Findings Of Fact Kenneth M. Olson, Jr., is a registered real estate broker with the FREC and Active Firm Member of Olson and Associates Real Estate, Inc., a corporate broker registered with the FREC. A copy of the Administrative Complaint was forwarded to the last address of Defendants registered with the FREC by certified mail numbers 4747 and 4748 and the notice of hearing was forwarded to the same address by certified mail numbers 4613 and 4614. Accordingly the Hearing Officer had jurisdiction over the Defendants and the offenses. By contract dated September 17, 1975 (Exhibit 6) Joseph J. Pillucere contracted to purchase real property from Paul L. Nave. The contract provided, inter alia, for a $500 earnest money deposit, $9500 down payment at closing with purchaser to assume existing first mortgage of approximately $28,000; and the seller taking back a purchase money second mortgage in the amount of $17,000. Thereafter, at the time scheduled for closing, the purchaser failed to produce the additional down payment required, execute the second mortgage and assume the existing first mortgage. After receiving conflicting demands from buyer and seller for the return of the earnest money deposit Defendant requested an advisory opinion from the FREC in accordance with Section 475.25(1)(c) FS. On May 13, 1976 an advisory opinion (Exhibit 5) was given by FREC to the Defendant, with copies to both parties to the contract, advising Defendant that the earnest money deposit should-be disbursed to the seller. The deposit has been disbursed to neither party to the contract.
The Issue The issue in these cases is whether petitioners are entitled to payment from the mortgage brokerage guaranty fund, and if so, in what amounts. A further issue is in what order of priority the claims should be paid. Based upon all of the evidence, including the pleadings filed in this cause, the following findings of fact are deter- mined:
Findings Of Fact The Department's Proposed Findings of Fact are adopted herein to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact adopted herein. The rulings on Alpert's Proposed Findings of Fact are as follows: A. Findings on Marting K. Alpert and general procedures of his office - These findings of fact are accepted except to the extent that it is stated that Ms. Evans understood certain of the transactions upon explanation by Mr. Alpert. She was confused and correct herself in her subsequent testimony. B. Findings on examination procedures of the Division - These findings are accepted to the extent that they coincide with the Hearing Officer's and the Department's findings adopted herein. They are otherwise rejected as unsupported by competent substantial evidence in the record, subordinate, cumulative, irrelevant, immaterial, unnecessary, and otherwise constituting conclusions of law and legal argument as opposed to findings of fact. C. Findings on paragraph 4 - These findings are accepted to the extent that they coincide with the Department's and the Hearing Officer's findings adopted herein. They are otherwise rejected as unsupported by competent substantial evidence in the record, subordinate, cumulative, irrelevant, immaterial, and otherwise constituting conclusions of law and legal argument as opposed to findings of fact. D. Findings on paragraph 5 - These findings are accepted to the extent that they coincide with the Department's and the Hearing Officer's findings adopted herein. They are otherwise rejected as unsupported by competent substantial evidence in the record, subordinate, cumulative, irrelevant, immaterial, and otherwise constituting conclusions of law and legal argument as opposed to findings of fact. E. Findings on paragraph 6 - These findings are accepted to the extent that they coincide with the Department's and the Hearing Officer's findings adopted herein. They are otherwise rejected as unsupported by competent substantial evidence in the record, subordinate, cumulative, irrelevant, immaterial, and otherwise constituting conclusions of law and legal argument as opposed to findings of fact. F. Findings on paragraph 7 - These findings are accepted to the extent that they coincide with the Department's and the Hearing Officer's findings adopted herein. They are otherwise rejected as unsupported by competent substantial evidence in the record, subordinate, cumulative, irrelevant, immaterial, and otherwise constituting conclusions of law and legal argument as opposed to findings of fact. G. Findings on paragraph 8 - These findings are accepted to the extent that they coincide with the findings of the Department and the Hearing Officer as adopted herein. They are otherwise rejected as unsupported by competent substantial evidence in the record and as constituting legal argument as opposed to findings of fact. H. Findings on paragraph 9 - These findings are accepted to the extent that they coincide with the findings of the Department and the Hearing Officer as adopted herein. They are otherwise rejected as unsupported by competent substantial evidence in the record, immaterial, and irrelevant. I. Findings on paragraph 10 - These findings are accepted except for the next to the last sentence which constitutes a conclusion of law. J. Findings on paragraph 11 - The first sentence of these findings is accepted. The second sentence is rejected on the basis of lack of credibility. The balance is rejected as unnecessary. K. Findings on paragraph 12 - These findings are rejected as unsupported by competent substantial evidence in the record, irrelevant, immaterial, and as otherwise constituting legal argument as opposed to findings of fact. L. Findings on paragraph 13 - These findings are rejected as unsupported by competent substantial evidence in the record, irrelevant, immaterial, and otherwise constituting legal argument as opposed to findings of fact. M. Findings on paragraph 15 - See ruling on Exception to paragraph 12. N. Findings on paragraph 16 - These findings are rejected as unnecessary, immaterial, irrelevant, and unsupported by competent substantial evidence in the record. RULINGS ON ALPERT'S EXCEPTIONS TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Exception to paragraph 3 - Alpert has requested that certain of the Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact be rejected as inconsistent. The Department's findings numbers 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 adopted herein clarify the apparent inconsistency. It was only months after the examination and after searching his records that Alpert was able to trace the disposition of the issuable funds with a reasonable degree of probability. At this late date, the disposition of the funds became apparent to Ms. Evans upon Alpert's explanation. Her testimony at the hearing must be considered in this context and it then becomes clear that the Hearing Officer's findings are not inconsistent. Exception to paragraph 4 - It is true that Ms. Evans' preferences do not necessarily determine Departmental policy. A ledger is but one of a variety of bookkeeping devices which are acceptable if they reflect receipts and disbursements in an orderly fashion. The Hearing Officer found only that Ms. Evans could not trace the receipts and disbursements. Exception to paragraph 