The Issue Whether or not Respondent's, Ondraus Redding, employment with Petitioner, Seminole County School Board, should be terminated or otherwise disciplined for misconduct in office or conduct unbecoming an employee of the School Board.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following findings of facts are made: Petitioner is the governing board of the School District of Seminole County, Florida. Paul J. Hagerty is the Superintendent of Public Schools for the School District of Seminole County, Florida, and the executive officer of Petitioner. Respondent, Ondraus Redding, is employed by Petitioner as a laborer in the grounds maintenance department. His employment is subject to the collective bargaining agreement titled "Official Agreement Between the Non-instructional Personnel of the Seminole County Board of Public Instruction Association, Inc. and the School Board of Seminole County, Sanford, Florida." At all times material to this action, Petitioner has had in force a Drug-Free Work Place Program as authorized under Section 440.102, Florida Statutes. Petitioner maintains that it has also had a policy and practice of "zero tolerance" for possession and use of controlled substances. This policy is published, and is specific in its terms. The policy prohibits possession of marijuana before, during, or after school hours at school or in any school district location. (emphasis added) At 1:40 a.m., July 3, 2002, Respondent was stopped in a routine traffic stop by an officer of the Lake Mary, Florida, Police Department. This traffic stop occurred on Lake Mary Boulevard; no suggestion is made that this location is "at school or in any other school district location." During the traffic stop, the officer observed a baggie of green, leafy substance on the console of the automobile driven by Respondent. Respondent acknowledged ownership of the baggie of green, leafy substance. Field testing and, later, laboratory testing, confirmed that the baggie contained marijuana. Respondent was charged with violation of Subsection 893.13(6)(b), Florida Statutes, possession of less than 20 grams of cannabis (marijuana), which is a first degree misdemeanor. On July 22, 2002, Respondent was arraigned in Seminole County Court; at the arraignment, he pled nolo contendere to the charge. The Court accepted the plea, withheld adjudication of guilt, and fined Respondent. As a laborer in Petitioner's maintenance department, Respondent is an "educational support employee," as defined in Section 231.3605, Florida Statutes (2001). No evidence was presented to suggest that Respondent had not successfully completed a probationary period, and, as a result of language in Subsection 231.3605(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2001), Respondent could only be terminated for reasons stated in the collective bargaining agreement. The collective bargaining agreement, DISCIPLINE AND TERMINATION, reads as follows: Section 5. Regular employees who have been hired for a minimum of three (3) continuous years (without a break in service) shall not be disciplined (which shall include reprimands), suspended or terminated except for just cause. * * * C. An employee may be suspended without pay or discharged for reasons, including, but not limited to, the following providing just cause is present: [twelve reasons are listed, only three of which may have application to this case] 1. Violation of School Board Policy * * * 4. While on duty, the possession and/or the use of intoxicating beverages or controlled substances after reporting for work and until after the employee leaves the work site after the equipment, if applicable, has been checked in * * * 7. An act committed while off duty, which because of its publication through the media or otherwise adversely affects the employee's performance or duties, or disrupts the operations of the District, its schools or other work/costs centers . . . . No evidence was offered to suggest that subparagraphs and 7. of Section 5. of the collective bargaining agreement are applicable to this case. Nor was any evidence offered to prove that Respondent was guilty of "misconduct in office and conduct unbecoming an employee of the School Board" other than his plea to the violation of Subsection 893.13(6)(b), Florida Statutes, possession of less than 20 grams of cannabis (marijuana).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Seminole County School Board enter a final order rejecting the recommendation for termination of Ondraus Redding, removing him from suspension, and restoring back pay. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of October, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of October, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Ned N. Julian, Jr., Esquire Seminole County School Board 400 East Lake Mary Boulevard Sanford, Florida 32773-7127 Ondraus Redding 342 South Wymore Road Apartment 101 Altamonte Springs, Florida 32714 Daniel J. Woodring, General Counsel Department of Education 325 West Gaines Street, Room 1244 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Dr. Paul J. Hagerty, Superintendent Seminole County School Board 400 East Lake Mary Boulevard Sanford, Florida 32773-7127
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the Pinellas County School Board may terminate the employment of Minnie L. Moody as a school bus driver.
Findings Of Fact Since 1996, Petitioner has employed Respondent, initially in the Food Services Department and then as a "Plant Operator." Beginning on January 3, 2001, Respondent began working for Petitioner in the Transportation Department as a school bus driver. Respondent is represented by a collective bargaining unit of the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) with whom Petitioner has entered into an agreement. Petitioner has adopted minimum qualifications an applicant must meet to become employed as a school bus driver. Although the job description has changed over a period of years, at all times material to this case Petitioner's minimum qualifications for employment as a school bus driver required as follows: "graduation from high school, possession of GED, or must obtain a GED within one year of being hired." A "GED" is a "general equivalency diploma" which can be earned by persons completing a prescribed course of study and passing a standard examination. The GED is generally regarded as the equivalent of a high school diploma. At the time Respondent began her employment as a school bus driver, she did not meet the minimum qualifications because she had not graduated from high school, did not possess a GED, and was not within one year of obtaining a GED. Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement between Petitioner and SEIU, a person not meeting the minimum requirements for employment may work in a position as an "intern" for a period of one year with a salary reduction of ten percent below the applicable minimum. An employee seeking employment as an intern enters into an "internship agreement" with Petitioner. The purpose of the internship mechanism is apparently to permit the employee an opportunity to complete certain job-related requirements within the first year of the employment. In January 2001, Respondent executed a one-year internship agreement with Petitioner. The agreement provided as follows: Internships are limited to one (1) year, however; [sic] in some circumstances, the Director of Personnel Relations, or designee, may grant an extension on a case- by-case basis. In June 2001, Respondent entered into an adult education course to prepare for enrollment in a GED program. Towards the end of 2001, Respondent sought and received an internship extension of three months. Because Respondent was attending educational classes, the request was approved, and Respondent continued bus driving through the end of the 2001-02 school year. In the summer of 2002, Respondent was enrolled in basic adult education classes. In August 2002, Respondent sought an additional internship extension. The request was approved, and Respondent drove a school bus for the 2002-03 school year. In February 2004, Respondent was again enrolled in basic adult education classes, and sought an additional internship extension. The request was again approved, and Respondent drove a school bus for the remainder of the 2003-04 school year. Respondent suffered a family tragedy in April 2004 when her son passed away after a long illness. By letter dated July 30, 2004, Petitioner advised Respondent that her internship would expire on August 21, 2004, and that she needed to complete the GED requirement prior to that date. The letter also provided several options to pursue, including other employment prospects with Petitioner, if the GED was not obtained by the expiration of the agreement. The internship agreement between Petitioner and Respondent expired on August 21, 2004, without Respondent's obtaining the GED. By letter dated September 3, 2004, Petitioner advised Respondent that her employment was suspended for failing to meet the minimum qualifications of the position for which she was employed. Because Respondent's progress toward obtaining the GED has been minimal, Petitioner determined that the internship agreement would not again be extended. Petitioner has no written policy regarding how many times an internship agreement can be extended. The witness testifying at the hearing indicated that in determining whether to grant an internship extension to Respondent, Petitioner considered Respondent's progress towards completion of the academic goals as well as personal factors, including the family illness. Since June 2001, Respondent has worked towards, but has not yet obtained, the GED. In order to obtain a GED a student must complete basic education classes prior to entering into the GED course of study. Respondent has worked to improve her reading ability so as to provide skills sufficient to support entry into the GED program, but her reading skill level has shown no marked improvement, and Respondent has not yet begun the actual GED course of study. There is no evidence that Respondent has not performed her duties as a school bus driver in an acceptable manner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order terminating Respondent's employment as a school bus driver. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of March, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of March, 2005.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is the governing body of the Jackson County School District, and maintains its office in Marianna, Jackson County, Florida., The Respondent is engaged in the business of operating a school system. The Respondent is a public employer. The JCEA is an employee organization. On or about June 16, 1975, the Public Employees Relations Commission, in Case No. 8H-RC-754-1084, certified the JCEA as the exclusive bargaining representative of certified instructional personnel who are employed halftime or more by the Respondent in specific job categories. After lengthy contract negotiations, which began in August of 1975, a collective bargaining agreement was executed by the School Board and the JCEA on February 2, 1976. A copy of the agreement was received in evidence as General Counsel's Exhibit 1. On February 12, 1976& the JCEA filed an unfair labor practice charge against the School Board with the Public Employees Relations Commission. On February 20, 1976, the JCEA filed written grievances pursuant to Article III of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. The matters raised in the grievances are substantially the same as those raised in the unfair labor practice charge. In accordance with the provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, implementation of the agreement was to be completed by February 16, 1976. During the period just prior to and just following February 16, the Respondent, through its agents, implemented numerous unilateral changes in policies. Prior to August, 1975, members of the collective bargaining unit at Marianna High School were not required to sign in at the beginning of the work day, or to sign out at the end of the work day. During August, 1976, new sign in and sign out procedures were implemented. The procedures applied only to members of the unit. On February 16, 1976, a time clock system was implemented at Marianna High. The system was implemented in accordance with "Memorandum #10", dated February 9, 1976. The memorandum was received in evidence as General Counsel's Exhibit 2. Members of the bargaining unit were required under the new policy to "clock in" on the time clock at the beginning of the work day, and to "clock out" at the completion of the work day. It was announced that failure to clock in and out would constitute grounds for dismissal. The principal at Marianna High School testified that the Collective Bargaining Agreement required more accurate time records, and that the time clock system was instituted in order that more accurate records could be kept. Article IV, Sections 4.2 and 4.3 of the Agreement were cited. Section 4.2 provides as follows: "The teacher's work day shall be seven (7) hours and fifty (50) minutes, during which each teacher shall be provided a duty-free lunch period on campus of not less than twenty-five (25) minutes. The principal of each school shall set the beginning and ending time of the work day. Teachers must have the prior approval of the principal or his designee before they leave school during working hours. Loss of time during the workday shall be covered by approved leave, loss of pay, or compensatory time." Section 4.3 provides as follows: "The principals may assign teachers extra duty which shall be restricted to supervising students on campus before and after school. The principal may also select from volunteers, teachers to supervise students at lunch. Compensatory time, equal to the extra duty time, shall be given teachers serving extra duty and lunch supervision, provided however, compensatory time shall not be given during the student day." Prior to the implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, employees within the bargaining unit were not paid extra duty time. The principal at Marianna High School testified that the precise delineation of the work day, and the entitlement to extra duty pay necessitated the more accurate record keeping. This explanation is inadequate. In the first place, in order to be entitled to extra duty compensation, the principal would have to assign the extra duty. The extra duties could include supervising students on campus before and after school, and during lunch. These sorts of extra duty are not such as would permit great variances in time. It is difficult to perceive why more accurate time keeping procedures were required. Indeed, as to extra duty during the lunch period, the time clock system would be of no assistance whatever. If more accurate time keeping was necessary at Marianna High School, it would have been just as necessary prior to implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Non-instructional employees of Marianna High School have not formed a collective bargaining unit. Any of these employees are compensated on an hourly basis, and are entitled to more or less compensation depending upon the hours they work. Accurate time records are as necessary for this group of employees as for employees within the bargaining unit; however, the time clock system applied only to employees within the bargaining unit. The time clock system was not the only new policy implemented at Marianna High School to coincide with implementation of the Collective bargaining Agreement. Teachers had been permitted prior to the adoption of the contract, to leave school early for doctors appointments, or to serve civic functions, without the necessity of taking any leave time. Subsequent to the adoption of the contract, if a teacher left more than ten minutes early, he or she would be required to take a minimum of one hour leave time. On or about February 16, 1976, teachers were instructed to stand outside of their classroom from 7:45 A.M. until 8:00 A.M. to supervise students coming into their classroom. Although teachers had previously been required to supervise students coming into their classroom, they were not required to stand outside of their classroom. Prior to implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement teachers were permitted to use the teacher's lounge for a planning period. As of February 16, teachers were not permitted to use the lounge for their planning period. The principal at Marianna High School testified that this was necessary in order that he would know where the teachers were since the planning period was to be used for parent consultations in accordance with the Collective Bargaining Agreement. The testimony clearly revealed, however, that the planning period had been used for parent conferences prior to the adoption of the contract. Insofar as limiting the locations for the planning period was necessary, it was as necessary prior to adoption of the contract as subsequent to it. During the course of negotiations, the principal at Marianna High School had expressed a hostile attitude toward the collective bargaining process. None of the new policies set out above were discussed during the course of the negotiations. Each of the new policies was more restrictive than had been the case prior to collective bargaining. The timing of implementation of the policies to coincide with implementation of the agreement, the fact that the policies applied only to personnel within the bargaining unit, the fact that a hostile attitude toward collective bargaining had been expressed, and the lack of any other reasonable explanation for the policies lead inescapably to the conclusion that the new policies were implemented in order to dramatize to members of the collective bargaining unit that resort to the bargaining process would result in more restrictive supervision by the employer. The new policies were implemented for the purpose of discouraging membership in the JCEA, and to interfere with the employees' rights to engage in the collective bargaining process. Similar new and restrictive policies were implemented by the Respondent's agents at Malone High School, and at Golson Elementary School. The new policies at these schools were adopted to coincide with implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, applied only to personnel within the unit, and were implemented in asetting of hostility toward the collective bargaining process. Like the new policies at Marianna High, the new policies at Malone and at Golson were adopted to discourage membership in JCEA, and to interfere with employees in the exercise of their rights to engage in the collective bargaining process. At Malone High. School teachers were no longer permitted to use the teacher's lounge for their planning period as they had been prior to implementation of the contract. Prior to implementation of the contract teachers were permitted to eat lunch in the cafeteria, in the teacher's lounge, or in their own classrooms. Subsequent to the agreement, they were permitted to eat lunch only in the cafeteria, or in the Home Economics classroom, which was not available during all lunch periods. Nothing in the contract in any way necessitated these new policies. One of the top priorities of JCEA in negotiating a collective bargaining agreement was a "duty free" lunch period. JCEA was successful in this respect. The agreement provides for a "duty free" lunch period. Subsequent to adoption of the agreement at a faculty meeting the principal at Malone strongly advised members of the unit to eat with their classes, and in this regard made statements which could only have been perceived as threats. He stated for example that it might be necessary to trade the best player to make a better team. At Golson Elementary School, a "sign-in, sign-out" system was initiated just prior to February 16, 1976. The principal told members of the bargaining unit that he had treated them as professionals", but that now there was a collective bargaining agreement. He required that they sign in at 7:45 A.M. and he frequently reminded the teachers over the intercom system during morning announcements that they should sign in. Prior to implementation of the contract, teachers at Golson Elementary were permitted to leave the school grounds as much as twenty minutes early in order to attend classes, civic functions, or doctors appointments, without the necessity for using leave time. After the contract it was necessary to use one hour leave time in order to leave ten minutes early. Prior to implementation of the contract teachers were permitted to eat lunch in the teacher's lounge or in their own classrooms. Subsequent to the contract they were no longer permitted to do that. Prior to certification of the JCEA as the exclusive bargaining agent of instructional employees of the School Board, the School Board utilized a "Calendar Committee" to assist it in promulgating a calendar for each school year. A representative would be chosen from each school, and the Committee would recommend a calendar for the school year. Among recommendations made by the Calendar Committee would be dates for holidays. During the course of negotiations leading to the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the School Board asserted that the calendar would prohibit negotiations respecting vacation days. The JCEA requested that a Calendar Committee not be utilized for the 1976-77 school year. The School Board nonetheless opted to utilize the Calendar Committee. At Marianna High School Betty Duffee, the chairman of the JCEA's negotiating team was nominated at a faculty meeting to serve on the Calendar Committee. The principal at Marianna High School discouraged the faculty from selecting Ms. Duffee because JCEA would be otherwise represented on the Committee. Use of the Calendar Committee was not designed to frustrate collective bargaining. A Calendar Committee had been utilized prior to certification of the JCEA by the Public Employees Relations Commission. Use of the Calendar Committee to make recommendations respecting mandatory subjects of collective bargaining, such as vacation days, would, however, at this juncture circumvent the exclusivity of JCEA's representation. The fact that the principal at Marianna High School discouraged selection of a JCEA representative to the Calendar Committee indicates an intention to utilize the Committee to make decisions respecting mandatory subjects of collective bargaining, such as vacation days, without the JCEA participating in negotiations. Mary Jo Morton is a teacher employed at Marianna High School. She is active in the JCEA, and this fact is known to the principal at Marianna High School. Shortly after implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement Ms. Morton was evaluated by her principal and received an unfavorable evaluation. It appears from the evidence that the evaluation was not conducted under the best circumstances. For example, Ms. Morton was criticized for not permitting sufficient classroom participation during one class while a test was being conducted. Insufficient evidence was offered, however, to establish that the unfavorable evaluations of Ms. Morton were motivated even in part by her participation in the JCEA.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, hereby RECOMMENDED that an order be entered as follows: Finding the School Board of Jackson County guilty of committing unfair labor practices by implementing restrictive policy changes at Marianna High School, Malone High School, and Golson Elementary School in such a manner as to discourage membership in the Jackson County Education Association, and interfere with its employees in the exercise of their rights to engage in the collective bargaining process. Finding the School Board of Jackson County guilty of committing an unfair labor practice by utilizing the Calendar Committee for the 1976-77 school year. Requiring that the School Board of Jackson County cease and desist from continued enforcement of the policy changes, and from continued utilization of a calendar committee. Directing that the School Board of Jackson County conspicuously post a notice that it has committed unfair labor practices, that it has been directed to cease and desist from such activities, and that it will cease and desist from such activities. RECOMMENDED this 12th day of January, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. G. STEVEN PFEIFFER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Austin F. Reed, Esquire Public Employees Relations Commission - Suite 300 2003 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard Frank, Esquire 341 Plant Avenue Tampa, Florida 33606 Joseph A. Sheffield, Esquire Post Office Box 854 Marianna, Florida 32446 John F. Dickinson, Esquire COFFMAN & JONES 2065 Herschel Street Post Office Box 40089 Jacksonville, Florida 32203
The Issue The issue in this case is when the 97-day probationary employment period began to run for each of the Respondents, and whether their employment could be terminated without just cause.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the School Board of Polk County, the entity responsible for operating, monitoring, staffing, and maintaining the public schools of Polk County. The Board hired both Respondents, Diane O'Brien and Marcee Gunn, to fill positions within the Polk County School System. Prior to the 2003-2004 school year, Federal requirements under the "No Child Left Behind" ("NCLB") program mandated that by the end of the 2005-2006 school year, all teachers in core academic areas must be "highly qualified" as defined by Federal guidelines. The guidelines state that a teacher must possess a combination of both appropriate certification and documentation of subject area knowledge. The determination of whether a teacher had the requisite knowledge was done by way of a battery of tests in the subject areas. At the time the NCLB program was instituted, Polk County was experiencing a high level of growth and was hiring approximately 1,200 new teachers each year. The shortage of teachers who had obtained the highly qualified status resulted in the Board hiring a class of teachers who were not highly qualified, but under certain restrictions. These teachers were deemed D-1 provisional substitute teachers. The D-1 teachers were hired with the intention of allowing them to be employed as substitutes, pending their passage of the subject area tests. D-1 teachers were first hired by the Board to fill positions in the 2002-2004 school year. D-1 teachers were paid a daily rate of pay and received insurance and retirement benefits. If the teacher ultimately became highly qualified, they were to be given seniority consideration retroactive to the date of their hire.1 As substitutes, D-1 teachers were "at will" employees and were not contract employees. Their employment could be terminated with or without cause at any time. All D-1 positions were terminated at the end of the school year for which they were hired. If a teacher had not obtained highly qualified status, they could be hired as a D-1 teacher for the next school year. The D-1 program was eliminated, in whole, at the end of the 2007-2008 school year. Diane O'Brien Respondent, Diane O'Brien, worked as a para-educator for 15 years before earning a degree in special education from Nova Southeastern University in 2006. O'Brien was hired by the Board to be a D-1 substitute teacher for handicapped students at Haines City High School for the 2007-2008 school year. At the time of her hire, O'Brien signed a Conditional Employment Agreement that refers to her as "Teacher." The agreement does, however, set forth certain requirements for becoming a regular teacher. O'Brien was assigned a full-time para-educator to assist her and was given a classroom for purposes of fulfilling her position. At all times during the school year, O'Brien acted as and considered herself to be the official teacher for the class. O'Brien was evaluated during the school year by the principal and the assistant principal. O'Brien attended the IEP meetings and was responsible for writing IEPs for her students. O'Brien was never referred to by staff or other teachers as a "substitute" teacher during that school year. Nonetheless, O'Brien signed a document entitled, "Guidelines for Provisional Substitute Teachers 2007-2008 School Year" when she was hired. The document clearly indicates the requirements for a regular teacher and states that until such requirements are met, the teacher is considered a provisional D-1 substitute. O'Brien does not specifically remember signing this particular document; she said she signed many documents when hired, and none of them were explained to her. O'Brien did not meet the requirements to be a regular teacher at that time. During the 2007-2008 school year, O'Brien was paid as a D-1 substitute teacher, i.e., $115 per day, plus benefits. As early as August 2007 (the month classes began), O'Brien contacted a Ms. Capoziello requesting that her salary be changed to full-time teacher salary. She was advised that she had not yet met the requirements for a full-time teacher, because she had not yet met the "Certified, Qualified and Highly Qualified" requirements set forth in the Guidelines for Provisional Substitute Teachers. In December 2007, O'Brien indicated in an email that she was working hard to pass the necessary tests, but had not yet done so. In January 2008, O'Brien contacted the human resource officer to inquire as to when her status would change. In response, she received the following explanation: Please refer to the individualized Guidelines for Provisional Substitute Teachers 2007-2008 School Year that you signed on August 8, 2007. During New Educator Orientation, you were provided with the requirements necessary to attain "highly qualified" status for your ESE assignment. You are fully certified in ESE, but according to federal legislation, you are not considered "highly qualified" as defined in the law, because you have not "demonstrated subject matter competence" to teach ESE academic subjects. [F]or your current assignment, you need to pass the Elementary Education K-6 subject area exam to be deemed "highly qualified." After you have completed this requirement that was provided to you on August 8, 2007, then you will be eligible to transfer to B1 status as a regular teacher. (Emphasis in original.) After the end of the 2007-2008 school year, O'Brien passed the subject area exam necessary to achieve "highly qualified" status. She was then hired in the 2008-2009 school year as a regular teacher by the Board. O'Brien commenced work under her first annual contract with the Board as a regular teacher on or about August 11, 2008. On November 11, 2008, a memorandum was issued to O'Brien by the Board entitled, "Dismissal of Instructional Employee During 97-Day Probationary Period." O'Brien signed the memorandum, acknowledging receipt. The memorandum identifies O'Brien as "an initial annual contract teacher." The effect of the memorandum was termination of O'Brien's employment by the Board. O'Brien maintains that her period of teaching during the 2007-2008 school year was as a regular teacher. If that is the case, then she could not be terminated within the 97-day probationary period without the establishment of just cause. Marcee Gunn Respondent, Marcee Gunn, received her education at the University of Missouri at St. Louis. Gunn received her Florida teaching certification and was, in August of 2007, a certified teacher. Gunn was hired by the Board as a pilot D-1 substitute teacher for the 2007-2008 school year. A pilot substitute teacher fills in for absent teachers at one particular school, rather than going to various schools. In February 2008, Gunn was transferred from a pilot substitute to a permanent position as a kindergarten teacher at the School. The previous teacher had moved to another position, and Gunn was asked to fill the position through the end of the current school year. The permanent position was also classified as D-1 substitute, because Gunn had not yet become highly qualified. Gunn acted as, and considered herself to be, the full-time kindergarten teacher. She organized the classroom, prepared all student assignments, issued a monthly newsletter, and attended IEP meetings. Gunn was evaluated in her position by the principal and assistant principal. While Gunn was a pilot D-1 substitute, she received pay of $115 per day, plus benefits. At the time she became the permanent kindergarten teacher she received the same pay, but believed she would be receiving regular teacher pay. However, upon taking the kindergarten teacher position, Gunn signed a document entitled, "Guidelines for Provisional Substitute Teachers 2007-2008 School Year." The document clearly indicates that Gunn was being hired as a D-1 substitute and sets forth the requirements for becoming a regular teacher, i.e., passing a test in the subject area to be taught. Gunn also acknowledges signing the document, but does not have any specific recollection of having seen it. She did know that the document required her to pass the K-12 subject area exam in order to be reclassified as a regular teacher. Gunn's position was terminated at the end of the 2007-2008 school year. Gunn was re-hired by the Board for the 2008-2009 school year as a regular teacher for the same kindergarten class. (The evidence is not clear whether Gunn was hired in 2008-2009 as a D-1 substitute or a highly qualified teacher. The fact is not relevant, however, because even if she was a regular teacher, she would have been in her first year of an annual contract.) On November 14, 2008, a memorandum was issued to Gunn by the Board entitled, "Dismissal of Instructional Employee During 97-Day Probationary Period." Gunn signed the memorandum, acknowledging receipt. The memorandum identifies Gunn as "an initial annual contract teacher." The effect of the memorandum was termination of Gunn's employment by the Board. Gunn maintains that her period of teaching during the 2007-2008 school year (or at least a part of it) was as a regular teacher. If that is the case, then she could not be terminated within the 97-day probationary period without the establishment of just cause. There is no dispute by Respondents that the dismissal memoranda were issued within 97 days of their commencement of work during the 2008-2009 school year. Rather, each Respondent contends that their full-time, contracted employment with the Board commenced earlier than the 2008-2009 school year.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Petitioner, Polk County School Board, terminating the employment of Respondents, Diane O'Brien and Marcee Gunn, effective as of the dates determined by the Board. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of November, 2009.
