The Issue The ultimate issue to be determined in this matter is whether the application filed by Boulevard Bank to establish a branch at Islamorada, Florida, should be approved or denied. The Applicant contends that all of the requirements set out at Section 658.26, Florida Statutes, and Rule 3C-13, Florida Administrative Code, have been met, and that the application should be approved. The Protestant contends that the Applicant has failed to demonstrate that the public convenience and necessity would be served by the proposed branch.
Findings Of Fact The Applicant, Boulevard Bank, is a full-service, commercial banking institution licensed by the Florida Department of Banking and Finance. Its principal offices are located in Key West, Monroe County, Florida. Boulevard Bank has filed an application with the Department of Banking and Finance to establish a branch banking facility at Islamorada, Monroe County, Florida. Boulevard Bank has acquired property for the facility. The property is located on "Old State Road" and is bounded on the north by Matecumbie Street and on the south by Jerome Street. Boulevard Bank has obtained zoning variances that would allow it to construct a branch banking facility on the property. The primary service area of the proposed branch banking facility would be from Mile Marker 87, northeast of the proposed facility, to Channel 5, southwest of the facility. This area is approximately 15 miles long. In keeping with the geography of the Florida Keys, the service area is quite narrow, approximately 0.3 miles at the widest. The service area is characterized by mixed residential and commercial uses. There are approximately 3,000 full-time residents within the service area. There are many people who live in the area on a part-time basis. During the winter months, the population increases dramatically. There are more than 90 stable businesses located within the service area. There are currently two banking institutions located within the service area of the proposed Boulevard Bank branch. The main office of The Islamorada Bank and a branch of the First Federal Savings and Loan Association of the Florida Keys are located within close proximity to the location of the proposed branch. The Islamorada Bank is the only full-service, commercial banking institution in the service area. The public convenience and necessity would be served by the opening of an additional full-service banking facility within the service area in that the public would be the beneficiary of the favorable impacts of competition. The Applicant proposes to provide a full range of banking services at the proposed branch. Applicant proposes to stay open at hours and on days that The Islamorada Bank remains closed. Competition can have a favorable impact upon interest that is paid to the bank's depositors and interest rates that are charged by the bank on loans. There is no evidence from which it could be concluded that the opening of the proposed branch would in any way damage the fiscal integrity of banking facilities already located within the service area. While the public convenience and necessity would be served by the increased number of facilities and by competition, it does not appear that there has been a dramatic increase in the need for banking services within the service area in recent years. The main office of The Islamorada Bank has not experienced an increase in deposits since 1979. It does not appear that existing banking facilities within the service area are providing inadequate service to residential and business customers. The Applicant is proposing to invest $470,000 in fixed assets, including the cost of land, building, and furniture and equipment to support the proposed branch. The building, which has not yet been constructed, would have dimensions of approximately 30 by 50 feet. The facility would include drive-in banking windows and an automatic teller machine. The Applicant has sufficient capital accounts to support the proposed branch. The Applicant's percentage of capital to total assets exceeds 7.5 percent. The ratio was 7.8 percent on December 31, 1981, and 8.6 percent on June 30, 1982. The operation of the proposed branch would pose no threat to depositors, creditors, or shareholders of the Applicant. Even if the branch operated without a single depositor, the losses to Applicant would not be such as to pose a risk to the integrity of the Applicant, nor to substantially reduce the stockholders' dividends. It is extremely unlikely that the branch would operate without any depositors, and it appears that there is a favorable prospect that the branch would be profitable. The Applicant has sufficient earnings and prospects for earnings to support the expenses of the proposed branch. The Applicant's net profits to assets ratio exceeded 0.5 percent during the past calendar year. For 1981, the Applicant's net profit to total assets ratio was 2.5 percent prior to the payment of federal income taxes, and 1.5 percent after taxes were paid. The Applicant's loans to deposits ratio was 63 percent on December 31, 1981. The Applicant appears to have sufficient management depth to operate the proposed branch without affecting its present services. Applicant proposes to assign Rudy D. Aud as chief operations officer. Mr. Aud is a vice president of the Applicant. He assisted in the establishment of the Applicant's Big Pine Key branch and has operated that facility. The name of the proposed branch would be "Islamorada Branch of Boulevard Bank, Islamorada, Florida." The name would reasonably identify the facility as a branch of the Applicant. The proposed name would not confuse the public either as to the nature of the facility or in relation to other banking facilities. The files of the Department of Banking and Finance, including the Department's confidential file, establish that the Applicant has operated in substantial compliance with applicable laws governing its operations. ENTERED this 17th day of December, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. G. STEVEN PFEIFFER Assistant Director Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of December, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert T. Feldman, Esquire 417 Eaton Street Key West, Florida 33040 Gustave W. Larson, Esquire 9999 Northeast Second Avenue Suite 307, Shoreview Bldg. Miami Shores, Florida 33138 Elsa Lopez Whitehurst, Esquire Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 The Honorable Gerald A. Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE DIVISION OF BANKING IN RE: BOULEVARD BANK--Application for authority to establish a branch CASE NO. 82-2623 at Mile Marker 81.4, U.S. Highway 1, Islamorada, Monroe County, Florida. / FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND FINAL ORDER Pursuant to notice, a formal administrative hearing was conducted in this matter on November 5, 1982, before G. Steven Pfeiffer, with the Division of Administrative Hearings, in Islamorada, Monroe County, Florida. The purpose of the hearing was to receive evidence concerning the application of Boulevard Bank for authority to open a branch at mile marker 81.4, U.S. Highway 1, Islamorada, Florida. At the hearing, the following appearances were entered: Robert T. Felman, Key West, appeared on behalf of the Applicant, Boulevard Bank; Gustave Larson, Miami Shores, Florida, appeared on behalf of the Protestant, the Islamorada Bank; Elsa Lopez Whitehurst, Tallahassee, Florida, appeared on behalf of the Florida Department of Banking and Finance. No exceptions were filed in this case. Having fully considered the facts and information contained in the record relating to the application of Boulevard Bank for authority to open a branch office at mile marker 81.4, U.S. Highway 1, Islamorada, Monroe County, Florida, The Comptroller of the State of Florida, as Head of the Department of Banking and Finance, hereby renders the following FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND FINAL ORDER in the above-styled cause.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Tarpon Financial Corporation is a federal banking corporation engaged in general banking services in the State of Florida, with its principal place of business in Tarpon Springs, Florida. Petitioners are not subsidiaries of, or associated with, either First National Bank of Florida, Inc., or First Florida Banks, Inc. On or about June 16, 1987, Petitioners submitted to and requested approval from Respondent of the name "First National Bank" as a service mark. Respondent denied registration of this service mark on June 29, 1987 by letter stating, "(W)e have a mark registered under the same or similar name and class." On August 6, 1987, Petitioners requested reconsideration citing the Rand McNally Banker's Directory, a nationally issued banking directory, to support its position that the same or similar service mark it seeks to register is not already in use in the State of Florida. The Respondent again denied the request on August 14, 1987 by letter stating, "Our records indicate 'First National Bank of Florida' is an active Florida corporation. We have no record of any name change." Petitioners sought reconsideration again on August 27, 1987, and requested that the matter be reviewed by Respondent's trademark committee. After review by that committee, Petitioners' application was denied for a third time on September 8, 1987. The service mark, "First National Bank of Florida," was registered with Respondent on June 16, 1982, and given mark number 927091. The owner of this mark is First National Bank of Florida, Inc., Tampa, Florida, and annual reports have been filed with Respondent in June of each year, including June 8, 1988, thereby indicating the mark has not been abandoned. The Respondent's records indicate that "First National Bank of Florida" is an actively registered service mark. The fact that it does not appear in the Rand McNally Banker's Directory does not establish that it is not an active mark registered with Respondent. The period of registration for service marks is ten years, and therefore the registration of "First National Bank of Florida" expires June 16, 1992, subject to renewal. The Respondent cannot register marks unless they are distinguishable from service marks already registered. Competent substantial evidence was not presented to support Petitioner's claim that "First National Bank," the mark it seeks to register, is distinguishable from "First National Bank of Florida," which is already registered. The absence of the phrase "of Florida" from the mark Petitioner seeks to register does not distinguish it from the mark already registered
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that Respondent enter a Final Order denying Petitioners' application to register the service mark, "First National Bank." DONE and ENTERED this 1st day of August, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of August, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-1250 Rulings on Petitioners' Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Finding of Fact 3, but otherwise Rejected in Finding of Fact 5 and as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 3-4. Rejected in Finding of Fact 7 and Rejected as unsupported in the record. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected in Finding of Fact 7. Rejected as irrelevant and unsupported in the record. Rejected as unsupported in the record. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. 6-7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. 8-9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. 10. Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Donald R. Hall, Esquire Suite 402, Corporate Square 2900 U.S. Highway 19, North Clearwater, Florida 34621 Henri C. Cawthon, Esquire Department of State The Capitol, Room LL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law recited above, it is RECOMMENDED that the specific statutory requirements for the granting of an application for a general banking corporation have been met and that it would, therefore, be within the lawful discretion of the Department of Banking and Finance to grant the application of Petitioner and it is further RECOMMENDED that no facts have been established to show that the department should not so exercise its discretion. In light of the matters discussed in paragraph 18, above, it would not be unreasonable to condition the granting of authority to establish a general banking corporation upon Petitioner's provision for a capitalization of $1,000,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of March 1977 in Tallahassee, Florida. CHRIS H. BENTLEY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building Room 430, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: John E. Mathews, Jr., Esquire 1500 American Heritage Life Building Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Attorney for Petitioner Ryland T. Rigsby, Esquire Office of the Comptroller Legal Annex Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Attorney for Respondent
Findings Of Fact The Applicant and the Department submitted Proposed Findings of Fact pursuant to Rule 3C-9.11, Florida Administrative Code. The Applicant's Proposed Findings are accepted except where they might specifically conflict with the Findings of the Hearing Officer's Report or where they may constitute conclusions of law.
The Issue The purpose of the mandatory public hearing is to afford the public an opportunity to comment on the application from a foreign national for authority to organize Union Credit Bank, a proposed new bank to be located in Miami, Dade County, Florida.
Findings Of Fact On October 18, 1999, the Department received an application (Application) from a foreign national to organize a new bank, Union Credit. The proposed location of Union Credit was Miami, Dade County, Florida. The Department published a notice of receipt of the Application in the October 29, 1999, publication of the Florida Administrative Weekly. The Department has satisfied the notice requirements of Subsection 120.80(3)(a)1.a., Florida Statutes, and Rule 3C-105.103, Florida Administrative Code. By letter dated November 8, 1999, the Department made a timely request for additional information, including additional information from Union Credit's proposed officers and directors (Applicants). The Department did not receive all of the additional information that it had requested from the Applicants until March 1, 2000. On April 3, 2000, the Applicants, as required by federal law, filed a separate application with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"). Identified on the Application are three individuals associated with Union Credit, Oddie Rishmague (O. Rishmague) , Miguel Rishmague (M. Rishmague), and Jorge Luis del Rosal, who are foreign nationals. Mr. O. Rishmague is a proposed director and the proposed sole owner. Mr. M. Rishmague is a proposed director, the proposed chairman of the board of directors, and a proposed officer. Mr. del Rosal is a proposed director. All other proposed officers and directors identified on the Application are citizens of the United States. The other proposed officers and directors are: John H. Blake, Alexander J. Evans, Robert Tamayo, Milton H. Lehr, and Grace V. McGuire. Mr. O. Rishmague, a proposed director and the proposed sole owner of Union Credit has more than 12 years of international banking experience. From 1988 to 1995, he served as Vice-Chairman of Banco Osorno. During his tenure, Banco Osorno grew from a small bank to the second largest bank in Chile. For the past five years, Mr. O. Rishmague has been a member of the board of directors of Corpbanca. In addition to his banking experience, Mr. O. Rishmague served as a director of Provida, a private company that manages $12 billion dollars of pension fund assets. Mr. Tamayo is the proposed president and chief executive officer for Union Credit. He has over 38 years of banking experience in the areas of international and domestic banking. From 1984 to July of 1993, Mr. Tamayo served as a Senior Vice President for Espirito Santos Bank of Florida, a state chartered domestic bank. From July of 1993 to 1999, he served as a Senior Vice President and General Manager of Banco Boliviano Americano’s Miami agency office. Mr. Lehr, a proposed director, has substantial banking experience. From 1976 to 1999 he served as a member of the board of directors of Republic National Bank of Miami. Mr. Blake, a proposed director, has over 13 years of banking experience. From 1986 to 1999 Mr. Blake served as a member of the board of directors of Republic National Bank of Miami. Mr. M. Rishmague, the proposed chairman of the board of directors, served two years as a member of the board of directors of Corpbanca. Ms. McGuire, a proposed director, is a self-employed bank consultant who has worked with numerous domestic and international banks on a variety of complex banking issues. Mr. del Rosal is a retired corporate executive. Mr. Evans is a certified public accountant. No evidence was presented and there is nothing in the record to indicate that the presently identified proposed officers do not have sufficient financial institution experience, ability, standing, and reputation to indicate reasonable promise of successful operation. No evidence was presented and there is nothing in the record to indicate that the proposed directors do not have sufficient business experience, ability, standing, and reputation to indicate reasonable promise of successful operation. None of the proposed officers or directors have been convicted of, or pled guilty or nolo contendere to, any violation of Section 655.50, Florida Statutes, relating to the Florida Control of Money Laundering in Financial Institutions Act; Chapter 896, Florida Statutes, relating to offenses related to financial institutions; or any similar state or federal law. Mr. Blake and Mr. Lehr, proposed directors who are not proposed officers, have had at least one year of direct experience as a director of a financial institution within three years of the date of the Application. Mr. Tamayo, the proposed president and chief executive officer, has had at least one year of direct experience as an executive officer of a financial institution within the last three years. The Applicants seek to organize Union Credit to provide a variety of competitive deposit products and other related banking services, including residential and commercial lending, within the Miami area. Union Credit’s target customers include individual consumers, professionals, and both small and large businesses. The initial gross capital for Union Credit will be $10,000,000.00, and will be classified as follows: $5,000,000.00 of paid-in capital; $4,750,000.00 of paid-in surplus; and $250,000.00 designated as undivided profits. Union Credit is authorized to issue, at opening, 1,000,000 shares of common stock at $10.00 per share. The initial capitalization of Union Credit is adequate in relation to its proposed business activities. However, should Union Credit’s capital fall below $10,000,000.00 within its first three years of operation, Mr. O. Rishmague will immediately contribute, from his own personal assets, the funds necessary to maintain Union Credit’s capital at the level of $10,000,000.00, thus ensuring that Union Credit’s gross capital remains, at a minimum, at $10,000,000.00. Thereafter, Mr. O. Rishmague has committed to infuse additional capital, as may be appropriate, as Union Credit grows in asset size. The local conditions in Miami are favorable to Union Credit’s business plan. Union Credit’s financial plan also appears reasonable and attainable. The Department and Applicants recognize that the corporate name of Union Credit is not, and cannot, be reserved with the Department of State. The Department of State no longer reserves corporate names. Union Credit will have suitable quarters. It will be located at 1150 South Miami Avenue, Miami, Florida. No member of the public appeared at the public hearing or spoke in opposition to the Application. No one testified in opposition to the Application. The Applicants cause notice of the public hearing to be published in the Miami Herald on May 4, 2000. The notice complied with the requirements of Rule 3C-105.106(1), Florida Administrative Code. The Applicants satisfied the notice requirements of Subsection 120.80(3)(a)4, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of July, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of July, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Alcides I. Avila, Esquire Patricia M. Hernandez, Esquire Holland & Knight, LLP 701 Brickell Avenue, Suite 3000 Miami, Florida 33131 Robert Alan Fox, Esquire Department of Banking and Finance 101 East Gaines Street Fletcher Building, Suite 526 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Honorable Robert F. Milligan Office of the Comptroller Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol, Plaza Level 09 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Harry L. Hooper, General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance Fletcher Building, Suite 526 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
