The Issue Whether or not Petitioner was subject to a discriminatory housing practice based on her race, age, and gender, or any of the foregoing, when her application for a loan was denied by Respondents.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses and documentary evidence presented, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner, Janice Buchanan, is an African-American female who was 44 years old at the time she applied for the home loan which is the subject of this claim. She had served on active duty in the United States Air Force and, as a result of her service, was eligible for a home loan guarantee by the federal Department of Veterans Affairs ("VA") if she met other financial criteria established by the VA. At all times material to the claim herein, Town & Country Mortgage Company ("Town & Country") was a correspondent mortgage lender. A correspondent mortgage lender originates a loan application for an individual seeking a loan, locates an investor, and, if the investor approves the applicant, assigns the file to the investor. As a correspondent mortgage lender, Town & Country did not make loans or make the decision whether or not to approve a loan application. The decision whether to approve the loan is made by an underwriter employed by the investor. The investor's underwriter, not Town & Country, decides whether an application for a VA home loan guarantee meets the criteria established by the VA. A Town & Country loan application commences with the "pre-qualification" interview. During this interview, the loan officer will obtain the applicant's income information, asset information, and look at a quick "snapshot" of the applicant's credit history, which is obtained from a credit reporting agency. Once the loan officer believes sufficient information has been obtained during the pre-qualification interview, the loan application is actually filled out by the applicant and the loan officer, and the applicant provides the loan officer with documents such as bank statements and income verification documents. While processing the loan application, the loan officer attempts verification of the information provided by the applicant during the initial interview. Once the loan application is completed, a loan processor with Town & Country will begin a more detailed verification of financial information which includes calling the applicant's employer, ordering a "full factual credit report," and verifying all financial information the applicant has provided. If the loan applicant has a complex financial history, the verification process may take a considerable amount of time. In the instant case, the "full factual credit report" was obtained from Stateswide Credit Bureau Services, Inc. ("Stateswide"). Stateswide assembles credit information on the loan applicant from the three main credit information repositories in the United States (Equifax, TransUnion, and TRW). The "full factual credit report" is known as a "tri- merge," i.e., credit information from all three credit information repositories is combined into one document. A "tri- merge" report is used because one credit information repository may not have all of the information another repository has. As a result, even if an applicant produced a satisfactory credit report from one credit information repository, it would be insufficient to overcome an unsatisfactory report on a "tri- merge." Petitioner's "full factual credit report" included at least nine negative credit references. A negative credit reference may be a delinquent account, a past due account, late payments or other activities considered inappropriate by a credit provider and reported to a credit information repository. The Stateswide "full factual credit report" was prepared by Laura Aguayo on November 2, 1999. In compiling the report, Ms. Aguayo telephoned each creditor which had provided negative credit information. Each creditor verified the negative information by social security number, in addition to name. If a creditor did not accept Ms. Aguayo's telephone call, she wrote the creditor. Petitioner was advised of the negative credit information; she provided Town & Country with additional information in an effort to explain the negative information on her credit report. After the verification process is completed, Town & Country's loan processor forwards the information obtained during the loan application and verification process to the investor. This information includes the loan application completed by the applicant and a credit package consisting of the applicant's credit report, income, assets, property, collateral, and additional information, e.g., the loan applicant's explanation of negative credit information, which was forwarded in the instant case. The investor's underwriter reviews the loan application and related information and makes a decision as to whether or not the investor will provide the loan. Town & Country would not forward a loan package to an investor if Town & Country did not want the application to be approved by the investor. There is an economic incentive for Town & Country to want a loan application to be approved by an investor; if an investor approves a loan, Town & Country receives a commission; if an investor does not approve a loan, Town & Country receives no income from the investor. The investor in the instant case was Irwin Mortgage Corporation ("Irwin"); the underwriter at Irwin who reviewed Petitioner's application was Ms. Christine Ross who, like her employer, has no affiliation with Town & Country. Ms. Ross has 15 or 16 years of underwriting experience. Ms. Ross reviewed Petitioner's income and assets and assessed whether she has the ability to make the payments and reviewed her credit history to determine if Petitioner had, in the past, made payments in a timely fashion. Ms. Ross determined that Petitioner was not credit worthy because of a poor credit history and insufficient funds to close the loan. In addition, Ms. Ross considered that Petitioner had several checks returned because of insufficient funds. She reviewed all of the information provided and opined that the application would not meet VA guidelines. If the loan is not approved by an investor, Town & Country's loan officer will work with the applicant to determine what can be done to have the loan approved. When dealing with a VA loan, as in this case, the loan application and related information can be forwarded to the VA for review even though it has not been approved by an investor. The benefit of having the package forwarded to the VA is that the VA might see something the investor missed, and provides the applicant with a second chance to have the loan approved. Town & Country would not request that the investor forward the loan file to the VA if it did not want the loan application to be approved. If the VA denies the loan, there is no purpose in trying to find another investor for the loan because by denying the loan application, the VA is indicating it will not accept the loan application from any investor. When Irwin advised Town & Country that Petitioner's loan application had been denied, Town & Country requested that Irwin forward the application directly to the VA. Upon Town & Country's request, Ms. Ross sent the loan package to the VA. If the VA had decided to guarantee the loan, Irwin would have no risk and would approve the loan. The VA also denied Petitioner's loan application. The reason the VA denied the loan was because "[t]he present income of the borrower(s) was not shown to be sufficient." Ultimately, Ms. Aguayo of Stateswide was able to remove one negative entry from Petitioner's credit report, but she was unable to remove any others. This deletion of one negative entry is evidenced by a December 17, 1999, Stateswide "full factual credit report." Had Ms. Ross been in possession of the December 17, 1999, credit report from Stateswide, this would not have affected her decision to deny Petitioner's loan application, because the report still showed a credit history that did not meet VA guidelines. Additionally, the VA denied the loan because of insufficient income, not poor credit. No credible evidence was presented that Town & Country caused a delay in seeking financing or provided false information as alleged in Petitioner's Petition For Relief. Steve Pilchick, President of Town & Country, had no direct involvement with Petitioner's loan application and did not discriminate against her. No evidence was offered regarding any discrimination against Petitioner based on her age. No evidence was presented that Town & Country was responsible for the denial of Petitioner's loan application. Nor was any evidence presented that Town & Country had approved loans for any particular person or persons of any race or gender who had loan qualifications similar to Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss Petitioner's Petition for Relief with prejudice finding that neither Town & Country Mortgage Company nor Steve Pilchick unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of April, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of April, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Janice Buchanan 4266 Cloverleaf Place Casselberry, Florida 32707 Janice Buchanan Teamesha Leyva 14901 Newland Street, Apartment C Midway City, California 92655 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Daniel P. O'Gorman, Esquire Ford & Harrison LLP 300 South Orange Avenue, Suite 1300 Orlando, Florida 32801 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: On September 5, 1978, the Applicant submitted to the Department its application pursuant to Sections 665.031 and 665.704(2), Florida Statutes, for authority to organize a corporation for the purpose of conducting a savings and loan association business to be located at the intersection of Kanner Highway (Colorado Avenue) and Monterey Road, Martin County, Florida. Notice of receipt of the application was published in a Florida Administrative Weekly on September 8, 1978. After receipt of the application, the Department requested additional information after receipt of which the application was deemed complete and assigned a filing date of December 7, 1978. The application as originally filed proposed the name AMERICAN SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION OF MARTIN COUNTY for the proposed association. On September 22, 1978, Applicant amended the Petition to change the name of the proposed corporation to CENTRAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION OF FLORIDA. This change was noticed in the Florida Administrative Weekly on October 6, 1978. As set forth above, the site of the proposed savings and loan association is at the intersection of Kanner Highway and Monterey Road, Martin County, Florida. The organizers of the Applicant obtained an option to purchase the property for the proposed site for $175,000. The option to purchase was obtained from Mr. Richard Geisinger, one of the proposed directors, with full disclosure to the other proposed directors. An MAI appraiser appraised the fair market value of the property for the proposed site at $210,000. The proposed site is directly on the corner of the subject intersection and represents 175 front feet on Kanner Highway and 300 front feet on Monterey Road. The applicants intend to build a freestanding building of approximately 6,400 square feet with two drive-in teller facilities. The total cost of land and building is projected at approximately $481,000 with an additional $85,514 to be spent for the purchase of fixtures and furniture. The applicant proposes to be capitalized at $1,000,000, with $500,000 of the total capital being held as paid in surplus. The capital will be raised from the issuance of 100,000 shares of common stock with a par value of $5.00 per share, selling at a price of $10.00 per share with a collection of an additional $.50 per share for an organizational expense fund. For the purposes of the application, 100 percent of the stock of the proposed association was subscribed to by the organizers. However, it is their intent to offer for sale approximately 46 percent of the stock of the association to the public prior to the opening of the proposed savings and loan association. Applicant's primary service area (PSA) incorporates most of the Northeast section of Martin County and includes the City of Stuart, Town of Sewalls Point and the communities of Palm City and Port Salerno. It is bounded on the north by the Martin-St. Lucie County line, on the west by the Sunshine State Parkway, on the south by the northern boundary of the Gomez Grant, and on the east by the Indian River. The PSA, as proposed, is the most densely populated area of Martin County, having approximately 38,400 residents. The per capita income for the residents of the PSA is above the state average. Both construction and sales of residential units within the PSA are increasing, with adequate room for future development. There is a high level of commercial activity in the PSA and the vacancy rate is low. The PSA contains the Monterey Shopping Plaza, which is directly opposite the proposed site, which shopping plaza opened for business in 1972, and which has expanded to over 100,000 square feet of gross leasable space. Within the PSA and directly across the street from the proposed site to the East, a 26 acre shopping mall is being developed. Downtown Stuart is less than one-half mile from the proposed site and in the PSA. The population of Martin County and the primary service area is a matter of dispute. The Martin County Planning and Zoning Department estimates the county's population at 61,692 residents. The University of Florida, Bureau of Economic and Business Research estimated the county population at 53,895 as of July 1, 1978. No annual estimates relating to census tracts or parts thereof are available from official U.S. or State of Florida sources in order to determine the population of the PSA. However, the trends of population changes in Martin County, Stuart, Sewalls point, Jupiter Island and Ocean Breeze Park and in the unincorporated areas of the county, which comprise much of the designated PSA should apply to the PSA. Relevant population data of these areas, compiled by the University of Florida, Division of Population Studies, are as follows: Martin 1970 County 28,035 1975 47,726 1976 48,496 1977 50,341 1973 53,895 1980 54,700 to 61,800 (projected) Stuart 4,280 8,787 8,479 8,520 8,942 NA Sewalls Point 298 741 791 829 1,025 Jupiter Island 295 349 352 353 355 Ocean Breeze Park 714 813 1,080 1,080 1,065 Unincorporated 21,908 36,936 37,794 39,559 42,468 NA Martin County population has risen dramatically since 1970, and that growth is expected to continue, essentially from in-migration. Since 1970 there has been a negative natural increase in population. The median age of the county population of 1977 was 45 years of age, with 26 percent of its residents 65 years or older. This is fairly representative of the PSA which includes the majority of the county's population. Within five miles of the site, there are four major shopping centers including Stuart Shopping Center with approximately 103,000 square feet, K-Mart Plaza with approximately 100,000 square feet, East Ocean Mall with approximately 100,000 square feet and Monterey Shopping Plaza referred to above. From 1971 to 1978, 17,088 housing units were built in Martin County. Permit activity in the county shows that there were $81,726,000 in permits issued in 1978. The proposed site is along a line of travel for a large number of commuters as well as shoppers who come to that area as a destination point. The latest unemployment data for Martin County shows an unemployment rate of 5.4 percent for November, 1978 (revised), and a 5.5 percent rate for December, 1978 (preliminary). This compares to a state average of 6.2 percent and 6.4 percent respectively. The per capita personal income for the county increased from $5,735 in 1975 to $6,156 in 1976. This was a 7.3 percent increase which was somewhat slower than the 7.6 percent state average. However, the county's absolute averages remained above the state average of $5,596 and $6,021 respectively for the same years. Commercial activity in Martin County is strong. There are presently eleven existing or approved savings and loan association offices within the proposed PSA. One of these is a main office and ten of these are branches or limited facilities. There are also four additional savings and loan association offices located outside the PSA, but within Martin County. There are nine commercial bank offices, including four main banking offices and five branches, within the PSA and another six hank and branch offices located outside the PSA, but within Martin County. There have been significant increases in savings deposits in Martin County. Significant factors in this increase is the in-migration of new residents and inflation. A continuation of this pattern will maintain the growth experience in recent years. The county summary for nine savings and loan offices indicates an increase of 27.1 percent in deposits between March 31, 1977 and March 31, 1978. This continues a similar growth rate achieved during 1976- 1977. A similar growth trend is being experienced by the commercial banks in the area. Savings and loan associations doing business in Martin County have total aggregate savings as of September 30, 1978 of $235,416,000. Commercial banks doing business in Martin County show total assets of $297,774,000 as of the same date. Only one savings and loan doing business in Martin County is headquartered in Martin County. All other savings and loans in Martin County are branches of institutions with headquarters outside Martin County. The Applicant expects to be competitive with the existing savings and loan offices in the PSA with regard to interest rates and breadth of services. Some of the services that the Applicant intends to offer to the community include the following: a mobile facility to serve the elderly and disabled, direct deposit of Social Security and other government checks, retirement plans such as IRA and KEOUGH, electronic funds transfer, Christmas Club and educational savings programs, certificate plans, and Saturday and extended Friday hours. With the exception of the mobile facility and Saturday hours, these services are currently offered by existing associations. The Applicant has not designated a chief managing officer. An informal offer and acceptance of employment exists with a capable individual having savings and loan experience. This individual did not assist in preparation of the pending application. The proposed Board of Directors is composed of nine members, all of whom are residents of the State of Florida and U.S. citizens. Although all of the proposed directors appear to be successful businessmen, none of them have any savings and loan experience. Six of the nine organizers are presently commercial bank directors and one is a former bank director. Mr. J. M. Brown is Director and Chief Executive Officer of American Bank of Martin County; Mr. Richard K. Carroll is a director of Jensen Beach Bank; Mr. John A. Darlson is a director of the American Bank of Martin County; Mr. Richard Geisinger is Chairman of the Board of Directors of American Bank of Martin County; Mr. Terry N. Keathley is a director of American Bank of Martin County; and Mr. Lawrence J. Timon is a director of American Bank of Martin County. Mr. Brown and Mr. Darlson do not intend to become directors of the proposed savings and loan association but do intend to held their stock in the proposed association. Those remaining proposed directors who also serve the Board of American Bank, Messrs. Geisinger, Keathley and Timen, have indicated their intent to resign their directorates in American Bank to serve on the Board of Directors of the proposed association in keeping with the requirements of the Financial Institutions Regulatory Act. The remaining proposed directors are Mr. Rockford H. Ern, Mr. Armando Farina, and Mr. John M. Fort. Mr. Brown, Mr. Carroll, Mr. Darlson, Mr. Geisinger, Mr. Keathley and Mr. Timon have each subscribed to more than 5 percent of the stock of the proposed savings and loan association and also presently own stock in a commercial bank in the PSA. All intend to retain that stock as well as their stock in the proposed savings and loan association. The Applicant has projected savings deposits at the end of the first, second and third years of operation to be $5,000,000, $10,000,000 end $15,000,000 respectively. The Applicant has presented a revised budget which projected net profit for the first three years of operation to be $55,000, $131,000, and $188,000 respectively. The Applicant has proposed that the new association bear the name CENTRAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION OF FLORIDA. No evidence was presented to show this name was confusing or misleading to the public. In accordance with the provisions of Section 120.57 (1)(a)(12), Florida Statutes, Conclusions of Law and a Recommendation are not included in this REPORT. Respectfully submitted and entered this 25th day of October, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHRIS H. BENTLEY, Director Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Karlyn Anne Loucks, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Barry E. Chapnick, Esquire 1666 Kennedy Causeway, Suite 700 Miami, Florida 33141 C. R. McDonald, Jr., Esquire Suite 200, Citizens Federal Bldg. 1600 South Federal Highway Ft. Pierce, Florida 33450 Frank Fee, III, Esquire Post Office Box 100 Ft. Pierce, Florida 33450 Richard J. Dungey, Esquire Post Office Box 288 Stuart, Florida 33494