Conclusions Objections 3B, 3C and 3D involve factual questions which can only be resolved by an evaluation of the credibility of various witnesses. Consequently, pursuant to Fla. Admin. Code Rule 8H- 3.28, a hearing shall be held where the underlying facts can be determined prior to ruling on the merits of those objections and the remainder of CWA's Objections are dismissed. It is so ordered. LEONARD A. CARSON CHAIRMAN 77E-207 THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on April 21st, 1977, this document was filed in the office of the Public Employees Relations Commission at Tallahassee and a copy served on each party at its last known address by certified mail. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RELATIONS COMMISSION BY: Judy N. Collins Deputy Clerk
The Issue The issues in the case are whether or not the Respondent (1) during the course of an organizing campaign by the Union engaged in a course of conduct amounting to unlawful surveillance and/or creation of the impression of surveillance (2) whether or not Respondent unlawfully refused to bargain in good faith with the Union and (3) whether or not Respondent unlawfully refused to execute dues checkoff authorizations signed by its employees. By the alleged acts referred above, the Respondent allegedly engaged in unfair labor practices affecting the orderly and uninterrupted operations and functions of government within the meaning of Florida Statutes 447. As stated, these issues arise on a complaint issued October 16, by the acting general counsel of the Public Employees Relations Commission (hereinafter referred to as PERC), as amended at the trial after PERC's investigation of-the charges filed by the Union on various dates. The Respondent denied the commission of any unfair labor practices. At close of the testimony all parties waived oral argument. A brief has been received by counsel for the general counsel and has been carefully considered by me in preparation of this hearing officer's report and recommended order which was signed and released by me on March 17, 1976, for distribution to the parties in the usual course. Upon the entire record in the case, observation of witnesses on the stand, and considerations of arguments of counsel, I make the following:
Findings Of Fact Respondent's operation and the status of the Union. The Respondent is now and has been at all times material herein, a public employer within the meaning of Section 447.203(2) of the Act. The Union is an employee organization within the meaning of Section 447.203(2) of the Public Employees Relations Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The Union was certified by the Commission on April 22, order no. 75E-6-31 and the parties commenced bargaining on or about April 23, 1975, and notice of negotiations was forwarded to the Commission's office on or about May 5, 1975. By way of background, the case was originally noticed for hearing to commence on October 29 and 30, 1975, in the Escambia County Courthouse. The Respondent, on October 29, applied for and obtained a temporary restraining order which had the effect of commanding the Public Employees Relations Commission to refrain from conducting or attempting to conduct the hearing based on the charges alleged in the subject complaint and notice of hearing. On the following day, the School Board filed a non-suit which had the effect of resolving the temporary restraining order. Prior thereto and subsequent to the non-suit, the Respondent filed numerous motions for continuance and dismissal based on alleged procedural violations. The basis of the procedural deficiencies were that (1) PERC failed to advise the Respondent of its investigation prior to issuing complaint and therefore the complaint was improperly issued. Additionally, the Respondent alleged that it has filed charges of a similar nature against the Union and that PERC has failed to expedite investigation of said charges which according to Respondent, amounts to violations of bad faith bargaining by the Union also in violation of Florida Statutes 447. Accordingly, Respondent asked that continuance be granted and that a period somewhere in the nature of 30 days be allowed to consider the charges alleged. Respondent also filed motions to dismiss alleging inter alia, that the charges filed by the Charging Party are false and groundless and that representatives of the Charging Party and PERC's agents have colluded to effectuate violations of its rules and enabling statutes as set forth in the complaint. Based thereon states the Respondent, it has been deprived of its opportunity for investigation and defense of the matters asserted in the administrative charges and the complaint and therefore the complaint should be dismissed. Aside from the fact that the hearing officer is without the authority to grant motions to dismiss, looking to the motion to dismiss and the motion for continuance, no evidence other than the bare claims were made to substantiate all of the allegations contained in both the motion to dismiss and the motion for continuance. Accordingly they are tentatively denied by the undersigned and the motion to dismiss is referred to PERC for final ruling. Respondent's counsel also made a motion for continuance on the final day of the hearing and as grounds therefor alleged that he had been recently retained. Aside from the fact that the testimony revealed that the law firm had been retained to represent Respondent months prior to the instant hearing, Dr. Moses, Respondent's chief negotiator under- took to represent Respondent at the hearing. Additionally, the motion was denied as being untimely filed. THE REFUSAL TO DEDUCT DUES ISSUE Guy Price, Special Education Teacher for approximately 4- 1/2 years, testified that he is a union member and that he signed a dues deduction authorization form in 1971. 2/ Price testified that the Respondent has refused to deduct dues since on or about July. He testified that the Respondent caused to be circulated in October, a notice which indicated it would only deduct dues pursuant to authorizations on a lump sum basis for the yearly dues which, according to the testimony, amounted to $110.00. He testified that inasmuch as he could not afford the lump sum deduction, he canceled his authorization go or about October 6. He testified that he was aware personally of approximately 10 other employees who canceled their dues deduction authorization based on the fact that according to his testimony, they were unable to afford a lump sum deduction. He testified that the Respondent permits piece meal deductions of other organizational and benefit drives whereas it refused to do so in this case. On cross-examination, he testified that during the months of March thru June, no deductions were made. On redirect examination, he reiterated his prior testimony that he canceled his dues deduction authorization based on the fact that he could not afford the lump sum payment as indicated by the Respondent's notice to employees. Carl Ledehman, an employee for approximately 18 months and a Union member indicated that he canceled his dues deduction authorization based on the fact that he too could not afford a lump sum deduction as testified to by Guy Price. He testified that the Respondent indicated sometime in early October that it would only deduct Union dues in a lump sum fashion and that based on this announcement, 3/ he then canceled his dues deduction. He testified that inasmuch as the Respondent indicated that it would only deduct dues pursuant to a lump sum method, he canceled his authorization and that he did so for no other purpose. He testified as did Mr. Price that to his knowledge, the Respondent deducts contributions for hospital, cancer and the united givers fund as well as other benevolent and humanitarian purposes. Albert M. Robuck, an employee for approximately 6 years, testified that he, signed a dues deduction authorization form yearly and that the employer refused, sometime in October, to deduct dues on a monthly basis. He testified that he received several memos citing in essence that Respondent would only deduct dues on a lump sum basis. Based on this statement, he canceled his dues deduction authorization on or about October 12, and that along with his cancellation, approximately three other teachers canceled their dues deduction authorization. He testified that he was aware that the employer is presently deducting health insurance, annuities and other deductions monthly. Jackie Barrineau, the Union's Chairperson and an employee for approximately three years as a teacher, testified that she has been a Union member throughout her employment with the Respondent. She testified that the Respondent submitted what she considered to be exorbitant proposals for the cost of processing the dues deductions and that the proposals ranged from $12,500.00 annually to its last offer which amounted to .05 per card per month for each employee utilizing the dues deduction procedure. On April 21, 1975, she testified that the Union agreed to pay $325.00 for dues deduction for the remainder of the school year, whereas the Employer on July 15, proposed the amount of $12,500.00 for dues deduction. She testified that the Employer amended its position and countered with the same figure it had originally proposed. Approximately two days later on July 17, the board reduced its cost for processing dues deductions and reduced the $12,500.00 figure to .50 per card per month for each employee utilizing dues deduction. In late July the parties declared an impasse and during the numerous proposals which were submitted during the impasse on or about September 4, the Respondent resubmitted the $12,000.00 figure as the cost for deducting dues. See for example Charging Party's Exhibit 7 received in evidence and is made a part hereof by reference. She testified that despite the adamant position taken by the Respondent on dues deduction, she did not cancel her dues authorization. On cross-examination she corroborated the fact that the parties tentatively agreed to a provision whereby the Respondent would deduct .05 per card for each member utilizing the dues deduction authorization procedure. The Employer advised that it had received legal advice regarding the legality of the notice given employees whereby it would only deduct dues in a lump sum and that a local attorney, William Davenport, advised that that procedure was permissible. She testified that she is charged with giving collective bargaining advice to all employees within the County School System. She testified as to a problem the Respondent advised that it had relative to incorrect signatures and improper amounts being recorded on dues authorization cards and that that was part of the stated motivation for the Employer cancelling the procedure of deducting dues on a monthly basis. She testified that as to the Respondent's release of its intention to deduct dues only on a lump sum basis, a substantial number of employees withdrew from the Union. The Respondent also claims that it refused to honor existing dues authorizations which were executed by its employees because numerous cards were either incorrectly executed or were undated. There is nothing in Section 447.303, F.S., which saddles Respondent with the responsibility of insuring that dues deduction authorizations are properly executed. Nor was there any credible testimony from any employee that dues deductions were being made without their express authorization. It thus appears that the Respondent's stated concern about the legality or propriety of the dues authorizations was nothing more than a pretext to effectuate its real desire of securing from employees mass cancellation of their dues authorizations and thus stifle the Union's ability to function. This becomes more apparent when consideration is given to the Respondent's attitude at the bargaining table relative to the amount that it proposed to the Union for the administrative costs for providing the dues deduction service. Respondent maintained the same basic "no give" position on this issue until the entry of the mediator into the negotiations. Although not specifically urged by Respondent as a defense to the refusal to deduct dues allegation, small mention was made of the fact that no contract was in existence between the parties when it (Respondent) ceased to deduct dues on a monthly basis as had been its practice during the remainder of the school year following the Union's certification as exclusive bargaining representative for Respondent's instructional personnel. Inasmuch as the statute which is pertinent to dues deduction (447.303, F.S.) at no point refers to the existence of a collective bargaining agreement as a prerequisite to dues deduction authorizations, the undersigned is constrained to conclude that the statute which is specific on its face, must be applied literally. Accordingly, even if Respondent had urged that as a defense for its actions stated above, the undersigned would recommend rejection of that ground as basis for its refusal to deduct dues pursuant to authorizations. 4/ THE SURVEILLANCE ISSUE Jack Bridges, who is the Employer's Director of Industrial Services and who is responsible for the media, news releases, etc., testified that he photographed pickets who picketed the Respondent's school administration building during the summer months of 1975. He testified that Charging Party's composite of approximately 17 pictures which the Respondent utilized in order to maintain a "historical" file. He testified that he was responsible for taking approximately 7 pictures and he recognized, after having been shown Mrs. Barrineau, Martha Smith and another teacher whom he described as being an active Union supporter. He testified that there was no blocking of ingress and egress into the school building and that the pickets picketed approximately 6 times. He testified that he had received advance notice from the news paper and TV advertisements that there would be a picket at the administration building. He testified that the photos were taken to the Director of Employee Relations, Dick Phillingem. 5/ He testified that the photos were taken with the school's camera and film. Bridges further testified that there were no blacks picketing during the time the photos were made and that to the best of his recollection there were only two pickets. On cross-examination he testified that he had received advance notice of racial picketing but that no photos were made nor was the division in which he headed asked to take pictures of such demonstration. On further recross, he testified that he was, contrary to his earlier testimony, asked to take pictures of racial matters. Thomas J. Le Master, the Respondent's Assistant Superintendent for approximately 5-1/2 years, testified that the pictures were taken to determine whether or not employees were breaking the law and to place such pictures in the labor files. He testified that Phillingem asked him if he had anyone to take pictures whereupon the answer was elicited that pictures were made such that there could be a record of labor relations. He testified that he was present at a school board meeting during mid September and that the pictures were discussed at such meeting and during a further conversation with Mr. Phillingem. He testified that he talked closely and worked closely with Phillingem on all matters relating to the operation of their division. When shown the pictures in Charging Parties Exhibit 11, he was able to identify the subjects in the pictures A,D,C,F and G. He testified that he presently serves on Respondent's bargaining team and has done so since January, 1975, when the pertinent divisions of Section 447, Florida Statutes, became operative. He testified that he had not witnessed a labor trial although he had seen Charging Party's Exhibit 2 which as stated was the notice to employees regarding dues deductions. The notice bears a date of October 2nd. On cross-examination, he also testified that the pictures were shown at a public board meetings and that few comments were made regarding the subjects contained on the pictures. He testified that the file which the pictures were part of, is used in collective bargaining negotiations between the Charging Party. He did not elaborate on this point. He testified that he obtained his advance notice for the picketing through either the news paper or the television. Dick Phillingem, Manager of Employee Relations for the past year, has been employed by the Respondent for approximately 24 years in various positions. He testified that he maintained records regarding employee relations and he referred to such correspondence a "blurb" sheets and Escambia Education Association fliers. He testified that he did not talk about his prior conversation regarding this hearing. He gave Le Master instructions to take the pictures. He testified that the instructions were to take pictures of bath the pickets and the legends contained thereon. Messr. Bridges called to inform him that the pictures were to be delivered to him via a courier and that he thereafter disbursed them at the Board meeting. He utilized the pictures to keep current his file which he uses to monitor Union activity. During the normal course of his work day he spends approximately 80 percent of his time visiting teachers, coordinators and checking records on disclosures at discussions of board meetings. When asked for the purpose for which he was collecting a "history" for his files, the witness was unspecific however, he did testify that no attempts were made to utilize the pictures for reprisals. Jackie Barrineau, who previously testified, was recalled and testified that she engaged in picketing on or about August 20, at approximately 3:30 p.m. She testified that there were approximately 25 pickets and that she confronted Jack Bridges and approximately 2 other photographers whose names she did not recall and that she approached Bridges and informed him that she did not like the idea of his taking photos of her. She testified that the Union obtained a Writ of Mandamus to compel the Respondent to disclose the budget and Dr. Moses' contract with the Respondent. The pickets expressed to her their fear of retaliation for engaging in such acts. There was no blockage of ingress or egress of the school's administration building where the picketing occurred. When shown the pictures, she was able to identify most of the subjects. She testified further that the picketing was at all times peaceful. On cross-examination she also stated that she is the Union's public relations official and reiterated her identification of Mr. Bridges as one of the photographers. 6/ Dr. Ruby Jackson Gainer, a counselor dean and an employee for approximately 20 or more years, testified that she engaged In the picketing and that she was also intimidated by a managerial employee taking pictures of her while she was picketing. She testified that despite this fear, she went along with the idea of picketing because she felt "committed to her task." She recalled an incident whereby she was discharged and her tenure removed due to her engagement in a walkout during school year 1968. She testified that the employer tried to discharge her for taking two days' sick leave and that this action was turned over to the professional practices committee. On or about August 28, she testified that she was demoted from administrative dean to counselor dean and that the difference being that as counselor dean, her work station is located in an isolated area removed from the other school facilities. William McArthur, the Respondent's Personnel Director, testified that the picketing occurred in front of the school building which is where his office is located. He is a member of the board's negotiating team and he testified that he was unaware of any employees being intimidated based on their engaging in picketing. He corroborated the earlier testimony that the pickets did not block any ingress or egress to the school's administrative building. He is the custodian of the instructional personnel records and to his knowledge, there was no data placed in the personnel files regarding the picketing. He also testified that the Respondent does not maintain any separate personnel file for pickets. He testified on cross-examination, that he viewed the picture in Mr. Odom's office which were lying on his desk uncovered. He was unable to witness pickets from the school's building as was previously testified to by other witnesses. In the private sector, the NLRB has consistently held that direct surveillance by company supervisory employees or executives is intimidating and coercive. However, the mere presence of a supervisor or agent of a Respondent is insufficient to prove surveillance where such presence is not out of the ordinary. In this case, evidence reveals that the occurrence of the picketing was a matter of common knowledge throughout the county. The picket was so well known that there was extensive media coverage. The evidence reveals further that the photos were passed around at a public School Board meeting and that since that time no reprisals have been practiced upon the subjects appearing in the photographs. There was no evidence that employees' job activities were more closely scrutinized than before the picture taking episode occurred. Jackie Barrineau, a chief spokesman for the Union testified that she engaged in picketing on or about August 20, at approximately 3:30 p.m. She testified that approximately 25 pickets gathered in front of the school's administration building and that Jack Bridges and two other photographers took pictures of the pickets. She as well as other witnesses testified that they feared reprisals would be taken against them for engaging in the picketing and that they were unable to discern any useful purpose as to why the pictures were being taken by Jack Bridges. The evidence also reveals that the Respondent's agents testified that the purpose for which the photos were made was to maintain "history" for their files. Further testimony on this point, however, reveals that the photos were openly discussed at a public meeting and that no attempts were made by the Respondent and/or its agents to utilize those photos for retaliation or for any other purpose unlawful under Chapter 447, Florida Statutes. The record was barren of any evidence that the Respondent attempted to use the pictures from the pickets to substantiate retaliatory motives. While one witness testified that she was demoted because she participated in a strike several years ago, such testimony standing alone is insufficient to base a finding that the Respondent during the picketing in 1975 utilized or planned to utilize the photos for some unlawful purpose. Furthermore, there is no evidence to show that the Respondent treated picketing employees any differently than it did any other employees who engaged in the strike following the time that the photos were taken. This tends to show the exact opposite of a surveillance situation or the creation of the impression of surveillance as alleged. It is true that there was scant evidence that the Respondent utilized the materials in a file relative to labor relations matters, no ulterior or unlawful motive was attached or shown by the evidence. While one might infer or surmise that the photos would be utilized for discriminatory purposes, there was no proof of that and mere suspicion is no substitute for proof. For these reasons, the undersigned hereby recommends that the surveillance issue be dismissed for lack of proof. THE REFUSAL TO BARGAIN ISSUE Fred Haushalter, the Charging Party's Executive Director for approximately 8 years and a consultant, testified that he requested access to budget information from the comptroller and for a copy of the contract given to the Respondent's labor negotiator, Ed Moses. He testified that the request was made on or about 5 different times during the month of July, 1975. He said when Respondent refused to honor his request for budget papers at the school board meeting, the mandamus suit was filed to compel disclosure whereupon the court ordered the Respondent to turn over those documents and, ill addition, the Union was awarded attorney's fees and cost for bringing the action. He testified that the school board plead that it was unable to pay any additional salaries since revenues were right and further, that there would be no economic improvements contained in the collective bargaining agreement that the parties were negotiating. He testified that all bargaining team members were notified that there would be no economic improvements forthcoming from the Respondent. On cross-examination, he testified that he requested the school board's budget work papers and a tentative budget. He testified that bargaining commenced in late July, 1975. Specifically, he testified that he asked the comptroller, Messr. Olden, for a copy of the tentative budget. Beginning in April, 1975, the Union formally began to formulate proposals and the procedure utilized was that of past practice when the employee organization had utilized in negotiating prior contracts. By letter dated September 8, Robert C. Mott, Deputy Superintendent, stated that he was supplying, (1) a copy of the tentative 75-76 budget; (2) a copy of Dr. Moses' contract; and (3) a copy of the administrative salary schedule. He testified that of the data which was requested by the union, some could not he supplied immediately as some of it needed to be assembled. As to the other request, Mott advised that "since it related so directly to the collective bargaining scene," he would need the "legal advice" from Dr. Moses concerning that data. He concluded by stating that he would submit the requested data when he was able to either assemble it or when Dr. Moses gave him the proper advice. 