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BERNICE INO vs. DIVISION OF HOTELS AND RESTAURANTS, 76-002098 (1976)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 76-002098 Latest Update: Apr. 29, 1977

The Issue Proposed transfer of Bernice Ino, as specified in letter of Anthony Ninos, Director of Division of Hotels and Restaurants, dated July 27, 1976. This is an appeal of a career service employee pursuant to Section 110.061, Florida Statutes. The appeal was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings by the Career Service Commission on November 24, 1976.

Findings Of Fact By the General Appropriations act emanating from the 1976 state legislative session, 38 employee positions of the Respondent's Division of Hotel and Restaurants were abolished. Although the specific positions were not identified in the appropriations act, the Division director was informed by a staff representative of the legislative committee on appropriations that 25 Hotel and Restaurant Inspector I positions and six Inspector II positions should be among those eliminated. The Division previously had 103 Inspectors of the two classes. Respondent identified the positions statewide to be eliminated and requested the Secretary, Department of Administration, to approve the concept that the competitive area for layoff of employees be statewide within the Division. Approval of this plan was secured and Respondent proceeded to abolish the positions and to layoff Inspectors in its various districts throughout the state. Since the Division at the time had eight vacancies for Inspector positions only 23 employees were actually eliminated. Layoffs were carried out under a retention point system based on length of service and performance evaluations, computed and applied under the provisions of Department of Administration Emergency Rule 22AER76-1, Subject "Emergency Rule Governing Layoff of Career Service Employees". As to Inspectors I, the 83 such positions in the state were placed on a numerical list, according to total number of retention points of each employee, and those with the lowest numbers were selected for layoff. Seven employees were terminated in District I (Jacksonville) and one in District IV (Ft. Lauderdale). (Testimony of Ninos, Dorn, Exhibits 1, 9-12) As a result of the abolishment of Inspector positions, there was an imbalance in manning levels in the various state districts. In Jacksonville, there had been eight inspector positions. The abolishment of three of these left five vacancies that had to be filled. On the other hand, there were negative vacancies in the Ft. Lauderdale district. The Division director therefore instructed the Respondents' personnel officer, Lee Dorn, to reapportion the state to effectively cover all inspection areas. Specifically, he directed that five Inspector I positions be transferred to Jacksonville, 3 of them to come from the Ft. Lauderdale district. In a Memorandum to Dorn, dated July 15, 1976, the director identified the three positions in Ft. Lauderdale for transfer as those held by A. V. Maloni, Bernice N. Ino, and J. F. Friedman. The retention points of these employees had been calculated respectively at 210, 169, and 165. These three employees, and two others to be transferred to Jacksonville from District V, were those Inspectors who had the lowest number of retention points after those having less retention points had been laid off. It was stipulated by the parties that the number of retention joints calculated for Petitioner is correct based on the criteria set forth in the Department of Administration's Emergency Rule. (Testimony of Ninos, Dorn, Exhibit 2) It thereafter developed that of the three Ft. Lauderdale employees, Petitioner was the only one who would actually have had to take an involuntary transfer to Jacksonville. Mr. Friedman, who had less retention points, secured a new position with another agency. Maloni, who had more retention points than Petitioner, was reassigned to a position in the Ft. Lauderdale district that was vacated when the incumbent, in turn, was reassigned to another position made vacant by the illness and eventual separation of its incumbent, John W. Murray. The person replacing Murray, A. J. Pergament, had 792 retention points. (Testimony of Ninos, Dorn, Smith, Exhibits 4, 6-8, 14-21) Petitioner was orally informed in late June of her proposed transfer by her District Supervisor, Chauncey D. Smith. This was followed by a letter, dated July 27, 1976, from the Division director that formally advised her of the transfer of her position to the Jacksonville district, effective August 1, 1976. The letter gave as a basis for the transfer the fact that legislative abolishment of positions made it necessary for the Division to reapportion its staffing to effectively cover all inspection areas and that the proposed changes were being made to obtain "equity, effectiveness, and efficiency within our districts". The letter further advised Petitioner of her right to appeal the transfer to the Career Service Commission. Although this letter did not reach Petitioner through the mail due to an incorrect address, a copy was personally served on her on July 29. Petitioner acknowledges that the incorrect address was due to her negligence in advising Respondent correctly as to the same. In a memo to Petitioner, dated July 28, Smith had conveyed Division instructions for her to report to Jacksonville on August 2. Petitioner declined to accept the transfer. She filed her appeal by letter of July 31, 1976 and thereafter resigned, effective August 2, 1976. Her appeal letter stated that she had not been given sufficient notice to relocate and that the transfer would be a great financial hardship due to the fact that she had purchased a home in the area recently. (Testimony of Dorn, Smith, Ino, Exhibits 3, 13, 22-23) At a meeting with Smith and the Division's Chief of Enforcement, B. E. Fernandez, in early August, Petitioner was informed that she would be given the next opening in Ft. Lauderdale. In fact, Inspector Murray was not separated until November but his job had been filled on a temporary basis by Maloni. When Murray was finally separated, Maloni stayed in the position. Petitioner had been told by Smith that it would be a hardship for Maloni to suffer a transfer because of family considerations, but would not be so difficult for her because she could obtain unemployment compensation and she need not be concerned because her husband was working. When Murray finally departed, Petitioner called the Division director regarding the promise that she would have the next opening and he wrote her in December, 1976, that, although she was next in line for any vacancy, Maloni had received Murray's job because he had more retention points. Also, during this period, Fernandez and Smith offered Petitioner openings in Gainesville and Daytona Beach, but she declined to accept them because she wished to stay in Broward County. Smith also suggested that she get a job as a hostess or cocktail waitress because she was cute and petite. (Testimony of Ino, Smith, Fernandez, Exhibit 4) Petitioner testified that she was of the opinion her sex was a factor in the matter because nothing was done for her by Division personnel and because of the comments made by Smith concerning her eligibility for unemployment compensation and his comments concerning the possibility of her becoming a cocktail waitress. (Testimony of Ino) Petitioner was employed by Respondent from June 1, 1973 to August 2, 1977. She had performed her duties in an exemplary manner. (Testimony of McCulley)

Recommendation It is recommended that the Career Service Commission deny the appeal. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd of March, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 COPIES FURNISHED: Lawrence D. Winson Staff Attorney Department of Business Regulation The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Roger D. Haagenson 800 E. Broward Building Suite 610 Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33301

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NORMA PEDRAZA vs AGENCY FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, 13-003709 (2013)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Sep. 25, 2013 Number: 13-003709 Latest Update: Feb. 05, 2014

The Issue Whether Petitioners received salary overpayments from the Agency for Persons with Disabilities.

Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Petitioners Ileana Toledo, Norma Pedraza, and Lil Guerrero have been career service employees of Respondent. The Department of Management Services (“DMS”) has a classification and pay system that is used by Respondent, and DMS is responsible for designating employment positions within Respondent. A position is either included for overtime pay or excluded from overtime pay. At issue is whether Petitioners erroneously received monetary compensation for overtime hours worked after their position was reclassified from an included career service position to an excluded career service position. Prior to March 28, 2013, Petitioners held the position of Human Services Counselor III, which was designated by DMS as an included career service position. On March 26, 2013, Respondent proposed to reclassify Petitioners’ position from Human Services Counselor III to Human Service Program Analyst, which is designated by DMS as an excluded career service position. The proposed reclassification resulted from a reorganization of Respondent’s regional offices, and an effort by Respondent to standardize its functions, services, and types of positions in its regional offices. In a letter dated March 26, 2013, Petitioners were advised by Respondent’s Human Resources Director, Dale Sullivan, that if they accepted an offer to reclassify their position from Human Services Counselor III to Human Service Program Analyst, their “current status and salary will remain unchanged.” Notably, the March 26, 2013, letter makes no specific mention of overtime. On March 28, 2013, Petitioners accepted Respondent’s offer of employment to reclassify their position from Human Services Counselor III to Human Service Program Analyst. Typically, employees of Respondent who are appointed to new positions are placed in probationary status, as opposed to permanent status, and are required to review and execute new position descriptions. However, the reclassification of Petitioners’ position by Respondent was not typical. As part of the reclassification of Petitioners’ position to Human Service Program Analyst, Respondent provided Petitioners with a new position description. However, Petitioners’ job duties, salaries, and permanent status remained the same as they had been in their prior position of Human Services Counselor III. Petitioners read and acknowledged their receipt of the new position description on March 28, 2013. On the first page of the position description, there is a heading titled “Position Attributes”. Under this heading, the term “Overtime” is shown, followed by two boxes, “Yes” and “No.” The “No” box is marked, indicating that Petitioners are not eligible to work overtime hours. The position description further indicates that Petitioners would be career service employees. However, the position description does not specifically include the terms included or excluded. Prior to the reclassification, Petitioners were paid bi-weekly based on an 80-hour pay period. If they worked more than 80 hours in a pay period, they received additional monetary compensation for their overtime hours. Payment for Petitioners’ regular and overtime work hours was based on employee timesheets submitted to the People First leave and payroll system. After the reclassification of their position, Petitioners continued to work overtime in excess of their bi-weekly contractual hours, despite the prohibition in the position description. Petitioners were required to obtain approval by their supervisors before being allowed to work overtime. Petitioners’ overtime was approved by their supervisors after the reclassification despite the prohibition on working overtime hours as indicated in the position description. During the pay periods of March 29-April 11, 2013; April 26-May 9, 2013; and May 10-June 23, 2013, Petitioner Ileana Toledo worked a total of 28 hours of overtime, and received monetary compensation in the amount of $464.63 from Respondent for these overtime hours. For the pay periods of March 29-April 11, 2013; April 12-April 25, 2013; April 26-May 9, 2013; and May 10-May 23, 2013, Petitioner Norma Pedraza worked a total of 32.25 hours of overtime, and received monetary compensation in the amount of $624.14 from Respondent for these overtime hours. For the pay periods of March 29-April 11, 2013; April 12-April 25, 2013; April 26-May 9, 2013; and May 10-May 23, 2013, Petitioner Lil Guerrero worked a total of 25.50 hours of overtime, and received monetary compensation in the amount of $426.65 from Respondent for these overtime hours. Respondent’s payment of monetary compensation to Petitioners for the overtime hours worked after the reclassification of their position to Human Service Program Analyst occurred due to an administrative coding error, thereby resulting in the overpayment of monetary compensation to Petitioners by Respondent in the amounts the Respondent seeks to recover from Petitioners. The administrative coding error occurred because of Respondent’s failure to note the change from included to excluded on the People First system following the reclassification of Petitioners’ position. The error occurred due to an honest mistake, and resulted in the overpayments at issue. Petitioners should not have received monetary compensation for their overtime hours in the Human Service Program Analyst position because a Human Service Program Analyst position is an excluded career service position. An excluded career service employee must earn and receive regular compensation leave credits for overtime work, but cannot receive monetary compensation for overtime work. On the other hand, included career service employees, such as those persons in Petitioners’ previous position of Human Services Counselor III, must receive monetary compensation for overtime hours worked, rather than regular compensatory leave credits. Neither Petitioners nor their supervisors were aware at the time that the overpayments were made that Petitioners could not receive monetary compensation for their overtime hours, but must instead receive regular compensatory leave credits. At hearing, Petitioners did not dispute the amounts and hours of overtime worked as set forth in paragraphs 12-14 above. In accordance with the Department of Management Services’ Bureau of Payroll Manual, the amount of salary overpaid, and the amount sought to be repaid, was calculated as set forth in paragraphs 12-14 above. When an agency has determined that a salary overpayment has occurred, it is required to follow procedures set forth in the above-referenced manual, to seek repayment. Respondent followed those procedures in making the calculations relevant in this case.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Agency for Persons with Disabilities determining that: 1) Petitioner Ileana Toledo was erroneously paid salary in the amount of $464.63; 2) Petitioner Norma Pedraza was erroneously paid salary in the amount of $624.13; 3) Petitioner Lil Guerrero was erroneously paid salary in the amount of $426.65; and 4) Petitioners are entitled to be compensated by Respondent through compensatory leave credits for the overtime hours worked as reflected in paragraphs 12-14 above. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of November, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of November, 2013.