Findings Of Fact The Department rules on the Proposed Findings of Facts submitted by the parties as follows: APPLICANT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS Applicant's proposed finding as to the net profit to asset ratio is accepted. Applicant's proposed finding as to the adjusted capital to asset ratio is accepted. Applicant's proposed finding as to the boundaries of the PSA are accepted. Applicant's proposed findings as to the population estimates of the PSA and the communities located within the PSA are accepted to the extent they are not inconsistent with the Department's findings adopted herein. Applicant's proposed finding as to net migration into Pinellas County and the age distribution characteristics of Pinellas County are accepted to the extent they are not inconsistent with the Department's findings adopted herein. Applicant's proposed finding that the Bank of Indian Rocks is the only full service bank with its main office operating in the PSA is accepted. Applicant's proposed finding that the Bank of Indian Rocks experienced a 23.3 percent rate of growth for loans and a relatively modest rate of growth for deposits during the last reporting year is accepted. Applicant's proposed findings as to the nature of the proposed branch site are accepted. Applicant's proposed finding as to the banks servicing the PSA is accepted to the extent that said banks have branch offices located in the PSA, but is rejected to the extent that said finding excludes other banks which may service customers in the PSA. Applicant's proposed finding that the PSA community is heavily dominated in terms of bank operations by the Bank of Indian Rocks is rejected as being unsupported by competent substantive evidence in the record. The record indicates that based on a telephone sample survey of 399 persons, 49 percent of the households in the PSA have their primary checking account at the Bank of Indian Rocks. The Applicant's proposed finding does not necessarily follow from the survey. Applicant's proposed finding as to the percentage of people located in the PSA that have a primary checking account in the PSA and bank with the Bank of Indian Rocks is rejected for the reasons previously stated in paragraph 10. Applicant's proposed finding as to the need for an additional full service bank based on the statistical data presented is rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. Applicant's proposed finding as to the savings and loan associations serving the PSA is accepted to the extent that said savings and loan associations have offices located in the PSA, but is rejected to the extent that said finding excludes other savings and loan association offices which may serve customers in the PSA. Applicant's proposed findings as to the nature of the primary service area is accepted, with the exception of the finding as to the amount of land available for future development which is rejected as being unsupported by competent substantial evidence in the record. Applicant's proposed findings that the Applicant's economic capacity will be enhanced by the branch; that the Applicant can support the proposed branch and statements with regard thereto, are rejected as constituting conclusions of law and legal argument, rather than findings of fact. Applicant's proposed findings as to the range of services that will be offered at the proposed branch are accepted. Applicant's proposed finding as to the need for additional banking facilities and the convenience of the proposed bank are rejected as constituting conclusions of law. Applicant's proposed findings as to the substantial experience of the bank staff, and significant assets are accepted; however, Applicant's proposed findings to the capability of the bank to support the branch facilities is rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. Applicant's proposed findings as to the Applicant's return on assets on 1977, 19978 and year to date are accepted. Applicant's proposed findings as to the liquid assets as a percent of total liabilities; condition of assets; classified assets and loan loss ratio are accepted. Applicant's proposed findings as to increased earnings, increased average balances and reduced chargeoffs are accepted. Applicant's proposed finding that there has been no cash operating loss of the Applicant is rejected as being unsupported by competent substantial evidence in the record. Applicant's other statements with regard thereto are rejected as constituting legal argument rather than findings of facts. Applicant's proposed finding that the review of the branch by management of the Applicant and the Atlantic Bancorporation is significant is accepted; however, Applicant's proposed finding as to the judgment of the management as to the success of the proposed branch constitutes a conclusion of law. Applicant's proposed finding that there was no insider transaction involved in the purchase of the land is rejected as being irrelevant and immaterial. Applicant's proposed finding that there was no showing that the lease transaction constitutes an insider transaction is rejected as being unsupported by competent substantial evidence in the record. Applicant's proposed finding that the lease sum represents approximately a 12 percent return on assets is accepted; however, the Applicant's proposed finding that the lease arrangement was not controverted as being unfair or unreasonable is rejected as being irrelevant and immaterial. Applicant's proposed finding that the depth of management is sufficient to operate the branch is rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. Applicant's proposed findings as to the number of years of experience of various officers of the bank is accepted. Applicant's proposed finding as to whether the name of the proposed branch was confusing is rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. Applicant's proposed finding that the Applicant does not have more than four pending branch applications is accepted. Applicant's proposed findings that there was no evidence presented which would indicate that the bank was not in compliance with federal and state regulations and statements of bank offices thereto are accepted. PROTESTANT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS Protestant's proposed findings in Section 1 are accepted, with the exception of the last sentence which is rejected as being a conclusory statement not supported by competent substantial evidence in the record. Protestant's proposed findings in Section 2 are accepted. Protestant's proposed findings in Section 3 are accepted, with the exception that the record reflects that the proposed site is located in the vicinity of the northwest quadrant of the intersection of Indian Rocks Road and Walsingham, and does not specify the number of fees west of the intersection. Protestant's proposed findings as to the PSA's boundaries as delineated by the Applicant in Section 4 are accepted. The second and third sentences in Section 4 are rejected as being unsupported by competent substantial evidence in the record. The first sentence in the second paragraph of Section 4 is accepted. The second sentence in the second paragraph of Section 4 is rejected as constituting legal argument rather than a finding of fact. The remaining proposed findings in Section 4 relating to the boundaries of the PSA of the First Bank of Treasure Island are irrelevant for the reason that said PSA is not necessarily applicable to subsequent applications. Protestant's proposed finding in Section 4 as to the population of the PSA is accepted and the proposed findings relating to the population of First Bank of Treasure Island's PSA is rejected as being irrelevant. Protestant's proposed finding in Section 4 as to the residential nature of the PSA is accepted. Protestant's proposed finding as to the limited nature of commercial activity is rejected as being unsupported by competent substantial evidence. The record reflects that although commercial activity in the PSA is in the form of small retail, professional, and service type establishments, these establishments are numerous in number. Protestant's proposed finding as to the considerable greenbelt lands which cannot be used for development is rejected as being unsupported by competent substantial evidence. The record reflects that there are greenbelt areas which cannot be used for development, but does not reflect that the amount of these lands is considerable. Protestant's proposed findings in the first and second sentences in Section 5 are accepted. The third sentence in Section 5 is accepted to the extent that traffic coming from west to east cannot enter the proposed site directly. The remaining findings in the first paragraph of Section 5 are accepted, with the exception of the last phrase of the last sentence which is rejected as speculation and not supported by competent substantial evidence in the record. Protestant's proposed finding in the second paragraph of Section 5 as to the number of Applicant's existing customers in the PSA is accepted, however, the remaining findings in that paragraph are rejected as unsupported by competent substantial evidence in the record. Protestant's proposed finding in the last paragraph of Section 5 is rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. Protestant's proposed finding in the first paragraph of Section 6 are accepted to the extent that said finding represents the number of offices of financial institutions serving the PSA and not the number of financial institutions. Protestant's proposed finding in the first sentence of the second paragraph of Section 6 is rejected as being unsupported by competent substantial evidence in the record. The record reflects that the Applicant offers automatic transfer from savings to checking and not that they contend this service is unique. Protestant's proposed finding in the second sentence of the second paragraph of Section 6 is accepted with the exception that the record does not support the finding that the Bank of Indian Rocks offers automatic transfer accounts. The finding in the last sentence of the second paragraph of Section 6 is rejected as being irrelevant. Protestant's proposed finding in the third paragraph of Section 6 is rejected as being unsupported by competent substantial evidence in the record. The record reflects that some of the questions asked in the Burke survey may have been based on the assumption that automatic transfer accounts were not presently offered in the PSA, however, the entire survey was not based on that assumption. Protestant's proposed finding in the fourth paragraph of Section 6 is accepted. Protestant's proposed finding in the fifth paragraph of Section 6 is rejected as being unsupported by competent substantial evidence in the record, said finding is based on hearsay evidence which is uncorroborated. Protestant's proposed finding in the sixth paragraph as to the number of businesses that the Applicant listed in its application which were not in its PSA is accepted, however, the remaining finding in that paragraph is rejected as irrelevant. Protestant's proposed finding in the last paragraph of Section 6 is rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. Protestant's proposed finding as to the provisions of Rule 3C- 13.041(2)(a), F.A.C. in the first paragraph of Section 7 are accepted. Protestant's proposed finding as to the Applicant's capital to asset ratio in the second paragraph of Section 7 is accepted. Protestant's remaining finding in that paragraph is rejected as constituting legal argument and opinion, rather than a finding of fact. Protestant's proposed findings in the first paragraph of Section 7 are accepted. Protestant's proposed finding in the fourth paragraph of Section 7 is rejected as being unsupported by competent substantial evidence in the record. The record reflects that Mr. Maurer stated that the Applicant probably would not be able to add to capital through earnings based on the projected losses of the unopened branches. Protestant's proposed findings as to the projected deposits of the Applicant's branches in the fifth paragraph of Section 7 are accepted, however, Protestant's proposed finding as to the need for additional capital is rejected as constituting a conclusion of law, opinion and legal argument. The remaining findings in that paragraph and the first sentence of the sixth paragraph are rejected as being legal argument rather than findings of facts based on competent substantial evidence in the record. The finding in the second sentence of the sixth paragraph is accepted. Protestant's proposed finding in the seventh paragraph of Section 7 that the applicant does not have sufficient personnel to staff and manage its new branches is accepted. Protestant's proposed finding that no manager for the proposed branch has been selected is rejected as being unsupported by competent substantial evidence in the record. Although there appears to be conflicting testimony as to this fact, the application contained in the record states that James Arntz had been selected as the branch manager, in addition to testimony on direct examination that Mr. Arntz had been selected as the branch manager and the record supports said finding. Protestant's proposed finding as to the managerial capacity of the Applicant and its impact on the adequacy of capital to asset ratio is rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. Protestant's proposed findings contained in the first two sentences of the eighth paragraph of Section 7 are accepted. Protestant's proposed finding contained in the last sentence is rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. Protestant's proposed finding in the last paragraph of Section 7 is rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. Protestant's proposed finding in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Section 8 is accepted. The remaining findings in that paragraph are rejected as constituting conclusions of law. Protestant's proposed finding in the first sentence of the second paragraph of Section 8 is accepted, and the remaining finding in that paragraph is rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. Protestant's proposed findings in Section 9 are accepted. Protestant's proposed findings in Section 10 are accepted. Protestant's proposed findings in the first two paragraphs and the first, second and fourth sentence of the third paragraph of Section 11 are accepted. The proposed findings in the third and fifth sentences of the third paragraph are rejected as constituting conclusions of law. Protestant's proposed findings in the first two sentences of the fourth paragraph of Section 11 are accepted, the remaining sentence in that paragraph is rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. Protestant's proposed findings in Section 12 are accepted, with the exception that (1) 9 percent represents an average cost of time deposits and to a minimum and (2) the proposed finding in the last sentence constitutes a conclusion of law. Protestant's proposed findings in the first two paragraphs of Section 13 are accepted. The remaining findings of the last paragraph are rejected as constituting conclusions of law. Protestant's proposed findings in the first paragraph of Section 14 are accepted, with the exception that the record reflects that the purchase price of the proposed site was $240,000 and not $200,000. Protestant's proposed findings in the first two sentences of the second paragraph of Section 14 are rejected as being irrelevant. The proposed findings in the third sentence is accepted. The proposed findings in the remaining sentences of that paragraph are rejected as constituting legal argument and conclusions of law. Protestant's proposed findings in Section 15 as to the provisions of Rule 3C-13.041(3) are accepted. The remaining proposed findings are rejected as being irrelevant. Protestant's proposed findings in Section 16 as to the provisions of rule 3c-13.041(2)(c) are accepted. The proposed finding in the second sentence of that section is accepted. The proposed finding in the third sentence is rejected as being unsupported by competent substantial evidence in the record for the reasons stated above in paragraph 53 of this Order. The proposed finding in the last sentence is rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. DEPARTMENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS The Department's proposed findings contained in paragraph 1, 3, 4 through 10, 12 through 19,22 and 23 are accepted. The Department's proposed findings contained in paragraph 2 are accepted with the exception of the third sentence which is rejected as being unsupported by competent substantial evidence in record for the reasons stated above in paragraph 53 of this Order. The Department's proposed findings contained in paragraph 11 are accepted, with the exception of the figure for the projected deposits for the first year based on 2.2 persons per household which is rejected as being unsupported by competent substantial evidence in the record. The record reflects that this figure is $2,487,000 and not $2,700,000. The Department's proposed findings contained in paragraph 20 are accepted, with the exception of the number of deposit and loan customers residing in the PSA which is rejected as being unsupported by competent substantial evidence. The record reflects that there was conflicting testimony as to the number of existing deposit customers, however, the hearing officer found the number to be 140, and 65 loan customers. The Department's proposed findings contained in paragraph 21 are accepted, with the exception of the amount of square feet of the building to house the proposed branch, which is rejected as being unsupported by competent substantial evidence. Although the application contained in the record stated that the building would contain 3,640 square feet (including the drive-in canopy), the hearing officer found that the building would contain 2,000 square feet. PROTESTANT'S EXCEPTIONS TO THE REPORT AND FINDINGS OF FACT OF HEARING OFFICER The Protestant's exception contained in Section 1, with regard to the Hearing Officer's ruling's on the proposed findings, is accepted to the extent that the better practice would be for the Hearing Officer to specify which proposed findings are rejected as not supported by the evidence, which are irrelevant and which constitute conclusions of law. However, it has been recognized that the hearing officer is not required to make explicit rulings on subordinate. commulative, immaterial or unnecessary proposed facts. Forrester v. Career Service Commission, 361 So.2d 220 (1st DCA Fla. 1978). Notwithstanding, the Department has expressly ruled on each proposed finding and stated the reasons therefore. Protestant's exception contained in Section 2 is rejected for the reason that some of the proposed findings contained in Protestant's Proposed Findings of Fact were not based on competent substantial evidence, were irrelevant or constituted conclusions of law, as more fully set forth above in paragraphs 31 through 70. Therefore, it would be improper for either the Hearing Officer or the Department to adopt each and every proposed finding contained in Protestant's Proposed Findings of Fact as requested in the exception. Protestant's exception contained in Section 3 is rejected for the reason that the Hearing Officer's finding that the proposed branch manager is James Arntz is supported by competent substantial evidence in the record. The testimony contained in pages 497 and 498 of the transcript, cited by Protestant in its exception, refers to the Applicant's application for a branch office in northeast St. Petersburg. Although there was conflicting testimony as to this fact (see TR-465 and TR-540), the application contained in the record also identified James Arntz as the proposed branch manager. As such, there was competent substantial evidence in the record to support the Hearing Officer's finding. Protestant's exception contained in Section 4 is accepted for the reason that the Hearing Officer found that the "the greater weight of the evidence indicates that average number of persons per household in Pinellas County is 2.2". As such, Applicant's revised figures based on 2.2 percent per household are accepted which indicate that the proposed branch will not show a profit until the fourth year. The Department's findings of fact have modified the Hearing Officer's findings accordingly. Protestant's exception contained in Section 5 is rejected for the reason that the Hearing Officer's finding is supported by competent substantial evidence in the record. The testimony contained on pages 511 and 512 of the transcript, which is cited by the Protestant, merely states that the Applicant probably would not be able to add to capital through earnings based on the assumption of the projected losses of the Applicant's new branches. As such, the Hearing Officer's finding is accurate. Protestant's exception contained in Section 6 is accepted for the reason that the record reflects that the Applicant's president stated that the branch will probably have Saturday banking hours, but that the exact hours had not been determined. The Department's Findings of Facts have modified the Hearing Officer's findings accordingly. Protestant's exception contained in Section 7 is rejected for the reason that the Hearing Officer's finding is supported by competent substantial evidence in the record. On pages 328 and 329 of the transcript, the witness for the Applicant testified that there was a stacking lane which functionally is in front of the site for traffic hearing west. Protestant's exception contained in Section 8 is rejected for the reasons that the Hearing Officer's finding based on the study was limited and for a limited purpose, and the questions asked in the survey and the procedure appear reasonable. In addition, the Hearing Officer's and Department's reliance on the study is minimal, if at all. Protestant's exception contained in Section 9 is rejected for the reason that the adverse impact of the establishment of a branch on other banks is irrelevant, because it is not a consideration under the statutory and regulatory criteria applicable to branch bank applications. Protestant's exceptions contained in Sections 10 and 19, 21 and 23 are rejected for the reasons that the requested findings are conclusions of law which are not properly included in the Hearing Officer's report pursuant to Section 120.60(3), Florida Statutes. Protestant's exception contained in Section 20 is rejected for the reason that the requested finding as to an appraisal of land and improvements is irrelevant where, as in this case, there is no insider transaction involved in the purchase of the land. Protestant's exception contained in Section 22 is rejected for the reason that the revisions referred to by the Protestant were updated figures based on data unavailable at the time of the application and figures relating to the lease arrangement. Although at the time of the application, the Applicant intended to purchase the proposed site, it later decided to lease the proposed site. The Department does not view this as a material change in the application and fails to see how the Protestant was prejudiced by this change. As to the updated figures, in McDonald v. Department of Banking and Finance, 346 So.2d 569, 584 (Fla. 1st DCA), the court stated that the hearing officer may freely consider relevant evidence of changing economic conditions and other current circumstances external to the application. It should also be noted that the revisions referred to by the Protestant were testified to at the hearing in June, thus giving the Protestant a month's notice to make any changes necessary in the preparation of its case which was later presented at the continuation of the hearing in July. Protestant's exception contained in Section 24 is rejected for the reason that the requested findings are not material to the statutory and regulatory criteria applicable to branch applications.
The Issue In DOAH Case No. 92-2455 the Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Banking (Department) seeks to recover the costs of examination and supervision of Bay Bank and Trust Company (Bay Bank). As reason, Bay Bank is alleged to have engaged in unsafe or unsound practices as discovered in the examination the Department made of Bay Bank on March 31, 1991. In addition, the Department seeks to impose a late payment penalty in the amount of $100.00 per day commencing on November 15, 1991, and an administrative fine of $1000.00 per day commencing on December 16, 1991. See Section 655.045(1), Florida Statutes (1991). In DOAH Case No. 92-3744 the Department seeks entry of a cease and desist order directed to Bay Bank and to John Christo, Jr. (Christo, Jr.) and John Christo, III (Christo, III). See Section 655.033, Florida Statutes (1991). Moreover, the Department seeks to remove Christo, Jr. and Christo, III, as Bay Bank Directors and to prohibit their participation in the affairs of Bay Bank or any other financial institution regulated by the Department. See Section 655.037, Florida Statutes (1991). In particular the Department seeks to impose this discipline based upon alleged unsafe and unsound practices as determined through the Department's March 31, 1991, examination conducted at Bay Bank and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) examination conducted at Bay Bank on November 18, 1991; for alleged breaches of the written agreement entered into between Bay Bank and the Department following the March 31, 1991 examination; for alleged violation of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 C.F.R. s. 215.4, known as Regulation O; for alleged violation of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. s. 371(c), and for alleged violation of fiduciary duties associated with the previously described acts by Christo, Jr. and Christo, III.
