Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, the factual stipulations into which the parties have entered, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: From approximately October of 1989, to February of 1990, Respondents were employed as telephone consultants by United Financial International, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "UFI"), a Florida-based business owned by Laura Correa and Anita "Ann" Cuevas that offered to provide assistance to consumers seeking various types of loans, including mortgage loans. Respondents were not then, nor have they ever been, licensed by the Department as mortgage brokers in the State of Florida. Furthermore, at no time did UFI have a license or registration issued by the Department to operate as a mortgage broker, mortgage brokerage business, correspondent mortgage lender or mortgage lender, although it did have at least one employee during the period of Respondents' employment, telephone consultant John Archer, who possessed a Department-issued mortgage broker's license. As telephone consultants for UFI, Respondents answered and screened telephone calls placed by potential UFI clients. Among the callers Respondent Cook screened were Dudley Phipps and Arthur McCullough. Among the callers Respondent Jelich screened was Connie Wiscaver. Phipps, McCullough and Wiscaver were all interested in obtaining mortgage loans. While on the telephone with a potential client, Respondents, as a general rule, identified themselves by name, explained to the caller the services offered and fees charged by UFI, and obtained from the caller the following information, which they recorded on a form provided by their employer: the caller's name, address, telephone number, date of birth, social security number, employer, salary, financial standing, and credit history; and the type, amount and purpose of the loan sought by the caller. Respondents also typically asked what the caller hoped for in terms of interest rate, size of monthly payments and loan repayment schedule. In addition, they indicated what items the caller needed to send to UFI to complete the caller's loan application package. The representations that Respondents made during a typical telephone conversation with a potential client seeking a mortgage loan gave the impression that, if the caller submitted a complete loan application package along with the requisite loan application processing fee, and everything "checked out," Respondents would make the arrangements necessary for the caller to obtain the mortgage loan he or she wanted from one of the lenders with whom UFI had an established relationship. UFI management, in writing, instructed all of its telephone consultants, including Respondents, to incorporate the following in their presentation to potential clients and it randomly monitored the consultants' telephone conversations to make sure that these instructions were being followed: We Co-Broker loans. We are not lenders nor do we have a Funding Committee to evaluate the Loan Package after we receive it. It takes twenty one (21) to thirty (35) [sic] business days from the day we receive ALL the information to evaluate the package. We have an application Fee of $399.00. MANDATORY Please use these statements to increase your credibility and assertiveness with potential clients. The maximum life of the loan will be determined by the investor/lender. The interest rates will be fixed and vary between 12-18 percent. The application fee is non-refundable and the assessed fees to your loan are separate from the application fee. There will be a Brokerage fee of 1-5 percent assessed to your loan upon closing. To increase your potential, please make sure when your [sic] finishing with your potential client to ask them [sic] when they [sic] would like to obtain a loan. Also in your closing statements be sure to tell your client to Bill Recipient with our Federal Express/Express Mail Service to Guarantee overnight delivery. Be advised this is for the return of the Application Fee Only! The application istself [sic] is returned at the client's own expense. The client may pay the application fee by personal check; however, as the checks will be out-of-state it will take approximately (21) days for the check to clear which will hold up the clients [sic] processing. Therefore, we recommend a money order to expidite [sic] the process. We do not like to use regular mail for sending the money orders, we rather the client use our courier sevice [sic]. (see above) If you need assistance please do not hesitate to phone us at 1-800-729-5666. We want to help you secure the funds you require as soon as possible. We sincerely thank you for giving us the opportunity to serve you. In most cases, Respondents followed these instructions. As compensation for performing their duties as UFI telephone consultants, Respondents received a percentage (either 20 or 30 percent) of the non-refundable loan application processing fee submitted by each caller whose call they screened. In an effort to encourage a caller to submit the fee, Respondents sometimes told the caller that, based upon the preliminary information provided, the chances of the desired loan being approved "looked good." They never stated, however, that loan approval was "guaranteed."
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order finding Respondents guilty of having violated Section 494.093(1), Florida Statutes (1989), as alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and imposing upon each of them an administrative fine of in the amount of $5,000.00 for having engaged in such wrongdoing. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 19th day of August, 1994. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of August, 1994.
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is the following clause on Form DBF-F-24, which form is incorporated by reference in Rule 3D-40.09(2), Florida Administrative Code: If the above commitment or a commitment in an amount and/or upon terms acceptable to the undersigned is obtained and said mortgage loan is not closed because (I) (We) have not fulfilled our part of this agreement, (I)(We) agree to pay $ the application deposit being a part, for obtaining said commitment. The Association contends that this type of charge is not authorized in Chapter 494, Florida Statutes, and is prohibited by other provisions of law. The validity of the above-cited clause is the sole issue here.
The Issue The issues in each case are whether, pursuant to Sections 489.141 and 489.143, Florida Statutes (2003), a claimant is entitled to payment from the Construction Industries Recovery Fund, and, if so, whether, pursuant to Section 489.143(7), Florida Statutes (2003), Respondent may automatically suspend the residential contractor's license of Petitioner until Petitioner reimburses Respondent for the paid claim.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is licensed as a certified residential contractor, holding license number CRC 013599. Respondent first issued a residential contractor's license to Petitioner in 1978, and Petitioner has been continually licensed since that time. Petitioner has never been disciplined by Respondent or any local governmental agency. On January 29, 2004, Respondent transmitted to the Division of Administrative Hearings seven files containing administrative complaints alleging disciplinary breaches against Petitioner for many of the transactions covered in the nine subject cases. These seven new cases have not yet been heard, and Respondent has not yet entered any restitution orders against Petitioner. In the past, Petitioner has placed his residential contractor's license with various corporations to qualify them to perform residential construction. In February 1999, Petitioner met with Lori Thomson, president of Thomson Homes, Inc., to discuss placing his license with her residential construction company. Now inactive, Thomson Homes, Inc., had been in the residential construction business since at least 1994, operating out of an office in Palm Beach County, which is also the location of all but one of the residential construction jobs that are the subject of these cases. Since 1994, Thomson Homes, Inc., had used the general contractor's license of Ms. Thomson's husband, Steven Thomson, to qualify to perform residential construction. During the time that his license qualified Thomson Homes, Inc., Mr. Thomson believed that he and his wife owned the corporation equally and that she served as the president and he served as the vice-president. In the summer of 1998, Mr. Thomson filed for divorce from Ms. Thomson. In February 1999, Ms. Thomson fired Mr. Thomson from Thomson Homes, Inc. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Thomson learned that Ms. Thomson had caused all of the stock to be issued to her when the corporation was formed, and that she had assumed all of the officer and director positions. In early March 1999, Mr. Thomson cancelled all of the building permits that he had obtained on behalf of Thomson Homes, Inc., and withdrew his general contractor's license from Ms. Thomson's corporation, effective March 20, 1999. When Mr. Thomson withdrew his license from Thomson Homes, Inc., it was in the process of building or preparing to build about ten homes. At no time during Petitioner's discussions with Ms. Thomson was he aware that Thomson Homes, Inc., was actively involved in construction. Eventually, Ms. Thomson and Petitioner agreed that Petitioner would place his residential contractor's license with Thomson Homes, Inc., and would supervise the corporation's construction activities. In return, Thomson Homes, Inc., would pay Petitioner $500 weekly and 35 percent of the profits. After filing the necessary documentation in April 1999, Petitioner qualified Thomson Homes, Inc. effective April 22 or 26, 1999. Petitioner advised Ms. Thomson that he had other work to do for another month, so he could not start with Thomson Homes, Inc. immediately. Ms. Thomson told him that she had to get financing arranged for several signed contracts and did not have any construction taking place at the time. The record is unclear whether this delay took place after the initial agreement between Petitioner and Ms. Thomson or after Petitioner formally placed his license with Thomson Homes, Inc. However, in either event, from the date that Petitioner formally placed his license with Thomson Homes, Inc., he never had a substantive conversation with Ms. Thomson about any construction activities of Thomson Homes, Inc. Not hearing from Ms. Thomson, Petitioner eventually called her to learn when he would start work. At first, Ms. Thomson took Petitioner's calls and kept explaining that the financing paperwork had been delayed. She promised to call Petitioner when construction was ready to proceed. However, Ms. Thomson never contacted Petitioner, and she later stopped taking or returning Petitioner's calls. In early August 1999, Petitioner called Thomson Homes, Inc., and learned that its telephone