Florida Laws (2) 120.569120.57
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JOSEPH A. CONLEY vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 03-004216SED (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Nov. 07, 2003 Number: 03-004216SED Latest Update: Jun. 17, 2004

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent properly reclassified Petitioner's employment position from Career Service status to Selected Exempt Service status.

Findings Of Fact In 2001, the Florida Legislature enacted a substantial revision to Florida's civil service system commonly referred to as the "Service First" initiative. See Ch. 2001-43, Laws of Fla. Among the significant changes, the revision redefined the parameters of the Selected Exempt Service classification for public employees. In essence, the Selected Exempt Service classification was expanded to include most of the supervisory level employee classifications which had previously been identified as part of the Career Service classification. The statutory changes brought about by the Service First initiative became effective on May 14, 2001. Id. at 15. Petitioner was employed under the Career Service classification by the Department of Children and Family Services since 1990, and served as a Public Assistance Specialist Supervisor, position number 64817, in the Suncoast Region. In light of Section 110.25(2)(x), Florida Statutes (2003), Respondent reclassified Petitioner's Career Service position to Selected Exempt Service status in July 2003. Petitioner's Career Service position description remained unchanged when it was reclassified to Select Exempt Service status. The position description specifically identifies supervisory responsibilities and states: Duties and Responsibilities: This is a professional position primarily responsible for the supervision of a public assistance unit for determining the initial and ongoing eligibility of applicants for programs such as Food Stamps, Medicaid, ICP, OSS, Waiver, etc. More specifically, pursuant to the written position description, the Public Assistance Specialist Supervisor is required to "supervise the appointment and case management system" to ensure that subordinates are correctly processing applications. The position is responsible for evaluating all scheduled work and appropriately reassigning work. In addition, pursuant to the position description, the supervisor shall analyze work reports provided by subordinate employees, educate staff, schedule case reviews with supervised employees, and conduct monthly conferences with each employee. The supervisor is obligated to review their performance, identify their strengths and weaknesses, and provide supervisory assistance in achieving acceptable standards. The supervisor is required to prepare written evaluations, conduct staff meetings, and develop in-service training for under achieving employees. Petitioner's actual duties and work-load were consistent with the written position description. Petitioner interviewed applicants and recommended candidates for job vacancies in his area. He supervised subordinates, recommended and levied appropriate corrective action, and organized and distributed work. Petitioner set organizational goals, motivated employees, trained and developed their technical skills, resolved employee problems, and implemented performance and quality control standards. Petitioner was responsible for ensuring that the staff assigned to him maintained at least a 90 percent accuracy rate on case reviews processed and a 96 percent processing rate on unit assigned client applications. Petitioner admits that his supervisory duties consumed most of his time. He acknowledges that client interviews were not part of his normal duties and concedes that he regularly supervised employees, provided feedback to employees, and performed evaluations. In addition, he agrees that his recommendations regarding discipline were usually followed. Petitioner routinely led staff meetings with his subordinates and frequently met with them individually. He controlled work-flow and made changes as he deemed appropriate within his department. Petitioner admits that he functioned as the supervisor in an area that was distinct and separate from the other units. The evidence presented at hearing establishes that Petitioner's written and actual duties were supervisory in nature, and he spent the majority of his time performing those duties.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order approving Petitioner's reclassification. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of March, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM R. PFEIFFER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph A. Conley, Jr. 8511 Sunflower Lane Bayonet Point, Florida 34667 Jennifer Lima-Smith, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 9393 Florida Avenue, Room 902 Tampa, Florida 33612-7236 Maria N. Sorolis, Esquire Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A. 324 South Hyde Park Avenue, Suite 350 Tampa, Florida 33606 Michael Mattimore, Esquire Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A. 906 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Paul Flounlacker, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Florida Laws (3) 110.205120.569120.57
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THOMAS J. CARPENTER vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 91-003826 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sarasota, Florida Jun. 24, 1991 Number: 91-003826 Latest Update: Jan. 17, 1992