Findings Of Fact Caribank, N.A. ("Caribank"), was acquired by J. J. Gonzalez Gorrondona, Jr. ("Gorrondona Jr.") and George Childs, Jr. ("Childs") in May, 1977, and Dania Bank was acquired by these individuals through a tender offer in April, 1978. Caribank Corporation, the Applicant herein, is a bank holding company that now owns more than 99 percent of the stock of Caribank. Gorrondona Jr. owns 90 percent of Caribank Corporation and Childs owns 10 percent. Caribank Corporation was originally named Banconac Shares, Inc. when it was established in November, 1977. Its name was changed to Caribank Corporation on June 5, 1979. Banconac is a name used by many subsidiaries of the Banco National de Descuento ("BND"), a Venezuelan private commercial bank, a majority of the stock of which was formerly owned by Gorrondona Jr. and his father, J. J. Gonzalez Gorrondona, Sr. ("Gorrondona Sr."). It is derived from the name Banco National de Descuento and is used in Venezuela to signify business owned by the BND directly or indirectly. The use of the name Banconac in the Applicant's former name was not explained by the Applicant although Gorrondona Jr.'s testimony established that BND funds were not used to purchase Caribank. Gorrondona Jr. owns approximately 90 percent of Dania Bank and Childs owns approximately 10 percent of the Dania Bank, a state chartered bank. Approximately .3 percent is owned by shareholders who did not surrender their shares. Martin L. Wyneken ("Wyneken") is President and chief executive officer of both the Dania Bank in Broward County and of the Caribank in Coral Gables, Dade County. Childs is Chairman of the Board of the Dania Bank and Caribank, and President, Treasurer and a Director of Caribank Corporation. Policies of Caribank and Dania Bank are established through frequent conferences between Childs and Wyneken. Wyneken has a very close working relationship with Childs. Gorrondona, Jr. has the power to remove Wyneken and Childs. Childs comes to Florida about three times per month to confer with Wyneken. In these above-mentioned discussions, Childs is the spokesman for the "capital." Owning 90 percent of the stock of the Dania Bank provides Gorrondona, Jr. with authority concerning the management and policies of the bank. Directors of the Dania Bank are selected by the shareholders. Gorrondona, Jr. and Childs have not taken any dividends as shareholders of Dania Bank or Caribank, despite the substantial earnings of these banks. Dania Bank and Caribank centralize their operations as much as possible with two separate corporations. Dania Bank and Caribank trade employees back and forth and bill each other through an elaborate accounting system. Thad R. Chamberlain, a director of Caribank Corporation, is executive director of the Banco Suramericano de Desarollo, a Panamanian bank in which Gorrondona, Jr. owns a controlling interest. This is an application pursuant to the Florida Banking Code, Section 658.28, Florida Statutes, for permission to acquire control of Dania Bank by Caribank Corporation. This change in control is sought in order to facilitate a merger of Caribank and Dania Bank. The merger is desired to facilitate the expansion of branch banking, the development of an international department and the development of subsidiaries in such areas as leasing, mortgage financing, and small business investment (S.B.I.C.). The combined capital of Caribank, of approximately $4 million, and the Dania Bank, of $16 million, is expected to facilitate the establishment of subsidiaries. Dania and Caribank are, according to their Chief Executive Officer, Wyneken, "aggressive" banks and there exists a policy of increasing total assets from $265 million at the end of June, 1982, to $500 million by the end of 1985; there is also an aggressive program for subsidiaries. The merged bank plans to spend more on advertising in Dade County. Caribank at its present size cannot justify an increase in advertising expenditures. If this application is approved and a merger subsequently occurs, management expects that there will be benefit on the deposit side since assertedly better use will be able to be made of the money deposited. The Caribank/Dania Bank management has an ambitious program of branch banking. Gorrondona, Jr. and Childs have asked that Dania and Caribank branch into the counties as quickly as possible. Management would like to concentrate branching efforts in Dade County, but their capital at Caribank is so much smaller that it must rely on the Dania Bank for all kinds of assistance. Denial of this application and the failure to merge would restrict expansion in Dade County. The Caribank/Dania Bank management hope that the merged bank will become a large chain bank. The Chief Executive Officer of the two banks testified that to become a large chain bank "[W]e need every bit of help we can get, and that is why we need this consolidation." According to Childs, merger is expected to allow a "substantial increase in the capital base of all the subsidiaries which we have established or intend in the future to establish." A merger is expected to follow immediately upon the granting of the application. If the application were approved and for some reason the merger did not occur, Applicant would seek to change the name of the Dania Bank to Caribank to get the maximum effect out of their advertising dollars. It is further expected that if the application for change in control is granted, the two banks could file a consolidated tax return with an annual tax saving of approximately $64,000. From the above findings, it can reasonably be inferred that this application is made to facilitate a program of rapid expansion and establishment of subsidiaries, and if the application is granted, it can be expected that rapid expansion and development of subsidiaries will be more likely to occur. George Childs, Jr., started Banac Management, Inc. ("Banac") for Gorrondona, Jr. seven and a half years ago and was president of the corporation at the time of the intervention of the BND (discussed below). Banca is a BND subsidiary located in New York City. At the time of the intervention it was acting as a representative of the BND and its subsidiaries to obtain credit lines. Prior to the intervention, Gorrondona, Jr. was involved in the affairs of Banac. He visited Banac in New York six to seven times per year. He was a member of the Banac Board of Directors from 1975 to 1979. The BND was founded in 1954 by Dr. Jose Joaquin Gonzalez Gorrondona, Sr., who is the father of Gonzalez Gorrondona, Jr., the ninety percent (90 percent) owner of the Petitioner, Caribank Corporation, and the subject bank, The Dania Bank. Dr. Gonzalez Gorrondona, Sr. does not now, nor has he ever had any interest in, nor involvement with, Caribank Corporation, The Dania Bank or Caribank, N.A. Since its beginning, the BND had a steady growth until, at the time of the intervention of the bank by the government on December 7, 1978, it was the largest privately owned (nongovernmental) bank in Venezuela with the largest amount of private deposits, 6.3 billion Bolivars (1 Bolivar equals about 0.25 in U.S currency). Gorrondona, Jr. began working at the bank in 1958, worked throughout his early years, and continued to work full-time for the bank after receiving his doctoral degree in economics from the Catholic University in Venezuela with a doctoral thesis in economic planning. During his education, Gorrondona, Jr. studied such subjects as Monetary Theory, History of Financial Institutions, Operation of Financial Institutions, and Public Finance. His interest in economics began early in his life because Dr. Gonzalez Gorrondona, Sr. was the founder of the School of Economics in Venezuela, having been the founder of the Venezuelan Economic Council and the representative of Venezuela at the Bretton Woods meeting in 1943 at which the International Monetary Fund was founded. After graduation, Gorrondona, Jr. continued to study, taking courses in management such as Management by Objective, Computer Science, Systems Analysis, and other courses which would enable him to perform as a manager of a financial institution. Gorrondona, Jr. worked in many phases of the management of the bank, until in 1974, he became president in charge, which means that he was the chief executive officer in the absence of his father. He never drew a salary. By the time of the BND intervention, the stock interest of Gorrondona, Jr. was worth between $350 and $700 million dollars. As an outcome of the intervention, Gorrondona, Jr. lost between $150 and $200 million dollars in the worth of the BND stock which was owned by him. By the time of the intervention, the BND had grown to a bank which included approximately 60 branches, primarily in urban areas of Venezuela. The BND also owned several profitable subsidiaries, including Crenca, a financial society which was able to engage in financial transactions forbidden for commercial banks; Credimatico, which was the owner of a Master Charge franchise in Venezuela which had a market share of twenty-five percent of the credit card sales in the country; Arrendarca, a leasing and factoring company; and Almacendadora Caracas, a bonded warehouse company owning bonded warehouses in several cities in Venezuela. The BND also owned Servimatico, which dealt mainly with consumer credit and financed appliance and other small consumer purchases. Each of these subsidiaries was profitable to the bank and assisted the bank in paying dividends which had been declared each year, since 1973. Beginning prior to 1977, the BND was required to send its minutes of Board meetings to the Superintendent of Banks because there had been detected, as a result of special inspection, a tendency toward concentration of credit. In 1978, BND was the only bank required to send minutes of Board meetings to the Superintendent. At a majority of the meetings of the Board of the Central Bank of Venezuela ("CBV") during the last six months of 1978, there was an agenda item entitled "BND." During this time, employees of the Superintendent and the CBV were at the BND carrying out studies to see in what way or ways the BND's financial soundness could be improved. In August of 1978, the Superintendent of Banks wrote to the Minister of Finance about the situation of the BND. The letter notes that credits of Bs. 2,553.8 million were concentrated in 130 companies, that directors of these companies were in turn, directors of the bank, that there was a disproportion between the amount of these credits and the net worth of the borrower, that renewals were made even after delay in payment and that the credits were extended without analysis of the balance sheet. In September, 1973, the BND was prohibited from distributing dividends by the Superintendent of Banks because it would have adversely affected the liquidity of the BND. In November of 1978, the BND asked the Venezuelan Government for special financial aid in the amount of Bs. 600 million. The BND proposed that it be made the subject of a "private intervention" during the period of time such advance was outstanding. On December 6, 1978, the CBV excluded the BND from the Clearing House effective December 7, 1978, by vote of its Board. The CBV, the equivalent of the U.S. Federal Reserve, is a public institution of the Republic of Venezuela, but is considered independent. Eight members of its Board of Directors and its President are appointed by the government. Six members are appointed on recommendation of the private sector. The CBV, through its credit functions, provides credit assistance to banks and credit institutions in Venezuela. Through its operations, it seeks to safeguard the solvency and liquidity of Venezuela's banking system. A Clearing House to settle accounts between banks is operated by the CBV. When bank customers draw and deposit checks, credits and debits between banks are created that have to be reconciled on a daily basis. Venezuelan banks are required by law to maintain a deposit account at the CBV in order to settle such accounts. If after reconciliation, a bank owes money to other banks, its CBV account is debited to cover the debt. If after reconciliation, a bank is owed money, its account is credited. If a bank does not have enough on deposit to cover its debts, it can present to the CBV cash or checks or payment orders against other banks in sufficient amount. It can also present funds obtained outside the country. Finally, it can obtain funds by rediscounting commercial paper at the CBV. Rediscount consists of endorsing eligible commercial paper to the CBV in return for payment. Eligible paper, for example, must mature within 360 days and be adequately secured so that there is assurance as to its liquidity or self-liquidating nature. Thus, medium or long-term loans do not normally give rise to eligible paper. The decision to exclude the BND from the Clearing House was reached on December 5 and 6, 1978. Prior to this time, BND had had repeated difficulties converting its debts at the Clearing House. On December 5, the CBV Board authorized the exclusion of the BND in principle subject to discussion with the Venezuelan Government. At the time, the BND did not have commercial paper considered eligible by the CBV to receive credit assistance from the CBV. The situation was examined again on December 6 by the CBV to see if there were new elements or new alternatives. On December 6, 1978, the BND was overdrawn at the Clearing House to the extent of being unable to make good in its negative balance of approximately Bs. 100 million. It was decided there were no new elements or alternatives, and accordingly, the President of the CBV wrote to the Venezuelan Minister of Finance to let him know (1) that the BND had a deficit in its legal reserve requirement (see below); and (2) that the CBV Board had decided to exclude the BND from the Clearing House effective December 7, 1978. Prior to the exclusion of the BND from the Clearing House, the CBV Board considered the possibility of extending extraordinary credit assistance to the BND. The Board concluded that such assistance would be in violation of Article 45 of the law governing the CBV. That article provides: "Article 45. - In exceptional cases and with the favorable vote of the six members of its Board of Directors, the Banco Central de Venezuela may, in order to insure the due liquidity of a bank or credit institution in transitory difficulties, provide it with funds for a period not to exceed ninety days, which may be extended for an equal term at the Bank's discretion, secured by other assets of said bank or credit institution, different from those listed in the previous article. "Loans may in no event be made to a bank or credit institution if the trans- itory difficulties it faces are due, in the Board's opinion, after having consulted with the Bank Regulatory Commission, to the poor management or inadequate investment of its resources." In the case of the BND, the CBV Board concluded extraordinary credit assistance would be illegal because BND's liquidity problems were not "transitory" but rather structural, permanent and progressive, because the liquidity problems of the BND were due to improper investment of its resources, and because its funds were invested in operations that were insecure or lacking in guarantees, which reflected bad banking management. Under the rules and regulations of the Clearing House, the exclusion of the BND was mandatory. On the evening of December 6, 1978, a meeting was held at the Presidential Palace attended by the President of Venezuela, the Minister of Finance, other ministers involved in the financial sector, some of the board members of the CBV and the Superintendent of Banks. The stated purpose of the meeting was to inform the President of the Republic about the BND situation. The meeting lasted three hours. There was a discussion as to whether there was any alternative to the one proposed by the CBV. It was concluded that there was no alternative. The President of the Republic instructed the Minister of Finance and the President of CBV to hold a meeting the following morning to inform the banking community that the BND had been excluded from the Clearing House and that the government had decided to intervene the BND. The decision to intervene was unanimous. Two major events which contributed to the liquidity crisis which allowed the government to intervene the BND, were the result of actions by the government itself. The first of these actions was the substantial withdrawal of public funds from the BND. Between November 30 and December 6, over 100 million dollars was withdrawn by the government agencies from