had been disconnected. He visited the office of Thomson Homes, Inc., but found it closed and the premises vacated. In fact, Thomson Homes, Inc., discontinued business on or about August 1, 1999. Between the date that Petitioner had qualified Thomson Homes and the point at which Thomson Homes ceased doing business, Thomson Homes, Inc., had entered into construction contracts, taken deposits and draws on construction loans, and performed residential construction--all unknown to Petitioner. Also unknown to Petitioner was the fact that Thomson Homes, Inc., had failed to perform its obligations under many, if not all, of its construction contracts during that period. The record is unclear when Petitioner withdrew his license from Thomson Homes, Inc. Petitioner sent Respondent a letter on August 30, 1999, advising of the withdrawal of his license from Thomson Homes, Inc. Later advised that he needed to file another form to effect the withdrawal, Petitioner did so in March 2000. The difference is not important in these cases. At no time did Petitioner receive any money from Thomson Homes, Inc., or any of the claimants who contracted with Thomson Homes, Inc. At no time did Petitioner enter into any contracts with any of the claimants. Only after Thomson Homes, Inc., had taken the claimants' money and abandoned work or failed to commence work did Petitioner learn that Thomson Homes, Inc., had done construction business under his license. DOAH Case No. 03-3540 involves the claim of Sandra Harvey. Ms. Harvey entered into a construction agreement with Thomson Homes, Inc., on September 9, 1998. Pursuant to the agreement, Ms. Harvey agreed to pay Thomson Homes, Inc., $25,500 for a lot and $115,260 for a home, which Thomson Homes, Inc., agreed to construct to "substantial completion" within 120 days from the date of slab pour. After pouring the slab, constructing the shell, and completing the rough plumbing, air conditioning, and electrical, Thomson Homes, Inc., stopped work on Ms. Harvey's home in early 1999. Ms. Harvey learned of the problem when Mr. Thomson called her in early 1999 and said that he could not finish the home because Ms. Thomson had taken over the business. This call probably took place no later than late March 1999, when Mr. Thomas withdrew as the qualifier for Thomson Homes, Inc. The record does not reveal the extent of payments from Ms. Harvey or her lender or the extent of completed work at the time that Thomson Homes, Inc., abandoned the job. Although the complaint is not part of this record, Ms. Harvey commenced a legal action against Thomson Homes, Inc., but not Petitioner. She obtained a default final summary judgment against Thomson Homes, Inc., on March 30, 2001, for a total sum of $46,267.32, including attorneys' fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. The judgment states, in part: Subsequent to entering into the above referenced contract, Defendant breached its contract by accepting Plaintiff's deposits and construction loan disbursements and thereafter abandoning the project and failing to pay subcontractors and/or materialmen for their labor, services and material provided. As a result of Defendant abandoning the project, Plaintiff was compelled to retain a new contractor to complete her home at an additional cost over and above the original contract amount. As a direct result of Defendant abandoning the project, the misapplication of construction funds and financial mismanagement Plaintiff has been forced to borrow additional funds from the construction lender. On May 3, 2001, Ms. Harvey filed a claim with the Construction Industries Recovery Fund (Recovery Fund). In response to a question asking if she had made a diligent effort to collect payment from the contractor, Ms. Harvey answered "yes," explaining she had "filed lawsuit." Ms. Harvey probably filed her claim within two years of when Thomson Homes, Inc., abandoned her job. By the end of March 1999, Mr. Thomson informed Ms. Harvey that his wife had fired him, so he could not work on her home anymore. A change in qualifier does not mean that Thomson Homes, Inc., would necessarily abandon the job, but, as noted in the Conclusions of Law, abandonment presumptively arises upon the expiration of 90 days without work. No work took place on Ms. Harvey's home after Mr. Thomson withdrew as qualifier, so presumptive abandonment took place by the end of June 1999--after May 3, 1999, which is two years prior to the date on which Ms. Harvey filed her claim. By letter dated June 5, 2001, from James Brogan of WEI Consulting Group to Ms. Harvey, Mr. Brogan states that he had investigated the assets of Thomson Homes, Inc. Mr. Brogan found no bankruptcy filing by Thomson Homes, Inc., in Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District of Florida. Thomson Homes, Inc., was a party to 282 legal actions and owed tangible personal property taxes on furniture in a model home, but the furniture was no longer available. On February 28, 2003, Respondent issued an Order approving Ms. Harvey's claim of $25,000 against the Recovery Fund and automatically suspending Petitioner's license until he reimburses the Recovery Fund for the full amount of the paid claim. The Order, copies of which were served on all parties, states that Ms. Harvey is the Petitioner, the Recovery Fund is a Respondent, and "Larry Shimkus, d/b/a Thomson Homes, Inc.," is a Respondent. The Order advises that "you" may seek a formal hearing, pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if material facts are in dispute. On March 17, 2003, Petitioner filed a Petition for Section 120.57 Formal Administrative Hearing. The petition, which was served on Ms. Harvey and Respondent, contests the payment to Ms. Harvey and the automatic suspension of Petitioner's license. The petition contests the payment of Ms. Harvey's claim because she had made insufficient efforts to satisfy the judgment; she had failed to submit all required exhibits with her claim; her judgment is against Thomson Homes, Inc., and not Petitioner; her judgment does not find that Petitioner violated Section 489.129(1)(g), (j), or (k), Florida Statutes; and Ms. Thomson deceived Petitioner in violation of Section 489.132, Florida Statutes. Additionally, the petition contests the automatic suspension because the payment to Ms. Harvey is not authorized, her claim is incomplete, and her judgment is not against Petitioner. Lastly, the petition seeks attorneys' fees under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. DOAH Case No. 03-3541 involves the claim of John and Kathleen Whitesides. The Whitesides, who lived at the time in Juno Beach, Florida, entered into a construction contract with Thomson Homes, Inc., on February 7, 1999. Pursuant to the agreement, the Whitesides agreed to pay Thomson Homes, Inc., $154,094 for a home, which Thomson Homes, Inc., agreed to construct to "substantial completion" within 120 days from the date of slab pour. After the Whitesides paid Thomson Homes, Inc., $5000 and secured a construction loan, Thomson Homes, Inc., never commenced construction. In a complaint filed April 3, 2000, the Whitesides commenced a legal action against Thomson Homes, Inc., but not Petitioner. The two-count complaint alleges a breach of contract, based on Thomson Homes' alleged "abandon[ment]" of the job "prior to any construction," and unjust enrichment, based on Thomson Homes' alleged receipt of funds and failure to complete construction. The Whitesides obtained a default final judgment against Thomson Homes, Inc., on December 21, 2000, for a total sum of $20,146.67, including attorneys' fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. The judgment states, in part: "Defendant is in breach of the Contract dated February 7, 1999, and has received unjust enrichment from Defendant's failure to fulfill the terms of the Contract to build a home for Plaintiffs." On August 9, 2001, David Tassell, the Whitesides' attorney in the circuit court action against Thomson Homes, Inc., stated, in an acknowledged statement, that he had performed "numerous" real property searches in Palm Beach and Martin counties' public records and determined that Thomas Homes, Inc., "owns no real property in Martin County." The omission of Palm Beach County in the statement is unexplained. Mr. Tassell's statement adds that he has retained a private investigator, who confirmed that Thomson Homes, Inc., owns no boats, planes, or automobiles. On August 10, 2001, the Whitesides filed a claim with the Recovery Fund. In response to a question asking if they had made a diligent effort to collect payment from the contractor, the Whitesides answered "yes," but did not supply an explanation in the following blank. The completed questionnaire accompanying the claim states that the Whitesides discovered the violation in September 1999 and that it occurred in July to August 1999. On September 17, 2002, Respondent issued an Order approving the Whitesides' claim of $18,526.67 against the Recovery Fund and automatically suspending Petitioner's license until he reimburses the Recovery Fund for the full amount of the paid claim. The Order, copies of which were served on all parties, states that the Whitesides are the Petitioners, the Recovery Fund is a Respondent, and "Larry Shimkus, d/b/a Thomson Homes, Inc.," is a Respondent. The Order advises that "you" may seek a formal hearing, pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if material facts are in dispute. The Whitesides probably filed their claim within two years of when they reasonably should have discovered that Thomson Homes, Inc., had wrongfully failed to commence construction, as is required for reasons set forth in the Conclusions of Law. As noted in the Conclusions of Law, presumptive abandonment arose when Thomson Homes, Inc., after entering the contract, performed no work for 90 days. Six months elapsed from the signing of the contract to the date that is two years prior to the filing of the claim. Although the record is not well-developed on the point, it is more likely than not that due diligence did not require that the Whitesides discover the abandonment within the first 90 days after it had presumptively arisen. The Whitesides' judgment is probably based on a violation of Section 489.129(1)(g), (j), or (k), Florida Statutes, as is required for reasons set forth in the Conclusions of Law. Although the record is not well-developed on this point either, it is more likely than not that the judgment is based on Thomson Homes' abandonment after entering into the contract. The judgment does not state this basis explicitly, but the complaint, on which the judgment is based, alleges abandonment. On December 23, 2002, Petitioner filed a Petition for Section 120.57 Formal Administrative Hearing. The petition, which was served on Respondent and the Whitesides' attorney in the circuit court action against Thomson Homes, Inc., contests the payment to the Whitesides and the automatic suspension of Petitioner's license. The petition contests the payment of the Whitesides' claim