The Issue Whether prison inmates' television viewing privileges are a legal interest of which the Administrative Procedure Act takes cognizance?
Findings Of Fact Until the memorandum and institutional operating pro- cedure here challenged were implemented, petitioners and other inmates at Union Correctional Institution were permitted (when not required to be doing something else) to watch television in common areas between three o'clock and eleven o'clock weekday evenings, and on holidays, between eight o'clock in the morning and two or three o'clock the following morning. After somebody donated equipment for cable television at Union Correctional Institution, and after inmates, including Lionel E. Chase, had installed the cable, James D. Stephens, recreation director at Union Correctional Institution, met with six other members of a committee which included Colonel D. E. Jackson, Jim Reddish, Assistant Superintendent for Prisoners, Lieutenant Rothman (phonetic) and an inmate representative who had no say in developing policy. As a result of the meeting, a memorandum dated January 23, 1984, was addressed to the inmate population, stating: T.V. programs including sporting events beginning at 10:00 p.m. or before, shall be viewed to completion. Any program starting after 10:00 p.m. shall be terminated at 11:30 p.m., unless authorized in advance by the T.V. Policy Committee. Petitioners' Exhibit No. 3. Earlier, on January 3, 1984, Superintendent Massey signed Union Correctional Institution Operating Procedure No. 83-30, "Institutional T.V. Policy" (IOP 83- 30) Petitioners' Exhibit No. 2. This document specified "selection and viewing procedures....[for] each respective housing area." With respect to every housing area in Union Correctional Institution, IOP 83-30 provides: On Monday through Friday, sets will be turned on at 3:00 P.M.; on weekends and holidays, sets will be turned on at 8:00 A.M. All t.v.'s shall be turned off exactly at 11:30 P.M. Sports programming and special events that air past the time limit shall be viewed to completion. IOP 83-30.5(D)(4). Although signed by Superintendent Massey on January 3, 1984, IOP 83-30 is dated December 30, 1983. The memorandum and IOP 83-30.5(D)(4) have been enforced against petitioners. In enforcing the new policy, correctional staff have not only turned the television sets off earlier on weekends, they have also closed the dayrooms earlier. The guards now padlock the dayroom doors when they turn off the television sets. In the past, the dayrooms remained open even after television viewing stopped, and inmates were allowed to read, paint, write letters and so forth. The inmates filed a grievance petition protesting this change in practice. Petitioners' Exhibit No. 1. Rule Rationale Before installation of the cable, inmates had a choice of two or three programs, but they now have a much wider choice, at least when the cable is in good repair. A person or persons unknown have slashed the cable some half dozen times. There are inmates who believe the guards, some of whom reportedly do not feel inmates should watch television at all, have sabotaged the cable. According to some prison officials, it is the inmates who have slashed the cables, which, they say, is an indication of how high feeling runs between the inmate faction that prefers sports programs and the faction that does not. In any event, according to respondent's witnesses, it was for fear of inmates' quarrelling in choosing among the larger number of options cable television has brought that viewing hours on weekends and holidays were shortened. This does not, of course, explain why they were lengthened on weekdays. Nor was there any evidence that the greater range of television programs has caused any dissension among the inmates. The hearing officer has had the benefit of the parties' posthearing submissions, including petitioners' proposed findings of facts, conclusions of law and final order. To the extent proposed findings of fact have not been adopted they have been deemed unsupported by the weight of the evidence, immaterial, subordinate or cumulative.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations concerned herein, Respondent, William M. Floyd has been certified as a corrections officer in Florida under certificate number C- 7585, dated May 23, 1980. He had been certified prior to that time under another Commission procedure. The Commission is the state agency responsible for certifying law enforcement and corrections officers in Florida. Throughout the majority of the year 1986, Respondent was employed as a corrections officer at the Department of Corrections' Tampa Corrections Work Release Center. When he was arrested for grand theft during 1986, he advised his boss that he intended to plead not guilty. Because of his prior eight years of good work and based on his representations, he was not discharged and was allowed to keep his employment. Approximately six months later, Respondent was hospitalized for what his doctors thought was cancer of the spine. While he was in the hospital, his attorneys convinced him that due to his poor health, it would be to his advantage to plead nolo contendere and avoid the stress of a trial and thereafter negotiated an arrangement with the state attorney that in exchange for the plea of nolo contendere, adjudication of guilt would be withheld and Respondent would be placed on two years probation. Respondent entered that plea in open court on November 10, 1986 in the Circuit Court of Hillsborough County and was placed on two years probation. He was promised that at the successful completion of his term of probation, his record would be sealed from the public but not from law enforcement officials. Respondent is looking forward to that happening. After his court appearance, Respondent resigned from his position as a corrections officer with the Department of Corrections, he claims, due to his poor health. On December 4, 1986, the Department of Corrections advised the Petitioner, Commission, however, that Respondent had resigned his position due to the fact that he was placed on two years probation for grand theft. The documentation in question was not presented at the hearing, however, but the basis for Respondent's resignation is irrelevant. The seminal issue here is Respondent's plea of nolo contendere to a felony and of that there is no question. Respondent is not now employed as a corrections officer or in any law enforcement capacity. As a result, he does not need his certification. However, because of the nature of the charges against him, and what he believes is a lack of culpability on his part, (not further explained); and because he may some day again want to work as a corrections officer, he wants to keep his certification.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the certification of Respondent, WILLIAM M. FLOYD, as a corrections officer be revoked. RECOMMENDED this 23rd day of January, 1989 at Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of January, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 William M. Floyd Post Office Box 1084 Gibsonton, Florida 33534 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Daryl McLaughlin, Executive Director Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether the memorandum petitioners challenge amounts to a rule improperly promulgated? Whether the rules petitioners challenge are arbitrary and capricious or are otherwise beyond the authority delegated to respondent? STANDING STIPULATED At the beginning of the hearing, Mr. O'Donnell stated a motion ore tenus to strike paragraph five of the petition, in which the memorandum was challenged, on grounds that a challenge to the memorandum was premature, quoting the memorandum: "[T]he limits contained in this memorandum will not be enforced until April 1, 1984." After argument, the hearing officer was persuaded that the challenge was not premature on its fact, inasmuch as inmates with "items no listed . . . or an excessive amount of property" must decide whether to dispose of property before April 1, 1984, or suffer its confiscation; since nothing further was required for the memorandum to be efficacious; and since failure to enforce a rule does not alter its character as a rule. After the motion to strike was denied, Mr. O'Donnell stipulated, on the record, that standing was not in issue. He nevertheless argues in respondent's "proposed findings of fact-- conclusions of law--final order," as follows: Knowing the issue of standing as to the memo to have been put at issue by Respondent, it was incumbent upon Petitioner to place into the record some indication of impact. Having failed to do so, Petitioners lacked standing to challenge the memo. State v. Alice P., 367 So.2d 1045 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). 