The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination should be dismissed as untimely pursuant to Section 760.11, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination dated June 2, 1998, alleges that Respondent discriminated against him because of his age and in retaliation for opposing illegal behavior. FCHR received the Charge of Discrimination on June 18, 1998. For purposes of this Recommended Order of Dismissal, it is assumed that the Charge of Discrimination was timely filed with FCHR. As of December 15, 1998, 180 days after Petitioner filed his Charge of Discrimination, FCHR had not assigned an investigator to investigate Petitioner's complaint or taken any other action related to the complaint. As of January 19, 1999, 35 days after December 15, 1998, Petitioner had not requested an administrative hearing. By letter dated June 2, 1999, Petitioner requested FCHR to forward his complaint to the Division of Administrative Hearings. FCHR received the request for an administrative hearing on June 7, 1999. This request was filed 354 days after June 18, 1998, 174 days after December 15, 1998, and 139 days after January 19, 1999. Petitioner does not argue or present any facts to support a finding that the doctrines of equitable tolling or excusable neglect apply in this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is
The Issue The issue for consideration in this hearing is whether Petitioner was discriminated against in employment by Respondent in retaliation for Petitioner's efforts in behalf of minority employees of Respondent.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, Petitioner, Priscilla M. Young, was a licensed practical nurse employed by Respondent, BAT Management Foundation, Inc. (BAT), at its Orlando Health Care Center (OHCC), as a floor nurse responsible for the care of approximately 60 residents during the 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. shift. Her immediate supervisor was Joan Renee’ Banton. Petitioner began working at OHCC as an LPN in 1992. In 1987 she had been convicted of a felony, aggravated battery, in circuit court and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 30 months. After serving 8 of the 30 months, she was released without probation. At that time, she went to nursing school and was subsequently licensed in Florida as a practical nurse. At no time did she ever conceal her conviction from either the nursing school or licensing authorities. Petitioner was hired at Winter Park Memorial Hospital after graduating from nursing school and becoming licensed. At that facility she worked for both Joan Renee’ Banton and Sue O’Brien. During this period, Ms. O’Brien left Winter Park Memorial to take a position with BAT at its OHCC facility. Somewhat later, Petitioner saw an advertisement by BAT in the newspaper and applied for employment there. She claims Ms. O’Brien, who was at that time director of nursing was happy to see her when she arrived to fill out the application. Petitioner was interviewed for employment at OHCC by Ms. Stanley, who was the unit manager of the north wing at the facility. The employment application form contained a question which asked the applicant if she "had ever been convicted of a felony or, within the last five years of a misdemeanor, which resulted in imprisonment." Petitioner claims she was not sure how to interpret the verbiage and asked Ms. Stanley. Ms. Stanley also was not sure, so they discussed it with Ms. O’Brien. Based on their discussion, the determination was made that Petitioner did not have to list her felony conviction because it had occurred more than five years prior to the application. This was an incorrect decision because clearly the application requires listing a felony conviction regardless of when it happened, but requires listing of only those misdemeanor convictions which occurred within the last five years prior to application. Nonetheless, Petitioner was hired. During the course of her employment with OHCC, Petitioner had no disciplinary problems. Both Ms. Stanley and Ms. Banton deny having had any problems with her or her work. Petitioner contends that at least twice during the term of her employment, however, she complained to Ms. Banton about Banton’s use of the term, "you people" in reference to the aides and orderlies who worked for her, all of whom were minority of some nature: African American, Hispanic, or Asian. Ms. Banton cannot recall Petitioner’s having ever complained to her about that, and she denies having ever used that term. She claims that if she ever did refer to the employees as a group, it would have been phrased more as "you guys," or something like that. Considering the evidence of record, however, it is found that Ms. Banton probably did use the term "you people" and that Petitioner did complain about that usage to Ms. Banton. According to Ms. Banton, shortly after Petitioner was hired, all people who had knowledge of her conviction had left employment with OHCC. Ms. Stanley had taken employment elsewhere. Ms. Banton also left employment with OHCC in August 1994 because of rumors involving management problems with which she did not want to be involved. Somewhere between two and three weeks after leaving OHCC, however, Ms. Banton received a call from Mr. Allen, the owner of the company, asking her to come back to OHCC as Director of Nursing to replace Ms. O’Brien whom he intended to discharge. She agreed, and when she assumed her new role, she quickly received a phone call from Mr. Allen. In this telephone call, Mr. Allen asked if Petitioner was employed at OHCC. When Banton replied that she was, Allen reportedly revealed he had received a background check on Petitioner which indicated she had a felony conviction. According to Banton, Allen, who did not want any