7/ He testified that Moses was Respondent's chief spokesman as of May 20, and that there were approximately 13 sessions. He phoned Dr. Moses on June 12, 13, 16, 18, 19, 20, 23 and 24 and he (Moses) failed to respond to his phone calls. He had previously been advised by Dr. Moses on June 4 that a negotiating session could be arranged on June 9. He testified that when his phone calls to Dr. Moses were unanswered, he started calling the school board's secretary; Mr. Phillinger and a Mr. Davis, who according to his testimony is Dr. Moses' assistant. Davis took the message and informed him that he would give it to Dr. Moses immediately. When he spoke to Mr. Phillinger, he indicated that he would try to contact Dr. Moses as soon as possible. After approximately 10 or more phone calls, Moses returned his call on June 24, a Tuesday, and informed him that he was told that no one would be in the office until around 1:00 p.m. on that day, i.e., June 24. He testified that Phillinger, Director of Employee Relations, stated that he would contact Dr. Moses since he did not have the authority to arrange dates for collective bargaining negotiation sessions. The following day a Messr. Leper was called and he informed him of the difficulty that he had encountered in trying to contact Dr. Moses. He testified that during a two-week period he made approximately 22 phone calls to both officers of Educational Services Bureau, Inc., a consulting firm in which Dr. Moses is employed and serves as its Executive Vice President. He testified that when he finally made contact with Dr. Moses, they arranged a tentative date of July 1 to commence negotiations and that he requested dates of June 25 or 26 and to that request, Moses indicated July 1 would be the earliest date. He testified that at the July 1 session, Moses brought with him no proposals, but merely read a statement that the union's proposals were hastily prepared and irresponsible. He testified that the negotiating team which consisted of approximately 6 members began preparing the original proposal in October of 1974 and that special preparation lasted through April 1975 when formal proposals were submitted. He testified that Phillingem advised that the employer would only discuss the preamble and the following three articles, mainly (1) recognition; (2) association and teacher rights and (3) negotiation procedures. 8/ He testified that at that session, Respondent would only propose language regarding the recognition article. During that meeting the employer submitted its "guidelines for negotiation" and previously thereto on April 23, Respondent advised that it would have prepared at its next session, a counter proposal. The Union's proposal consisted of some 123 pages containing approximately 33 articles. The next meeting was held on May 19, and the parties agreed to payroll deduction for the remaining school year. He testified that Moses, at that meeting, advised that he wanted the Union's negotiating team to "localize the agreement." He testified that the next three sessions mainly consisted of questions by Moses, who informed the Union's bargaining team that "when we start bargaining, we will get. responses." 9/ On cross-examination, Moses asked the witness a number of questions regarding the Union's necessity of affiliation, the understanding as to why two whereases were included in Hue Union's preamble and other questions regarding language contained in provisions of its (the Union's) proposal. Moses inquired of him what his definition of good faith bargaining was and how the Union derived the one 1000th figure as the cost for dues deduction payments. He testified that Moses indicated to him that most of the Union's proposals were "non-bargainable items." The Respondent counter-proposed with a one page proposal. The Employer's initial counterproposal, which was submitted on July, in essence contained provisions that all offers were package offers which had to be either accepted or rejected as a package; that the contract term be two years and that the salary level be that level that was paid to instructional personnel the last school year. The proposal also contained provisions that all negotiable benefits be maintained at the funded level as contained ill the last contract and for existing benefits only; that final and binding arbitration be added to the present concept of grievance as is now in use in the Escambia County Schools.. The counterproposal ended with a provision which stated that all other bargainable items proposed by the union and identified as bargainable by the board were rejected. 10/ Mrs. Barrineau testified that the board's final proposal which was mailed to the teachers contained provisions whereby lunch hours were discretionary with the principal; a no strike provision; dues deduction and mileage allowance which was less beneficial than that contained in the predecessor agreement. The counterproposal also contained more restrictive provisions regarding maternity leave, personal leave and a two year contract term. There was a provision regarding association and teacher rights, three paid holidays, professional leave and procedures for reviewing personnel files. There was a provision controlling posting, voluntary transfers, class size, teacher's schedules, $60.00 bonus and that in her opinion, the salary proposal was regressive. She testified that the Respondent attempted to withdraw certain items which had been tentatively agreed to by the parties. The Respondent advised that this proposal which was submitted to the union on or about September 26, could only be accepted or rejected "in toto." On July 3, Mrs. Barrineau asked the Respondent for a counter and that its failure to do so would result in the Union's filing an unfair labor practice charge with PERC. Respondent's chief negotiator indicated that management's rights superseded employee rights except as specifically restricted by law. She testified that the only items which he considered negotiable were those items which were existing items or items which were covered by Respondent's policy. She testified that the principle area of discussion at that session dealt with grievance procedures and Dr. Moses informed the Union's negotiating team that their proposals were "so far out of line that they would not be either accepted or entertained." She testified that while the Union was willing to discuss item by item in their proposals and various counterproposals, the Employer indicated that all proposals had to be either totally accepted or rejected. The Union pressed for an informal grievance procedure and a more expeditious manner to resolve such but this was not forthcoming through negotiations. She expressed the opinion the "in toto" position urged by the Respondent was stifling the bargaining process and in her opinion, an attempt was being made to create an impasse. Regarding maternity and sabbatical leave, the discussion surrounding those areas were more regressive and restrictive than the existing policy. 11/ She testified that the Union agreed to accept the Respondent's dormant position regarding insurance in order to enable it to put insurance bids to various carriers. The Employer took a "no give" stance on the preamble and refused to allow employees a "choice of forums to resolve grievances." The next session which was held on July 9 was, according to Mrs. Barrineau, a discussion which largely centered around grievance procedure and sabbatical leave and that in the Unions opinion, the grievance procedure advanced by Respondent was "too detailed." For a detailed discussion on the grievance procedure, see Charging Party's Exhibit 31, which is a counter dealing with grievance procedure. During the next discussion, the witness testified that she expressed concern about the absence of insurance, sabbatical leave and teacher's retirement provisions, and that this was a subject to which the Employer refused to discuss.. The only items that the Employer would discuss were sabbatical leave and insurance. During the July 9 meeting, the Employer agreed to withdraw its insurance proposal. At the next session on July 14, the Union submitted its counterproposal no. 5, which was a regression from its earlier proposal regarding unpaid leave and grievance procedures and all other proposals were identical to its earlier submission and previously adopted position. 12/ Another session was held the following day, i.e., July 15, and the employer adopted the position of making responses only via written proposals and during that session, the Union changed its dues deduction proposal and incorporated a hold harmless clause for the Employer. Thereafter, the Union changed its position on the grievance procedure and advanced an informal one which in her opinion, provided for a more expedited procedure of resolving grievances. During that period from May 20 through mid-July, the parties had only agreed to three items. The Employer adopted a "no give" position regarding sabbatical leave. During a negotiating session on July 17, Dr. Moses appeared at the session approximately one and one-half hours late. At that meeting he submitted a counter which in essence stated that all issues which were "bargainable" had been discussed. She testified that the employer refused to submit counters on promotions, overtime, transfers, calendars, affect of class sizes and all other items. The Employer remained adamant regarding its position that dues deductions were subject to a $.50 deduction per card per employee and that she expressed the opinion that all other deductions were not subject to a like charge and, therefore, the administration charge for dues deduction was punitive in nature. She testified that at the July 17 meeting, the Respondent submitted its counterproposals 9 and 10 and that there were no changes regarding bargainable versus nonbargainable items. The proposals contained regressive language and that employees had to specifically state the reasons for taking personal leave. There were other changes in military and professional leave which deviated from and were more restrictive than existing policies. She testified that the dues deduction pursuant to the $.50 per card charge amounted to approximately $12,450.00 for the Union. The Employer submitted a proposal whereby the instructional personnel would work an 8-hour day which had the effect of increasing the normal work day and the lunch period was reduced to 20 minutes. The proposal contained no compensation allotments for overtime work and the Employer took the position that salary supplements were not negotiable. The Employer refused to change its attitude with regard to physical examinations, mileage allowances and the collective bargaining contracts would be printed at the Union's expense. There was no movement from the initial salary proposals submitted on April 23. During the period from July 1 through July 23, Respondent was unprepared approximately seven times and was late approximately nine times for bargaining sessions. On July 23, the Respondent submitted its counter no. 11 which changed the contract terms from one year to two years and the recognition clause also contained the provision deleting "the board and the association and added the State of Florida." On dues deduction, the employer agreed to recede from its earlier position adopted in its counter no. 10 by an amount totaling $50.00, i.e., the amount previously stated from $12,450.00 to $12,400.00. The proposal also contained a provision that Respondent reserved the right to establish those deductions which it considered to be voluntary deductions and that said right also included the "establishment of a reasonable set deduction, if in the opinion of the board such cost is necessary." All other items were consistent with those contained in its earlier counterproposal. 13/ On July 23 the Union declared impasse which was 60 days prior to the Respondent's budget submission date. At the time of the impasse, the parties had not reached agreement on: the insurance proposal, grievance procedures, sick leave, illness in line of duty, personal leave, sabbatical leave, general leave of absence, military leave, professional leave, visitation rights, dues deduction, preamble, maternity leave, as well as others. 14/ The parties scheduled their first mediation session on August 13, and it was scheduled to begin at 4:30 p.m. At that session, the Respondent's team was late by approximately two hours. The testimony is that the dues deduction costs submitted to the mediator was for a lump sum payable by the Union of $12,400.00. At that session, the Employer took the position that the subject of discharges was a nonnegotiable item. At the next meeting, on or about August 26, the Respondent's chief negotiator was late approximately two hours. On November 10, the Union requested a further session and Moses wired a message that he would not be available until November 15. The witness remained at the negotiating meeting on November 15 for approximately one hour and no negotiating official of Respondent appeared. The Employer remained adamant on positions wherein there was disagreement only as to language but not in principle. The parties agreed to a marathon bargaining session beginning November 28, and the sessions continued through November 30, at which time an agreement was tentatively reached by the parties, subject to ratification by the bargaining unit members. 15/ The unit members voted against ratification of Charging Party's Exhibit 46 which is the agreement entered into by the negotiating team and the Respondent's team on that same date. Included therein, is a salary proposal which amounts to a reduction in the previous school year salary of approximately 3.6 percent, i.e., $8,320.00 per annum versus $8,266.00. The Respondent refused to accede to most proposals submitted by the Union based on its stated claim that most were already provided for by law and thus that there was no need to incorporate such in a collective bargaining agreement. A member of the Respondent's negotiating team allegedly made the statement that "the teachers had nothing, that the school board had everything, that the school board could do what it desired regarding salaries. Additionally, it considered as nonnegotiable such matters as: dismissal, layoffs, evaluation, tenure, discipline for annual contract teachers and the scheduling of planning periods." Floating teachers, assignment of summer school teachers, problems regarding absence without leave and class size were also nonbargainable. Respondant's negotiating team also took the position that the effects of such items were also nonnegotiable. The chief spokesperson, Mrs. Barrineau, testified that her duties consisted primarily of carrying out speaking engagements regarding collective bargaining rights, effectuating collective bargaining policy for the Escambia Education Association, the certified bargaining agent, to settle disagreements within the collective bargaining team, to formulate policy, to issue news releases, to make civic speeches, to attend EEA workshops and to formulate a collective bargaining budget. She testified that the proposals resulted from a joint effort of EEA's collective bargaining team. She became actively engaged in the formulation of proposals on or about March 1. She testified that she made approximately seven phone calls during the period June 12 through June 26, in an effort to schedule a session with Respondent. At the August 14 meeting, the Respondent presented the impasse proposals to the FMCS mediator. As of September 25, the parties reached the figure of approximately $1300.00 for the cost of deducting dues pursuant to checkoff authorizations. Mr. Phillingem was called and testified that the file to which he earlier testified to contain Chapter 447 and the pertinent enabling statutes and the Department of Education Rules and Regulations in addition to proposals submitted by EEA, the certified bargaining agent, "blurb" sheets which are distributed and various other Union news letters. He testified that the school board's legal counsel is, to the best of his knowledge, associated with Muller & Mintz, a Miami law firm. Wallace S. Odom, the comptroller, testified that he is responsible for maintaining all financial data with regard to the school's budget. He is charged with maintaining accurate records and during fiscal year from October 1, thru September 30, there was a county wide reduction in teacher aides by approximately 110. He testified that there was no increase in salaries based on the status of incoming revenues. He testified that there has been an increase in the millage paid for property tax in and around Escambia County and that such increase is up to, according to his testimony, a full 8 mills. Fred Haushalter, EEA's Executive Director, testified that he monitors correspondence which comes through his office. He testified that the allowance for dues deductions during the months of June, July and August was achieved through negotiations and that the parties stipulated as to the amount of the cost for such deductions. He testified that the stipulation was reached on or about May 20, 1975. Thereafter during the remaining months of the school year, the parties entered into a stipulation whereby the cost of administration and dues deduction were set at a cost somewhere in the nature of $325.00 for the remaining three months. While the basic issues here can be simply stated, they are not susceptible of a short and simple answer: Did the Respondent negotiate with the Union in bad faith and with the intent of avoiding reaching agreement or conditioning agreement with the Union's acceptance of terms and conditions which the Respondent knew or should have known are unacceptable to any self respecting Union? The governing principles need not be set forth in exhaustive detail. Section 447, F.S., (the Act) defines collective bargaining and imposes upon the parties the duty to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment or the negotiation of and agreement, or any question arising thereunder... but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. " The Public Employees Relations Act which was largely patterned after the National Labor Relations Act, 29 USC 151 et seq, sets forth the yard stick which is contained in Section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act and provides that the measurement of "good faith" is not rigid but, necessarily is an elastic concept having meaning only in its application to the particular facts of a particular case. See for example N.L.R.B. v. American National Insurance Company, 343 U.S. 395, 410 (1952). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the second circuit stated in N.L.R.B. v. National Shoes, Inc., and National Syracuse Corporation, 208F 2d. 688, 691-692 (1953), the problem is essentially to determine from the record the intention of the state of mind of [the employer] in the matter of [his] negotiations with the Union. In this proceeding, as in many others, such a determination is a question of fact to be determined from the whole record. See also N.L.R.B. v. Reed and Prince Manufacturing Company, 205F. 2d.131, 134-135 (C.A. 1, 1953), cert. denied 346 U.S. 887 (1954). The National Labor Relations Board has repeatedly held that it is without authority to either directly or indirectly compel concessions or otherwise set in judgement upon substantive terms of a collective bargaining agreement. A necessary corollary to this principal is that just as the Act contains no authority to force an agreement when the parties have reached an impasse (N.L.R.B. v. The United Clay Mines Corporation, 219F. 2d 120, 126 (C.A. 6, 1955), so also refusal to bargain cannot he equated with refusal to recede from an announced position advanced and maintained in good faith. Division 1142, Amalgamated Association of Street Electric Railway and Motorcoach Employees of America, AFL-CIO (Continental Bus System v. N.L.R.B., 294F. 2d 264, 266 (C.A.D.C., 1961). Applying these principles to the facts here, it becomes apparent that based on the small movement and the repeated standoffs by Respondent, I am constrained to conclude that the Respondent here has failed to fulfill its obligation to bargain in good faith with the Union. Turning to the pertinent facts in this case, up to and including the point of "impasse", the Respondent refused to recede from its initial stand on inter alia, checkoff, seniority, grievance procedure, all types leave, assignment scheduling, shorter lunch periods, reduction in pay and longer work days. Based on this position, one would readily infer that the Respondent approached the table with a preconceived determination never to reach agreement on these issues and that it maintained this position during negotiations without doing anymore than listen to Union argument on those points. Thus, in effect it engaged in surface bargaining on those as well as other issues without any attempt to explore argument thereon with a sincere desire to reach agreement. The Respondent's chief negotiator approached the table with a cleverly concealed scheme of displaying a real and sincere attitude of negotiating which was carried on with sophistication and finesse and the mere making of concessions on some items was the very means by which he concealed a purposeful strategy to make bargaining futile or fail. Using this approach, the Respondent opened negotiations with an extremely high cost for the administration of dues deduction and then failed to recede from this position until the waining moments of the negotiating sessions and after the parties had gone through the lengthly process of calling in mediators which were costly to both parties. There was no meaningful change on its consideration of position on the mandatory subject of checkoff as provided in Section 447.303, Florida Statutes. Throughout the sessions, the Union brought out and repeated all its main arguments regarding checkoff, salary levels, scheduling assignments, grievance procedures, contract terms, health insurance coverage as well as other items which the record is replete with documentary evidence. The Respondent, according to the testimony, stood fast on various articles which it deemed to be nonbargainable throughout the negotiation and as the sessions progressed, its position hardened. These are mandatory bargaining subjects and the Respondent's failure to enter negotiations with an effort to reach agreement constitutes bad faith bargaining in violation of 447.501(c), Florida Statutes. One example of this unlawful conduct can be examined by consideration of the fact that during the previous school year, the Respondent agreed to deduct dues on a monthly basis and the cost of such deduction amounted to approximately $325.00 for a three month period whereas when it entered the negotiation table it started out with the "outrageous" figure of approximately $13,000.00 for the same service that it had earlier provided for a total cost of $1300.00 if projected over a one year period. The same can be said for the Respondent's adamant refusal throughout the negotiations to accede to minor language changes in the preamble and other matters which in its opinion, were matters already covered by other laws and therefore there was no need to incorporate such in a collective bargaining agreement. While not suggesting that the Act requires concession by either side during bargaining nor the surrender of convictions or alterations of philosophies provided such convictions or philosophies are not made operative in such manner as to foreclose bone fide consideration of bargainable issues, the repeated refusal to consider or counter when proposed with items which amounts to nothing more than language changes, such a position militates a finding that the employer approaches the bargaining table with the intent of reaching an agreement and/or to engage in good faith bargaining. While parties oft times approach the bargaining table and jockey for positions, there comes a time when there must be a sincere desire to reach agreement. Further support in this position can be found in the fact that the Union on numerous occasions made futile attempts to reach the Respondent's Chief negotiator. During one period during the negotiating sessions, the Union's chief spokesman testified that she made more than ten phone calls during a twelve day period and that at no time were her calls returned by the Respondent and/or its agents. This in the opinion of the undersigned evinces a practice on the part of the Respondent to engage in dilatory and evasive tactics designed to make the bargaining process a sham and fruitless process. For example, anti-discrimination clauses are customarily included in contracts whereas there are other specific laws which specifically provide for and cover such proscribed activity. The fact that a proposal is made to include such in an agreement does not detract from or otherwise modify from other existing laws covering the same procedure. Further support for the conclusion reached by the undersigned can he found in the fact that the Respondent's chief negotiator entered the negotiating sessions with the idea that all proposals submitted by the Respondent would be package proposals and that the Union could not accept part of a counter proposal put by the Respondent without completely accepting or rejecting the entire proposal. This is not to say that the parties cannot enter into negotiations and negotiate on an item by item basis but the adoption of an "in toto", or take it or leave it" policy is further indication of bad faith bargaining. This is of much significance here since Respondent refused to agree to insignificant or traditional items contained in collective agreements. See e.g., Big Three Industries, 201 N.L.R.B. No. 105. Another indicia of the negotiating process which is indicative of bad faith bargaining is the fact that after the Union had been certified for approximately 6 months, the Respondent without prior consultation with the Union, unilaterally indicated that dues deductions could only be effected on a lump sum basis which ultimately had the effect of forcing numerous employees to cancel their dues deduction authorizations. This statement is based on the credited testimony of several witnesses including Mrs. Barrineau and Mr. Price. Although the Respondent, during the course of the hearing, testified that the dues deductions were canceled or that attempts were made to get employees to execute new authorization forms, there is nothing in Florida Statutes which places such a burden on the Respondent. A careful reading of Section 447.303, Florida Statutes, indicate that such authorizations are revokable at the employee's will upon 30 days written notice to both the employer and employee organization. Based on the foregoing, I therefore conclude and find that the Respondent's negotiating team entered the table with no intent to fulfill their duty to bargain in good faith and that its actions in forcing employees to execute forms which call for the single deduction of Union dues was a deliberate attempt on its part to force mass withdrawals from the Union in an effort to undermine it.