because they did not file certified copies of the final judgment and levy and execution documents and their judgment did not find that Petitioner violated Section 489.129(1)(g), (j), or (k), Florida Statutes. Additionally, the petition contests the automatic suspension because Ms. Thomson deceived Petitioner in violation of Section 489.132, Florida Statutes; Petitioner received no notice of the hearing that resulted in the Order to pay the Whitesides and suspend Petitioner's license; the Whitesides' claim is incomplete; and the Whitesides' judgment is not against Petitioner. Lastly, the petition seeks attorneys' fees under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. DOAH Case No. 03-3542 involves the claim of Richard and Kathleen Beltz. The Beltzes entered into a construction contract with Thomson Homes, Inc., on July 13, 1999. Pursuant to the agreement, the Beltzes agreed to pay Thomson Homes, Inc., $35,500 for a lot and $140,500 for a home, which Thomson Homes, Inc., agreed to construct to "substantial completion" within 120 days from the date of slab pour. After the Beltzes paid Thomson Homes, Inc., $17,283.70, Thomson Homes, Inc., never appeared at the closing, which had been scheduled for August 10, 1999. Nor did Thomson Homes, Inc., ever commence construction. The record does not disclose the extent, if any, to which Thomson Homes, Inc., completed construction. The Beltzes' discovery of Thomson Homes' failure to commence construction was hampered by the fact that they resided in California at the time. However, the Beltzes had obviously discovered the wrongful acts and omissions of Thomson Homes, Inc., by September 29, 1999, when they sent a letter to Petitioner demanding that he return the money that they had paid Thomson Homes, Inc. On October 19, 1999, the Beltzes signed a claim under the Recovery Fund, but the record contains no indication when the claim was filed. The completed questionnaire attached to the claim does not ask if the claimants had made a diligent effort to collect payment from the contractor. For reasons set forth in the Conclusions of Law, a claim must follow a judgment, so, the Beltzes could not file a valid claim until they had obtained a judgment. Two years from September 29, 1999, at which point the Beltzes obviously knew of a violation, requires that they file the claim, on an already- secured judgment, prior to September 29, 2001. In a complaint filed February 4, 2002, the Beltzes commenced a legal action against Thomson Homes, Inc., but not Petitioner. The two-count complaint alleges a breach of contract, based on Thomson Homes' alleged "abandon[ment]" of the job "prior to any construction" and "fail[ure] and refus[al] to pay subcontractors and/or materialmen which resulted in Claims of Liens against Plaintiffs [sic] residence, which Defendant has failed and refused to satisfy," and unjust enrichment, based on Thomson Homes' alleged receipt of funds and failure to complete construction and pay for goods and services provided by subcontractors and materialmen. The Beltzes obtained a default final summary judgment against Thomson Homes, Inc., on May 22, 2002, for a total sum of $23,280.20, including attorneys' fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. The judgment states, in part: Subsequent to entering into the above referenced contract, Defendant performed some work on the project. However, Defendant breached its contract by accepting deposits and construction loan disbursements and thereafter abandoning the project and failing to pay subcontractors and materialmen for their labor, services and material provided. As a result of Defendant failing to pay Lienors who provided labor, service and materials to Plaintiffs [sic] real property, Construction Liens were recorded against same, which Plaintiffs had to satisfy. As a result of Defendant abandoning the project, Plaintiffs were compelled to retain a new contractor to complete their home at an additional cost over and above the original contract amount. As a direct result of Defendant abandoning the project, failing to pay Lienors, the misapplication of construction funds and financial mismanagement, Plaintiffs were forced to borrow additional funds from their construction lender. By unacknowledged statement dated August 23, 2002, Ms. Beltz declared that someone at the Florida Department of State advised her that Thomson Homes, Inc., was administratively dissolved on September 24, 1999. She also declared that she had found on the internet two pieces of real property owned by Thomson Homes, Inc., but they had been transferred within the past year. Ms. Beltz stated that she searched the database of the "Department of Motor Vehicles in Palm Beach County" in May 2000 and found no vehicles or boats registered to Thomson Homes, Inc. Lastly, she reported that she contacted the "Federal Aviation Association" at an unspecified time and found no "airplanes" registered to Thomson Homes, Inc. On November 26, 2002, Respondent issued an Order approving the Beltzes' claim of $17,222.78 against the Recovery Fund and automatically suspending Petitioner's license until he reimburses the Recovery Fund for the full amount of the paid claim. The Order, copies of which were served on all parties, states that the Beltzes are the Petitioners, the Recovery Fund is a Respondent, and "Larry Shimkus, d/b/a Thomson Homes, Inc.," is a Respondent. The Order advises that "you" may seek a formal hearing, pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if material facts are in dispute. On December 27, 2002, Petitioner filed a Petition for Section 120.57 Formal Administrative Hearing. The petition, which was served on the Beltzes and Respondent, contests the payment to the Beltzes and the automatic suspension of Petitioner's license. The petition contests the payment of the Beltzes' claim because they did not submit all of the necessary exhibits with their claim; their judgment is against Thomson Homes, Inc., and not Petitioner; and their judgment does not find that Petitioner violated Section 489.129(1)(g), (j), or (k), Florida Statutes. Additionally, the petition contests the automatic suspension because Ms. Thomson deceived Petitioner in violation of Section 489.132, Florida Statutes; the Beltzes' claim is incomplete; and the Beltzes' judgment is not against Petitioner. Lastly, the petition seeks attorneys' fees under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. DOAH Case No. 03-3543 involves the claim of Keith and Karen Deyo. The Deyos entered into a construction contract with Thomson Homes, Inc., on October 31, 1998. Pursuant to the agreement, the Deyos agreed to pay Thomson Homes, Inc., $25,500 for a lot and $123,400 for a home, which Thomson Homes, Inc., agreed to construct to "substantial completion" within 120 days from the date of slab pour. Although the Deyos clearly suffered damages from the acts and omissions of Thomson Homes, Inc., the record does not disclose how much they paid the company, how much they had to pay unpaid suppliers and laborers, and how much construction the company completed before abandoning the job. Thomson Homes, Inc., began construction on the Deyos' home about 30-45 days after the parties signed the contract, but all work stopped in July 1999. In an undated complaint, the Deyos commenced a legal action against Thomson Homes, Inc., but not Petitioner. The two-count complaint alleges a breach of contract, based on Thomson Homes' alleged "abandon[ment] of the project prior to completion" and "fail[ure] and refus[al] to pay subcontractors and/or materialmen which resulted in Claims of Liens against Plaintiffs [sic] residence, which Defendant has failed and refused to satisfy," and unjust enrichment, based on Thomson Homes' alleged receipt of funds and failure to complete construction and pay for goods and services provided by subcontractors and materialmen. The Deyos obtained a final summary judgment against Thomson Homes, Inc., on March 15, 2000, for a total sum of $55,458.64, including attorneys' fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. The judgment states, in part: Subsequent to entering into the above referenced contract, Defendant partially performed work under the Contract. However, it breached its contract by accepting deposits and construction loan disbursements and thereafter abandoning the project and failing to pay subcontractors and materialmen for their labor, services and material provided. As a result of Defendant failing to pay lienors who provided labor, services and materials to Plaintiffs [sic] residence, construction liens were recorded against same, which Plaintiffs had to satisfy. As a result of Defendant abandoning the project, Plaintiffs were compelled to retain a new contractor to complete their home at an additional cost over and above the original contract amount. As a direct result of Defendant abandoning the project, failing to pay lienor's [sic], the misapplication of construction funds and financial mismanagement Plaintiffs have been forced to borrow additional funds from their construction lender. On April 27, 2000, the Deyos signed a claim under the Recovery Fund, but the record contains no indication when the claim was filed. A cover letter dated May 8, 2000, suggests that the Deyos mailed their claim a couple of weeks after signing it, so it was probably filed in mid-May 2000, although their questionnaire bears a revision date of November 2001, which would be beyond two years after the violation. In the questionnaire, the Deyos did not respond to the question asking if they had made a diligent effort to collect payment from the contractor. By an undated and unacknowledged statement, Mr. Deyo declared that someone at the Florida Department of State advised him that Thomson Homes, Inc., was administratively dissolved on September 24, 1999. He also declared that he had found on the internet two pieces of real property owned by Thomson Homes, Inc., but they had been transferred within the past year. Mr. Deyo stated that he searched the database of the "department of motor vehicles in Palm Beach County" in on April 14, 2000, and found no motor vehicles or boats registered to Thomson Homes, Inc. Lastly, he reported that he contacted the "Federal Aviation Association" on April 21, 2000, and found no "airplanes" registered to Thomson Homes, Inc. On January 22, 2003, Respondent issued an Order acknowledging the Deyos' claim of $55,458.64, approving the payment of the statutory limit of $25,000 against the Recovery Fund, and automatically suspending Petitioner's license until he reimburses the Recovery Fund for the full amount of the paid claim. The Order, copies of which were served on all parties, states that Mr. Deyo is the Petitioner, the Recovery Fund is a Respondent, and "Larry Shimkus, d/b/a Thomson Homes, Inc.," is a Respondent. The Order advises that "you" may seek a formal hearing, pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if material facts are in dispute. On February 3, 2003, Petitioner filed a Petition for Section 120.57 Formal