Findings Of Fact By application filed July 24, 1991, Petitioner requested a permit to erect a sign on the north side of, and visible from, U.S. 192. In this area, U.S. 192, which is a federal-aid primary highway, is located in unincorporated Osceola County. The sign would be within 660 feet of the right-of-way of U.S. 192. The property on which the sign would be located is less than one acre in the center of an area of existing roadside tourist-commercial uses. The property is about 1 1/2 miles west of Walt Disney World. Immediately west of the property is a waterslide that is part of the Watermania tourist attraction that extends north behind the subject parcel. West of the waterslide is a Shoney's restaurant and hotel. Immediately east of the subject parcel is a small vacant parcel. Immediately east of the vacant parcel is a HoJo's motel and International House of Pancakes. A gift shop and another motel are east of the International House of Pancakes, and a Racetrac gas station is east of the gift shop and motel. A frontage road serves these facilities, including the subject parcel. These facilities, which are generally recognized by commercial uses by zoning authorities in the state, constitute three or more distinct commercial uses within 1600 feet of the subject parcel. Osceola County issued a building permit for the sign on July 30, 1991. However, Respondent rejected the application for a sign permit by memorandum dated July 24, 1991, because of, in addition to minor omissions since resolved, "underlying zoning of agricultural (unpermitted zoning)." In the comprehensive plan adopted prior to the application, Osceola County designated the subject parcel, as well as vast expanses of land all around the parcel, as commercial. Prior to adoption of the plan, zoning for the property was Tourist Service Center overlaid on an Agricultural Conservation zoning district. Under zoning regulations, the Tourist Service Center overlay allows numerous conditional uses, such as motels, hotels, restaurants, convention facilities, convenience stores, shopping centers, gas stations, and tourist attractions. This zoning has not been changed since the adoption of the plan. Osceola County adopted the Tourist Service Center overlay in 1972 when it had no tourist-oriented zoning classification. The Tourist Service Center overlay, which operates similar to a Planned Development overlay, is placed over land whose underlying zoning classification is Agricultural Conservation. This is not a case in which a special zoning classification, such as Planned Development, has been overlaid upon an underlying classification, such as Agriculture, without any development yet exploiting the zoning overlay. In this case, tourist-commercial development has occupied the immediately surrounding land, of which the subject parcel is a part.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order granting the subject sign permit. ENTERED this 28th day of January, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of January, 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450 ATTN: Eleanor F. Turner, M.S. 58 Thornton J. Williams, General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Attorney John E. McIntee 241 Ruby Ave., Suite A Kissimmee, FL 34741 Vernon L. Whittier, Jr. Assistant General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwanee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458
Findings Of Fact On or about March 13, 1986, Petitioner applied to Respondent for a conditional use permit to allow the package sale of alcoholic beverages in a convenience store at 410 through 422 North Belcher Road, Clearwater, Florida. The property is located in a general commercial district. On or about April 15, 1986, the Planning and Zoning Board of the City of Clearwater denied Petitioner's application and on April 28, 1986, Petitioner timely appealed that decision. Petitioner's property is immediately adjacent to Faith Bible Church which operates Suncoast Christian School with approximately 120 students through the sixth grade, and the property is across the street from Trinity Baptist Church which operates a school with approximately 200 preschool through first grade students. The subject property is within 500 feet of the property of both of these churches, and there are two additional churches in the neighborhood. Richard Tobias, property appraiser, testified that convenience stores such as the one Petitioner proposes do not enhance the properties in their immediate vicinity, although they are generally an asset to the neighborhood as a whole due to the convenience of local shopping. Public witnesses expressed concern about the proximity of the proposed convenience store to churches and schools because of litter problems which they feel could develops as well as public drinking in the store parking lot. The use and enjoyment of such church and school properties will be adversely affected if the conditional use is approved, accordingly to the testimony and evidence presented by public witnesses. Petitioner, as property owner, plans to lease the subject property to Carlos Yepes, President of Clay Oil Enterprises, for the operation of the convenience store. Yepes operates seven other stores which sell beer and wine, and according to Denise Williams, leasing agent, there have been no neighborhood or police complaints concerning Yepes' operations.