9. The issue of the adverse impact of the memo is crucial to a proper determination of whether the memo is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. * * * The memo, rather than adversely affect inmates, may not have any substantial impact on Petitioners. Section 120.56, Fla. Stat. Again, Petitioner entirely failed to introduce evidence on this point. This argument is precluded by Mr. O'Donnell's stipulation on the record at the hearing. Having stipulated that no proof was necessary to show the impact of the memorandum, respondent cannot now be heard to complain of the absence of proof on that point. Mr. O'Donnell also stipulated that the memorandum was not promulgated in accordance with Section 120.54, Florida Statutes (1983).
Findings Of Fact It is clear from its title that the memorandum is meant to apply only to Union Correctional Institution. The body of the memorandum, dated February 1, 1984, provides, in full: The attached 1/ is a list of the type and quantity of inmate property authorized at UCI. Inmates may also possess items sold by the Canteen, items received through an approved Package Permit, items authorized to be in cells as part of the Hobbycraft Program and items issued by the state. Property Quantity limits are necessary to prevent fires and control insect infestation. In addition, they provide a standard for both inmates and staff to follow in determining if an inmate's amount of property is excessive. Since many inmates have accumulated property for a long time, the limits contained in this memorandum will not be enforced until April 1, 1984. Inmates who have items not listed in this me[m]orandum or an excessive amount of property should begin making arrangements to send items out of the institution. Inmates who need to dispose of property should send a request to Sgt. Singletary, Property Officer. Items may be mailed somewhere or placed on the Main Gate for pick-up by a visitor. Your cooperation in reducing the amount of excess property yourselves, prior to April 1, 1984, will be greatly appreciated. Petitioners' Exhibit No. 2. It is signed by D. E. Jackson, Colonel, Correctional Officer Chief II, and P. V. Gunning, Assistant Superintendent of Operations. Dennis Dean Cooper is an inmate at Union Correctional Institution. In the month or two preceding the hearing, prison personnel confiscated wax, a wooden mallet, a hammer, a knife and rubber glue, all belonging to Cooper, who had acquired them, after gaining approval to do so, in connection with the Hobbycraft program. Guards searched from cell to cell and filled a 50 gallon barrel with items they took from Dean's cell alone. Kenneth Hayes' right eye was injured in a boxing accident. A governmental agency set up to assist the blind issued Hayes, an inmate at Union Correctional Institution, a green tape cassette recorder which prison personnel seized on January 19, 1984; they also took the stool he had made with approved Hobbycraft materials. That was the same day, or perhaps the day before, William Joseph Goens, an inmate house in the Main Housing Unit at Union Correctional Institution, lost his inlaid wooden chessboard in a "shakedown." Another inmate, Clayton, had given him the chessboard. Goens later saw the chessboard in a trash barrel in the back of a dump truck. Incarcerated at Union Correctional Institution and housed at 3T8, John Richard Clayton also lost property in the January 1984 shakedown, including Hobbycraft items, personal letters and letters from his attorney bearing on the proceedings eventuating in his incarceration. He is skilled at leather working and sometimes has temporary possession of other inmates' leather goods for purposes of effecting their repair. An electric fan which an inmate transferred to another institution had given Clayton before leaving was also confiscated. When prison personnel proposed to confiscate John McConnell's legal papers, if he did not dispose of them himself, he called several lawyers. Eventually he was issued a metal locker to which he transferred his legal papers from the cardboard box that had held them. No papers were ever confiscated. Petitioner Carl Cribbs, also confined at Union Correctional Institution lost two, bound folders containing legal documents, including 13 affidavits, as well as an electric fan, when these items were confiscated by prison guards on January 19, or 20, 1984. Radios and electric fans are registered as a means of identifying them. They are treated as contraband except when they are in the possession of the inmate to whom they are registered. If an inmate lends property to another inmate, it may become contraband subject to confiscation, regardless of the type of property involved. These practices protect inmates from theft, which is rampant at Union Correctional Institution. Guards and inmates alike are subject to "shakedowns" without notice as a means of controlling the flow of contraband. Under the right circumstances, virtually any property in an inmate's possession might be seized. At one time inmates were permitted to have matches and buy honey from the canteen in glass jars. After they began hurling empty honey jars at one another, the canteen switched to plastic containers for honey, and glass jars of all kinds were treated as contraband and confiscated. Inmates are still allowed cigarette lighters, but matches have been contraband ever since the authorities learned that new equipment in the shop made it possible for the inmates to manufacture zip guns. On the other hand, inmates are allowed Hobbycraft items, under ordinary circumstances, including X-acto knives. These knives have blades less than an inch long, but could be lethal if used as a weapon. If an inmate if found guilty of a rule infraction and subjected to administrative confinement, his property is confiscated. If an inmate attempted suicide, even his clothes might be removed. Petitioner Joe Lewis Holland, confined at Union Correctional Institution at the time of the hearing, had legal papers confiscated while he was at Baker Correctional Institution, but eventually recovered them pursuant to court order. Douglas L. Adams and Joe Lewis Holland v. Department of Corrections ex rel. Louie L. Wainwright, Secretary, et al., No. AV-483 (Fla. 1st DCA; December 13, 1983). At Baker Correctional Institution everything that did not fit into a bed locker was treated as contraband. David Watson, Assistant Superintendent at Florida State Prison, has been ordered by the fire marshall to cause large cardboard boxes of papers to be removed from the prison. Some items seized as contraband are burnt. Others are given to the Boys' Ranch or the inmates' welfare fund. All Florida prisons have storage rooms and inmates are ordinarily issued lockers, but there are physical limits on how much personal property can be stored at Union Correctional Institution or any other prison. Too many things in prisoners' cells make for problems with sanitation and insect infestation.