felons working in his nursing homes, directed Banton to check Petitioner’s background to see if the conviction had been noted on her application. She did, and when she reported to Allen that it had not been listed, he directed Banton by telephone to fire the Petitioner. Ms. Banton did what she had been directed to do. Petitioner contends that Banton’s attitude at the time of discharge was cavalier. Ms. Banton admits that at the time she had the discussion with Mr. Allen, she knew that Petitioner had served time in prison, but did not know why. She also claims that she did not know that Petitioner had discussed the conviction with Stanley and O’Brien and had been advised not to list it. Petitioner’s termination from employment with OHCC was based on her failure to disclose her felony conviction. Petitioner claims the termination was based on her speaking out for the other nursing assistants, all of whom were minority, when they were accused of incompetence. Ms. Banton, however, cites instances where when she would come in at night to check on how things were going, she would find pillows and chairs scattered around as if people were sleeping on their shift. She discussed this with Petitioner and admits the discussions were sometimes loud, but she never took any disciplinary action against Petitioner or wrote her up for this. Banton absolutely denies having ever disciplined any employee in public, always taking an employee to a private area to take corrective action. Petitioner is adamant in her contention that the fundamental basis for her discharge from employment with OHCC is retaliation for her standing up for the minority nursing assistants who were accused of incompetence. She firmly believes that her failure to list her felony conviction was seized upon as a pretext upon which to support the unlawful basis for her discharge. She cites that both Banton and O’Brien knew of her conviction and the fact that she had served time, when they all were employed at Winter Park Memorial, and that though it was not listed on her application for employment with OHCC, O’Brien knew about it at the time of her hiring, and Banton knew about it when she, Banton, subsequently came to work at OHCC. Coincidentally, Petitioner claims to have been instrumental in Banton’s obtaining employment at OHCC.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order determining that Petitioner, Pricilla Young, was not subjected to racial discrimination or retaliation because of her advocacy on behalf of minority employees; that her discharge from employment with Respondent, BAT Management Foundation, Inc., d/b/a Orlando Health Care Center was based on a determination by Mr. Allen, the owner thereof, that her prior felony conviction disqualified her from employment at the facility; and that she is not entitled to back pay, expenses, or compensatory damages as a result thereof. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of June, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of June, 2000 COPIES FURNISHED: Priscilla M. Young 312 Lime Avenue Orlando, Florida 32805 Jefferson M. Braswell, Esquire Scruggs & Carmichael, P.A. One Southeast First Avenue Post Office Box 23109 Gainesville, Florida 32602 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issue is whether the Respondent discriminated unlawfully against the Petitioner by discharging him because of a handicap contrary to Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and, if so, the nature and extent of financial loss suffered by the Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Shannon M. Spence, was employed from March 1993 until May 1, 1993 by the Respondent. The Respondent is an employer as defined by Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner, who earned on average $125/week, was employed by the Respondent as a bouncer and "bar backer", a person who assisted the bartender. On or about April 29, 1993, the Petitioner suffered an on the job injury which was duly reported to the employer and for which the Petitioner was treated at a local hospital pursuant to arrangements made by the employer. The Petitioner's injury was determined to be a right inguinal hernia, and the Petitioner was cautioned against lifting more than 25 pounds and standing for long periods of time. The Petitioner reported for work the following day, and communicated to his supervisor his inability to lift and to stand for long periods of time. His supervisor, Jess Wall or J.W., placed the Petitioner on security detail for the parking lot and entrance. There were additional light duties available for security personnel within the employer's business in which the employee could have been placed. The Petitioner's employment was terminated later that evening. The testimony is conflicting regarding whether the Petitioner was discharged because he was dating another employee, or because he was injured, or quit in sympathy with Jess Wall, who was also terminated on that evening. The most credible evidence is that the Petitioner was discharged because of his injury, but was told it was because he was dating another employee. The prohibition against dating was a new rule, it was applied against the Petitioner without any prior warning, the female employee was not discharged, and the Petitioner was the only person discharged for this activity although there were others who dated employees. The alternative theory that Petitioner quit in sympathy with the head bouncer, Mr. Wall, is specifically rejected for lack of credibility of the various witnesses. The Petitioner subsequently settled his workman's compensation claim arising from this injury with the Respondent for $15,000. No details were received regarding the allocation of moneys for medical and wages. The Petitioner is entitled to back wages from his discharge until the hearing on April 27, 1995, less any mitigation, including any portion of the settlement of his workman's compensation claim attributable to lost wages, occurring after surgical repair of the hernia when the Petitioner was reemployed. The Petitioner is entitled to reasonable costs and attorneys fees.