the BND. Withdrawals averaged 20 million dollars per day with a high of 30 million dollars on December 6. These daily balances were reported by the Comptroller of the bank to Gorrondona, Jr. on a twice daily basis during these days. No testimony, either from a witness or in the form of an exhibit, was ever introduced to contradict Gorrondona, Jr.'s testimony concerning these substantial withdrawals during the week prior to the intervention. The second action which was taken by the government injurious to the BND was the refusal to accept commercial paper for rediscount. Gorrondona, Jr.'s unrebutted testimony established that the same paper which was denied rediscount by the Central Bank on December 6 was granted rediscount on December 30 and during the period of time after the intervention. Gorrondona, Jr.'s testimony established that it would have been impossible to change the loan portfolio within such a short period of time and therefore of necessity it was the same loan portfolio which was granted rediscount after the intervention which had been denied rediscount during the week prior to the intervention. Gorrondona, Jr. further testified that the December 7, 1978, hand- written balance sheet, contained in Petitioner's Exhibit 70, the Intervenor's January 12, 1979, report, was a consolidated balance sheet including all 60 of the BND's branches. Therefore, the balance sheet was prepared by employees of the intervenor during the period between December 7, 1978 and January 12, 1979. On the issue of loans eligible for rediscount on December 7, Mr. Gabledone, Respondent's witness, using Respondent's Exhibit 70, stated that if the figures in Exhibit 70 were correct, the BND had 3.663 billion Bolivars eligible for rediscount on December 7, and that "the BND would have been able to obtain a large amount of rediscounts, or large amounts that would be eligible for rediscounts." In part, a result of the withdrawal of government funds, the failure of the government to repay its loans and overdrafts, and the denial of rediscount by the Central Bank of BND commercial paper, the BND had a deficit at the Central Clearing House on December 6 of 100 million Bolivars. Article 166 of the General Banking Law of Venezuela provides: "Whenever a bank or credit institute, subject to the Provisions of this Act, faces a preca- rious situation which might entail an eventual detriment to its depositors or creditors, or endanger the banking system in general, or when infringing repeatedly (the provisions of) this Act, or those of the Central Bank of Venezuela Statute or the Regulations of either or both, or any Resolution adopted by the Executive Branch, the Superintendent of Banks or of the Central Bank of Venezuela, then the Executive Branch shall empower the Superintendent of Banks or any other individual it may deem com- petent to place the Bank or Credit Institute in Receivership. The Receiver may agree with the Central Bank of Venezuela on the course of action to be taken for the respective bank's or credit institute's redress, its eventual reorganization or liquidation, which shall become mandatory for the respective financial house. But he shall, without exception, pre- pare, within a period not exceeding thirty days as from the date or resolution decreeing the receivership, a complete and itemized report concerning the legitimacy of the respective intervention and submit it to the Executive Branch. By Resolution 2296 issued December 7, 1978, the Minister of Finance of Venezuela intervened the BND. Intervention is an uncommon occurrence and the law contemplates it will occur only when a financial institution is in danger. The decision to intervene the BND could have been appealed to the Supreme Court of Venezuela. No appeal was taken. Neither Gorrondona, Sr. or Jr. or any other shareholder filed suit to block or overturn the intervention, although they had lawyers in Venezuela and Gorrondona, Sr. was in Venezuela. The BND is still under intervention. On march 31, 1979, the Superintendent of Banks of Venezuela issued its Annual Report for the year 1978 ("Superintendent's Report"). The Report contains an extensive discussion of the BND and the reasons for its intervention. The Superintendent's Report states the following: In 1977 and 1978, a decrease in the rate of growth of the Venezuelan economy together with unbalanced financial management at the BND whose key feature was credit over- expansion, especially as regarded credits to companies connected to the bank, placed the BND in a non-liquidity crisis to be- come increasingly notorious. The BND was the object of special attention by the Bank Regulatory Commission because over the 5 years preceding the intervention several violations of the General Law on Banks and other Credit Institutions had been detected. The BND had repeated insufficiency of the reserve requirement, a problem from which the bank chronically suffered. The BND was twice fined the maximum amount for illegal credits extended (1) to the Banco Suramericano de Desarollo ("BSD"), a Panamanian bank in which Gorrondona Jr. owns 80 percent of the shares, and (2) Crenca, a BND subsidiary, in violation of Article 153 of the Banking Law. Certain credits regarded by the BND as agricultural were not properly classified as agricultural. As of March 31, 1978, Bs. 2,553.8 million of bank loans were concentrated in 130 customers (the "Specially Classified Companies"). Directors of these companies were also bank directors. Credits were granted to these companies easily, then were renewed frequently and even when over- due, balance sheets for some of these credits did not exist and most of the credits were unsecured. The minutes provided by the BND to the Superintendent of Banks were not identical to those recorded in the BND's minute book, including that innumerable credit operations with subsidiaries had been omitted from the provided minutes. BND employees failed to cooperate with the Superintendency in providing requested in- formation. An official memorandum was sent to the BND president about this matter, ordering him to rectify this situation. Irregularities in the BND's legal reserve led to numerous notices to the BND president as well as to the levying of several fines. Until December 12, 1978, the BND received 224 memoranda concerning shortages in the legal reserve requirement and was fined 32 times for such legal reserve requirement deficiencies. The average weekly shortage in the legal reserve requirement through- out 1978 was Bs. 124 million. An audit conducted as of September 30, 1978, showed that the estimated loss on the loans to the Specially Classified Companies was Bs. 632.9 million. The estimated loss on other credits in the bank Portfolio was 35.7 million. The reserve for Portfolio Contin- gencies was Bs. 12 million. On January 12, 1979, the BND Intervenor, Tinco, made a report 1/ to the Minister of Finance pursuant to Article 166 of the General Banking Law of Venezuela. The Report describes the reasons for intervention. The Intervenor's Report states the following: During the first eleven months of 1978 the BND increased its Invested Assets by Bs. 1.0789 billion while in that same period deposits increased only Bs. 183 million. The imbalance was partially covered by rediscounts. By November 30, 1978, the BND had rediscounts of Bs. 485.4 million, which is 32.7 percent of all commercial bank re- discounts for that period. Many of the documents submitted to the Central Bank for rediscounts were rejected by it since they did not comply with the requirements for eligible paper. Credit restrictions were imposed on the BND by other banks. The BND's failure to make timely remittance of funds to correspondents resulted in their not honoring checks and refusing to open let- ters of credit. In 1975-78 the BND had a chronic shortage in its legal reserve requirement. The BND had a shortage in the legal reserve in 38 of 48 weeks during the first 11 months of 1978. The BND's reserve shortage stabilized during the months of September 1978 through November 1978 at over Bs. 100 million and reached Bs. 169 million in the last week of November. Prior to the intervention the BND was twice fined Bs. 30,000 for having granted illegal credits to the BSD, the Panamanian bank owned by Gorrondona Jr., and to Crenca. Even after the fines, the illegality was not corrected. In the case of the BSD the credit at the time of the fine through a time deposit was Bs. 657 million. At the time the BND was inter- vened, this deposit had not been reduced at all. In late November and early December of 1978 the situation grew more serious as the BND's negative balances at the Clearing House in- creased, and the BND had difficulty sub- mitting documents eligible for rediscount by the CBV. Questions from abroad about the BND's situation became more insistent. When the BND was unable to make good on its negative balance at the Clearing House on December 6, the BND was expelled as of December 7 in compliance with Article 11 of the pertinent Rules and Regulations. Thereupon the BND was intervened pursuant to Article 166. There were large withdrawals after the intervention and instructions were given that teller windows would not close as long as there were clients present. As of December 7, 1978 loans placed with affiliates (companies owned totally or partially by the BND) totaled more than Bs. 1.302 billion. Loans placed in 93 companies with which important shareholders, directors or executive officers of either the BND or its affiliates were directly or indirectly associated totaled Bs. 1.739 billion. Other credits were as of the date of the Intervenor's Report are still under study. On October 14, 1976, five vice-presidents of the BND, including the vice-president of Credit, the First Vice- President-Treasurer, the Vice- President-Comptroller, the Vice- President of Branches and Agencies, and Jaime Benitez ("Benitez") Vice-President for Banking Services, wrote a confidential memorandum to Gorrondona, Sr. and Gorrondona, Jr. in order to emphasize deficiencies and problems within the BND and to present recommendations. As summarized by Benitez, who testified at the hearing in this matter on July 16, 1982, the principal problem was a high concentration of credits in a group of businesses. These credits were not paid as they matured. This created a deficiency in cash flow and caused liquidity problems. There were also deficits in the legal reserve requirement. Accounting procedures were not being correctly applied and there was a problem of overdrafts. The memorandum recommended: (1) a change in credit policy even though this would limit the expansion program; (2) affiliated and related companies should start paying their debts; (3) concentration of credit should be eliminated; and (4) internal controls aid internal procedures should be improved. Benitez' testimony established that as a whole, recommedations were not carried out and deficiencies were not eliminated. The Memorandum of October 14, 1976, stated that: "The Office of the First Vice-President for the Treasury has repeatedly voiced to the highest authorities in the institution its opinion regarding the excessive placements with Group Companies and has gone as far as to file a written report with the President and the Acting President. In spite of the fact that, on account of its position, it must authorize almost all of the overdrafts and/or charges to the accounts of Group companies, it acknowledges the need to put an end to this practice. This question has been the subject of repeated discussions with the President and the Acting President, who are the only authorities empowered to put an end to this situation. The Memorandum of October 14, 1976, identified a number of problems then existing at the BND. It stated that there existed problems of: "1. High credit concentration (approximately 60 percent of the entire credit portfolio is placed with 1.4 percent of the total number of clients) in Group companies or companies directly or in- directly tied and/or related to it. We mean by this those companies or natural persons in the organization created by the highest ex- ecutive level or under instructions from it, who are organized with high Group officials, Bank officers or trusted persons, both as regards the holding and representation of their shares and their administrative or Director offices. These companies were expedited by said high levels or under orders from them, given through high Bank officers." "2. Non-payment by said companies due to con- stant renewals, without partial [the translation of "abonos parciales" should be "partial pay- ment" in the sense of "amortization"] or in- terest payments." "3. Credits to Group companies, above the legal limits, which are authorized or ordered by the highest officials." "4. Interest documented as promissory notes that accumulates above and beyond the credits originally granted." "5. Excessive number of permanent overdrafts with the National Government, governmental de- pendencies and especially and in an increasing fashion, with Group companies or companies directly tied or related thereto." "6. Overdrafts and collateral obligations in overseas banks due to the financing com- mitment and ever increasing requirements of Group companies or companies directly or indirectly tied or related thereto, which render the institution vulnerable to possible changes in the financial market." "7. Constant use of the Bank's own credit resources for the financing of Group companies directly or indirectly tied or associated there- to, whether they be already in existence or some of the ones that are constantly being created for expanionist purposes and whose activities represent a medium or long-term investment, at loggerheads with the soundness of commercial banking (Treasury Commission: see the material submitted at the meetings and on the minutes)" "8. Exclusion from the List ratified by the Board of Directors of certain operations of Group's companies and of companies directly or indirectly tied or related thereto, following longstanding instructions from high officers, who, in turn, received them from the highest levels." "9. Credits to companies whose balance sheets do not justify the amounts of said loans, mainly Group companies, and which credits are authorized or ordered by the highest levels." "10. Accounting omission of operations-especially guarantees and bonds-conducted from the Group com- panies under order from the highest levels." "11. Excessive financial burden due to the payment of surtaxes and commissions on deposits." "12. Increase in expenses through outlays that are not compatible with the normal management of the Bank." "13. Insufficient income generation, In relation to portfolio volume, which causes the interest account to be affected by amounts equal to the yield said portfolio should generate. Therefore, an insufficient amount in the account Interest Collected in Advance due to the drain it has been withstanding." "14. Inconsistency in the Reserve Requirements position due to a weak treasury and the continuous negative balances at the Clearing House." "15. Unbridled personnel growth at all levels, which has brought about an evident bueaucratization of Bank functions." "16. Ignorance of normal communication channels and of approved bonus norms and procedures." One of the signers of the memorandum of October 14, 1976, Santiago Rodriquez Marcano, was made an Assistant to the President of BND after the memorandum was sent, but he left after a few months saying that he did not receive the necessary cooperation in his new position. Gorrondona, Jr. testified that in 1978, BND was facing a "serious . . . liquidity crisis" and "had very little liquidity." Gorrondona, Jr.'s testimony established that he made his fortune in real estate. Gonzalez' testimony indicated that in 1978 the BND faced liquidity problems, a "liquidity crisis" which even with government assistance would have continued until the end of 1979. Benitez' testimony indicated that the BND was in serious trouble at the time of intervention and that the primary cause was credit concentration and the lack of payment upon maturity. Romero's testimony indicated that at the time of intervention the BND had the following problems in the area of credits or loans: A substantial part was concentrated in real estate activities. A lot of the business that had received credits from the bank was related indirectly with directors and executives of the bank. Some businesses received credits for amounts that went over what the law allows. The credits were not sufficiently col- lateralized or guaranteed. Some of these credits had a maturity of more than one year which is illegal for a commercial bank. Gabaldon's testimony established that while he has been President of the BND many adjustments had to be made to correct the accounts of the BND as they existed at the time of intervention; that the BND Board had decided to make an appropriate footnote reservation in the BND financial statements calling attention to the possibility of future adjustments which might result from investigations and analyses of the BND's accounts prior to the intervention. Gabaldon's testimony, based on his study of BND records, established that at the time of intervention is some cases the loans to subsidiary companies were paying interest but in a majority of the cases they were not doing so but rather the BND would increase the amount of the debt to cover the amount of the interest due. At the time of intervention, approximately 12 to 15 percent of the BND loan portfolio consisted of loans to these subsidiary companies. Alejandro Guevara Chacin's ("Guevara Chacin") testimony established that the minutes of the BND sent to the Superintendent compared with the minute books of the bank revealed that many operations were omitted. Guevara Chacin supervised the comparison. Juan Ramirez' ("Ramirez"), the present Superintendent of Banks of Venezuela, testimony indicated that there were many reasons for the intervention of the BND and any one of them, if put together with or alongside the others, was enough to support the decision. Benitez' testimony indicated that the basic principle of the banking business is diversification; in other words, to place loans with diverse or different customers. Childs' testimony indicated that renewal of loans without payment of interest is bad banking practice. Childs' testimony indicated that loans to corporations in which directors have an equity interest should be secured and at arms length. Wyneken's testimony indicated that there are reserve requirements in the United States and violation is not a trivial matter. The testimony of Guevara Chacin, Eenitez, Lopez-Romero and Ramirez established that one of the BND's major problems under Gorrondona, Jr. was repeated deficiencies in the BND's legal reserve. After the intervention, there was a run on the BND. Between June 30, 1978, and December 31, 1978, deposits from the public decreased by Bs. 2.1 billion and most of this decrease occurred between December 7, 1978, and December 31, 1978. In the six months following the intervention government deposits at the BND went from Bs. .6 to Bs. 2.7 