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, William F. Reid, is currently and has been at all times pertinent to the issues herein, an inmate at UCI, having been committed to the custody of the DOC for an offense committed prior to July 1, 1978. At the time of filing of the Petition, he was in administrative confinement at UCI but, at the time of the hearing, had been released and was not in that status. Petitioner concedes that even during the period of his administrative confinement, he was awarded basic gain time as provided for since he was committed prior to July 1, 1978. However, due to the fact that he was unable to work while in administrative confinement, he did not receive any incentive gain time during that period. Work opportunities for inmates in administrative confinement status are extremely limited. This is because of the security and manpower problems involved in providing adequate supervision of this category of inmate during a work detail. Rule 33-3.081, Florida Administrative Code, allows the placing of an inmate in administrative confinement then disciplinary or criminal charges are pending against him and his presence in the general prison population would present a danger to himself, to others, or to the security and order of the institution. It is also authorized when an investigation is pending and the inmate's presence in the prison population might tend to interfere with that investigation. If, for medical reasons, an inmate's remaining in the prison population would create a health or safety risk, administrative confinement is also authorized. Another reason justifying administrative confinement is when the inmate is alleged to have committed misconduct and there is concern that because of that, his safety is at risk. The rule does not provide any maximum length of time for administrative confinement and the reason for this is that the investigations supporting it are of varying complexity and take differing lengths of time. Petitioner and the other inmates who testified on his behalf all of whom have been in administrative confinement in the past, all denied that they had received the required informal hearing called for under the rule. At best, they were told by the officer placing them in administrative confinement generally why this action was being taken. However, they contend they were never given any opportunity to submit anything to a senior official or a classification officer and they are of the opinion that at no time was there an emergency situation involved. The impression that the inmates have is that a corrections officer can have an inmate confined or released for any reason whether there is adequate justification or basis for the action. Clifford Towbridge has been an inmate at UCI since December, 1983. When he was placed in administrative confinement he was advised of this fact by a corrections officer who told him to pack his things and who put him in administrative confinement status without telling him why. He contends he got no hearing but was ultimately told he was being confined because a confidential informant advised that his life was in danger. Approximately two to three weeks later, he was released when he signed a paper indicating that his life was not in danger. At no time was he told who had made the allegation against him and he was not given a hearing either before confinement or before release. Curtis Mangram had an experience with administrative confinement at his prior incarceration at Belle Glade Correctional Institution. At that time he was given no hearing nor was he brought before a review board. When he left administrative confinement at Belle Glade he was assigned to UCI and remained clean until August 4, 1984 when he was placed in administrative confinement there. It appears that his name was mentioned in connection with the rape of a prisoner and he was placed in administrative confinement for several weeks pending investigation of that incident. One day after his release he was again placed in administrative confinement for possession of contraband wine. He was given no hearing prior to being placed into administrative confinement nor was he initially given a reason for this action. However, he wrote several letters to officials within the DOC to determine why this action was taken. The first response he got indicated he was being placed in for evaluation but regardless of the reason, he is sure he was not given a hearing. On neither occasion of his being placed in administrative confinement, in his opinion, was there any emergency reason for precipitous action. From first hand and from what he has seen and heard, it is his opinion that prisoners are placed in administrative confinement solely on the uncorroborated allegations of other prisoners and when this happens, there is no hearing prior to she placement nor within a timely period thereafter. As was stated previously, the witness was placed in administrative confinement on August 4 and was released on August 28. At that time he was told the reason for him having been placed in administrative confinement (the alleged rape) was resolved. The following day, August 29, he was placed back in administrative confinement and was told by a corrections officer that the action was being taken because Lt. Dixon, an investigator, wanted him back in. Later on, Officer Ward, Dixon's assistant, read him his rights and asked him some questions after which the witness was returned to administrative confinement. The witness admits that he had the wine which he subsequently found out was the basis for his second administrative confinement but he was never punished for the wine nor was he ever charged with the rape. He was in administrative confinement for a total of four months at UCI and had he been punished for the unlawful possession of the wine, it is his opinion he would have been placed in disciplinary confinement for fifteen or thirty days, a period much shorter than the entire period of his administrative confinement. Inmate Edwin Paul has been placed in administrative confinement for investigative reasons twelve or thirteen times during the two and a half years he has been an inmate at UCI. He relates that when he is placed there, the corrections officer comes up to him and tells him to pack his things but never gives him a reason for this action. The response to his inquiry is always that someone will tell him. It is his experience that at UCI, regardless of what the rule requires, no review is done and the inmate is not told anything until he files a grievance. That generally takes approximately ninety days to resolve and during this time, the inmate is in administrative confinement earning no incentive gain time. According to Paul, his requests for information as to the reason for his status are met with various answers such as "you're a menace," "none of your business," or "I don't know." It is his opinion that administrative confinement can be imposed on an inmate at the whim of a correctional officer. He contends that in all of his periods of administrative confinement either no charges were preferred against him, or he was found not guilty of the allegation that was laid, but during all that period, he has not received any gain time that he would have earned had he not been placed in administrative confinement. This has affected his status in that had he not been placed in administrative confinement, his sentence would have been up after forty months confinement. Because of his inability to earn gain time, he is not serving the fiftieth month of his period of confinement. Petitioner was placed in administrative confinement on March 17, 1985. He was not then nor has he since that time been given an informal hearing by a correctional officer, he states. He claims he was placed in administrative confinement by a corrections officer - and was not given an opportunity to sign anything regarding this action. On this occasion he was in for two and a half months. In a prior period of administrative confinement, he claims he was not told why he was there officially. Only through the information given him by a friendly corrections officer two weeks after the fact was he advised why he was incarcerated. Never has a senior corrections officer ever held a hearing with him, he states, nor has he ever been told how long the investigation on which his administrative confinement status is based will take. He has not seen any investigative report nor has he even been given any assistance in finding out the reason for his status. Even a personal