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times material to this proceeding, the Petitioner was an employee of the state of Florida employed by the Department. On May 10, 1991 the Petitioner was arrested and placed in isolation without any outside contact except in the evenings by phone. By letter dated May 15, 1991, mailed to Petitioner's home address, the Department advised Petitioner that having been absence from work for three consecutive days without authorized leave of absence the Department assumed that the Petitioner had abandoned his position and resigned from career services. Additionally, this letter advised the Petitioner that he had 20 calendar days from receipt of the notice to petition the State Personnel Director for a review of the facts to determine if the circumstances constituted abandonment of position. The return receipt for this letter appears to be signed by Vickie Carpenter but does not indicate the date it was signed by her. A copy of this same letter was mailed by the Department to the Petitioner at the jail but no return receipt was ever received by the Department. However, the Petitioner testified at having received the letter around May 23, 1991. On May 23, 1991 the Respondent was released from jail and was available for work beginning on May 24, 1991. However, the Department had already terminated the Petitioner based on abandonment of position. By letter dated June 6, 1991 the Petitioner requested the State Personnel Director to review his case. By letter dated June 12, 1991 and received by Petitioner on June 14, 1991, the Department again advised Petitioner that the Department assumed that he had abandoned his position and again outlined the review process. On June 20, 1991 the Secretary of the Department of Administration entered an Order Accepting Petition and Assignment to the Division of Administrative Hearings. By letter dated August 27, 1991 the Department advised Petitioner that it was withdrawing the action of abandonment of position, and that he was reinstated to his position effective August 30, 1991. However, by letter dated August 29, 1991 the Department advised Petitioner that he was to report for work on September 3, 1991 rather than August 30, 1991, and that he was to report to Ft. Myers rather than to his old job in Punta Gorda. Additionally, Mark M. Geisler, Subdistrict Administrator, the author of the letter, advised the Petitioner that since the issue of back pay had been discussed with DeLuccia it was best for Petitioner to contact him in that regard. Petitioner was reinstated by the Department on September 3, 1991. Petitioner did not at any time agree to forego any back pay in order for the Department to reinstate him. The Petitioner has never received any back pay for the period beginning Friday, May 24, 1991 (the day he was able and ready to return to work) through Monday, September 2, 1991 (the day before Petitioner returned to work). Petitioner's wife, Vickie L. Carpenter was, at all times material to this proceeding, employed by the state of Florida, and because she and Petitioner both were employed by the state of Florida their health insurance was furnished by the state of Florida at no cost to them. Upon the Department terminating the Petitioner his wife was required to pay for her health insurance until Petitioner was reinstated on September 3, 1991. Petitioner was unable to report to work during the period from May 10, 1991 through May 23, 1991, inclusive, due to being incarcerated, and was on unauthorized leave of absence during this period. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to any back pay for this period, and so stipulated at the hearing. However, Petitioner is entitled to receive back pay for the period from May 24, 1991 through September 2, 1991, inclusive. There is sufficient competent substantial evidence to establish that the Department was aware of Petitioner's incarceration and that it was not Petitioner's intent to abandon his position with the Department.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Administration enter a Final Order (1) confirming the action of the Department that Petitioner did not abandon his position with the Department, and (2) reimbursing Petitioner for back pay for the period from May 24, 1991 through September 2, 1991, inclusive, and for any other benefit that Petitioner was entitled to during this period, including, but not limited to, health insurance benefits. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of December, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of December, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas J. Carpenter 1669 Flamingo Blvd. Bradenton, FL 34207 Susan E. Vacca, Qualified Representative Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services P.O. Box 1415 Punta Gorda, FL 33951-1415 Augustus D. Aikens, General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 John A. Pieno, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Robert B. Williams, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Anthony N. DeLuccia, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services P.O. Box 06085 Fort Myers, FL 33906

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MARK A. SEMONE vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 03-004715SED (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Petersburg, Florida Dec. 15, 2003 Number: 03-004715SED Latest Update: Mar. 19, 2008

The Issue The issues in this matter are whether Petitioner was a supervisory employee as defined by Subsection 110.205(2)(x), Florida Statutes (2001), and was, therefore, properly reclassified from Career Service to Selected Exempt Service effective July 1, 2001.