Administrative Hearing. The petition, which was served on Respondent and the Deyos' attorney who represented them in the action against Thomson Homes, Inc., contests the payment to the Deyos and the automatic suspension of Petitioner's license. The petition contests the payment of the Deyos' claim and suspension of Petitioner's license because Petitioner did not receive notice of the hearing at which Respondent entered the Order; the Deyos did not satisfy all requirements for payment from the Recovery Fund; their claim was not accompanied by certified copies of the levy and execution documents; their judgment is against Thomson Homes, Inc., and not Petitioner; their judgment does not find that Petitioner violated Section 489.129(1)(g), (j), or (k), Florida Statutes; and Ms. Thomson deceived Petitioner in violation of Section 489.132, Florida Statutes. Lastly, the petition seeks attorneys' fees under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. DOAH Case No. 03-3544 involves the claim of Sylvia Reinhardt. Ms. Reinhardt entered into a construction contract with Thomson Homes, Inc., on October 14, 1998. Pursuant to the agreement, Ms. Reinhardt agreed to pay Thomson Homes, Inc., $45,000 for a lot and $147,150 for a home, which Thomson Homes, Inc., agreed to construct to "substantial completion" within 120 days from the date of slab pour. After Ms. Reinhardt paid Thomson Homes, Inc., $144,769, directly and indirectly, by way of her construction lender, the house was little more than half complete when Thomson Homes, Inc., abandoned the job. Thomson Homes also failed to pay various suppliers that filed liens, so Ms. Reinhardt had to pay $8550.41 to RTS Roofing, $882 to Palm Beach Garage Door, and $3421.32 to Woodworks, Inc. In an undated complaint filed in 1999 (actual date illegible), Ms. Reinhardt commenced a legal action against Thomson Homes, Inc., but not Petitioner. The two-count complaint alleges a breach of contract, based on Thomson Homes' alleged "abandon[ment]" of the job "prior to completion" and "fail[ure] and refus[al] to pay subcontractors and/or materialmen which resulted in Claims of Liens against Plaintiff's residence, which Defendant has failed and refused to satisfy," and unjust enrichment, based on Thomson Homes' alleged receipt of funds and failure to complete construction and pay for goods and services provided by subcontractors and materialmen. Ms. Reinhardt obtained a final summary judgment against Thomson Homes, Inc., on March 28, 2000, for a total sum of $61,471.15, including attorneys' fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. The judgment states, in part: Subsequent to entering into the above referenced contract, Defendant performed work under the Contract. However, it breached its contract by accepting deposits and construction loan disbursements and thereafter abandoning the project and failing to pay subcontractors and materialmen for their labor, services and materials provided. As a result of Defendant failing to pay lienors who provided labor, services and materials for the construction of Plaintiff's residence, construction liens were recorded against same, which Plaintiff had to satisfy. As a result of Defendant abandoning the project, Plaintiff was compelled to retain a new contractor to complete their [sic] home at an additional cost over and above the original contract amount. As a direct result of Defendant abandoning the project, failing to pay lienor's [sic], the misapplication of construction funds and financial mismanagement Plaintiff has been forced to borrow additional funds from her construction lender. On April 17, 2000, Ms. Reinhardt filed a claim with the Recovery Fund. In response to a question asking if she had made a diligent effort to collect payment from the contractor, Ms. Reinhardt answered "yes" and explained: "Telephone calls were unanswered. Certified mail requesting response were [sic] never answered. Our attorney made written and personal contact with the owner and there was no intention to pay." The claim states that the violation took place in July 1999. By acknowledged statement dated July 21, 2000, Ms. Reinhardt declared that she had completed a "reasonable search and inquiry" and had not found any property or assets against which to satisfy her judgment. Ms. Reinhardt stated that someone at the Florida Department of State advised her that Thomson Homes, Inc., was administratively dissolved on September 24, 1999. She also declared that she had found one parcel of property owned by Thomson Homes, Inc., and valued at $115,387, but this had been sold to "Joan Thomson" on February 1, 2000. Ms. Reinhardt stated that she had found tangible personal property worth $5000. She added that she had not found any motor vehicles registered with the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, nor had she found anything registered with the "FAA." On November 26, 2002, Respondent issued an Order acknowledging Ms. Reinhardt's claim of $58,661.44, approving the payment of the statutory limit of $25,000 against the Recovery Fund, and automatically suspending Petitioner's license until he reimburses the Recovery Fund for the full amount of the paid claim. The Order, copies of which were served on all parties, states that Ms. Reinhardt is the Petitioner, the Recovery Fund is a Respondent, and "Larry Shimkus, d/b/a Thomson Homes, Inc.," is a Respondent. The Order advises that "you" may seek a formal hearing, pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if material facts are in dispute. On December 24, 2002, Petitioner served a Petition for Section 120.57 Formal Administrative Hearing. The petition, which was served on Ms. Reinhardt and Respondent, contests the payment to Ms. Reinhardt and the automatic suspension of Petitioner's license. The petition contests the payment of Ms. Reinhardt's claim and suspension of Petitioner's license because Ms. Reinhardt did not submit certified copies of the levy and execution documents; her judgment is against Thomson Homes, Inc., and not Petitioner; her judgment does not find that Petitioner violated Section 489.129(1)(g), (j), or (k), Florida Statutes; and Ms. Thomson deceived Petitioner in violation of Section 489.132, Florida Statutes. Lastly, the petition seeks attorneys' fees under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. DOAH Case No. 03-3545 involves the claim of Louis and Ann Mahoney. The Mahoneys entered into a construction contract with Thomson Homes, Inc., on June 28, 1999, for the construction of a home in Martin County. Pursuant to the agreement, the Mahoneys agreed to pay Thomson Homes, Inc., $32,000 for a lot and $149,000 for a home, which Thomson Homes, Inc., agreed to construct to "substantial completion" within 150 days from the date of slab pour. After the Mahoneys paid Thomson Homes, Inc., $14,500, directly and indirectly, by way of their construction lender, they suffered damages due to the acts and omissions of Thomson Homes, Inc., although, again, the record does not describe specifically how Thomson Homes caused them damage. In an undated complaint that bears no filing date, the Mahoneys commenced a legal action against Thomson Homes, Inc., but not Petitioner. The two-count complaint alleges a breach of contract, based on Thomson Homes' alleged "abandon[ment]" of the job "prior to completion" and "fail[ure] and refus[al] to pay subcontractors and/or materialmen which resulted in Claims of Liens against Plaintiffs [sic] residence, which Defendant has failed and refused to satisfy," and unjust enrichment, based on Thomson Homes' alleged receipt of funds and failure to complete construction and pay for goods and services provided by subcontractors and materialmen. The Mahoneys obtained a final summary judgment against Thomson Homes, Inc., on April 13, 2000, for a total sum of $43,084.49, including attorneys' fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. The judgment states, in part: Subsequent to entering into the above referenced contract, Defendant breached its contract by accepting Plaintiffs' deposits and construction loan disbursements and thereafter abandoning the project and failing to pay subcontractors and/or materialmen for their labor, and/or services provided. As a result of Defendant failing to pay lienor's [sic] who provided labor, services and materials for the construction of Plaintiffs [sic] residence, a construction lien was recorded against Plaintiffs' property, which Plaintiffs will have to satisfy. As a result of Defendant abandoning the project, Plaintiffs were compelled to retain a new contractor to complete their home at an additional cost over and above the original contract amount. As a direct result of Defendant abandoning the project, failing to pay lienor's [sic], the misapplication of construction funds and financial mismanagement Plaintiffs have been forced to borrow additional funds from their construction lender. On April 30, 2000, the Mahoneys signed a claim under the Recovery Fund. Although the claim form bears no filing date, the completed questionnaire attached to the claim was filed on May 3, 2000, so that is the likely filing date of the claim. In response to a question asking if they had made a diligent effort to collect payment from the contractor, the Mahoneys answered "yes" and explained: "This is explained in General Allegations, enclosed with this paperwork." Evidently, the reference is to a copy of the circuit court complaint. By acknowledged statement dated April 8, 2002, Mr. Mahoney declared that he had completed a "reasonable search and inquiry" and had not found any property or assets against which to satisfy his judgment. Mr. Mahoney stated that someone at the Florida Department of State advised him that Thomson Homes, Inc., was administratively dissolved on September 24, 1999. He also declared that an internet search had disclosed no property owned by Thomson Homes, Inc. Mr. Mahoney stated that the "department of motor vehicles in Palm Beach County" found no motor vehicles or boats registered to Thomson Homes, Inc., and that the "FAA" had found nothing registered to Thomson Homes, Inc. On February 28, 2003, Respondent issued an Order acknowledging the Mahoneys' claim of $38,185, approving the payment of the statutory limit of $25,000 against the Recovery Fund, and automatically suspending Petitioner's license until he reimburses the Recovery Fund for the full amount of the paid claim. The Order, copies of which were served on all parties, states that the Mr. Mahoney is the Petitioner, the Recovery Fund is a Respondent, and "Larry Shimkus, d/b/a Thomson Homes, Inc.," is a Respondent. The Order advises that "you" may seek a formal hearing, pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if material facts are in dispute. On March 17, 2003, Petitioner served a Petition for Section 120.57 Formal Administrative Hearing. The petition, which was served on the Mahoneys and Respondent, contests the payment to the Mahoneys and the automatic suspension of Petitioner's license. The petition contests the