Findings Of Fact The Business of Respondent The Respondent is a public employer with its principle place of business located in Orange County, Florida, where it is engaged in the business of operating a school system. Respondent is created directly by the Florida State Constitution or legislative body so as to constitute a department or administrative arm of the government and is administered by individuals who are responsible to the public officials or to the general electorate. Respondent is now, and has been at all times material herein, a public employer within the meaning of Section 447.203(2) of the Act. The Employee Organization Involved The Orange County Classroom Teachers Association is now, and has been at all times material herein, an employee organization within the meaning of Section 447.203(10) of the Act. Background During April, 1975, PERC certified the employee organization as the exclusive bargaining representative of all employees in the following collective bargaining unit: INCLUDED: All certified non-administrative personnel including the following: teachers, teachers-countywide, teachers-exceptional, teachers-gifted, speech therapist, teachers- specific learning disabilities, teachers-adults full-time, guidance personnel, occupational specialist, teachers-adult basic education, librarians-media specialist, deans, department chairpersons, physical therapist. EXCLUDED: All other positions of the Orange County Public Schools. Soon thereafter, the CTA and the School Board began negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement. Each party submitted written proposals or counter proposals. (See Joint Exhibit #3 and #4, received in evidence). When negotiations began, teachers in the bargaining unit represented by the CTA were employed in one of the following categories: 10, 11, or 12-month contract. While most bargaining unit members were on 10-month contract status, some guidance counselors and approximately 90 teachers commonly referred to as vocational/technical teachers were on 12-month contract status. `These 90 vocational/technical teachers had been on 12-month contract status since at least 1970 and some since at least 1965. The negotiations resulted in a collective bargaining agreement which became effective on October 1, 1975. (Joint Exhibit #1). Neither the CTA's proposals nor the School Board's counter proposals for the 1975-76 contract contained a provision expressly granting the School Board the right to unilaterally change 12-month employees to 12 month status. Additionally, there was no specific discussion during negotiations regarding the alteration of the vocational/ technical teachers' 12-month contract status. During late spring, 1975, the Charging Party, and others similarly situated, were informed that during the 1975-76 fiscal year (which runs from July 1, 1975 through June 30, 1976) they would be employed for a full twelve months. They began their twelve month period of employment on July 1, 1975, prior to the effective date of the collective bargaining agreement-between the Board and the teachers' union. At that time there were approximately 200 teachers employed within the vocational/technical and adult education department. During the 1975-1976 school year, the school system with the exception of the post-secondary programs operated for two full semesters plus a summer school. Portions of the post-secondary programs, such as the vocational/technical and adult educational programs operated on a year-round basis. During the school year, the School Board decided to institute a system- wide program of year-round schools by adopting the quinmester system. Under the quinmester system the year is divided into five terms, each consisting of forty- five (45) days of student class time. Students can attend all five terms (or quins) thereby allowing them to graduate early, take extra courses or make up failed courses. Respondent takes the position that it was not possible to employ teachers on the 12-month basis as they would not be available for the required number of days. This is based on the fact that, as stated during the hearing under the 12-month system of employment, employees were only available for a total of 233 working days. Such a figure is derived by taking the number of days in a year, 365, and subtracting the number of Saturdays and Sundays, 104, which leaves 261 days. The School Board allows up to nineteen (19) days annual leave each year. Further, employees did not work on nine legal holidays on which the school system was closed which together with the 19 days annual leave made an additional 28 days that the employees would not be available for work in addition to the 104 Saturdays and Sundays. Thus when Saturdays, Sundays, Holidays and leave time are subtracted from the total 365 days, there are 233 available working days that employees working on a 12-month basis would be available. Therefore, the Board contended that in making its operational decision to change to a year-round school system, by adoption of the quinmester program, it needed employees to be available for 237 days if the teacher would be available to work all five quinmesters. Such a figure is derived by computing the number of days that the student will attend and the number of days that the teacher would therefore be required to be in attendance. Under the quinmester system, the student attends classes forty-five (45) days each quinmester, which means that the teacher needs to be present at least 225 days when the students are going to be present. Additionally, the Respondent urges that the collective bargaining agreement (Joint Exhibit #2) requires that teachers be on duty twelve (12) days when the students are not in attendance. These twelve days consist of five days of preplanning, five days of in-service training and two days of post-planning. With these figures, it is apparent that the teacher who is to work the entire year must be available the 225 days which the students are to be present together with the twelve days which the students are not present. Thus, wider this system, the teachers must be available 237 days during the school year. It is based on these figures that the Respondent contends that it made the operational decision to convert to a year-round school system, during the spring of 1976. In so doing, the Board advised its employees in the bargaining unit that they would be employed for an initial period of ten (10) months and given an extended contract for services rendered in programs extending beyond the regular school year. The regular school year comprises 196 days during a 10-month period of employment. Under the 10-month appointment, the teacher would be employed for an initial period of 196 days as provided for by the collective bargaining agreement and by statute. Out of the 196 days, the teacher earns 4 days leave which leaves available 192 work days in the initial employment period. The 192 work days include the 12 days that teachers are present and students are not. It also includes 180 days that the teacher is present with the students. This of course equals the first 4 quinmesters. The teacher employed to work year-round during the fifth quinmester would, under the operation of the quinmester system, be issued an extended contract to cover the additional 45 days of the fifth quinmester. By so doing, the 45 working days of the fifth quinmester with the 192 working days of the initial employment period provided for in the 10-month contracts provides the total 237 days needed to implement the year-round school system. It suffices to say that the neither the employee organization nor Respondent bargained about the implementation of the year-round school system. The teachers' union was not given advance notice of this action by the school board nor was there any attempt by the school board to bargain the impact of this decision with the teachers' union. During the course of the hearing, the Respondent introduced evidence to establish that the Charging Party and others similarly situated who are employed on a 10-month basis would receive a salary of $17,629.00 whereas the salary for the same services rendered under the 10-month plus extended contracts for the fifth quinmester would be $18,063.75. Respondent also introduced evidence establishing that the sick leave under either system was identical and that the Charging Party and others similarly situated are able to work 4 more work days under the 10-month plus extended contract than was available under the 12-month system. As stated, Respondent does not deny that it made its decision to employ vocational/technical teachers on a 10 month plus extended contract basis and that such was a departure of the contract status which said teachers had received in the past. In making its decision, Respondent contends that its acts were permissible under Chapter 447.209,F.S., since it is clothed with the statutory authority to unilaterally "determine the purpose of each of its constituent agencies, set standards of services to be offered to the public, and exercise control and discretion over its organizations and operations It contends further that armed with this authority, it was not required to bargain concerning its management rights (which it contends that this was) in that here there is no violation of any contractual provision or of any other section of Chapter 447, Florida Statues, since Chapter 447 does not call for year-round bargaining. Chapter 447.309, F.S., provides in pertinent part that a certified employee organization and the public employer shall jointly bargain collectively in the determination of the wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment of bargaining unit employees. Respondent contends that since a collective bargaining agreement "shall contain all the terms and conditions of employment for the bargaining unit employees" and that since the current collective bargaining agreement does not provide in any part that bargaining unit employees are given a contractual right to a 12 month contract, there has been no violation of Chapter 447, F.S. While research reveals no reported decisions in Florida defining or otherwise interpreting terms and conditions of employment, other public employment relations boards aid state courts have determined that terms and conditions of employment means "salaries, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment". The length of the work year is a function of hours or work and thus has been determined to be a term of employment, and thus a public employer is required to negotiate with its employees concerning all terms and conditions unless a specific statutory provision prohibits negotiations on a particular item. See for example, Board of Education of Union Free School District #3 of the Town of Huntington v. Associated Teachers of Huntington, 30 N.Y. 2nd 122 at 129. First of all it is clear in this case that there has been no bargaining on this item and further that there has been no express waiver to bargain regarding the employment term. It is also clear that the employees in question had been granted 12 month contracts during previous years and that they were not advised of the alteration of the term of their contracts until Respondent had unilaterally made its decision to employ said teachers on a 10 month plus extended contract basis. Finally, there is no specific statutory provision which prohibits the parties from negotiating the term of the employment contract other than Section 447.209(5), F.S., which is inapplicable here. Based thereon, I find that the Respondent's actions in unilaterally adopting a year round instructional program by terminating the 12 month contract status of teachers-adult full-time and teachers-adult basic education by placing such teachers on 10 month plus extended contract status was a unilateral alteration of a term and condition of said employees' employment relationship in violation of Sections 447.501(1)(a) and (c) and is a derivative violation of Section 447.301(a) of the Act.
Recommendation Having found that the Respondent has violated the Act as stated above, I shall therefore recommend that it: Bargain collectively upon request, with the Orange County Classroom Teachers Association as the exclusive representative of the employees in the unit described above. Such duty to bargain shall extend to all mandatory subjects of bargaining including changes in the term of the contract year of said bargaining unit employees. Post at its facilities, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are usually posted, on forms to be provided by PERC, a notice substantially providing: that it will not refuse to bargain, upon request, with the Orange County Classroom Teachers Association, as exclusive representative of the employees in the unit described above; and that its duty to bargain shall extend to all mandatory subjects of bargaining including, but not limited to, any changes in the term of the employment contracts of bargaining unit employees. DONE and ORDERED this 17th day of February, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Rowland, Petruska, Bowen & McDonald by John W. Bowen, Esquire 308 North Magnolia Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Thomas W. Brooks, Esquire Staff Attorney for the Public Employees Relations Commission 2003 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 300 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John W. Palowitch, President Orange County Classroom Teachers Association 6990 Lake Ellenor Drive Orlando, Florida
Findings Of Fact The business of the Respondent. Respondent is, and has been at all times material herein, created directly by the Constitution of the State of Florida and constitutes a Department or administrative arm of the government that is administered by individuals who are responsible to public officials or to the general electorate. At all times material herein, the Respondent is engaged in and has been engaged in the business of operating a county school system in Pasco County, Florida. The labor organization involved. Pasco Classroom Teachers Association is now, and has been at all time material herein, an employee organization within the meaning of Section 447.203(10) of the Act. The issues. Whether the Respondent unlawfully refused to employ Ronald Eckstein on a continuing contract status; whether it unlawfully refused to reappoint him as department chairman and whether it unlawfully refused to grieve the above acts in violation of Florida Statutes. Whether the Respondent unlawfully terminated Sharyn Disabato and also, whether the Respondent unlawfully failed to grieve the termination of Sharyn Disabato pursuant to Article 12 of the parties collective bargaining agreement. Whether the Respondent unlawfully terminated Fred Rydzik and whether it unlawfully refused to grieve the termination of alleged discriminatee, Fred Rydzik. Whether the Respondent unlawfully adopted a salary schedule which amounted to a 5 percent wage reduction for employees in the certified bargaining unit; whether it unlawfully froze every employee's increment steps and three; whether it unlawfully reduced all supplements paid to bargaining unit employees and also whether it unlawfully postponed previously scheduled preschool planning days. Whether the Respondent unlawfully refused to process dues authorizations card executed by bargaining unit employees in violation of Section 447.303 of the Act. Alleged unfair labor practices. (a) The Facts The Pasco Classroom Teachers Association, hereinafter sometimes referred to as PCTA, was certified by the Public Employees Relations Commission, hereinafter sometimes referred to as PERC, on April 17, 1975, as the exclusive representative of the certified personnel employed by the School Board, except those who hold supervisory authority specifically excluding the Superintendent, Assistant Superintendents, District Level Supervisors, Directors, Principals, Assistant Principals, and Curriculum Assistants from functioning as a second-in- command in the building. The PCTA and employer were as stated parties to a collective bargaining agreement which by its terms was effective August 6, 1974, through June 30, 1975. Larry Smith is PCTA's designated bargaining agent and Ronald Forguson is the Employer's designated bargaining agent. The Respondent employs approximately 2500 instructional employees throughout the county at 25 or more locations or school districts. The employer operates in a manner which is somewhat unique to most school districts in that a school year begins in approximately July of each year and the instructional personnel work a 45 day schedule and they are off approximately 15 days. This system is referred to as the Track system and there are 4 tracks described as A, B, C and D. Alleged discriminatee, Sharyn Disabato, was employed by the employer from the school year 1973 through June of 1975. Ms. Disabato testified that her duties consisted of providing an atmosphere for students to learn science, math, social studies, art, music and physical education at Schrader Elementary School, where she was employed. Schrader is an open school, which means that there are no classroom areas partitioned off and all student's and teachers are somewhat visible at all times. Disabato's students consisted of fourth, fifth and sixth graders. Her most recent employment contract was for a 196-day period beginning July 24, 1974 through June 30. She testified that she was very active in curricular activities as well as extracurricular activities. For an example, she testified that she served on the construction committee, which was a committee formulated to provide input for an addition to the facility. Ms. Disabato testified that she sponsored the bus patrol group and assisted several teachers on science projects and assisted new teachers in locating resource materials, filing cabinets, new books and to generally review the overall physical plant. During her last year of employment, she received the "Teacher of the Year" award for her school. Her principal at Schrader Elementary School gas Larry Robison. She also served as the building presentative, which meant that she handled grievances filed by the other teachers. She assisted Mr. Larry Smith in contacting her fellow employees to execute payroll deduction authorization forms. She was approached by her principal sometime in October of 1974 and was asked by him to form a committee of volunteers to make up the association's building committee. That committee was designed to present and resolve grievances that the other teachers were experiencing at the school. She also asked employees to serve on the committee to "maintain the collective bargaining agreement". She was the assistant committee chairperson and during committee meetings, Mr. Robison attended. Mr. Robison also asked her to schedule all building committee meetings. She joined the union at the inception of her employment with the employer. Beginning in January of 1974, she researched the contract and proposed and formulated several provisions which are now presently contained in the contract. She also served on the bargaining team during January of 1974; she conducted surveys and spent approximately 3 hours, 3 times each week for a total of more than 100 hours preparing contract proposals. According to her testimony, in addition to the above activities in which Mr. Robison would know of her union activities, she also indicated that her name appeared on several union flyers which were distributed throughout the facility and also, on one occasion, she was approached by Mr. Robison, who at that time told her that "bargaining wasn't what she thought it to be." At Schrader, during the school year 1974-75, there were approximately 580 students and approximately 26 instructional personnel. She testified that the building representative association meetings were conducted on a monthly basis and that she presented and resolved grievances which were filed by both union as well as non-union members and that she acted as a conduit for resolution of all employee grievances. Sometime prior to November, Disabato testified that she mentioned to Mr. Robison that all vacancies had to be advertised, whereupon Mr. Robison approached Mr. Smith and asked him if that was in fact the case. According to Disabato, Smith informed Mr. Robison that vacancies were to be advertised. During January 1975, Disabato began formulating new contract proposals and a flyer was distributed around the school building, which somewhat depicted her activities in this regard. She testified that Mr. Robison may have seen the flyer. The alleged discriminatee testified and the record reflects that she often criticized school and administration policies and in those instances in which she felt that the contract was being violated by the administration, she would immediately call such to their attention. She testified further that Mr. Robison did not take kindly to such criticism. She testified that during the school year 73-74, she received an outstanding rating and at no place on her evaluation form did there appear any teaching deficiencies. During school year 74-75, she indicates that she was evaluated by Mr. Robison sometime in February 1974. On that evaluation, she testifies that Mr. Robison informed her and noted on her evaluation form that she needed improvement as to her rapport with fellow employees. Also, that as to her personal qualities, she was uncooperative. Specifically, he mentioned an incident wherein she had interceded on behalf of another fellow teacher, Mayna Radacky, and that her interjection upset Mrs. Radacky. When she was presented with the evaluation form, the alleged discriminatee felt that she needed a witness present and at that meeting she took Mrs. Radacky along with her. On voicing her objections to the alleged deficiencies noted on the evaluation form Mr. Robison merely indicated to her that she lacked rapport with her fellow employees and aside there from, he was very unspecific. Upon receipt of this evaluation, Ms. Disabato wrote a letter to Mr. Robison indicating her dissatisfaction with the evaluation and she relayed this to him by giving a letter to his secretary. According to M. Disabato, Mr. Robison told her that her letter would be attached to her evaluation. By letter dated March 14, Ms. Disabato was informed that she would not be rehired. When asked the reason, Mr. Robison informed her that "he would hire someone to do a better all-around job." Ms. Disabato testified that she did not request a written list of reasons for Mr. Robison's refusal to rehire her. She testified that her attitude with Mr. Robison was very good prior to her participation in negotiations for the collective bargaining agreement, but thereafter Mr. Robison's attitude, in her opinion, changed. She testified that after her participation in negotiations, problems occurred on a daily basis for her to resolve. She testified that during a faculty meeting held sometime in November December 1974, Mr. Robison announced to the faculty members that "you do not have a guardian angel" and their problems should be addressed to him. During the beginning of the 1974-75 school year when all of the faculty personnel were introduced, Ms. Disabato indicated that Mr. Robison omitted introducing her to the other faculty members and that such omission was purposeful on his part inasmuch as he was reading from a printed list and further that the same situation occurred on another occasion. She indicates that after all the other instructors were introduced, Mr. Robison tried to pretend that the omission was inadvertent and he thereupon introduced her. Sometime in September or October of that year, Disabato testified that she was called in to a conference with Mr. Robison whereupon he indicated that she was insubordinate to him; that she did not respect him, and that he "should be respected." He also told her at that time that she was a "gutsy lady and that if this had occurred three years earlier, she'd be walking the streets. Upon learning of Ms. Disabato's discharge or nonrenewal of her contract, a petition was circulated by other teachers supportive of Ms. Disabato and approximately one-half of the instructional personnel signed such petition. In an effort to resolve her non-renewal grievance, Ms. Disabato first talked to Larry Smith and they completed a grievance form. On various occasions, Smith and Ms. Disabato attempted to meet with Mr. Robison in an effort to resolve the grievance to their satisfaction, and on each occasion, Mr. Robison refused to meet with them. Ms. Disabato, when asked, knew of no other contract teachers who were not rehired during the school year 1975-1976. On cross-examination, Ms. Disabato related two instances wherein grievances advanced by her to Mr. Robison were resolved. Specifically, she raised an objection to a janitor vacuuming the halls during school hours and this procedure was stopped. Also, with regard to posting vacancy announcements, Mr. Robison, subsequent to her protest, advertised all vacant positions. She also worked with and mutually resolved the problem or a problem regarding long distance phone calls and the utilization of subs during the school year. She also reiterated on cross-examination the fact that her name was deliberately omitted from other lists, but she was not specific in indicating other lists which her name was omitted from as she previously testified to on direct examination. Larry Smith, PCTA's Executive Director, testified that he attempted to grieve the non-renewal of Sharyn Disabato's contract by initially attempting to contact Mr. Robison by telephone sometime in mid-March, 1975. Thereafter he called Dr. Ferguson with no success. The next day he contacted Mr. Robison and Mr. Robison informed him that he would contact him the following Friday. On or about March 21, Smith called Dr. Forguson by telephone and he would not accept the grievance indicating the the grievance was invalid and the non-renewal of an annual contract teacher was not a grievable item. He was also, at that time, instructed by Mr. Robison to deal a with Dr. Forguson. Smith made several attempts to send a written grievance to Mr. Robison and Dr. Forguson and on each occasion the grievance was returned. The procedure of sending a grievance by certified mail was also futile. Finally, the association's president, David Suttle, was able to get the grievance served by the sheriff's department, but the Respondent, and/or its agents, would not hear the grievance. Smith testified that they failed to accept the grievance in order to "prevent binding arbitration." Smith states that Superintendent Thomas Wateman and their counsel, Mr. Joe McClain, gave this opinion. Smith testified that not only M. Disabato's grievance would be handled in a similar manner, but that Ronald Eckstein and Fred Rydzik's or any other grievance of a similar nature would not be a matter subject to the grievance provision of the collective bargaining agreement. Smith stated that they (the Respondent) made it clear to him that grievances dealing with renewal of a contract was not a grievable item under the contract. Thereafter, Smith indicated his opinion that the grievance was not appealed to level 3 because it would be futile to do so based on his prior attempts. Smith testified that employees voiced extreme concern about their job security after Ms. Disabato's contract was not renewed and that several employees, specifically the annual contract teachers who are non-tenured, asked to withdraw their authorizations for payroll deductions of their dues check-off. Larry Robison has served as the principal at Schrader Elementary School for approximately 3 years and he is in charge of the overall operation of the school. He testified that in the employment process, he makes what is essentially the final recommendation in that an employee cannot be hired, that is, an instructional employee, cannot be hired without recommendation by him to obtain a teaching position at the school. Robison testified that he evaluates new teachers approximately 3 times annually and that both annual contract teachers and continuing contract teachers are evaluated only once per year. Robison testified that the evaluation process consists of conferences, both informal and formal visits, and that in making his evaluation, he relies on mental notes primarily. He testified that in instances wherein he notes deficiencies in an instructor's teaching skills, he advises them of such deficiencies and provides ample time for them to correct any deficiencies that, in his opinion, are warranted. He testified that the amount allotted a deficient teacher varies according to the teacher's ability to correct the problem that he notes. Robison testified that he was aware of Ms. Disabato's position as the building representative in 1973 and that this fact was a matter of common knowledge throughout the school. He was also aware of her participation on the union's bargaining committee during school year 1973. He also admitted asking either Ms. Disabato or Richard Culp to formulate the building committee, which was in his opinion, a forum to resolve grievances. David Suttle, PCTA's vice president and an elementary teacher at Elfers School for approximately five years was called and testified that he was a "building rep" for the school year 1973-1974 and served on the negotiating team for 1974 and 1975. Suttle testified that the binding arbitration provisions included in the contract was based on passage of Florida Statute 74, Chapter 100 and Chapter 447, Florida Statutes. Suttle testified that PCTA attempted to grieve the matter of Ms. Disabato's separation, but that the Respondent refused to accept the grievance and that based on the fact that this grievance was not accepted and the employer failed to grieve it, the union felt that it would be futile and fruitless to attempt to grieve the discharges of the other two discriminatees contained in the consolidated Complaint. 