Findings Of Fact Prehearing Stipulations of Fact The following facts were admitted and required no proof at the final hearing: At all times material hereto, Bay Bank and Trust Company ("Bay Bank") has been a state-chartered, federally insured bank operating under Charter No. 188-T, having a principal place of business at 509 Harrison Avenue, Box 1350, Panama City, Florida, 32402. At all times material hereto, Florida Bay Bank, Inc. ("FBB") has been a Florida corporation operating as a one bank holding company. FBB owns 100 percent of Bay Bank. At all times material hereto, John Christo, Jr. has been chairman of the board of FBB, John Christo, III has been president and Irene Christo has been secretary/treasurer. Until November, 1992, John Christo, Jr. was Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of Bay Bank. From November, 1992, John Christo Jr. has been Chairman of the Board of Bay Bank. Until July, 1992, John Christo, III was a Director and President of Bay Bank. From July, 1992 until the present, Christo III has been Vice-Chairman of the Board of Bay Bank. At all times material hereto, JCJ Irrevocable Trust ("JCJ Trust") has been a trust, the managing trustee of which has been John Christo, III. Each of the children of John Christo, Jr. has possessed a beneficial interest in JCJ Trust in at least the following amounts: John Christo, III - 40 percent James Phillip Christo - 30 percent Irene L. Christo - 30 percent FBB has two classes of voting securities outstanding, voting preferred stock and common stock. At all times material hereto, John Christo, Jr. owned approximately 97 percent of the preferred stock and JCJ Trust owned more than 65 percent of the common stock of FBB. John Christo, Jr. was Chairman of the Board and owned approximately 32 percent of the outstanding shares of Bay Savings Bank, a state chartered savings and loan association in West Palm Beach. JCJ Trust owned approximately 37 percent of Bay Savings Bank. FBB owned approximately 5 percent of Bay Savings Bank. Bay Savings Bank failed and was placed in receivership by the Resolution Trust Corporation on September 6, 1992. On April 18, 1986, the Board of Directors of Bay Bank voted to approve two irrevocable standby letters of credit in favor of SouthTrust Bank of Alabama, N.A. ("SouthTrust") for the benefit of John Christo, Jr. (LOC #281) and JCJ Trust (LOC #282) respectively. These letters of credit were unsecured. These loans at SouthTrust were originally obtained by the Christos for the purpose of providing the initial capitalization of Bay Savings Bank in West Palm Beach. These letters of credit were subsequently renewed and approved by the Board of Directors of Bay Bank on April 18, 1989 and again on February 15, 1990. These renewal letters of credit, like #281 and #282, were unsecured. On February 19, 1991, the Board of Directors of Bay Bank voted to again renew the irrevocable letters of credit in favor of SouthTrust for the benefit of and to secure the debts of JCJ Trust and John Christo, Jr. to SouthTrust. Christo, Jr. was present at the board meeting when the board voted to approve LOC #509. Christo, III voted with the Board of Directors of Bay Bank to approve LOC #509. On February 25, 1991, Bay Bank issued the irrevocable letter of credit (LOC #509) in favor of SouthTrust in the aggregate amount of $425,000 for the benefit of and to secure a debt owed by JCJ Trust to SouthTrust. The terms of LOC #509 permitted SouthTrust to draw any amounts of funds due and payable to SouthTrust from JCJ Trust that were at least 30 days past due, up to the limit of LOC #509. On September 23, 1991, SouthTrust sent Bay Bank a letter indicating that SouthTrust would draw on LOC #509 because JCJ Trust owed SouthTrust $433,429.17, which amount was past due for more than 30 days. On October 2, 1991, Bay Bank funded a loan in the amount of $425,000 to JCJ Trust to cover LOC #509 as drawn upon by SouthTrust. The note was signed by Christo, III as trustee of JCJ Trust. The note was unsecured. On February 25, 1991, Bay Bank issued the irrevocable letter of credit (LOC #510) in favor of SouthTrust in the aggregate amount of $425,000 for the benefit of and to secure a debt by Christo, Jr. to SouthTrust. The terms of LOC #510 permitted SouthTrust to draw any amount of funds due and payable to SouthTrust from Christo, Jr. that were at least 30 days past due, up to the limit of LOC #510. Christo, Jr. was present at the board meeting when the board voted to approve LOC #510. John Christo, III voted with the Board of Directors to approve LOC #510. On August 26, 1991, SouthTrust notified Bay Bank that it would draw on LOC #510 because Christo, Jr. owed SouthTrust $425,000, which amount was past due for more than 30 days. On September 3, 1991, Bay Bank funded an unsecured loan in the amount of $425,000 to Christo, Jr. to cover LOC #510 as drawn upon by SouthTrust. The note was signed by Christo, Jr. Although bank documents reflect board approval of LOC #509 and #510, there is no bank document relating to LOC #509 or #510 reflecting approval by the Board of Directors, on or about the time of the issuance of LOC #509 and #510, of the terms of any loan to John Christo, Jr. or JCJ Trust that might be made should the letters of credit be drawn upon by SouthTrust. In December, 1990, Bay Bank exchanged a 1986 Ferrari Testarossa with FBB in exchange for a 1984 Ferrari 4001. The Bank booked the value of the 4001 as $35,954 and FBB booked the value of the Testarossa at $110,793. The Testarossa had a market value in excess of that of the 4001. No security was given by FBB in connection with this transaction. Other Facts The State Examination and Findings Pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(b)15, Florida Statutes (1992 Supp.) (Use of Manuals) Consistent with long-standing practices in examining Bay Bank and other financial institutions over which the Department has had jurisdiction, it performed an examination to assess Bay Bank's financial condition and banking practices. This examination took place on March 31, 1991. In performing the examination it employed the use of a manual produced by the FDIC which the Department has used in conducting examinations beginning in 1977, to include examinations of Bay Bank. The Department also utilized its Examination Procedures Manual. Again, this manual had been referred to in the past when conducting examinations of this and other regulated institutions. As had been its custom the Department also utilized a document known as Management Evaluation Guidelines, derived from information gained from the state of Texas. Prior to the March 31, 1991 examination the Department had used the Management Evaluation Guidelines in performing examinations of Bay Bank. The Department has substantially affected the interest of Bay Bank and the Christos by resort to the three manuals in conducting the March 31, 1991 examination. None of these manuals had been adopted as rules when the March 31, 1991 examination was made; however, on August 6, 1993, Respondent noticed its intent to adopt the manuals as rules through incorporation by reference into an existing chapter within the Florida Administrative Code. The FDIC Manual establishes a rating system known as the Camel rating system. That acronym stands for measurements of a bank's condition related to capital, asset quality, management, earnings and liquidity. Out of component scores assigned to those measurements of the bank's condition, but not through averaging, an aggregate score is assigned which identifies the overall health of the institution. An aggregate score of 1 is the highest rating, with aggregate scores of 4 or 5 considered to be substandard. In March, 1991, as in its general experience with prior examinations, the Department equated the assigned aggregate score of 4 with unsafe and unsound practices by Bay Bank. This opinion was held when taking into account the specific conditions within the bank found at the time of examination and as set forth in the post-examination written report. The Camel rating system had its origin with the Federal Financial Institutions Examinations Council and was designed to identify institutions that needed closer supervisory attention. It is a system that had been used in regulation of banks since the 1970s. The FDIC Manual and the state Examination Procedures Manual include definitions of the numerical ratings found within the Camel rating system. The source material for arriving at the Camel ratings are constituted of the lending institution's records and other information gathered during the examination sessions. In assigning the Camel ratings in the March 31, 1991 examination, the Department followed these approaches. In addition to the Camel rating system, the FDIC Manual sets forth criteria related to determining whether a bank violated federal banking statutes and regulations. On this occasion the Department considered the criteria set forth in the FDIC Manual to determine whether Bay Bank violated federal law. The Department's Examination Procedures Manual explains procedural steps that the examiners took in conducting the March 31, 1991 examination. The state Examination Procedures Manual affords latitude to the examiners to deviate from guidelines set forth in the manual if the deviation can be supported in writing. The right to deviate from the guidelines was available upon the occasion of the March 31, 1991 examination. Over and above the possibility that an examiner, in this case an examiner performing the examination on March 31, 1991, would deviate from the guidelines set forth in the state Examination Procedures Manual, the entire examination process draws upon the experience of the examiner in a somewhat subjective manner and in recognition that the activity of bank examination is one that requires flexibility in thinking. Specific guidance to the examiners contained within the state Examination Procedures Manual includes a statement of expected documentation that a bank should have in support of its loans, instructions concerning how to grade the bank, as well as how to proceed with the examination, to include various operational steps to be taken while conducting the examination. The state Examination Procedures Manual also sets forth personnel duties for the examiners. The state Examination Procedures Manual sets forth the need for bankers to adhere to safe and sound banking practices. The Management Evaluation Guidelines sets forth guidance for the examiners, to include their responsibilities in the March 31, 1991 examination, related to assessing bank management. This guidance is in addition to the guidance set forth in the FDIC Manual and the state Examination Procedures Manual. The Management Evaluation Guidelines sets out instructions about its use and provides worksheets to be executed in the assessment process. The rating system contemplated by the Management Evaluation Guidelines ties in with the Camel rating system. Aside from the legal requirements set forth in Chapter 655, Florida Statutes, the Department has not established formal rules which would further define the term "unsafe and unsound" practices as that term describes the circumstances under which the Department would assess a bank for costs of examination and supervision, seek to order a bank or its directors, officers and employees to cease and desist or seek the removal of a bank's officers and directors and to restrict and prohibit those officers and directors from participating in the affairs of that bank or any other financial institution over which the Petitioner has regulatory authority. Other than information gained during an examination, to include the March 31, 1991 examination, concerning perceptions held by the examiners about the Camel ratings for the bank, as reflected in the examination report provided to the bank and through the aforementioned manuals, the Department has made no attempt to specifically describe its use of the Camel ratings. The explanation of the Camel rating as set forth in the three manuals would become codified requirements of law if the rule enactment process is concluded. The contents of those manuals would be specifically disseminated to affected persons with that eventuality; however, such an arrangement would have only prospective utility as a means to specifically notify a regulated entity concerning the imposition of the regulatory terms set forth in the manuals. When the March 31, 1991 report of examination was prepared there were no formal written rules or other written guidance concerning the occasion upon which the Department would seek a written agreement as opposed to an imposition of a cease and desist order in trying to correct problems with a bank discovered through the examination process. Instead, the Department exercised its discretion consistent with findings made during the examination. The three manuals offer assistance in the proper exercise of regulatory discretion concerning corrective action directed to a given institution and had that part to play in the March 31, 1991 examination process as well as the overall decision to pursue the present cases. As far back as 1984 it has not been the Department's policy to provide copies of the state Examination Procedures Manual to institutions being examined under its terms. It was not the policy to provide a copy of the state Examination Procedures Manual to the Bay Bank at the March 31, 1991 examination. On the other hand, there has never been any prohibition against allowing the members of the banking industry in Florida or others to have access to the state manual. Similarly, the Department does not provide copies of the FDIC Manual to the public, nor did it provide a copy of the FDIC Manual to Bay Bank when the March 31, 1991 examination was conducted. The Department does not deem the failure to provide that manual and the state Examination Procedures Manual as an inappropriate oversight. The Department is not conversant with the opportunities which the public, to include Bay Bank, would have to obtain the FDIC Manual from federal officials. The Department makes the assumption that the FDIC Manual is available from the FDIC. Finally, Respondent does not publish the Management Evaluation Guidelines for the benefit of members of the regulated industry, but it would provide a copy of the Management Evaluation Guidelines on request. In particular, it did not provide a copy of the Management Evaluation Guidelines to Bay Bank associated with the March 31, 1991 examination. None of the three manuals discussed are deemed to be confidential. Ultimately, the decision to take administrative action based upon the findings made in the March 31, 1991 examination must be factually supported and legally correct, whatever contribution was made to the regulatory function when the Department chose to make its customary usage of the three manuals in performing the March 31, 1991 examination. Petitioners Exhibit No. 2 is the report of examination for March 31, 1991. It identifies the aggregate Camel rating of 4 and sets forth the reasons for that finding. As set forth in the report of examination there were numerous unsatisfactory conditions found during the March 31, 1991 examination. In particular, the findings in the report of examination identify a number of unsafe or unsound practices, together with other shortcomings in the performance by Bay Bank, its management, employees and directors. In carrying out the examination of March 31, 1991, the examination team was constituted of 14 examiners to include two Area Financial Managers, two Financial Examiner Analyst Supervisors, and two Financial Specialists. Two members of the examination team were trainees. The work performed by the trainees was supervised and the examination findings made were not constituted of work performed by the trainees that had not been reviewed. In conducting the examination 2,538 hours were devoted to the task. Additionally, the examiner in charge spent 116 hours planning the examination and writing the report of examination, activities conducted away from the bank. The costs of examination and supervision was $67,494.20. Review was made of the examination report through various department employees. This arrangement was in accordance with normal departmental routine for conducting such review. The only notable change to the report prepared by the Examiner in Charge concerned the component Camel rating for assets wherein the Examiner in Charge had failed to offer a written explanation for assigning a component rating of 4 when written guidelines in the state Examination Procedures Manual called for a 5 for that component. Consequently the component rating was changed by the Bureau Chief for the area where Bay Bank conducts its business. This change for the asset component did not modify the overall Camel rating. Among the unsafe and unsound practices discovered in the March 31, 1991 examination was Bay Bank's failure to establish an adequate loan loss reserve. The management and directors had set aside approximately 1.364 million dollars for loan loss reserve. The methodology utilized by the Department to identify an adequate loan loss reserve revealed the need for 4.05 million dollars to be available for that function. That methodology is accepted. Therefore, the deficiency in the loan loss reserve approximated 2.686 million dollars. This shortfall was brought about by the ineffective methods of risk identification which the bank management and its directors had utilized prior to the March 31, 1991 examination. For a substantial period of time prior to the March 31, 1991 examination Bay Bank had maintained a significantly higher percentage of noncurrent loans and leases than its peers, while maintaining a loan loss reserve comparable to its peers. This contributed to the inadequate loan loss reserve. Bay Bank questioned the formula employed by the Department to establish loan loss reserves wherein it is anticipated that 10 percent losses are contemplated for substandard loans. Bay Bank claimed to have a loss experience for substandard loans in the range of 2 to 4 percent. Nonetheless, the Bay Bank internal loan watch-list estimated the loss of approximately 9.14 percent for each loan that it had designated as substandard, which more closely approximates the formula utilized by the Department in establishing a proper loan loss reserve. The deficiency in the loan loss reserve is high and contrary to standards expected of Bay Bank in maintaining a loan loss reserve, so much so that it constitutes an unsafe and unsound practice. Without providing an adequate reserve the financial health of the banking institution is at risk, in that the management has a false picture of the bank's condition when making decisions about banking activities. The deficiency in the loan loss reserve creates the likelihood of abnormal risk or loss, insolvency, or dissipation of assets or other serious prejudice to the interests of the bank and its depositors. During the March 31, 1991 examination, the examiners found numerous instances where the bank management had failed to establish or enforce internal routines and controls. Included within those findings were: Improper recordation of other real estate (ORE) within the bank's books, contrary to bank loan policies, Failure to obtain and maintain current appraisals on ORE and pending ORE, Failure to establish adequate records to allow reconciliation of income and expenses relating to ORE and to maintain adequate documentation thereof, Failure to comply with the bank's loan policies preventing the continued accrual of interest on loans delinquent 90 days or more, Failure to implement credit risk grades established in loan policies more than a year before the examination period, Disorganized and outdated loan file information, Statutory violations associated with loans that were past due for more than a year and Failure to document secured real estate loans as first liens, a requirement by the bank's loan policy and state law. As the examination report states, Bay Bank's Board of Directors had implemented a corrective plan of action dated January 31, 1989, which responded to material deficiencies that had been reported in the June 30, 1988 FDIC report of examination and the November 30, 1987 Department report of examination. The findings within the March 31, 1991 examination show significant violations of the internal plan for corrective action implemented on January 31, 1989, especially in the area of adequate loan policies and the need to insure compliance with the requirements of law. The failure to establish and enforce internal routines and controls and noncompliance with the January 31, 1989 corrective plan of action point to practices and conduct contrary to proper expectations incumbent upon Bay Bank, its management and directors, thereby constituting unsafe and unsound practices that creates the likelihood of abnormal risk or loss, insolvency, or dissipation of assets or otherwise seriously prejudices the interests of Bay Bank or its depositors. The March 31, 1991 examination revealed violations of laws and regulations governing the bank's activities. Taken together these violations point to an unsafe and unsound practice that creates the likelihood of abnormal risk or loss, insolvency or dissipation of assets or otherwise seriously prejudices the interests of the bank or its depositors. On the occasion of the March 31, 1991 examination it was appropriate for the Department to advise Bay Bank to refrain from paying dividends until asset quality, earnings and capital had improved sufficiently to justify dividend payments. Prior to the examination Bay Bank had paid questionably high dividend amounts in a circumstance in which the bank's capital position was tenuous. The excessive levels of adversely classified loans discovered during the March 31, 1991 examination were somewhat the product of conditions in the local economy. However, the outside influences in the economy did not completely explain the deteriorating loan portfolio and offer a defense to imprudent lending practices and the failure to adequately diversify the loan portfolio. The imprudent lending practices were manifested through inadequate risk identification and lack of proper attention to problem loans. In the final analysis the bank management and directors were responsible for the loan portfolio's substandard condition. The circumstances associated with adversely classified loans as commented on in the March 31, 1991 examination report are indicators of unsafe and unsound practices by bank management and the directors, creating the likelihood of abnormal risk or loss, insolvency, or dissipation of assets or otherwise seriously prejudicing the interests of the bank or its depositors. Costs of Examination, Late Payment Penalty and Administrative Fine On July 26, 1991, the Department transmitted a copy of its March 31, 1991 examination report to Bay Bank. Then on July 31, 1991, the Department began a free-form negotiation process to try and get Bay Bank to honor an invoice in the amount of $67,494.20 which constituted the costs associated with examination and supervision for the March 31, 1991 examination. The theory for claiming those costs was pursuant to Section 655.045, Florida Statutes (1991), which indicates that the Department may recover the costs of the examination and supervision against banks engaging in unsafe and unsound practices as defined at Section 655.005(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1991). The correspondence dated July 31, 1991, asked Bay Bank to remit payment within 30 days of receipt of the invoice setting forth the costs of the examination and supervision. The correspondence reminded Bay Bank that a late payment penalty of up to $100.00 a day might be imposed for overdue examination and supervisory fees. This reminder was as contemplated by Section 655.045, Florida Statutes (1991). A dialogue commenced between the Department and Bay Bank through further correspondence in which Bay Bank was unavailing in its attempt to convince the Department that its practices as revealed through the March 31, 1991 examination were not unsafe and unsound, thereby setting aside the right for the Department to assess the costs of examination and supervision. Rather than apprising Bay Bank that it could contest the preliminary agency decision concerning assessment of costs of examination and supervision related to the March 31, 1991 examination, by resort to procedures set forth in Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, the Department sent another free-form notification on October 2, 1991, stating that the Department continued to assert its claim based upon the belief that the practices found in the March 31, 1991 examination constituted unsafe and unsound practices. Again the October 2, 1991 correspondence instructed Bay Bank to remit $67,494.20 within 30 days of receipt of