payment of the Mahoneys' claim and suspension of Petitioner's license because they did not submit all of the required exhibits; their judgment is against Thomson Homes, Inc., and not Petitioner; their judgment does not find that Petitioner violated Section 489.129(1)(g), (j), or (k), Florida Statutes; and Ms. Thomson deceived Petitioner in violation of Section 489.132, Florida Statutes. Lastly, the petition seeks attorneys' fees under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. DOAH Case No. 03-3546 involves the claim of Dennis and Carolyn DeStefanis. The DeStefanises entered into a construction contract with Thomson Homes, Inc., on April 7, 1999. Pursuant to the agreement, the DeStefanises agreed to pay Thomson Homes, Inc., $137,455 for a home, which Thomson Homes, Inc., agreed to construct to "substantial completion" within 150 days from the date of slab pour. After the DeStefanises paid Thomson Homes, Inc., $15,765, directly and indirectly, by way of their construction lender, Thomson Homes, Inc. never did any work, except to contract with a surveyor, who, unpaid, filed a claim of lien against the DeStefanises's lot. In an undated complaint bearing no filing date, the DeStefanises commenced a legal action against Thomson Homes, Inc., but not Petitioner. The two-count complaint alleges a breach of contract, based on Thomson Homes' alleged "abandon[ment]" of the job "prior to completion" and "fail[ure] and refus[al] to pay subcontractors and/or materialmen which resulted in Claims of Liens against Plaintiffs [sic] residence, which Defendant has failed and refused to satisfy," and unjust enrichment, based on Thomson Homes' alleged receipt of funds and failure to complete construction and pay for goods and services provided by subcontractors and materialmen. The DeStefanises obtained a final summary judgment against Thomson Homes, Inc., on March 15, 2000, for a total sum of $36,701.87, including attorneys' fees and costs. The judgment states, in part: Subsequent to entering . . . into the above referenced contract, Defendant, [sic] breached its contract by accepting Plaintiffs [sic] deposits and construction loan disbursements and thereafter abandoning the project. [sic] As a result of Defendant abandoning the project, Plaintiffs were compelled to retain a new contractor to complete their home at an additional cost over and above the original contract amount. As a direct result of Defendant abandoning the project, the misapplication of construction funds and financial mismanagement Plaintiffs have been forced to borrow additional funds from their construction lender. On April 19, 2000, the DeStefanises filed a claim with the Recovery Fund. In response to a question asking if they had made a diligent effort to collect payment from the contractor, the DeStefanises answered "yes" and explained: "Went to DBPR Investigative Services, hired Attorney Barry W. Taylor [attorney in circuit court action], got Final Summary Judgment against Thomson Homes, Inc." On March 20, 2003, Respondent issued an Order acknowledging the DeStefanises' claim of $34,965.52, approving the payment of $15,765 against the Recovery Fund, and automatically suspending Petitioner's license until he reimburses the Recovery Fund for the full amount of the paid claim. The Order, copies of which were served on all parties, states that the DeStefanises are the Petitioners, the Recovery Fund is a Respondent, and "Larry Shimkus, d/b/a Thomson Homes, Inc.," is a Respondent. The Order advises that "you" may seek a formal hearing, pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if material facts are in dispute. On April 7, 2003, Petitioner filed a Petition for Section 120.57 Formal Administrative Hearing. The petition, which was served on the DeStefanises and Respondent, contests the payment to the DeStefanises and the automatic suspension of Petitioner's license. The petition contests the payment of the DeStefanises' claim and suspension of Petitioner's license because they did not submit all of the required exhibits; their judgment is against Thomson Homes, Inc., and not Petitioner; their judgment does not find that Petitioner violated Section 489.129(1)(g), (j), or (k), Florida Statutes; and Ms. Thomson deceived Petitioner in violation of Section 489.132, Florida Statutes. The petition contests the suspension of Petitioner's license on the additional ground that he was not the qualifier for Thomson Homes, Inc., when it and the DeStefanises entered into the construction contract. Lastly, the petition seeks attorneys' fees under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. DOAH Case No. 03-3547 involves the claim of James and Donna Barr. The Barrs entered into a construction contract with Thomson Homes, Inc., on September 12, 1998. Pursuant to the agreement, the Barrs agreed to pay Thomson Homes, Inc., $30,000 for a lot and $140,900 for a home, which Thomson Homes, Inc., agreed to construct to "substantial completion" within 120 days from the date of slab pour. The Barrs paid Thomson Homes, Inc., $8500 in the form of a down payment. They or their construction lender paid Thomson Homes, Inc., considerably more money and suffered the imposition of claims of lien by unpaid subcontractors and suppliers, but, after negotiating with the bank, emerged from the transaction having lost only the $8500 down payment. Thomson Homes, Inc., obtained permits in April 1999 and started construction in May 1999. Before abandoning the job, Thomson Homes, Inc., worked on the home in May, June, and July of 1999. The Barrs and their lender did not make additional payments after the Barrs found the Thomson Homes, Inc., office empty on August 1, 1999. In a complaint filed October 6, 1999, the Barrs commenced a legal action against Thomson Homes, Inc., but not Petitioner. The two-count complaint alleges a breach of contract, based on Thomson Homes' alleged "abandon[ment]" of the job "prior to completion" and "fail[ure] and refus[al] to pay subcontractors and/or materialmen which resulted in Claims of Liens against Plaintiffs [sic] residence, which Defendant has failed and refused to satisfy," and unjust enrichment, based on Thomson Homes' alleged receipt of funds and failure to complete construction and pay for goods and services provided by subcontractors and materialmen. The Barrs obtained a final summary judgment against Thomson Homes, Inc., on May 8, 2000, for a total sum of $45,435.62, including attorneys' fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. The judgment states, in part: Subsequent to entering into the above referenced contract, partially performed work under the Contract. However, Defendant breached the contract by accepting Plaintiffs [sic] deposits and construction loan disbursements and thereafter abandoning the project and failing to pay subcontractors and/or materialmen for their labor services and materials provided. As a result of Defendant failing to pay lienors who provided labor, services and materials for the construction of Plaintiffs [sic] residence, construction liens were recorded against same, which Plaintiffs will have to satisfy. As a result of Defendant abandoning the project, Plaintiffs will be compelled to retain a new contractor to complete their home at an additional cost over and above the original contract amount. As a direct result of Defendant abandoning the project, failing to pay lienors, the misapplication of construction funds and financial mismanagement Plaintiffs will be forced to borrow additional funds from their construction lender. On June 2, 2000, the Barrs filed a claim under the Recovery Fund. In response to a question asking if they had made a diligent effort to collect payment from the contractor, the Barrs answered "yes" and explained: "I have looked into the assets of Thomson Homes Inc. and they do not have any. My affidavit is attached." The completed questionnaire states that the Barrs discovered the violation on August 11, 1999. They therefore failed to file their claim within two years of the discovery of the violation. By acknowledged statement dated May 23, 2000, Ms. Barr declared that she had completed a "reasonable search and inquiry" and had not found any property or assets against which to satisfy her judgment. Ms. Barr stated that someone at the Florida Department of State advised her that Thomson Homes, Inc., was administratively dissolved on September 24, 1999. She also declared she had found no property owned by Thomson Homes, Inc., in Palm Beach County. Ms. Barr stated that the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles found no motor vehicles or boats registered to Thomson Homes, Inc., and that the internet site of the "FAA" had revealed nothing registered to Thomson Homes, Inc. On November 26, 2002, Respondent issued an Order approving the payment of the Barrs' claim of $8500 against the Recovery Fund and automatically suspending Petitioner's license until he reimburses the Recovery Fund for the full amount of the paid claim. The Order, copies of which were served on all parties, states that the Barrs are the Petitioners, the Recovery Fund is a Respondent, and "Larry Shimkus, d/b/a Thomson Homes, Inc.," is a Respondent. The Order advises that "you" may seek a formal hearing, pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if material facts are in dispute. On December 27, 2002, Petitioner served a Petition for Section 120.57 Formal Administrative Hearing. The petition, which was served on the Barrs and Respondent, contests the payment to the Barrs and the automatic suspension of Petitioner's license. The petition contests the payment of the Barrs' claim and suspension of Petitioner's license because they did not submit a certified copy of the levy and execution documents; their judgment is against Thomson Homes, Inc., and not Petitioner; their judgment does not find that Petitioner violated Section 489.129(1)(g), (j), or (k), Florida Statutes; and Ms. Thomson deceived Petitioner in violation of Section 489.132, Florida Statutes. Lastly, the petition seeks attorneys' fees under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. DOAH Case No. 03-3633 involves the Joanne Myers. Ms. Myers entered into a construction contract with Thomson Homes, Inc., on February 7, 1999. Pursuant to the agreement, Ms. Myers agreed to pay Thomson Homes, Inc., $29,500 for a lot and $125,400 for a home, which Thomson Homes, Inc., agreed to construct to "substantial completion" within 120 days from the date of slab pour. Ms. Myers directly or indirectly paid Thomson Homes, Inc., $12,840. According to Ms. Myers' claim, Thomson Homes, Inc., never commenced construction before going out of business in August 1999. In an undated complaint bearing no filing date, Ms. Myers commenced a legal action against Thomson Homes, Inc., but not Petitioner. The two-count complaint alleges a breach of contract, based on Thomson Homes' alleged "abandon[ment]" of the job "prior to completion" and "fail[ure] and refus[al] to pay subcontractors and/or materialmen which resulted in Claims of Liens