6 - While the Department defers to the Hearing Officer's finding, Alpert's suggested finding would not in any event alter any of the conclusions of law. Obtaining a satisfactory lender's commitment gives the broker the right to disburse a borrower's advance fee deposit from trust, but the money must first be placed in trust. The transactions herein involved no advance fees. Alpert's practice had the effect of circumventing the use of a trust account, and at the same time depriving the lender and borrower of the intended safeguards. Exception to paragraph 9 - There is competent substantial evidence in the record to support the Hearing Officer's finding that the charges for amortization schedules were improperly listed as official fees. Exception to paragraph 11 - The Department's mail-out advised Alpert of the changes in the law, and there was competent testimony that a copy of the new legislation was attached as indicated in the mailout. Exception to paragraph 12 - The characterization of the violations as technical or serious in the present action contemplates a conclusion of law and not a finding of fact. In any event, the fact that Alpert admitted to "technical violations" in a prior proceeding does not preclude a finding that the violations in the present action are more serious than Alpert is willing to admit. First Exception to Conclusions of Law - Alpert is correct in that the violation is specifically directed to subsections (1) and (3) of Section 494.06, Fla. Stat. Alpert argues that these subsections are, "so vague that a mortgage broker of average intelligence must guess at its meaning." But, it is noted that Alpert himself could not trace the flow of funds at the time of the examination. A competent mortgage broker does not have to guess at what records he must keep to enable himself to trace the flow of funds. Even after searching his records and his memory, Alpert was only able to show records which created inferences as to the disposition of the funds. A competent mortgage broker would devise a record-keeping system which would enable him to determine the flow of funds and then presumably could demonstrate the flow of funds to a competent examiner. The Department's objection is that Alpert's records were so disorderly as to render the examiner's job unreasonably difficult at the very least, and in fact, impossible at the time of the examination. All that is required of a statute is that the language convey a sufficiently definite warning as to the required conduct when measured by common understanding and practices. It is clear by common understanding and practice that any orderly recordation of receipts and disbursements will satisfy the statute. The Department's finding is simply that the state of disorder and confusion of Alpert's records constitutes an element of the negligence and incompetence underlying all of the violations cited in the Administrative Charges and Complaint. Second Exception to Conclusions of Law - The record supports the Hearing Officer's reasoning that Alpert was unable to document the flow of funds at the time of the examination. This statement is not a conclusion of law in itself but is an element of the underlying conclusions of law discussed above. Third Exception to Conclusions of Law - As to the fee overcharge, guilt imports the fact of having committed a breach of conduct. The statute makes no suggestion that an intentional or wilful breach is essential to a finding of guilt. In fact, a license may be revoked pursuant to Section 494.05(2), Fla. Stat., for negligence or incompetence. Furthermore, Section 494.08(4), Fla. Stat., is sufficiently definite in that the record reflects that Alpert calculated the correct fee and then admitted the precise amount of the overcharge. The argument in 9(a) applies to items accepted as closing costs which were not supported in fact. The $2.00 charges were imposed for official fees. There were no official fees in this amount. Therefore, the charges for official fees were not supported in fact. Alpert misrepresented the fee as an official fee which is a fee required by law and is not negotiable. A charge for an amortization schedule is subject to arms length negotiation if properly disclosed. The misrepresentation precluded any such negotiation. Paragraph 10 of the Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact merely restates Alpert's testimony regarding the subject advertisements. However, the Hearing Officer concluded in her Conclusions of Law that Alpert's advertisements constituted a violation of the Act. Therefore, the Hearing Officer necessarily rejected the credibility of or gave little weight, if any, to Alpert's testimony in this regard. Fourth Exception to Conclusions of Law - The Department finds as a matter of law that Alpert's collection practices were sufficiently connected to his mortgage brokerage business to fall within the scope of the trust account requirement. Fifth Exception to Conclusions of Law - Alpert has misconstrued Section 494.05(1)(f), Fla. Stat., in section 11 of his Exceptions. Obtaining a satisfactory commitment permits disbursement of an advance brokerage fee out of trust when the contract between the borrower and mortgage broker expressly so provides. This provision in the statute contemplates a borrower who has made an advance deposit to secure the broker's fee and has agreed to disbursement of the fee upon receipt of a satisfactory commitment and prior to closing and disbursement of the loan proceeds. This was not the case in the instant transactions. Here there were no advance deposit agreements. In any event, obtaining a commitment simply authorizes disbursement of an advance fee from trust, but does not excuse the broker from the requirement of using a trust account. The violation concerns the fact that the funds were not deposited in trust in the required chronological sequence prior to closing. Alpert's practice had the effect of circumventing the use of a trust account and depriving the lender and borrower of the intended safeguards. Furthermore, in two of the transactions, trust funds were clearly held for extended periods of time in Alpert's personal checking account. In these two transactions, Alpert did not advance his own funds and receive the lender's funds after closing. Hence, there can be no argument that the funds were not entrusted to him. Furthermore, the deposits were not exempted from the trust account requirement on the basis that a commitment had been obtained, as these were not advance deposit transactions. Sixth Exception to Conclusions of Law - Alpert argues that the Department "admitted" in the previous Stipulation that escrow infractions were merely "technical" as opposed to serious violations. To the contrary, a close reading of the Stipulation of May 25, 1976, reveals that the Department "agreed", inter alia, that if Alpert admitted that certain technical violations occurred, it would dismiss the administrative charges and complaint. Such is substantially different from the Department agreeing or admitting that such violations are technical. The Department only agreed by compromise that a certain admission constituted sufficient consideration to dismiss the administrative charges and complaint under the attendant