the letter. Having failed to hear from the bank by virtue of its October 2, 1991 communication, the Department again wrote on November 13, 1991, this time telling Bay Bank that the Department had determined to impose a late payment penalty of $100.00 per day commencing November 5, 1991, and of the possibility of imposing a $1,000.00 per day administrative fines if payment were not received. This November 13, 1991, correspondence was free-form. As with prior correspondence it did not advise Bay Bank of its right to seek relief pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. On February 5, 1992, another free-form communication was provided vying for the cost of the examination and supervision related to the March 31, 1991 examination, reminding Bay Bank that the Department was persuaded that it was entitled to a late payment penalty of $100.00 per day commencing November 5, 1991, and informing Bay Bank that as of December 16, 1991, a date upon which the Department surmised Bay Bank had received an earlier communication, that the Department was imposing an administrative fine of $1,000.00 per day. As was the circumstance of prior occasions the February 5, 1992 correspondence was free- form and failed to advise Bay Bank concerning its right to seek administrative relief from the decision by the agency to seek the costs of examination and supervision for alleged unsafe and unsound practices. Finally, the Department issued an administrative complaint to recover the costs of examination and supervision associated with the March 31, 1991 examination. This complaint was dated March 11, 1992, and advised Bay Bank of its right to contest the determination concerning whether the practices by Bay Bank were unsafe and unsound, thus entitling the Department to collect the costs of examination and supervision associated with the March 31, 1991 examination. The administrative complaint also asserted claims for late penalty and administrative fines dating from November 5, 1991 and December 16, 1991 respectively. Bay Bank contested the administrative complaint leading to the formal hearing which this recommended order addresses. Absent a rule describing the occasion upon which the Department would seek to recover costs of examination and supervision for unsafe and unsound practices, the Department has acted rationally and has been acceptably consistent in exercising its discretion to recover the costs of examination and supervision when comparing the Bay Bank experience to other circumstances where the Department had the opportunity to recover costs of examination and supervision based upon unsafe and unsound practices within an institution. Further Administrative Correction: The Written Agreement Based upon the results of the March 31, 1991 examination the Department deemed it necessary to initiate administrative action against Bay Bank and its directors in accordance with Section 655.033, Florida Statutes (1991). That provision allows the Department to impose cease and desist orders for unsafe and unsound practices, violations of laws relating to the operation of the bank, violation of rules of the Department, violation of orders of the Department or breach of any written agreement with the Department. The law contemplates that a complaint shall be drawn stating the facts that support the action and noticing the accused of the opportunity to seek hearing pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. The Department did not file the formal administrative complaint. Instead, through negotiations with Bay Bank and its directors it addressed the concerns the Department had about the findings made in the report of examination through entry of a written agreement between the Department and Bay Bank and its directors. In anticipation of the written agreement the directors of Bay Bank passed a resolution in support of the written agreement. The directors took that action on September 17, 1991. Two directors were not immediately available to execute the written agreement as such by signing the document. Their unavailability delayed the submission of the written agreement signed by Bay Bank until October 4, 1991. On that date Bay Bank transmitted the signed written agreement to the Department. In support of the written agreement there was a stipulation between the parties to enter into the written agreement. Given the language of the stipulation to enter the written agreement and the written agreement itself, it was contemplated that both documents be executed simultaneously by the Bay Bank directors and that the Department would sign the stipulation to enter the written agreement at the time that the directors signed the stipulation to enter the written agreement. The signing of the stipulation to enter into the written agreement and the written agreement itself by Bay Bank directors and the signing of the stipulation to enter into the written agreement by the Department would make the written agreement effective upon the date of issuance by the Department subsequent to those activities. The written agreement would be issued after the Comptroller signed it. The stipulation to enter into the written agreement was signed by both parties on October 7, 1991. The language employed with the signing of the stipulation to enter the written agreement stated: WHEREFORE, and it is resolved, that in consideration of the foregoing, the Department and Bay Bank and Trust Co., Panama City, Florida and each of the directors, hereby execute this Stipulation and consent to its terms, this 7th day of October, 1991. The exact language related to the effective date of the written agreement was set forth in the stipulation to enter into the written agreement at Paragraph 6 which stated: Effectiveness. Bay Bank and each of the directors stipulate and agree that the Agreement attached hereto shall be effective on the date of its issuance by the Department. The version of the written agreement upon which the Department has based its actions is dated September 29, 1991, and carries the Comptroller's signature. On October 9, 1991, through correspondence from Department's counsel to counsel for Bay Bank, the Department acknowledged receipt of the written agreement signed by the directors. The October 9, 1991 correspondence from the Department to the bank goes on to describe the notion that when the Comptroller signed the written agreement one of the originals would be forwarded to the bank for its file. This comment makes the meaning of the September 29, 1991, signature by the Comptroller unclear. Further contributing to the confusion, there is a reference in the next paragraph to the October 9, 1991 correspondence, to the effect that some conversation was held between counsel for the Department and a Joel McLamore in the office of counsel for the bank, about an agreement made in the course of that conversation, that the written agreement had an effective date of September 29, 1991. On October 14, 1991 the written agreement was docketed by the Department. On that same date the Department sent the bank a copy of the written agreement as executed by the Comptroller. Again, this correspondences from the Department stated that the written agreement had an effective date of November 29, 1991. On November 12, 1991, further correspondence was directed from the Department to Bay Bank making mention that the Department considered the effective date of the agreement to be September 29, 1991. Before the occasion of the administrative complaint seeking a cease and desist order and removal and prohibition directed to Christo, Jr. and Christo, III there was no dispute concerning the effective date of the written agreement. Now Bay Bank and the Christos assert that the written agreement was effective on October 7, 1991, contrary to the Department's position that the effective date is September 29, 1991. The general purposes which the parties had in mind for entering into the stipulation for entry of the written agreement are set out in Paragraph 1 to that stipulation which states: Consideration. The Department has determined that necessary grounds exist to initiate an administrative proceeding pursuant to Section 655.033, Florida Statutes, against Bay Bank and each of the directors. Bay Bank and each of the directors wish to cooperate with the Department and avoid the initiation of administrative litigation. Accordingly, Bay Bank and each of the directors, hereby stipulate and agree to the following terms in consideration of the Department's forbearance from initiating such administrative litigation through the attached Written Agreement (hereinafter Agreement). This intent by the parties to resolve their differences is brought forth in the written agreement where it states: WHEREAS, in an effort to avoid the consequences of protracted litigation and by virtue of signing the Stipulation, Bay Bank and each of the directors have waived their rights to separately stated Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, such findings and conclusions would be taken from and based upon the most recent State Report of Examination, specifically the State's Report of Examination dated March 31, 1991. By the terms of the stipulation for entry into the written agreement Bay Bank and its directors consented had agreed to the entry of the written agreement and to comply with the provisions, without admitting or denying violations of laws or regulations or rules and without admitting or denying that those entities had engaged in any unsafe and unsound practices. There was a section within the stipulation to enter into the written agreement which spoke to the matter of future administrative action by the Department against Bay Bank or its directors where it stated: 7. Future Action. The Stipulation is being entered into without prejudice to the rights of the Department and to take such further action, joint or severally, against Bay Bank and the directors as the Department deems necessary and appropriate to insure compliance with the terms of the Stipulation and the attached Agreement, any other Agreement or order entered against Bay Bank, and/or to prevent any violation of laws relating to financial institutions. The written agreement did not speak to the opportunity for the Department to seek costs of examination and supervision pursuant to Section 655.045, Florida Statutes (1991), and to pursue removal and prohibition actions against Christo, Jr., and Christo, III, as Bay Bank officers pursuant to Section 655.037, Florida Statutes (1991), based upon findings made in the March 31, 1991 examination. Among requirements of the written agreement was found Paragraph 5 (a) which states: As of the effective date of this Agreement, the Bank shall not extend, directly or indirectly, any additional credit to or for the benefit of any borrower who has a loan or other extension of credit from the Bank which has been charged-off or classified, in whole or in part, "Loss" or "Doubtful" and is uncollected. The prohibition of this paragraph 5(a) shall not prohibit the Bank from renewing or extending the maturity of any credit, provided that the renewal or extension is approved by the full board and that all interest due at the time of such renewal or extension is collected in cash from the borrower. An additional requirement of the written agreement was set forth in Paragraph 7 where it states: As of the effective date of this Agreement, all new loans or lines of credit (including renewals and extensions of existing loans and lines of credit, but excluding additional advances under existing lines of credit) in an amount of $200,000 or more shall require the prior approval of the Bank's board of directors or the directors' committee designated to approve and review loans, and all such loans or lines of credit shall be supported by a written summary that provides the board of directors or directors' committee with the information sufficient for it to make a prudent decision. The Department seeks to impose discipline based upon alleged violations of the written agreement as set forth in the administrative complaint of May 15, 1992. Specifically, that administrative complaint contains allegations of violation of the written agreement associated with Paragraphs 5(a) and 7 directed to Bay Bank and the Christos for cease and desist and as a means of removal and prohibition against the Christos. Concerning Paragraph 5(a), Bay Bank allowed a customer to post over drafts on his checking account, thus maintaining an overdraft position, commencing September 28, 1991, and ending November 18, 1991. The allegations related to Paragraph 7 are discussed under the section in the recommended order detailing events about the letter of credit and a subsequent loan to JCJ Trust said to be made without board approval and proper documentation. Beyond alleged violations of the compromise of the differences between the Department, Bay Bank and its directors embodied by the written agreement, the May 15, 1992 administrative complaint seeks to impose discipline against the Christos for findings made in the course of the March 31, 1991 examination. Those allegations are associated with the manner in which the Christos conducted themselves as officers and directors of Bay Bank based upon findings made through the examination of March 31, 1991 related to the Christos' fiduciary duties. These latter allegations are grounded upon the contention that the Christos were responsible for the unsafe and unsound practices discovered during the March 31, 1991 examination. In response to problems with the payment of dividends Paragraph 2e of the written agreement stated: 2. (e) During the life of this Agreement, the bank shall not pay any dividends at any time it is in noncompliance with the capital and reserve requirement specified in paragraphs 2.(b), 3., 9., or Section 658.37, Florida Statutes. Prior to declaration of dividends, the board of directors will certify the bank's compliance with the cited sections and provide that certification to the Department. Letters of Credit and Loans On April 18, 1986, Bay Bank issued an unconditional/ irrevocable letter of credit to South Trust Bank of Alabama for JCJ Trust and a similar letter of credit to South Trust Bank of Alabama for Christo, Jr. Both letters of credit were in the amount of $425,000.00. The letters of credit expired on February 25, 1989. South Trust had required letters of credit as preconditions to granting the loans described on the stipulated facts herein. At some point in time unsigned notes and security agreements were placed in the files of Bay Bank associated with the Christo, Jr., and JCJ Trust letters of credit. The terms of the notes and security agreements to address the contingency that South Trust Bank would draw upon the letters of credit were not identified. Also missing was an amount of collateral to secure repayment. Nonetheless, there appeared to be a commitment by Bay Bank to meet the contingency where South Trust Bank drew upon the letters of credit by Bay Bank by then offering to loan money to Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust at an undisclosed rate. The Bay Bank records merely describe the collateral arrangement for such a contingent liability as "open". Further letters of credit were requested by Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust and issued by Bay Bank in the amount of $425,000.00 each to favor South Trust. The next letters of credit were issued on April 26, 1989. The duration of those letters of credit was until February 25, 1990. The letters of credit of April 26, 1989, had been approved by action of the Bay Bank directors through a common certification for John Christo, Jr., and JCJ Trust in which Christo, Jr. and Christo, III, abstained from voting and other beneficiaries through the JCJ Trust who were directors to Bay Bank were absent. When the letters of credit were issued on April 26, 1989, the loan line presentation for Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust revealed that no collateral was required when issuing the letters of credit to favor South Trust Bank. Included with the documents under consideration by the directors when they decided to issue these letters of credit was customer profile information for Christo, Jr., a statement of financial condition dated December 31, 1988 for Christo, Jr., a balance sheet for JCJ Trust from December 31, 1988, a February 28, 1989 portfolio investment review for JCJ Trust, and a review of assets of JCJ Trust as of December 31, 1988. On February 15, 1990, the Bay Bank directors again voted to approve lines of credit to favor South Trust Bank in amounts of $425,000.00 each at the request of Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust. The common certification of approval shows that Christo, Jr. and Christo, III abstained, while Missey Christo and Phillip Christo beneficiaries under JCJ Trust and directors voted to approve the issuance of the letters of credit. Again the loan line presentations for Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust reveal that collateral was not required in issuing the two letters of credit. The terms of the duration of the letters of credit issued on February 25, 1990, ended on February 25, 1991. The beginning date for the letters of credit was February 25, 1990. The Bay Bank records reveal a customer profile of John Christo, Jr., as associated with the letter of credit approved on February 15, 1990. The information concerning the customer profile is dated February 13, 1990. On February 19, 1991, the Bay Bank directors were requested to and voted to issue letters of credit to favor South Trust Bank related to Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust in the amount of $425,000.00 each. The common certification of approval shows that Christo, Jr. abstained from voting. Christo, III, voted in favor of the letters of credit as did Phillip Christo and Missey Christo, other directors and beneficiaries under JCJ Trust. In association with the letters of credit on February 19, 1991, the loan line presentations for Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust revealed that no collateral was provided. The act of approval involved a customer profile for Christo, Jr. from February 12, 1991. Also included was a balance sheet for JCJ Trust dated December 31, 1989, with notes to the financial statement. The duration of the respective letters of credit was February 25, 1991 through February 25, 1992. A draft or drafts drawn on the respective letters of credit would be honored through March 25, 1992. Each time Bay Bank through its directors voted to approve letters of credit to favor South Trust Bank at the request made by Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust, the directors exercised distinct acts of discretion. The letters of credit issued in 1986, 1989, 1990 and 1991 did not establish terms that would entitle Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust to an automatic renewal once a prior letter of credit expired. Each letter of credit had its own identifying number. The common features of the respective letters of credit were that they were irrevocable and transferable. Commencing with the series of the letters of credit issued in 1989 and extending through the series in 1990 and 1991, the basis for drawing on the letters of credit was a statement from South Trust Bank that the amount for which the draft was drawn was representative of amounts due and payable by Christo, Jr. or JCJ Trust to South Trust Bank on loans extended from South Trust Bank to Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust which were a minimum of 30 days past due. The March 31, 1991 examination did not report that the actions by Christo, Jr., Christo, III, and other beneficiaries that the JCJ Trust who were directors had violated any laws or regulations in their conduct around the time the Bay Bank directors' made their February 19, 1991 decision to approve the letters of credit to favor South Trust Bank. Contentions of violations of laws or regulations concerning the conduct by Christo, Jr. and Christo, III first arose in the May 15, 1992 administrative complaint for cease and desist and removal and prohibition. The administrative complaint concerning inappropriate action by Christo, Jr. and Christo, III in their consideration of the extension of the letters of credit to South Trust Bank through the February 19, 1991 meeting of Bay Bank directors and the consequences of that decision is somewhat premised upon findings made by the FDIC in the November 18, 1991 examination as adopted by the Department, in which the FDIC reported violations of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 C.F.R. 215.4 (Regulation O), and Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. s. 371(c). Related allegations about the letters of credit are based upon claims of breaches of fiduciary duties by the Christos. A further discussion of the November 18, 1991, federal examination follows. A notation was made in the March 31, 1991 examination concerning the Christo, Jr. letter of credit issued on February 25, 1991 in the amount of $425,000.00 wherein it is described in the examination report as, "additionally, a contingent liability of an unfunded, unsecured letter of credit to South Trust Bank of Alabama, N.A. to secure a $425,000.00 note there, also exist." As of August 26, 1991, Christo, Jr. was past due on his obligation to South Trust Bank and South Trust Bank drew upon the letter of credit. The draw was in the amount of $425,115.00 which was paid from Bay Bank to South Trust Bank on August 26, 1991. On September 3, 1991, Christo, Jr. signed a term disclosure note and security agreement in the amount of $425,000.00 at an annual interest rate of 10.736 percent. That interest rate was not more favorable than an ordinary customer of Bay Bank could have obtained. No security was required when Bay Bank made its September 3, 1991 loan to Christo, Jr. On September 23, 1991, the JCJ Trust debt to South Trust Bank having been overdue for more than 30 days, South Trust Bank drew upon the letter of credit associated with JCJ Trust. The draw was in the amount of $425,000.00. On October 2, 1991, a loan in the principle amount of $426,479.80 was made from Bay Bank to JCJ Trust, Christo, III as Trustee, to cover the draw that had been made by South Trust Bank against Bay Bank upon the letter of credit. The granting of this loan is alleged to be in violation of paragraph 7 to the written agreement. It is not a violation because the loan predates the effective date of the written agreement. The maturity date on the loan made on October 2, 1991, was October 1, 1992. The annual percentage rate was 10.885, interest terms that were not more favorable to JCJ Trust than would be available to Bay Bank's ordinary customers. In February, 1992, the Bay Bank directors took action to approve the loan that had been made to JCJ Trust on October 2, 1991. No indication is made in the credit file records of Bay Bank concerning the date upon which the Bay Bank directors may have approved the September 3, 1991 loan to Christo, Jr. Prudent lending practices would not have justified the approval of the February 26, 1991, letters of credit requested by Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust when taking into account credit information made available to the Bay Bank directors, especially when considering that the letters of credit were approved without provision of security from the requesting parties, Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust. It can be inferred that Christo, Jr., Christo, III, and other directors were aware that the custom and practice within Bay Bank was to not extend letters of credit in excess of $100,000.00 without requiring provision of security in the way of mortgages on real estate, certificates of deposit or a combination of both forms of security. At the time the February 19, 1991 decision was made to approve the letters of credit to South Bay at the request of Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust, it can be inferred that Christo, Jr. and Christo, III, recognized that terms of credit should not have been granted to those requesting parties because the arrangements did not comport with terms available to other borrowers. This admonition included reference to more beneficial terms to "related interests" and "affiliates." JCJ Trust was a "related interest" and "an affiliate" at the time the decision was reached on February 19, 1991, to approve the letter of credit requested by JCJ Trust through Christo, III. Christo, Jr. and Christo, III, as trustee for JCJ Trust had made no alternative arrangements to make Bay Bank whole in the event South Trust Bank called on the letters of credit issued February 26, 1991. This refers to an arrangement separate and apart from the unsecured notes which were signed by Christo, Jr., and JCJ Trust in the person of Christo, III, following