2/ Suttle testified that the union received the letter from the sheriff's department indicating that they would no longer serve grievances filed by the union. Suttle testified that during a union meeting with management in mid-May, 1975, the employer indicated that they had the right to determine "what was or was not a grievable matter." Suttle testified that the subject charges were filed when it became clear that issues regarding the renewal or non-renewal of annual contract teachers would not be accepted. Suttle testified also that during this meeting in mid-May the employer was informed that unfair labor practices would be charged with PERC based on their failure to accept the grievance regarding the non-renewal of annual contract teachers. Suttle testified that various employees indicated to him that they felt reprisal would be taken if their union activities were known by the employer. Suttle testified that union deduction authorizations were cancelled and that salaries were unilaterally cut. Suttle testified that the fear of reprisals was not only confined to union members but also to non-union members as well. After Suttle was examined and excused, the general counsel and the charging party rested their case with regard to the allegations contained in Case No. 1040. At the outset of the defense to the charge in this case, the Respondent made a Motion to Dismiss which the undersigned denied, based on his opinion that the general counsel and charging party had presented a "prima facie" case. Respondent's Defense to CA-1040 3/ Minnie Kownach, secretary to Mr. Robison for approximately three years, testified that on March 24, 1975, Larry Smith visited the office at approximately 2:30 p.m. She advised Mr. Robison of Mr. Smith's presence. Mr. Robison was in the office interviewing another teacher; she buzzed Mr. Robison and he asked her to tell Mr. Smith that he would be glad to see him at another time. She testified that Mr. Smith stayed in the office and at approximately 2:45 on that day, Ms. Disabato came down and she and Mr. Smith stayed until approximately 3:00. She testified that Mr. Smith did not make an appointment to see Mr. Robison on that date, i.e., March 24. Marsetta Haspelhorn, assistant principal at Schrader since January, 1974, testified that she was on the team with Ms. Disabato and Sharyn Watson for a period of time and that she observed Ms. Disabato's teaching. She testified that she had a conversation with Ms. Disabato about the non-renewal of her contract when she learned about it, and during a break during April, 1975, in the teachers' lounge, she asked Ms. Disabato not to file unfair labor practice charges inasmuch as it would "ruin her reputation." She testified that Ms. Disabato informed her the "the union would take care of her." She testified that she and Ms. Disabato are friends. She testified that Ms. Disabato is an effective teacher; however, her discipline leaves something to be desired. She testified that Ms. Disabato sometimes stops a pupil and tells him that he should not be doing something and that she is "harsh with the students." She testified that Ms. Disabato is vocal if another employee or person expresses views contrary to her own. She testified that she was aware that Ms. Disabato had problems with some teachers; however, she "got along with others", She testified that she and Ms. Disabato were not on good terms and that she did not try to help new teachers, whereas other teachers helped. She testified that Ms. Disabato was antagonistic towards Mr. Robison and that this attitude was pervasive and increased as the year progressed. She noted no change in the attitude or demeanor of employees since Mrs. Disabato's separation and that employees of Schrader are "always open." She testified that the employees never expressed any fear or reprisal for voicing complaints. She acknowledged that Mrs. Disabato was the building committee representative. She testified that Mrs. Disabato always questioned school practices during faculty meetings and that she did so more frequently than other employees. She testified that she was not a union member because she felt that she did not "need the union's backing." She testified that although no teachers other than Mrs. Disabato complained to Mr. Robison, they were not afraid of him. She testified that she never observed Mr. Robison refusing to speak to Mrs. Disabato or to introduce her. She testified that Mr. Robison omitted her name in an open house meeting and that she did not take it as an insult. She testified that Mrs. Disabato and Mrs. Radacky had a good relationship and that Mrs. Disabato approached Mrs. Radacky about the problem regarding the students missing the bus. However, she testified that she did not overhear Mrs. Disabato tell Mrs. Radacky not to take the students home. She testified that the separation of Mrs. Disabato has had no effect on the employees' freedom of expression at the school and that Culp was a building "rep" during the time that Mrs. Disabato was a building representative and is still employed and continues to serve as a building representative. She testified that Mrs. Disabato has an "explosive personality" and that if she cannot get things her way, she would walk away with a "sarcastic" look. The charging party introduced a telegram into evidence which purports to be a message to Mrs. Disabato signed by Carolyn White, Mary Garrison, Sue Walsh, Jane Foteys, Karen Johnson, Russ Willie, James Baretti, Tom Barnard, Gene Turner, over the Respondent's objection. The hearing officer received the exhibit into evidence. On cross examination Mrs. Haspelhorn testified that she did not know whether Mrs. Disabato was well thought of by her peers. She testified that she purchased a home from Mr. Robison. She testified that the problems of Mrs. Disabato and Mr. Robison related to school policies, and that the problems were not union related. She testified that she was unaware of Mrs. Disabato's union activities. She testified that Mrs. Disabato complained of school practices and often disagreed with school policy and that her disagreement was aired in a "loud tone." She testified that Mrs. Disabato told her that she would be employed by the union. She also testified that the other employees have not talked to her about Mrs. Disabato's separation. Leona Supurka, an elementary teacher at Schrader for the past two years, was called and testified that she has been employed in Maryland and in Pennsylvania as a teacher for approximately 16 years. She testified that she did not work in close proximity to the alleged discriminatee, and that she (Mrs. Disabato) did not offer any assistance to her. She testified that Mrs. Disabato's attitude toward the principal was rude and it was the type of rudeness in which she had never experienced a teacher voice to a principal. She testified that she was presented with a petition supportive of Mrs. Disabato on two separate occasions; that she refused to sign it and also that she resented being approached on two occasions by employees who felt that she should sign the petition. She also testified that Mrs. Disabato was disruptive and not always with, and in fact, frequently questioned school policies. She testified on cross examination that Mrs. Disabato offered no assistance to her. However, she also testified that no occasion arose wherein the alleged discriminatee would have needed to assist her. She testified that Mrs. Disabato expressed rude manners in faculty meeting on two occasions that she could recall In late September or early October, 1974. She testified that on one occasion Mrs. Disabato disagreed with the arrangement or timing of the lunch schedule and that Mrs. Disabato was insubordinate at faculty meetings. She testified that in her opinion, the employer is the boss and the employee should go along; that if there is disagreement, it should be voiced in a private conference. She testified that she was of the opinion that Mrs. Disabato was a disruptive influence on the faculty at Schrader and that she probably discussed this fact with Mr. Robison during the school year. Catherine O'Conner, an employee of approximately ten months in Pasco County, testified that she does not know Mrs. Disabato as a teacher, but that she was approached on two occasions to sign a petition supportive of Mrs. Disabato. She also testified that she felt intimidated by being approached on two separate occasions, inasmuch as she had voiced her opposition to signing the petition. Mrs. O'Conner testified that she did not know whether or not Mrs. Disabato was irrational or not and she was very vague about meetings regarding the presentation of contract to teachers within the "required" 30-day period. She testified that the contracts were presented later and that she was upset that the contracts were not presented timely. She could not recall if Mrs. Disabato assisted her when she became a teacher at Schrader. Larry Robison, the principal at Schrader, was called and testified that he received an evaluation by PCTA in mid-May, 1975. He testified that he was unaware that Mrs. Disabato was a union officer. He testified that his decision to non-renew Mrs. Disabato's contract had nothing to do with union activities. He testified and the record evidence shows (see Respondent's exhibit no. 4, which is received in evidence) that his overall rating was 3.4 out of a possible 5. He testified that he received his lowest evaluation in the areas of (1) reacting positively to constructive criticism; (2) seeks to lessen the non-teaching burden by avoiding excessive paper work and supervises without favoritism by equalizing teaching loads and administrative assignments. He testified that he was aware that Mrs. Disabato was a building rep and that she was a union member. He testified that in early 1974, Mrs. Disabato was very active in the union. He testified that he could have discussed Mrs. Disabato with other faculty members. He testified that he discharged Mrs. Disabato based on her behavior, her rudeness to students, her poor rapport with peers and uncooperativeness. He also testified that he also discharged her based on her difficulty with regard to "getting along with the administration." He testified that the Radacky incident played a small part of his decision to non-renew Mrs. Disabato's contract. Mr. Robison testified that he was the party who upset Mrs. Radacky during the incident. He testified that he left a note to Mrs. Radacky indicating that he was sorry that he caused her to be upset and that he was sorry that he had created discord with one of her peer groups. However, in an affidavit given to the Public Employees Relations Commission dated on or about May 29, he testified that the reason he discharged Mrs. Disabato was based on her harshness, her lack of cooperation, and interference with other affairs of the building that's none of her business. He later testified on redirect that she was not rehired because she was a building representative, nor did he observe any increase in her union activity during the prior year. On re-cross examination, he testified that he made the decision independently not to rehire Mrs. Disabato. Gary B. Potts, teacher-coach and department chairman, social studies, Hudson High School, testified that he knew Ron Eckstein and that he did not tell Ron Eckstein or anyone how he got to be department chairman. He testified that he received more votes than anyone in the recommendation to the principal for the social studies department chairmanship. He testified that he did not vote in the election and that there were perhaps five or six employees in the social studies department who would have been eligible to vote for the recommendation. He testified that prior to the election, there was a lot of conversation regarding the vote and as to how the department was being run under Mr. Eckstein's chairmanship. He testified that he talked to approximately two of the four or five employees in the social studies department regarding their vote and the chairmanship election and that on one occasion Mr. Coy Pigman, the principal, called him in to ask him if he would assume the chairmanship if offered. He also testified that he spoke to a Mr. Ronald Clayback, an employee in the math department. He testified that he was a union member, however, there was some mix up in his dues authorization and the authorization had not been either executed on time or the Respondent was not deducting the dues pursuant to his dues check off authorization. Margaret Rose De Jong, a teacher at Hudson Senior High School from July 1974 through November 1974, testified that she resigned her duties at Hudson due to Ronald Eckstein; however the reasons cited in her resignation indicated that she resigned due to health reasons. She testified that she disagreed with Ronald Eckstein and Mr. Sinholtz, also an employee instructor in the social studies department and when she attempted to interject new ideas in the classroom, they were met with extreme criticism from Eckstein and Sinholtz. She testified that Mr. Eckstein attempted to utilize the inquiry method in a classroom setting of approximately 40 to 50 students and that that procedure was not a proper one in a class of that size. On cross examination she testified that she never spoke to Mr. Pigman regarding the stated reasons in her resignation letter. She also testified that she suffered a miscarriage approximately one month after leaving her duties at the school. She testified that health reasons played no part in her decision to resign. Case No. 1037 Jerry Morriss, an employee of Gulf High School since 1970 and the current PCTA vice president testified that he served on the negotiating team and he was the chief negotiator for the parties current collective bargaining agreement. Morriss testified that the contract contains specific language pursuant to Florida Statutes 74.100 regarding sick leave, grievance procedure, etc. He testified that he had filed grievances and that he has known Ronald Eckstein since the 1973-74 school year. He testified that Eckstein became a union member in the summer of 1973, and that Coy Pigman, Principal, knew of Eckstein's union activities based on the fact that Eckstein was a building representative. In March 1975, he testified that Pigman told him that his attitude towards him had changed. He testified that Eckstein was Instrumental in filing a grievance protesting the overlap in the teachers work schedule i.e., the 5 period vs. the 6 period day. He testified that during March, 1975, Eckstein showed him a copy of what in actuality is a renewal of his employment status only on an annual contract basis as opposed to a continuing contract. He testified that Eckstein accepted the annual contract status inasmuch as he felt that it was his only employment opportunity as Mr. Pigman was not recommending him for employment on a continuing contract basis. He testified that Eckstein asked for but was not given a list of deficiencies. Sometime in April of 1975, he testified that the issue regarding Ronald Eckstein's renewal on an annual contract basis was brought up and he was of the opinion that Eckstein was entitled to a list of reasons as to what area(s) he was deficient in. He testified that he discussed procedural due process requirements and to that Pigman did not respond. He testified that Pigman sought his advice regarding Eckstein and Pigman indicated to him that Mr. Eckstein was "riling up". According to Morriss, Pigman told him that teachers should come to him individually and not collectively. He testified that the principal told him that Mr. Weightman, the superintendent, attempted to abort his contract. On cross examination he testified that he had no direct knowledge that Eckstein applied to the county for a continuing contract but that he was present when Eckstein accepted the 4th year annual contract employment. He reiterated the fact that the principal sought his advice on many matters. He testified that Eckstein was a good teacher and his performance was better than some teachers that Pigman gave continuing contract status. He testified that he informed Mr. Pigman that he was as good as Don Roland (apparently an employee whom Mr. Pigman had given a continuing contract) and that Pigman nodded in approval. On redirect Morriss testified that as a result of Mr. Eckstein's separation, the union was experiencing a more difficult time signing members, that employees are concerned about their union activities and the union is concerned about its loss in membership. Morriss testified that he did not feel inhibited. Ronald Eckstein, the alleged discriminatee herein, was a teacher at Pasco County for approximately 3 years and testified that he was County Social Studies Chairman during the school year 1973-74 and he was a member of the skills committee during the school year 1974-75. During the school year 1973- 74, he received the "Teacher of the Year" award at Hudson Senior High, he was a member of the chess club, the faculty scholarship fund, co-sponsor of the student government association, a union member since 1973, an executive board member, a county parliamentarian, building representative during the school year 1973- 74, an FEA member during school year 1973, chairman of the constitutional revision committee and during school year 1974-75, senior building representative which required him to coordinate all building representatives. In addition, he presented grievances to the principal and organized the teachers to support the principal, Coy Pigman, to the school board. He also testified that he informed the principal of the elected members of the PCTA. He testified that on one occasion, Pigman asked him how the collective bargaining agreement negotiations were going. Be also distributed union materials in the school and his picture is on the inside cover page of the collective bargaining agreement which is Petitioner's Exhibit no. 3 received in evidence. During January 1974, Mr. Pigman, the principal, asked Eckstein why were problems relayed through him. He testified that he handled complaints for both union as well as non-union members. His testimony is that during the late part of the 1974-75 school year, the principal told him that PCTA was drawing lines and that the principal associated him with the "Uniter", which is a union publication. Eckstein was evaluated by Mr. Pigman on approximately March 21, and at that time Mr. Pigman informed him that he was "having difficulty filling out his evaluation. He testified that Mr. Pigman questioned him regarding Pigman's receipt of an anonymous letter written by a parent which was critical of some teaching practices allegedly attributed to Mr. Eckstein. He testified that Mr. Pigman failed to be specific regarding any deficiencies that he might have in his teaching abilities. He testified that overall he was graded either excellent, outstanding or not applicable, but he was rated needed improvement in the areas of not accepting comments favorably and that Pigman indicated to him that his teaching methods were good and he was knowledgeable, active and reliable. He testified that Pigman informed him that he did not like to rate teachers exceptional or outstanding. Eckstein asked Pigman if he would receive continuing contract and he replied that he was having a "difficult time". Specifically, that he had a "feeling" which he (Pigman) could not put in words. Eckstein testified that he was told by Pigman that he was more effective than others whom he had given continuing contract status. Eckstein testified that he accepted the annual contract offer because he had no alternative and that when he asked Mr. Pigman for the reasons, he replied that he "was not obligated to state reasons for denial of continuing contract status". Eckstein asked Pigman for a letter indicating the reasons for the denial of continuing contract status and also that he was extremely concerned about Pigman's "feelings". Pigman replied that he thought it would be a good idea for him to serve a 4th year on annual contract status. He testified that during a meeting during the early part of the school year he was given a letter noting that he "failed to meet the educational requirements of the community". (See Charging Party's Exhibit No. 19 received in evidence.) During that same year Eckstein was not awarded the social studies department chairmanship. Eckstein testified that he did not attempt to grieve the non-renewal of the continuing contract or of his failure to be awarded the chairmanship. He testified that he was told (apparently by Pigman) that he was "too enthusiastic". Eckstein testified that the "too enthusiastic" remark related directly to his union activities; that he has been ostracized since the non-renewal of his continuing contract; that this event inhibited other employees from freely associating with him especially the annual contract teachers and that based on this action he was declined to serve as building representative. Eckstein testified that he was asked by Pigman whether or not he wrote various articles of the "Uniter". Coy Pigman, Principal, Hudson Senior High School for the past 2 years and prior thereto served as guidance counselor for approximately 3 years, was examined as an adverse witness based on his position as principal. Pigman testified that in making the recommendation for a continuing contract teacher he consults with his curriculum advisor and evaluates classroom performance as well as other responsibilities. He testified that he also consults with his assistant principal as to whether or not a particular employee he has in mind should receive a continuing contract. He testified that if an instructor is not given verbal or written deficiencies, he would expect that that teacher would expect to be renominated on a continuing contract basis. He testified that he prefers dealing with teachers on a professional basis rather than a written basis or via written communications. He testified that in evaluating instructors he utilized day to day staff contacts. He testified that he made the recommendation regarding the departmental chairmanships during the first two weeks in April testified that he rated Eckstein strongly but that after the evaluation he told him to be "more tactful". Pigman testified that it was not uncommon for instructional personnel to have personality differences but that several employees were forced to resign due to differences that they had with Eckstein. Pigman testified that the problems with regard to personality differences were personal in some instances, for example, a Mr. Corvalis, but that as the differences related to other staff instructional personnel, the problem was significant. He related an incident regarding Ms. De Jong, who testified that she was harassed and that Mr. Eckstein made her appear immature in the presence of fellow teachers, and that the curriculum assistant and the assistant principal made similar remarks to him. He testified that according to the resignations records, Ms. De Jong resigned based on ill health, however, in actuality, she resigned due to her differences with Eckstein. Pigman also related an incident regarding a student who had been sent to see the dean by Mr. Eckstein and when the dean, Gus Manticus, was informed that the student had filled out her own discipline slip, Mr. Manticus sent the student back to Mr. Eckstein's class. There-after, Mr. Eckstein approached Mr. Manticus and shouted, "Why did you send her back to my class" Pigman testified that he asked Mr. Eckstein to refrain from yelling at his dean, Mr. Manticus. Pigman testified that he granted Eckstein leave to attend the FEA convention and the he told Mr. Eckstein to keep politics out of the school. He said he did this on a precautionary measure and that to his knowledge the witness did not engage in any politics during school hours. He testified that during Mr. Eckstein's evaluation he noted the resignations that had allegedly been occasioned by difficulties regarding personality clashes and the anonymous letter received from a parent. He testified that he thought that Eckstein was in fact the teacher whom the letter was directed to because Virginia Collins (also an instructor at the school) indicated that she was having a difficult time with students following her lesson plans and that when he visited Mrs. Collins' class, one of the students stated Mr. Eckstein and gasped and closed his mouth in a surprised manner, which in Mr. Pigman's opinion concluded that Mr. Eckstein had in fact made a statement that students should be able to choose their lesson plans; that the students outnumbered the faculty and that in a democratic society they should be able to voice their opinions. Pigman testified that he used the evaluation form as a motivational item and that he gave Eckstein a 4th year annual contract due to differing philosophies and actions. He acknowledged