against Plaintiff's residence, which Defendant has failed and refused to satisfy," and unjust enrichment, based on Thomson Homes' alleged receipt of funds and failure to complete construction and pay for goods and services provided by subcontractors and materialmen. Ms. Myers obtained a final summary judgment against Thomson Homes, Inc., on May 31, 2000, for a total sum of $28,307.77, including attorneys' fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. The judgment states, in part: Subsequent to entering . . . into the above referenced contract, Defendant breached the contract by accepting Plaintiff's deposits and construction loan disbursements and thereafter abandoning the project and failing to pay subcontractors and/or materialmen for their labor services and materials provided. As a result of Defendant failing to pay lienor's [sic] who provided labor, services and/or materials for the construction of Plaintiff's residence, construction liens were recorded against same, which Plaintiff will have to satisfy. As a result of Defendant abandoning the project, Plaintiff will be compelled to retain a new contractor to complete her home at an additional cost over and above the original contract amount. As a direct result of Defendant abandoning the project, failing to pay lienor's [sic], the misapplication of construction funds and financial mismanagement Plaintiff will be forced to borrow additional funds from her construction lender. On September 18, 2000, Ms. Myers filed a claim with the Recovery Fund. In response to a question asking if she had made a diligent effort to collect payment from the contractor, Ms. Myers answered "yes" and explained: "Contractor closed corporate office--would not answer telephone calls." By letter dated November 30, 2000, from James Brogan of WEI Consulting Group to Ms. Myers, Mr. Brogan states that he had investigated the assets of Thomson Homes, Inc. Mr. Brogan found no bankruptcy filing by Thomson Homes, Inc., in the Southern District of Florida. Thomson Homes, Inc., was a party to 282 legal actions and owed tangible personal property taxes on furniture in a model home. On February 28, 2003, Respondent issued an Order approving the payment of Ms. Myers' claim of $14,080.66 against the Recovery Fund and automatically suspending Petitioner's license until he reimburses the Recovery Fund for the full amount of the paid claim. The Order, copies of which were served on all parties, states that Ms. Myers is the Petitioner, the Recovery Fund is a Respondent, and "Larry Shimkus, d/b/a Thomson Homes, Inc.," is a Respondent. The Order advises that "you" may seek a formal hearing, pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, if material facts are in dispute. On March 17, 2003, Petitioner filed a Petition for Section 120.57 Formal Administrative Hearing. The petition, which was served on Ms. Myers and Respondent, contests the payment to Ms. Myers and the automatic suspension of Petitioner's license. The petition contests the payment of Ms. Myers' claim and suspension of Petitioner's license because she did not submit evidence of a diligent search for assets; she did not submit all of the required exhibits; her judgment is against Thomson Homes, Inc., and not Petitioner; her judgment does not find that Petitioner violated Section 489.129(1)(g), (j), or (k), Florida Statutes; and Ms. Thomson deceived Petitioner in violation of Section 489.132, Florida Statutes. Lastly, the petition seeks attorneys' fees under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. On January 4, 2004, Ms. Myers died. However, the probate court of Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, issued letters testamentary on her estate to James W. Myers III, in whose name Ms. Myers' claim is now being prosecuted. At the hearing, Petitioner contended that most, if not all, of the claims failed because the claimants had not exercised reasonable diligence in searching for assets, although Petitioner has dropped this contention in its proposed recommended order. In his petitions for hearing, Petitioner raised this contention only as to Ms. Myers. Ms. Myers, as well as the remainder of the claimants, made or caused to be made a reasonable search and inquiry for the assets of Thomson Homes, Inc. It is obvious that Thomson Homes, Inc., had no assets by the first letter from Mr. Brogan, dated November 30, 2000, nor did it have assets when Mr. Brogan issued his later letter on June 5, 2001, or when the attorney issued his affidavit on August 9, 2001. What is reasonable, in terms of a search, is dictated here by the fact that Thomson Homes, Inc., had no discoverable assets against which it could be made to answer for the considerable fraud that it perpetrated against these nine claimants. Respondent provided all of the parties, including Petitioner, with notice of its hearings at which it entered Recovery Fund orders. The petitions contend that Petitioner received no such notice in the Whitesides and Deyos cases. Although not litigated at the hearing, the presumption of notice, pursuant to the recitations set forth in each of Respondent's orders, results in a finding that Petitioner received timely notice in all cases.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order dismissing the claims against the Recovery Fund of the Beltzes and Barrs; paying the claims against the Recovery Fund of the remaining claimants, pursuant to the provisions of the orders of Respondent already issued in these cases and pursuant to the provisions of Section 489.143(1)-(6), Florida Statutes; and dismissing Respondent's request for the automatic suspension of Petitioner's license, pursuant to Section 489.143(7), Florida Statutes, without prejudice to any separate disciplinary proceedings that Respondent has commenced or may commence against Petitioner or others for the acts and omissions involved in these nine cases. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of February, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of February, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce G. Kaleita Law Office of Bruce G. Kaleita, P.A. 1615 Forum Place, Suite 500 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Adrienne C. Rodgers Assistant General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1023 Tim Vaccaro, Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Nancy Campiglia, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent violated Sections 494.0043(1)(b), 494.0038(1)(a) and (b)1, and 494.0038(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), by failing to provide a mortgagee's title insurance policy; by obtaining a mortgage broker fee without a written agreement; and by failing to disclose the receipt of rates, points, or fees on behalf of a lender; and, if so, what, if any, penalty should be imposed. (All chapter and section references are to Florida Statutes (1997) unless otherwise stated.)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for regulating mortgage brokers in Florida. Until September 1999, Respondent was licensed in the state as a mortgage broker pursuant to license number MB9804519. Respondent's license became inactive when Respondent did not renew her license. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was the sole owner and operator of Blackstone. Blackstone is licensed in the state as mortgage brokerage business pursuant to license number MBB9901308. On January 8, 1996, Mr. Brian S. Carter and Ms. Lisa G. Carter closed on the purchase of real property located at 1503 Mobile Avenue, Holly Hill, Florida 32117. A non-institutional lender provided a purchase money second mortgage of $19,100 through Karlis and Uldis Sprogis, as co-trustees of the K. E. Sprogis Trust. Respondent was the mortgage broker responsible for the loan in the Carter transaction (the "Carter loan"). On November 12, 1995, Respondent entered into a mortgage brokerage contract with the Carters on behalf of Blackstone. Respondent failed to obtain, or retain in the Carter loan file, a written receipt from the non-institutional lender for the title policy, an opinion of title by an attorney licensed to practice law in Florida, a binder of the title insurance or a conditional opinion of title, or a waiver thereof by the non- institutional lender. In her Petition for Hearing, Respondent admits the foregoing findings pertaining to the Carter loan. On July 11, 1996, Ms. Kay George closed on the purchase of real property located at 2753 Foxdale Drive, Deltona, Florida 32738. Ms. George obtained a purchase money first mortgage in the amount of $56,000 from an institutional lender. Respondent was the mortgage broker responsible for the loan in the George transaction (the "George loan"). On June 15, 1996, Respondent entered into a mortgage brokerage contract with Ms. George on behalf of Blackstone. The mortgage broker contract stated that the mortgage brokerage fee to be paid by Ms. George would not exceed $400. However, the contract disclosed that Respondent would receive between $500 and $2,000 in additional compensation from the lender. The loan-closing documents in the George loan disclose that Respondent received additional compensation of $1,140 comprised of $840 in loan origination fees and $300 in processing fees. The mortgage broker contract failed to disclose the loan origination and processing fees paid by the lender to Respondent. On December 29, 1997, Mr. Roy J. Piper and Ms. Laura A. Piper closed on the purchase of real property located at 30 Arrowhead Circle, Ormond Beach, Florida 32174. EMB Corporation ("EMB") provided a purchase money first mortgage of $68,400. Respondent was the mortgage broker responsible for the loan in the Piper transaction (the "Piper loan"). On December 1, 1997, Respondent entered into a mortgage brokerage contract with the Pipers on behalf of Blackstone. The mortgage broker contract failed to state the amount of the mortgage brokerage fee to be paid by the Pipers. The contract also failed to disclose any additional compensation Respondent was to receive from EMB. The closing documents show that EMB paid Respondent $1,926.25 in additional compensation as a "broker service release premium." On April 9, 1998, Ms. Sunday S. Reiland closed on the purchase of real property located at 300 Chipeway Avenue, Daytona Beach, Florida 32118. Ms. Reiland obtained a first mortgage in the amount of $96,000 from an institutional lender. Respondent was the mortgage broker responsible for the loan in the Reiland transaction (the "Reiland loan"). On March 9, 1998, Respondent entered into a mortgage brokerage contract with Ms. Reiland on behalf of Blackstone. The mortgage broker contract stated that the mortgage brokerage fee to be paid by Ms. Reiland would not exceed $250. However, the contract disclosed that Respondent would receive between $960 and $3,000 in additional compensation from the lender. The loan closing documents in the Reiland loan disclose that Respondent received additional compensation of $730 comprised of a $480 "cash out fee" and a $250 processing fee. The