Conclusions UPON CONSIDERATION of the Administrative Complaint attached hereto as Exhibit “A”, the transcript of the corresponding Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) case, the exhibits received into evidence, ‘the Proposed Recommended Order filed by the Administrative Law Judge in this matter and attached hereto as Exhibit “B’, any exceptions to the Recommended Order filed by either party, and being otherwise fully advised of the premises, it is hereby, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: 1. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and recommended penalty as _ detailed in the Recommended Order are hereby adopted. 2. Respondent is not guilty of engaging in the unlicensed practice of landscape architecture and electrical contracting. . 3. This Final Order shall become effective on the date of filing with the Agency Clerk of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation. DONE AND ORDERED this ogee, of (Octien. 2008. W. Drago, Secretary Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Center 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0750
Appeal For This Case Unless expressly waived, any party adversely affected by this Final Order may seek judicial review by filing an original Notice of Appeal with the Clerk of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, and a copy of the notice, accompanied by the filing fees prescribed by law, with the clerk of the appropriate District Court of Appeal within 30 days of the effective date of this order, in accordance with Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Section 120.68, Florida Statutes. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE | hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Final Order has been provided via U.S. Mail to Respondent, Todd Boetzel and Boetzel Landscaping, Inc., c/o Gregory T. Elliott, Esquire, Elliott-Berger, P.A., 7310 Gulf Boulevard, St. Petersburg, Florida 33706, wie ny of CC 2008. SARAH WACHMAN, AGENCY CLERK By: Mush Ah Min Brandy Nichols, Deputy Clerk Copies furnished to: Reginald D. Dixon, Informal Hearing Officer Sorin Ardelean, Assistant General Counsel Division of Regulation, Bureau of Unlicensed Activity Daniel Manry, Administrative Law Judge, Division of Administrative Hearings, 1230 Apalachee Parkway, Tallahassee, FL 32399-3060 Steven Petrozak, d/b/a Southern Cross Construction, 6435 92" Place #901, Pinellas Park, Florida 33782
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner showed by a preponderance of the evidence that it is entitled to a refund of $1,500,216.60 in sales and use tax paid during the period from January 2005 through January 2007 to purchase industrial printing machinery that allegedly satisfied the statutory requirement for a 10 percent increase in productive output for printing facilities that manufacture, process, compound or produce tangible personal property at fixed locations in the state within the meaning of Subsection 212.08(5)(b), Florida Statutes (2005), and Florida Administrative Rule 12A-1.096.1/
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the agency responsible for administering the state sales tax imposed in Chapter 212. Petitioner is a "for profit" Florida corporation located in St. Petersburg, Florida. Petitioner is engaged in the business of publishing newspapers and commercial printing. Petitioner derives approximately 85 percent of its revenue from advertising and approximately 15 percent of its revenue from circulation subscriptions. In April, 2007, Petitioner requested a refund of $403,780.05 in sales and use taxes paid for the purchase of industrial machinery and equipment during the period from January, 2005, to January, 2006. In October, 2007, Petitioner requested a refund of $1,096,436.61 in sales and use taxes paid for the purchase of industrial machinery and equipment for the period from January, 2006, to January, 2007. The first refund request in April, 2007, became DOAH Case Number 08-3938, and the second refund request in October, 2007, became DOAH Case Number 08-3939. The two cases were consolidated into this proceeding pursuant to the joint motion of the parties. The parties stipulated that the only issue for determination in this consolidated proceeding is whether Petitioner satisfied the requirement for a 10 percent increase in productive output in Subsection 212.08(5)(b) and Rule 12A- 1.096. If a finding were to be made that Petitioner satisfied the 10 percent requirement, the parties stipulate that the file will be returned to Respondent for a determination of whether the items purchased are qualifying machinery and equipment defined in Subsection 212.08(5)(b) and Rule 12A-1.096. The issue of whether Petitioner satisfied the statutory requirement for a 10 percent increase in productive output in Subsection 212.08(5)(b) and Rule 12A-1.096 is a mixed question of law and fact. The ALJ concludes as a matter of law that Petitioner did not satisfy the 10 percent requirement. The ALJ discusses that conclusion briefly, for context, in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Findings of Fact, and explains the conclusion and the supporting legal authority more fully in the Conclusions of Law. It is an undisputed fact that Petitioner counts items identified in the record as "preprints," "custom inserts," and "circulation inserts" separately from the "newspaper" as a means of exceeding the 10 percent