circumstances. However, to continue this reasoning is to miss the point. A violation can be both technical and serious. Failure to give Miranda Warnings during custodial interrogation may cause a conviction to be thrown out on a technicality. Nonetheless, the technicality is considered serious enough to throw out the conviction. To carry this semantic dialectic further, a technical violation is sometimes characterized as one resulting in no injury, but which may be, as in the case of trust account violations, serious in terms of the risk of injury to which depositors are exposed. Alpert next argues that the Department is estopped to criticize his practice of depositing mortgage collections in his personal checking account as opposed to a trust account, because the Department did not allege such a violation in the 1976 Administrative Charges and Complaint. A review of said Complaint and the underlying examination report reflects many serious violations of the Act, including trust account violations. In any event, application of the principle of estoppel to the Department would be misplaced in this instance. If the practice does constitute a violation, it is at the risk of injury to the public and not to the Department. To estop the Department from proscribing illegal conduct would only benefit Alpert at the expense of the rights of the public. Different reasoning may or may not apply in a dispute between private litigants where the rights of the public are not in issue. To carry Alpert's argument to its logical conclusion is to hold that since he did not get caught the first time, he cannot be punished the second time. Such reasoning is patently absurd. Seventh Exception to Conclusions of Law - Alpert's argument relative to the legal effect of the previous Stipulation is an attempt to elevate form over substance. Guilt here is the fact of having committed a breach of conduct involving a penalty. That Alpert admitted the violations and agreed to the penalty is tantamount to a finding of guilt. Alpert's claim of deprivation of due process is without merit. An Administrative Charges and Complaint was filed and Alpert was advised of his right to a hearing in the previous as well as the instant action. In the first action, the right to hearing was knowingly and voluntarily withdrawn pursuant to his Stipulation. ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT Alpert's Motion to Dismiss Complaint is denied for reasons stated in the Conclusions of Law and rulings on Exceptions. PENALTY Section 494.05(2), Fla. Stat., provides: The license of a licensee may be revoked, if the application for the license is found to contain a material misstatement, or the licensee demonstrates by a course of conduct, negligence or incompetence in performing any act for which he is required to hold a license under this act, or if the licensee for a second time, shall be found guilty of any misconduct which warrants his suspension under subsection (1). The Department finds that Alpert's violations of Section 494.05(1)(b)(f)(g)(h), Fla. Stat., when taken together with the previous finding of guilt warranting suspension, form a sufficient basis for revocation of his license pursuant to Section 494.05(2), Fla. Stat., to wit: that Alpert has, for a second time, been found guilty of misconduct warranting suspension of his license. Secondly, when all of the acts of misconduct are considered cumulatively, they demonstrate a course of negligence and/or incompetence in performing material acts for which Alpert is required to hold a license under this Act. Hence, two out of the three bases for revocation have been met. The Department has also considered that Alpert's present violations are identical to or substantially similar to the violations for which he was previously cited. Therefore, it is the Department's finding that, among other wilful violations cited herein, the present trust account violation in particular was committed wilfully and constitutes an aggravating circumstance such as to form an additional basis for the maximum penalty within the permissible range of statutory authority.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is RECOMMENDED that the mortgage brokerage license and registration of respondent Martin K. Alpert be REVOKED. It is further recommended that the respondent be provided a period of sixty (60) days from the date of the final order entered in this cause within which to close out all pending mortgage loan transactions. Respectfully submitted and entered this 26th day of June, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Michael A. Gross Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John W. Bakas and John W. McWhirter, Jr. Post Office Box 2150 Tampa, Florida 33601 Comptroller Gerald A. Lewis State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact The Respondents at all times pertinent hereto are licensed real estate brokers having been issued, in the case of Lorraine B. Anthony individually, license number 0123486, and in the case of Lorraine Anthony Realty, Inc., as a corporate broker, license number 0181092. At all times pertinent hereto, Respondent Lorraine B. Anthony was licensed and operating as a real estate broker and the sole "qualifying" broker and officer of Respondent Lorraine Anthony Realty, Inc. The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with enforcing the provisions of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes and appurtenant rules governing the licensure standards and practice standards for real estate brokers, broker salesmen and salespersons in the State of Florida and conducting disciplinary proceedings inconnection therewith. On or about May, 1982, Mr. Leif Rosenquist journeyed to Lee County, Florida from his native Sweden with the intention of purchasing real property for the purpose of building a residence for himself and his wife. He became acquainted with Ida Chacko, a real estate salesperson operating in Lee County, Florida, and ultimately entered into a real estate sales contract partly at her behest. Ida Chacko was not then employed by the Respondent, Lorraine B. Anthony nor the Lorraine Anthony Realty, Inc. Mr. Rosenquist gave Ida Chacko approximately $10,000 to place in an escrow account for him in order to effect a deposit and down payment on that real estate purchase. This transaction ultimately did not occur. Ida Chacko, however, retained $7,000 of those funds which were placed in an escrow account with Tri-County Title Company in approximately May of 1982. Shortly thereafter Ms. Chacko became an employee and salesperson with the Respondents real estate firm, with the Respondent Lorraine Anthony as her managing broker. In approximately August, 1982, Mr. and Mrs. Rosenquist entered into a "deposit, receipt and sales contract" with Santa Barbara Development Corporation and Thomas Romano, its president, for the purchase of a piece of property upon which they wished Mr. Romano to construct a duplex which they would use as their residence. The transaction was arranged by Ida Chacko. Mr. Romano owned that property and contracted with the Rosenquists to construct the dwelling. The contract terms required the payment of a $500 earnest money deposit to Mr. Romano and Santa Barbara Development Corporation. Ida