the draws by South Trust against the letters of credit, as a means of protecting Bay Bank at a time when the bank was troubled financially. The February 19, 1991, decision to approve letters of credit requested by Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust were not adequately supported with an underlying written justification contrary to existing bank policy and prudent banking practice. As with the extension of the line of credit on February 26, 1991, the financial position of Christo, Jr. did not justify the unsecured loan that Bay Bank made to him on September 3, 1991. These arrangements were contrary to prudent banking practice. Moreover, it was violative of the Bay Bank loan policies and constituted more favorable treatment than an ordinary customer would receive. The loan was contrary to the policies in that the unsecured loan was not "supported by satisfactory balance sheet and income statement information with repayment from demonstrated cash flow or reasonably certain conversion of its assets." Similar problems were in evidence concerning the loan made to JCJ trust on October 2, 1991. Prudent bankers would not have extended the credit to JCJ Trust, to include a lack of security, contrary to the credit opportunities a normal customer would have had. The balance sheet available to support the JCJ loan was out of date. Moreover, the availability of funds to repay the loan according to the balance sheet was inadequate. The problems with the Christo, Jr. September 3, 1991 loan concerned heavy debt obligations for notes payable to Bay Bank and South Trust and a questionable position concerning assets that were readily available to meet debt service at the time the decision was being reached to extend the September 3, 1991 credit. These problems were evident in the December 31, 1989 financial statement pertaining to Christo, Jr. The principle asset available to JCJ Trust to meet the debt obligations contemplated by the October 2, 1991 loan were associated with Bay Bank stock. The Bay Savings Bank stock which was shown on the December 31, 1989 balance sheet for JCJ Trust had no value as support for the October 2, 1991 loan in that the savings bank had been declared insolvent by the Department and placed in conservatorship through the Resolution Trust Corporation in September, 1991. The Bay Bank stock was not a liquid asset to meet the loan obligation, there being no apparent market for its disposal as a means to obtain ready cash to meet the debt obligation envisioned by the note issued on October 2, 1991. Nor could dividends be anticipated as a means to meet the debt obligation, Bay Bank having been criticized in the March 31, 1991 examination for paying out dividends in a circumstance in which there was a need to infuse additional capital to bolster the loan loss reserve deficit and in view of the limiting features in the written agreement concerning payment of dividends. In this connection the true value of the Bay Bank stock when considering the methods employed for its valuation is uncertain during the period of time at which the loans were made to JCJ Trust and Christo, Jr., those dates being October 2, 1991 and September 3, 1991 respectively. Although more recent financial statements not found in the credit files associated with the loans made on September 3, 1991, and October 2, 1991, to Christo, Jr. and JCJ Trust respectively was potentially available in making the decisions concerning those loans, those more recent financial statements do not depict a financial position by the borrowers that would justify the loans. Strictly considered, the existence of other financial statements had no pertinence at the time that the loans were made, because the loan and discount committee and the directors made their decisions based upon matters found within the credit file and it is their actions at the moment that warrant criticism. After the letter of credit issued on February 25, 1991 to Christo, Jr. was drawn upon, the September 3, 1991 note for repayment by Christo, Jr., to Bay Bank was one without collateral and for which no payment was due until maturity on September 3, 1992 and about which the source of repayment was questionable. Therefore, it involved more than the normal risk of repayment. After the letter of credit issued on February 25, 1991 to JCJ Trust was drawn upon, the October 2, 1991 note for repayment by JCJ Trust to Bay Bank as one without collateral and for which no payment was due until maturity on October 1, 1992 and about which the source of repayment was questionable. Therefore, it involved more than the normal risk of repayment. Christo, III's claim that when he voted on February 19, 1991 to approve the JCJ Trust letter of credit that he did so through inadvertence is not persuasive. The protocol for considering this letter of credit was the same as had been the case in the past when the directors decided to provide a letter of credit for JCJ Trust. On those prior occasions Christo, III, had abstained from voting on the JCJ Trust on a single voting sheet for JCJ Trust and Christo, Jr. Nothing had changed in the voting sheet format for February 19, 1991. His claim that he was confused and mistakenly voted for the JCJ Trust letter of credit on February 19, 1991, because it also contained a reference to the Christo, Jr. letter of credit is not credible. The idea that his decision was inadvertent based upon some confusion is rejected in favor of the inference that his choice to vote was through negligence or intent. FDIC Examination The circumstances associated with the JCJ Trust February 25, 1991 letter of credit and the ensuing loan of October 2, 1991, that have been described form the basis for the FDIC through the November 18, 1991 report of examination to comment that violations of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 C.F.R., s. 215.4 and Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. 371(c) had occurred. In addition, the FDIC in its November 18, 1991 examination rated Bay Bank through the Camel rating system as an aggregate 4. As with the prior rating by the Department, Bay Bank was observed by the FDIC to be engaged in unsafe and unsound practices through acts of commission or omission by its management team and directors. Although some changes can be seen through the findings made in the state examination performed on March 31, 1991 compared to the report of examination by the FDIC on November 18, 1991, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6, they do not tend to substantially alter the impression about the persistent problems within the institution. In particular, the FDIC directed criticism to the board of directors concerning the need for the directors to ensure that executive management was cognizant of applicable laws and regulations pertaining to the bank's activities and the need to develop a system to affect and monitor compliance with those laws and regulations. This observation was made notwithstanding the recognition that members of the board of directors for Bay Bank would not necessarily be expected to have personal knowledge of those laws and regulations, but would need to make certain that the laws and regulations received high priority attention by the bank's everyday managers. The FDIC also commented on a problem with maintaining an appropriate internal control system and an adequate means of auditing as evidenced by violations found within the November 18, 1991 report. The board was reminded to evaluate the adequacy of the bank's loan watch-list as that device was calculated to assist in determining the proper allowance for loan losses, and from there establish a sufficient loan loss reserve. The loan loss reserve was criticized. The regulators subsequent adjustment to the loan loss reserve calculation following the November 18, 1991 examination still revealed a deficiency in the loan loss reserve. There was a continuing problem with asset quality showing a further deterioration from the March 31, 1991 state examination. This pertains to adversely classified loans in the categories of loss and doubtful loans, when taking into account the need to comply with the written agreement in charging off 100 percent of loss and 50 percent of doubtful. Among the adversely classified loans which were mentioned in the FDIC examination was the October 2, 1991 loan to JCJ Trust. The November 18, 1991 report reminded Bay Bank to dispose of other real estate at the earliest favorable opportunity. The FDIC examination pointed out the weakness in the bank's capital position due to large loan losses. When the examination was conducted on November 18, 1991, the liquidity ratio was found to be unsatisfactory. Fiduciary Duties Generally, Christo, Jr. and Christo, III, were sufficiently apprised of the practices which are complained of and proven here to be held accountable for their respective actions or inactions as bank officers. More specifically, Christo, Jr., and Christo, III, were knowledgeable concerning the respective financial positions of Christo, Jr., and JCJ Trust associated with the letters of credit approved on February 25, 1991, for Christo, Jr., in his personal capacity and Christo, III, as Trustee for JCJ Trust. The Christos knew or should have known about the Bay Bank loan policies for issuing letters of credit on February 25, 1991. The basis for imputing this knowledge or need for knowledge is premised upon the fact that Christo, Jr., was then CEO and Christo, III, was then president of Bay Bank. Given their positions as officers the Christos knew or should have known that the letters of credit that were issued on February 25, 1991, were by terms dissimilar to those afforded the ordinary bank customer when receiving a letter of credit. Similarly, the Christos knew or should have known that the loans that were made to Christo, Jr., and JCJ Trust on September 3, 1991 and October 2, 1991 respectively were pursuant to arrangements that were not otherwise available to an ordinary bank customer. Another reason for holding the Christos to knowledge of relevant requirements for proper practices and conduct in bank affairs is based upon the fact that Christo, Jr., had been a banker, and for the most part, a chief executive of a bank, for a period approximating 30 years at the time the decisions were made concerning the letters of credit and loans once the letters of credit were drawn upon. In a related capacity Christo, III, has been a national bank examiner and has worked in banking for a period of approximately 25 years to include 10 years service with Bay Bank as an executive officer. Notwithstanding their background and knowledge the Christos allowed conditions to arise in association with the issuance of the two letters of credit and the loans that were made following draws, in contravention of internal loan policies, prudent banking practices and laws and regulations. It is to be expected that the Christos should have reminded the other directors that internal bank policies and laws and regulations would not allow more favorable treatment for Christo, Jr., and JCJ Trust concerning the issuance of letters of credit in February of 1991 and loans in September and October, 1991, to pay back the draws, especially when taking into account that security was not required for the transactions in question. The need for the other directors who voted to issue the letters of credit and to approve loans following the draws, to conform to acceptable banking practices in their respective positions as directors, does not excuse the Christos from their affirmative duty to remind the other directors to conform to internal policies and laws and regulations concerning equal treatment of other persons and bank officials when establishing letters of credit and making loans. The Christos failed to properly exercise their fiduciary duties when action was taken concerning the letters of credit and subsequent loans following the draws. It was not enough for Christo, Jr., to abstain from participating in the decision to approve his letter of credit and that for JCJ Trust. It was even more inappropriate for Christo, III, to affirmatively vote in favor of the letters of credit for JCJ Trust and Christo, Jr. The arrangements made for the benefit of Christo, Jr., and JCJ Trust left Bay Bank exposed for $850,000.00 in disbursements without security should the letters of credit be drawn upon and that arrangement continued following the decision to make loans to Christo, Jr., and JCJ Trust in a related amount after the letters of credit were drawn upon. The Christos as the principal managers of the bank when the examinations were conducted were shown through the findings made in the examination reports to have breached their fiduciary duties. By failing to meet their responsibilities concerning the findings made in the two examinations and related to the Christo, Jr., and JCJ Trust letters of credit and loans, the Christos engaged in unsafe and unsound practices whose consequences created the likelihood of abnormal risk or loss, insolvency or dissipation of assets which seriously prejudice the interests of Bay Bank and its depositors when taking into account the overall condition of Bay Bank at the time at which the letters of credit were issued and the loans made following the draws. History of Regulatory Correction The external history of action by the Department to correct problems within Bay Bank is constituted of the written agreement that has been described. Consistent Agency Practices As alluded to before, the treatment given other institutions which the Department regulates when considering the propriety of assessing the costs of examination and supervision does not point out inconsistent agency practices. Having reviewed the evidence concerning inconsistent agency practice in removal and prohibition of individuals from participating in banking in Florida, while the means to affect removal from an institution may not have always been the same, the outcome anticipated by that process is sufficiently consistent and the factual differences between cases do not lead to a finding that the agency has acted inconsistently when comparing its effort to remove the Christos with other removal actions described at hearing.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of facts and the conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be issued which assesses the cost of examination and supervision for the March 31, 1991 examination in the amount $67,494.20; That denies the imposition of a levy for late payment of $100.00 per day commencing November 5, 1991 and beyond; That denies the imposition of an administrative fine for intentional late payment in the amount of $1,000.00 per day commencing December 16, 1991 and beyond; That orders Bay Bank, its officers, directors, or other persons participating in the conduct of the affairs of Bay Bank, to cease and desist from engaging in practices which would allow Christo, Jr., and Christo, III, to obtain credit from Bay Bank in contravention of laws and regulations, and which breach the October 14, 1991 written agreement and Bay Bank internal policies; That prohibits Christo, Jr., from participating in Bay Bank or any other financial institution regulated by the Department as an officer or in a similar position for Bay Bank or any other financial institution or becoming a director in any other financial institution and that restricts Christo, Jr., in his directorship at Bay Bank from participating in any decision to select or dismiss Bay Bank officers or directors; That prohibits Christo, III, from participating in Bay Bank or any other financial institution regulated by the Department as an officer or in a similar position for Bay Bank or any other financial institution or becoming a director in any other financial institution and that restricts Christo, III, in his directorship at Bay Bank from participating in any decision to select or dismiss Bay Bank officers or directors; DONE and ENTERED this 1st day of February, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-2455 and 92-3744 The following discussion is given concerning the proposed facts submitted by the parties: Petitioner's Facts: Paragraphs 1 through 26 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 27 and 28 constitute conclusions of law. Paragraphs 29 through 81 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 82 constitutes legal argument. Paragraphs 83 through 85 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 86 is not relevant. Paragraphs 87 through 123 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 124 is rejected. Paragraphs 125 through 136 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 137 constitutes legal argument. Paragraphs 138 through 145 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 146 constitutes a conclusion of law. Paragraph 147 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 148 constitutes a conclusion of law. Paragraphs 149 through 152 constitute legal argument. Paragraph 153 through 170 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 171 through 181 constitute legal argument. Paragraph 182 through 201 are subordinate to facts found. Respondent's Facts: Paragraphs 4 through 7 with the exception of the latter sentences found within subparagraphs 13 through 15 to paragraph 7 are subordinate to facts found. Those latter sentences within the subparagraphs are not relevant. Paragraphs 8 through 10 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 11 is subordinate to facts found with the exception that subparagraph 1 in its suggestion that the Department does not adequately explain its assignment of an aggregate score is rejected, as is the contention at subparagraph 9 that Camel rating may be changed at a "whim" and that a change was made to a component Camel rating in the March 31, 1991 examination without justification for that change. Paragraph 12 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 13 is rejected. Paragraph 14 is not relevant. Paragraphs 15 through 30 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 31 as it attempts to defend the accusations in the administrative complaint is rejected. Paragraph 32 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 33 through 36 are not relevant. Paragraph 37 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 38 is rejected. Paragraph 39 is not relevant. Paragraph 40 is rejected. Paragraph 41 is not relevant. Paragraph 42 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 43 is not relevant. Paragraphs 44 through 48 are subordinate to facts found, except that the subparts to Paragraph 48 constitute legal argument. Paragraph 49 is not relevant. The first sentence to Paragraph 50 is not relevant. The second sentence is rejected. Paragraphs 51 and 52 are rejected. Paragraph 53 constitutes legal argument. Paragraphs 51 and 52 are rejected. Paragraph 53 constitutes legal argument. Paragraphs 54 through 56 are not relevant. Paragraphs 57 and 58 are rejected. Paragraph 59 is not relevant. Paragraph 60 does not form a defense to the accusations. Paragraph 61 and 62 are rejected. COPIES FURNISHED: Alan C. Sundberg, Esquire Robert Pass, Esquire E. Kelley Bittick, Jr., Esquire Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel Smith & Cutler, P.A. 500 Barnett Bank Building 215 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William G. Reeves, General Counsel Albert T. Gimble, Chief Banking Counsel Department of Banking and Finance Suite 1302, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 William A. Friedlander, Esquire Raymond B. Vickers, Esquire Craig S. Kiser, Esquire 424 West Call Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gerald Lewis, Comptroller Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
Findings Of Fact Caribank, N.A. ("Caribank"), was acquired by J. J. Gonzalez Gorrondona, Jr. ("Gorrondona Jr.") and George Childs, Jr. ("Childs") in May, 1977, and Dania Bank was acquired by these individuals through a tender offer in April, 1978. Caribank Corporation, the Applicant herein, is a bank holding company that now owns more than 99 percent of the stock of Caribank. Gorrondona Jr. owns 90 percent of Caribank Corporation and Childs owns 10 percent. Caribank Corporation was originally named Banconac Shares, Inc. when it was established in November, 1977. Its name was changed to Caribank Corporation on June 5, 1979. Banconac is a name used by many subsidiaries of the Banco National de Descuento ("BND"), a Venezuelan private commercial bank, a majority of the stock of which was formerly owned by Gorrondona Jr. and his father, J. J. Gonzalez Gorrondona, Sr. ("Gorrondona Sr."). It is derived from the name Banco National de Descuento and is used in Venezuela to signify business owned by the BND directly or indirectly. The use of the name Banconac in the Applicant's former name was not explained by the Applicant although Gorrondona Jr.'s testimony established that BND funds were not used to purchase Caribank. Gorrondona Jr. owns approximately 90 percent of Dania Bank and Childs owns approximately 10 percent of the Dania Bank, a state chartered bank. Approximately .3 percent is owned by shareholders who did not surrender their shares. Martin L. Wyneken ("Wyneken") is President and chief executive officer of both the Dania Bank in Broward County and of the Caribank in Coral Gables, Dade County. Childs is Chairman of the Board of the Dania Bank and Caribank, and President, Treasurer and a Director of Caribank Corporation. Policies of Caribank and Dania Bank are established through frequent conferences between Childs and Wyneken. Wyneken has a very close working relationship with Childs. Gorrondona, Jr. has the power to remove Wyneken and Childs. Childs comes to Florida about three times per month to confer with Wyneken. In these above-mentioned discussions, Childs is the spokesman for the "capital." Owning 90 percent of the stock of the Dania Bank provides Gorrondona, Jr. with authority concerning the management and policies of the bank. Directors of the Dania Bank are selected by the shareholders. Gorrondona, Jr. and Childs have not taken any dividends as shareholders of Dania Bank or Caribank, despite the substantial earnings of these banks. Dania Bank and Caribank centralize their operations as much as possible with two separate corporations. Dania Bank and Caribank trade employees back and forth and bill each other through an elaborate accounting system. Thad R. Chamberlain, a director of Caribank Corporation, is executive director of the Banco Suramericano de Desarollo, a Panamanian bank in which Gorrondona, Jr. owns a controlling interest. This is an application pursuant to the Florida Banking Code, Section 658.28, Florida Statutes, for permission to acquire control of Dania Bank by Caribank Corporation. This change in control is sought in order to facilitate a merger of Caribank and Dania Bank. The merger is desired to facilitate the expansion of branch banking, the development of an international department and the development of subsidiaries in such areas as leasing, mortgage financing, and small business investment (S.B.I.C.). The combined capital of Caribank, of approximately $4 million, and the Dania Bank, of $16 million, is expected to facilitate the establishment of subsidiaries. Dania and Caribank are, according to their Chief Executive Officer, Wyneken, "aggressive" banks and there exists a policy of increasing total assets from $265 million at the end of June, 1982, to $500 million by the end of 1985; there is also an aggressive program for subsidiaries. The merged bank plans to spend more on advertising in Dade County. Caribank at its present size cannot justify an increase in advertising expenditures. If this application is approved and a merger subsequently occurs, management expects that there will be benefit on the deposit side since assertedly better use will be able to be made of the money deposited. The Caribank/Dania Bank management has an ambitious program of branch banking. Gorrondona, Jr. and Childs have asked that Dania and Caribank branch into the counties as quickly as possible. Management would like to concentrate branching efforts in Dade County, but their capital at Caribank is so much smaller that it must rely on the Dania Bank for all kinds of assistance. Denial of this application and the failure to merge would restrict expansion in Dade County. The Caribank/Dania Bank management hope that the merged bank will become a large chain bank. The Chief Executive Officer of the two banks testified that to become a large chain bank "[W]e need every bit of help we can get, and that is why we need this consolidation." According to Childs, merger is expected to allow a "substantial increase in the capital base of all the subsidiaries which we have established or intend in the future to establish." A merger is expected to follow immediately upon the granting of the application. If the application