requirement in Subsection 212.08(5)(b). Respondent construes the 10 percent exemption authorized in Subsection 212.08(5)(b) in pari materia with the exemption authorized in Subsection 212.08(5)(1)(g) for "preprints," "custom inserts," and "circulation inserts" (hereinafter "inserts"). The latter statutory exemption treats inserts as a "component part of the newspaper" which are not to be treated separately for tax purposes. For reasons stated more fully in the Conclusions of Law, the ALJ agrees with the statutory construction adopted by Respondent. That conclusion of law renders moot and, therefore, irrelevant and immaterial, the bulk of the evidence put forth by the parties during the two-day hearing because the evidence assumed arguendo that Petitioner's statutory interpretation would be adopted by the ALJ, i.e., inserts would be counted separately from the newspaper for purposes of satisfying the 10 percent requirement in Subsection 212.08(5)(b). In an abundance of caution, the fact-finder made findings of fact based on the legal assumption that inserts are statutorily required to be counted separately for purposes of the 10 percent requirement in Subsection 212.08(5)(b). Those findings are set forth in paragraphs 9 through 11. The verification audit by Respondent's field office was able to verify an output increase of only 4.27 percent for 2005 and only 8.72 percent for 2006. A preponderance of evidence in this de novo proceeding did not overcome those findings. The trier of fact finds the evidence from Petitioner during this de novo proceeding to be inconsistent and unpersuasive. For example, Petitioner inflated production totals by counting materials printed for its own use, and materials in which the unit of measurement was inconsistent. In other instances, production totals for printing presses identified in the record as Didde and Ryobi presses varied dramatically with circulation. In other instances, Petitioner's reporting positions changed during the course of the proceeding. There is scant evidence that the alleged increase in production created jobs in the local market in a manner consistent with legislative intent. Rather, a preponderance of evidence shows that when Petitioner placed the equipment in service it was job neutral or perhaps reduced jobs.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order finding that Petitioner did not satisfy the requirement for a 10 percent increase in productive output defined in Subsection 212.08(5)(b) and Rule 12A-1.096, and denying Petitioner's request for a refund. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of October 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of October, 2009.
The Issue This case arises out of a notice to show cause served upon the Respondent by the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco alleging that Beverage License No. 27-92 should be suspended, revoked or otherwise disciplined for five separate counts involving drug sales on the licensed premises. As a basis for its proof, Petitioner relied upon a stipulation entered into with the Respondent and a Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco Case Report which was admitted without objection. Mr. Charles Andrews testified on behalf of himself as licensee. A copy of the notice to show cause was admitted as Joint Exhibit 1 and the Petitioner of foreign and had admitted without objection one exhibit, the case report of the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco.
Findings Of Fact Charles D. Andrews, trading as Odom's Bar, is the licensee of Beverage License No. 27-92, License Series 4-COP. The licensed premises is located on Highway 29 in Century, Escambia County, Florida. The Petitioner and Respondent, having stipulated to the truth and accuracy of those facts alleged in the notice to show cause, and based upon that stipulation, the undersigned Hearing Officer finds those facts set forth in A through F of this paragraph: On May 24, 1982, Johnny Andrews, the employee of Charles D. Andrews, did violate the laws of the State of Florida by delivering a controlled substance, to wit: cannabis to Agent P. A. Blackman while on the licensed premises of Charles D. Andrews, contrary to Florida Statute 893.13 within Florida Statute 561.29. On June 14, 1982, Johnny Andrews, the employee of Charles D Andrews, did violate Florida Statute 893.13 and Florida Statute 561.29 by delivering a controlled substance, cannabis, to Agent P. A. Blackman while on the licensed premises of Charles D. Andrews. On June 17, 1982, Johnny Andrews, the employee of Charles D. Andrews, did violate Florida Statute 893.13 and Florida Statute 561.29 by delivering a controlled substance, cannabis, to Agent P. A. Blackman while on the licensed premises of Charles D. Andrews. On July 11, 1982, Johnny Andrews, the employee of Charles D. Andrews, did violate Florida Statute 893.13 and Florida Statute 561.29 by delivering a controlled substance, LSD, to Agent P. A. Blackman while on the licensed premises of Charles D. Andrews. On August 6, 1982, Johnny Andrews, the employee of Charles D. Andrews, did violate Florida Statute 893.13 and Florida Statute 561.29 by delivering a controlled substance, LSD, to Actent P. A. Blackman while on the licensed premises of Charles D. Andrews. A. The negotiations and discussions about the May 24, 1982, transaction occurred inside Odom's Bar and the delivery took place through the drive-in