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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. JIMMY D. NAPIER, 82-000080 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-000080 Latest Update: Sep. 07, 1982

Findings Of Fact Respondent Jimmy D. Napier is a licensed real estate broker having been issued license No. 0063347. His license has been inactive since March 31, 1981. In early May of 1980, respondent entered into a two-year lease of real property owned by Rosemary Drake, with an option to purchase it. The property was encumbered at the time by a mortgage in favor of Farmers Home Administration (FHA), and Ms. Drake was in arrears on her mortgage payments. Respondent went to FHA's DeFuniak Springs office to inquire as to the precise amount of the arrearage before executing the lease with option to purchase. Mack Baker, who had charge of the FHA office in DeFuniak Springs, had knowledge of the transaction at the time and discussed it with respondent. On May 17, 1980, respondent entered into a two-year lease of real property in Walton County, Florida, owned by Bobby Joe and Hilda Turner, with an option to purchase it. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. One provision of this agreement purported to allow respondent to sublease. The Turners were not delinquent on the FHA mortgage that encumbered the property at the time. Mrs. Turner telephoned FHA's Mack Baker and told him that they planned to rent their home and give an option to purchase. Only after this conversation did she and her husband execute the lease and option. Respondent gave the Turners a check for $3,075 on May 17, 1980, and other consideration subsequently. No commission was paid by any party. Respondent told them that he was a real estate broker buying for his own account, before the lease was executed. Respondent said he would let Mr. Baker know about the transaction and did in fact do so. Since the lease was executed, various people have lived on the property. On June 14, 1980, respondent entered into a two-year lease of real property in Walton County, Florida, owned by Doris A. Stocker, now Wilson, with an option to purchase it. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. At the time, the property was encumbered with a mortgage in favor of FHA, and Mrs. Wilson was sometimes in arrears on her mortgage payments. Jack Webster, a licensed real estate broker, had not succeeded in finding a purchaser for Mrs. Wilson's property when he worked as a salesman in the office of another broker with whom Mrs. Wilson had listed the property. After he went out on his own, he introduced Mr. Napier to Mrs. Wilson (then Stocker) and he was present when Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 was executed. He had told Mrs. Wilson that respondent was a real estate broker buying for his own account. Respondent paid Mrs. Wilson $1,750 on June 14, 1980. No commission was paid by any party. Mrs. Wilson asked respondent whether she should contact Mr. Baker, but respondent said he would handle it. Eventually, Mrs. Wilson deeded the property to respondent. One provision of the lease and option purported to allow respondent to sublease. Somebody else is now living on the property. Fred Thurmond Wakefield II, and his wife, Marie, bought some property in Walton County with money they borrowed from FHA. Eventually they listed the property, encumbered with an FHA mortgage, for sale with Joseph G. Lamerche, Jr., a licensed real estate broker in DeFuniak Springs. Mr. Lamerche read the FHA mortgage, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3, a form used by FHA in all Florida transactions for the last few years. Paragraph (12) states: Neither the property nor any portion thereof or interest therein shall be leased, assigned, sold, transferred, or encumbered, voluntarily or otherwise, without the writ- ten consent of the Government. The Govern- ment shall have the sole and exclusive rights as beneficiary hereunder, including but not limited to the power to grant consents, par- tial releases, subordinations, and satisfac- tion, and no insured holder shall have any right, title or interest in or to the lien or any benefits hereof. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. Mr. Lamerche telephoned Mr. Baker and brought the matter up without, however, mentioning the Wakefield property specifically. Mr. Baker told Mr. Lamerche he was glad respondent had bought the Drake property because of problems with Ms. Drake before the sale. Five or six days later, on February 3, 1981, respondent entered into a two-year lease of the Wakefield property with an option to purchase it. Respondent's Exhibit No. 1. Mr. Lamerche represented the Wakefields when the agreement was executed. Before they signed, respondent told them he was a real estate broker buying for his own account. Mr. Wakefield asked respondent if the transaction was legal and respondent answered that he had done three or four the same way. In all, respondent leased six separate parcels encumbered by FHA mortgages with options to purchase each, and without the written consent of FHA. Typically, the leases called for respondent to make the lessors' FHA mortgage payments. As a result of conversations going back to 1967 with Jerry Ausley, an FHA employee, respondent was under the impression that real estate encumbered by an FHA mortgage could be leased for two years before refinancing was necessary. He did not know that the consent FHA required for a mortgagor to sell property had to be in writing. FHA's Mr. Baker was aware of each of the six transactions. The office which Mr. Baker headed was the appropriate office at which to approach FHA for permission to lease or encumber property mortgaged to the FHA. FHA accepted mortgage payments from respondent for each of the six mortgages. At some point, however, FHA mailed warning letters threatening everyone leasing to respondent with foreclosure. Under FHA rules, Napier was ineligible for FHA loans because his income was too high, his assets were too great, and because he did not reside on any of the six parcels. Nevertheless, FHA eventually permitted respondent to assume the Turner, Wilson, and Wakefield mortgages. Respondents' Exhibit Nos. 2, 3, and 4. Respondent's proposed recommended order has been considered in preparation of the foregoing findings of fact, and respondent's proposed findings of fact have been adopted, in substance.

Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner dismiss the administrative complaint filed against respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of June, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of June, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Russell A. Cole, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 155 Bonifay, Florida 32425 Carlos B. Stafford Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Samuel R. Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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MARIKA TOLZ vs FLORIDA HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION, 19-000165 (2019)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jan. 09, 2019 Number: 19-000165 Latest Update: Jun. 24, 2019

The Issue Whether Petitioner was properly denied mortgage assistance through Florida Housing Finance Corporation's ("Florida Housing") Hardest-Hit Fund Elderly Mortgage Assistance ("ELMORE") program based on a conviction for fraud allegedly in connection with a real estate transaction.

Findings Of Fact The Parties Florida Housing is a public corporation created pursuant to section 420.504, Florida Statutes, to promote the public welfare by administering the governmental function of financing or refinancing housing. For purposes of this proceeding, Florida Housing is an agency of the State of Florida. Florida Housing is also considered the state's housing finance agency which means Florida Housing, at times, conducts business as if it were a financial institution. Florida Housing administers the Hardest-Hit Fund, using funds appropriated by the United States Congress through the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act to help stabilize housing markets and prevent foreclosures. The Hardest-Hit Fund comes directly to Florida Housing from the United States Treasury through a Housing Finance Agency ("HFA") Participation Agreement. The ELMORE program is one of the programs created under the umbrella of the Hardest-Hit Fund. The ELMORE program is designed to assist senior homeowners in Florida who are facing foreclosure due to the inability to pay property charges such as property taxes, homeowners insurance, and homeowners or condo association dues after the homeowner was paid all of the equity under a reverse mortgage. The HFA agreement is a summary guideline for the ELMORE program and its general requirements. The stated goal of the program is to help senior homeowners remain in their homes. The Summary Guidelines include certain borrower eligibility criteria, property/loan eligibility criteria, and program exclusions, among other guidelines. The program exclusions reference the "Dodd-Frank exclusion for having been convicted of a mortgage-related felony in the past ten years." The Dodd-Frank Act exclusion for criminal applicants is codified 12 U.S.C. § 5220b, and states in part: (d) Prevention of qualification for criminal applicants (1) In general No person shall be eligible to begin receiving assistance from the Making Home Affordable Program authorized under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (12 U.S.C. 5201 et seq.), or any other mortgage assistance program authorized or funded by that Act, on or after 60 days after July 21, 2010, if such person, in connection with a mortgage or real estate transaction, has been convicted, within the last 10 years, of any one of the following: Felony larceny, theft, fraud, or forgery. Money laundering. Tax evasion. On or about February 27, 2017, Betty Baldwin, Power of Attorney for Tolz, submitted an application for mortgage assistance through Florida Housing's Hardest-Hit Fund for ELMORE benefits. On or about May 11, 2017, the application was denied. On or about November 8, 2018, Tolz submitted another application for mortgage assistance from the ELMORE program. On December 5, 2018, Florida Housing's Director of Homeownership Programs, David Westcott, issued a letter with an ineligibility determination to Tolz, which included a Notice of Rights.1/ Mr. Westcott is ultimately responsible for the final eligibility determinations on Hardest-Hit Fund mortgage assistance applications. The Denial of ELMORE Program Benefits Mr. Westcott denied Tolz's application for ELMORE program funds because she had, what Mr. Westcott determined to be, a disqualifying felony conviction in connection with a real estate transaction in violation of the Dodd-Frank Act provision. Mr. Westcott testified that pursuant to the HFA agreement with the United States Treasury, Florida Housing is prohibited from using ELMORE funds to assist applicants that have a disqualifying Dodd-Frank Act conviction. During the period of 2003 through 2010, Tolz used her position as a fiduciary in the role of bankruptcy trustee, receiver, and personal representative to misappropriate millions of dollars from bankruptcy estates, receiverships, and other matters, by writing or causing the writing of unauthorized checks from a variety of fiduciary accounts which contained funds she was appointed to safeguard. Tolz then used the misappropriated money for her own benefit and to conceal her previous misappropriations