six months and five days in the amount of $471.83, for a total of $15,778.43. It was stipulated by the parties at the hearing that this amount is correctly computed and is the proper amount payable if the Petitioner is deemed liable therefor. (Exhibits A, C, E to Petition, Exhibit 3) At the time Petitioner purchased the trustee's interest in the property, it had no intention of paying Fidelco's full lien because the amount of that mortgage exceeded the fair market value of the land. It intended to use the trustee's deed as a negotiating tool to get a better arrangement with Fidelco. Consequently, it made no payments on the mortgage and, on April 7, 1976, Fidelco filed foreclosure proceedings in the Broward County Circuit Court. Petitioner interposed set-off and a counter claim in an amount exceeding $500,000.00 based on funds it had previously advanced to RCA under a prior contract. (Testimony of Mehallis) A real estate appraisal of the property established its fair market value to be $1,120,000.00 as of January, 1976. (Testimony of Lukacs)
Recommendation That Petitioner be held liable for the proposed assessment of documentary stamp tax, penalty, and interest under Chapter 201, Florida Statutes, in the amount of $15,778.43. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of April 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 COPIES FURNISHED: Edwin J. Stacker, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Brian C. Deuschle, Esquire Spear, Deuschle and Curran, P.A. 5554 North Federal Highway Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33308
Findings Of Fact On February 16, 1979, I-B-A, Inc., a Florida corporation, executed a Declaration of Trust pursuant to Section 689.071, Florida Statutes (1977), designating I-B-A, Inc., as Beneficiary and Lewis H. Harmon as Trustee. The trust agreement defined and declared the interest of the Beneficiary to be personal property only. Pursuant to the terms of the trust agreement I-B-A, Inc., conveyed legal title to the real property described in the Declaration of Trust to the Trustee by Warranty Deed. I-B-A, Inc., assigned its beneficial interest to One Biscayne Tower, N.V. Following the assignment, the Trustee, upon direction of the Beneficiary, conveyed legal title to the property to One Biscayne Tower, N.V. by Special Warranty Deed. These documents were all executed on February 16, 1979, and only minimal documentary stamps were placed on the Warranty Deed and the Special Warranty Deed. The consideration paid for the assignment of the beneficial interest from I-B-A, Inc., to One Biscayne Tower, N.V. was $49,101,000. On June 27, 1978, attorneys for taxpayer requested a private ruling from DOR respecting the documentary stamp taxes due on conveyances transferring real property through a Florida land trust established pursuant to Section 689.071, Florida Statutes. By letter dated July 10, 1978, DOR responded to this inquiry by opining that if the necessary documentation exists to comply with the statute the two recorded conveyances would require only minimal documentary tax stamps. One or more articles and/or editorials appeared in Miami newspapers following the February 16, 1979, transaction above discussed pointing out that some $200,000 in documentary stamp taxes had not been collected by the State on the transfer of a large downtown office building from one owner to another. On November 8, 1979, taxpayer received a Notice of Proposed Assessment under Chapter 201, Florida Statutes, in which DOR claimed $268,939.10 in taxes, penalties and interest due on the Special Warranty Deed by which the Trustee conveyed the trust property to One Biscayne Tower, N.V. Following an informal conference between Taxpayer's attorneys and DOR, DOR on June 18, 1980, issued a Revised Notice of Proposed Assessment under Chapter 201, Florida Statutes, in which DOR claimed $283,939.76 in taxes, penalties and interest, with interest accruing at the rate of $66.18 per day. In this assessment DOR claimed taxes were due on the Special Warranty Deed from Trustee to Taxpayer or, in the alternative, on the assignment of the beneficial interest under the trust from I-B-A, Inc., to One Biscayne Tower, N.V. Both the Warranty Deed from I-B-A, Inc., to the Trustee and the Special Warranty Deed from the Trustee to One Biscayne Tower, N.V. were recorded. The Trust Agreement was not recorded. DOR's basis for the assessment issued in this transaction was that no recorded instrument contained a provision declaring the interests of the beneficiaries under the Trust Agreement to be personal property-only. Following receipt of the Revised Assessment, the Trustee and One Biscayne Tower, N.V. filed suit in the Circuit court in and for Dade County seeking to reform the Warranty Deed from I-B-A, Inc., to the Trustee to include a provision specifically stating that the interest of the beneficiaries under the Trust Agreement was personal property only. I-B-A, Inc., was joined as a defendant. On 18 July 1980, the parties to this suit submitted a stipulation to the court that final judgment may be entered ex parte without delay, reforming the Warranty Deed ab initio in accordance with the Complaint. By Final Judgment entered 12 August 1980, Circuit Judge Dan Satin reformed this Warranty Deed ab initio to include the language in a recorded instrument specified in Section 689.071(4), Florida Statutes. The purpose of the parties in setting up a Florida land trust through which to transfer the property was to avoid the payment of documentary stamp taxes and surtaxes on the $49,101,000 purchase price which a bankruptcy court had approved for the sale of this asset. Accordingly, the reformation of the Warranty Deed was to comply with the intent of the parties at the time the Warranty Deed was executed and delivered.
The Issue Whether the petitioners are entitled to a refund of the documentary stamp taxes paid on a Special Warranty Deed conveying real property from the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation to one of the petitioners.
Findings Of Fact Based on the facts alleged in the petition for administrative hearing, the responses to requests for admission, and the facts stipulated to at the hearing on the motion for recommended summary final order, the following findings of fact are made: On September 27, 1994, Freddie Mac conveyed to Abe Saada by a Special Warranty Deed real property located in Dade County, Florida. Regina Saada is not a party to the Special Warranty Deed. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development Settlement Statement prepared for the closing on the property showed that $9,600.00 in "state tax/stamps" was owed on the deed, of which $4,800.00 was to be paid from the funds of the seller, Freddie Mac, and $4,800.00 was to be paid from the funds of the borrower, Abe Saada. Pursuant to its agreement with Mr. Saada, Freddie Mac paid $9,600.00 to the Clerk of Court as the documentary stamp tax on the deed on or about September 28, 1994. The deed was recorded in the Dade County Official Records at Book 16525 at pages 3583-3585. Abraham Saada is not exempt from the documentary stamp tax.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a Final Order dismissing the Petition for Chapter 120 Administrative Hearing to Contest Denial of Stamp Tax Refund filed by Abraham Saada and Regina Saada. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of May, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of May, 1997.