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Commission find that the Petitioner was unlawfully discriminated against by the Respondent, and that the Respondent be ordered to pay the Petitioner his lost wages from May 1, 1993 until April 27, 1995 less any amounts the Petitioner earned during this period and any amounts included in the workman's compensation settlement specifically provided for wages; that the Commission retain jurisdiction for the award of damages and attorney's fees and costs; and the Commission remand the matter for a determination of the attorney's fees and costs and to permit the Respondent to present any evidence in mitigation of its damages. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of June, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 1995. APPENDIX The parties filed proposed findings which were read and considered. The following states which of their findings were adopted and which were rejected and why: Petitioner's Recommended Order Findings Paragraph 1,2 Subsumed in Paragraph 1 and 2. Paragraph 3-5 Subsumed in Paragraphs 3-5. Paragraph 6-8 Subsumed in Paragraphs 6-9. Paragraph 9 Subsumed in 3 and 11. Respondent's Recommended Order Findings Paragraphs 1-3 Paragraphs 1-3 Paragraph 4 Rejected because the date was April 29, 1993. Paragraph 5 Subsumed in Paragraphs 4,5. Paragraph 6,7 Rejected as contrary to more credible evidence. Paragraph 8,9 Subsumed in Paragraphs 10,11. COPIES FURNISHED: James P. Tarquin, Esquire Michael B. Staley, Esquire P.O. Box 906190 Ocala, FL 34478 John Daley, Esquire 201 E. Pine Street 15th Floor Orlando, FL 32801 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4113
The Issue The issue is whether the medical license held by Respondent, Louis C. Alaia, M.D., should be revoked or otherwise penalized based on the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Louis C. Alaia, M.D., was issued Florida medical license ME 0008062 on August 14, 1958. Dr. Alaia placed his Florida license on voluntary inactive status on December 31, 1979. Dr. Alaia's last known address is 18890 Santa Clara Circle, Fountain Valley, California. The Board of Medical Quality Assurance, the licensing authority for the State of California, revoked Dr. Alaia's license to practice medicine in California on May 15, 1987. The revocation was based on Dr. Alaia's conviction for manslaughter for the murder of his former wife and her boyfriend, on his inability to safely practice as a result of impairment from narcolepsy and cataplexy, and on his failure to show rehabilitation following the convictions and incarceration for the killings.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that The Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine, enter a Final Order and therein revoke the license of Louis C. Alaia, M.D., to practice medicine in the State of Florida. DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of February, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of February, 1989. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 88-4659 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by Petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine 1. Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1(1), 2(2), and 3(2). COPIES FURNISHED: JONATHAN KING STAFF ATTORNEY DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 130 NORTH MONROE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0750 LOUIS C. ALAIA 18890 SANTA CLARA CIRCLE FOUNTAIN VALLEY, CALIFORNIA 92708 KENNETH EASLEY GENERAL COUNSEL DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 130 NORTH MONROE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0750 DOROTHY FAIRCLOTH EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR BOARD OF MEDICINE 130 NORTH MONROE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0750
The Issue The issues in this case are whether the allegations in the Administrative Complaint are correct, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, the Respondent was certified as a law enforcement officer by the Petitioner. On the evening of July 13, 2010, the Respondent was observed driving erratically by Deputy Mark Buswell, an officer of the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office. After observing the Respondent driving for a distance, Deputy Buswell executed a traffic stop, at which time he smelled the odor of alcohol on the Respondent. In response to Deputy Buswell's inquiry, the Respondent denied having consumed alcohol. Deputy Buswell asked the Respondent to step out of the truck and observed that the Respondent was unsteady on his feet and swaying. Deputy Buswell then administered a series of sobriety tests to the Respondent. Based on his observations, and his training and experience as a law enforcement officer, Deputy Buswell believed that the Respondent had been driving under the influence of alcohol. Deputy Buswell arrested the Respondent for DUI, a violation of section 316.193, Florida Statutes (2010).1/ After the arrest, Deputy Buswell twice asked the Respondent to submit to a breath alcohol test, and, on both occasions, the Respondent declined to take the test. The Respondent had previously been arrested for DUI.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order permanently revoking the certification of Derek C. Floyd as a law enforcement officer. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of November, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of November, 2012.