by restoring the balances of other fiduciary accounts from which she had previously taken funds in a Ponzi scheme framework. To conceal this theft, Tolz falsified documents and used a fictitious bank account. On or about December 12, 2011, Tolz was convicted in Broward County Circuit Court of grand theft in the first degree. Tolz was convicted on or about July 27, 2011, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida of conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349. To secure a plea deal and in order to bolster her claim that her sentence should be reduced from the federal guidelines, prior to sentencing, Tolz surrendered five real estate properties, which she owned, to the United States government. The value of these properties was then used to offset and lessen Tolz's restitution obligation to her victims. Tolz understood that these properties would not be accepted to satisfy her restitution obligation unless they were purchased, mortgaged, or improved with the assets of her victims. In the federal criminal case, Tolz executed a Factual Basis Supporting Change of Plea ("Factual Basis") on or about April 15, 2011. Tolz agreed not to contest the information in the Factual Basis. Further, Tolz agreed that it provided a sufficient factual basis for her plea of guilty in the case, and had the case proceeded to trial, that the United States would have proven the facts beyond a reasonable doubt. Paragraph 11 of the Factual basis states: MARIKA TOLZ, directly or indirectly, utilized funds obtained through the fraudulent scheme to purchase, maintain and improve real properties, including, but not limited to the following real properties: 2344 North Federal Highway, Hollywood, Florida; 1804 Sherman Street, Hollywood, Florida; 704 SE 3rd Avenue, Hallandale, Florida; 815 SW 30th Street, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida; and 3031 North Ocean Blvd, Apartment 403, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33308. In making the ineligibility determination on Tolz's application for ELMORE program funds, Mr. Westcott determined that Tolz's conviction was in connection with a real estate transaction because Tolz agreed in the Factual Basis that she used funds obtained through the fraud to "purchase, maintain and improve real properties." Florida Housing determined that Tolz's conviction disqualified her from receiving mortgage assistance from the ELMORE program because: As part of the Hardest-Hit Fund, the ELMORE program funds are authorized by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008; Tolz was convicted of the enumerated offense of a "fraud;" The conviction occurred on or about July 21, 2011, which is within the last ten years; and The conviction was in connection with a real estate transaction because Tolz used funds obtained through the fraud to "purchase, maintain and improve real properties." "In Connection With" A Mortgage or Real Estate Transaction Tolz contends that her crimes were not "in connection with a mortgage or real estate transaction." At both her sentencing hearing in federal court and at the final hearing in this proceeding, Tolz stated that she owned these surrendered properties for 30 or 40 years. Tolz now argues that because she owned these properties well before the fraud of which she was convicted occurred, no mortgage or real estate transaction was involved in the crime and, therefore, she should not be disqualified from ELMORE benefits. Tolz now claims she surrendered these properties to facilitate the forfeiture on the advice of counsel, that she was heavily medicated at the time of sentencing, and that the prosecutor and the court knew that these properties were not associated with her underlying crimes. Tolz admitted at final hearing that she surrendered these properties to do an end-run around the system to reduce the more than two million dollars she owed in restitution. However, in that same sentencing hearing, the prosecutor representing the United States stated "I'll also indicate, although it's clear from the record, that notwithstanding the picture that she's somehow a pauper, or was a pauper, the fact of the matter is the forfeiture properties indicated in the forfeiture which she agreed to were her properties, at least partially paid for by the offense."2/ An impartial reading of the sentencing transcript demonstrates that during sentencing the United States believed that the properties involved in the criminal forfeiture were, in part, paid for by the crime for which Petitioner was convicted. The undersigned finds the facts, as offered by Tolz in her 2011 "Factual Basis" offered in support of a sentence reduction and reduction of her restitution obligation, to be more credible than her denial at final hearing that these properties were not purchased, improved, or maintained with the funds from her crimes.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Housing enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Amended Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of April, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MARY LI CREASY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 2019.