interview with the superintendent of UCI has not changed this process, he says. Reid and the other inmates who testified on his behalf all contend that the implementation of the rule regarding administrative confinement creates great stress for them because of, (1) the loss of incentive gain time, (2) the inability to get appropriate exercise, and (3) the impact that the status has on the ability to receive visitors, and all agree that being afforded a hearing or being told why the administrative confinement action was being taken would tend to reduce that stress. Petitioner admitted that he does not have much of a problem with the rule except for the fact that it does not put any time limit on the length of the investigation. His complaint is primarily with the way the rule is followed by UCI. Mr. Tabah, the classification specialist at UCI, related that there is no formal board hearing when inmates are placed in administrative confinement. The inmates' case is reviewed by the chief correctional officer and this review is termed a hearing. This action, however, is itself reviewed by the classification team within 72 hours of the hearing. At the inmates' hearing, a form DC4-318 is prepared by the chief correctional officer on which the reason for the administrative confinement action is listed. The bottom half of this form is subsequently filled out by the classification team during its review as to its concurrence or non-concurrence and the team's recommendation for action. The inmate is given a copy of this review and has an opportunity to make comment thereon. Both the recommendation of the team and the comments of the inmate, if any, are referred to the superintendent. Every inmate in administrative confinement is reviewed weekly. Each inmate is usually advised of the reason for his being placed in administrative confinement either at the time or immediately thereafter. Only in emergency cases can the inmate be placed in administrative confinement without review/hearing by the chief correctional officer. In that case, the hearing is held within forty-eight hours. Review of the files on both Mangram and Towbridge reveal that, as to Towbridge, the inmate was advised by the corrections officer placing him in administrative confinement on February 13, 1985 as to the reason therefor. The chief corrections officer approved the actions of the corrections officer thereafter and the following day, the classification team reviewed the action and furnished the inmate with a copy of their recommendation. As to Mangram, the records reflect that he was placed in administrative confinement on August 18, 1984. An informal hearing was held that same day and the action was reviewed by senior corrections officer Bryant at 4:00 P.M. the same day. Mr. Mangram was retained in administrative confinement because of the belief that the safety of the institution required it. It was felt that Mangram was a potentially violent inmate who posed a clear danger to others. As to Mr. Paul, the file reflects that the two times he was in administrative confinement he was advised of the reasons and given a hearing. As to Petitioner, the record reflects that on January 24, 1985 he was placed in administrative confinement and given the reasons therefor by corrections officer Brown. The reviewing corrections officer supervisor Bryant concurred.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners, Joseph Redman, Stanley Blanding, and Douglas Laverne Adams are inmates at UCI. Blanding lives in the southwest unit housing and three times a day is required to walk from that facility to the central mess facility. He is not issued thermal underwear or a raincoat even though he works outside a great deal of the time. Issuance of those items is discretionary with the inmates' supervisor who has consistently refused to draw and issue these items. Blanding contends that during the past winter, he became so cold working outside in the rain and cold, he caught a cold for which he was treated only with aspirin. Because of the situation, he refused to work without additional clothing and was, because of his actions, placed in confinement. Blanding also contends that thermal underwear and rain gear is issued in a discriminatory fashion. He states that the people who work in the laundry get raincoats and thermal underwear, yet he travels the same distance in the outside and does not receive it. His quarters are inadequately heated and in many instances the windows are broken out. Inmates tried to put up cardboard to keep out the cold on occasion and even tried to close the inner doors to preserve what warmth they could. They were; allegedly, told they could not do this. He has repeatedly tried to convince his supervisor to issue the thermal and rain gear on an equitable basis but has been unsuccessful. Nobody in his shift who works outside has received this clothing even though his supervisor has repeatedly promised to get it for them. His letters and a personal visit to Mr. Connors, the laundry manager and clothing supply officer, to explain that he and his co-workers worked outside without adequate protection met with no success. Blanding is an outside laborer whose duties entail any manual labor that has to be accomplished outside. DOC has a rule which provides that when the temperature falls below 40 degrees Fahrenheit, including the chill factor, outside work is terminated. In practice, however, Blanding works 8 to 9 hour shifts which include outside work regardless of the 40 degree rule if the supervisor so directs. He admits, however, that during the cold weather this past winter, he worked outside only approximately 30 percent of the time. Even so, when he went to the doctor and requested a letter to authorize thermal underwear, he says he was advised that such a request was outside the doctor's authority. Joseph Redman lives in the west unit at UCI and is required to participate in outside activities as exercise for his back condition. However, on those days when the weather is inordinately cold or rainy, he has to cancel this beneficial exercise because of the lack of either thermal or rain clothing. If he desires to eat, it is necessary for him to make a 400 yard round trip to the dining facility several times a day. Respondent's rule does not take into consideration an individual's physical condition or how far he has to go to eat. Even if he does not work outside, it is still necessary for him to spend extended periods of time outside in cold or inclement weather. Redman says that the doctor agrees that this clothing is appropriate but denies that he has the authority to request its issue. Petitioner Adams' job requires him to travel around to the various compounds and to attend various call- outs approximately 120 yards from his quarters. Cold weather can often keep him inside, however, he is required to go outside to eat each meal. In practice, even though they do not have raincoats, in rainy weather the inmates are prohibited from standing under available shelter but must remain in line in the rain even if suffering from a bold or other illness in order to eat. Inmates also are not allowed to provide any type of protection for themselves such as a towel or other headcovering unless it Is issued and in most cases, it is not. Adams contends his dormitory is one in which the heating system is inadequate for cold weather. He wrote to the inspector for DOC and talked to the Assistant Superintendent who, in all fairness, tried to correct the problem but could not. When Adams asked for thermal underwear to be used as pajamas, his request was denied because he does not work outside and therefore fall within the category of individual to who this clothing is normally issued. Though not a Petitioner here, inmate Tommie Greene has been at UCI for approximately four weeks and has not had any cold weather experience at that facility. However, for the year prior to coming to UCI, he was an inmate at the Florida State Prison, adjoining UCI. In that facility, some cells were adequately warm and some were not. This situation was the same at Baker Correctional