mortgage broker contract failed to disclose the "cash out fee" and processing fee the lender paid to Respondent. On April 23, 1998, Mr. Brian M. Reigel closed on the purchase of real property located at 931 Aspen Drive, South Daytona, Florida 32119. Mr. Reigel obtained a first mortgage in the amount of $39,425 from an institutional lender. Respondent was the mortgage broker responsible for the loan in the Reigel transaction (the "Reigel loan"). On April 8, 1998, Respondent entered into a mortgage brokerage contract with Mr. Reigel on behalf of Blackstone. The mortgage broker contract stated that the mortgage brokerage fee for the Reigel loan would not exceed $550. However, the contract also stated that Respondent would receive additional compensation from the lender ranging between $0 and $3,000. The loan closing documents in the Reigel loan disclose that Respondent received additional compensation of $1,038 from the borrower's funds for a loan discount fee and a processing fee. On October 16, 1998, Mr. William M. Netterville, III, closed on the purchase of real property located at 808 South Grandview Avenue, Daytona Beach, Florida 32118. Mr. Netterville obtained a first mortgage in the amount of $66,000 from an institutional lender. Respondent was the mortgage broker responsible for the loan in the Netterville transaction (the "Netterville loan"). On September 10, 1998, Respondent entered into a mortgage brokerage contract with Mr. Netterville on behalf of Blackstone. The mortgage broker contract stated that the mortgage brokerage fee to be paid by the Mr. Netterville would not exceed $1,000. The loan-closing documents in the Netterville loan disclose that an additional mortgage broker fee of $500 was paid from the borrower's funds to Grandview Financial. The mortgage broker contract failed to disclose the fee paid to Grandview. The mortgage broker contract in the Carter loan stated that the mortgage broker "can make loan commitments." However, Respondent could not make loan commitments. Only the lender could make loan commitments pursuant to a written commitment or "lock-in" for the loan. There is no evidence that the Carters ever obtained the necessary loan commitment from the lender. Respondent represented that the mortgage broker was able to provide loan commitments without disclosing the necessity for a written commitment from the lender.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent not guilty of violating Section 494.038(1) in the George, Reiland, and Reigel transactions; guilty of violating Sections 494.043(1)(b) and 494.038(2) in the Carter transaction; guilty of violating Section 494.038(1) in the Piper and Netterville transactions; and issuing a written reprimand for Respondent's violations in the Carter transaction; and imposing fines totaling $2,426.25 for Respondent's violations in the Piper and Netterville transactions. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of January, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Robert F. Milligan Comptroller State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Harry Hooper, General Counsel Fletcher Building, Suite 526 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Chris Lindamood, Esquire Department of Banking and Finance Hurston Tower South, Suite S-225 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Teresa M. Steininger 8907 Roberts Drive Dunwoody, Georgia 30350
Findings Of Fact On November 15, 1976, the Outrigger Club, Inc., a Florida corporation, through its president, Ervin Freeman, and its Secretary, Joan Dimon, executed a warranty deed conveying all right, title and interest, in and to certain property located at Northeast 135th Street and Biscayne Boulevard, North Miami, Florida, to Petitioner, Biscayne South, Inc. (hereafter Biscayne South), a Florida corporation. The warranty deed was recorded with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, on November 16, 1976. On November 22, 1976, Biscayne South executed a mortgage deed in favor of Fidelity Mortgage Investors, a Massachusetts business trust, as a second mortgage on the same parcel of land to secure the payment of a promissory note in the principal sum of $1,500,000.00 which note was made by Outrigger Club, Inc., on the same date in favor of Fidelity Mortgage Investors. On November 22, 1976, Outrigger Club, Inc., as the "borrower" executed a future advance agreement with Fidelity Mortgage Investors as "lendor". The future advance agreement provides for the advancement of the sum of $1,500,000.00 to be secured by a prior mortgage dated October 27, 1972, executed by Outrigger Club, Inc., in favor of Fidelity Mortgage Investors, which mortgage provided for future advances. On November 22, 1976, a construction loan and disbursement agreement was executed by the parties thereto which provided that the $1,500,000.00 advance be paid to Miami National Bank as disbursement agent for the benefit of Biscayne South. On November 23, 1976, the mortgage deed and the future advance agreement were recorded in the public records of Dade County, Florida, and on that same date, the warranty deed was rerecorded in the public records of Dade County, Florida. Because the 1.5 million dollars was paid to Miami National Bank to be disbursed for future construction work on a draw-down basis, Outrigger Club, Inc., the grantor, never received the 1.5 million dollars. The warranty deed provides in paragraph 9 thereof that the conveyance is subject to: a second mortgage wherein the Outrigger Club Inc., is mortgagor and the trustees of Fidelity Mortgage Investors, a Massachusetts business trust, is mortgagee, dated the day of November, 1976, which said mortgage is given as additional collateral for payment of certain sums as provided under a settlement and release agreement between the Outrigger Club, Inc., a Florida corporation, and Lawrence F. Lee, Jr., and others as trustees of Fidelity Mortgage Investors, a Massachusetts business trust dated the 16th day of January, 1976. Neither the Department of Revenue nor Biscayne South have introduced evidence to establish that such a mortgage in fact exists or if it did, the value of such mortgage. The only mortgage in evidence is Respondent, Department of Revenue's Exhibit 2, which shows Biscayne South as mortgagor rather than the Outrigger Club, Inc., as recited in the warranty deed. However, the future advance agreement introduced as Respondent's Exhibit No. 3, establishes the existence of a mortgage encumbering the subject property in which the Outrigger Club, Inc., is mortgagor and Fidelity Mortgage Investors is mortgagee. Such mortgage is dated October 27, 1972, and not dated with the month of November, 1976, as recited in paragraph 9 of the warranty deed. As recited in the future advance agreement, the mortgage of October 27, 1972, secured an indebtedness of $7,214,000.00. The mortgage provided that future advances could be made to Outrigger Club, Inc., not to exceed in the aggregate $16,500,000.00. The future advance agreement provides that an additional advance of $1,500,000.00 is to be made to Outrigger Club, Inc., thereby increasing the indebtedness represented by the October 27, 1972, mortgage to the aggregate sum of $8,715,000.00. In other words, the buyer of the property sought to borrow an additional 1.5 million dollars. The lender, in order to achieve priority of lien to secure its loan, treated the funding as an advance against a preexisting mortgage originally binding the seller, but then delivered the 1.5 million dollars directly to Miami National Bank for the benefit of the buyer. Accordingly, the seller never received the proceeds of the loan but rather participated in a "book transaction" for the benefit of the buyer and the lender.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent violated Subsections 489.129(1)(g)2., (j), and (m), Florida Statutes (2005),1 by allegedly engaging in financial mismanagement or misconduct in the practice of contracting that causes financial harm to a customer, abandoning a construction project, or committing misconduct or incompetence in the practice of contracting.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for regulating the practice of contracting in the state. Respondent is licensed in the state as a certified general contractor pursuant to license number CGC59204. Respondent is the qualifier of South West Florida Development Corporation (South West) doing business as Back Bay Homes (Back Bay). On February 7, 2006, Respondent executed a contract with Gail and Gary Veith to build a residential home on a vacant lot located at 3218 Southwest 11th Place, Cape Coral, Florida. The contract price was $276,983.00 (the initial contract). The initial contract provided for the construction of a sea wall at a cost of $17,257.00 in addition to the contract price of $276,983.00. On February 7, 2006, Respondent entered into a second contract with Mr. and Mrs. Veith. The only difference between the initial and second contracts was the contract price of each contract. The second contract price was $289,686.00, excluding the sea wall cost of $17,257.00. Mr. and Mrs. Veith secured payment of the construction project with a construction loan from Market Street Mortgage Corporation (Market Street) in the original approximate amount of $412,000.00. The total loan amount was intended to be sufficient to cover the second contract price of $289,686.00 and the amount contracted by Mr. and Mrs. Veith for acquisition of the vacant lot (construction site), which was $128,000.00.2 Clear and convincing evidence shows that Respondent engaged in financial mismanagement or misconduct in the practice of contracting that caused financial harm to his customers in violation of Subsection 489.129(1)(g)2. Clear and convincing evidence also shows that Respondent committed incompetence and mismanagement in the practice of contracting. The percentage of completion of the residence, which was zero, was less than the percentage of the contract price paid to Respondent, which was 29 percent. Respondent received approximately $84,655.00 in construction loan proceeds from Market Street in two draws. Market Street paid the first draw at closing on May 5, 2006, in the amount of $42,901.20 and paid the second draw to Respondent on June 26, 2006, in the amount of $41,754.00. However, Respondent never commenced construction of the residence. Respondent reported a profit of $48,637.72 on the Veith property and completed only the sea wall at a cost of $17,257.00. Respondent paid the cost of the sea wall and other expenses on the Veith property to keep the net profit at $48,637.72. Other expenses included $420.00 for surveys, $34.34 for blue prints, $1,707.75 for plan drafts, $350.00 for septic engineering, and $3,138.19 for construction loan interest. Respondent was not entitled by the terms of the contract to retain the funds paid to Respondent by Market Street. The loan agreement provided that draws were to be made at the discretion of Market Street based on work completed and materials incorporated into