were approved and for some reason the merger did not occur, Applicant would seek to change the name of the Dania Bank to Caribank to get the maximum effect out of their advertising dollars. It is further expected that if the application for change in control is granted, the two banks could file a consolidated tax return with an annual tax saving of approximately $64,000. From the above findings, it can reasonably be inferred that this application is made to facilitate a program of rapid expansion and establishment of subsidiaries, and if the application is granted, it can be expected that rapid expansion and development of subsidiaries will be more likely to occur. George Childs, Jr., started Banac Management, Inc. ("Banac") for Gorrondona, Jr. seven and a half years ago and was president of the corporation at the time of the intervention of the BND (discussed below). Banca is a BND subsidiary located in New York City. At the time of the intervention it was acting as a representative of the BND and its subsidiaries to obtain credit lines. Prior to the intervention, Gorrondona, Jr. was involved in the affairs of Banac. He visited Banac in New York six to seven times per year. He was a member of the Banac Board of Directors from 1975 to 1979. The BND was founded in 1954 by Dr. Jose Joaquin Gonzalez Gorrondona, Sr., who is the father of Gonzalez Gorrondona, Jr., the ninety percent (90 percent) owner of the Petitioner, Caribank Corporation, and the subject bank, The Dania Bank. Dr. Gonzalez Gorrondona, Sr. does not now, nor has he ever had any interest in, nor involvement with, Caribank Corporation, The Dania Bank or Caribank, N.A. Since its beginning, the BND had a steady growth until, at the time of the intervention of the bank by the government on December 7, 1978, it was the largest privately owned (nongovernmental) bank in Venezuela with the largest amount of private deposits, 6.3 billion Bolivars (1 Bolivar equals about 0.25 in U.S currency). Gorrondona, Jr. began working at the bank in 1958, worked throughout his early years, and continued to work full-time for the bank after receiving his doctoral degree in economics from the Catholic University in Venezuela with a doctoral thesis in economic planning. During his education, Gorrondona, Jr. studied such subjects as Monetary Theory, History of Financial Institutions, Operation of Financial Institutions, and Public Finance. His interest in economics began early in his life because Dr. Gonzalez Gorrondona, Sr. was the founder of the School of Economics in Venezuela, having been the founder of the Venezuelan Economic Council and the representative of Venezuela at the Bretton Woods meeting in 1943 at which the International Monetary Fund was founded. After graduation, Gorrondona, Jr. continued to study, taking courses in management such as Management by Objective, Computer Science, Systems Analysis, and other courses which would enable him to perform as a manager of a financial institution. Gorrondona, Jr. worked in many phases of the management of the bank, until in 1974, he became president in charge, which means that he was the chief executive officer in the absence of his father. He never drew a salary. By the time of the BND intervention, the stock interest of Gorrondona, Jr. was worth between $350 and $700 million dollars. As an outcome of the intervention, Gorrondona, Jr. lost between $150 and $200 million dollars in the worth of the BND stock which was owned by him. By the time of the intervention, the BND had grown to a bank which included approximately 60 branches, primarily in urban areas of Venezuela. The BND also owned several profitable subsidiaries, including Crenca, a financial society which was able to engage in financial transactions forbidden for commercial banks; Credimatico, which was the owner of a Master Charge franchise in Venezuela which had a market share of twenty-five percent of the credit card sales in the country; Arrendarca, a leasing and factoring company; and Almacendadora Caracas, a bonded warehouse company owning bonded warehouses in several cities in Venezuela. The BND also owned Servimatico, which dealt mainly with consumer credit and financed appliance and other small consumer purchases. Each of these subsidiaries was profitable to the bank and assisted the bank in paying dividends which had been declared each year, since 1973. Beginning prior to 1977, the BND was required to send its minutes of Board meetings to the Superintendent of Banks because there had been detected, as a result of special inspection, a tendency toward concentration of credit. In 1978, BND was the only bank required to send minutes of Board meetings to the Superintendent. At a majority of the meetings of the Board of the Central Bank of Venezuela ("CBV") during the last six months of 1978, there was an agenda item entitled "BND." During this time, employees of the Superintendent and the CBV were at the BND carrying out studies to see in what way or ways the BND's financial soundness could be improved. In August of 1978, the Superintendent of Banks wrote to the Minister of Finance about the situation of the BND. The letter notes that credits of Bs. 2,553.8 million were concentrated in 130 companies, that directors of these companies were in turn, directors of the bank, that there was a disproportion between the amount of these credits and the net worth of the borrower, that renewals were made even after delay in payment and that the credits were extended without analysis of the balance sheet. In September, 1973, the BND was prohibited from distributing dividends by the Superintendent of Banks because it would have adversely affected the liquidity of the BND. In November of 1978, the BND asked the Venezuelan Government for special financial aid in the amount of Bs. 600 million. The BND proposed that it be made the subject of a "private intervention" during the period of time such advance was outstanding. On December 6, 1978, the CBV excluded the BND from the Clearing House effective December 7, 1978, by vote of its Board. The CBV, the equivalent of the U.S. Federal Reserve, is a public institution of the Republic of Venezuela, but is considered independent. Eight members of its Board of Directors and its President are appointed by the government. Six members are appointed on recommendation of the private sector. The CBV, through its credit functions, provides credit assistance to banks and credit institutions in Venezuela. Through its operations, it seeks to safeguard the solvency and liquidity of Venezuela's banking system. A Clearing House to settle accounts between banks is operated by the CBV. When bank customers draw and deposit checks, credits and debits between banks are created that have to be reconciled on a daily basis. Venezuelan banks are required by law to maintain a deposit account at the CBV in order to settle such accounts. If after reconciliation, a bank owes money to other banks, its CBV account is debited to cover the debt. If after reconciliation, a bank is owed money, its account is credited. If a bank does not have enough on deposit to cover its debts, it can present to the CBV cash or checks or payment orders against other banks in sufficient amount. It can also present funds obtained outside the country. Finally, it can obtain funds by rediscounting commercial paper at the CBV. Rediscount consists of endorsing eligible commercial paper to the CBV in return for payment. Eligible paper, for example, must mature within 360 days and be adequately secured so that there is assurance as to its liquidity or self-liquidating nature. Thus, medium or long-term loans do not normally give rise to eligible paper. The decision to exclude the BND from the Clearing House was reached on December 5 and 6, 1978. Prior to this time, BND had had repeated difficulties converting its debts at the Clearing House. On December 5, the CBV Board authorized the exclusion of the BND in principle subject to discussion with the Venezuelan Government. At the time, the BND did not have commercial paper considered eligible by the CBV to receive credit assistance from the CBV. The situation was examined again on December 6 by the CBV to see if there were new elements or new alternatives. On December 6, 1978, the BND was overdrawn at the Clearing House to the extent of being unable to make good in its negative balance of approximately Bs. 100 million. It was decided there were no new elements or alternatives, and accordingly, the President of the CBV wrote to the Venezuelan Minister of Finance to let him know (1) that the BND had a deficit in its legal reserve requirement (see below); and (2) that the CBV Board had decided to exclude the BND from the Clearing House effective December 7, 1978. Prior to the exclusion of the BND from the Clearing House, the CBV Board considered the possibility of extending extraordinary credit assistance to the BND. The Board concluded that such assistance would be in violation of Article 45 of the law governing the CBV. That article provides: "Article 45. - In exceptional cases and with the favorable vote of the six members of its Board of Directors, the Banco Central de Venezuela may, in order to insure the due liquidity of a bank or credit institution in transitory difficulties, provide it with funds for a period not to exceed ninety days, which may be extended for an equal term at the Bank's discretion, secured by other assets of said bank or credit institution, different from those listed in the previous article. "Loans may in no event be made to a bank or credit institution if the trans- itory difficulties it faces are due, in the Board's opinion, after having consulted with the Bank Regulatory Commission, to the poor management or inadequate investment of its resources." In the case of the BND, the CBV Board concluded extraordinary credit assistance would be illegal because BND's liquidity problems were not "transitory" but rather structural, permanent and progressive, because the liquidity problems of the BND were due to improper investment of its resources, and because its funds were invested in operations that were insecure or lacking in guarantees, which reflected bad banking management. Under the rules and regulations of the Clearing House, the exclusion of the BND was mandatory. On the evening of December 6, 1978, a meeting was held at the Presidential Palace attended by the President of Venezuela, the Minister of Finance, other ministers involved in the financial sector, some of the board members of the CBV and the Superintendent of Banks. The stated purpose of the meeting was to inform the President of the Republic about the BND situation. The meeting lasted three hours. There was a discussion as to whether there was any alternative to the one proposed by the CBV. It was concluded that there was no alternative. The President of the Republic instructed the Minister of Finance and the President of CBV to hold a meeting the following morning to inform the banking community that the BND had been excluded from the Clearing House and that the government had decided to intervene the BND. The decision to intervene was unanimous. Two major events which contributed to the liquidity crisis which allowed the government to intervene the BND, were the result of actions by the government itself. The first of these actions was the substantial withdrawal of public funds from the BND. Between November 30 and December 6, over 100 million dollars was withdrawn by the government agencies from the BND. Withdrawals averaged 20 million dollars per day with a high of 30 million dollars on December 6. These daily balances were reported by the Comptroller of the bank to Gorrondona, Jr. on a twice daily basis during these days. No testimony, either from a witness or in the form of an exhibit, was ever introduced to contradict Gorrondona, Jr.'s testimony concerning these substantial withdrawals during the week prior to the intervention. The second action which was taken by the government injurious to the BND was the refusal to accept commercial paper for rediscount. Gorrondona, Jr.'s unrebutted testimony established that the same paper which was denied rediscount by the Central Bank on December 6 was granted rediscount on December 30 and during the period of time after the intervention. Gorrondona, Jr.'s testimony established that it would have been impossible to change the loan portfolio within such a short period of time and therefore of necessity it was the same loan portfolio which was granted rediscount after the intervention which had been denied rediscount during the week prior to the intervention. Gorrondona, Jr. further testified that the December 7, 1978, hand- written balance sheet, contained in Petitioner's Exhibit 70, the Intervenor's January 12, 1979, report, was a consolidated balance sheet including all 60 of the BND's branches. Therefore, the balance sheet was prepared by employees of the intervenor during the period between December 7, 1978 and January 12, 1979. On the issue of loans eligible for rediscount on December 7, Mr. Gabledone, Respondent's witness, using Respondent's Exhibit 70, stated that if the figures in Exhibit 70 were correct, the BND had 3.663 billion Bolivars eligible for rediscount on December 7, and that "the BND would have been able to obtain a large amount of rediscounts, or large amounts that would be eligible for rediscounts." In part, a result of the withdrawal of government funds, the failure of the government to repay its loans and overdrafts, and the denial of rediscount by the Central Bank of BND commercial paper, the BND had a deficit at the Central Clearing House on December 6 of 100 million Bolivars. Article 166 of the General Banking Law of Venezuela provides: "Whenever a bank or credit institute, subject to the Provisions of this Act, faces a preca- rious situation which might entail an eventual detriment to its depositors or creditors, or endanger the banking system in general, or when infringing repeatedly (the provisions of) this Act, or those of the Central Bank of Venezuela Statute or the Regulations of either or both, or any Resolution adopted by the Executive Branch, the Superintendent of Banks or of the Central Bank of Venezuela, then the Executive Branch shall empower the Superintendent of Banks or any other individual it may deem com- petent to place the Bank or Credit Institute in Receivership. The Receiver may agree with the Central Bank of Venezuela on the course of action to be taken for the respective bank's or credit institute's redress, its eventual reorganization or liquidation, which shall become mandatory for the respective financial house. But he shall, without exception, pre- pare, within a period not exceeding thirty days as from the date or resolution decreeing the receivership, a complete and itemized report concerning the legitimacy of the respective intervention and submit it to the Executive Branch. By Resolution 2296 issued December 7, 1978, the Minister of Finance of Venezuela intervened the BND. Intervention is an uncommon occurrence and the law contemplates it will occur only when a financial institution is in danger. The decision to intervene the BND could have been appealed to the Supreme Court of Venezuela. No appeal was taken. Neither Gorrondona, Sr. or Jr. or any other shareholder filed suit to block or overturn the intervention, although they had lawyers in Venezuela and Gorrondona, Sr. was in Venezuela. The BND is still under intervention. On march 31, 1979, the Superintendent of Banks of Venezuela issued its Annual Report for the year 1978 ("Superintendent's Report"). The Report contains an extensive discussion of the BND and the reasons for its intervention. The Superintendent's Report states the following: In 1977 and 1978, a decrease in the rate of growth of the Venezuelan economy together with unbalanced financial management at the BND whose key feature was credit over- expansion, especially as regarded credits to companies connected to the bank, placed the BND in a non-liquidity crisis to be- come increasingly notorious. The BND was the object of special attention by the Bank Regulatory Commission because over the 5 years preceding the intervention several violations of the General Law on Banks and other Credit Institutions had been detected. The BND had repeated insufficiency of the reserve requirement, a problem from which the bank chronically suffered. The BND was twice fined the maximum amount for illegal credits extended (1) to the Banco Suramericano de Desarollo ("BSD"), a Panamanian bank in which Gorrondona Jr. owns 80 percent of the shares, and (2) Crenca, a BND subsidiary, in violation of Article 153 of the Banking Law. Certain credits regarded by the BND as agricultural were not properly classified as agricultural. As of March 31, 1978, Bs. 2,553.8 million of bank loans were concentrated in 130 customers (the "Specially Classified Companies"). Directors of these companies were also bank directors. Credits were granted to these companies easily, then were renewed frequently and even when over- due, balance sheets for some of these credits did not exist and most of the credits were unsecured. The minutes provided by the BND to the Superintendent of Banks were not identical to those recorded in the BND's minute book, including that innumerable credit operations with subsidiaries had been omitted from the provided minutes. BND employees failed to cooperate with the Superintendency in providing requested in- formation. An official memorandum was sent to the BND president about this matter, ordering him to rectify this situation. Irregularities in the BND's legal reserve led to numerous notices to the BND president as well as to the levying of several fines. Until December 12, 1978, the BND received 224 memoranda concerning shortages in the legal reserve requirement and was fined 32 times for such legal reserve requirement deficiencies. The average weekly shortage in the legal reserve requirement through- out 1978 was Bs. 124 million. An audit conducted as of September 30, 1978, showed that the estimated loss on the loans to the Specially Classified Companies was Bs. 632.9 million. The estimated loss on other credits in the bank Portfolio was 35.7 million. The reserve for Portfolio Contin- gencies was Bs. 12 million. On January 12, 1979, the BND Intervenor, Tinco, made a report 1/ to the Minister of Finance pursuant to Article 166 of the General Banking Law of Venezuela. The Report describes the reasons for intervention. The Intervenor's Report states the following: During the first eleven months of 1978 the BND increased its Invested Assets by Bs. 1.0789 billion while in that same period deposits increased only Bs. 183 million. The imbalance was partially covered by rediscounts. By November 30, 1978, the BND had rediscounts of Bs. 485.4 million, which is 32.7 percent of all commercial bank re- discounts for that period. Many of the documents submitted to the Central Bank for rediscounts were rejected by it since they did not comply with the requirements for eligible paper. Credit restrictions were imposed on the BND by other banks. The BND's failure to make timely remittance of funds to correspondents resulted in their not honoring checks and refusing to open let- ters of credit. In 1975-78 the BND had a chronic shortage in its legal reserve requirement. The BND had a shortage in the legal reserve in 38 of 48 weeks during the first 11 months of 1978. The BND's reserve shortage stabilized during the months of September 1978 through November 1978 at over Bs. 100 million and reached Bs. 169 million in the last week of November. Prior to the intervention the BND was twice fined Bs. 30,000 for having granted illegal credits to the BSD, the Panamanian bank owned by Gorrondona Jr., and to Crenca. Even after the fines, the illegality was not corrected. In the case of the BSD the credit at the time of the fine through a time deposit was Bs. 657 million. At the time the BND was inter- vened, this deposit had not been reduced at all. In late November and early December of 1978 the situation grew more serious as the BND's negative balances at the Clearing House in- creased, and the BND had difficulty sub- mitting documents eligible for rediscount by the CBV. Questions from abroad about the BND's situation became more insistent. When the BND was unable to make good on its negative balance at the Clearing House on December 6, the BND was expelled as of December 7 in compliance with Article 11 of the pertinent Rules and Regulations. Thereupon the BND was intervened pursuant to Article 166. There were large withdrawals after the intervention and instructions were given that teller windows would not close as long as there were clients present. As of December 7, 1978 loans placed with affiliates (companies owned totally or partially by the BND) totaled more than Bs. 1.302 billion. Loans placed in 93 companies with which important shareholders, directors or executive officers of either the BND or its affiliates were directly or indirectly associated totaled Bs. 1.739 billion. Other credits were as of the date of the Intervenor's Report are still under study. On October 14, 1976, five vice-presidents of the BND, including the vice-president of Credit, the First Vice- President-Treasurer, the Vice- President-Comptroller, the Vice- President of Branches and Agencies, and Jaime Benitez ("Benitez") Vice-President for Banking Services, wrote a confidential memorandum to Gorrondona, Sr. and Gorrondona, Jr. in order to emphasize deficiencies and problems within the BND and to present recommendations. As summarized by Benitez, who testified at the hearing in this matter on July 16, 1982, the principal problem was a high concentration of credits in a group of businesses. These credits were not paid as they matured. This created a deficiency in cash flow and caused liquidity problems. There were also deficits in the legal reserve requirement. Accounting procedures were not being correctly applied and there was a problem of overdrafts. The memorandum recommended: (1) a change in credit policy even though this would limit the expansion program; (2) affiliated and related companies should start paying their debts; (3) concentration of credit should be eliminated; and (4) internal controls aid internal procedures should be improved. Benitez' testimony established that as a whole, recommedations were not carried out and deficiencies were not eliminated. The Memorandum of October 14, 1976, stated that: "The Office of the First Vice-President for the Treasury has repeatedly voiced to the highest authorities in the institution its opinion regarding the excessive placements with Group Companies and has gone as far as to file a written report with the President and the Acting President. In spite of the fact that, on account of its position, it must authorize almost all of the overdrafts and/or charges to the accounts of Group companies, it acknowledges the need to put an end to this practice. This question has been the subject of repeated discussions with the President and the Acting President, who are the only authorities empowered to put an end to this situation. The Memorandum of October 14, 1976, identified a number of problems then existing at the BND. It stated that there existed problems of: "1. High credit concentration (approximately 60 percent of the entire credit portfolio is placed with 1.4 percent of the total number of clients) in Group companies or companies directly or in- directly tied and/or related to it. We mean by this those companies or natural persons in the organization created by the highest ex- ecutive level or under instructions from it, who are organized with high Group officials, Bank officers or trusted persons, both as regards the holding and representation of their shares and their administrative or Director offices. These companies were expedited by said high levels or under orders from them, given through high Bank officers." "2. Non-payment by said companies due to con- stant renewals, without partial [the translation of "abonos parciales" should be "partial pay- ment" in the sense of "amortization"] or in- terest payments." "3. Credits to Group companies, above the legal limits, which are authorized or ordered by the highest officials." "4. Interest documented as promissory notes that accumulates above and beyond the credits originally granted." "5. Excessive number of permanent overdrafts with the National Government, governmental de- pendencies and especially and in an increasing fashion, with Group companies or companies directly tied or related thereto." "6. Overdrafts and collateral obligations in overseas banks due to the financing com- mitment and ever increasing requirements of Group companies or companies directly or indirectly tied or related thereto, which render the institution vulnerable to possible changes in the financial market." "7. Constant use of the Bank's own credit