Institution where he was also incarcerated for a time. Depending on the floor level the heat may or may not be adequate. No thermal underwear was issued and it was several hundred yards from his living area to the dining facility. In order to eat, inmates had to line up outside the dining facility without raincoats. If it was raining and one wished to eat, one stood out in the rain. This same procedure, according to Greene, applies to UCI where the distance from his housing to the dining facility is more than 100 yards. If it is cold, he must be in it if it rains, he must also be in it, and the only way to avoid getting wet is not to eat. There are approximately 90 people in his area who eat at the same time and they go from the cell area to the dining facility in line with an officer leading. The standard clothing issue provided to inmates at UCI is outlined in UCI Operating Procedure No. 85-02, revised in March, 1985. This procedure calls for each inmate to be issued: 1 blue jacket 3 blue shirts 3 pairs blue trousers 1 web belt 1 pair boxer shorts 1 pair socks pair high top shoes In addition, some prisoners whose work calls for it, are issued white shirts and trousers instead of the blue. The shirts, trousers, and jacket are made of a polyester cotton blend of light weight. The jacket is lined with a light flannel. For linen each inmate is issued: sheets 1 towel 1 blanket 1 pillow case According to Mr. Conner, the laundry manager and the individual responsible for the issue of clothing to the inmates, thermal underwear is issued only to those inmates who work outside 8 hours a day. This is because of a lack of money. However, he contends that if a doctor prescribed it, he would issue thermal underwear to individuals who do not meet the other criteria. T- shirts for use as underwear were not being issued until recently. However, they are now a part of the issue and will be provided to any inmate who wants one. Straw hats are issued to outside workers through their supervisors who make the determination as to which inmates get them. Raincoats are not issued but are available for purchase by inmates in the institution canteen at a cost of under $3.00 each. According to Mr. Gunning, inmates who work outside can get raincoats if the department head draws them directly from the warehouse and issues them. The same applies to thermal underwear. When prisoners are dissatisfied with the procedure for issuing clothing and equipment, they can either file a formal grievance or write an informal note to the Superintendent or Assistant Superintendent. Admittedly, until recently, the institution's package rule prohibited inmates from receiving any type of civilian clothing through the mail and as a result, sweat shirts, jogging suits; and other items of a similar nature were prohibited and returned to the sender if sent in. Recently, however, the rule was changed so that inmates are now allowed to receive gray or white sweat shirts from outside correspondents even though jogging suits are still prohibited. Mr. Gunning admits that certain buildings at UCI, including the dormitory identified by Petitioners, do have problems with heat, but it is not, he says, a chronic problem. There is a chronic problem regarding broken windows which are broken by the inmates as fast as they are repaired. Since cold and climate conditions are considered a health and comfort item, available repairs to the living areas are made as quickly as possible on a priority basis. He does not see wet clothing as a problem. If it were, he would have heard about it sooner because the inmates would, without question, complain about it. He has heard no complaints about this subject and notwithstanding the allegations by inmates at the hearing that they are not allowed to change their clothing if wet, they are allowed to change if necessary. Mr. Singletary indicated that the rule on the issue of clothing calls for each inmate to have three sets of clothing in his possession notwithstanding the Petitioner's claim that they are issued only one set at a time. It is more likely that Mr. Singletary's isolation from the inside conditions at UCI renders his opinion less than valid. Accordingly, it is found that most likely the inmates are not issued all their uniforms at one time. This has no real bearing on the ultimate issue of the adequacy of the rule however. He admits that thermal underwear is not issued to all inmates. It is seasonal and issued to those inmates who work outside and need it. Raincoats are issued as needed for work and those inmates who are not issued raincoats can buy them at a reasonable price. Many inmates who work for PRIDE and the canteen receive direct pay. These include inmates working at the furniture factory, the tag plant, the abattoir, and other facilities and many other inmates receive money from outside sources. While some buildings may be underheated in the coldest weather, Mr. Singletary contends that in general, the buildings are warm enough. Recognizing that the package permit rule now permits inmates to receive sweatshirts through the mail, Mr. Singletary indicated that the rule may again be amended to permit inmates to receive thermal underwear through the mail.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Teresa D. Mejico, was certified as a correctional officer by petitioner, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, on February 17, 1988, and issued certificate number 03-87-502-02. At approximately 2:45 a.m., on October 3, 1988, respondent, while employed as a correctional officer at the Broward Correctional Institute, was observed by her supervisor leaning on her desk in the officer's station at Dormitory H-4. Sitting in a chair at respondent's side was Inmate Deronda Lemmonds, who was observed holding respondent's right arm, and kissing, licking and nuzzling it, while her right hand was between respondent's legs in the area of her crotch. Respondent was immediately relieved of duty, and later that day was discharged from her employment at Broward Correctional Institute for her failure to comply with Florida Department of Corrections Rule 33-4.002(28), Florida Administrative Code. That rule provides: Employees shall maintain a professional relationship with all persons in the custody or under supervision of the Department, and their immediate family or visitors. No personal or business relationships are permitted. Marriage between employees and inmates is prohibited. That respondent was fully aware of the foregoing rule, and the standard of conduct it established, cannot be gainsaid for she acknowledged such at hearing. Notwithstanding such knowledge, however, respondent persisted in fostering the personal relationship which existed between her and Inmate Lemmonds despite denials to her superintendent that any such relationship existed and counseling from her superintendent to avoid any such relationships. Following the termination of her employment at Broward Correctional Institute, respondent maintained contact with Inmate Lemmonds through the mail and by telephone, and variously expressed her affection and love for the inmate. On one occasion, she mailed the inmate 20-25 photographs of herself, including some photographs that captured respondent in partially nude and suggestive poses. In all, the proof demonstrated that respondent was romantically involved with Inmate Lemmonds while she was employed at Broward Correctional Institute, and continued to be so involved as of the date of hearing. It further demonstrated that she was untruthful with her superintendent, failed to abide the rules of conduct for correctional officers, and neglected her duty to guard Dormitory H-4 while engaged in a liaison with an inmate under her charge.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered revoking respondent' s certification. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 24th day of May 1990. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May, 1990. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-6410 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: 1. Adopted in paragraph 1. 