Findings Of Fact The findings of fact stipulated to by the parties are as follows: The Respondent's license was suspended for a period of three years by Final Order of the Board of Medical Examiners filed on or about June 25, 1985. The Respondent filed a timely Notice of Appeal of the foregoing Final Order. The Respondent filed a Motion to Stay the Final Order with the Board of Medical Examiners, through appellate counsel, but said motion was not ruled upon by the Board of Medical Examiners at any time pertinent to the dates related to the Administrative Complaint. No petition for stay was filed by the Respondent until August 6, 1985, with the appellate court having jurisdiction of the direct appeal, when said motion was filed by appellate counsel. The District Court of Appeal, First District, entered a temporary stay of the Final Order of the Board of Medical Examiners on August 6, 1985, but dissolved the stay on August 9, 1995, upon written response from the Department of Professional Regulation. No other stay was in effect at any time pertinent to the times material to the matters raised in the Administrative Complaint filed herein. The Respondent continued to practice medicine subsequent to the filing of the Motion to Stay filed with the Board of Medical Examiners until contacted in person by investigators of the Department of Professional Regulation who informed the Respondent, on August 12, 1985, that no stay of the Final Order was in effect. At that point, the Respondent immediately surrendered his medical license to the investigators of the Department of Professional Regulation and informed said investigators that the investigators should contact his appellate Counsel because of the "Confusion." The Respondent believed, and was specifically advised by appellate Counsel, that the Final Order of the Board of Medical Examiners filed June 25, 1985, was stayed automatically by the District Court of Appeal, First District, notwithstanding the fact that the only stay entered by the District Court of Appeal, First District, was from August 6 to August 9, 1985. Not only was the Respondent advised by appellate counsel orally that such a stay was automatically effected by the filing of the Notice of Appeal with the District Court of Appeal, First District, but appellate counsel provided written confirmation of the alleged existence of such a stay to Jacksonville hospitals providing medical privileges to the Respondent. An example of such written confirmation is a letter dated July 30, 1985, to the President, Board of Trustees of St. Vincent's Medical Center advising St. Vincent's Medical Center that the Final Order of the Board of Medical Examiners was automatically stayed by operation of Section 120.68(3), Florida Statutes. In that letter, appellate counsel not only advised St. Vincent's Medical Center of the existence of an alleged automatic stay, but copied the Respondent with said advice, confirming to the Respondent that the Final Order of the Board of Medical Examiners had in fact been stayed.
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the Respondent unlawfully discriminated against the Petitioner on the basis of age.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent initially employed the Petitioner in the maintenance department in January 1996. There is no evidence that the Petitioner’s employment in the maintenance department was unsatisfactory. In May 1996, the Petitioner transferred into the production department. The Petitioner’s supervisor in the production department described his performance as somewhat unsatisfactory but made no written report of any problems. On September 17, 1996, the Petitioner transferred into the laboratory and began work as a lab technician. The transfer in the lab technician position was at the Petitioner’s request. On October 21, 1996, Richard Barnes, an employee of the Respondent, assumed supervisory responsibility for the laboratory operation. On November 8, 1996, Mr. Barnes met with the Petitioner to discuss the job. At the time of the November 8 discussion, the Petitioner had been working in the lab for almost eight weeks. The Respondent’s lab employees are responsible for assuring that the materials produced by the plant comply with the "release specifications" set by the buyers of the materials. During the discussion, the Petitioner was asked about specific tasks assigned to lab employees. His response was incorrect and indicated a lack of familiarity with lab procedures. The Petitioner was informed that his job performance was unsatisfactory. Over the next week, Mr. Barnes continued to monitor the situation, and subsequently decided to terminate the Petitioner’s employment for unsatisfactory performance. On November 18, 1996, the Respondent terminated the Petitioner’s employment on the grounds of unsatisfactory work performance. At the time of the termination, the Petitioner was 56 years old. During the time of the Petitioner’s transfer into, and termination from, the lab, the Respondent was in the process of expanding the number of lab employees from six to ten employees. Shortly before terminating the Petitioner’s employment, the Respondent transferred another employee, of similar age as the Petitioner, into the lab. Shortly after the Petitioner’s termination, Respondent transferred another employee, younger than the Respondent, to the lab. The transfer of the younger employee was being processed prior to the termination of the Petitioner’s employment. There is no evidence that a transfer of the younger employee was related to the termination of the Petitioner’s employment. The evidence fails to establish that termination of the Petitioner’s employment was based on his age. There is no evidence that the Respondent discriminated against the Petitioner on the basis of age. There is no evidence that the Petitioner suffered any economic injury based on the termination. He became employed shortly after the termination at a salary higher than the Respondent was paying him. Subsequent employment has included additional increases in compensation. The Petitioner asserts that had he remained employed by the Respondent, his compensation would have included promotions and increased compensation. The evidence fails to establish that the Petitioner would have received further promotions from the Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Terry B. Hillman. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of November, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Terry B. Hillman 2048 Laurel Lane North Fort Myers, Florida 33917 Robert E. Tardif, Jr., Esquire Duncan & Tardif, P.A. 1601 Jackson Street, Suite 101 Post Office Box 249 Fort Myers, Florida 33902-0249 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether GMD Carpet, Inc., failed to comply with coverage requirements of the workers’ compensation law, Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for enforcing provisions of Florida law, specifically Chapter 440 of the Florida Statutes, which require that employers secure workers’ compensation coverage for their employees. Respondent, whose principal is Emmanuel Simone, Jr. (Mr. Simone), is in the business of providing carpet installation services. At all times material to this case, Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 440.02(16)(a), Florida Statutes. At all times material to this case, Respondent was legally obligated to provide workers' compensation insurance in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, for Mr. Simone and four other individuals employed by GMD. On or about May 21, 2004, Petitioner became aware that Mr. Simone and another GMD employee were working a carpet installation job in Broward County, Florida. Upon inquiry, Petitioner accurately determined that GMD had not furnished the required coverage, and that there was no valid exemption from the coverage requirement. Accordingly, on May 21, 2004, a Stop Work and Penalty Assessment Order was properly entered. Thereafter, Petitioner reviewed Respondent's payroll records, which revealed that GMD employed three other individuals under circumstances which obliged Respondent to provide workers’ compensation for these employees. Based upon Respondent's payroll records, Petitioner recalculated the penalty assessment to be imposed in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 440, and issued an Amended Order in the amount of $1,916.65 on May 25, 2004. Respondent did not intend to violate the law. Rather, he mistakenly believed that he held a valid exemption; that his wife was not an employee, but rather a helper; and that the three other carpet installers were subcontractors to whom he had no insurance-related obligations. It is undisputed that Petitioner correctly calculated the penalty prescribed by law in the amount of $1,916.65 based upon Respondent's records and applicable law.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner enter a final order confirming the Stop Work Order and imposing a penalty in the amount of $1,916.65, as set forth in the Amended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of October, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of October, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Colin M. Roopnarine, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Workers’ Compensation 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4229 Emmanuel Simone, Jr. Debra Simone GMD Carpet, Inc. 717 North 31st Avenue Hollywood, Florida 33021 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florid a 32399-0300 Pete Dunbar, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's Petition for Relief should be dismissed as untimely pursuant to Subsection 760.11(7), Florida Statutes (2003).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner filed a Charge of Discrimination with FCHR on February 20, 2004. Petitioner alleged that Respondent discriminated against him based on his age when it failed to hire him for a position with the agency. Finding no reasonable cause to believe that Respondent had committed an unlawful employment practice, FCHR issued a Determination: No Cause on May 4, 2004. On the same date, FCHR issued a Notice of Determination: No Cause advising Petitioner that he had 35 days from the date of the notice in which to request an administrative hearing. The notice clearly stated that Petitioner's claim would be dismissed pursuant to Section 760.11, Florida Statutes (2003), if he failed to request a hearing in a timely manner. The 35th day was June 8, 2004. FCHR received the Petition for Relief on June 14, 2004, six days after expiration of the 35-day period.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ORDERED this 26th day of August, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of August, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Edward W. Koerner 81 Emerald Woods Drive, M-11 Naples, Florida 34108 Mary Linville Atkins, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent, G and F Renovations, Inc. (Respondent), timely challenged Petitioner's proposed agency action; and, if not, whether pursuant to the doctrine of equitable tolling Respondent is entitled to an administrative hearing to challenge the proposed agency action.