billion. These deposits permitted the BND to cover withdrawals. Gorrondona, Jr. left Venezuela for a two week period on November 17, 1978, and a detention order was issued on November 24 which would have resulted in arrest had he had been in the country. In Venezuela, the subject of a detention order is immediately arrested and is held without any opportunity for posting bail until the detention order is resolved. The detention order was based upon an allegation that Gorrondona, Jr. had been involved in a company which had committed a security violation more than five years prior to the detention order. Petitioner contends that the charges against him, which resulted in the detention order, were politically motivated. This order kept Gorrondona, Jr. out of the country during the intervention, and was eventually dismissed. The Court, in dismissing the charges, stated: It then follows from the aforesaid, that it would -- clearly result in an injustice to assign any criminal liability to persons who are not even members of the Board when the presumed irregularities may have been committed. The period leading up to the intervention of the BND was also the period immediately prior to the national election which was held on December 3, 1978. In the elections in 1974, Gorrondona, Jr. had contributed 9 million dollars to the unsuccessful opponent of President Perez. In the election of 1978, Gorrondona, Jr. had contributed over 1 million dollars to the opponent of President Perez's party, the Accion Demicratico (AD) party. Venezuelan laws do not restrict the size of campaign contributions. Gorrondona, Jr. returned to Venezuela in June, 1979. At that time Gonzalez recommended to Gorrondona, Jr. that he go to court to prove his innocence. In June, 1979, Gorrondona, Jr. and Sr. initiated a noticia criminis proceeding in a Venezuelan Penal Court of First Instance. There are three ways to initiate a criminal proceeding in Venezuela: denunciation (a person makes a charge that a crime may have been committed), accusation (a person makes a charge that a particular person may have committed a crime), and noticia criminis (the court takes notice that a crime may have been committed). In Venezuela, the courts may call witnesses and thereby take investigative initiative. The noticia criminis proceeding is based on the obligation of a Venezuelan court to investigate a possible crime of which it has notice from whatever source. In the case of the noticia criminis proceeding initiated by Gorrondona, Jr. and Sr., the court was called on to determine if the BND administrators had participated in the commission of any crime while they were serving as such. In other words, the purpose of the noticia criminis proceeding initiated by Gorrondona, Jr. and Sr. was to determine if during the period of time in which they were administering the bank they committed an act that would or could be considered criminal in Venezuela. The word used by Gonzalez in describing the noticia criminis determination was "delito," which the interpreter testified means crime. The decision of the Court of First Instance in the noticia criminis proceeding was to terminate the summary investigation pursuant to Article 206 of the criminal code for criminal trials. The court found there was no evidence of crime. In other words, the determination of the judge in the noticia criminis proceeding was to end the criminal investigation because the facts presented were not of a criminal nature. With regard to the violation of banking laws described in the Superintendent's Report and the Intervenor's Report, the Court said "[a]s is clearly appreciated from these provisions, none establishes penal sanctions and although they constitute a violation of juridical regulations and comprise sanctions, same have no other character than an administrative one. The appellate court said, "this Superior Court considers that lack of maintenance of reserves in such proportion and manner as established in Articles 20, 21, and 163 of the General Act governing Banks and other Credit Institutes, is object of a sanction under Article 170 of the said law consisting of a fine to be applied by the Superintendent of Banks. Efforts to collect the loans made by the BND prior to intervention: On February 28, 1980, the BND entered into an agreement with Gorrondona, Sr. and Gonzalez regarding the loans to certain debtors of the BND ("February 28, 1980 Agreement"). All these loans were made prior to the intervention. The February 28, 1980 Agreement fixed the amount of the debt to the BND of the ap- proximately 180 companies specified therein at Bs. 4.038 billion. It specified that the BND would accept in payment of this debt the amount of Bs. 3.388 billion. It specified that payment would be made within one year. It specified that during that year no actions would be commenced to compel payment of this debt. Gorrondona, Sr. and Gonzalez signed the February 28, 1980 Agreement either as business brokers for the companies specified therein or as representatives of such companies. According to Gorrondona, Jr. all the debtor companies obligated themselves jointly, and any collateral posted by one could be used to satisfy the debts of the other. Paragraph 15 of the February 28, 1980 Agree- ment specifies certain responsibilities assumed by Gorrondona, Sr. and Gonzalez. "We, JOSE JOAQUIN GONZALES GORRONDONA, a Venezuelan citizen, of legal age, of this domicile, the bearer of identity card number 30.580; and DIOGENES Jr. GONZALES HURTADO, a Venezuelan citizen, of legal age, of this domicile, the bearer of identity card number 1.193.753, state that acting as business brokers for THE DEBTORS by virtue of the already noted common interests, personally and jointly and severally in behalf of all of THE DEBTORS undertake to accept and comply with the present agreement in all of its parts. Therefore, and to preserve the fullness of its effects, we undertake to have those debtor companies whose Articles of Incorporation or By-Laws forbid or limit the granting or posting of guarantees or securities, amend them as needed in order to allow for the profferred guarantees; we likewise undertake to have them grant their consent lawfully and execute the present in- strument within the term of thirty (30) days, and to execute any other documents, as re- quired, that may be necessary for the per- formance thereof. As of the present, the loans of the com- panies specified in the February 28, 1980 Agreement have not been paid in full. The amount remaining to be paid, exclusive of interest, is either approximately 2.8 bil- lion B's or 2.1 billion B's depending on whether the loans compromised in the February 28, 1980 Agreement (the difference between Bs. 4.038 billion and Bs. 3.388 billion) are treated as paid. Such unpaid loans as of this time are neither principal nor interest. At this time the BND's total loan portfolio is approximately Bs. 6.2 billion. Whether the figure of Bs. 2.1 or Bs. 2.8 billion is used for the amount of these unpaid loans, these frozen loans from prior to the intervention represent a substantial portion of the BND loan port- folio. These loans to related or Specially Classified Companies are in addition to the approximately Bs. 900 million in loans to subsidiary or affiliated companies that are not paying interest or amortizing principal. There is no evidence that Gorrondona, Sr. or Gonzalez were coerced into signing the February 28, 1980 Agreement. The Agreement was negotiated over an extended period of time. Gonzalez has testified that he signed the February 28, 1980 Agreement in order to assist the rehabilitation of BND and that Gorrondona, Sr. signed in the same spirit. Both men initialed each page when they signed it. Gorrondona, Jr. has testified that it is his position that the agreement is invalid in parts because he did not sign it. The BND has negotiated with Gorrondona, Jr. concerning the performance of the February 28, 1980 Agreement and the debts owed by the Specially Classified Companies. Such negotiations have not been successful. Under the February 28, 1980 Agreement, suits could not be filed for one year. When the agree- ment was not performed, the administration of Borjas pursued negotiations with Gorrondona, Jr. and, when Gabaldon became President of BND in August, 1981, he continued negotiations with Gorrondona, Jr. No suits have been filed against Gorrondona, Sr. or Gonzalez personally on account of the February 28, 1980 Agreement. The BND has very recently started to file suits against some of the debtors. Gorrondona, Sr.'s signing of the Agreement of February 28, 1980, Gorrondona, Jr.'s partici- pation in negotiations with respect to the performance thereof, together with the state- ments made in Memorandum of October 14, 1976 and described above concerning loans made prior to intervention to companies owned directly or indirectly by owners of the BND, corroborates the finding of the Intervenor that prior to intervention a substantial amount of loans were made to companies in which officers and directors of the BND had an interest. The inability to collect these loans corroborates the conclusion of the Superintendent and Intervenor that these loans were not adequately collateralized and were made in amounts in excess of what prudent credit practices would dictate based on the companies' balance sheets. Transfer of ownership of the BND: In the days following the intervention, members of the national government of Venezuela, including the Minister of Finance, met with Gorrondona, Sr. The possible liquidation of the BND and the possible transfer of ownership were discussed. On February 8, 1979, agreements were signed providing for the sale of 65 percent of the BND's shares to the Corporation Venezolana de Fomento ("CVF") . Sixteen shareholders, including Gorrondona, Sr., signed these agreements. They covered the shares owned by both Gorrondona, Sr. and Jr. The February 8, 1979 Agreement set a minimum price of Bs. 1 per share. The Agreement provided that the actual price would be set by the Superintendent of Banks prior to July 31, 1979. The price was to be fixed based on the book value of the BND and its subsidiaries as of December 31, 1978 less the uncollect- ible loans in its portfolio. At the time of intervention the losses on the BND loan portfolio exceeded the capital and reserve of the bank. Under Venezuelan law, when a bank has lost more than 25 per- cent of its capital, the stockholders are required to replace it. Accordingly, had they not sold their shares, the former owners of the BND would have had to make a capital contribution to the BND. As it is, the new owners of the shares have replaced the lost capital of the BND. Gorrondona, Jr., Borjas, the then President of the BND, and the Planning Minister of Venezuela met between June and November, 1979, to discuss the price for the BND shares and repayment of debts owed by the Specially Classified Companies. As a result of this meeting, an agreement was signed on December 21, 1979, regarding the fixing of the price of the stock and the negotiation of the re- payment of loans made to the Specially Clas- sified Companies. In February, 1980, two agreements were signed finalizing the sale of the BND shares to the CVF. One of these agreements (Respondent's Exhibit 82) was with the parties that had signed the February 8, 1979 Agreement. Re- spondent's Exhibit 82 was signed by Gorrondona Sr. and Gonzalez among others. In paragraph First it recites that: "In execution of the agreement reached in the Third clause of the sales contracts for Banco National de Descuento, C.A. shares, sub- scribed between C.V.F. and THE SELLERS and dated February 8, 1979, the Bank Examiner through Official Notices Nos. HSE-200- 3860 and HSE-200-3992, dated July 31 and August 7, 1979, respectively, ad- dressed to the Banco National de Descuento, C.A., determined losses in the Credit Portfolio of said Institution reaching an amount of ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY SIX MILLION AND SEVEN [TOS (hundred) omitted in translation] THOUSAND BOLIVARS (Bs. 1,186,700,000.00) and therefore ordered the pertinent adjustments to the BANCO NACIONAL DE DESCUENTO C.A.'s Balance Sheet as of December 31, 1978." In paragraph Second it recites: "Due to the adjustments referred to in the previous Clause, and pursuant to the agree- ment between the parties listed in the con- tracts entered into on February 8, 1979, the Book value of the sold shares resulted in an amount less than One Bolivar (Bs. 1.00) per share, wherefore 'THE SELLERS' have, pursuant to the provisions of the Third Clause of the aforementioned contracts, agreed to accept the amount of One Bolivar (Bs. 1.00) per share, as the sale price for the shares sold." In paragraph Third it recites: "Lastly, 'THE SELLERS' state for the record that what they declare herein completely invalidates any statement or claim made by them, their agents, attorneys or represent- ative regarding any questions on the validity of the agreements executed on February 8, 1979, whose contents they are aware of, and which they execute in a final and definite manner through this document." There is no claim made in the record that the signers of Respondent's Exhibit 82 were coerced in their decision to execute that agreement. The other agreement of February 1980 regard- ing the transfer of shares of the BND (Respon- dent's Exhibit 81) was with shareholders who had not signed the February 8, 1979 Agreement. That agreement also fixed the sales price at 1 B per share. As recited therein, it used as the amount of the losses the Bs. 649 million figure established by the Minister of Finance pursuant to the appeal taken November 30, 1979, rather than the Bs. 1.186 billion figure established by the Superinten- dent of Banks prior to the appeal. This established that whether the Bs. 1.186 bil- lion or the Bs. 649 million figure is used for the amount of the losses, the shares of the BND had at most a nominal value of 1 B on December 31, 1978. Property in Venezuela cannot lawfully be taken by the Government without compensation. If it is taken for less than a fair price, the aggrieved person can go to court to seek a fair price. The judiciary in Venezuela is independent. No lawsuit has yet been filed to obtain ad- ditional compensation for the shares of the BND transferred to the new owners. Recently an "administrative letter" was sent regarding additional compensation for the shares. Nothing in Venezuelan law precluded its being sent earlier. The evidence in the record does not support a finding that the government of Venezuela coerced the owners of the BND to sell their shares or that such shares were sold at less than a fair price. As alleged by Petitioner. SUMMARY FINDINGS The decision to intervene the BND was, in part, politically motivated as evidenced by the timing of the intervention, the withdrawal of substantial government deposits immediately prior to intervention and the decision to refuse recognition of previously accepted commercial paper for rediscount. This is not to conclude, however, that the continuing liquidity problems of the BND were caused by the government. The reasons for the liquidity crisis experienced by the BND in 1978 had existed since at least 1976, and were identified in internal memoranda as well as Superintendent of Banks' and Intervenor's reports. The liquidity crisis experienced by the BND in 1978 and the intervention of the BND by the Venezuelan Government have at the present time a somewhat adverse effect on the reputation of Gorrondona, Jr. with respect to his qualifications as a banker. There is no evidence of any deficiency in his character or integrity. The education and business experience of Gorrondona, Jr. tend to establish his qualifications. However, his role as President-in-Charge of the BND during the liquidity crisis and intervention reflects adversely on those qualifications. No witness was called by the Banking Department or the Applicant on the question whether the practices that gave rise to the intervention constitute unsound banking practices. Those practices have been identified in the findings herein and include concentration of credit in the loans to the Specially Classified Companies, the renewal of loans to subsidiary companies though those loans were not paying interest, repeated violation of legal reserve requirements, failure to comply with the laws relating to agricultural loans, and failure to disclose to regulatory authorities that the minutes submitted for review by those authorities were not the same as the minutes in the books of the bank. LEGAL CONCLUSIONS AND RULINGS Subsection 120.57(1)(b) 12, Florida Statutes, provides: In applications for a license or mergers pursuant to title XXXVIII which are referred by the agency to the division for hearing pursuant to this section, the hearing officer shall complete and submit to the agency and to all parties a written report consisting of findings of fact and rulings on evidentiary matters. The agency shall allow each party at least 10 days in which to submit written exceptions to the report. Subsection 120.52(7), Florida Statutes, defines "license" as [a] franchise, permit, certificate, registration, charter, or similar form of authorization required by law, but it does not include a license required pri- marily for revenue purposes when issuance of the license is merely a ministerial act. Subsection 658.28(1), Florida Statutes, provides in part: (1) In any case in which a person or a group of persons, proposes to purchase or acquire a controlling interest in any state bank or state trust company and thereby to change the control of that bank or trust company, each person shall first make ap- plication to the department for a certificate of approval of such proposed change of control of the bank or trust company. . . The above provisions of Chapter 120 establish the Hearing Officer's report procedure for license applications under Florida banking laws. This is an application for a certificate of approval which is a form of license application within the meaning of that term as used and defined in Chapter 120. Therefore, no recommended order will be issued. Subsection 658.28(1), Florida Statutes, provides in part: [T]he department shall issue a certificate of approval only after it has made an investi- gation and determined that the proposed new owner or owners of the interest are qualified by character, experience, and financial responsibility to control and operate the bank and trust company in a legal and proper manner and that the interests of the other stockholders, if any, and the depositors and creditors of the bank or trust company and the interests of the public generally will not be jeopardized by the proposed change in ownership, controlling interest, or management. The above provision necessitates Respondent's investigation of Gorrondona, Jr.'s banking experience. Thus, the history of the BND and his role in the management of that institution are relevant to Respondent's investigation and to this proceeding. Petitioner's objection to such evidence is hereby overruled. FILED this 28th day of December, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of December, 1982.