USC (2) 12 U.S.C 5220b18 U.S.C 1349 Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57120.68420.504 Florida Administrative Code (1) 67-60.009 DOAH Case (1) 19-0165
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. O. B. LINKOUS AND O. B. LINKOUS REALTY, INC., 80-002235 (1980)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 80-002235 Latest Update: Dec. 17, 1982

Findings Of Fact In the fall of 1973, Mr. and Mrs. Delmar D. Carter purchased the Buccaneer Motel and Woodside Apartments [the motel] from C.E.K., Inc., whom respondents represented in the sale. Respondents agreed to accept less from C.E.K., Inc., as their commission on the sale, that they might have otherwise, because the Carters agreed to give respondents the exclusive right to resell the motel for a period of five years. Two years after they purchased the motel, the Carters asked O.B. Linkous to try to sell the motel, but the Carters sell held the motel when the resale agreement expired in late 1978. One of the obligations assumed by the Carters in exchange for the motel was secured by a mortgage that C.E.K., Inc., had executed in favor of O.B. Linkous Realty, Inc., on December 14, 1972. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. This assumed obligation required the Carters to make certain monthly payments to the corporate respondent including a payment of $862.19 on January 1, 1979. Under the mortgage agreement, the entire principal (originally $88,247.93) would become due if a "default continue for a space of 30 days." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. On January 25, 1979, Mr. Carter delivered to Mr. Linkous a check in the amount of $862.19, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, as payment of the amount due on January 1, 1979. When he handed the check to respondent Linkous, Mr. Carter told him that the funds in the account on which the check was drawn were insufficient for the drawee to pay the check, but that he would deposit sufficient funds on the following day. Respondent Linkous answered that he saw no problem since he intended to deposit the check in his own account in another bank and assumed it would be at least a day before the check was presented to the drawee. On the following day, Mr. Carter deposited $865.96 in the account on which the check was drawn. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. On January 31, 1979, the balance in the account was $1,000.32. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. Instead of depositing the check, respondent Linkous took the check, on the same day he received it, to the Flagship First National Bank of Ormond Beach, on which it was drawn, and persuaded a teller there to stamp it so as to indicate that it had been dishonored because sufficient funds were not on deposit. On February 7, 1979, a mortgage foreclosure complaint was filed against the Carters and C.E.K., Inc., (as holder of a junior mortgage), in which respondents' attorney alleged that the Carters had "defaulted under the note and mortgage by failing to pay the payment due January 1, 1979, and all subsequent payments." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. The Carters retained counsel who filed an answer and counterclaim in which it was alleged, inter alia, that Linkous "deliberately with premeditated design, deceived and tricked [the Carters]." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. After these pleadings had been filed, the Carters agreed to respondents' counsel's suggestion that they grant the corporate respondent the exclusive right to sell the motel for another five-year period in exchange for an end to the litigation, and executed an agreement to that effect. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6. The parties stipulated that both respondents hold real estate licenses issued by petitioner.

Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner suspend respondents' licenses for a period of five years. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of June, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of June, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: S. Ralph Fetner, Jr., Esquire 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Howard Hadley, Esquire 827 Deltona Boulevard Deltona, Florida 32725

Florida Laws (1) 475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. CARLEEN CHALK LUND, 76-001453 (1976)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 76-001453 Latest Update: Jan. 28, 1977

The Issue Whether Carleen Chalk Lund, an active broker in Lund Realty, Inc. , a licensed corporate broker, failed to account or deliver to Daisy and Kenneth Parnell money in the form of a deposit which had come into her hands and which was not her property or which she was not in law or equity entitled to retain, under the circumstances, and at the time which was agreed upon or which was required by law or, in the absence of an agreed upon time, upon demand of the Parnells, who were entitled to such an accounting or delivery.