2-4. Adopted in paragraph 4. 5-9. Not material or not necessary to result reached. 10-14. Adopted in paragraph 5. Adopted in paragraph 2. Adopted in paragraph 3. COPIES FURNISHED: Elsa Lopez Whitehurst Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Teresa D. Mejico 7502 S.W. 5th Street North Lauderdale, Florida 33068 Jeffrey Long, Director Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James T. Moore Commissioner Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Petitioners were inmates incarcerated at Union Correctional Institution in Raiford, Florida. Respondent has stipulated that Petitioners have "standing" to challenge the rules and the policy and procedure directives which are the subject of this proceeding. At the time the petition in this cause was filed, Petitioners challenged the validity of Rule 33-3.081, Florida Administrative Code, as it existed as of its latest revision on May 22, 1981. However, subsequent to the filing of the petition in this cause, and prior to the date of final hearing, Respondent amended Rule 33-3.081, and filed these amendments with the office of the Secretary of State on June 23, 1983. At final hearing in this cause, the parties stipulated to the Petitioners maintaining a challenge to newly amended Rule 33-3.081(4), (5), and (9)(a) and (d), Florida Administrative Code. On or about November 30, 1979, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections issued Policy and Procedure Directive No. 4.07.11, which was subsequently revised on June 14, 1981. This directive contains 13 separately titled sections. The first section, entitled Authority, simply lists the authority, both statutory and rule-based, for issuance of the directive. Section three contains definitions which, with a single exception not relevant here, are identical to those contained in Rule 33-3.081(2). Sections four through thirteen likewise recapitulate provisions contained in Respondent's rules or in relevant statutes. The following is a list of titles of sections four through thirteen, each of which is followed with a parenthetical reference of the rule provision substantially incorporated therein: Staff Selection (33- 3.081(10)); Basis for Placement (33-3.081(1)); Placement (33-3.081(4)); Protection Cases (33-3.082); Visiting (33-3.081 (5)); Gain Time (33-11.11 and Section 944.28, Florida Statutes); Review of Administrative Confinement (33- 3.081(6)); Self-Improvement Programs (33-081(7)); Facilities (33-3.081(8)); General Provisions (33-3.081(9)(a)-(k)). Sections 13(l) and (m) of the policy and procedure directive essentially reiterate the provisions of Rule 33-3.081(6) and 33-3.081 (11) , respectively. On or about June 14, 1981, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections issued Policy and Procedure Directive No. 4.07.20, entitled "Discipline." This directive which purportedly issued pursuant to the authority contained in Sections 944.09, 944.14, 944.15, 944.28 and 945.21, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 33-3.08, Florida Administrative Code. In fact, each of the 20 separately numbered portions of this directive substantially recapitulate requirements already contained in Rule 33-3.08, Florida Administrative Code. The single exception is Section 7 of the directive, entitled Administrative Confinement, which finds its support in Rule 33-3.081. Neither Policy and Procedure Directive 4.07.11 nor Policy and Procedure Directive 4.07.20 purport to create or otherwise adversely affect rights of inmates in any manner which differs from corresponding provisions of Rules 33- 3.081, 33-3.08 or the provisions of the Florida Statutes cited as authority for issuance of the policy and procedure directive. Rather, the rights of inmates are specifically determinable pursuant to those cited statutory provisions and the requirements of Rules 33-3.081 and 33-3.08, and the challenged policy and procedure directives simply recapitulate the requirements contained therein.
The Issue The issue is whether the correctional officer certification of Steven S. Wright should be revoked or otherwise penalized based on the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Steven S. Wright is a certified correctional officer, having been issued certificate number 43-88-502-05 on December 19, 1988. Mr. Wright was employed as a Correctional Officer I at Lake Correctional Institute in June 1989. On the morning of June 20, 1989, and on other occasions, Mr. Wright had discussed drugs with inmates. He did not encourage or support the use of drugs. He believed these discussions were a useful part of the rehabilitation process. Later on June 20, 1989, Inmate Clinton Gholson approached Mr. Wright in the Food Services area and placed a piece of paper in Mr. Wright's pocket. Mr. Wright was planning to be married in a short time. Gholson had indicated that he and some other inmates wanted to make a wedding present for Wright in Arts and Crafts. Because inmates are generally prohibited from giving gifts to correctional officers, Mr. Wright and Gholson had agreed to a paper work process which was to be followed if Gholson and the others wished to make the gift for Mr. Wright. Authorization was to be sought before Mr. Wright actually received the gift. Gholson was to give Mr. Wright a choice of gifts Gholson could make. Mr. Wright understood that Gholson was to give him a short written list from which to pick. While Mr. Wright was working on June 20, 1989, Gholson approached him from behind and slipped the piece of paper into Mr. Wright's back pocket. Gholson indicated it was the gift list and Mr. Wright was to circle the gift he wanted. Gholson said something like, "You do that and that's what we'll make." Mr. Wright did not look at the note then. He forgot about it and finished his work. When Mr. Wright got home that evening, he discovered the note in his pocket. When he opened it, instead of a gift list, he found $3.00 and a note asking Mr. Wright to smuggle drugs (a "twenty cent piece") into the prison and they would make $240.00 from it. Mr. Wright was scheduled off from work the next two days. He was afraid he would lose his job because of what Gholson had done. When Mr. Wright returned to work on June 23, 1989, he told Sergeant Alexander what had happened. She sent him to Major Collier to make a report. Wright made the report and submitted it. He had forgotten to bring the note and money that day, so he could not attach it to the report. When Mr. Wright returned home that night, the note and money were gone. It was never determined if his wife or his nephew or someone else had thrown it away. Once Gholson knew he had Mr. Wright in a bad position, he used it to his advantage. He began demanding money from Mr. Wright and stated at various times that he had given Mr. Wright $10.00 to buy drugs and that he had loaned Mr. Wright $10.00. Mr. Wright reported these incidents immediately. When Gholson wrote another note demanding $10.00, Mr. Wright immediately turned that note over to Major Collier. A hearsay statement from Gholson in the form of a taped interview was submitted into evidence. It is found that Gholson's statements are so unbelievable as to be unworthy of any credibility. Even if the statements were not hearsay, they would be too unbelievable to form the basis for a finding of fact. Mr. Wright was fired from his job at Lake Correctional Institute as a result of these incidents and Gholson's statements. While there are some insignificant inconsistencies among the various statements and reports given by Mr. Wright, I find that his testimony and account of these events is absolutely credible and worthy of belief. While it is not disputed that Mr. Wright left the correctional institute on June 20, 1989, with a note and $3.00 which Gholson slipped into his pocket, it is affirmatively found that Mr. Wright had unwittingly done so. Mr. Wright had no idea that Gholson had placed money into his pocket until he reached home later that night. Mr. Wright did not knowingly accept money from Gholson.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a Final Order dismissing all charges against Steven S. Wright. RECOMMENDED this 10th day of June, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of June, 1991.