Chacko assured Mr. and Mrs. Rosenquist that the $500 earnest money deposit required by the contract would be paid to Mr. Romano from the $7,000 escrow account which she maintained on their behalf. In fact, Ms. Chacko had, prior to that time, withdrawn the $7,000 from the escrow account with Tri-County Title Company for unknown purposes. Further, Ms. Chacko never paid over the $500 earnest money to the Respondent's escrow account nor to Mr. Romano or Santa Barbara Development Corporation. The contract, moreover, was contingent in its terms on the Rosenquists being able to obtain financing at terms stated on the face of the contract, secured by a mortgage with Barnett Bank. The Rosenquists however, were unable to secure compatible financing in accordance with the contractual terms regarding that financing and so that contingency was never satisfied and the Rosenquists elected to never consummate that transaction. That contingency never being satisfied, the Rosenquists never actually defaulted on the contract. Moreover, during the pendency of the Rosenquists attempts to obtain the financial arrangements with Barnett Bank, the time period stated in the contract during which it could be enforceable, expired. Pursuant to a later contract entered into September 26, 1982, the real estate involved in the Rosenquist transaction was sold to Ida Chacko's daughter. Mr. Romano sold her the property and ultimately constructed a duplex dwelling for Ms. Chacko's daughter on that property according to the same construction plans referenced in the Rosenquist contract and for a higher purchase price. He thus incurred no financial detriment caused by the failure of the Rosenquist transaction, nor did the Santa Barbara Development Corporation. Some two months after the failure of the Rosenquist transaction, Mr. Romano sought payment of the $500 earnest money deposit he believed he was due from the Respondent Lorraine B. Anthony and Lorraine Anthony Realty, Inc. She initially refused to pay him the $500. The Respondent had no knowledge that the Rosenquist's agreement had been entered into, knew nothing of its particulars, nor of any representations made by any of the parties to the agreement, nor Ida Chacko, until approximately two days after the contract was executed. She learned of the contract when her office manager, Ellen Smith, told her that no earnest money deposit had been obtained on that contract. She immediately instructed Mrs. Smith to ascertain that an earnest money deposit was immediately obtained according to the terms of the contract. After later consulting with Ida Chacko and learning that the transaction never reached fruition, she did not inquire further concerning the earnest money deposit or other particulars regarding that transaction, believing that she had no reason or duty to do so. The Respondent, Lorraine B. Anthony never met with the Rosenquists nor discussed any facet of the transaction with them nor made any representations to them with regard to the transaction. She never discussed the transaction or made any representations regarding it to Mr. Romano, until he finally demanded the $500 earnest money deposit some two months after the failure of the contract with the Rosenquists and after the consummation of the second contract with Ida Chacko's daughter. The Respondents had had a successful business relationship with Mr. Romano prior to these occasions and desired to continue such relationship and therefore, in an abundance of caution, ultimately paid the $500 to Mr. Romano. He has no claim presently pending against the Respondents. Helen Smith, the Respondents' office manager, established that it was the Respondents' consistent policy to always obtain an earnest money deposit contemporaneously with the execution of a real estate sales contract in which she or her agents were involved, and to deposit such money in her escrow account. Ida Chacko was well aware of this policy at the time the Rosenquist transaction was entered into, but never obtained the earnest money deposit either directly from the Rosenquists nor carried out her assurance to the Rosenquists that she would obtain the required $500 earnest money deposit from the $7,000 "escrow account" supposedly on deposit on their behalf with Tri- County Title Company (or another unidentified party). The $7,000 which Ms. Chacko had on deposit on behalf of the Rosenquists was obtained before she was ever employed with the Respondents' firm as an agent of the Respondent and the Respondent never knew of the existence of those funds. The only connection Respondent and her firm had with this transaction and her only representation made with regard to this transaction was that Mrs. Smith should make sure that agent Chacko placed the $500 earnest money deposit in the proper escrow account in favor of Mr. Romano and Santa Barbara Development Corporation. In any event the Respondents never received the $500 earnest money deposit. The only representation made to the Rosenquists with regard to the earnest money deposit was that of Ida Chacko to the effect that she would pay it over to the Respondents' escrow account from the funds she supposedly had on deposit on the Rosenquists' behalf, which of course, she failed to do. Neither the Respondent, Lorraine B. Anthony, nor any of her agents, ever represented to Mr. Romano or Santa Barbara Development Corporation that the $500 was held on deposit on his behalf or otherwise. Finally, because the Respondents never received the $500 deposit, they could not possibly have return edit to the purchasers without the prior knowledge or consent of the seller, as alleged in Count II of the Complaint. In summary, the Respondent instructed her office manager to see that Ida Chacko received the deposit money and placed it in the escrow account at the time she believed the contract to be valid and enforceable and Ida Chacko failed to comply, thus flouting the Respondent's clearly defined office policy regarding the escrowing of deposit money, of which policy Ida Chacko was previously well aware. The Respondent had had prior and subsequent difficulties with Ida Chacko concerning her failure to follow this and other office policies required by the Respondents. The Respondent only learned definitely that no deposit money had been received nor deposited in her escrow account, approximately two months after the contract was executed and long after the contract was automatically cancelled. She at no time received any commission related to any transaction involving the subject parcel of real property. She never made any representations of any kind to any of the parties to the deal.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint against Lorraine B. Anthony and Lorraine Anthony Realty, Inc. be DISMISSED in its entirety. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of April, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Fred Langford, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Harvey Rollings, Esquire PAVESE, SHEILDS, GARNER, HAVERFIELD, DALTON & HARRISON Post Office Box 88 Cape Coral, Florida 33910 Harold Huff, Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Fred M. Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the Respondent, Alvin I. Siegel, should be suspended or otherwise disciplined for failure to properly disburse funds or to retain said funds in an escrow account.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Alvin I. Siegel is a registered real estate broker with License #0080637, trading under the registered trade name of Cambridge Realty in South Miami, Florida. An administrative complaint dated February 7, 1979, was filed by the Petitioner Commission, alleged that the Respondent has been guilty of failure to account for or deliver monies which had come into his hands and which were not his own property. Respondent Siegel requested an administrative hearing. On or about February 16, 1973, Sylvia M. Ramirez executed a purchase and sale contract and receipt for deposit for a house located in Dade County, Florida. The house was owned by Deanna P. Cooper. Ms. Ramirez had deposited $1,325.00 as earnest money deposit in the escrow account of broker Respondent Siegel. The contract provided that if the purchaser could not obtain a mortgage, the deposit would be refunded: that if the purchaser breached the contract, the deposit would be forfeited and divided equally by the seller and the broker; and that if the seller defaulted, the brokerage commission would be paid only upon a successful suit for specific performance by the purchaser. Respondent Siegel was notified of the date of closing the same day of the closing, July 20, 1973, but did not attend because of prior commitments. Later that day, the seller, Ms. Cooper, presented a closing statement to the Respondent stating that the transaction had closed and that she wanted the excess of the deposit over the commission owed to broker Siegel. He disbursed to her $235.00, which was the excess of the deposit over and above the commission. Respondent Siegel learned later that the checks issued at the closing were cancelled. Demands were made upon Respondent Siegel by both the seller, Ms. Cooper, and the purchaser, Ms. Ramirez, for the deposit money. The seller, Ms. Cooper, demanded one-half of the deposit as a forfeiture, and the purchaser, Ms. Ramirez, demanded that the money should be refunded to her. No suit for specific performance was instituted. Respondent Siegel refused to pay the seller, Ms. Cooper, the difference between the amount he had disbursed at the time she submitted the closing statement to him and one-half the deposit (i.e. $427.50). A lawsuit was filed by Sylvia Ramirez on December 4, 1973, demanding return of the deposit. The would-be seller, Ms. Cooper, was joined as a party Respondent, so that the rights of all parties could finally be determined. Respondent Siegel was advised by his attorney not to disburse monies to any of the parties, and he followed his attorney's advice. The lawsuit ended in dismissal in January of 1977, and no demand has been made upon Respondent Siegel since that date by either Ms. Cooper or Ms. Ramirez. Respondent Siegel has agreed to rely on the advise of the Petitioner Commission, and has stated that he is ready to disburse the necessary funds but is in doubt as to his duty. Both parties submitted memoranda of law and recommendations. These instruments were considered in the writing of this Order.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that this complaint be dismissed without prejudice. DONE AND ORDERED this 29th day of June 1979 in Tallahassee, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth M. Meer, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings ROOM 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Lawrence C. Rice, Esquire 6075 Sunset Drive, Suite 203 Miami, Florida 33143 Mr. Alvin I. Siegel c/o Cambridge Realty 6313 Sunset Drive South Miami, Florida 33143
The Issue Respondents' alleged violation of subsection 475.25(1)(a), 475.25(1)(c), and 475.25(3), Florida Statutes, as set forth in the Administrative Complaint. Inasmuch as Respondents were not represented by legal counsel at the hearing, the Hearing Officer explained their rights in administrative proceedings to James F. Catron who elected to represent himself and Cooke Catron Realty, Inc.
Findings Of Fact Cooke Catron Realty, Inc. is now and was at all times alleged in the Administrative Complaint a corporation registered as a real estate broker doing business at 5805 Margate Boulevard, Margate, Florida. Respondent James F. Catron is now and was at all times alleged in the Administrative Complaint a registered real estate broker and the active broker and officer of Cooke Catron Realty, Inc. (Stipulation) In January, 1976, Richard H. Goodwin, Jr. and Christine S. Goodwin, his wife, owned a four-unit apartment building at 7650 Southwest 10th Court, North Lauderdale, Florida, described as Lot 7, Block 13, Lauderdale North Park, Section 3. The Goodwins were having marital difficulties and decided to separate at this time and divest themselves of mutually-owned property. In a conversation with a salesman for respondents, Mr. Goodwin learned that James F. Catron was in the business of purchasing investment properties and reselling the same whereupon he would divide any profit with the former owner. Goodwin thereafter entered into negotiations with Catron for the sale of the apartment building. It was orally agreed that Catron would pay $62,700.00 for the property with a $1,000.00 down payment, and assume a first mortgage with Southern Federal Savings and Loan Association of Broward County in the amount of approximately $57,400.00 and a second mortgage with Seacrest Homes, Inc., John E. Abdo, Trustee, in the approximate amount of $5,300.00. It was further agreed that Catron would pay the Goodwins 30 percent of 80 percent of any net profit realized when he resold the property. As a consequence of this agreement, the Goodwins, on January 19, 1976, executed a deposit receipt contract embodying the above terms except that it recited the receipt of $10.00 as a deposit rather than $1,000.00, and made no mention of assumption of the mortgages. However, the sum of $1,000.00 was paid to the Goodwins by Catron. Although Mr. Goodwin testified that Catron signed this contract, Catron denied it and no such contract signed by Catron was placed in evidence at the hearing. (Testimony of R. Goodwin, C. Goodwin, Catron, Petitioner's exhibit 1) Mr. Goodwin, on January 19, 1976, executed a document authorizing Cooke Catron Realty, Inc. to collect rents from the tenants of the apartment building. Catron, anticipating consummation of the purchase, proceeded to collect rentals in the amount of approximately $800.00 per month for the next four and one-half months, for total collections of approximately $3,600.00. He also made some repairs to the property and paid utilities bills. The Goodwins believed that he would take steps to assume the two mortgages on the property and take over the payments thereon. Although Mr. Goodwin testified that he and his wife had executed a warranty deed and delivered it to Catron, Catron denied receipt of such a deed and it was not produced at the hearing. Accordingly, it cannot be found that such a deed was in fact executed and delivered. The rents were collected by a limited partnership called Forest Run, Limited, of which Catron was a partner. Although the February payments were made on the mortgages, they were discontinued when Catron discovered that he could not assume the second mortgage from Seacrest Homes, Inc. without payment of $1,000.00 to the trustee, Abdo. As a consequence, the Goodwins filed suit against the respondents in the Broward County Circuit Court on June 23, 1976, requesting that any agreements concerning the property be rescinded, and that an accounting be ordered and a receiver appointed to administer and manage the property in question. A receiver was appointed by the court. Thereafter, in August 1976, Southern Federal Savings and Loan Association filed suit to foreclose its mortgage on the property and obtained summary judgment in the Broward County Circuit Court on January 25, 1977. The property was thereafter sold at public sale and bought in by Southern Federal. On January 25, 1977, the suit of the Goodwins against respondents was dismissed by stipulation after the parties had reached an amicable settlement in the matter. (Testimony of R. Goodwin, C. Goodwin, Petitioner's Exhibits 2-4)