the fact that Eckstein was not the only teacher whom he had differing philosophies with. Be noted that Eckstein was above average and that he possessed outstanding teaching abilities and techniques, that he was not irrational or militant. He testified that he denied Eckstein the chairmanship for the social studies department based on his non-recommendation to him by his fellow instructors. He testified that he rated Eckstein as needing improvement regarding students making their own decisions with regard to what they do in class. He also acknowledged the fact that he told Eckstein that he was "over zealous". He testified that he was aware that PCTA opposed the superintendent, Mr. Weightman's, nomination. Be also testified that he knew that Mr. Eckstein was actively involved in union activities. He further recalled meetings he had with Mr. Eckstein regarding the resolution of grievances. Pigman testified that he and Eckstein had a good relationship until school year 1974-75. He testified specifically that Eckstein was not given the chairmanship due to personnel problems and recommendations in the social studies department. He also emphasized that Eckstein possessed good abilities and techniques. Pigman testified that he was unaware that the professional practices code required him to give any instructor who requests such a list of written deficiencies. On cross examination, Pigman testified that he made the decision independently regarding appointing Eckstein as a annual contract teacher rather than a continuing contract teacher. Kenneth B. Sennholtz, Jr., an employee in the social studies department was called and testified that he has known Mr. Eckstein for approximately three years. He testified that he was present during the meeting with Mr. Pigman and Mr. Eckstein in which Eckstein received his evaluation. He also testified that during that same time he received his evaluation he and Eckstein reversed roles as witnesses for receipt of their evaluations. He testified that he was impressed that the principal liked the teaching techniques, the professional preparation of developing the social studies curriculum but that the principal stated that he had "this feeling" about Eckstein. He testified that he did not quite understand what Mr. Pigman's "feelings" were but that he knew that as a teacher, Mr. Eckstein was "more effective than other teachers". He testified that Mr. Pigman informed him that employees had left and that he knew they left but it's not Mr. Eckstein's fault; that Mr. Eckstein was not to blame and that Mrs. De Jong had personal illness. He testified that Mr. Pigman later learned that it was due to the difficulties that Mrs. De Jong and Mr. Eckstein were experiencing. Sennholtz testified that he asked Mr. Pigman why he wasn't advised that other members on the social studies staff were having difficulties with him whereupon Mr. Pigman indicated that he felt that they were not that important. Sennholtz testified that Eckstein was rated outstanding or one below in most categories and that he was not aware of or knew exactly how to incorporate Pigman's "feelings" into the evaluation form. He testified that Pigman indicated reservations about filling in needs improvement on the evaluation but that he did not know where else to put it. He testified that Eckstein was not given his evaluation but he was permitted to look through his personnel file. He testified that Pigman informed him that form A was strictly an "inhouse" form and that it would not be placed in Eckstein's personnel file. On form B Eckstein was rated outstanding or exceptional in all ranges. Sennholtz testified that Eckstein asked Pigman if he would be considered for continuing contract and he replied that it was "a difficult question". Sennholtz testified that Mr. Pigman informed him that he intended to align himself with Mr. Weightman during the coming school board election and that he was aware that he, Eckstein and the union actively supported the incumbent superintendent Ray Stuart. Pigman advised Mr. Sennholtz that he would not hold his or Eckstein's political differences against them. He testified that Pigman's philosophy was one of "fitting students into the society" whereas Eckstein's philosophy was one of "developing students to their maximum potential; that society is dynamic and students should be so prepared". Sennholtz also testified that Eckstein and he had done an excellent job in dealing with controversial issues which Pigman noted and that he would handle such issues in a similar manner if he was in a classroom. Sometime during October, 1974, Pigman and Sennholtz had a conference regarding the anonymous letter which is charging party's exhibit no. 20 received in evidence. According to Sennholtz, Pigman called a conference to rebut or to be prepared for any charges that might arise as a result of the "anonymous" letter, and that he paid little credence to the letter inasmuch as the party failed to identify themselves and further that the comments would not be used against them in any manner. Sennholtz related an incident regarding a problem with the stage door during a play in which Mr. Eckstein was involved. He testified that Manticus slammed the door and the door fell down and Eckstein indicated to Manticus that the door was important whereas Manticus jokingly said that "he would fix it; it's simple to fix." Eckstein disagreed but remained calm according to Sennholtz. Sennholtz testified and the evidence is clear that the Pasco County Teachers Association supported the incumbent superintendent Steward whereas Corvalis, according to Sennholtz, stated that the union should not endorse a candidate but that if one was in fact endorsed, it should be Mr. Weightman. Sennholtz testified that Eckstein and De Jong had little or no contact but that he and De Jong worked together as a team. He testified that De Jong wasn't happy because there was a lack of independence with regard to the track program and that Eckstein modified the program to satisfy Mrs. De Jong. He testified as to problems, small problems, with Lucinda South but that they were basically political and philosophical differences and that as to the alleged difficulty with Virginia Collins, Eckstein and she are good friends. Sennholtz related his opinion that Eckstein's demotion inhibited the employee association; that they fear reprisals and that its difficult to recruit building representatives because they are fearful of criticizing board policies. He testified that he is more cautious in his dealing with school rules and regulations because he does not want to inadvertently violate a rule or regulation which could be regarded as "just cause" for his dismissal. On cross examination he testified that he had no knowledge of any family problems that existed between Eckstein and his wife and that they are mutual friends; that he (Eckstein) according to his information, was experiencing no financial difficulties, that he recently purchased a home and was thinking of purchasing a pool etc. He also testified that he attached little credence to the 'anonymous' letter and also the principal asked them to "forget about it." He testified also that Potts asked Eckstein why wasn't he selected chairperson inasmuch as Potts was only at the school approximately 1 year whereas Eckstein was a better teacher and that the opposition (to Mr. Weightman) resulted in discrimination, i.e., quasielective (appointive) positions were given to those who supported Mr. Weightman, i.e., the dean, the assistant principal, etc. He testified that no union member was given a higher position than they previously held after January, 1975. He testified that after Eckstein's nonrenewal of continuing contract, it is difficult to solicit union members. He also testified that Weightman advised employees to cancel their dues authorization forms. He testified that he noticed that Eckstein had gone through an entire school year receiving commendations and was suddenly "framed." He testified that Pigman asked Eckstein for a copy of the collective bargaining law in January and Eckstein gave a copy to Pigman. He testified that Pigman forced his respect and acknowledged the right of employees to have philosophical differences and that he (Pigman) advised that he noted "an appreciable increase in his union activities." He testified that he and Eckstein supported Mr. Pigman in obtaining the principalship at his school. He testified that Pigman felt that he was being put up to do things by Mr. Eckstein. He also testified that Pigman was given a copy of all union materials and that Mr. Eckstein was told to report directly to him. Respondent's defense to CA 1037 Richard Coot, Assistant Principal, Hudson Senior High School testified that he tallied the votes in the social studies department. The evidence surrounding the tally is reflected in Respondent's Exhibit no. 5 admitted into evidence over the objection of the Charging Party based on the fact that copies were not the "best evidence." Coot testified that he tallied the ballots on or about April 15. Coy Pigman was recalled and testified that he was aware that both De Jong and Kratovill resigned due to difficulties with Eckstein. He denied telling anyone that he placed instructor Rodey on continuing contract status although he was a better teacher than Eckstein. Pigman testified that he received an overall evaluation of 2.6 by PCTA. Pigman testified that Eckstein's union activities played no part in his decision to not renew his continuing contract. He testified on cross examination that Eckstein cooperated with him on filling out discipline slips and he also indicated he asked Rose De Jong to write a list of difficulties that she had with Ronald Eckstein. He testified that he was unaware of any health problems of Mrs. De Jong however in later testimony, he acknowledged that he was aware that health problems existed at the time of her resignation. He was unclear as to whether he was testifying that the health problem played a part but that the health reason would be the easiest way out rather than to cite the health reason which then would just be a pretext for the real reason i.e. the difficulty with Ronald Eckstein. He testified that in March, 1975, the determination was made that based on projections that at least two new teachers would be needed in the social studies department, however, the two individuals who allegedly would be permitted to vote (recommend) were not told that they would be in the social studies department. Specifically, the record tends to indicate that they were Mr. Carvealis and Mr. Manticus. He testified that he made an error in his affidavit and that there was no rating of the social studies department chairmanship recommendations. He states that he appointed Potts as chairmen of the social studies department because in his opinion "he was a better teacher than Eckstein." Case No. 1041 Fred Rydzik was employed by the county in September of 1973, as a substitute teacher and approximately 10 days later he was appointed a full time substitute teacher. Thereafter in January of 1973, he was appointed to a full time position and he was employed through June 30, 1975. His lest employment was at Gulf Jr. High School where his principal was James Campbell. Rydzik served as co-sponsor for the conservation club during the school year 74-75, he sponsored several field trips, managed the publication of the yearbook for the school year 74-75 end in order to do this, he gave up his planning period. He was also on the guidance committee, coach for the "powder puff" football team, chairman of the tutorial committee based on the selection by the guidance counselor, director of the energy management center and he taught power and industrial arts as a substitute teacher. As a full time instructor, Rydzik taught English and Personal Development. He testified that during his evaluation by Mr. Campbell, he was asked to sign blank evaluation forms in Spring 1974. He was evaluated as being effective. Rydzik refused to sign blank forms because in his mind it was not a proper thing to do based on his prior military experience. During the spring of 1974, he became involved with employees who were trying to form an affiliate of the American Federation of Teachers (a labor organization). He testified that several co-workers approached him about forming an affiliate and during the summer of 1974, in a conversation with Campbell, Campbell spoke to him about the union not being viable. Campbell, according to Rydzik concurred and suggested some building association (i.e. an in-house employee group) rather than a union. During the fall of 1974, he testified that Monique Lefebre, his department chairman, told him that he would have to wear a tie. Thereafter he was called into the office and was asked by Campbell "why wasn't he wearing a tie?" Campbell told him that "he would wear a tie." Rydzik testified that he was unaware of any rule or regulation which prohibited an instructor from coming to school without wearing a tie however he complied with Campbell's directive. The effort to form an affiliate of AFT was unsuccessful although Rydzik testified that he successfully solicited and obtained signed authorization cards for approximately 160 employees. He testified that the AFT president denied a charter to Pasco County, due to political infights. In late September, 1974, Rydzik spoke to PCTA's president Larry Smith about merging the solicited employees with PCTA and that conversation resulted in the solicited employees merging and joining PCTA as a joint group. Rydzik testified that Campbell was aware of his union activities based on conversations he had with him and because his name appeared on various flier's which were distributed throughout the school. Rydzik testified that during early spring 1975, he spoke at a faculty meeting regarding a union meeting and the principal told the faculty that they didn't have to remain whereas they had been asked to remain for other activities such as pitches for the sale of life insurance and cookware sales and other utensils on the school's proper. Rydzik testified that he was rated effective in most areas in his evaluation but that he was rated as needing improvement in the area of turning in his plan book. Rydzik testified that he asked Campbell what he meant about needing improvement and Campbell replied that "he heard that his plan book was on most occasions, turned in late." He testified that his plan book would be one or two days late. Rydzik testified that in order to rectify his problems regarding his plan book, he talked to various experienced teachers who shared ideas and that each teacher who observed his plan book indicated that his plan books were better than most. He testified that two week units, a planning period, was a requirement whereas he was required to submit three week units and that his percentages were always rejected whereas other teachers were not. Rydzik testified that he did not grieve his problems regarding his plan book because of his annual contract status and also because various teachers warned against grieving that matter. Rydzik testified that criticisms regarding his plan book grew worse as the year proceeded and although he tried to correct whatever problems he experienced, he was never able to do so. He testified that to his knowledge, he was never personally observed by Mr. Campbell or Mrs. Lefebre in the classroom. However, he testified that during his evaluation he was told that "he had a good class." During the evaluation he was criticized about not patrolling bathroom duties as scheduled, however, he testified that he in fact followed the schedule. Rydzik testified that he was tardy approximately six times during the school year (school started at 6:30 am.). He states that on two occasions he was late approximately 15 minutes, and four or five times he was late less then 10 minutes. He also testified that on two occasions he was late as much or more than an hour. 4/ On April 2, 1975, Rydzik returned to work after having been on a 15 day off duty track and was at the time told by Campbell that he would not be recommended for employment. Rydzik asked Campbell why he was not being recommended for employment for the coming school year and Campbell replied "he could get someone better all around." Rydzik testified that he and other union members including Larry Smith, had discussed this problem and Smith informed him that he would not file a grievance inasmuch as similar grievances had been rejected by Respondent. He testified that Campbell informed him that he would reply to his request for a written list of deficiencies but Campbell never replied. He testified that he was a member of the bargaining team, that proposals were formulated sometime in January, 1975, and the bargaining sessions commenced during the spring of that year. In addition to serving on the bargaining team, Rydzik ran for the union vice president but lost that election. Rydzik testified that he received his second evaluation which is Charging Parties no. 25 received in evidence on the date therein noted although the date of the writing is different from the date that he actually received it. That is, the observation period as reflected on the exhibit covers a period from June 1974 thru June 1975 whereas Rydzik received it on April 22, 1975. Rydzik testified that he was regarded as the information source regarding any contract problem and fellow employees constantly inquired of him the status of the contract. He testified that the Math Department Head, Mr. Gibson, inquired of him regarding suggestions during January thru March of 1975, and he was viewed by him as a leader regarding contractual knowledge. Charging Parties no. 26 is a petition supportive of Rydzik and is signed by approximately 35 of the 60 instructors. Rydzik testified that employees were fearful to associate with him especially the annual contract teachers due to their financial obligations. He testified that several employees indicated that "if the union could not protect its own certainly it could not protect them." Rydzik testified that Mike Thomas of PCTA cautioned against his taking an active role in the union inasmuch as he was on annual contract rather than other employees who had tenure and could provide the leadership. James Campbell, the principal since February, 1972, was called and examined as an adverse witness. Campbell testified that there are approximately 75 instructional personnel including the support personnel. He testified that he evaluates on the basis of his daily observation of employees end that he hired Rydzik based on a recommendation of a Mr. Tucker. He testified that he evaluated Rydzik at least once although according to regulations he was required to do so at least three times per year. Charging Parties no. 27 received into evidence is the evaluation of Fred Rydzik. Campbell testified that he rated Rydzik in the low to strong areas in most categories and that he was "satisfied with his work." He denied ever asking Rydzik to sign a blank evaluation form. He recalled calling Rydzik in to discuss the incident regarding his not wearing a tie during school hours. He testified that Rydzik informed him that he could grieve the matter but that he would wear a tie until the grievance was resolved favorably on his behalf. He recalled the faculty meeting wherein Rydzik was introduced as a union representative. He testified that he called Rydzik in to inform him of his tardiness and his failure to fulfill his bathroom duties. He testified that Rydzik was late as much as 5 minutes on two occasions and 30 minutes on several occasions; he also recalled the problem with regard to Rydzik's planbook. He testified that his rapport was somewhat weak in that he failed to speak with and listen to his department head. The only deficiency notes on his evaluation was lateness in turning in his planbook. He was aware of no other instructional personnel that Rydzik had problems with. Campbell testified that Rydzik inquired why he was not being recommended for employment for the coming school year whereupon he informed him that it was a personnel cutback. He testified that he lost a total of six employees and he filled three of those positions which included a Spanish instructor and an industrial arts instructor. He testified that Rydzik was not appointed or recruited for the industrial arts position inasmuch as he lacked state certification in industrial arts. Campbell testified that he did not respond to Rydzik's request for a written list of deficiencies because he felt that that was "within his discretion." Campbell testified that he did not personally observe Rydzik. He testified that he would see Rydzik in the hall and around the campus but he relied on the evaluations of his curriculum assistant and the assistant principal and it was his own decision not to rehire Rydzik based on his discretionary authority. Campbell testified that he retained teachers normally with effective evaluations. Campbell testified that from the period of March 21, which was the date of his first evaluation of Rydzik thru April 2, 1975, which was the period that he made the decision not to renew or rehire him, he witnessed no improvement in Rydzik's tardiness, his bathroom duties or his plan book difficulties. Campbell also denied that he told Rydzik that he preferred a local building representative rather than a union. With regard to Rydzik's protest of the failure to provide english books to each student, Campbell testified that he referred the letter to the language arts department wherein they advised that books would not be a worthwhile expenditure for the current year but the parties did agree to provide books for the coming school year. Campbell indicated however that he did not respond to the union's letter concerning this problem. He testified that he is of the opinion that he is an administrator and the department head can best determine the needs of students due to their daily contact. Campbell testified that he was never told by Dr. Forguson that the discharge of Rydzik was not a grievable matter. Campbell admits having knowledge of Rydzik's union activities and also of knowing that Rydzik and others were interested in breaking away from PCTA and forming an affiliate of FTA. Campbell testified that he was unaware of Rydzik's relationship with his peers or what they thought of him personally. Campbell testified that he did not personally observe Rydzik's plan book prior to his determination to not renew his contract. Campbell testified that he was rated by PCTA in June and that his overall rating was 3.6. Linda Elkins, an art teacher of approximately 5 years and who is on continuing contract has known Rydzik for approximately 1 year. Elkins testified that she approached Rydzik regarding forcing a union and that he attended several meetings with officials of AFT. She testified that Rydzik was very active in the union's organizational drive. Elkins testified that she had a son who was one of Rydzik's students end he rated Rydzik as the "top teacher" of the school. She testified that she taught some of the same students as Rydzik and she heard favorable comments from several students regarding his teaching ability. She testified that she observed Rydzik's plan book and it was more thorough then many others whose plan books were approved and she was accordingly led to believe that Rydzik was about to be "axed." She also testified that it was probably true that Rydzik should not have played an active role in the union drive. She testified that since the discharge of Rydzik, most employees without continuing contracts status are afraid to participate in collective activities. On cross examination, she testified that several employees informed her that inasmuch as they were on annual contracts they would not sign the petition supportive of Rydzik. She testified that over 100 students commended Rydzik on his teaching abilities. Elkins testified that she was late and she received a note cautioning her to not be late again. She reiterated the fact that morale seemed to drop after Rydzik's separation. Donald W. Livesey, an employee for approximately 5 years was called and examined as follows: Livesey testified that Rydzik assisted him in trying to bring an affiliate of AFT into the school. He testified that Rydzik solicited him to join the union and that Rydzik got along with most employees. He testified that Rydzik "could have had a problem with his department head, Monique Lefebre." He testified that Rydzik asked to borrow his plan book which he loaned to him. He testified that Rydzik took his plan book home and based on his observation of Rydzik's plan book, it was better than most teachers. He testified that Rydzik was one of the "better dressed teachers in the school," end the parents often expressed a desire to have him teach school there based on his good rapport with kids. He testified that Rydzik was very active in all the plans and extra curricular activities end that his plan beak was very good. He expressed the opinion that Rydzik was a "superior teacher" and does not remember Rydzik not being on bathroom duty. He testified that during early 1975, the tension mounted after the commencement of collective bargaining negotiations. He also testified that a co-employee, a Mrs. Snell, did not sign a petition supportive of Rydzik until she was informed that she would be recommended for employment for the coming school year. He stated that it is common knowledge throughout the school that employees fear reprisals for testifying and they are expressing tenseness due to Rydzik's separation. He expressed his opinion that Rydzik was terminated due to his union activities. On cross examination he reiterated basically the same testimony that he testified to on direct. Barbara Snell, an employee at Hudson High School for approximately 3 years was called next and examined as follows: Snell testified that she had been tardy approximately 6 times during the period from July 1, 1974 thru April 1, 1975. She testified that she arrived earlier on numerous occasions, approximately 10 minutes and she on occasions remained late. She testified that she shared bathroom duty with Rydzik and that because she knew that they were being watched, she made a special effort to avoid being remiss in her bathroom duties. She testified that she could overhear Mr. Rydzik's class lectures because their planning periods were staggered and in her opinion Mr. Rydzik was "one of the best teachers she had seen". She testified that she feared reprisals from her employer due to the fact that she is an annual contract teacher. She voiced her opinion that the atmosphere around the campus has been somewhat tense and the employees fear being critical of the principal, Mr. Campbell. She testified that she signed the petition supportive of Mr. Rydzik after she had been rehired for the current school year. Bruce Bluebaum, a math teacher of approximately 4 years was called and testified that he knew Mr. Rydzik and that their homerooms were on opposite sides of the hall facing each other. He testified that on numerous occasions he observed Mr. Rydzik on bathroom duty and he was always in and around the bathroom during the class period changes. He testified that students liked Rydzik very much and always "flocked around him". Bluebaum testified that Rydzik worked diligently about his planbook and in his opinion, his plan book was excellent. He