Findings Of Fact Carleen Chalk Lund and Norman Wayne Lund are registered real estate brokers holding current registration from the Florida Real Estate Commission and are active brokers in Lund Realty, Inc., a corporate broker registered with the Florida Real Estate Commission. On or about January 4, 1975, Daisy and Kenneth Parnell, the buyers, signed an offer to purchase the following real property from David and Wilma Hammer: East 184.5 ft. of NW 1/4 of SW 1/4 of Sec 6, Twp. 26 S, Range 29 E, N Osceola County. Said offer was accepted by the sellers. Subsequently, the buyers sent a telegraphic money order in the amount of $2,200 to Lund Realty, Inc. Therefore said money was deposited in the escrow account of Lund Realty, Inc. $2,000 as deposit on the Hammer's property and $200 to be used for closing costs. The following provisions of the Contract for Purchase between the buyers and the sellers are specifically noted and referenced: In accordance with provisions of paragraph 4, the contract was to be closed and the deed delivered on or before January 31, 1975. In accordance with the provisions of paragraph 6, the seller was to convey title to the aforesaid property to the buyer by agreement for deed. In accordance with the provisions of paragraph 7, the costs, if any, of preparation of closing documents and closing fee shall be borne equally by the seller and buyer. In accordance with the provisions of paragraph 9, all closing costs were to be divided equally between the buyer and seller including title insurance. In accordance with paragraph G of said standards, if the buyer failed to perform any of the covenants of the contract within the time specified, the deposit paid by the buyer might be retained by or for the account of the seller as consideration for the execution of the contract and in full settlement of any claims for camages and all parties would be relieved of all obligations under the contract and each party would execute a separate release of the other at that time. In accordance with the provisions of paragraph P of the standards, in the event that the buyer failed to perform and the aforesaid deposit was retained, the amount of the deposit was to have been divided equally between the realtor and the seller provided that the amount to be retained and received by the realtor would not exceed the full amount of the commission and that any excess would be paid to the seller. In accordance with the provisions of the paragraph "Commission to Realtor", the seller acknowledged the employment of Lund Realty, Inc. and agreed to pay Lund Realty a commission in accordance with the commission agreement. On January 25, 1975, copies of the articles of agreement, closing statement, and title insurance cost disclosure were sent by Chelsea Title and Guaranty Company to Mrs. Daisy Parnell at 88 North Pasack Road, Spring Valley, New York, 10977. The letter accompanying the aforementioned documents indicated that the sellers had executed the closing papers on that date. Said letter further indicated that as soon as the papers were signed by the recipient, that Dee A Burttram, manager of Chelsea Title and Guaranty Company, would record the articles of agreement and insure title to property. These papers were net signed and returned to Chelsea Title, and on February 14, 1975 a subsequent letter was addressed from Dee A. Burttram to airs. Daisy Parnell at the aforestated address indicating that Chelsea Title had not received the documents forwarded to Mrs. Parnell and offering further information if they had not been completed. See Composite Exhibit 10. Between January 25 and February 28, 1975 efforts were made by Lund Realty, Inc. to contact airs. Daisy Parnell without success. On February 28, 1975 it was determined that Frank Townsend, Attorney at Law practicing in Kissimmee, had been engaged by Sidney Schwartz, Attorney at Law practicing in New York, to review the contract entered into by Mrs. Daisy Parnell. According to his testimony, Frank Townsend recommended to Schwartz that Mrs. Parnell not go through with the contract until certain discrepancies in the contract were clarified. The discrepancies involved were the conflict between the provision of paragraph 2 stating that $8,000 purchase money note and mortgage to the seller while paragraph 6 indicated that the seller would convey title by an agreement for deed; the lack of a scribner's statement note on the papers to be filed with the Court; and a discrepancy between the amount of monthly payment as stated in the Contract for Sale and Purchase and the Agreement for Deed. However, by his letter of March 5, 1975 to Mrs. Daisy Parnell, Townsend refers only to problems involving the use of the Agreement for Deed which he concluded was not a problem if the sellers insisted on that form of conveyance, and the fact that the Agreement for Deed is unacceptable because it is unrecordable (an apparent reference to the fact that a scribner's notation was not made on the Agreement for Deed). By his letter of April 3, 1975 to Mr. Sidney Schwartz, Mr. Townsend indicates that he had completed all back ground work on the transaction and had advised Mr. Murray W. Over street, attorney for Mr. and Mrs. Hammer three weeks prior that he (Townsend) was ready to provide a note and mortgage in exchange for a Warranty Deed and had requested that Overstreet arrange a closing date. Mr. Townsend closes indicating that he had again contacted Mr. Overstreet reminding him that the Parnells wished to close. Several things are apparent from Townsend's letters of March 5 and April 3, 1975. It is apparent from the letter to Mrs. Parnell from Townsend dated March 5, 1975 that substantial concern existed on the part of Schwartz that the use of an Agreement