Recommendation That the charges against the respondents, James F. Catron and Cooke Catron Realty, Inc., be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of October, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 COPIES FURNISHED: Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 James F. Catron and Cooke Catron Realty, Inc. 5805 Margate Boulevard Margate, Florida 33063
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found. Respondent, Evon E. Brewton, is a licensed real estate broker/salesman whose license has been in an inactive (dormant) status for approximately one year. Respondent has been a resident of Bay County since approximately 1924. On March 29, 1978, Respondent assisted Mildred C. Webber, a real estate developer, in the search of property suitable for development purposes in Bay County, Florida. Such efforts led Respondent to seek out Walter 13. West, who had a parcel of property in Bay County that he desired a "quick sale". To accomplish such a sale, local T.V. advertisements were used. Respondent's efforts resulted in a contract between Mildred C. Webber and Walter B. West (Seller) for the purchase and sale of the West property for a purchase price of $115,500.00. Mr. West, the Seller, in unequivocal terms and conditions, made clear to Respondent that he was desirous of selling the property to the first purchaser who was able to tender an acceptable cash offer. Seller West also made clear to Respondent that all offers must contain a sizeable cash deposit to secure the property and which deposit he would consider forfeited provided the transaction failed to close. These conditions were made clear to Ms. Webber by Respondent and she agreed to place a $5,000.00 deposit in the form of a check which was turned over to the Seller. Mr. West accepted Ms. Webber's offer to purchase the property described as Parcel No. 1 for the price of $115,500.00. The $5,000.00 deposit check tendered by Ms. Webber was signed over to the Seller and was immediately negotiated by Mr. West. Also on March 29, 1978, Respondent secured a contract from Seller West for Ms. Webber to purchase a second parcel of property for which Ms. Webber placed a $500.00 earnest money deposit to secure the offer. Although Mr. West granted Ms. Webber two extensions of time to secure funds to finance the purchase of the two parcels of property, she was unable to secure financing to close the transaction. As a result, Seller West considered Ms. Webber's deposits to be forfeited and, accordingly, he retained the deposit monies. Real estate salesmen R. B. Ballard and J. K. Watts appeared and expressed their familiarity with the West/Webber real estate transactions. Witnesses Ballard and Watts corroborated the pertinent testimony of Respondent respecting the facts that prospective purchaser Webber understood Seller West's conditions and the resulting consequences should she be unable to secure financing to purchase the property. In this regard, testimony herein indicates that Ms. Webber, a knowledgeable real estate developers has not made any demands upon Mr. West to obtain a refund of the deposit monies, nor has any litigation been instituted by her to recover such deposit monies.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings or Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the complaint allegations charging that Respondent violated Subsection 475.25(1)(a) and (i) Florida Statutes, be DISMISSED. RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of December, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Collins Building Room 101 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of December, 1980.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is and at all material times has been a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida. He holds license number 0404010. On or about October 14, 1985, Respondent, as seller, entered into a purchase and sale contract with William and Lois Ehmke, as buyers, with respect to Respondent's condominium known as Unit 502 of Blind Pass Lagoon Condominiums located at 9825 Harrell Avenue, Treasure Island, Florida. The Ehmke contract called for a purchase price of $85,000, which included $15,000 as an earnest money deposit. The contract form provided a paragraph for the closing date, but this was left blank. The only special clause in the contract provided that: The Buyer(s) shall pay $550.00 monthly beginning the date said unit is occupied by buyer and until buyers home in Deluth, Minn. is sold. At the time of closing upon Condo Unit 502, Phase 3, the buyers' shall reimburse the Seller the difference between $550.00 and actual costs to carry the unit per month. ($755.00 plus 90.00 maintenance, or $300.pr [i.e., $300 per month]. The Ehmkes duly paid Respondent the $15,000 deposit and moved into the condominium, which they occupied continuously from October, 1985, through December, 1986. The Ehmkes paid Respondent $550 per month for each month of their occupancy. When making the deal, the Ehmkes were aware that the average time that a house remained unsold on the market in Deluth was 210 days. They knew that the market was very slow because of a sluggish local economy. They expected their house to be sold in about 210 days. After 210 days passed and the house had not sold after the Ehmkes' good faith efforts to sell it, the Ehmkes asked Respondent to refund their $15,000 deposit. Respondent refused. Negotiations resulted in Respondent returning to the Ehmkes $10,000 of the deposit in July, 1987. Respondent did not stand in a confidential or fiduciary relationship with the Ehmkes. William Ehmke had owned and operated a restaurant in Deluth and, after meeting Respondent, initiated discussions with Respondent concerning Mr. Ehmke's desire to purchase property in Florida. Respondent showed the Ehmkes other properties and informed them from the start that Respondent and his daughter owned the condominium unit in question. The mortgage payments, insurance, taxes, and maintenance fees on the condominium unit were about $850 per month in October, 1985. During the period that the Ehmkes occupied the condominium unit, the maintenance fees went up by $30 per month and there was a $1200 special assessment. All of these expenses were borne by