Findings Of Fact The 2001 Florida Legislature enacted a substantial revision of the Florida Civil Service system referred to as the "Service First" initiative. (See Chapter 2001-43, Laws of Florida). This revision, which became effective on July 1, 2001, substantially expanded the parameters of the Selected Exempt Service classification to include many positions which had previously been identified as Career Service positions. Generally, Selected Exempt Service employees serve at the pleasure of the agency head and are considered at-will employees; whereas, Career Service employees have greater employment rights and job security. Petitioner was employed by Respondent at the Pinellas Maintenance Yard from December 15, 1997, to September 19, 2002. Initially, Petitioner held the position of Office Support III, but was eventually promoted to Office Support V in June 2001, both Career Service classifications. Following the enactment of the Service First initiative, Respondent reclassified Petitioner's Career Service position to Selected Exempt Service status in July 2001. On September 19, 2002, Petitioner was terminated from employment without explanation. His annual salary was $32,500. Following the decision in Reinshuttle v. Agency for Health Care Administration, 849 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), Respondent notified Petitioner of his rights to seek an administrative hearing and challenge the reclassification. Petitioner timely challenged Respondent's action. During his tenure working for Respondent, Petitioner, pursuant to his written position description, was responsible for various administrative functions, including personnel, records, and fiscal matters, as well as supervisory responsibilities, including the supervision of a few administrative staff. Specifically, his position description provides in part: 20% of time: Supervises and/or participates in the daily administrative activities . . . . Ensuring the reception telephone and radio are fully staffed at all times. . . 15% of time: Supervises and/or participates in the personnel activities for Pinellas Maintenance Office. Counsels employees in matters of retirements, benefits, grievances, discipline and other personnel and work related problems. . . 15% of time: Supervises and/or participates in the fiscal activities for the Pinellas Maintenance Office. Supervises the maintenance of ledgers and Journals associated with local Purchase Orders, local Charge Accounts and Purchase Requisitions, Utility Invoice Transmittals, Contract Invoice transmittals, Partial Payments, etc. . . 10% of time: Directs purchasing for the Pinellas Maintenance Office. . . 10% of time: Serves as representative of the Pinellas Maintenance Engineer at meetings. . . 10% of time: Receives incoming mail, reviews and distributes to appropriate personnel. . . 5% of time: Participates in the selection process for entry level Field Operations Unit positions. . . 5% of time: Directs and coordinates the maintenance and use of records storage. . . 5% of time: Trains employees in methods for performing an efficient and effective job. 5% of time: Performs other related duties as required. Petitioner admits that he was responsible for and routinely engaged in many activities that were supervisory in nature. The evidence supports the fact that Petitioner performed these duties, and his performance evaluations reflect his activity. Petitioner's position description allocated specific time frames to the written duties and responsibilities. Upon careful review, the position description provides that the Office Support, Level V position employee shall "supervise and/or participate" in administrative, personnel, and fiscal matters 50 percent of the work-time. The remaining 50 percent of work-time is allocated to other duties, including purchasing, attending meetings, mail distribution and inquiries, assisting with the selection process of certain entry level positions, coordinating records storage, training certain employees, and performing other "related duties as required." While Petitioner admits that he performed supervisory activity, he contends that it consumed a small percentage of his work-time. He further argues that he was authorized and required to spend 50 percent of his time "supervising and/or participating in" certain activities. Petitioner alleges that he spent little time "supervising" and most of his time "participating" and actually performing the activities. The evidence demonstrates that among the 80 to 100 people employed at the yard, Petitioner supervised a personnel technician, a financial clerk, a clerical employee, and a receptionist, all of whom required limited supervision. Petitioner primarily served as the personnel liaison for all of the employees, maintained their files, researched personnel matters, and responded to inquiries. He handled the personnel paperwork related to hiring and firing, leave, pay adjustments, travel reimbursements, and employee benefits. In addition, Petitioner investigated and processed workers' compensation claims and handled the yard's safety and training records. He worked on special projects including ferreting out overtime abuse, installing a security system, and handling certain maintenance issues. In addition to his administrative personnel responsibilities, Petitioner admittedly supervised, trained, directed, and evaluated four subordinates and was responsible for improving their performance via counseling and corrective action. He initiated disciplinary action and issued a written reprimand to one employee with poor attendance. On occasion, Petitioner conducted staff meetings with his subordinates and also met with them individually. He managed attendance and approved leave for his staff of four. He participated in interviewing and selecting candidates for open positions under his supervision and determined the appropriate criteria, created the interview questions, and was a member of the interview panel. Petitioner was evaluated, in part, upon his supervision of subordinates. One evaluation noted that he needed to improve follow-up with assignments made to others and another indicated that he capably initiated change, but occasionally required assistance to effectuate it. Petitioner's evaluations also assessed his leadership and delegation skills, and one noted that he delegated well, but needed to work to regain better control of his areas. Although some of Petitioner's time was spent supervising, the evidence demonstrates that the vast majority of his work-time was spent performing non-supervisory activities. The facts show that Petitioner actually performed the noted activities the majority of the time and supervised those activities on occasion. Furthermore, Mr. Nawab, who periodically served as Petitioner's supervisor, provided credible evidence that Petitioner's primary responsibilities and the majority of his work-time involved non-supervisory activities. While Petitioner, during his testimony, diminished the time he spent engaged in supervisory work, the credible evidence demonstrates that he spent the minority of his work-time communicating with, motivating, training, and evaluating employees and planning and directing employees' work. Although Petitioner may have demonstrated mediocre supervisory skills, which does not make the position any less supervisory, neither Petitioner's supervisor nor his position description required him to spend the majority of his work time engaged in those supervisory activities.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The position of Office Support V for the Pinellas Maintenance Yard for the State of Florida Department of Transportation was not exempt from Career Service classification as defined in Subsection 110.205(2)(x), Florida Statutes (2001); Respondent improperly reclassified the position as Selected Exempt Service; and Petitioner should be reinstated with the full benefits accrued since his termination on September 19, 2002. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of May, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM R. PFEIFFER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of May, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert M. Burdick, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Mary F. Aspros, Esquire Meyer and Brooks, P.A. 2544 Blairstone Pines Drive Post Office Box 1547 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Maria N. Sorolis, Esquire Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A. Hyde Park Plaza, Suite 350 324 South Hyde Park Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33606 James C. Myers, Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450

Florida Laws (3) 110.205120.569120.57
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PATRICIA BURGAINS vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 90-005652 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Sep. 06, 1990 Number: 90-005652 Latest Update: May 16, 1991

Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner was formerly employed by Respondent as a Human Services Worker assigned to the Landmark Learning Center, a residential facility located in Dade County. She began her employment on May 10, 1985. On January 13, 1989, Petitioner received the following memorandum from the Residential Services Director of Facility I at Landmark: In reviewing your time and attendance record from August, 1988, I have observed that you are exhibiting excessive absences and/or tardiness. These frequent absences place an unfair burden on your coworkers and interfere with the operations of this center. Therefore they will no longer be tolerated. Effective on the date you receive this communication, the following restrictions will be in effect: As always, you are expected to have all leave time approved in advance by your immediate supervisor. You are expected to submit a doctor's statement justifying your absence prior to the approval of any sick leave, annual-sick leave, or family-sick leave. You will not be allowed to substitute any other type of leave for these absences. Failure to comply with the above restrictions will result in disapproved leave without pay for the dates in question, and a recommendation for disciplinary action based on absence without authorized leave. In addition a continued pattern of excessive absence could result in disciplinary action for excessive absence/tardiness. All disciplinary [action] will be in accordance with HRS-P-60-1, Employee's handbook. I am confident that you will correct this situation in a satisfactory manner. At no time prior to the termination of Petitioner's employment with Respondent were the "restrictions" imposed by this memorandum lifted. In early 1990, Petitioner sustained an on-the-job injury. As a result of the injury, Petitioner was on authorized leave from February 25, 1990, until April 4, 1990. When she returned to work on April 5, 1990, Petitioner was assigned to "light duty" in the field office of which Sylvia Davis, a Senior Residential Unit Supervisor, was in charge. Petitioner's working hours were 6:00 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. Petitioner was advised that Roberta Barnes would be her immediate supervisor during her "light duty" assignment. On April 5, 1990, Petitioner worked six and a half hours. She was on authorized leave the remainder of her shift. On April 6 and 7, 1990, she worked her full shift. On April 8 and 9, 1990, Petitioner did not report to work. She telephoned the field office before the beginning of her shift on each of these days and left word that she would not be at work because she was experiencing pain in her lower back and right leg; however, she never received supervisory authorization to be absent from work on these days. April 10 and 11, 1990, were scheduled days off for Petitioner. At approximately 11:00 p.m. on April 11, 1990, Petitioner telephoned the field office and gave notice that, inasmuch as her physical condition remained unchanged, she would not be at work the following day. Petitioner did not report to work on April 12, 1990. Although she had telephoned the field office the night before to give advance notice of her absence, at no time had she received supervisory authorization to be absent from work on April 12, 1990. On April 13, 14, 15 and 16, 1990, Petitioner did not report to work because she was still not feeling well. She neither telephoned the field office to give advance notice of her absences, nor obtained supervisory authorization to be absent on these days. April 17 and 18, 1990, were scheduled days off for Petitioner. Prior to the scheduled commencement of her shift on April 19, 1990, Petitioner telephoned the field office to indicate that she would not be at work that day because she had a doctor's appointment, but that she hoped to return to work on April 20, 1990. Petitioner did not report to work on April 19, 1990. Although she had telephoned the field office to give advance notice of her absence, at no time had she received supervisory authorization to be absent from work on that day. On April 19, 1990, Petitioner was sent the following letter by the Superintendent of Landmark: You have not called in or reported to work since April 12, 1990 and therefore you have abandoned your position as a Human Services Worker II and are deemed to have resigned from the Career Service according to Chapter 22A-7.010(2)(a) of Personnel Rules and Regulations of the Career Service System. Your resignation will be effective on the date that you receive this letter or on the date we receive the undelivered letter advising you of your abandonment. You have the right to petition the State Personnel Director, 530 Carlton Building, Tallahassee, Florida 32304 for review of the facts. Such petition must be filed within twenty (20) calendar days after receipt of this letter. At approximately 12:40 a.m. on Friday, April 20, 1990, unaware that she had been deemed to have resigned her position, Petitioner telephoned the field office to give notice that she would be out of work until after her doctor's appointment on Monday, April 23, 1990. On April 23, 1990, Petitioner again telephoned the field office to advise that she had to undergo further medical testing and therefore would remain out of work until the required tests were performed. Petitioner's call was transferred to Elaine Olsen, a Personnel Technician II at Landmark, who told Petitioner about the letter the Superintendent had sent to Petitioner the previous Thursday. Petitioner received the letter on April 30, 1990. Petitioner did not report to work during the period referenced in the Superintendent's letter because she was not feeling well. She did not intend, by not reporting to work on these days, to resign or abandon her position. It was her intention to return to work when she felt well enough to do so.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration enter a final order (1) finding that Petitioner did not abandon her career service position, and (2) directing Respondent to reinstate Petitioner with back pay. DONE and ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 16th day of May, 1991. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of May, 1991.