Conclusions THIS CAUSE, arising under Florida’s “Agricultural License and Bond Law” (Sections 604.15-604.34), Florida Statutes, came before the Commissioner of Agriculture of the State of Florida for consideration and final agency action. On October 21, 2008, the Petitioner, Ricky A. Branch, III, a producer of agricultural products as defined by Section 604.15(9), Florida Statutes, timely filed an administrative claim pursuant to Section 604.21, Florida Statutes, to collect $31,296.18 for eggplants they sold to Respondent, a licensed dealer in agricultural products. Respondent’s license for the time in question was supported by a surety bond required by Section 604.20, Florida Statutes, written by Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland in the amount of $100,000. On January 7, 2009, a Notice of Filing of ‘an Amended Claim was mailed to Respondent and Co-Respondent. On January 27, 2009, the Respondent filed an ANSWER OF RESPONDENT with attachments wherein they denied the claim as being valid, admitted no indebtedness and requested a hearing. Therefore, this matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) for an administrative hearing in accordance with the provisions of Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. An administrative hearing was scheduled in this matter for April 17, 2009. Attached to the NOTICE OF HEARING was an ORDER OF PRE-HEARING INSTRUCTIONS with instructions for the parties to follow prior to and at the hearing. On March 30, 2009, the Respondent filed a ' MOTION TO CONTINUE FINAL HEARING. The Administrative Law Judge (“Judge”) issued an ORDER GRANTING CONTINUANCE (“Order”) on April 3, 2009. In the Judge’s Order, he asked the parties to confer and advise him on the status of the matter among other things. An ORDER RE-SCHEDULING. HEARING was issued on April 16, 2009 and a new hearing date was set for June 9, 2009. Prior to the hearing, on June 5, 2009, the Respondent filed a RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS claiming their efforts to contact the Claimant have been futile. Additionally, Respondent asserts that Claimant failed to comply with the ORDER GRANTING CONTINUANCE, the ORDER RE-SCHEDULING HEARING and the ORDER OF PRE-HEARING INSTRUCTIONS issued by DOAH. For the aforesaid reasons, the Respondent feels the Claimant’s claim should be denied and the claim dismissed with prejudice. On June 16, 2009, the Judge issued a RECOMMENDED ORDER OF DISMISSAL, a copy of which is attached hereto as EXHIBIT “A”, to which neither party filed written exceptions with this Department. . Upon the consideration of the foregoing and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is ORDERED: Based on the fact that the Claimant failed to appear at the final hearing with DOAH on June 9, 2009 and failed to meet his burden of proof in presenting evidence in support of his claim, the Department adopts the Judge’s RECOMMENDED ORDER OF DISMISSAL. The Department hereby dismisses the captioned claim and the file is closed without further action. Any party to these proceedings adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to seek review of this Final Order pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes (2002) and Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure (2003). Review proceedings must be instituted by filing a petition or notice of appeal with the Agency Clerk, 5" Floor, Mayo Building, Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800. A copy of the petition for review or notice of appeal, accompanied by the filing fees prescribed by law must also be filed with the appropriate District Court of Appeal within thirty (30) days of the date this Final Ondet yas filed with the Agency Clerk. DONE AND ORDERED this77_ day of , 2009. ES H. BRONSON TERRY/L. RHODES Assi Commissioner of Agriculture Ke Filed with Agency Clerk this? _ day of , 2009. (pL Vb AM Agency Clerk COPIES FURNISHED TO: Judge Daniel Manry Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (Certified Receipt No. 7160 3901 9848 2604 4626) Mr. Gary Wishnatzki, Registered Agent Wishnatzki, Inc., d/b/a Wishnatzki Farms 100 Stearn Avenue Plant City, FL 33566 (Certified Receipt No. 7160 3901 9848 2605 1259) Mr. Ricky A. Branch, IIT Post Office Box 42 Webster, FL 33597 (Certified Receipt No. 7160 3901 9848 2605 1266) Ms. Kathy Alves, Claims Specialist Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland Post Office Box 87 , Baltimore, MD 21203-0087 (Certified Receipt No. 7160 3901 9848 2605 1273) (Claim No. 6380046897) Thomas F. Munro, Esquire FOLEY & LARDNER LLP 100 North Tampa Street, Suite 2700 Tampa, FL 33602 (Certified Receipt No. 7160 3901 9848 2605 1280) . Mr. Bedford Wilder General Counsel Staff Mayo Building, M-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Ms. Stephenie Butscher and Mr. Mark Moritz, Field Representatives
Findings Of Fact Respondent is an applicant to register as a securities salesman with Realty Income Securities, Inc., said application having been submitted to the Division of Securities on February 2, 1975 and is currently pending (Testimony of Dove). During the period of approximately February through - September, 1973, Respondent, a registered mortgage broker, was employed by Financial Resources Corporation of Fort Lauderdale, Florida, in the sale of promissory notes secured ostensibly by first mortgages upon land located in Highlands County, Florida. These notes and security documents were issued by Equitable Development Corporation of Miami Beach, Florida. The notes were payable to "investors" at 14 percent interest per year, payable monthly for several years at which time the full principal balance would become due. The mortgage deeds recited that Equitable Development Corporation held the land which secured the notes in fee simple, free and clear of all encumbrances except real estate taxes. The mortgage deeds further recited that Equitable reserved the right to convey the land to a purchaser under an installment land contract subject to the lien of the mortgage and would deliver to the National Industrial Bank of Miami, an escrow agent, a copy of any such agreement for deed and a quit-claim deed which would be held in escrow. They also provided a procedure by which under any default of Equitable, the escrow agent would deliver the escrow documents to the investor (Testimony of Dove, Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 1). Respondent's association with Financial Resources Corporation came about as a result of a visit by Mr. Robert Rinehart, President of the firm, who explained the mortgage sales program to him and stated that the security instruments were indeed first mortgages. Additionally, Rinehart supplied Respondent with brochures, letters, and documents containing questions and answers concerning the program and the protection afforded thereby to investors. Respondent personally viewed the property in question at Highland Park Estates and observed that over a hundred homes had been constructed which were of a value from $14,000 to $40,000. He also observed that docks had been built on the lake in the project area and that almost all of the roads had been paved. He was shown the MIA appraisal on the property which stated that Rinehart's representations as to property values were accurate. Equitable further represented to him that the notes in question were exempt securities in that they came within the provisions of Section 517.06(7), F.S., concerning the issuance or sale of notes secured by a specific lien upon real property created by mortgage or security agreement. In fact, Respondent became so convinced of the merits of these transactions that he had his mother invest twenty thousand dollars in the program (Testimony of Respondent, Watts; Respondent's Exhibits 1,2). In September 1973, Respondent formed Florida Income Resources Corporation, a mortgage brokerage firm. He did not sell any of the Equitable notes for a period of some months and, prior to commencing sale of them through his firm in the Spring of 1974, his attorney looked over the various aspects of the Equitable program and advised him that everything seemed "open and above board." Respondent thereafter on April 9 and August 1, 1974 sold to William H. Mott secured promissory notes of Equitable Development Corporation in the amounts of $2,000 and $2,250 respectively (Testimony of Respondent, Zawadsky; Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 1). During the period of these sales, letters of Albert George Segal, attorney, were being sent to investors advising them that he had examined the title to the real property purchased and that it was free and clear of encumbrances and constituted valid first mortgages (Respondent's Exhibit 3, Stipulation). Administrative proceedings were brought against Respondent by the Division of Finance involving sales of the notes in question resulting in a settlement by stipulation whereby Respondent did not acknowledge any wrongdoing, but agreed to a suspension of his mortgage broker's registration for two years. Respondent's firm secured no appraisals or title searches on the property involved in the sales to Mott (Testimony of Respondent).
Recommendation That the allegations be dismissed and that Respondent Edgar A Dove be registered as a securities salesman if he otherwise meets the qualifications set forth in Section 517.12, Florida Statutes and Chapter 3E-30, Florida Administrative Code. DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of March, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Fred O. Drake, III Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 H. Gordon Brown, P.A. 301 W. Camino Gardens Boulevard Suite B P.O. Box 1079 Boca Raton, Florida 33432
The Issue The issue in this case is whether disciplinary action should be taken against Respondents' mortgage brokerage licenses for the reasons set forth in the Order to Cease and Desist, Administrative Complaint and Notice of Rights filed by Petitioner on January 18, 1989 (the "Administrative Complaint".) The Administrative Complaint alleges that Respondents violated the following statutory and rule provisions: Section 494.055(1)(b), Florida Statutes, by charging borrowers closing costs that were in excess of the actual amount incurred by the mortgagor; Section 494.08(3), Florida Statutes, and Rule 3D- 40.008(9), Florida Administrative Code, by charging excess brokerage fees; Section 494.055(1)(b), Florida Statutes, by engaging in deceit, misrepresentation, negligence or incompetence in mortgage financing transactions and for breach of the fiduciary duty of a broker as a result of the manner in which escrow accounts were handled; Section 494.055(1)(h), Florida Statutes, due to the misuse, misapplication or misappropriation of funds, mortgage documents or other property entrusted to Respondents as a result of the excess charges assessed to borrowers and the misuse of monies in the escrow accounts; Rule 3D- 40.006(6)(a), Florida Administrative Code, for failing to maintain trust, servicing and escrow account records in accordance with good accounting practices; and Section 494.0393(2), Florida Statutes by failing to operate the company under the full charge, control and supervision of a principle who is a licensed mortgage broker.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent hereto, Respondent All States Mortgage and Investment Corporation ("All States Mortgage") was licensed by the Department as a mortgage brokerage company having been issued License Number HB-592582215. All States Mortgage had its principle place of business in Davie, Florida. All States Mortgage did not typically engage in traditional "mortgage broker functions." Instead, it generally worked with other mortgage brokers in providing funds for loans brought to All States Mortgage by other brokers. At all times pertinent hereto, Respondent, Lynn F. Smith ("Smith") was a licensed mortgage broker having been issued License Number HA-265-72-0045. Smith was the principle mortgage broker for All States Mortgage. Smith has been the principle mortgage broker for All States Mortgage since its inception and has been registered with the Department as a licensed mortgage broker since before a license was issued to All States Mortgage. In addition to being the principle broker for All States Mortgage, Smith was an officer and director of the company and had responsibility for the direction, control, operations and management of the company. In May of 1988, Respondents were affiliated with a licensed consumer finance company known as All States Finance Company. Currently, both All States Mortgage and All States Finance are inactive and an application has been filed to transfer the license of All States Mortgage to a new company known as All States Financial Services. As a result of an audit and examination conducted by the Department in May, 1988, it was determined that one client of All States Mortgage, Donald Salvog, was charged a brokerage fee in excess of the maximum allowable fee under Chapter 494. After notification by the Department, Respondents admitted that they inadvertently charged an excess fee to Mr. Salvog and Respondents immediately proceeded to refund the excess of $82.63 to the customer. There is no evidence that Respondents charged any other customers with a brokerage fee in excess of the maximum allowed under Chapter 494. In a number of the individual mortgage transactions in which it was involved, Respondents charged a standard credit report fee of $25.00 to the borrowers. The following chart reflects the individual loan files where such a fee was charged and the total amount of the invoices in the respective loan file to support the charges. Borrower's Name Cost per Closing Stmt. Cost per Invoices Roland Sagraves $25.00 $3.25 John Murphy $25.00 $3.25 Donald Salvog $25.00 $2.95 Harry Walley $25.00 $2.57 Raymond Parker $25.00 $5.14 Shateen/Lawrence $25.00 $5.75 James Arnold $25.00 $3.94 Richard Pope $25.00 $5.04 James Smith $25.00 $6.50 9. In four of the nine customer files listed in Findings of Fact 8 above, a "standard factual" credit report was included in the file. The typical cost for a "standard factual" is $45.00. No invoices were included in those files to reflect this cost. In obtaining credit reports for an individual mortgage transaction, Respondents did not generally order a credit report from an existing service. Instead, All States Mortgage had an on-line computer terminal with a direct phone modem linked to the individual credit reporting agency's computer data base. An employee of All States Mortgage, usually Burton Horowitz, used this computer link-up to conduct a credit report on the borrower. "Standard Factual" reports were ordered from existing services as necessary to supplement the computer search. The standard $25.00 fee charged by All States Mortgage was based upon an estimate of the overhead and indirect costs associated with producing credit reports in this manner. The overhead and indirect costs involved in obtaining credit reports as described in Findings of Fact 10 include the cost of leasing the equipment, the labor involved in obtaining the computer report (it typically takes an operator 30 minutes to obtain the credit reports) and the cost of the materials involved in producing a copy of the report. The standard $25.00 fee charged by All States Mortgage was not based on a specific allocation of the indirect costs associated with producing a particular report, but, instead, was simply based upon an estimate of the costs involved. During the course of its operations, All States Mortgage would periodically receive funds that were to be held in escrow. These escrow funds were kept in an interest-bearing account that was used by All States Mortgage and All States Finance. (This account is hereinafter referred to as the "Commingled Account.") The escrow funds in this Commingled Account were mixed with other funds of All States Mortgage as well as money belonging to All States Finance. Respondents contend that the escrow funds were commingled with the other funds because the companies had only one interest bearing account and that account had limited check writing ability. Respondents transferred money between the interest bearing Commingled Account and their other operating accounts on a continuous basis. At the end of each month, Respondents attempted to perform a reconciliation as to the escrow balances in the Commingled Account. On several occasions during the period from July 1987 through May 1988, the balance in the Commingled Account was less than the total funds that Respondents were supposed to be holding in escrow. No evidence was introduced to indicate that Respondents' handling of the escrow funds and/or the Commingled Account ever resulted in a loss to any of their borrowers or customers. Thus, while the evidence does indicate that, on occasion, the balance of the Commingled Account was less than the funds that should have been in escrow, the difference on each occasion was ultimately corrected in the reconciliation process. Respondents failed to use good accounting principles in the handling of the escrow funds. The Department has not adopted any rules requiring a mortgage broker to handle escrow funds in a separate account. Prior to the initiation of this Administrative Complaint, Respondents were never informed that they were required to do so. The Department's examiners prepared a schedule indicating that Respondents had diverted some of the escrow funds to their own use. However, that schedule includes several loans that had already been sold to another company on the date listed. Thus, the schedule does not accurately reflect the funds that should have been in escrow on any particular day. Although Respondent Lynn Smith was only in the office approximately fifteen percent (15%) of the time while the Department's examiners were conducting their audit in May of 1988, insufficient evidence was introduced to establish the charge that Smith was not fully supervising or controlling the actions of the employees of All States Mortgage. The unrefuted testimony of Smith indicates that she often worked non-regular hours, that she reviewed all the documents for every transaction in which All States Mortgage was involved and she supervised the work of all of the employees of the company. Extenuating circumstances in May of 1988 caused her to be out of the office more than usual during regular business hours. However, this fact alone is insufficient to establish the charge that she was not fully supervising or controlling the actions of the company.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law it is, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Banking and Finance enter a final order finding the Respondents guilty of violating Sections 494.055(1)(b), (d), (f), (h) and (k) and issue a reprimand to the Respondents and impose a fine of one thousand five dollars ($1,500.00). DONE and ORDERED this 9th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 1990.