Respondent. However, Mr. Ehmke was aware that every month he was losing $300 of his deposit toward these expenses. The fair rental value of the condominium unit from December 1 through April 30 each year is $1400 to $1600 per month. By the time that the Ehmkes vacated the unit, Respondent had paid at least $3000 in monthly expenses over the rent received and the $1200 the special assessment. He had also lost at least $3000 in premium seasonal rentals. Mr. Ehmke has since received his real estate salesman's license. He admits that the $5000 retained by Respondent does not cover Respondent's out-of- pocket expenses. He also admits that he has no complaints about the transaction in retrospect. Frank Myles owns all of the stock of Myles, Inc., which owned Unit 202 of Blind Pass Lagoon Condominiums in Treasure Island. Having been neighbors with Respondent for two years and also involved part-time in real estate sales, Mr. Myles mentioned to Respondent that he was trying to sell his unit. After their conversation, Respondent delivered to Mr. Myles a contract for the purchase and sale of his unit. The contract was executed by all parties on July 29, 1986. The buyers were Ralph and Margaret Magno, who had recently purchased another unit in the same complex through Respondent as the broker. The purchase price was $94,000 to be paid cash at closing, as Mr. Myles had said he desired. The contract contained no contingencies, such as for financing, which was also consistent with Mr. Myles' previous instructions to Respondent. The contract called for a closing on or before August 25, 1986, and provided that time was of the essence. The Magnos paid an earnest money deposit of $8000 to Pat Jano and Associates, "reg. real estate broker." The form language of the contract provided that Respondent was to "hold said earnest money or deposit and act as escrow agent until closing of deal ..." The contract elsewhere provided that if the purchaser failed to perform any of his obligations, then he "shall forfeit said earnest money or deposit; and the same shall be retained by the Seller as liquidated damages, and the escrow agent is hereby authorized by the purchaser to pay over to the Seller the earnest money or deposit." In the event of a default by the purchaser, the earnest money would be divided equally between Respondent and the seller. On or about August 13 or 14, 1986, the Magnos discovered that the financing terms that they had arranged with a third-party lender could no longer be obtained. Respondent promptly notified Mr. Myles of the problem. Mr. Myles and Respondent tried unsuccessfully to resolve the problem with the lender, which ultimately declined to make the loan. When first informed of the buyers' financing problems, Mr. Myles told Respondent that the two of them should push the sellers through to closing. (Tr. 82.) Immediately after this conversation with Respondent, Mr. Myles stepped aside so that his lawyer could handle what had become a "shaky" deal. (Tr. 84.) On August 16, 1986, Respondent refunded all of the earnest money to the Magnos by delivering to Mr. Magno a check drawn on Respondent's escrow account in the amount of $8000 and payable to Mr. Magno. Respondent returned the deposit without the prior knowledge of Mr. Myles or consent of Myles, Inc. (Tr. 73 and 8.) Mr. Myles' lawyer sent a letter dated August 20, 1986, to Respondent informing him that Myles, Inc. intended to proceed to closing and would not consent to the release of the earnest money deposit to the Magnos. Mr. Myles appeared at the closing at the time and place specified in the contract. The Magnos did not appear. Myles, Inc. never received its share of the forfeited deposit. Myles, Inc., through Mr. Myles, stated in a letter dated May 13, 1987, that it was "no longer" pursuing any legal action against Respondent and that no suits were filed and no further action would be taken. During a lengthy meeting with Petitioner's investigator, Respondent never suggested that he had had Myles' permission to return the Magnos' deposit. Rather, he said only that he had returned the deposit out of "loyalty" to the Magnos. At the hearing, Respondent testified that he told Mr. Myles that Respondent was going to return the deposit to the Magnos and Mr. Myles' only reaction was that "those are the breaks." (Tr. 129.) This apparent inconsistency between the testimony of Mr. Myles and Respondent, both of whom were credible witnesses, is reconciled by the finding that Mr. Myles never consented to the release of the earnest money, but Respondent misunderstood their conversation in this regard. Since October 16, 1986, Respondent's principal place of business has been 7345 Bay Street, St. Petersburg, Florida. Respondent failed to maintain a sign at this location from October 16, 1986, through January 8, 1987. He was having a sign prepared by a third party during that time.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that a final order be entered dismissing Counts I, II and IV of the Administrative Complaint and finding Respondent guilty of the allegations set forth in Counts III and V of the Administrative Complaint. It is recommended that the Final Order impose an administrative fine of $1000 with respect to Count III and a reprimand with respect to Count V. ENTERED this 20th day of May, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of May, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-4391 Treatment Accorded Petitioner's proposed Findings 1,3-5. Adopted. 2,6. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. The location of Respondent's "principal office and each branch office" is relevant under Section 475.22 to determine where he was required to maintain a sign. The statute does not refer to the office registered with Petitioner. 7-8,16. Adopted. 9-.14. Adopted. 15,17. Rejected as unnecessary. 18. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant for the reason set forth for rejecting the proposed findings in paragraphs 2 and 6. Treatment Accorded Respondent's Proposed Findings Rejected as legal argument, except that Respondent and the Ehmkes entered into a contract. Last sentence - rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. Remainder rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Rejected as unnecessary, except that the blast sentence is adopted as to the sign being made. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Brian E. Johnson, Esquire 7190 Seminole Boulevard Seminole, Florida 34642 Darlene F. Keller Executive Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 William O'Neil General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