resources for the financing of Group companies directly or indirectly tied or associated there- to, whether they be already in existence or some of the ones that are constantly being created for expanionist purposes and whose activities represent a medium or long-term investment, at loggerheads with the soundness of commercial banking (Treasury Commission: see the material submitted at the meetings and on the minutes)" "8. Exclusion from the List ratified by the Board of Directors of certain operations of Group's companies and of companies directly or indirectly tied or related thereto, following longstanding instructions from high officers, who, in turn, received them from the highest levels." "9. Credits to companies whose balance sheets do not justify the amounts of said loans, mainly Group companies, and which credits are authorized or ordered by the highest levels." "10. Accounting omission of operations-especially guarantees and bonds-conducted from the Group com- panies under order from the highest levels." "11. Excessive financial burden due to the payment of surtaxes and commissions on deposits." "12. Increase in expenses through outlays that are not compatible with the normal management of the Bank." "13. Insufficient income generation, In relation to portfolio volume, which causes the interest account to be affected by amounts equal to the yield said portfolio should generate. Therefore, an insufficient amount in the account Interest Collected in Advance due to the drain it has been withstanding." "14. Inconsistency in the Reserve Requirements position due to a weak treasury and the continuous negative balances at the Clearing House." "15. Unbridled personnel growth at all levels, which has brought about an evident bueaucratization of Bank functions." "16. Ignorance of normal communication channels and of approved bonus norms and procedures." One of the signers of the memorandum of October 14, 1976, Santiago Rodriquez Marcano, was made an Assistant to the President of BND after the memorandum was sent, but he left after a few months saying that he did not receive the necessary cooperation in his new position. Gorrondona, Jr. testified that in 1978, BND was facing a "serious . . . liquidity crisis" and "had very little liquidity." Gorrondona, Jr.'s testimony established that he made his fortune in real estate. Gonzalez' testimony indicated that in 1978 the BND faced liquidity problems, a "liquidity crisis" which even with government assistance would have continued until the end of 1979. Benitez' testimony indicated that the BND was in serious trouble at the time of intervention and that the primary cause was credit concentration and the lack of payment upon maturity. Romero's testimony indicated that at the time of intervention the BND had the following problems in the area of credits or loans: A substantial part was concentrated in real estate activities. A lot of the business that had received credits from the bank was related indirectly with directors and executives of the bank. Some businesses received credits for amounts that went over what the law allows. The credits were not sufficiently col- lateralized or guaranteed. Some of these credits had a maturity of more than one year which is illegal for a commercial bank. Gabaldon's testimony established that while he has been President of the BND many adjustments had to be made to correct the accounts of the BND as they existed at the time of intervention; that the BND Board had decided to make an appropriate footnote reservation in the BND financial statements calling attention to the possibility of future adjustments which might result from investigations and analyses of the BND's accounts prior to the intervention. Gabaldon's testimony, based on his study of BND records, established that at the time of intervention is some cases the loans to subsidiary companies were paying interest but in a majority of the cases they were not doing so but rather the BND would increase the amount of the debt to cover the amount of the interest due. At the time of intervention, approximately 12 to 15 percent of the BND loan portfolio consisted of loans to these subsidiary companies. Alejandro Guevara Chacin's ("Guevara Chacin") testimony established that the minutes of the BND sent to the Superintendent compared with the minute books of the bank revealed that many operations were omitted. Guevara Chacin supervised the comparison. Juan Ramirez' ("Ramirez"), the present Superintendent of Banks of Venezuela, testimony indicated that there were many reasons for the intervention of the BND and any one of them, if put together with or alongside the others, was enough to support the decision. Benitez' testimony indicated that the basic principle of the banking business is diversification; in other words, to place loans with diverse or different customers. Childs' testimony indicated that renewal of loans without payment of interest is bad banking practice. Childs' testimony indicated that loans to corporations in which directors have an equity interest should be secured and at arms length. Wyneken's testimony indicated that there are reserve requirements in the United States and violation is not a trivial matter. The testimony of Guevara Chacin, Eenitez, Lopez-Romero and Ramirez established that one of the BND's major problems under Gorrondona, Jr. was repeated deficiencies in the BND's legal reserve. After the intervention, there was a run on the BND. Between June 30, 1978, and December 31, 1978, deposits from the public decreased by Bs. 2.1 billion and most of this decrease occurred between December 7, 1978, and December 31, 1978. In the six months following the intervention government deposits at the BND went from Bs. .6 to Bs. 2.7 billion. These deposits permitted the BND to cover withdrawals. Gorrondona, Jr. left Venezuela for a two week period on November 17, 1978, and a detention order was issued on November 24 which would have resulted in arrest had he had been in the country. In Venezuela, the subject of a detention order is immediately arrested and is held without any opportunity for posting bail until the detention order is resolved. The detention order was based upon an allegation that Gorrondona, Jr. had been involved in a company which had committed a security violation more than five years prior to the detention order. Petitioner contends that the charges against him, which resulted in the detention order, were politically motivated. This order kept Gorrondona, Jr. out of the country during the intervention, and was eventually dismissed. The Court, in dismissing the charges, stated: It then follows from the aforesaid, that it would -- clearly result in an injustice to assign any criminal liability to persons who are not even members of the Board when the presumed irregularities may have been committed. The period leading up to the intervention of the BND was also the period immediately prior to the national election which was held on December 3, 1978. In the elections in 1974, Gorrondona, Jr. had contributed 9 million dollars to the unsuccessful opponent of President Perez. In the election of 1978, Gorrondona, Jr. had contributed over 1 million dollars to the opponent of President Perez's party, the Accion Demicratico (AD) party. Venezuelan laws do not restrict the size of campaign contributions. Gorrondona, Jr. returned to Venezuela in June, 1979. At that time Gonzalez recommended to Gorrondona, Jr. that he go to court to prove his innocence. In June, 1979, Gorrondona, Jr. and Sr. initiated a noticia criminis proceeding in a Venezuelan Penal Court of First Instance. There are three ways to initiate a criminal proceeding in Venezuela: denunciation (a person makes a charge that a crime may have been committed), accusation (a person makes a charge that a particular person may have committed a crime), and noticia criminis (the court takes notice that a crime may have been committed). In Venezuela, the courts may call witnesses and thereby take investigative initiative. The noticia criminis proceeding is based on the obligation of a Venezuelan court to investigate a possible crime of which it has notice from whatever source. In the case of the noticia criminis proceeding initiated by Gorrondona, Jr. and Sr., the court was called on to determine if the BND administrators had participated in the commission of any crime while they were serving as such. In other words, the purpose of the noticia criminis proceeding initiated by Gorrondona, Jr. and Sr. was to determine if during the period of time in which they were administering the bank they committed an act that would or could be considered criminal in Venezuela. The word used by Gonzalez in describing the noticia criminis determination was "delito," which the interpreter testified means crime. The decision of the Court of First Instance in the noticia criminis proceeding was to terminate the summary investigation pursuant to Article 206 of the criminal code for criminal trials. The court found there was no evidence of crime. In other words, the determination of the judge in the noticia criminis proceeding was to end the criminal investigation because the facts presented were not of a criminal nature. With regard to the violation of banking laws described in the Superintendent's Report and the Intervenor's Report, the Court said "[a]s is clearly appreciated from these provisions, none establishes penal sanctions and although they constitute a violation of juridical regulations and comprise sanctions, same have no other character than an administrative one. The appellate court said, "this Superior Court considers that lack of maintenance of reserves in such proportion and manner as established in Articles 20, 21, and 163 of the General Act governing Banks and other Credit Institutes, is object of a sanction under Article 170 of the said law consisting of a fine to be applied by the Superintendent of Banks. Efforts to collect the loans made by the BND prior to intervention: On February 28, 1980, the BND entered into an agreement with Gorrondona, Sr. and Gonzalez regarding the loans to certain debtors of the BND ("February 28, 1980 Agreement"). All these loans were made prior to the intervention. The February 28, 1980 Agreement fixed the amount of the debt to the BND of the ap- proximately 180 companies specified therein at Bs. 4.038 billion. It specified that the BND would accept in payment of this debt the amount of Bs. 3.388 billion. It specified that payment would be made within one year. It specified that during that year no actions would be commenced to compel payment of this debt. Gorrondona, Sr. and Gonzalez signed the February 28, 1980 Agreement either as business brokers for the companies specified therein or as representatives of such companies. According to Gorrondona, Jr. all the debtor companies obligated themselves jointly, and any collateral posted by one could be used to satisfy the debts of the other. Paragraph 15 of the February 28, 1980 Agree- ment specifies certain responsibilities assumed by Gorrondona, Sr. and Gonzalez. "We, JOSE JOAQUIN GONZALES GORRONDONA, a Venezuelan citizen, of legal age, of this domicile, the bearer of identity card number 30.580; and DIOGENES Jr. GONZALES HURTADO, a Venezuelan citizen, of legal age, of this domicile, the bearer of identity card number 1.193.753, state that acting as business brokers for THE DEBTORS by virtue of the already noted common interests, personally and jointly and severally in behalf of all of THE DEBTORS undertake to accept and comply with the present agreement in all of its parts. Therefore, and to preserve the fullness of its effects, we undertake to have those debtor companies whose Articles of Incorporation or By-Laws forbid or limit the granting or posting of guarantees or securities, amend them as needed in order to allow for the profferred guarantees; we likewise undertake to have them grant their consent lawfully and execute the present in- strument within the term of thirty (30) days, and to execute any other documents, as re- quired, that may be necessary for the per- formance thereof. As of the present, the loans of the com- panies specified in the February 28, 1980 Agreement have not been paid in full. The amount remaining to be paid, exclusive of interest, is either approximately 2.8 bil- lion B's or 2.1 billion B's depending on whether the loans compromised in the February 28, 1980 Agreement (the difference between Bs. 4.038 billion and Bs. 3.388 billion) are treated as paid. Such unpaid loans as of this time are neither principal nor interest. At this time the BND's total loan portfolio is approximately Bs. 6.2 billion. Whether the figure of Bs. 2.1 or Bs. 2.8 billion is used for the amount of these unpaid loans, these frozen loans from prior to the intervention represent a substantial portion of the BND loan port- folio. These loans to related or Specially Classified Companies are in addition to the approximately Bs. 900 million in loans to subsidiary or affiliated companies that are not paying interest or amortizing principal. There is no evidence that Gorrondona, Sr. or Gonzalez were coerced into signing the February 28, 1980 Agreement. The Agreement was negotiated over an extended period of time. Gonzalez has testified that he signed the February 28, 1980 Agreement in order to assist the rehabilitation of BND and that Gorrondona, Sr. signed in the same spirit. Both men initialed each page when they signed it. Gorrondona, Jr. has testified that it is his position that the agreement is invalid in parts because he did not sign it. The BND has negotiated with Gorrondona, Jr. concerning the performance of the February 28, 1980 Agreement and the debts owed by the Specially Classified Companies. Such negotiations have not been successful. Under the February 28, 1980 Agreement, suits could not be filed for one year. When the agree- ment was not performed, the administration of Borjas pursued negotiations with Gorrondona, Jr. and, when Gabaldon became President of BND in August, 1981, he continued negotiations with Gorrondona, Jr. No suits have been filed against Gorrondona, Sr. or Gonzalez personally on account of the February 28, 1980 Agreement. The BND has very recently started to file suits against some of the debtors. Gorrondona, Sr.'s signing of the Agreement of February 28, 1980, Gorrondona, Jr.'s partici- pation in negotiations with respect to the performance thereof, together with the state- ments made in Memorandum of October 14, 1976 and described above concerning loans made prior to intervention to companies owned directly or indirectly by owners of the BND, corroborates the finding of the Intervenor that prior to intervention a substantial amount of loans were made to companies in which officers and directors of the BND had an interest. The inability to collect these loans corroborates the conclusion of the Superintendent and Intervenor that these loans were not adequately collateralized and were made in amounts in excess of what prudent credit practices would dictate based on the companies' balance sheets. Transfer of ownership of the BND: In the days following the intervention, members of the national government of Venezuela, including the Minister of Finance, met with Gorrondona, Sr. The possible liquidation of the BND and the possible transfer of ownership were discussed. On February 8, 1979, agreements were signed providing for the sale of 65 percent of the BND's shares to the Corporation Venezolana de Fomento ("CVF") . Sixteen shareholders, including Gorrondona, Sr., signed these agreements. They covered the shares owned by both Gorrondona, Sr. and Jr. The February 8, 1979 Agreement set a minimum price of Bs. 1 per share. The Agreement provided that the actual price would be set by the Superintendent of Banks prior to July 31, 1979. The price was to be fixed based on the book value of the BND and its subsidiaries as of December 31, 1978 less the uncollect- ible loans in its portfolio. At the time of intervention the losses on the BND loan portfolio exceeded the capital and reserve of the bank. Under Venezuelan law, when a bank has lost more than 25 per- cent of its capital, the stockholders are required to replace it. Accordingly, had they not sold their shares, the former owners of the BND would have had to make a capital contribution to the BND. As it is, the new owners of the shares have replaced the lost capital of the BND. Gorrondona, Jr., Borjas, the then President of the BND, and the Planning Minister of Venezuela met between June and November, 1979, to discuss the price for the BND shares and repayment of debts owed by the Specially Classified Companies. As a result of this meeting, an agreement was signed on December 21, 1979, regarding the fixing of the price of the stock and the negotiation of the re- payment of loans made to the Specially Clas- sified Companies. In February, 1980, two agreements were signed finalizing the sale of the BND shares to the CVF. One of these agreements (Respondent's Exhibit 82) was with the parties that had signed the February 8, 1979 Agreement. Re- spondent's Exhibit 82 was signed by Gorrondona Sr. and Gonzalez among others. In paragraph First it recites that: "In execution of the agreement reached in the Third clause of the sales contracts for Banco National de Descuento, C.A. shares, sub- scribed between C.V.F. and THE SELLERS and dated February 8, 1979, the Bank Examiner through Official Notices Nos. HSE-200- 3860 and HSE-200-3992, dated July 31 and August 7, 1979, respectively, ad- dressed to the Banco National de Descuento, C.A., determined losses in the Credit Portfolio of said Institution reaching an amount of ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY SIX MILLION AND SEVEN [TOS (hundred) omitted in translation] THOUSAND BOLIVARS (Bs. 1,186,700,000.00) and therefore ordered the pertinent adjustments to the BANCO NACIONAL DE DESCUENTO C.A.'s Balance Sheet as of December 31, 1978." In paragraph Second it recites: "Due to the adjustments referred to in the previous Clause, and pursuant to the agree- ment between the parties listed in the con- tracts entered into on February 8, 1979, the Book value of the sold shares resulted in an amount less than One Bolivar (Bs. 1.00) per share, wherefore 'THE SELLERS' have, pursuant to the provisions of the Third Clause of the aforementioned contracts, agreed to accept the amount of One Bolivar (Bs. 1.00) per share, as the sale price for the shares sold." In paragraph Third it recites: "Lastly, 'THE SELLERS' state for the record that what they declare herein completely invalidates any statement or claim made by them, their agents, attorneys or represent- ative regarding any questions on the validity of the agreements executed on February 8, 1979, whose contents they are aware of, and which they execute in a final and definite manner through this document." There is no claim made in the record that the signers of Respondent's Exhibit 82 were coerced in their decision to execute that agreement. The other agreement of February 1980 regard- ing the transfer of shares of the BND (Respon- dent's Exhibit 81) was with shareholders who had not signed the February 8, 1979 Agreement. That agreement also fixed the sales price at 1 B per share. As recited therein, it used as the amount of the losses the Bs. 649 million figure established by the Minister of Finance pursuant to the appeal taken November 30, 1979, rather than the Bs. 1.186 billion figure established by the Superinten- dent of Banks prior to the appeal. This established that whether the Bs. 1.186 bil- lion or the Bs. 649 million figure is used for the amount of the losses, the shares of the BND had at most a nominal value of 1 B on December 31, 1978. Property in Venezuela cannot lawfully be taken by the Government without compensation. If it is taken for less than a fair price, the aggrieved person can go to court to seek a fair price. The judiciary in Venezuela is independent. No lawsuit has yet been filed to obtain ad- ditional compensation for the shares of the BND transferred to the new owners. Recently an "administrative letter" was sent regarding additional compensation for the shares. Nothing in Venezuelan law precluded its being sent earlier. The evidence in the record does not support a finding that the government of Venezuela coerced the owners of the BND to sell their shares or that such shares were sold at less than a fair price. As alleged by Petitioner. SUMMARY FINDINGS The decision to intervene the BND was, in part, politically motivated as evidenced by the timing of the intervention, the withdrawal of substantial government deposits immediately prior to intervention and the decision to refuse recognition of previously accepted commercial paper for rediscount. This is not to conclude, however, that the continuing liquidity problems of the BND were caused by the government. The reasons for the liquidity crisis experienced by the BND in 1978 had existed since at least 1976, and were identified in internal memoranda as well as Superintendent of Banks' and Intervenor's reports. The liquidity crisis experienced by the BND in 1978 and the intervention of the BND by the Venezuelan Government have at the present time a somewhat adverse effect on the reputation of Gorrondona, Jr. with respect to his qualifications as a banker. There is no evidence of any deficiency in his character or integrity. The education and business experience of Gorrondona, Jr. tend to establish his qualifications. However, his role as President-in-Charge of the BND during the liquidity crisis and intervention reflects adversely on those qualifications. No witness was called by the Banking Department or the Applicant on the question whether the practices that gave rise to the intervention constitute unsound banking practices. Those practices have been identified in the findings herein and include concentration of credit in the loans to the Specially Classified Companies, the renewal of loans to subsidiary companies though those loans were not paying interest, repeated violation of legal reserve requirements, failure to comply with the laws relating to agricultural loans, and failure to disclose to regulatory authorities that the minutes submitted for review by those authorities were not the same as the minutes in the books of the bank. LEGAL CONCLUSIONS AND RULINGS Subsection 120.57(1)(b) 12, Florida Statutes, provides: In applications for a license or mergers pursuant to title XXXVIII which are referred by the agency to the division for hearing pursuant to this section, the hearing officer shall complete and submit to the agency and to all parties a written report consisting of findings of fact and rulings on evidentiary matters. The agency shall allow each party at least 10 days in which to submit written exceptions to the report. Subsection 120.52(7), Florida Statutes, defines "license" as [a] franchise, permit, certificate, registration, charter, or similar form of authorization required by law, but it does not include a license required pri- marily for revenue purposes when issuance of the license is merely a ministerial act. Subsection 658.28(1), Florida Statutes, provides in part: (1) In any case in which a person or a group of persons, proposes to purchase or acquire a controlling interest in any state bank or state trust company and thereby to change the control of that bank or trust company, each person shall first make ap- plication to the department for a certificate of approval of such proposed change of control of the bank or trust company. . . The above provisions of Chapter 120 establish the Hearing Officer's report procedure for license applications under Florida banking laws. This is an application for a certificate of approval which is a form of license application within the meaning of that term as used and defined in Chapter 120. Therefore, no recommended order will be issued. Subsection 658.28(1), Florida Statutes, provides in part: [T]he department shall issue a certificate of approval only after it has made an investi- gation and determined that the proposed new owner or owners of the interest are qualified by character, experience, and financial responsibility to control and operate the bank and trust company in a legal and proper manner and that the interests of the other stockholders, if any, and the depositors and creditors of the bank or trust company and the interests of the public generally will not be jeopardized by the proposed change in ownership, controlling interest, or management. The above provision necessitates Respondent's investigation of Gorrondona, Jr.'s banking experience. Thus, the history of the BND and his role in the management of that institution are relevant to Respondent's investigation and to this proceeding. Petitioner's objection to such evidence is hereby overruled. FILED this 28th day of December, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of December, 1982.