window located on the north side of the licensed premises. On June 14, 1982, Beverage Officer Blackman drove to the drive-in window and asked Johnny Andrews if he was holding any pot. Johnny Andrews stated he was holding a 35 cents bag. After a short discussion about possible purchase of a larger quantity, Officer Blackman purchased the bag of marijuana for $35.00. The plastic bag of marijuana was in a brown paper bag and was handed to Officer Blackman through the drive-in window. The delivery of the marijuana to Officer Blackman on June 17, 1982, also took place at the drive-in window. Johnny Andrews handed Blackman a brown paper bag containing a Miller and a plastic bag of marijuana. On July 11, 1982, Officer Blackman observed three patrons smoking a marijuana cigarette in Odom's Bar, and this activity was observed. by the barmaid on duty. No attempt was made to stop the activity. Officer Blackman was offered the marijuana cigarette and he pretended to smoke it. At this time, Johnny Andrews approached Officer Blackman and offered to 7 sell him some "acid" (LSD). Officer Blackman agreed and was instructed to drive around to the drive- in window. He did so and the delivery of the "acid" took place through the drive-in window. On August 5, 1982, Officer Blackman, after being in the licensed premises, drove up to the drive-in window where Johnny Andrews offered to sell him some "acid" (LSD) Officer Blackman agreed to purchase and agreed to return on August 6 to pick up the "acid". on august 6, 1982, Officer Blackman returned to the drive-in window where Andrews handed him a bag containing six hits of acid. At the time of the conversations and purchases on June 14, August 5, and August 6, 1982, Johnny Andrews was on duty and working at Odom's Bar. Mr. Charles Andrews has owned Odom's Bar for the past five years and worked for the two previous owners. He began working at Odom's Bar 20 years ago. The bar is managed by Respondent and his wife. Johnny Andrews, referred to in the stipulation above, is the son of Mr. and Mrs. Charles D. Andrews, and during the time period of the incidents set forth in Paragraph 1, was working as an employee at the bar. This was the first summer he had worked at the bar. He was working while he was home from college, and has not been allowed to work at the bar since August, 1982, when he was arrested. Generally, Johnny Andrews would relieve Mr. and Mrs. Andrews and they would leave the bar while he was working. The Respondent, Charles D. Andrews, had no knowledge of the drug transactions his son was involved in. Prior to the incidents in question, Odom's Bar was operated by Mr. and Mrs. Andrews with the help of four women whom they employed. Mr. Andrews had previously given instructions to his employees that they were not to allow drugs of any type to be used or sold on the premises. On the date of Johnny Andrews' arrest, agents for the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco thoroughly searched the licensed premises and found no drugs. The clientele of Odom's Bar is primarily middle- aged persons. Prior to the incidents described in Paragraph 1 above, the licensee, Charles Andrews, had had no other violations of the law or drug related problems at the licensed premises. Once Mr. and Mrs. Andrews were notified of the charges and arrest warrant for their son, they cooperated with the police and also aided them in completing their arrest of Johnny Andrews. Although the Respondent testified that he had cautioned his employees against drugs on the premises, there was no evidence that he took any steps to ensure that the premises were being properly supervised and legally operated in his absence. There was no arrangement or plan whereby the licensee monitored what was occurring at the licensed premises in his absence.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered finding the Respondent in violation of Florida statute 561.29, imposing a civil penalty of $1,000,and suspending Respondent's beverage license for a period of 60 days. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of April, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARVIN E. CHAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of April, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: William A. Hatch, Esquire Mr. Howard N. Rasmussen Department of Business Director, Division of Alcoholic Regulation Beverages and Tobacco 725 South Bronough Street 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Charles D. Andrews Mr. Gary Rutledge Highway 29, Odom's Bar Secretary, Department of Business Century, Florida Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Petitioner's witness admitted that all of the sign were permittable with the possible exception of the sign located .90 miles east of US 27 which is in the city limits of Bartow (Sign #5, Exhibit 1). Respondent has applied for permits for those signs for which permits are required. Sign #5 was first erected in 1942 by Respondent's predecessor in title and was rebuilt in 1952. The lessor of the property when the sign was first erected was the City of Bartow and it was sold to a private party in 1944. At the time the sign was erected and rebuilt there was no zoning ordinance in Bartow. Non-conforming lawful uses of property before the enactment of Bartow' s Zoning Ordinance were grandfathered and remained lawful after passage of the Zoning Ordinance (Exhibit 2, Section 4)