Findings Of Fact On November 15, 1976, the Outrigger Club, Inc., a Florida corporation, through its president, Ervin Freeman, and its Secretary, Joan Dimon, executed a warranty deed conveying all right, title and interest, in and to certain property located at Northeast 135th Street and Biscayne Boulevard, North Miami, Florida, to Petitioner, Biscayne South, Inc. (hereafter Biscayne South), a Florida corporation. The warranty deed was recorded with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, on November 16, 1976. On November 22, 1976, Biscayne South executed a mortgage deed in favor of Fidelity Mortgage Investors, a Massachusetts business trust, as a second mortgage on the same parcel of land to secure the payment of a promissory note in the principal sum of $1,500,000.00 which note was made by Outrigger Club, Inc., on the same date in favor of Fidelity Mortgage Investors. On November 22, 1976, Outrigger Club, Inc., as the "borrower" executed a future advance agreement with Fidelity Mortgage Investors as "lendor". The future advance agreement provides for the advancement of the sum of $1,500,000.00 to be secured by a prior mortgage dated October 27, 1972, executed by Outrigger Club, Inc., in favor of Fidelity Mortgage Investors, which mortgage provided for future advances. On November 22, 1976, a construction loan and disbursement agreement was executed by the parties thereto which provided that the $1,500,000.00 advance be paid to Miami National Bank as disbursement agent for the benefit of Biscayne South. On November 23, 1976, the mortgage deed and the future advance agreement were recorded in the public records of Dade County, Florida, and on that same date, the warranty deed was rerecorded in the public records of Dade County, Florida. Because the 1.5 million dollars was paid to Miami National Bank to be disbursed for future construction work on a draw-down basis, Outrigger Club, Inc., the grantor, never received the 1.5 million dollars. The warranty deed provides in paragraph 9 thereof that the conveyance is subject to: a second mortgage wherein the Outrigger Club Inc., is mortgagor and the trustees of Fidelity Mortgage Investors, a Massachusetts business trust, is mortgagee, dated the day of November, 1976, which said mortgage is given as additional collateral for payment of certain sums as provided under a settlement and release agreement between the Outrigger Club, Inc., a Florida corporation, and Lawrence F. Lee, Jr., and others as trustees of Fidelity Mortgage Investors, a Massachusetts business trust dated the 16th day of January, 1976. Neither the Department of Revenue nor Biscayne South have introduced evidence to establish that such a mortgage in fact exists or if it did, the value of such mortgage. The only mortgage in evidence is Respondent, Department of Revenue's Exhibit 2, which shows Biscayne South as mortgagor rather than the Outrigger Club, Inc., as recited in the warranty deed. However, the future advance agreement introduced as Respondent's Exhibit No. 3, establishes the existence of a mortgage encumbering the subject property in which the Outrigger Club, Inc., is mortgagor and Fidelity Mortgage Investors is mortgagee. Such mortgage is dated October 27, 1972, and not dated with the month of November, 1976, as recited in paragraph 9 of the warranty deed. As recited in the future advance agreement, the mortgage of October 27, 1972, secured an indebtedness of $7,214,000.00. The mortgage provided that future advances could be made to Outrigger Club, Inc., not to exceed in the aggregate $16,500,000.00. The future advance agreement provides that an additional advance of $1,500,000.00 is to be made to Outrigger Club, Inc., thereby increasing the indebtedness represented by the October 27, 1972, mortgage to the aggregate sum of $8,715,000.00. In other words, the buyer of the property sought to borrow an additional 1.5 million dollars. The lender, in order to achieve priority of lien to secure its loan, treated the funding as an advance against a preexisting mortgage originally binding the seller, but then delivered the 1.5 million dollars directly to Miami National Bank for the benefit of the buyer. Accordingly, the seller never received the proceeds of the loan but rather participated in a "book transaction" for the benefit of the buyer and the lender.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto John Young was registered as a real estate salesman by the Florida Real Estate Commission. On October 2, 1985 Respondent and William Kelly, D.O. entered into a contract to jointly purchase a condominium from Concord Developers Inc. (Exhibit 1). The contract provided for a down payment of $2,000 with an additional earnest money deposit of $3690 to be paid on or before November 4, 1985. Respondent and Kelly each gave the seller a check for $1000 at the signing of the contract and this $2000 was deposited in escrow with the escrow agent. Kelly met Respondent through Respondent's wife who worked in Kelly's office. At the time Kelly was looking for income tax shelters and this purchase appeared to qualify for that purpose. On November 9, 1985, Kelly made out a check payable to John Young in the amount of $1845 which represented Kelly's half of the additional $3690 earnest money deposit. This check was either cashed by Young or deposited in Young's bank account (Exhibit 2). The additional earnest money deposit was not made to the seller, as required by the contract, Exhibit 1. Young notified Bayside Federal Savings and Loan Association, who was to finance the sale, that the loan application was withdrawn, the transaction was cancelled, and two checks in the amount of $1000 each were returned to the seller by the escrow agent (Exhibit 6). The customary practice of the seller in such a situation was to return the down payment to the buyer by check drawn on the seller's account. While no witness could recall this specific transaction, the usual practice would be to return the deposit to the buyer. In this case, the deposit would normally have been returned to Young. Young acknowledged that he received the return of his $1000 deposit but not the $1000 that represented Kelley's portion of the down payment. When Kelley gave Young the check for $1845 he inquired if it was necessary for him (Kelley) to attend the closing and Young advised him it was not. When Kelley subsequently learned that the transaction did not close, he demanded the return of his money. To date he has received none of the monies he deposited to purchase this property. Evidence was presented that in December 1985, Young closed on a condominium he and his wife had contracted to purchase in this same development, and subsequently moved into this unit. While this indicates Young had the opportunity to convert Kelley's contribution to the purchase of the condominium by Young and his wife, no credible evidence was presented that he did so. The evidence that was presented regarding this transaction was that Young was able to move into that unit with a total cash outlay of less than $500. Young accounted for the $1845 check from Kelley as payment of a bet between him and Kelley on one football game. In rebuttal Kelley testified that not only did he not bet with Young on any matter, but also he has never gambled on a football game in his life. Young's testimony that a $1845 bet was made on a football game is so unbelievable that it taints all of his testimony.
Recommendation That the Real Estate license of John Young be revoked. Entered this 2nd day of June, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of June, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur R. Shell, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Robert H. Dillinger, Esquire 5511 Central Avenue St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32802 Bruce D. Lamb General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0729