The Issue The issue for determination in this consolidated bid protest proceeding is whether the Florida Housing Finance Corporation’s (“FHFC”) intended award of tax credits for the preservation of existing affordable housing developments was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.
Findings Of Fact FHFC and Affordable Housing Tax Credits FHFC is a public corporation that finances affordable housing in Florida by allocating and distributing low income housing tax credits. See § 420.504(1), Fla. Stat. (providing that FHFC is “an entrepreneurial public corporation organized to provide and promote the public welfare by administering the governmental function of financing or refinancing housing and related facilities in this state.”); § 420.5099(2), Fla. Stat. (providing that “[t]he corporation shall adopt allocation procedures that will ensure the maximum use of available tax credits in order to encourage development of low-income housing in the state, taking into consideration the timeliness of the application, the location of the proposed housing project, the relative need in the area for low-income housing and the availability of such housing, the economic feasibility of the project, and the ability of the applicant to proceed to completion of the project in the calendar year for which the credit is sought.”). The tax credits allocated by FHFC encourage investment in affordable housing and are awarded through competitive solicitations to developers of qualifying rental housing. Tax credits are not tax deductions. For example, a $1,000 deduction in a 15-percent tax bracket reduces taxable income by $1,000 and reduces tax liability by $150. In contrast, a $1,000 tax credit reduces tax liability by $1,000. Not surprisingly, the demand for tax credits provided by the federal government exceeds the supply. A successful applicant/developer normally sells the tax credits in order to raise capital for a housing development. That results in the developer being less reliant on debt financing. In exchange for the tax credits, a successful applicant/developer must offer affordable rents and covenant to keep those rents at affordable levels for 30 to 50 years. The Selection Process FHFC awards tax credits through competitive solicitations, and that process is commenced by the issuance of a Request for Applications (“RFA”). Florida Administrative Code Rule 67-60.009(2) provides that unsuccessful applicants for tax credits “may only protest the results of the competitive solicitation process pursuant to the procedures set forth in Section 120.57(3), F.S., and Chapter 28-110, F.A.C.” For purposes of section 120.57(3), an RFA is equivalent to a “request for proposal.” See Fla. Admin. Code R. 67.60.009(4), F.A.C. FHFC issued RFA 2015-111 on October 23, 2015, and responses from applicants were due on December 4, 2015. Through RFA 2015-111, FHFC seeks to award up to $5,901,631 of tax credits to qualified applicants that commit to preserve existing affordable multifamily housing developments for the demographic categories of “Families,” “the Elderly,” and “Persons with a Disability.” FHFC only considered an application eligible for funding from RFA 2015-111, if that particular application complied with certain content requirements. FHFC ranked all eligible applications pursuant to an “Application Sorting Order” set forth in RFA 2015-111. The first consideration was the applicants’ scores. Each application could potentially receive up to 23 points based on the developer’s experience and the proximity to services needed by the development’s tenants. Applicants demonstrating that their developments received funding from a U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) Rural Development program known as RD 515 were entitled to a 3.0 point proximity score “boost.” That proximity score boost was important because RFA 2015-111 characterized counties as small, medium, or large. Applications associated with small counties had to achieve at least four proximity points to be considered eligible for funding. Applications associated with medium-sized counties and those associated with large counties had to achieve at least seven and 10.25 proximity points respectively in order to be considered eligible for funding. Because it is very common for several tax credit applicants in a particular RFA to receive identical scores, FHFC incorporated a series of “tie-breakers” into RFA 2015-111. The tie-breakers for RFA 2015-111, in order of applicability, were: First, by Age of Development, with developments built in 1985 or earlier receiving a preference over relatively newer developments. Second, if necessary, by a Rental Assistance (“RA”) preference. Applicants were to be assigned an RA level based on the percentage of units receiving rental assistance through either a U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) or USDA Rural Development program. Applicants with an RA level of 1, 2, or 3 (meaning at least 75 percent of the units received rental assistance) were to receive a preference. Third, by a Concrete Construction Funding Preference, with developments incorporating certain specified concrete or masonry structural elements receiving the preference. Fourth, by a Per Unit Construction Funding Preference, with applicants proposing at least $32,500 in Actual Construction Costs per unit receiving the preference. Fifth, by a Leveraging Classification favoring applicants requiring a lower amount in housing credits per unit than other applicants. Generally, the least expensive 80 percent of eligible applicants were to receive a preference over the most expensive 20 percent. Sixth, by an Applicant’s specific RA level, with Level 1 applicants receiving the most preference and Level 6 the least. Seventh, by a Florida Job Creation Preference, which estimated the number of jobs created per $1 million of housing credit equity investment the developments were to receive based on formulas contained in the RFA. Applicants achieving a Job Creation score of at least 4.0 were to receive the preference. Eighth, by lottery number, with the lowest (smallest) lottery number receiving the preference. Rental assistance from the USDA or HUD is provided to existing developments in order to make up for shortfalls in monthly rent paid by tenants. For example, if an apartment’s base rent is $500 per month and the tenant’s income limits him or her to paying only $250 towards rent, then the USDA or HUD rental assistance pays the other $250 so that the total rent received by the development is $500. As evident from the tie-breakers incorporated into RFA 2015-111, the amount of rental assistance, or “RA Level,” played a prominent role in distinguishing between RFA 2015-111 applicants having identical scores. RFA 2015-111 required that applicants demonstrate RA Levels by providing a letter containing the following information: (a) the development’s name; (b) the development’s address; (c) the year the development was built; (d) the total number of units that currently receive PBRA and/or ACC;/3 (e) the total number of units that would receive PBRA and/or ACC if the proposed development were to be funded; (f) all HUD or RD financing program(s) originally and/or currently associated with the existing development; and (g) confirmation that the development had not received financing from HUD or RD after 1995 when the rehabilitation was at least $10,000 per unit in any year. In order to determine an applicant’s RA Level Classification, RFA 2015-111 further stated that Part of the criteria for a proposed Development that qualifies as a Limited Development Area (LDA) Development to be eligible for funding is based on meeting a minimum RA Level, as outlined in Section Four A.7.c of the RFA. The total number of units that will receive rental assistance (i.e., PBRA and/or ACC), as stated in the Development Category qualification letter provided as Attachment 7, will be considered to be the proposed Development’s RA units and will be the basis of the Applicant’s RA Level Classification. The Corporation will divide the RA units by the total units stated by the Applicant at question 5.e. of Exhibit A, resulting in a Percentage of Total Units that are RA units. Using the Rental Assistance Level Classification Chart below, the Corporation will determine the RA Level associated with both the Percentage of Total Units and the RA units. The best rating of these two (2) levels will be assigned as the Application’s RA Level Classification. RFA 2015-111 then outlined a Rental Assistance Level Classification Chart to delineate between the RA Levels. That chart described six possible RA Levels, with one being developments that have the most units receiving rental assistance and six pertaining to developments with the fewest units receiving rental assistance. A development with at least 100 rental assistance units and greater than 50 percent of the total units receiving rental assistance was to receive an RA Level of 1. FHFC also utilized a “Funding Test” to assist in the selection of applications for funding. The Funding Test required that the amount of unawarded housing credits be enough to satisfy any remaining applicant’s funding request. In other words, FHFC prohibited partial funding. In addition, RFA 2015-111 applied a “County Award Tally” designed to prevent a disproportionate concentration of funded developments in any one county. As a result, all other applicants from other counties had to receive an award before a second application from a particular county could be funded. After ranking of the eligible applicants, RFA 2015-111 set forth an order of funding selection based on county size, demographic category, and the receipt of RD 515 financing. The Order was: One RD 515 Development (in any demographic category) in a medium or small county; One Non-RD 515 Development in the Family Demographic Category (in any size county); The highest ranked Non-RD 515 application or applications with the demographic of Elderly or Persons with a Disability; and If funding remains after all eligible Non- RD 515 applicants are funded, then the highest ranked RD 515 applicant in the Elderly demographic (or, if none, then the highest ranked RD 515 applicant in the Family demographic). Draft versions of every RFA are posted on-line in order for stakeholders to provide FHFC with their comments. In addition, every RFA goes through at least one workshop prior to being finalized. FHFC often makes changes to RFAs based on stakeholder comments. No challenge was filed to the terms, conditions, or requirements of RFA 2015-111. A review committee consisting of FHFC staff members reviewed and scored all 24 applications associated with RFA 2015-111. During this process, FHFC staff determined that none of the RD-515 applicants satisfied all of the threshold eligibility requirements. On June 24, 2016, FHFC’s Board of Directors announced its intention to award funding to five applicants, subject to those applicants successfully completing the credit underwriting process. Pineda Village in Brevard County was the only successful applicant in the Non-RD 515 Family Demographic. The four remaining successful applicants were in the Non-RD 515 Elderly or Persons with Disability Demographic: Three Round Tower in Miami-Dade County; Cathedral Towers in Duval County; Isles of Pahokee in Palm Beach County; and Lummus Park in Miami- Dade County. The randomly-assigned lottery number tie-breaker played a role for the successful Non-RD 515 applicants with Three Round Tower having lottery number one, Cathedral Towers having lottery number nine, and Isles of Pahokee having lottery number 18. While Lummus Park had a lottery number of 12, the County Award Tally prevented it from being selected earlier because Three Round Tower had already been selected for funding in Miami-Dade County. However, after the first four applicants were funded, only $526,880 of credits remained, and Lummus Park was the only eligible applicant with a request small enough to be fully funded. All Petitioners timely filed Notices of Protest and petitions for administrative proceedings. The Challenge by Woodcliff, Colonial, and St. Johns Woodcliff is seeking an award of tax credits in order to acquire and preserve a 34-unit development for elderly residents in Lake County.4/ Colonial is seeking an award of tax credits in order to acquire and preserve a 30-unit development for low-income families in Lake County.5/ St. Johns is seeking an award of tax credits to acquire and preserve a 48-unit development for elderly residents in Putnam County.6/ FHFC deemed Woodcliff, Colonial and St. Johns to be ineligible because of a failure to demonstrate the existence or availability of a particular source of financing relied upon in their applications. Specifically, FHFC determined that the availability of USDA RD 515 financial assistance was not properly documented. For applicants claiming the existence of RD 515 financing, RFA 2015-111 stated: If the proposed Development will be assisted with funding under the United States Department of Agriculture RD 515 Program and/or RD 538 Program, the following information must be provided: Indicate the applicable RD Program(s) at question 11.b.(2) of Exhibit A. For a proposed Development that is assisted with funding from RD 515 and to qualify for the RD 515 Proximity Point Boost (outlined in Section Four A.6.b.(1)(b) of the RFA), the Applicant must: Include the funding amount at the USDA RD Financing line item on the Development Funding Pro Forma (Construction/Rehab Analysis and/or Permanent Analysis); and Provide a letter from RD, dated within six (6) months of the Application Deadline, as Attachment 17 to Exhibit A, which includes the following information for the proposed Preservation Development: Name of existing development; Name of proposed Development; Current RD 515 Loan balance; Acknowledgment that the property is applying for Housing Credits; and Acknowledgment that the property will remain in the USDA RD 515 loan portfolio. (emphasis added). FHFC was counting on the letter mentioned directly above to function as proof that: (a) there was RD 515 financing in place when the letter was issued; and that (b) the RD 515 financing would still be in place as of the application deadline for RFA 2015-111. FHFC deemed Woodcliff, Colonial and St. Johns ineligible because their RD letters were not dated within six months of the December 4, 2015, deadline for RFA 2015-111 applications. The Woodcliff letter was dated May 15, 2015, the Colonial letter was dated May 15, 2015, and the St. Johns letter was dated May 5, 2015. FHCA had previously issued RFA 2015-104, which also proposed to award Housing Credit Financing for the Preservation of Existing Affordable Multifamily Housing Developments. The deadline for RFA 2015-104 was June 23, 2015, and Woodcliff, Colonial, and St. Johns applied using the same USDA letter that they used in their RFA 2015-111 applications. Woodcliff, Colonial, and St. Johns argued during the final hearing that FHFC should have accepted their letters because: (a) they gained no competitive advantage by using letters that were more than six months old; (b) waiving the six- month “shelf life” requirement would enable FHFC to satisfy one of its stated goals for RFA 2015-111, i.e., funding of an RD 515 development; and (c) other forms of financing (such as equity investment) have no “freshness” or “shelf life” requirement. However, it is undisputed that no party (including Woodcliff, Colonial, and St. Johns) challenged any of the terms, conditions, or requirements of RFA 2015-111. In addition, Kenneth Reecy (FHFC’s Director of Multifamily Programs) testified that there must be a point at which FHFC must ensure the viability of the information submitted by applicants. If the information is “too old,” then it may no longer be relevant to the current application process. Under the circumstances, it was not unreasonable for FHFC to utilize a six-month shelf life for USDA letters.7/ Furthermore, Mr. Reecy testified that excusing Woodcliff, Colonial, and St. Johns’ noncompliance could lead to FHFC excusing all deviations from all other date requirements in future RFAs. In other words, applicants could essentially rewrite those portions of the RFA, and that would be an unreasonable result. Excusing the noncompliance of Woodcliff, Colonial, and St. Johns could lead to a “slippery slope” in which any shelf- life requirement has no meaning. The letters utilized by Woodcliff, Colonial, and St. Johns were slightly more than six months old. But, exactly when would a letter become too old to satisfy the “shelf life” requirement? If three weeks can be excused today, will four weeks be excused next year? St. Elizabeth’s and Marian Towers’ Challenge St. Elizabeth is seeking low-income housing tax credit financing in order to acquire and preserve a 151-unit development for elderly residents in Broward