Florida Laws (1) 110.201
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RICHARD F. MARSH vs. DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, 77-000404RE (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-000404RE Latest Update: Apr. 25, 1977

The Issue Validity of Emergency Rule 22 AER 76-1, Department of Administration. This case concerns Petitioner's challenge of the validity of Emergency Rule 22 AER 76-1, Department of Administration, State of Florida, on the ground that promulgation of the rule was an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. The petition specifically alleges that Respondent failed to make an adequate finding that an immediate danger to the public health, safety, or welfare warranted an emergency rule, and that there existed no such immediate danger which might have necessitated enacting an emergency rule. The petition further alleges that the procedure adopted by Respondent in promulgating the emergency rule was unfair and contrary to law. The petition was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on February 23, 1977, and thereafter assigned to the undersigned Hearing Officer. Prior to final hearing herein, Petitioner propounded written interrogatories and requests for admission from Respondent. The Respondent filed a "Notice of Objection" to the said interrogatories on grounds that judicial review is exclusive as to the agency's findings of immediate danger, necessity, and procedural fairness, as provided under subsection 120.54(9)(a)3, F.S., and that therefore the Hearing Officer has no jurisdiction over the matter. The parties stipulated that if Respondent's objection was resolved in favor of Petitioner, the interrogatories and answers submitted by Respondent thereto, together with supporting documents, would be admissible in evidence for all relevant purposes. For the reasons stated hereinafter in Conclusions of Law, it is determined that the Hearing Officer has jurisdiction in this case and, accordingly, the stipulated matters are accepted, as set forth below.

Findings Of Fact On April 26, 1976, the procedures for layoff of state career service employees contained in certain memoranda of the Department of Administration (DOA) and the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services were determined to be invalid rules by a Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings. (J. Richard Stevens v. DHRS and DOA, DOAH Case No. 75-2024R). The specific documents held to be invalid rules were Personnel, Policy and Procedure Memorandum No. 74-7, Subject: Guidelines for Preparing Layoff Procedures, issued by the DOA, and Directive No. 8.07, Dept. of HRS, Subject "Layoff and Reemployment of Personnel." The DOA procedures were effective on July 1, 1974, and implemented Rule 22A-7.10(H)(3), Florida Administrative Code. On May 25, 1976, the First District Court of Appeal denied a motion of the DOA for a stay of the Hearing Officer's Final Order (Case No. CC-101). However, the Hearing Officer granted a stay of his Final Order until June 21, 1976. On April 6, 1977, the First District Court of Appeal upheld the Final Order of the Hearing Officer in the Stevens case (Case No. CC-101,156.) A 1976 amendment of subsection 110.061(2)(a), required specified layoff procedures to be developed by Respondent. (Chapter 76-116, Laws of Florida) Federal standards for a merit system of personnel administration affecting all state agencies receiving federal grant-in-aid funds that were in effect in 1976 require the establishment of certain procedures for layoff of permanent state employees. (Testimony of Dean, Attachment 5 to Respondent's memorandum) Respondent's personnel officers were aware that there was impending legislation to abolish some 2,000 state employee positions, effective June 30, 1976, that would require the existence of layoff criteria and procedures for orderly and fair implementation (Testimony of Dean). In view of the foregoing, DOA,during the latter part of May and early June, 1976, began the process of formulating and adopting an emergency rule to cover layoff procedures. Although consideration was given to the possibility of following normal rule-making procedures, it was determined that there was insufficient time available to promulgate a rule in that manner. (Testimony of Dean) Notice of the proposed emergency rule was prepared and published in the June 11, 1976, issue of the Florida Administrative Weekly. The notice stated that the rule would become effective upon filing with the Secretary of State, and that a copy could be obtained by writing to the state personnel director. It provided in part as follows: "SPECIFIC REASONS FOR FINDING AN IMMEDIATE DANGER TO PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY AND WELFARE: Recent changes in law have cast doubt upon the proper current Career Service layoff procedure. Because numerous layoffs may be required before a permanent rule could become effective, it is essential to the welfare of the State that all doubt be removed by adoption of a definite procedure, both for the benefit of the State as employer and of the affected employees. REASONS WHY PROCEDURE USED IS FAIR UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES: The emergency rule is based on the recommendations of the Career Service Commission contained in its report of November 7, 1975, following public hearings October 23 and 24, 1975, incorporating any applicable guidelines approved by the Secretary of Administration." The proposed emergency rule was placed on the agenda of the Administration Commission for June 15, 1976, and, after discussion, the rule was amended and adopted by that body. On the same date, the emergency rule was filed with the Department of State. (Composite Exhibit 1a-d, Exhibit 2) By letter of June 16, 1976, Petitioner was informed by the personnel officer of the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services that his position of Agriculture Investigator Supervisor in the Division of Animal Industry had been abolished, effective June 30, 1976, and that, in accordance with Department of Administration Emergency Rule No. 22 AER 76-1, he was being notified of the proposed action. Pursuant to that notification, Petitioner was laid off as of June 30, 1976. He thereafter filed an appeal with the Career Service Commission on July 7, 1976. (Testimony of Shelby, Exhibits 3, 4)