for Deed in the transaction would provide to Mrs. Parnell less protection than she would have in a situation in which a note and mortgage was used. However, as stated above, Townsend pointed out that the use of an Agreement for Deed under the Florida Law would afford Mrs. Parnell the same protection as a mortgage. It is also clear from the April 3 letter that all problems related to the Parnell-Hammer transaction had been resolved, that they were ready to close but insisted upon a note and mortgage in exchange for a warranty deed, and their position had bean communicated to counsel for the Hammers. The demand for the use of a note and mortgage by the Parnells is contrary to the provisions of the Contract for Sale and Purchase between these parties entered into on January 4, 1975 and as of April 3, 1975 was the only reason for the Parnell's refusing to close. On April 3, 1975, Mr. Murray Overstreet attorney for Mr. and Mrs. Hammer, advised Frank N. Townsend, attorney for Mrs. Parnell, that the Hammers considered their Contract for Sale and Purchase with Mrs. Parnell to be null and void because the transaction was to be closed on or before January 31, 1975 and that as of April 3, 1975 the matter had not been completed. Mr. Overstreet further advised that his clients made no claim on the deposit made to Lund Realty and that said deposit might be returned to the buyers. A copy of this letter was sent to Lund Realty, Inc. Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph G of the Contract for Sale and Purchase referenced above, upon default of the buyer, the deposit paid by the buyer could be retained by or for the account of the sellers as consideration for the execution of the contract and in full settlement of any claims for damage. Under the provisions of paragraph P of said contract, said deposit would be divided equally between the realtor and seller; provided, however, that the amount retained or received by the realtor was not to exceed the full amount of the commission, in this instance $600. On April 4, 1975 in response to the copy of the letter from Overstreet to Townsend in which the Hammers declared the Contract for Purchase and Sale null and void, Lund Realty, Inc. wrote Frank Townsend advising him that the expenses for sales commission, cancellation fee, and termite inspection should be considered before any escrow funds were disbursed and requesting that Lund Realty be advised as to how Mrs. Parnell would like to handle the charges. Clearly, Lund Realty considered the Parnells to be in default and asserted a claim for commission. No evidence was received regarding any response from Townsend to the letter of Lund Realty, Inc. dated April 4, 1975. On May 14, 1975 Lund Realty wrote Mrs. Daisy Parnell sending her a check in the amount of $1,466, the amount of her deposit less expenses incurred by her for sales commission, cancellation fee, termite inspection, and insurance. The amounts of each of the expenses and copies of statements were enclosed. Although the check in question was retained by Mrs. Parnell, Lund Realty received a letter from Sidney Schwartz dated May 23, 1975 which states in pertinent part as follows: "I am led to believe that the seller in the proposed transaction did not perfect title and waived and/or released its interest in the contract. If this be so, the entire down pay ment of Mrs. Parnell must be returned to her imme- diately. Please inquire into this matter. You no doubt are aware that Mrs. Parnell has retained Florida counsel, namely, Frank N. Townsend, Esquire, Post Office Box 847, Kissimmee, Florida. This is further to advise that in the event there has been a wrongful retention of any of Mrs. Parnell's funds, complaints shall be lodged with all appropriate authorities including licen- sing authorities in the State of Florida." The next contact between the parties was a letter to Lund Realty from Frank Townsend dated June 19, 1975. In that letter, Mr. Townsend stated as follows: "This confirms our request in accordance with Mr. Overstreet's letter wherein no demand is made for any funds on behalf of the Hammers, the return of all funds deposited with you by the Parnells is specifically requested." A second follow-up letter was addressed to Lund Realty on July 14,1975 requesting a response to the aforementioned letter of June 19, 1975. It is clear that the basis for demand of return of the deposit receipt in its entirety was based on the statements in Overstreet's letter to Townsend dated April 3, 1975, that the Hammers made no claim to the deposit to Lund Realty, Inc. This position of the Hammers was subsequently clarified by Mr. Hammer in his letter of August 12 (Exhibit 7) and by Mr. Overstreet, who at the hearing, testified that the Hammers never intended to waive the amount of the commission and the cost. Lund Realty was entitled to its commission and the Hammers would have had a cause of action against the Parnells under the contract for the entire amount of the deposit. However, the existence of a dispute over claims to all or portions of the escrow funds developed slowly, and was based on whether the Hammers waived their rights to all or any portion of the escrow funds. In September 1975 Lund Realty requested an advisory opinion of the Florida Real Estate Commission regarding its duties. The conclusion of that advisory opinion was that disbursement should be made to the Parnells, and that the claims that Lund, Chelsea Title and any other individuals should be filed in a court of competent jurisdiction. The advisory opinion was silent, however, on Hammer's subsequent claim for the commission and cost from the deposit. As of the date of hearing, the $2,200 was on deposit in the escrow account of Lund Realty, Inc.