County, Florida. Marian Towers is an applicant for RFA 2015-111 funding seeking low-income housing tax credits to acquire and preserve a 220-unit development for elderly residents in Miami-Dade County, Florida. The same developer is associated with the St. Elizabeth and Marian Towers projects. In its scoring and ranking process, FHFC assigned St. Elizabeth an RA Level of two. RFA 2015-111 requires that Applicants demonstrate RA Levels by providing a letter from HUD or the USDA with specific information. That information is then used to establish an RA Level for the proposed development. As noted above, the RFA requires the letter to contain several pieces of information, including: (a) the total number of units that currently receive PBRA and/or ACC; and (b) the total number of units that will receive PBRA and/or ACC if the proposed development is funded. RFA 2015-111 provided that a development with at least 100 rental units would receive an RA Level of one. St. Elizabeth included with its application a letter from HUD’s Miami field office stating in pertinent part that: Total number of units that currently receive PBRA and/or ACC: 99 units. Total number of units that will receive PBRA and/or ACC if the proposed Development is funded: 100 units*. The asterisk in the preceding paragraph directed readers of St. Elizabeth’s HUD letter to a paragraph stating that: HUD is currently processing a request from the owner to increase the number of units subsidized under a HAP Contract to 100 by transferring budget authority for the one additional unit from another Catholic Housing Services Section 8 project under Section 8(bb) in accordance with Notice H-2015-03. Because of the foregoing statement from HUD, FHFC concluded that St. Elizabeth did not have 100 units receiving rental assistance as of the application deadline. Accordingly, FHFC used 99 units as the total number of units that would receive rental assistance when calculating St. Elizabeth’s RA Level, and that led to FHFC assigning an RA Level of two to St. Elizabeth’s application.8/ If St. Elizabeth had been deemed eligible and if FHFC had used 100 units as the total number of units that would receive rental assistance, then St. Elizabeth would have received an RA Level of one. Given the application sorting order and the selection process outlined in RFA 2015-111, St. Elizabeth (with a lottery number of six) would have been recommended for funding by FHFC, and that outcome would have resulted in Intervenors Isles of Pahokee and Lummus Park losing their funding. St. Elizabeth asserted during the final hearing that the 100th unit had obtained rental assistance financing since the application deadline on December 4, 2015. However, FHFC could only review, score, and calculate St. Elizabeth’s RA Level based on the information available as of the application deadline. While St. Elizabeth argues that the asterisk paragraph sets forth a “condition,” Kenneth Reecy (FHFC’s Director of Multifamily Housing) agreed during the final hearing that the asterisk paragraph was more akin to information that was not explicitly required by RFA 2015-111. FHFC did not use that additional information to declare St. Elizabeth’s application ineligible for funding. Despite being assigned an RA Level of two, St. Elizabeth’s application still could have been selected for funding because RFA 2015-111 merely established RA Level as a basis for breaking ties among competing applications. However, too many applicants for RFA 2015-111 had identical scores, and RFA 2015-111’s use of RA Level as a tiebreaker forced St. Elizabeth’s application out of the running. Under the circumstances, FHFC’s treatment of St. Elizabeth’s application was not clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. As noted above, tie- breakers are very important, because there is often very little to distinguish one application for tax credits from another. Given that there was a degree of uncertainty about whether St. Elizabeth’s would have 100 qualifying units, FHFC acted reasonably by assigning St. Elizabeth’s application an RA Level of two for this tie-breaker rather than an RA Level of one. St. Elizabeth and Marian Towers argue that other applications contained language that indicated a degree of uncertainty. Nevertheless, those other applications received an RA Level of one. For example, FHFC assigned an RA Level of one to Three Round and Haley Sofge even though their HUD letters stated that both developments would be “subject to a Subsidy Layering Review to be conducted by HUD.” Marian Towers argued that if FHFC does not accept HUD or RD letters containing conditional language about the number of units that will be subsidized, then FHFC should have assigned an RA Level of six to Three Round and Haley Sofge. If Three Round and Haley Sofge had been assigned an RA Level of six, then Marian Towers (with a lottery number of five) would have been recommended for funding. St. Elizabeth and Marian Towers cited another instance in which an application received an RA Level of one, even though its application contained a letter from the RD program stating that “USDA Rural Development will consent to the transfer if all regulatory requirements are met.” (emphasis added). However, St. Elizabeth and Marian Towers failed to demonstrate that the language cited above applied only to those particular applications rather than to all applications for tax credits. For example, if all applications are subject to a subsidy layering review and compliance with all regulatory requirements, then inclusion of such language in a HUD letter (in and of itself) should not prevent an applicant from being assigned an RA Level of one. St. Elizabeth and Marian Towers also cited a HUD Letter used in another recent RFA by an applicant that received an RA Level of one. The HUD letter in question contained an asterisk followed by the following statement: “It is HUD’s understanding that two separate applications are being submitted – one for each tower comprising St. Andrew Towers. If funded, HUD will consider a request from the owner to bifurcate the St. Andrew Towers HAP contract in order to facilitate the separate financing of each tower.” However, St. Elizabeth and Marian Towers failed to demonstrate why the language quoted directly above should have resulted in the applicant in question being awarded an RA Level less than one. There is no indication that the total number of units receiving rental assistance would change.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Housing Finance Corporation enter a final order awarding funding to Three Round Tower A, LLC; Cathedral Towers, Ltd; Isles of Pahokee Phase II, LLC; SP Manor, LLC; and Pineda Village. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of October, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G.W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of October, 2016.
The Issue Whether Petitioner, One Watergate Association, Inc. ("One Watergate"), as a prevailing small business party in an adjudicatory proceeding, initiated by a state agency, should be awarded attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act, Subsection 57.111(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2002).
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Commission is the state agency charged with investigating complaints of discriminatory housing practices and enforcing the Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2002). The Commission is charged with investigating fair housing complaints filed with the Commission and with the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development under the Federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 3601, et. seq. One Watergate is the duly-incorporated owners' association for the One Watergate condominium building in Sarasota. The Board is the governing body of One Watergate and is responsible for the approval or denial of potential residents and purchasers of units in the One Watergate building. One Watergate is a "prevailing small business party," as that term is employed in Section 57.111, Florida Statutes (2002). Prior to May 2002, prospective buyers or residents at One Watergate were required to complete an application that asked for character references, but did not require the applicant to provide bank references or other financial information. In early 2001, the Board commenced a search process to find a third-party investigative firm to conduct more detailed screenings of potential residents and purchasers at One Watergate. In April 2002, the Board reviewed detailed information regarding one such firm, Renters Reference of Florida, Inc. ("Renters Reference"), an investigative consumer reporting agency operating under the Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act. On April 16, 2002, the Board met in a duly-noticed, regularly scheduled meeting and voted to pursue a contract with Renters Reference to conduct applicant screenings. The minutes of the April 16, 2002, Board meeting also indicated that the Board approved an amendment to the Renters Reference motion to the effect that no new applicants would be rejected until the Board voted on the repeal of the "buy back" provision of the One Watergate by-laws. The "buy back" provision stated that if the Board rejected a bona fide purchaser, the owner of the unit in question could demand that One Watergate itself purchase the unit. On May 2, 2002, One Watergate and Renters Reference entered into an "Agreement for Service" for the conduct of confidential background checks, credit checks, and other screenings of potential One Watergate residents. In cooperation with the Board, Renters Reference established form applications to be completed by potential residents and by potential unit purchasers. The forms required applicants to sign an authorization to release their banking, credit, residence, employment, and police record information to Renters Reference. The forms also required applicants to disclose their Social Security numbers to Renters Reference, which would allow Renters Reference to obtain credit reports directly from the three national credit reporting agencies, TransUnion, Experian, and Equifax. The purchase application form also contained a provision that required the applicant to agree to "hold harmless" Renters Reference and the Board from any claim in connection with the use of information obtained through the Renters Reference investigation. The forms advised applicants that a failure to complete any portion would result in the application being "returned, not processed and not approved." Renters Reference advised One Watergate to strictly enforce the requirement that applicants complete all portions of the forms on the ground that a waiver of application requirements for any one applicant would necessitate such a waiver for any subsequent applicant or else invite a discrimination claim by the subsequent applicant. After completing the investigation, Renters Reference would send a report to One Watergate with its findings. Renters Reference was not authorized to approve or deny the application, and it made no recommendations as to approval of the application. The Board established a screening committee to act upon the applications. The two-person screening committee consisted of Janis Farr, One Watergate's resident manager, along with the sitting Board president. The screening committee's decision to approve or disapprove the application was later subject to a ratification vote by the full Board. On May 16, 2002, potential unit purchaser Marcia Lang submitted a completed form Application for Occupancy/Approval and a completed form Application for Purchase. The application was forwarded to Renters Reference, which performed a background screening that included obtaining a TransUnion credit report dated May 24, 2002. Renters Reference completed its investigation on May 29, 2002, and made its report to One Watergate. The screening committee approved the application and issued an undated Certificate of Approval. Ms. Lang closed on her unit in One Watergate in August 2002. Because the Board does not meet during the months of May through August, the Board did not ratify the screening committee's approval until its October 15, 2002, meeting. On May 29, 2002, Derrick Bhayat, a Sarasota realtor, entered into a contract with Janey and Paul Hess to purchase their One Watergate unit for $315,000. Mr. Bhayat was originally from Capetown, South Africa, where he was considered "colored." His ancestry is Malaysian, Zulu, and French. No party to the underlying proceeding disputed that Mr. Bhayat was a person of color. On May 30, 2002, Mr. Bhayat telephoned Ms. Farr and requested that he not be required to complete the application forms. Mr. Bhayat explained that he had always been cautious about providing personal information, such as his Social Security number to businesses. This general cautiousness became alarm in 2001 when his wife, Nancy Bhayat, was the victim of an identity theft. The thief used Mrs. Bhayat's Social Security number to obtain a Visa card and make $12,000 worth of purchases. Ms. Farr responded that the application would not be accepted unless all the requested information was provided. Nevertheless, on May 31, 2002, Mr. Bhayat submitted to the One Watergate office an application to occupy a unit and an application to purchase a unit. On these applications, Mr. Bhayat did not provide his or his wife's Social Security number. He did not sign the authorization to release his banking, credit, residence, employment, and police record information to Renters Reference, and he struck through the hold harmless provision. Mr. Bhayat's application to purchase was not accepted because One Watergate deemed it incomplete. This event triggered a series of negotiations between One Watergate's attorneys and the lawyer for Mr. Bhayat, the details of which are recited in the Recommended Order in Case No. 04-0816. The parties finally agreed that One Watergate would accept an application from Mr. Bhayat that reinstated the hold harmless provision, include his driver's license number in lieu of his Social Security number for conduct of the Renters Reference background check, and also include a credit report provided by Mr. Bhayat. Pursuant to this agreement, Mr. Bhayat re-submitted his application on or about June 12, 2002. On June 14, 2002, One Watergate's lawyer wrote a letter to Mr. Bhayat's lawyer that stated, in relevant part: It has come to my attention that the credit report submitted by Mr. and Mrs. Bhayat is not a credit report from a national credit reporting bureau but, in fact, is a consumer report which apparently is used quite often by mortgage brokers and realtors to compile only the positive aspects of an individual's credit reports. As a result of Mr. and Mrs. Bhayat's misrepresentation and attempt to deceive the Association, at this point only a complete and accurate application will be accepted by One Watergate Association. A complete and accurate application shall include both applicant's [sic] date of birth and social security numbers, as well as all other information requested on the application. . . . Mr. Bhayat made no further attempts to submit applications to One Watergate. Neither the screening committee, nor the full Board, ever took official action because the application was never deemed complete. Mr. Bhayat's purchase of the unit fell through. On July 19, 2002, Mr. Bhayat filed the Complaint with the Commission, alleging that One Watergate discriminated against him on the basis of national origin and color. The Commission assigned an investigator to the case. In support of his Complaint, Mr. Bhayat submitted a copy of his One Watergate application, including a 13-page credit report generated by MSC Mortgage, a joint venture of Wells Fargo Bank and Mr. Bhayat's employer, Michael Sanders and Company. The credit report was a "tri-merge" report, meaning that it combined information from all three major reporting services into a single report. In response to the investigator's request, One Watergate submitted a position statement on August 22, 2002. One Watergate generally denied Mr. Bhayat's allegations of discrimination and set forth a statement of facts in support of its position. One Watergate explained that Mr. Bhayat's final application was not considered complete because the credit report came from MSC Mortgage, rather than a credit reporting agency, which rendered it unacceptable. In response to Mr. Bhayat's allegation that he was required to provide information not asked of other applicants, One Watergate pointed out that Marcia Lang had applied and been accepted as a unit purchaser, using the Renters Reference application, two weeks before Mr. Bhayat submitted his first application. The Commission's investigator interviewed Jan Gillett, a former resident and Board member of One Watergate. Ms. Gillett