Florida Laws (3) 120.54120.568.07
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RUBY HOLLOWAY-JENKINS vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 87-004369 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-004369 Latest Update: Nov. 30, 1987

Findings Of Fact On July 9, 1986 Petitioner, a Clerk Typist Specialist employed by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, signed a receipt acknowledging that she had received a copy of the Department's Employee Handbook which contains the information that an employee who is absent for three consecutive workdays without authorization may be considered to have abandoned his or her position and thereby to have resigned. On September 3, 1987 Petitioner telephoned her supervisor to advise him that she had an interview scheduled and that she would be at work by 9:30 a.m. She, however, thereafter failed to appear at work and failed to make any further contact with her supervisor on September 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, and 11, 1987. On September 11, 1987 by certified letter the Department advised Petitioner that, as of the close of business on September 9, she was deemed to have abandoned her position and to have resigned from the Career Service due to her unauthorized absence for three consecutive workdays, i.e., September 3, 4, and 8, 1987.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered deeming Petitioner to have abandoned her position and to have resigned from the Career Service. DONE AND ORDERED this 30th day of November, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Ruby Holloway-Jenkins 649 West 4th Street Riviera Beach, Florida 33404 K. C. Collette, Esquire District IX Legal Counsel 111 Georgia Avenue West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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IIEANA TOLEDO vs AGENCY FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, 13-003708 (2013)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Sep. 25, 2013 Number: 13-003708 Latest Update: Feb. 05, 2014

The Issue Whether Petitioners received salary overpayments from the Agency for Persons with Disabilities.

Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Petitioners Ileana Toledo, Norma Pedraza, and Lil Guerrero have been career service employees of Respondent. The Department of Management Services (“DMS”) has a classification and pay system that is used by Respondent, and DMS is responsible for designating employment positions within Respondent. A position is either included for overtime pay or excluded from overtime pay. At issue is whether Petitioners erroneously received monetary compensation for overtime hours worked after their position was reclassified from an included career service position to an excluded career service position. Prior to March 28, 2013, Petitioners held the position of Human Services Counselor III, which was designated by DMS as an included career service position. On March 26, 2013, Respondent proposed to reclassify Petitioners’ position from Human Services Counselor III to Human Service Program Analyst, which is designated by DMS as an excluded career service position. The proposed reclassification resulted from a reorganization of Respondent’s regional offices, and an effort by Respondent to standardize its functions, services, and types of positions in its regional offices. In a letter dated March 26, 2013, Petitioners were advised by Respondent’s Human Resources Director, Dale Sullivan, that if they accepted an offer to reclassify their position from Human Services Counselor III to Human Service Program Analyst, their “current status and salary will remain unchanged.” Notably, the March 26, 2013, letter makes no specific mention of overtime. On March 28, 2013, Petitioners accepted Respondent’s offer of employment to reclassify their position from Human Services Counselor III to Human Service Program Analyst. Typically, employees of Respondent who are appointed to new positions are placed in probationary status, as opposed to permanent status, and are required to review and execute new position descriptions. However, the reclassification of Petitioners’ position by Respondent was not typical. As part of the reclassification of Petitioners’ position to Human Service Program Analyst, Respondent provided Petitioners with a new position description. However, Petitioners’ job duties, salaries, and permanent status remained the same as they had been in their prior position of Human Services Counselor III. Petitioners read and acknowledged their receipt of the new position description on March 28, 2013. On the first page of the position description, there is a heading titled “Position Attributes”. Under this heading, the term “Overtime” is shown, followed by two boxes, “Yes” and “No.” The “No” box is marked, indicating that Petitioners are not eligible to work overtime hours. The position description further indicates that Petitioners would be career service employees. However, the position description does not specifically include the terms included or excluded. Prior to the reclassification, Petitioners were paid bi-weekly based on an 80-hour pay period. If they worked more than 80 hours in a pay period, they received additional monetary compensation for their overtime hours. Payment for Petitioners’ regular and overtime work hours was based on employee timesheets submitted to the People First leave and payroll system. After the reclassification of their position, Petitioners continued to work overtime in excess of their bi-weekly contractual hours, despite the prohibition in the position description. Petitioners were required to obtain approval by their supervisors before being allowed to work overtime. Petitioners’ overtime was approved by their supervisors after the reclassification despite the prohibition on working overtime hours as indicated in the position description. During the pay periods of March 29-April 11, 2013; April 26-May 9, 2013; and May 10-June 23, 2013, Petitioner Ileana Toledo worked a total of 28 hours of overtime, and received monetary compensation in the amount of $464.63 from Respondent for these overtime hours. For the pay periods of March 29-April 11, 2013; April 12-April 25, 2013; April 26-May 9, 2013; and May 10-May 23, 2013, Petitioner Norma Pedraza worked a total of 32.25 hours of overtime, and received monetary compensation in the amount of $624.14 from Respondent for these overtime hours. For the pay periods of March 29-April 11, 2013; April 12-April 25, 2013; April 26-May 9, 2013; and May 10-May 23, 2013, Petitioner Lil Guerrero worked a total of 25.50 hours of overtime, and received monetary compensation in the amount of $426.65 from Respondent for these overtime hours. Respondent’s payment of monetary compensation to Petitioners for the overtime hours worked after the reclassification of their position to Human Service Program Analyst occurred due to an administrative coding error, thereby resulting in the overpayment of monetary compensation to Petitioners by Respondent in the amounts the Respondent seeks to recover from Petitioners. The administrative coding error occurred because of Respondent’s failure to note the change from included to excluded on the People First system following the reclassification of Petitioners’ position. The error occurred due to an honest mistake, and resulted in the overpayments at issue. Petitioners should not have received monetary compensation for their overtime hours in the Human Service Program Analyst position because a Human Service Program Analyst position is an excluded career service position. An excluded career service employee must earn and receive regular compensation leave credits for overtime work, but cannot receive monetary compensation for overtime work. On the other hand, included career service employees, such as those persons in Petitioners’ previous position of Human Services Counselor III, must receive monetary compensation for overtime hours worked, rather than regular compensatory leave credits. Neither Petitioners nor their supervisors were aware at the time that the overpayments were made that Petitioners could not receive monetary compensation for their overtime hours, but must instead receive regular compensatory leave credits. At hearing, Petitioners did not dispute the amounts and hours of overtime worked as set forth in paragraphs 12-14 above. In accordance with the Department of Management Services’ Bureau of Payroll Manual, the amount of salary overpaid, and the amount sought to be repaid, was calculated as set forth in paragraphs 12-14 above. When an agency has determined that a salary overpayment has occurred, it is required to follow procedures set forth in the above-referenced manual, to seek repayment. Respondent followed those procedures in making the calculations relevant in this case.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Agency for Persons with Disabilities determining that: 1) Petitioner Ileana Toledo was erroneously paid salary in the amount of $464.63; 2) Petitioner Norma Pedraza was erroneously paid salary in the amount of $624.13; 3) Petitioner Lil Guerrero was erroneously paid salary in the amount of $426.65; and 4) Petitioners are entitled to be compensated by Respondent through compensatory leave credits for the overtime hours worked as reflected in paragraphs 12-14 above. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of November, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of November, 2013.

Florida Laws (2) 120.569120.57
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JERRY M. COOPER vs DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, 89-005519 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Apr. 11, 1990 Number: 89-005519 Latest Update: Feb. 16, 1990

The Issue The ultimate issue in the instant case is whether Petitioner abandoned his position with Respondent and resigned from the Career Service.

Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, the Hearing Officer makes the following Findings of Fact: Petitioner was formerly employed as an Unemployment Compensation (UC) Adjudicator in Respondent's Miami UC office. In this capacity, he interviewed claimants seeking unemployment compensation and made initial determinations regarding the validity of their claims. Petitioner was often absent because of illness. When he was at work, however, he performed his duties competently. Petitioner and his fellow employees at the Miami UC Office were required to notify supervisory personnel no later than the beginning of the workday if they were going to be absent that day. Petitioner was made aware of this requirement on various occasions prior to the absences that led to the termination of his employment with Respondent. On Tuesday, September 5, 1989, Petitioner telephoned his supervisor and told her that he would be absent that day because of an ankle injury he had sustained. He did not indicate during the conversation whether he would be at work the following day. On Wednesday, September 6, 1989, and Thursday, September 7, 1989, Petitioner neither reported to work nor contacted his supervisor at any time during the day to give notification of his absence. On Friday, September 8, 1989, Petitioner again failed to report to work. He did, however, telephone his supervisor concerning his absence, but he did not do so until 4:50 p.m., 20 minutes after the shift to which he was assigned had ended. By letter dated September 11, 1989, Respondent notified Petitioner that it had determined that Petitioner had abandoned his position and resigned from the Career Service effective the close of business September 8, 1989, in view of his unauthorized absence from work on September 6, 7, and 8, 1989. It is this determination that is the subject of the instant controversy.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration enter a final order sustaining Respondent's determination that Petitioner abandoned his UC Adjudicator position with Respondent and resigned from the Career Service. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 16th day of February 1990. STUART H. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of February 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact To the extent that Petitioner asserts in his letter that he contacted his supervisor on September 5, 1989, and again on September 8, 1989, his proposed findings of fact have been accepted and incorporated in substance in this Recommended Order. To the extent that he claims that he "did not have 3 consecutive days of unauthorized absences," his proposed factual findings have been rejected because they are contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact First Sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Second Sentence: Rejected because it adds only unnecessary detail. First and second sentences: Rejected because they add only unnecessary detail; Third sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected because it adds only unnecessary detail. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected because it adds only unnecessary detail. Accepted and incorporated in substance. First, second and fifth sentences: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Third and fourth sentences: Rejected because it adds only unnecessary detail. Accepted and incorporated in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerry Cooper 1601 Northwest 17th Street, #2 Miami, Florida 33125 Edward A. Dion, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security Suite 131, Montgomery Building 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0657 William A. Frieder Senior Attorney Office of the General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Aletta Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr. General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Hugo Menendez, Secretary Florida, Department of Labor and Employment Security Berkeley Building, Suite 200 2590 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152

Florida Laws (1) 110.201
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