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility of enforcing and ensuring employers meet the requirements of chapter 440, Florida Statutes. The law in Florida requires employers to maintain appropriate workers' compensation coverage for their employees. At all times material to this case, Respondent was doing business in Florida and was represented by Pedro Malaret, attorney at law. Prior to May 1, 2014, Michael Robinson, a compliance investigator employed by Petitioner, visited a job site wherein workers were engaged in the business of construction/roofing. Robinson was advised by the workers at the site that they were employed by Respondent. Robinson then investigated the matter to determine whether the persons at the job site were covered by Respondent's workers' compensation insurance. To do so, he spoke to the supervisor at the site and others to whom he was referred. After verifying the persons on the job site were not on the list of Respondent's covered employees, and consulting with his supervisor, Robinson posted a Stop-Work Order at the job site. The Stop-Work Order provided, in pertinent part: You have a right to administrative review of this action by the Department under sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes. To obtain review, you must file a written petition requesting review. If you dispute a material fact contained in this action, you are entitled to a hearing under Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, at which you may be represented by counsel, present evidence and argument on the issue(s), examine witnesses, submit a proposed recommended order, and file exceptions to the recommended order of the Administrative Law Judge. If you do not dispute a material fact contained in this action, you are entitled to a hearing under section 120.57(2), Florida Statutes, at which you may be represented by counsel, present documentary evidence, and present a written statement in opposition to this action. * * * You must file the petition for hearing so that it is received by the Department within twenty-one (21) days of your receipt of this agency action. The petition must be filed with Julie Jones, DFS Agency Clerk, Department of Financial Services, 612 Larson Building, 200 East Gaines Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0390. FAILURE TO FILE A PETITION WITH THE TWENTY-ONE(21) DAYS CONSTITUTES A WAIVER OF YOUR RIGHT TO ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW OF THE AGENCY ACTION. The Stop-Work Order and an Order of Penalty Assessment was served on Respondent's corporate agent, or authorized agent, by a process server. Respondent did not timely file a petition challenging the agency's proposed action. Instead, by email only, Respondent's counsel directed a letter to Robinson that provided: This firm has the pleasure of representing G & F Renovations, Inc. All papers to be served on G & F should be mailed or delivered to this office. My client wishes to resolve all issues relating to the matter amicably and as quickly as possible. As such, please forward a list of all documents needed to my office so that I may get them to you as soon as possible. Should you require any further documentation, please feel free to contact me either at my office or on my cell . . . I look forward to working with your [sic] to resolve this matter. Contrary to the offer to provide documents to Petitioner, Respondent did not provide business records. Eventually, an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was issued and provided by email to Respondent's counsel at his email address of record. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was sent to counsel on or about October 6, 2014. Respondent did not timely file a petition to challenge the proposed agency action. Respondent did not timely challenge the Stop-Work Order and did not timely challenge the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment. Respondent did not provide any assistance to resolve the issues presented by the Stop-Work Order. When Respondent failed to timely respond to the Petitioner's requests for information, refused certified mail addressed to its office or corporate representative, and failed to timely challenge Petitioner's proposed action, a final order was entered on or about July 8, 2015. Thereafter, Respondent filed an appeal claiming Petitioner had not properly served notice of its proposed action. This case was initiated in response to the appeal to address the issue of whether the Petitioner lulled the Respondent into inaction and thereby tolled the time within which to file an administrative challenge to the proposed agency action. At no time did Respondent deny allegations pertinent to the instant case, including whether the workers at the construction job site were employed by Respondent. If the workers at the construction job site were appropriately covered by workers' compensation insurance or were exempt from coverage, Respondent did not assert such defense. In fact, Respondent did not cooperate to provide any information to Petitioner that would "resolve all issues relating to the matter amicably and as quickly as possible." Petitioner provided notice to Respondent of the procedural requirements to challenge the agency action and did not lull Respondent into a false sense of security or inaction. To the contrary, Respondent attempted to circumvent its legal responsibilities by refusing certified mail and failing to provide business records in a timely manner. Respondent seeks to benefit from its inaction. Had Respondent provided documents to support any defense to the Stop-Work Order and initial assessment of administrative fine, the issues could have been resolved. The weight of the credible evidence supports the finding that Respondent did not timely challenge the proposed agency action within the 21 days allowed by law. In short, Respondent ignored the Stop-Work Order and the legal claims it presented.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, enter a final order determining that Respondent failed to timely file a petition to challenge the agency's proposed action and its failure to do so was not the result of equitable tolling. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of December, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 2016. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael Joseph Gordon, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Kelli B. Hastings, Esquire Law Office of Kelli B. Hastings, PLLC 4005 North Orange Blossom Trail Orlando, Florida 32804 (eServed) Pedro Malaret, Esquire Malaret Law Firm, PLC 732 North Thorton Avenue Orlando, Florida 32803 Julie Jones, CP, FRP, Agency Clerk Division of Legal Services Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0390 (eServed)