told the investigator that the Renters Reference form applications had not been approved at the time Mr. Bhayat applied because the Board had yet to resolve the "buy back" controversy. Ms. Gillett also mentioned that a former Board member, now deceased, believed that Arab terrorists were planning to come into high rise condominiums, such as One Watergate, and blow them up. Ms. Gillett asserted that this former Board member had also stated that Mr. Bhayat's reluctance to disclose his Social Security number indicated that he had something to hide. The Commission's investigator interviewed Ms. Hess, co-owner of the unit Mr. Bhayat attempted to purchase. Ms. Hess told the investigator that Larry Farr, the husband of Janis Farr and "a member of management," had made remarks to her about Mr. Bhayat that could only be interpreted as referring to his skin color. According to Ms. Hess, Mr. Farr stated, "I knew the minute I saw that guy he was going to be trouble." Given that Mr. Bhayat did not have an intimidating physical presence, Ms. Hess assumed that Mr. Farr was referencing Mr. Bhayat's skin color or national origin. The Commission's investigator requested One Watergate to produce copies of all applications submitted by prospective residents during the period May 2002 through December 2002. When One Watergate declined to provide the applications, the Commission issued a subpoena seeking their production. One Watergate again declined on the ground that its residents' privacy interests precluded production of these applications absent a court order setting forth the type and dates of documents to be produced and the information that could be redacted from the documents prior to their production. One Watergate ultimately produced the redacted applications pursuant to an Order of the Circuit Court of the Twelfth Judicial Circuit entered on July 18, 2003. On September 22, 2003, the Commission's investigator produced a Final Investigative Report listing all the witnesses interviewed and documents reviewed during the investigation. The report lists Mr. Bhayat, Ms. Hess, and Ms. Gillett as the only substantive interviewees. On the same date, the investigator also produced a document entitled, "Determination" that set forth his findings and his recommendation that there was cause to believe that a discriminatory housing practice had occurred. On November 14, 2003, the Commission issued a document entitled, "Legal Concurrence: Cause." As the title suggests, this document represented the concurrence of the Commission's legal counsel with the investigator's conclusion that there was reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory housing practice had occurred. The legal analysis, prepared by the Commission's attorney Vicki Johnson, stated as follows, in relevant part: The Complainant has satisfied all the requirements of a prima facie case. The Complainant has a dark complexion and is from South Africa, therefore he is protected on the basis of color and national origin; he submitted an application to purchase the condominium and had obtained mortgage approval. Once his application was rejected, the condominium remained available for sale. Respondent articulated a non-discriminatory reason for denying the Complainant's application; however, this reason is determined to be pretext. To show pretext, the Complainant need only show that his color and national origin were in some part, the basis for the denial of the sale. . . A landlord has the right to request information about the financial status of prospective tenants; an inadequate or incomplete application form may act as a defense to a discrimination charge by providing a legitimate basis for the action taken. . . However, a violation of the Fair Housing Act can be found even where formal requisites of a contract/application are not satisfied, if the motivation behind rejection of the contract was discriminatory. . . . Respondent states that the Complainant did not submit a complete application because he failed to provide his and his wife's social security number[s]. The Complainant explained that he did not provide the social security numbers because his wife had recently had her identity stolen and was afraid to disclose her social security number. The application which the Complainant was asked to complete was not to take effect until July 1, 2002, when Respondent entered into a contract with Renter's [sic] Reference, who was to provide a credit report for applicants applying to purchase a condominium. The Renter's Reference application form is more detailed than the previous application. While it is true that the Complainant did not disclose his social security number, which would permit Renter's Reference to obtain his credit report, the Complainant did provide a copy of a credit report that was obtained by his mortgage company. This credit report included both positive and negative credit issues and provided similar information as that which would have been generated by Renter's Reference. Moreover, the minutes of the April 2002 meeting of the One Watergate Board of Directors indicates [sic] that the board approved a motion that "no new applicants be turned down until the revision of documents with reference to the obligation of the Association to purchase the unit where an applicant has been rejected." The Complainant's application was submitted after this decision by the board, but was turned down. In addition, Mrs. Hess stated that when she inquired about the Complainant's application, Mr. Farr (the building manager) told her that "I knew from the minute I saw that guy that he was going to be trouble . . . when you see him, you'll know what I mean." This statement is clearly referencing the Complainant's physical appearance. Mr. Farr was acting as an agent for the Respondent, therefore, the Respondent is vicariously liable for his actions and statements. [Citations omitted.] Also, on November 14, 2003, the Commission's executive director issued a Notice of Determination and Administrative Charge finding that there was reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory housing practice had occurred. Prior to filing the Petition for Relief that initiated the underlying proceeding, the Commission afforded One Watergate an opportunity to submit additional information in its defense. On February 23, 2004, counsel for One Watergate submitted several documents to the Commission. The first was a signed statement by Mr. Farr denying that he made the remarks alleged by Ms. Hess. The second document was the contract between Renters Reference and One Watergate, indicating an effective date of May 6, 2002, not July 1, 2002, as alleged by the Commission. Counsel for One Watergate also included Ms. Farr's version of the sequence of events concerning Mr. Bhayat's application and the minutes of a June 25, 2002, Board meeting at which the Board voted to return the application to Mr. Bhayat for completion, thus indicating that the Board did not "disapprove" that application. Finally, One Watergate included a letter from Warren Plant, the president of Renters Reference, explaining why he considered the credit report submitted by Mr. Bhayat to be unacceptable: At this time in 2002, we could not pull a credit report without an individual's Social Security Number. We obtain our credit reports directly from the national credit bureaus and provide our customer with an exact copy of this credit report. We do not obtain our credit reports from third-party consumer reporting agencies. The credit report submitted by Mr. Bhayat was a concoction put together by a third-party consumer reporting agency, not an exact copy of a credit report from a national credit bureau. A consumer reporting agency takes information from different sources and they make up their own credit report, including or excluding whatever information they want. On March 10, 2004, the Commission filed the Petition for Relief that initiated Case No. 04-0816. At the hearing in that case, it was established that Mr. Farr had nothing to do with management of One Watergate; rather, he was the building's maintenance man. The undersigned credited his denial of the statements attributed to him by Ms. Hess, but also found that even if Mr. Farr made those statements, they could not be attributed to One Watergate because Mr. Farr played no role in the application process and had not discussed Mr. Bhayat with any Board member or with his wife. At the hearing, it was also established that Renters Reference never received the full credit report prepared by MSC Mortgage and submitted by Mr. Bhayat with his last application. Mr. Bhayat produced a 13-page report at the hearing, but witnesses for One Watergate and Renters Reference credibly testified that they received only the first two pages, which summarized the information in the full report. The undersigned credited Mr. Plant's testimony that even the full report did not meet Renters Reference's criteria for a credit report, and thus, the result would have been the same even if Mr. Bhayat had submitted the full credit report. The undersigned also credited Mr. Plant's testimony that his company does not "mess around" with the Fair Housing Act and that he would have immediately canceled the contract with One Watergate if he had had the least suspicion that the Board was basing its actions on Mr. Bhayat's race, color, or national origin. The Recommended Order in Case No. 04-0816 did not directly address the issue of the minutes of the April 16, 2002, Board meeting because the evidence produced by One Watergate at the hearing rendered that issue irrelevant. The undersigned credited the testimonial and documentary evidence produced by One Watergate to show that the referenced minutes were not accurate. No motion was made or adopted regarding the effect of the "buy back" provision on the new applicant screening process. The issue was discussed at the meeting, but no action was taken by the Board. The undersigned found no evidence that any member of the Board or the screening committee discriminated against Mr. Bhayat due to his race, national origin, or for any other reason. Most of them never met Mr. Bhayat and were unaware of his race or national origin during the period in dispute. Mr. Bhayat simply declined to submit a complete application to One Watergate, which, in turn, declined to consider his incomplete application. Prior to filing its Petition for Relief, the Commission did not interview either of the Farrs or any Board member aside from Ms. Gillett. Such interviews might have caused the Commission to question the credibility and/or accuracy of the information provided by Mr. Bhayat, Ms. Gillett, and Ms. Hess. However, nothing that the Farrs or the Board members stated would necessarily have led the Commission to conclude that it lacked cause to proceed. The Commission would have had to make a judgment as to the credibility of the witnesses, as did the undersigned at the final hearing. A more detailed investigation might have revealed that there was a dispute as to whether Mr. Bhayat submitted the full credit report or merely the first two pages. However, at the time the Commission found cause, neither the Commission nor One Watergate apparently realized there was an issue regarding the report. The Commission assumed that One Watergate received the full 13-page report and had no reason to believe otherwise. One Watergate assumed that the two pages it received constituted the full report until Mr. Bhayat produced the full report at the hearing. The matter was resolved at the hearing, essentially as a matter of witness credibility. Mr. Bhayat was adamant that he submitted the full report, but Ms. Farr and Mr. Plant convincingly testified that they received only the first two pages. It is not clear how extensive the Commission's investigation would have to have been in order to learn that the published minutes of the Board's April 16, 2002, meeting were not accurate. According to the published minutes, no applicant would be rejected until the Board voted on the repeal of the "buy back" provision of the One Watergate by-laws, yet Mr. Bhayat was rejected (or more precisely, his application was not considered) prior to any such vote being taken. Thus, the published minutes were a very significant factor in the Commission's judgment that One Watergate was treating Mr. Bhayat differently than other applicants, and the Commission continued to rely on the minutes throughout the underlying proceeding. The Commission argued, strenuously and not unreasonably, that the undersigned should not credit One Watergate's self-serving testimony and documentary evidence indicating that the minutes were inaccurate. An interview with Mr. Farr would have revealed that he disputed Ms. Hess' account of their conversation, but this again would have been a matter of witness credibility and the weighing of corroborating evidence to determine the facts. The Commission had Mr. Farr's written statement of denial in its possession at the time the Petition for Relief was filed indicating that the Commission did not find Mr. Farr persuasive. The mere fact that Mr. Farr denied the allegation would not render the Commission's reliance on Ms. Hess' testimony unreasonable per se. From the outset of the underlying proceeding, the Commission made it clear that it did not intend to rely solely on the alleged statement of Mr. Farr, or the hearsay statements of Ms. Gillett, to establish that One Watergate had discriminated against Mr. Bhayat. Counsel for the Commission acknowledged in her opening statement that this would be a case based on circumstantial evidence of discriminatory motive on the part of One Watergate. The Commission's theory of the case, in a nutshell, was that Renters Reference's "bread and butter" lay in assisting organizations such as One Watergate to keep out "undesirables," and that Renters Reference was always going to find some reason not to accept Mr. Bhayat's application because One Watergate had labeled him an "undesirable." Because Mr. Bhayat was a successful realtor, was financially able to purchase the condominium in question, and lacked a criminal record or other disqualifying attribute, the Commission concluded that the reason for not accepting his application must have been his color or national origin, which was the only obvious distinction between Mr. Bhayat and those applicants whose applications were accepted and approved by Renters Reference and One Watergate. Based on the information before it at the time it found reasonable cause to believe that an act of discrimination occurred, the Commission had a reasonable basis in law and fact to proceed with the case. The Commission's investigation was not perfect, but the overriding factor in the underlying case was witness credibility. The Commission was substantially justified in finding the statements and testimony of Mr. Bhayat, Ms. Hess, and Ms. Gillett credible during its investigation, despite the fact that the undersigned ultimately chose to credit the testimony of One Watergate's witnesses, in light of all the evidence produced at the hearing.
The Issue Whether Respondent owes Petitioner $14,080 on account for vegetables sold and delivered at the request of Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, M.O. "Buster" Williams, is an agent for the producers of agricultural products, carrots, red radishes and white corn. Respondent, Dougal M. Buie, III, d/b/a Blue Star Citrus and Vegetables, is a dealer of such products in the normal course of its business activity. Respondent is licensed by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services and is bonded by First Union National Bank of Florida. Petitioner sold Respondent carrots, red radishes and white corn by the truck load between the period May 19, 1993 and June 14, 1993, and was given a Bill of Lading therefor. Respondent was sent an Invoice for each shipment and payment was due in full following receipt of the Invoice. As of the date of the formal hearing, each invoice for shipments made between May 19 and June 14, 1993 remains due and owing and unpaid. The total amount of indebtedness owed by Respondent, Buie, to Petitioner is $14,080.00.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered requiring Respondent to pay to the Petitioner the sum of $14,080.00 DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of March, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of March, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing & Bond Department of Agriculture 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Robert F. Vason, Jr., Esquire Potter, Vason and Clements 308 East Fifth Avenue Mount Dora, Florida 32757 M.O. Buster Williams 1412 Raintree Lane Mount Dora, Florida 32757 Lewis Stone, Esquire P. O. Box 2048 Eustis, Florida 32727-2048 First Union National Bank of Florida 21 North Grove Street Eustis, Florida 32726