improvements. Respondent never commenced construction of the residence. Respondent did not obtain permits for the job. Mr. Winston testified that when Market Street transferred a single, lump sum deposit to his company in the amount of $41,754.00 on June 26, 2006, he did not know that he was appropriating funds he was not entitled to under the contract. When that testimony is weighed against evidence that the work Mr. Winston had performed was limited to a sea wall costing only $17,257.00, the testimony is persuasive evidence to the trier of fact that Respondent engaged in mismanagement.3 Respondent billed Market Street for payment of the sea wall when Respondent completed the sea wall. However, the draw schedule in the loan documents does not provide a draw payment for the sea wall. Respondent stopped paying construction interest that Respondent was obligated to pay under the terms of the construction loan. Thereafter, Mr. and Mrs. Veith paid construction interest of approximately $13,800.00. Clear and convincing evidence shows that Respondent abandoned the construction project within the meaning of Subsection 489.129(1)(j). Respondent failed to perform any work on the residence for 90 consecutive days without just cause. Respondent did not notify Mr. and Mrs. Veith that Respondent had abandoned the project. Rather, Mr. and Mrs. Veith started receiving requests for payment of construction loan interest. Respondent failed to conduct any construction activity on the project site for more than 90 consecutive days. On May 13, 2008, Mr. and Mrs. Veith received notice that their loan had been assigned from Market Street to Gulf Coast Bank & Trust Company (Gulf Coast). Gulf Coast sent Mr. and Mrs. Veith repeated demands for payment of the construction loan principal and interest. Mr. and Mrs. Veith entered into a transaction identified in the record as a "short sale" in which they sold the construction site, which they originally purchased for $128,000.00, for $20,000.00. The $20,000.00 sale proceeds were paid to Gulf Coast. Mr. and Mrs. Veith have been financially unable to make payments to Gulf Coast. They remain liable for the full amount of the loan, including delinquent principal and interest. Mr. and Mrs. Veith brought a civil action against Respondent. They were unable to sustain the action because they could not afford the attorney fees. Petitioner incurred investigative costs in this matter of $204.26. The investigative costs do not include attorney time.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order finding that Respondent is guilty of the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint; imposing the fines enumerated in paragraph 24 of this Recommended Order; requiring Respondent to pay investigative costs in the amount of $204.26; and requiring Respondent to make full restitution to Mr. and Mrs. Veith in the amount of $61,747.72. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of July, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of July, 2010.
Findings Of Fact Respondent was issued Mortgage Broker License No. 3082 on September 3, 1974 by Petitioner. Respondent conducted certain transactions under its Mortgage Broker License during the period from September, 1973 until April, 1974. Respondent found client investors who had funds which they wished to invest in mortgages which would pay a greater return in interest than the average land mortgage. The transactions involved the purchase of a promissory note from a land development corporation secured by a mortgage deed on land ostensibly owned by the developer, in which the latter reserved the right and was authorized to convey the premises to a purchaser under an installment land contract subject to the lien of the mortgage. The deed further provided that the developer would deliver to a bank as an escrow agent a copy of any such agreement for deed and a quitclaim deed which would be held in escrow unless a default was established under the mortgage deed. What the investor would receive in such cases would be the developer's assignment of an agreement for deed collateralized by the mortgage deed. The issuance of these high interest notes were for the purpose of enabling the development company to make certain improvements on the land which they were obligated to do under sales contracts. In the transactions in question, Respondent dealt through Financial Resources Corporation of Ft. Lauderdale, Florida to which he remitted the investors funds, less an amount retained for fees or commissions. The land developer/borrower would then issue the note and mortgage in the face amount of the total investment made by the investor. The detailed procedure was that when an investor inquired concerning such mortgages, Respondent would determine from Financial Resources Corporation if any were available. It was the practice of Respondent's President then to look at the land development, determine if, in fact, the land was in development and had streets and the like, and to read pertinent documents concerning the development. He would then proceed to accept the full sum of the investment from the investor pursuant to an agreement by which the investor, in consideration of the stated sum, would authorize Respondent to use its best efforts to secure collateralized promissory notes at a minimum percentage of interest on the declining balance with principal and interest payable monthly if held to maturity. Respondent would then deposit the investor's check, usually on the same day as received, and then in several days send a notice to Financial Resources Corporation authorizing it to prepare and execute a self-amortizing monthly principal and interest promissory note with quitclaim deed in the amount of the investment, together with a check representing the proceeds of the Investment less the Respondent's fee or commission, and a sum for intangible tax on the transaction. Financial would thereafter return to Respondent a copy of the note and mortgage in exchange for the funds remitted. The recorded mortgages would be sent to Respondent within a month or so thereafter. Respondent had no agreements in writing with the land developer, nor with Financial Resources Corporation. Respondent claimed that its fees for services were set by Financial Resources Corporation which usually amounted to about 12 percent of the face amount of the investment, but which was sometimes more and frequently less than that authorized under the applicable statutes and regulations. Respondent did not maintain an escrow bank account and all funds received from investors were deposited into the corporate bank account of the firm. Respondent's agreements with investors set no specific term or period of time in which the secured promissory notes were to be obtained although its president would customarily tell investors that it would take some time for the transaction to be consummated, and that they could not expect to receive the recorded mortgages right away (testimony of Mr. Montague, Petitioner's Exhibits 2-10). Respondent discontinued transactions as described above in April, 1974 because he was dissatisfied with the business. He had been informed that certain lands under some of the mortgages had not been sold until after the mortgage had been executed and that this was in violation of State law. In the fall of that year, he received a memorandum from the State Comptroller on the subject of escrow accounts, dated October 11, 1974, which warned mortgage brokers in the state concerning the practice of remitting investors' funds to land developers in anticipation of receiving a recorded mortgage and note (testimony of Mr. Montague, Respondent's Exhibit 9). In 1975,a financial examiner from Petitioner's office was sent to the office of Respondent to examine his books and records. Pursuant to that examination, it was determined that Respondent had committed various violations of Chapter 494, F.S. on certain transactions. The following findings of fact are made with respect to the transactions in question: Allegation: That Respondent took and received deposits of money from Robert E. Creighton, Hazel R. Hardesty, J. Wilfred Caron, Rose A. Hoadley, Margaret A. Gregory and Willard A. Kotthaus, in the regular course of business, and failed to immediately place such said funds in an escrow or trust account as required by Section 494.05(1) , F.S. As heretofore stated, the Respondent did not maintain an escrow trust account with respect to any of the above-stated transactions. The above- mentioned individuals had authorized Respondent to disburse the funds immediately upon receipt (testimony of Mr. Montague, Supplemented by Exhibits 3- 8). Allegation: Respondent failed to maintain adequate records in violation of Section 494.06(3), F.S., in that its files contained no written agreements on transactions with Della W. Shaw, Lantana Sheet Metal and A.C. Inc., and another transaction with Lantana Sheet Metal. The agreement between Della Shaw and Respondent, although not present in Respondent's file at the time of examination of its records by Petitioner's representative, had been executed on October 15, 1975, and presently is contained in the records of the Respondent. It had been taken out temporarily by one of Respondent's associates who also had Della Shaw as a client. Respondent had entered into two transactions with the trustee of the pension fund and profit sharing plan of Lantana Sheet Metal, one for ten thousand dollars from the pension fund and one for three thousand dollars from the profit sharing plan. At the time of these investments there were written contracts which were executed by the parties. The books and records of both the pension fund and the profit sharing fund were maintained at Respondent's office by a firm which administered both plans. The agreements pertaining to the Lantana transactions were requested and withdrawn from Respondent's files by the trustee of the Lantana funds. Consequently, they did not appear in the records of the corporation at the time of examination by Petitioner's representative (Petitioner's Exhibits 2 and 4; Respondent's Exhibit 10). Allegation: Respondent failed on numerous loan purchase agreements to establish the term for which the agreement was to remain in force before the return of the deposit for nonper- formance could be required by the investor, in violation of Chapter 3-3.06, F.A.C. The transactions in question did not involve applications for mortgage loan, but agreements to purchase secured promissory notes. Respondent's clients were investors/purchasers, not borrowers (testimony of Mr. Montague; Petitioner's Exh. 2-10). Allegation: Respondent charged and accepted fees or commissions in excess of the maximum allowable in violation of Section 494.08(4), F.S., and Chapter 3-3.08(3) and (4), F.A.C., on trans- actions involving Rosa Eichelberger, overcharge of $10.90, Lantana Sheet Metal, overcharge of $62.60; Lantana Sheet Metal, overcharge of $10.91; Rose A. Hoadley, overcharge of $9.10; and Margaret A. Gregory, overcharge of $9.10.