testified that Rydzik's planbook would always be turned down based on the dislike that existed between Mrs. Lefebre, his department head, and he. He opined that Mrs. Lefebre would search to find a way of "axing him". He testified that Rydzik was regarded as the "leader in the school". As to Rydzik's teaching abilities, he related an incident wherein he put on a mock trial and he also generally stated that Rydzik was "very innovative and a very good teacher". He gave the opinion that Rydzik was dismissed because he was "too vocal" in union activities and due to the dislike of him by his department head. On cross examination, he also opined that the teachers around the campus felt that the principal, Mr. Campbell, was led astray and made the wrong decision with regard to discharging or, that is, not rehiring Rydzik. He testified that when a union meeting was announced, Mr. Campbell would make the announcement in a manner which tended to show that he somewhat disliked having union meetings held on the campus facility whereas employees were asked or "forced" to sit through meetings regarding sales of "pot and pans". He indicated this same procedure with regard to insurance sales. Bluebaum testified that grievances were not well accepted around Gulf High School. Ruth J. Morris, a community school manager and employed at Gulf Junior High for approximately 9 years testified that she has known Fred Rydzik for approximately 2 years. Morris is presently the school's building representative. She testified that she had dealt with the principal, Mr. Campbell, on numerous occasions and she has assisted in the development of evaluation forms. She testified that evaluations tend to lose their worth because "different standards are used" nor do principals place much reliance on evaluations but that a new teacher will tend to feel that if they are not evaluated highly, it will play some important role in whether or not they will be rehired the next year. She testified that she evaluated Mr. Rydzik's planbook and told him that it was excellent. She testified that the employees in her opinion were afraid of criticizing Mr. Campbell but in cross examination she also testified that complaints were received satisfactorily by him. Campbell, she noted, was rated very good in an evaluation conducted by PCTA. Respondent's Defense to CA-1041 Monique Lefebre, Department Chairman, Social Science at Crawford Junior High School, has served in that capacity for approximately 5 years. She was the alleged discriminatee, Fred Rydzik's department chairman. Lafebre testified that Rydzik turned in his planbook only once or twice and that she did not talk to him about not timely turning in his planbook. She testified that initially Rydzik failed to perform his bathroom duty but that after warning him, he fulfilled his duties in that regard. This was noticed by her particularly after Rydzik received his mid-term evaluation. Lefebre also testified that she noted certain deficiencies in Rydzik's planbook percentages and that based or the manner in which she criticized them, there was no way that he could correct the deficiencies inasmuch as the time period had passed wherein such deficiencies could have been corrected. She testified that during a faculty meeting at the early part of the school year, male instructional personnel were told to wear a tie during school hours and to refrain from walking out of the faculty lounge with coffee. She testified that she observed Rydzik not wearing a tie for a period of approximately 15 days after this rule was announced and when she spoke to him about not wearing a tie and he failed to heed her advice, she then spoke to the principal. She testified she was aware that other teachers violated the coffee rule also although she did not personally see them. She testified that this was an unwritten rule and to the best of her recollection Rydzik was not present when the principal announced the rules regarding males wearing a tie or that they were not to walk out of the faculty lounge with coffee. She testified that the problem with regard to Rydzik not performing his bathroom patrolling occurred during the early part of the year, perhaps in late August or early September but that after he was evaluated during the early part of the year she did not notice him failing to perform his bathroom duty. James Campbell, the principal at Gulf, indicates that the sign in sign out sheets have been in effect for quite some time at the school. Respondent's exhibit no. 9 reflects inter alia, the sign in - sign out records of Rydzik and other instructional personnel at the school. He testified that he noted on a few occasions Rydzik would write in or drawn in a "smiling face" in the spot where he was to sign in. Campbell testified that based on his calculation Rydzik was late on approximately 51 occasions during the school year and that 3 occasions his secretary called him and he was late for as much as one hour. Campbell was rated by PCTA and on that evaluation form he was rated 3.6 of a possible 5. (See Respondent's exhibit no. 10, received in evidence). Campbell testified that union activities played no part in his decision to not rehire Rydzik nor did he have any knowledge as to Rydzik's serving as a building representative or running for any union office. On cross examination, Campbell testified he evaluated Rydzik on or about September 22 and his final evaluation came approximately 3 weeks later. He testified that in his opinion, 3 weeks was sufficient for Rydzik to correct any deficiencies noted on his evaluation. Campbell testified that school officially starts at 6:30 and homeroom begins approximately 6:45 a.m. He also testified that during the early part of the school year the time clock was not working and a small clock was used to apprise the employees of the correct time. A casual or cursory look at the time sheets indicates that there were a number of instructors who were late and that the correct time was not always adhered to nor was there any rigid policing of the time sheets. That is to say that instructors would often record that they would come in at say 6:30 a.m. whereas they might in fact arrive at 5:30 a.m. or on the other hand they might arrive at 6:45 a.m. and the same is true for signing out. Specifically employees may sign out at 2:00 and leave the building at say 1:30 or they may leave as late as 4:00. Campbell testified that he did net regard the fact that employees signed in when in fact they arrived earlier than that period as being violative of the "sign-in" rule and that the only objection he had to such procedure was a situation where for example a faculty member would leave the school say at 1:40 and sign out at 2:00. The records reflect that other employees were late a number of times. One case in point is Lucia Adkinson. Her time sheet reflects that she was late as much as 27 times during the past school year for a total of 665 minutes. The record also reflects that there was no method whereby one could determine whether employees were late or whether they were out on school business. Campbell's testimony regarding the sign-in, or time sheets reflect that a number of employees were late and this can be established by looking at the time sheets for Gene Lydman, Debbie Snyder, Mrs. Fisk, William Lynch, and a number of other employees, too numerous to recite herein. It was also noted that the time sheets are recorded in pencil and are easily distorted and difficult to determine if in fact an alteration has been made. Testimony was also heard by Campbell that on the PCTA evaluation form his lowest rating was in the area of "evaluating objectively after sufficient observation". Dr. Ferguson was called and testified that based on an examination after the hearing in the subject case commenced, he was able to determine that 5 employees were promoted to managerial or non-unit positions after Mr. Weightman was nominated. He testified that one employee was put on 4th year continuing contract and served as a building representative rather than on annual contract. He testified that throughout the county, approximately 19 annual contract teachers were not rehired and that 7 teachers were put on 4th year annual contracts. He testified that an examination of the school boards records indicate that on June, 1975, there were approximately 590 employees on dues check off and that on July 28th the number was 429 employees and the 429 figure does not reflect those employees who were serving on D track. Ferguson testified that the only alleged discriminatee that he knew was Ron Eckstein and this knowledge came from observing his picture in the collective bargaining agreement which is charging parties exhibit no. 3 received in evidence. At the conclusion of case numbers 1037; 1040 and 1041, counsel for Respondent asked the hearing officer to take official notice of the official regulations of the Department of Education and official notice of Florida Statutes 447. Thereafter Respondent rested as to cases 1037; 1040 end 1041. General Counsel end Charging Party's rebuttal in cases 1037, 1040 and 1041 Ronald Claybeck, an unemployed male teacher who served the previous school year at Hudson Senior High testified that his prior experience included serving as a teacher in New York State's school system for approximately 12 years. Claybeck testified as to conversations preceding the election and subsequent to the election of the social studies chairmen at Ronald Eckstein's school. Claybeck testified that there were conversations regarding the number of possible ballots to be cast regarding the recommendation to the principal for the social studies chairmanship and there was some discussion as to whether two deans who were working in the social studies or other departments would be permitted to vote. Those individuals are a Mr. Carvealis and a Mr. Menticus. He said the conversation was generally that the two deans would be permitted to vote in the election. He testified that Carvealis indicated that he would vote for Potts who in fact received the chairmanship due to a personality clash that Carvealis had with Eckstein. Clayback expressed a reluctance to testify end in fact testified under subpoena because he "feared his wife's job (an elementary teacher at Hudson Elementary School)." Claybeck testified that he and Potts are neighbors and that Potts told him that Eckstein was "a competent teacher end that he (Potts) indicated as much to the principal, Coy Pigman". He testified that Potts indicated to him that he was called in by Pigman and asked if he wanted the chairmanship. Clayback testified that Potts remained neutral as to the chairmanship because Eckstein was a good teacher although he differed with him regarding his teaching methods. Clayback testified that it was obvious that Carvealis and Eckstein did not agree with each other. Clayback testified that another factor leading to his reluctance to testify was occasioned by the fact that he was called approximately two days before his appearance and he had an unlisted phone number. He testified that he was told that if he testified, "his wife's job would be in jeopardy". On redirect examination Clayback testified that he attended the union hall and was given a subpoena by Mr. Matthew, charging parties' attorney and he also gave his phone number to Larry Smith, union president. Fred Rydzik was also recalled and testified that he was not given a new school book by his department head, Mrs. Lefebre. Rydzik also testified he was not evaluated by Lefebre, nor did she assist or advise him of his duties nor did she tell him that he was deficient. Rydzik testified that he turned his planbook in approximately 12 times at 3 week intervals as per the schedule and that to the best of his recollection he failed to turn the planbook in only on two occasions meaning that he in fact turned the planbook in approximately 10 times. He testified that his planbook was never approved by Mrs. Lefebre. He testified that he was unaware of any dress code relating to males wearing a tie. He also denied that he failed to wear a tie on 15 occasions as testified to by Mrs. Lefebre. Mr. Rydzik also denied taking coffee to areas other than the yearbook planning and production area and that he served his bathroom duty daily. Rydzik testified that the schedule relating to patrolling the bathroom and the hall was "a loose schedule". Rydzik testified that on 3 occasions the office secretary called and informed him that he forgot to sign in and in those instances, his entry for signing in remained blank. He testified that he was late on no more than seven occasions and this was for a period of 5 minutes or so. He testified that there were approximately 3 times that he was late as much as 1 hour and that his examination of the time sheets indicate that there were approximately 12 alterations. On redirect examination, Rydzik testified that sometime in January, 1975, Campbell told the employees that they would not sign others out and that he obeyed this mandate. Josephine Lofland was also called to testify and testified that it was common practice to sign in at the proper time even though employees did not always arrive at the time recorded. She testified that on example of this was Art Engle, a curriculum coordinator who was late on several occasions according to a Mrs. Williams. This concluded the evidence taken in cases 1037, 1040 and 1041. Case Number Ca-1062 and Case Number CA-1082 Larry Smith, the union president was called and testified that he assisted in the negotiations for end ratification of the current collective bargaining agreement. (Charging Parties' exhibit no. 3). Smith testified that both parties were pleased to ratify the contract and they discussed the amiable relationship that existed based on the contract. Smith testified that good faith bargaining existed through November, 1974, end that the union supported the incumbent superintendent, Ray Stewart, actively. Smith testified that he started working with the newly elected superintendent Weightman, late in November, 1974. Smith testified that in late January or early February, 1975, the negotiations and the atmosphere appeared to, in his opinion, "breakdown." He testified that he requested voluntary recognition and that he presented to Dr. Ferguson, the Respondent's designated collective bargaining agent, approximately 90 percent of the employees who had executed authorization forms. He testified that Dr. Ferguson recommended recognition be granted on a voluntary basis. Accordingly, PCTA was certified by PERC on April 17, 1975. Negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement began on or about April 24, 1975, and a mediator was assigned approximately 60 days thereafter, after the parties had reached an impasse. Smith testified that he contacted a mediator and the mediator indicated that he would be pleased to assist the parties at arriving at a settlement but based on his experience in the mediation field, it would be fruitless to do so unless he was requested jointly by both parties. Smith testified that a special master was assigned sometime in early July, 1975. Smith testified that he received a written authorization from Mr. Weightman designating Ferguson as the school board's agent for collective bargaining. Smith testified that he was present at all the negotiations and acted as the union's chief spokesman. The proposal submitted by the union included salary and increment proposals, planning days etc. Smith testified that at a school board meeting on or about May 6, 1975, the school board, over his objection, adopted the proposed schedule as provided in the old collective bargaining agreement i.e., (Charging Parties' exhibit no. 3). Smith indicated that this objection came through oral objection and by a letter sent to Mr. Ferguson prior to May 6. Smith testified that Ferguson was not prepared to and did not present salary proposals, based on a claim that the parties or the school board did not know its true financial condition. Smith testified that at no time did the union waive its right on salaries, planning days or salary increments. He testified that increments were cut by approximately 5 percent and instructional personnel salaries were frozen at the old rate. Smith recalls making an objection after he was shown charging parties' exhibit no. 33 which was received in evidence. Smith testified that he had no indication that check off authorizations would be revoked prior to the cut off by the school board. Charging parties' exhibit no. 33 received in evidence is a reflection of the evidence regarding dues check off. Smith testified that he advised Ferguson that the dues authorizations were continuous in nature and that article 2, section 2, page 3 of charging parties' exhibit no. 3 in fact provides for continuous check off. Smith testified that he was afforded a short period i.e., from July 28th thru August 5th to sign the D Track teachers and this is evidenced by charging parties' exhibit no. 34 received in evidence. He testified that he expressed concern about the short period of time to Dr. Ferguson. The testimony indicated that D Track teachers were off duty during the period In question and therefore they had to be contacted either at their homes or through other means. Smith testified that he thereafter contacted PERC regarding the dues check off problem and PERC indicated its opinion which in essence is an advisory opinion indicating that in its opinion the dues check off authorizations were not in violation of Florida Statutes, 74, Chapter 100. On cross examination Smith reiterated the fact that after Mr. Weightman took office the bargaining relation ship appeared to "breakdown." Smith testified that on July 2, Dr. Ferguson advised him that if employees were not signed by the date indicated in his letter i.e., August 5, they would not be deducted.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings and conclusions I hereby recommend that the Public Employees Relations Commission enter an order finding that the actions by Respondent, as set forth above and more specifically in the subject administrative complaints, constitute unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 447.501(1)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes, as alleged. RECOMMENDED this 28th day of April, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675
Findings Of Fact Jurisdiction The complaint alleges, the Respondent admits and I find that it is a public employer within the meaning of Section 447.203(2) of the Act. The Employee Organization Involved The complaint alleges, the parties admit, and I find that the Charging Party is now and has been at all times material herein, an employee organization within the meaning of Section 447.203(10) of the Act. In addition, the complaint alleges, the Respondent admits, and I find that the Charging Party is now, and has been at all times material herein, a certified representative for the purposes of collective bargaining for all employees employed by the Duval County School Board in the following described unit: INCLUDED: Classroom teachers: nursery, kindergarten, elementary (primary 1-3), elementary (intermediate 4-6), elementary (1-6), junior high (7-9), senior high (10-12), driver education, exceptional (special education), remedial, resource (art, music, etc.), vocational-home econo- mics, vocational distributive, vocational agriculture, vocational trade and indus- trial, vocational technical, office educa- tion, industrial arts, manpower and diver- sified (DCT), guidance counselors, occupa- tional specialists, media specialists, specialists-other, instructional, TV instructor, other instructional (except administrative assistants). EXCLUDED: Associate superintendents, general directors, directors, supervisors, coordi- nators, specialists, community school "coordinators", principals and assistant principals, and administrative assistants. The Charging Party was certified as representative of the above named employees on March 24, 1975, following voluntary recognition by Respondent. The Charging Party and Respondent were parties to a collective bargaining agreement effective July 1, 1975, which expired June 30. On March 16, Duval Teachers United's President, James W. Geiger (DTU) called Respondent's superintendent, Herb A. Sang and requested that collective bargaining for a successor agreement begin as soon as possible. Geiger suggested that bargaining commence during the first week in April which was rejected by Sang. After two other suggestions by Geiger, the parties agreed to meet on April 22, and the session opened with the introduction of the respective bargaining team members and an introductory statement by Robert B. Bates, Chief Negotiator for DTU. At the outset, Bates initially alluded to the fact that a few days prior, superintendent Sang had publicly attacked him as a "outside agitator and hired gun and that the DTU was coming to the table to pick the pockets of the taxpayers." Bates advised the Respondent's team that despite the public attack, mutual trust was essential to the negotiation process and that both sides should refrain from making such attacks in the future. Thereafter negotiations began by discussion of the ground rules which had been presented by Respondent and had been used in the previous year's negotiations. The first ground rule proposal stated that each negotiating session would be scheduled at a mutually agreeable date, time and place which would be determined at the preceding session. Bates expressed reservations about daily scheduling in light of his commitment to negotiate an agreement in St. Louis, Missouri. After some discussion with DTU President Geiger, Bates agreed with the day to day scheduling rule as proposed by Respondent. Bates also advised Respondent's team that he would like to take a vacation sometime in July, if negotiations had not been completed by that time and that he would want to clear it with Respondent's team prior to scheduling any time during that month. Respondent voiced no objections to Bates' suggestions and indicated that hopefully an agreement would be consummated prior to June 30. Thereafter the parties agreed to meet on April 28, 29 and 30, for the purpose of clearing up ground rules and according to DTU, to proceed into negotiations on the union's proposals. The parties met, as agreed, on April 28 and after three hours of discussion, the language of ground rules which had not been agreed to on April 22, was finalized. Andrew J. Knight, Respondent's chief negotiator, announced that since the ground rules stated that the parties' final proposals were to be submitted by May 10, and since all of the union's package was not in, no bargaining on proposals already submitted would occur until May 10. In this regard, the record reflects that approximately 80 percent of the DTU proposals had been submitted on April 28. When Respondent refused to commence substantive bargaining, the DTU team left the meeting with Bates advising the Respondent's team that DTU would resume bargaining when management submitted its proposals. The remainder of the DTU's proposals were submitted on May 10. Respondent's team submitted five proposals to the DTU on May 11. The parties again met on May 12, at which time Respondent's chief negotiator advised Bates that the five proposals was its entire response to the DTU's package. When Bates complained about not receiving counter proposals as to all of its proposals, the Respondent's team advised DTU that it should not look forward to receiving responses to all proposals. At this meeting the parties agreed to the Purpose and Agreement clauses submitted by Respondent. The parties agreed to meet the following day and they placed on the agenda proposals dealing with Discipline and Discharge, Tenure, Personnel Files, Reprimand or Criticism, Grade Reporting, Personal Rights, Academic Freedom and Transfer. When the parties met on May 13, and DTU attempted to negotiate concerning Discipline and Discharge, Personal Rights, Academic Freedom, and Transfer, Knight stated that these subjects were "inherent rights of management" and therefore nonnegotiable. Respondent's counter proposals on the other agenda items were those extracted from the previous years contract. Bates tried to schedule future sessions and was told by Knight that such scheduling could not be done in view of the language of ground rule 1. (See joint exhibit 4). Bates attempted to secure a commitment from Respondent that it would meet on Saturday, May 15, since he had a plane ticket on Friday that he would cancel in order to negotiate on that Saturday. Knight responded that it would "probably be OK" but refused to categorically state that it would negotiate on the 15th because the strict interpretation of ground rules precluded such commitment a day in advance. The parties agreed to and met on May 14. On May 13, Bates attempted to place items the Respondent had declared nonnegotiable back on the agenda whereupon Respondent's negotiator insisted that agendas must be "mutually agreed to" and refused to put those items on the agenda. The following day, Bates again attempted to begin discussions of the DTU proposals that he wanted on the agenda and again Knight insisted that the DTU items were not on the agenda and therefore could not be negotiated. Near the close of the session and when it was too late for Bates to depart on his flight as scheduled, Respondent declined to meet on Saturday, May The next session was held on May 19 and at that time Bates insisted that the ground rules did not provide for a mutually agreed to agenda as Respondent insisted and he (Bates) thereupon demanded that the alleged nonnegotiable items be placed on the agenda for that date. Since this item did not appear on the agenda prepared by Respondent for the 19th, Respondent refused to negotiate and Knight responded that the Board counters would be given on each issue as it came up on a "mutually agreed to agenda". The DTU team left the meeting and Bates replied that the DTU would return when management's proposal package was forthcoming. On May 28, Knight and Geiger had a phone conversation in which the parties agreed to resume bargaining on June 3. Geiger questioned whether Knight and the remainder of the Board's team were serious about bargaining and Knight replied affirmatively and that they would move "immediately into their calendars". The parties met on June 3 at 5:00 P.M. at which time the Respondent presented the expired contract as its counter proposal package. No counter proposals were given on any item in the union package which was not contained in the expired agreement. Bates again attempted to negotiate the alleged nonnegotiable items with no success. Knight replied that the Board team was there only to transmit its package and not to bargain since no agreement to meet on that date had been achieved pursuant to the ground rules and no mutually agreed to agenda had been set up. Knight advised however that the Board's team was willing to sit with the DTU's team but not to bargain. The parties eventually agreed to meet on June 8. At the outset, Bates advised the Board's team that the DTU was unavailable for negotiations from June 19 to June 22 because of schedule conflicts but that the DTU was available for five days preceding June 19. No agreements were reached on June 8 except an agreement to meet on June 14. On June 8, Geiger asked the Respondent's team whether it intended