Recommendation The position and actions of the various individuals should also be considered in this case in arriving at a penalty because none of the parties have completely "clean hands." The Parnells precipitated the breach by insistence on a note and mortgage; the Hammers have made no attempt to clarify the situation by paying the commission and cost; and the attorneys kept Lund Realty completely in the dark about what was transpiring. The Lunds are the only ones involved in the transaction who have tried to carry out their obligation. Further, they also are the only ones who stand to lose financially without seeking judicial relief. While they have held the money, it has remained in escrow since the dispute arose. Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and other factors bearing on the case, the Hearing Officer would recommend that the Florida Real Estate Commission place Carleen Chalk Lund on probation for one year. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of January 1977 in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Manuel E. Oliver, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 Carleen Chalk Lund 612 West Vine Street Kissimmee, Florida 32741

Florida Laws (1) 475.25
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs. RICHARD KONDIAN, 85-002333 (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-002333 Latest Update: Dec. 16, 1985

Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Richard Kondian, was a licensed real estate salesman having been issued license number 0302230 by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate. The license is currently in an inactive status. His present address is 300 South Pine Island Road, Plantation, Florida. In July, 1984, James E. and Janis Shand, who lived at 4940 S. W. 16th Street, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, suffered extensive fire damage to their residence. Respondent approached the Shands, introduced himself as Dick Como, and offered to repair their home to its original condition. He also represented himself to be a contractor and that he was a principal in Apex Roofing, a local contracting firm. The Shands agreed to permit Kondian (Como) to perform the work, and they executed a contract prepared by Kondian on an "Apepco Corp." letterhead which authorized the work. A copy of the contract has been received in evidence as petitioner's exhibit 2. The document is a photostatic copy of the original, and is only partially legible. It does reflect July 24, 1984 as being the date of execution, and describes the repairs to be made as follows: To be effected to return Property to Pre- Fire Condition as per policy. (No extra charge to Home.) It also authorizes Allstate Insurance Company to pay for the repairs in accordance with the terms of the Shands' insurance policy. The contract was accepted by "D. Como." Como and Kondian were identified by the Shands as being one and the same. The owner of Apex Roofing and Insurance Repair Corporation was Michael Derhagopian, a licensed roofing contractor in Dania, Florida. Respondent told Derhagopian that he had procured a repair job on the Shands' residence and that he desired Apex to do the roofing portion of the work, and that a general contractor would perform the remainder of the project. He also advised Derhagopian that he needed to use Apex Roofing as the licensee on the project. Derhagopian agreed to do the work and pulled a permit for the roofing work. He also opened a checking account in which the insurance proceeds from Allstate were to be deposited. Both he and respondent had authorization to sign checks drawn on that account. On September 24, 1984, Allstate Enterprises Mortgage Corporation issued a check payable to Apex Roofing and Insurance and J. E. Shand in the amount of $18,150.66. The check was issued for the purpose of enclosing the house, cleaning it, and installing a new roof, trusses and windows. The check was endorsed by both the Shands and Richard Kondian who 'indicated on the endorsement that he was president of Apex. The check was then deposited into the Derhagopian Kondian joint account. Work began on the Shands' residence in September, 1984. Derhagopian completed a small flat deck in the rear of the house, and the general contractor began stripping the inside of the house and cleaning the premises. When neither was paid by Kondian they ceased work on the project. At that time Derhagopian learned that Kondian had spent the entire $18,150.66 within a week. According to Derhagopian, Kondian spent around $5,000.00 on a "nursing home" transaction, $500.00 for legal expenses, and an undisclosed amount for mortgage payments on his home. It is not known how the remainder of the funds were spent except that they were not used for their intended purpose of repairing the Shands' home. Despite demands for repayment of their monies, Kondian has never repaid the Shands. The Shands eventually had their home repaired, but still have liens on it to this date. They have pending a civil action against Kondian to recover the insurance proceeds.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of violating Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and that his license number 0302230 be REVOKED. DONE and ORDERED this 16th day of December, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer ~ Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32301 (904 ) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16 day of December, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Richard Kondian 300 South Pine Island Road Plantation, FL 33324 Arthur R. Shell, Jr., Esq. P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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