Findings Of Fact Santa Cruz Marketing, Inc., d/b/a SMI (hereinafter referred to as SMI), a Delaware corporation, is located at Suite 29, 1280 South Powerline Road, Pompano Beach, Florida 33069. Although SMI began operating as a business in Florida in December of 1988, it was not authorized to do business in Florida until December of 1991. At all times material hereto, Edward Winders has been the president/secretary, Jim Winders has been the vice president/treasurer, and Cecil Butler has been the general manager for SMI. Edward Winders and Jim Winders each own 50% of the stock of SMI. Cecil Butler has no ownership interest in SMI and is simply a salaried employee. Edward Winders and Jim Winders are responsible for the day-to-day operation of the business. Although Cecil Butler has some unidentified level of supervisory responsibility over some of the other employees, no evidence was offered that he in any way participates in management decisions regarding the operation of the business itself. SMI advertises by placing ads in newspapers throughout the United States. Its ad reads as follows: "Easy credit card, cash advance, $5000 credit line, no credit check! Call 1-800-347-0773." SMI's business operations consist of the following units: the origination department, the customer service department, the clerical section, and the shipping section. When a call is placed using the toll-free number, that telephone call is answered by an account representative in the origination department. A written script called a credit card presentation is utilized by the account representative. The account representatives do not deviate from that script. The account representative obtains basic information from the caller, gives a brief program description, and then causes to be sent a packet of information called the first mailer to the caller. The script utilized by the account representative, however, does not tell the account representative how to answer questions from the callers. No evidence was offered as to any procedures SMI may have in place for assuring the correctness of answers given to callers' questions. The credit card presentation script tells the caller that he or she has reached the "easy credit card division," advises the caller that "our credit card offers a $5,000 line of credit which includes cash advance availability, now our major credit cards are also available regardless of credit history!", advises the caller that there are no annual fees and that the lifetime membership is a "one time processing fee," advises the caller that he or she is participating in a "limited membership drive," and advises the caller that "all the information on our credit card will be in your package along with our customer service number." The first mailer greets the "prospective member," refers to SMI's credit card program, encloses a pre-approved application, sets forth the amount of SMI's "lifetime membership fee," encloses a "100% money-back guarantee certificate," encourages the recipient to return his or her application and membership fee within 10 days, and promises a $100 gift certificate usable on the charge balance. The lifetime membership fee is $75 if paid by money order or cashier's check and $85 if paid by personal check or C.O.D. No further information is given regarding the details of SMI's "credit card program." An enclosure in the first mailer is a one-page sheet entitled "Special Notice." It features a facsimile of a Visa card and a facsimile of a MasterCard card. The short text includes the following language: Mail today and receive all these privileges. *CASH ADVANCES *VISA CARD AVAILABLE *MASTERCARD AVAILABLE *$100.00 MERCHANDISE CERTIFICATE *ADD POSITIVE INFORMATION ON YOUR CREDIT REPORT HAPPY SHOPPING!!!! The enclosed return envelope is directed to Santa Cruz Marketing, Inc. The line underneath that states that the envelope is going to "SMI Card Distribution Center." If the recipient does not immediately comply, a second mailer is sent five days later. The enclosures are the same as in the first mailer. The "dear prospective member" letter is different and is "just a friendly reminder that we have not received your lifetime membership fee for your pre-approved $5,000 credit card." It encourages the recipient to "take advantage of this unique credit card offer!" and advises the recipient that if the recipient's deadline has already expired, then a call should be placed to SMI's customer service department at a non-toll-free number. After the recipient submits the pre-approved application and pays the membership fee, he or she then receives the membership package. That package begins with a letter greeting the "new card member" and contains the following introductory paragraph: Welcome to the wonderful world of home shopping with your SMI credit card. As a preferred card member, you are offered the opportunity to purchase merchandise from our fantastic color catalogues filled with a wide variety of items. Attached to the letter is an SMI credit card. That letter is the first advice given by SMI to its new "lifetime member" that he or she has paid $75 to join a home shopping club. The letter further advises the recipient that purchasing merchandise from SMI's catalogues will "enable you to establish that A+ credit rating you have always desired, but which may have been denied to you in the past." The letter further advises that SMI will submit monthly statements to the member and that the member can then pay 10% of the balance (with a minimum payment of $15) or the balance can be paid in full. The letter also advises that the new member will pay no interest charges on his or her purchases, "but please remember in order to help you establish your A+ credit rating, your payments must be made on time." The membership packet also contains two merchandise catalogues, an order form, and a price list. According to the price list and the terms of SMI's home shopping program, two prices are available to an SMI member. For each item, the member may pay a specified cash price and a specified shipping charge. Alternatively, the member can pay a credit price, which is higher than the cash price. If the member chooses to purchase the item on credit, the member will pay the higher price as follows: the member includes with his or her order form a specified portion of the credit price as a down payment on the item, with the balance of the credit price being charged to the member's charge account. The member paying the higher credit price will also pay the specified shipping charge. The promised $100 merchandise certificate is included in the membership packet. The certificate specifies that it can only be applied to the credit portion of an order after the down payment for that order is paid and that the certificate is void after 30 days from the date on which the membership was issued. The membership packet includes, for the first time, a description of SMI's cash advance program. The description of that cash advance program begins as follows: Once you have established a sufficient credit record with SMI, you will be extended 'cash advance privileges'. Simply prove your credit worthiness by shopping with your SMI credit card. All you have to do is, charge and pay for at least $500.00 of purchases of your unpaid balance. Once you have done that, you have qualified for a cash advance of $250.00. CASH ADVANCES OFFERS Immediate cash No interest charge Low monthly payments No processing fee Cash advances up to $2,500.00 According to the program, a cash advance of $2,500 would only be available if a member had charged and paid for $5,000 worth of purchases. The flyer also recites that the $100 merchandise certificate does not apply to cash advances. The next flyer contained in the membership packet is entitled "Qualify for a Visa or MasterCard." That flyer features facsimiles of both a MasterCard and a Visa card. The description of that portion of SMI's program begins as follows: Simply prove your credit worthiness by using your SMI Credit card. Just charge and pay for at least $750.00 of your unpaid balance. It's as simple as that! Once you have established a sufficient credit record, you will be sent a 'GOOD CREDIT REFERENCE LETTER' that you can use when applying for credit elsewhere. Plus, you will receive a 'MAJORITY APPROVED' application for a visa or mastercard with 'NO SECURITY DEPOSIT REQUIRED.' UNSECURED - NO SECURITY DEPOSIT REQUIRED (WE WILL DO IT FOR YOU) A $380.00 IMMEDIATE CREDIT LINE CASH ADVANCES COMPETITIVE INTEREST RATES ONE TIME PROCESSING CHARGE ONLY $35.00 ANNUAL CHARGE MAJORITY APPROVED WE ARE SO SURE THAT YOU WILL BE APPROVED THAT WE WILL SEND YOU A 'CASHIERS CHECK FOR $380.00' IF YOU DO NOT QUALIFY. The flyer points out that the $100 merchandise certificate does not apply to this part of the program. Another flyer contained in the membership packet explains a second way in which a member can qualify for a Visa or MasterCard as follows: New Collateralized Credit Card Program You Can Now Obtain a Major Bank Credit Card even though you may have previously been turned down! Under the 'collateralized credit card program' the member may obtain a secured major bank credit card which 'requires a security deposit equal to your initial credit limits.' If the member returns the coupon requesting details, SMI provides the name of another company, Access Credit Card Company, which company would charge an additional fee to provide the member with an application from New Era Bank. If the member followed that procedure, he or she would most likely obtain a Visa or MasterCard bank card from New Era Bank with a credit limit equal to the amount of money the member was willing to deposit in New Era Bank since that bank approves the majority of such applications. The membership packet contains three additional flyers. The first one relates to the SMI jewelry catalogue and explains that most gold items are sold by weight at current gold market prices, that prices fluctuate daily with the market, and that the member should check with SMI's ordering department by phone to receive current market prices. The second flyer gives the member information on joining the Select Coupon Club by paying a membership fee of $19.95 and receiving coupons for use at the supermarket. The third flyer describes a program whereby the member can pay $14.95 postage and handling and receive a Hotel Express Membership Directory and membership discount at participating hotels and resorts. A customer cannot obtain an SMI credit card prior to payment of the $75 membership fee. A customer cannot obtain credit for purchasing products from SMI's catalogues prior to payment of the membership fee. The SMI catalogues, received after payment of the fee, are not available to the general public. The customer is not informed prior to paying the membership fee, either during telephone conversations with SMI account representatives or from the first two mailers, that the credit card which the customer would receive can only be used to purchase goods from the two SMI catalogues. Although prospective members are advised in the first and second mailers that Visa and MasterCard cards are available, they are not told how they can obtain such cards until after they have paid their fee. Until after payment of the fee, they are not told that they can obtain a secured, i.e., a fully collateralized bank card by depositing in that bank monies equivalent to the credit limit then extended to them by the bank. Customers are not told prior to the payment of their membership fee, either by SMI account representatives during telephone conversations or in the first or second mailers, that the obtaining of a secured Visa or MasterCard card from New Era Bank will also require the payment of a processing fee and will carry a minimum $500 deposit requirement. Until after payment of the fee, they are not told that the alternative is to charge and pay for $750 worth of merchandise from SMI's two catalogues (not including the amount paid as a down payment on each item purchased) which amounts to $850 worth of charged merchandise if the customer uses the $100 gift certificate, in exchange for SMI then giving the customer a letter saying the customer is a good credit risk, which the customer can then present in applying for credit elsewhere. No evidence was offered that any other organization considers SMI's letter of recommendation meaningful. Prior to the payment of the fee, the prospective member is not advised that the cash advances which he or she would become entitled to receive are limited to an amount of one-half of the total balance the member has paid on the member's SMI charge account balance. No member has received a cash advance from SMI. No members have obtained a Visa or MasterCard card by charging and then paying for $750 worth of products from SMI's catalogues. Other than those documents previously described, no other documents, contracts, or statements are provided by SMI to prospective members or members. SMI purchases the products found in its catalogues at the distributorship cost, a lower price than members pay for the products when they purchase from SMI. As of July 1, 1991, SMI had 12,567 members. By the time of the final hearing in this cause, SMI had over fifteen thousand members. Eighty-four members had purchased items from the SMI catalogues. Petitioner received a consumer complaint regarding SMI in February of 1990. On June 28, 1990, Petitioner served on SMI a subpoena requesting that SMI provide to Petitioner the following information: Name of surety bonding company, location of surety bond and copy of surety bond; location and account number of Florida escrow account, proof of account; copy of information statement and consumer contract. SMI was unable to respond to the subpoena by providing that information because it did not have those items. SMI did respond to the subpoena, however, by providing copies of its advertising and the materials used in its mailers and membership packages. SMI further obtained a bond pursuant to Petitioner's direction to do so. In a series of letters from SMI's attorney to Petitioner, SMI submitted revised advertising and revised informational documents requesting Petitioner's approval of the revisions to bring SMI in compliance with the Department's requirements. The Department failed to respond to SMI's requests. Rather, on March 21, 1991, the Department served on Jim Winders and Cecil Butler an Administrative Complaint for Entry of a Cease and Desist Order and Imposing Penalties, alleging that Jim Winders and Cecil Butler were operating as a credit service organization without fully complying with Chapter 817, Florida Statutes. Jim Winders and Cecil Butler timely requested a formal hearing, and this cause was transferred to the Division of Administrative Hearings. While this administrative proceeding was pending, on July 1, 1991, the activities of loan brokers became regulated, and responsibility therefor was assigned to the Department. On August 12, 1991, the Department filed its Amended Complaint for Entry of a Cease and Desist Order and Imposing Penalties which included the allegations in the original Administrative Complaint, named SMI as a Respondent for the first time, added allegations that the three Respondents were operating as loan brokers, and further added allegations that the three Respondents were operating as retail sellers.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered Finding Respondents SMI and Jim Winders guilty of the allegations contained in the Amended Complaint for Entry of a Cease and Desist Order and Imposing Penalties as described in this Recommended Order; Finding Respondent Cecil Butler not guilty of the allegations contained within the Amended Complaint for Entry of a Cease and Desist Order and Imposing Penalties; Ordering Respondent SMI to cease and desist from violations of the statutes regulating the operation of credit service organizations, loan brokers, and retail sellers; Ordering Respondent Jim Winders to cease and desist from violations of the statutes regulating the operation of credit services organizations and loan brokers; Imposing an administrative fine against Respondent SMI in the sum of $90,000 to be paid by a date certain; and Imposing an administrative fine against Respondent Jim Winders in the sum of $6,000 to be paid by a date certain. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of March, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SC 278-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of March, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The Department's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-30, 34-46, 56, 57, 59- 66, 71-83, 85-89, and 91 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. The Department's proposed findings of fact numbered 31, 32, 95, and 96 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting argument of counsel, conclusions of law, or recitation of the testimony. The Department's proposed findings of fact numbered 33 and 97 have been rejected as being contrary to the evidence in this cause. The Department's proposed findings of fact numbered 84, 90, 92-94, and 111 have been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues under consideration in this cause. The Department's proposed findings of fact numbered 47-55, 58, and 67-70 have been rejected as being unnecessary to the issues involved herein. The Department's proposed findings of fact numbered 98-106 have been rejected as being subordinate to the issues herein. The Department's proposed findings of fact numbered 107-110 have been rejected as not being supported by any competent evidence in this cause. Respondents' proposed findings of fact numbered 1-3 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondents' proposed findings of fact numbered 4-11 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting argument of counsel, conclusions of law, or recitation of the testimony. Respondents' proposed findings of fact numbered 12-19 have been rejected as being subordinate to the issues herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Bridget L. Ryan, Esquire Richard Bisbee, Esquire Department of Banking and Finance Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Jan Peter Weiss, Esquire Parkway Plaza-Suite 21 1280 South Powerline Road Pompano Beach, Florida 33069 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 William G. Reeves, General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance Room 1302, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