to predetermine bargaining concerning the calendar by its adoption of the 76-77 school year calendar which had been put into effect. The Board's response was that the calendar could be modified at the bargaining table respecting any dates that affected students. Thereafter they met daily from June 14 - 19. During this period, one agreement was reached on June 16, when a "salesman" article was signed. Thereafter Respondent maintained its prior stand on issues of summer school assignment, student discipline, and a fair treatment clause stating either that the subject items were inherent management rights or that they were matters which were nonnegotiable in that they "infringed student rights". Respecting the DTU's attempt to produce dialogue on a DTU proposal on fair treatment, Respondent made the comment that the union only represented incompetent teachers, and that competent teachers had no problems concerning the meaning of "fair and equitable". Knight said that if the union was in charge of student discipline, "the firing squad would come into existence", and that he would "take it all the way to the supreme court before this would ever go into a collective bargaining agreement". Other items such as disruptive student policy, school nurse, and evaluations were labeled nonnegotiable by Respondent. During the June 18 session, Respondent's team advised the DTU's team that any agreement reached thru negotiations after the expiration of the current agreement would not be retroactive and that if the DTU did not meet on Saturday, June 19, the Board "just might have to file an unfair labor practice charge." The parties met again on June 19, and the entire discussion centered around the grievance procedure proposal. Knight, while admitting that employees were required to follow Board rules and policies, indicated that the Board would not put them into a contract. Near the end of the June 19 meeting, Respondent's team indicated that they desired to meet on Sunday, June 20, which was Father's Day. Bates declined, citing his previous commitment in Tampa to which the Respondent had been informed and when the Board's team insisted that a meeting take place on the 20th or 21st notwithstanding previous DTU commitments, the parties engaged in a lengthy discussion about both teams' failure to meet as scheduled. According to Bates, he was told that the Board's team was available to meet on Wednesday, June 23, and when Bates advised that the DTU's team would be available, Respondent's team indicated its availability. The DTU team, believing that a meeting was setup for Wednesday, June 23, arrived for the session at 9:00 A.M. but the Respondent's team did not appear. The next meeting was held on June 24, the following day. Geiger states that he advised Knight that the DTU's team wanted to commence serious bargaining at the next session and on this, he was assured by Knight that serious negotiations would occur. Geiger received a memo from Knight stressing his version which in essence was that the June 24 meeting was solely to set a date, time and agenda, pursuant to the ground rules. (See GC Exhibit 4a). Knight, as evidenced by his memo, refused to bargain at the June 24 session, insisting that to do so would violate the ground rules since in his opinion, no agreement had been reached at the prior meeting. After some exchange of words, Knight suggested that the meeting be adjourned for an hour, and officially reconvened after agreement pursuant to the ground rules. Geiger commented that such a move was "silly" and that he thought Respondent was "playing games". The next session took place on June 25 which centered almost exclusively around a budget presentation by school board member, Mssr. Clemmons. Respondent submitted its first counter proposals on salary on June 3, which was identical to the then existing current salary schedule. During his testimony, Kennedy admitted that that proposal was not submitted in earnest. Respondent's second salary proposal was submitted on July 1 which was the existing salary schedule plus $100 across the board. Geiger testified that he and other DTU members had heard of this offer on the radio the previous Saturday i.e., June 26, and that they had expected it to be offered at the earlier sessions prior to July 1. At the July 2nd meeting, DTU requested from Respondent information regarding the employee benefits article it submitted to which Knight responded that "no cost estimates had been prepared and that DTU could work out the costs as easily as the Board could". Knight advised that the board was of the opinion that DTU did not feel serious about the Board's being able to afford the proposals and therefore no estimates were prepared. Estimates however were provided at the next meeting which, according to Geiger, were prepared by Messr. Simmons, of the Board's team. In submitting them, he advised that they were not detailed estimates. Also discussed at the July 2nd meeting was the issue of the sick leave bank. The Board team expressed no objection in principle to the foundation of a bank but expressed its opinion that it was illegal. Then advised that such a bank existed in Dade County, Knight testified that he still questioned its legality since Kennedy had made inquiries of the Dade County School Board and when he inquired as to the authority for such a bank, he was told that it was not expressly sanctioned by any statute, rule or regulation. On July 1, Respondent's team requested the assistance of a mediator and DTU responded that on July 2, it had not objection to the appointment of a mediator. DTU expressed its opinion that the appointment of a mediator at that time was premature but that they had no objection based on the Respondent's commitment that they were really "ready to get down to meaningful bargaining". Geiger conversed with Bates about the DTU's availability during the following week whereupon they agreed that they would have their team there and would be at the bargaining table. The DTU's team cancelled its vacation plans and agreed to be prepared to negotiate the next week. Geiger testified that negotiations were carried on during the week July 5 - 9 and that it was a fruitless exercise in futility". On July 9, after the DTU's team was unable to obtain counter proposals from Respondent, and when they refused to schedule the next meeting date or to agree to any time after the 26th of July, a period to which Respondent had agreed to in view of the DTU's advance statements that it would be gone for the three week period during July 2 thru July 26, the Union declared impasse. Mr. Kazin, the mediator, indicated that of the two following weeks he was not available for one of those weeks since he would be out of town and the DTU's team suggested that the remaining week be spent to resume bargaining for the teacher aide unit. It should be noted that the DTU was certified to represent the regular unit in addition to the teacher aide unit and that Respondent's team was used to negotiate on behalf of the school board for both units. Geiger testified without contradiction, that Superintendent Sang had released to the press) a copy of what he termed to be "nonnegotiable issues". When the DTU's team asked Respondent's team for such a list, they were advised that no such list existed initially and after pressing for approximately three to four hours, Mr. Knight produced a list which coincided with the list which had been distributed to the press and to which Respondent indicated that it would refuse to bargain over. (See General Counsel's Exhibit 5, received in evidence and made a part hereof). No bargaining took place between the period July 9 thru August 2. Bargaining resumed on August 3, at which time the DTU demanded that Respondent place on the table the salary schedule which had been released to the press by Respondent on July 22. Respondent refused to present the schedule which had never been submitted at the table. The demand was renewed at bargaining sessions on August and 5 and it was finally submitted by Respondent on August 10. The schedule was unilaterally adopted by Respondent September 13. During the August 10 session, Bates questioned whether Kennedy and the remainder of the Respondent's team had the authority to negotiate issues reported to be nonnegotiable by Respondent. Kennedy admitted that while there was some overlap between management rights and working conditions, he refused to negotiate those areas. A special master hearing was held on August 20 and his report was received by the parties on September 1. (See General Counsel's Exhibit #6). On August 21, negotiations resumed under a court order following the issuance of an injunction which was petitioned for against the Respondent for allegedly engaging in bad faith bargaining and against the Union for allegedly participating in unlawful strike activity. On August 21, the parties reached an agreement on the language on a discipline and discharge article, however the Respondent indicated that it would not include such agreement in the collective bargaining agreement but rather would append it to the contract. Messr. Kennedy of the Respondent's team advised that a transfer proposal would be included in the contract which was the first time that such a proposal had been introduced since negotiations started in April, if the Union accepted Respondent's proposal on discipline and discharge. The Union rejected the package as unacceptable following Respondent's notice that the agreed language was not for inclusion in the collective bargaining agreement. During a circuit court hearing on the progress of the parties' negotiations on August 27, DTU offered to accept school board language on two issues, grade reporting and court or jury duty. No further negotiations were held after September 9. A final package offer was made to DTU which was essentially the same package offer of August 21 with the exception of the transfer/discipline and discharge proposal and with a retroactive effective date of July 1. When this package was offered on September 9, the Respondent was at the same time rejecting the special master's report in toto. As stated, in its answer, Respondent takes the position that it has not refused or failed to bargain collectively in good faith in that the items listed in the Acting General Counsel's complaint are items which are vested in Respondent by Chapter 230, Florida Statutes and Section 447.209, Florida Statutes and it is therefore precluded as a matter of law from negotiating said items. Section 447.209, F.S., gives public employers the right to unilaterally determine the purpose of its constituent agencies, to set standards, to exercise control, to take disciplinary action for cause and to relieve employees from duty due to lack of work or for other legitimate reasons. That statute goes on to read that employees aren't precluded from raising grievances where decisions have the practical consequence of violating terms and conditions of any collective bargaining agreement in force or any civil or career service regulation. It seems glaringly apparent therefore that the legislature foresaw instances wherein public employers and employee organizations would reach agreements on the very matters on which Respondent would urge that it has no obligation to include or bargain about. Collective bargaining as defined in the Public Employees Relations Act, Section 447.203(14) is: "the performance of the mutual obligations of the public employer and the bargaining agent of the employee organization to meet at reasonable times, to negotiate in good faith, and to execute a written contract with respect to agreements reached concerning the terms and conditions of employement, except that neither party shall be compelled to agree to a proposal or be required to make a concession unless otherwise provided in this part". The undersigned could find no Florida cases in which this issue had been decided, however there are numerous federal and state cases in other jurisdictions in which collective bargaining has been defined by judicial and other administrative bodies. Section 447.203(14), F.S., is strikingly similar to Section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151, et-seq. Respondent does not dispute the fact that it approached the negotiation table with a fixed and preconceived determination on its part to never reach agreement on those issues listed in the complaint filed herein. It maintained this position in the negotiations without doing anymore than listen to Union arguments on those points and by so doing it engaged in surface bargaining on those as well as other issues, without any attempt to explore the arguments thereon with a sincere desire to reach agreement on them. Court decisions too numerous to cite here have stated that "good faith bargaining takes more than mere surface bargaining or "shadow-boxing to a draw" or "giving the union a run around while purporting to be meeting with the union for the purpose of collective bargaining". On the subjects listed in the complaint, it is patent that by the third negotiating session, the Union had brought out and repeated all its main arguments for those subjects. Throughout the sessions, Respondent stood fast on its position that it would never include those subjects into a collective bargaining agreement. Its position on this had hardened even at the outset of the negotiations when it maintained that it had customarily appended said subjects to the collective bargaining agreement such that they would not be subjected to the grievance arbitration provision of the collective bargaining agreement and further that those items were among those rights exclusively vested to it by Section 447.209, F.S. Respondent maintains that it released information to the public through its agent which was an exercise of its right of free speech pursuant to Section 447.501(3), Florida Statutes, and/or that it was its legal duty imposed on it by Chapter 119, Florida Statutes. The Respondent apparently overlooked the fact that the employee organization (the Charging Party here) is certified to be the exclusive bargaining agent for purposes of bargaining. This means of course, that as agent for unit employees, it is charged with the responsibility of negotiating with the public employer in an attempt to reach agreement on all matters affecting wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment. This also means that Respondent is obliged to do more than merely listen to the various proposals advanced without any attempt or effort to reach an agreement on basic terms which are customarily included within collective bargaining agreements. As previously stated, the Act does not require concessions by either side during bargaining nor the surrender of convictions of alterations of philosophies, provided such convictions or philosophies are not made operative in such manner as to foreclose bona fide consideration of bargainable issues. Duro Fittings Company, 121 N.L.R.B. 377, 383. Throughout these sessions, DTU was repeatedly rebuffed on minor problems such as establishing an agenda and obtaining agreement for future negotiating sessions. Respondent maintained its stand on all the items alleged by it as "nonnegotiable" which left the Union in a situation wherein, in order to make any movement, it was forced to submit counters to its own proposals without any movement on management's part. The failure on management's part to submit any counter proposals on those items lends support for an inference that they were not bargaining in good faith. Further support for this inference lies in the fact that Respondent publicly denounced the DTU's chief negotiator as a hired gun and as a person who wanted to pick the pocket of the taxpayers and by publicly releasing to the press items which the employees' exclusive bargaining representative had been repeatedly pressing for at the negotiating table. I recognize it is not usually the obligation of the employer to make suggestions when it takes a position and maintains it in good faith, and that refusal by an employer to aid a Union by acceding is not sufficient, standing alone, to permit an imputation of an intent to frustrate final agreement. This is true only if the refusal is supported by reasons of substance which are advanced in good faith and to further legitimate business interests, while indicating that it still maintained an open mind on the issue. Hence, where the Union had displayed a disposition to be flexible and make concessions on the deadlock issues and Respondent itself indicated publicly to the unit employees that it had in mind a possible raise for them, it was incumbent upon Respondent, as evidence of its good faith, to broach the alternatives formally to the Union immediately after, if not before, said information was released to the press, especially when the Union questioned its stand, if it was at all sincere in its desire to resolve those issues in an effort to reach a final agreement. Also the thrust of the article released to the press which in essence indicated that the Union had lost a 6.25 percent raise because their Union forced negotiators to an impasse, while failing to advise the Union even after the details of such had been released to the press, strongly indicated that the Respondent was treating the Union, not as a certified bargaining agent of the workers, but as an interloper seeking to gain some advantage for itself, in any dealing between Respondent and its employees. This attitude ignored the fact that Respondent was in fact and in law dealing with the employees themselves, when it talked to the Union as their bargaining agent. This is strong indication of bad faith bargaining, for in effect Respondent was announcing to the employees, during and after bargaining, that while it would give them benefits as workers it would not consider a grant of certain benefits, because they were asking for them through their bargaining agent. See for example Kayser-Roth Hosiery Company, 176 N.L.R.B. 999, 1000, 1001. Considering the totality of its conduct vis-a-vis the employees and their chosen agent before, during and after the negotiations, I am constrained to conclude that Respondent's standing attitude of hostility toward the Union, including its blunt threats against the bargaining team's members, pervaded and controlled its attitude in bargaining and its adamant opposition to those subjects was the primary cause of the impasse reached. In this respect, Respondent failed to meet its obligation to bargain in good faith with the Union in violation of 447.501(1)(a) and (c) of the Act. Additional indicia of Respondent's bad faith bargaining appears in its dealing with the press when it released the fact that the union had been instrumental in losing a 6.25 percent raise because it (the Union) forced negotiations to an impasse while knowing that it had never offered such to the Union and when requested for such proposals, it initially denied that it existed and after repeated requests only grudgingly released such. The same is true with respect to the failure to submit to the DTU's negotiating team a list of items which Respondent labeled "nonnegotiable" by its taking the position initially that no such list existed and after repeated requests to find out if such a list existed, the Respondent belatedly released such to the DTU's team. The Respondent's contention that its purpose in issuing the letter to the press was not to make a proposal but to (a) avert a strike and (b) to allow the Union a face saving means of returning to the bargaining table is unpersuasive and is regarded by the undersigned as incredible in view of the entire course of conduct by the Respondent's team throughout the negotiating process. This was further clear indication of surface" or "sham" bargaining in bad faith in violation of the Act. 2/ The evidence indicates that on at least two occasions after the information had been released to the public, Respondent refused to grant those releases to the DTU's team at the negotiating table. I find that such conduct on the part of the Respondent is coercive in nature because, when stated in the terms released to the press without explanation, they tended to demonstrate to employees the futility of further negotiations on salaries, as well as an adamant and apparent unreasoning attitude on it, which is some evidence of bad faith bargaining. I find that Respondent thereby violated Chapter 447.501(1)(a) and (c) of the Act. Additional indicia of Respondent's bad faith bargaining is found in the fact that it refused to reduce and include in written form in its collective bargaining agreement, those items to which it reached agreement on. By engaging in such conduct, I find that the Respondent thereby engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 447.501(1)(a) and (c) of the Act. Additional indicia of Respondent's bad faith bargaining lie in its insistence on agreeing to schedule sessions on a daily basis and by its refusal to discuss items which, although not on the agenda, were related and the only reason Respondent advanced for not discussing such items was based on that fact. At one session, when DTU attempted to discuss a non-agenda subject, management suggested that the session be adjourned for one hour and reconvene so that the additional non-agenda items could be placed on the agenda and discussed. In each case in which the Respondent is charged with having failed to satisfy its duty to bargain in good faith, the entire course of conduct at the bargaining table has to be judged and considered by the totality of the circumstances. The term good faith has been held to mean that parties must approach the bargaining table with an open mind and with the intent to reach agreement. See for example N.L.R.B. v. Herman Sausage Company, 275 F.2d 229 (CA5, 1960); N.L.R.B. v. Reed and Prince Manufacturing Company, 205 F.2d 131 (CAl, 1953). Turning to the outset of the negotiation process in this case, prior to the first session, Bates testified without contradiction that superintendent Sang publicly attacked him as Charging Party's national representative as a "hired gun" and a person who was seeking to "pick the pockets of the taxpayers". Concerning his memo of April 19, Kennedy testified that "this document reads like history written in the spring as to what occurred not". See General Counsel's Exhibit #7 received into evidence. As that exhibit reflects, Respondent seemed calculated and more concerned with establishing rules and creating other subterfuges by which it could refuse to bargain than it was with performing its obligation to bargain in good faith. For example, evidence reveals that bargaining did not commence until approximately five weeks after the DTU's initial request. The first session centered around clearing up a ground rules proposal which as the evidence reveals, were the previous years ground rules. It took more than two negotiating sessions to finalize ground rules. This pattern continued throughout the negotiating process and clearly evinces Respondent's strategy of putting form over substance. Management does not deny and in fact admits that it termed various subjects "nonnegotiable". However it urges that it would include such subjects as appendages to the collective bargaining agreement. By so doing, the enforceability of such appendages would indeed be questionable. Furthermore, Section 447.001, F.S., requires the parties to negotiate a grievance procedure which shall be final and binding on the parties. By appending traditional subjects of collective bargaining such as discipline and discharge to the collective bargaining agreement, the employer would obviate its obligation to submit any disciplinary action to the grievance machinery and the collective bargaining agreement and would make a nullity of the proviso to Section 447.209, F.S. Also, Section 447.309(5), F.S., provides in pertinent part that "any collective bargaining agreement ... shall contain all of the terms and conditions of employment of the employees in the bargaining unit The evidence clearly shows in this regard that Respondent, after having agreed on certain proposals, refused to put them in the collective bargaining agreement thereby obviating any obligation to grieve them by the grievance machinery. Without going through each of the subjects listed in the complaint, some discussion on some of the items is worthy of mention in this decision. The Respondent termed discipline and discharge, seniority, transfer, summer school assignment, student discipline and disruptive student policy nonnegotiable subjects. However it agreed to append such subjects to the collective bargaining agreement. It is ludicrous to even suggest that discipline, discharge, seniority and transfer are not matters which affect an employee's employment relationship. As the evidence indicates, Respondent has a rule which states that violations of its policies subject a teacher to disciplinary action including discharge. Thus, for example, if a teacher fails to discipline a student who is disruptive in a manner which, according to Respondent, violates its policy, said teacher is subject to disciplinary action which often may lead to discharge. Another subject, seniority, has been held by numerous jurisdictions to be a mandatory subject of bargaining in that it, among other things such as merit, determines which teachers are eligible for promotion to various positions which become vacant during the school term. This necessarily affect a teacher's employment conditions and is therefore a term and condition of employment within the meaning of Section 447.309, F.S. Additionally, numerous jurisdictions have held that the impact of a managerial decision on terms and conditions of employment is a mandatorily negotiable subject. See for example, West Irondequoit Teachers Association v. Helsby, 315 N.E. 2d 775(Ct of App., 1974). Based on the foregoing, and by offering only the prior contract language as its counter proposals on the vast majority of issues, by refusing to tie logically related issues together in negotiations, by unreasonably delaying discussion on money issues, by attempting to denigrate the DTU's representative in the press and by attempting to deal directly with the employees and thereby bypassing the employees designated exclusive bargaining representative, and by unreasonably delaying discussion on money issues, Respondent effectively refused to bargain throughout the entire course of negotiations. Based on the above conduct and in light of Respondent's continual insistence on appending agreed upon proposals to the collective bargaining agreement and thereby avoiding the enforceability thereof by arbitration, Respondent thereby violated Section 447.501(1)(a) and (c), F.S.
Recommendation Having found that the Respondent has refused to bargain collectively in good faith with the Union as found above, I shall therefore recommend that it take the following action, which is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: Upon request, bargain collectively in good faith with the above-named union as the exclusive bargaining representative of all employees in the appropriate unit described above and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement and recognize and deal with said union as such exclusive bargaining agent. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of November, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675