The Issue Whether Rules 33-3.0084(1)(i)1 and 33-3.005(4)(a) and (b), Florida Administrative Code, constitute an invalid exercise of delegated authority?
Findings Of Fact Standing. The Petitioners, William Van Poyck and Mike Ramadanovic, are inmates in the custody of the Respondent, the Department of Corrections. The Petitioners are subject to the rules of the Respondent, including the rules at issue in this proceeding. The rules at issue in this proceeding govern the treatment of inmates while in "disciplinary confinement." At the time of the formal hearing, neither of the Petitioners were in disciplinary confinement. Both Petitioners have, however, been in disciplinary confinement. The Respondent. Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that the Respondent adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida. Among other things, Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that rules be adopted by the Respondent governing the rights of inmates, inmate conduct, inmate discipline and all other aspects of the operation of the prison system in Florida. C. Rules 33-3.005(4)(a) and (b), and 33-3.0084(1)(i)1, Florida Administrative Code. The Petitioners have challenged Rules 33-3.005(4)(a) and (b), and 33- 3.0084(1)(i)1, Florida Administrative Code (hereinafter referred to collectively as the "Challenged Rules"). Rule 33-3.005(4)(a) and (b), Florida Administrative Code, provides, in pertinent part: (4) . . . . Inmates in disciplinary confinement status shall not be allowed to prepare legal documents and legal mail while in that status except under the following conditions: When there is a time limitation on the filing of legal material with a court and it reasonably appears necessary for the inmate to prepare the same while in confinement status in order to get the same filed within the required time. When the inmate wishes to prepare legal material to file with a court for the purpose of testing the legality of his disciplinary confinement. The specific statutory authority for Rule 33-3.005, Florida Administrative Code, is Sections 20.315, 944.09 and 944.11, Florida Statutes. The law implemented by Rule 33-3.005, Florida Administrative Code, is Sections 944.09 and 944.11, Florida Statutes. Rule 33-3.0084(1)(i)1, Florida Administrative Code, provides, in pertinent part: 1. Legal materials shall be accessible to inmates in disciplinary confinement provided such use of legal material is for the purpose of challenging such confinement or in the event there are time restrictions on filing court papers. The specific statutory authority for Rule 33-3.0084, Florida Administrative Code, is Section 944.09, Florida Statutes. The law implemented by, Rule 33-3.0084, Florida Administrative Code, is Sections 20.315 and 944.09, Florida Statutes. Chapter 33-22, Florida Administrative Code, titled "Inmate Discipline", specifies what constitutes prohibited conduct for inmates, the procedures for determining if an inmate has violated the rules establishing prohibited conduct and the maximum punishment which may be imposed if an inmate violates the rules establishing prohibited conduct. The "Rules of Prohibited Conduct" and the maximum punishment for an infraction of these rules are contained in Rule 33-22.012, Florida Administrative Code. Among other things, an inmate who violates the Rules of Prohibited Conduct, may be placed in "disciplinary confinement" for specified periods of time. The length of time an inmate may be placed in disciplinary confinement for is not to exceed 60 days for any one infraction. "Disciplinary confinement" is defined in Rule 33-22.002(3), Florida Administrative Code, as: (3) Disciplinary Confinement -- Confinement which includes the loss of privileges normally afforded other inmates and is effected only after procedures outlined in this chapter have been fully complied with. Although the maximum term of disciplinary confinement is 60 days, it is possible for an inmate to be placed in disciplinary confinement for longer periods of time: (1) an inmate may be convicted of more than one violation of the Rules of Prohibited Conduct and be sentenced to multiple 60-day (or less) sentences to be served consecutively; (2) an inmate may commit another infraction(s) (including a violation of the Challenged Rules) while in disciplinary confinement, resulting in additional disciplinary consecutive confinement sentences; and (3) an inmate may commit an infraction soon after release from disciplinary confinement and be returned to disciplinary confinement. It is also possible for an inmate to serve less than the full term of his sentence to disciplinary confinement. Being placed in disciplinary confinement is a direct result of the actions of an inmate in failing to follow the established rules of conduct of the Respondent. At least one inmate has been in disciplinary confinement for periods of up to two and one-half years. An inmate would have to commit a minimum of fifteen infractions to be sentenced to disciplinary confinement for two and one- half years. The evidence failed to prove that the one inmate that has been in disciplinary confinement for two and one-half years was in disciplinary confinement continuously without any break. The inmate could not recall. The number of inmates in disciplinary confinement for more than one year was not proven. At best, it was proved by the Petitioners that one inmate (Charles William Bowe, Jr.) has served more than one year in disciplinary confinement. Even the evidence concerning Mr. Bowe, however, did not prove that his time in disciplinary confinement was continuous and without any break. Based upon an estimate of the Respondent, it is likely that no more than 1% of the inmate population (less than 460) is in disciplinary confinement for more than one year. Although the evidence did not prove that any inmate has actually been in disciplinary confinement for more than two and one-half years, it is not impossible that an inmate could be in disciplinary confinement for an unlimited period of time, as long as the inmate continues to commit violations of the Respondent's Rules of Prohibited Conduct. Although it may be unlikely, it is not impossible for an inmate to be in disciplinary confinement for the entire term of his sentence. The purpose for placing an inmate in disciplinary confinement and the purpose of the Challenged Rules is to attempt to correct an inmate's demonstrated negative behavior; to eliminate "privileges" inmates normally are given. Pursuant to Rule 33-3.005(4)(a) and (b), Florida Administrative Code, an inmate who is placed in disciplinary confinement is prohibited from instituting any new litigation (other than a challenge to the decision to place the inmate in disciplinary confinement or litigation which must be instituted within a specified time period) while the inmate is in disciplinary confinement. Pursuant to Rule 33-3.005(4)(a) and (b), Florida Administrative Code, an inmate who is placed in disciplinary confinement is generally prohibited from preparing legal documents and legal mail unless the inmate is required to meet a time limitation in an existing legal matter or the inmate intends to test the legality of his disciplinary confinement. When an inmate is placed in disciplinary confinement, all of the inmate's legal materials are confiscated and impounded. Access to an inmate's legal materials may be obtained while in disciplinary confinement pursuant to the exceptions of the Challenged Rules. At Florida State Prison, access is allowed to an inmate' legal materials if the inmate can show the necessity for those materials through: (1) a court order that requires the inmate to take some action in a pending matter; (2) any other source, i.e., a rule of the court, indicating that the inmate must meet some procedural or other requirement of the court; or (3) if the inmate indicates a desire to prepare a challenge to the legality of his disciplinary confinement. The procedure followed at Florida State Prison for an inmate in disciplinary confinement to obtain access to the inmate's legal materials is as follows: The inmate makes a request to an institutional counselor assigned responsibility for the inmate; The inmate must indicate to the institutional counselor why one of the exceptions provided in the Challenged Rules allowing access to his legal materials applies; If the institutional counselor is convinced that one of the exceptions applies, access to the inmate's legal materials is allowed. If not, no access is allowed; The procedure followed at Florida State Prison if an inmate convinces an institutional counselor that access to his legal materials should be allowed is as follows: The institutional counselor retrieves the inmate's legal materials and brings them to the inmate's cell; In some instances the institutional counselor may give the legal materials to the inmate or require the inmate to describe to the counselor, and convince the counselor of, what materials he actually needs to meet the deadline or to challenge his disciplinary confinement; and The institutional counselor, based upon the inmate's description of the materials he needs, makes the final determination of what materials may actually be given to the inmate. If the inmate does not get the materials he needs, he then must convince the counselor of what additional materials are needed. If an inmate is denied access to his legal materials or is not provided with the materials he needs, the inmate may challenge the decision of the institutional counselor by filing a grievance. Based upon the experiences of the inmates who testified in this proceeding, requests for access to an inmate's legal materials may be granted or denied, and when granted, an inmate may be given the whole file, he may be denied materials, he may be asked "is this it" and he may get only the materials he actually needs. Institutional counselors may even make more than one attempt to find the requested materials. Pursuant to Rule 33-3.0084(1)(i)1, Florida Administrative Code, an inmate may not have access to any legal materials except to the extent necessary for the inmate to meet a time limitation in an existing legal matter or if the inmate intends to test the legality of his disciplinary confinement. Access to legal materials in the library may generally be obtained by inmates. Such access is not, however, without limitation. There are limitations on the procedure which must be followed to obtain access to the library and the amount of materials which may be obtained at any one time. An inmate in disciplinary confinement is further limited as to when and how he may access library resources pursuant to the Challenged Rules. At Florida State Prison, access is allowed to library legal materials only if an inmate can show the necessity for those materials in the same manner an inmate may obtain access to his own legal materials as explained in finding of fact 26. The procedure followed at Florida State Prison for an inmate in disciplinary confinement to obtain access to library legal materials is as follows: The inmate must make a request in writing to the librarian; The inmate must indicate to the librarian why one of the exceptions to the lack of access to library legal materials applies; If the librarian is convinced that one of the exceptions applies, access to the library's legal materials is allowed. If not, no access is allowed; The librarian, based upon the inmate's description of the materials he needs, makes the final determination of what materials may actually be given to the inmate. If the inmate does not get the materials he needs, he may make additional requests. If an inmate is denied access to library legal materials or is not provided with the materials he needs, the inmate may challenge the decision by filing a grievance. Institutional counselors and librarians are not required to have legal education or training. The evidence failed to prove that any inmate has been totally denied access to the courts by the proper application of the Challenged Rules. The evidence proved that the Challenged Rules are inconvenient and aggravating to some inmates who have experienced the procedures which must be followed in order to obtain access to the inmate's legal materials or library legal materials. The procedures can be a hinderance to an inmate's pursuit of litigation to the extent that the procedures are one more step an inmate must follow that the inmate would not otherwise have to follow if he were not in disciplinary confinement. The evidence proved that, although inconvenient, some of the inmates who testified were able to pursue litigation even though they have been in disciplinary confinement at times. There was some aggravation and frustration caused those inmates who testified because of the Challenged Rules, but the evidence failed to prove that any of the inmates who testified or any other inmates were actually prevented from pursing litigation: Inmate Bowe, who has served two and one-half years of disciplinary confinement (although it was not proved whether the time was without interruption because of Inmate Bowe's memory lapse), had several court proceedings (Florida and federal) pending at the time of the formal hearing and did not indicate that he has missed any court ordered or procedural time limit or that any case has been dismissed because of an inability to prosecute his cases caused by the Challenged Rules; Leonard Bean, another inmate who testified, has served 140 to 150 days in disciplinary confinement for multiple infractions. Although Inmate Bean testified that his co-defendant's conviction had been reversed (in February, 1991), the evidence failed to prove that Inmate Bean's conviction would have also been reversed but for his disciplinary confinement or, more importantly, would have also been reversed but for the Challenged Rules. Although Inmate Bean was released from disciplinary confinement in May, 1991, he still had not filed for habeas corpus as of the date of the formal hearing; Jimmy Stephens, another inmate who testified, has served 240 days of disciplinary confinement for four infractions during the past two years. Although inconvenienced by the limitation on library legal material use, Inmate Stephens did not indicate that he has missed any court ordered or procedural time limit or that any case has been dismissed because of an inability to prosecute his cases caused by the rules at issue; Carl Watts, another inmate who testified, served 180 days in disciplinary confinement prior to being transferred to Florida State Prison and another 60 days after arriving at Florida State Prison. Inmate Watts' testimony concerning a possible habeas corpus action failed to prove that he has missed any court ordered or procedural time limit or that any case has been dismissed because of an inability to prosecute his cases caused by the rules at issue; Petitioner Ramadanovic has served up to 100 days in disciplinary confinement. Although he filed two grievances dated August 22, 1990, concerning his efforts to file a brief in an appellate court proceeding, his disciplinary confinement ended August 23, 1990, and therefore, he failed to prove that he was prevented from filing a brief or any other pleading in any case pending while he was in disciplinary confinement. The evidence also failed to prove that he has missed any court ordered or procedural time limit or that any case has been dismissed because of an inability to prosecute his cases caused by the rules at issue; Petitioner Van Poyck failed to prove that he has missed any court ordered or procedural time limit or that any case has been dismissed because of an inability to prosecute his cases caused by the rules at issue. As long as an inmate is in disciplinary confinement, that inmate may not file an action for federal habeas corpus. An inmate in disciplinary confinement may also not file an action for habeas corpus in the State courts until some, unspecified date, which the Respondent determines is close enough to necessitate preparation of the pleadings in order to meet the time limitations on habeas corpus in Florida.
