The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is liable for corporate income and excise taxes that have been assessed by Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a subsidiary of PBS Building Systems America, Inc. (PBS- A). PBS-A and Petitioner filed consolidated Florida income and excise tax returns during the time in question. During the years in question, PBS-A had no tax nexus with Florida, but incurred losses that were available to offset gross income. During the years in question, Petitioner had nexus with Florida and incurred taxable income. The filing of the consolidated return reduced the taxable income of Petitioner by the losses of PBS-A. On December 19, 1990, Respondent issued two notices of proposed assessment for years ending December 31, 1985, through March 31, 1989. One notice identifies $8273 of unpaid corporate excise tax, plus $2798 of interest through September 15, 1990. The notice states that interest would continue to accrue at the daily rate of $2.27. The second notice of proposed assessment identifies $55,480 of unpaid corporate income tax, plus $20,254 of interest through September 15, 1990. The notice states that interest continues to accrue at the daily rate of $15.20. Petitioner filed a notice of protest dated February 15, 1991. By notice of decision dated October 17, 1991, Respondent rejected the protest and sustained the proposed deficiencies. The claimed deficiency for unpaid corporate income tax, however, was revised to $75,039. A notice of reconsideration dated July 21, 1992, restates the conclusions of the notice of decision. By petition for formal hearing dated September 16, 1992, Petitioner requested a formal hearing concerning the tax liabilities in question and specifically the conclusion that PBS- A was ineligible to file a consolidated return in Florida due to the absence of tax nexus with Florida. The September 16 letter recites facts to establish tax nexus with Florida through the establishment of financing relationships. However, it is unnecessary to consider the sufficiency of these factual assertions because they represent mere allegations. Petitioner failed to produce any evidence in the case and, when noticed for a corporate deposition, failed to appear. Additionally, Petitioner's failure to respond to requests for admission results in admissions that, during the relevant period, PBS-A was not a bank, brokerage house, or finance corporation and did not lend money to Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order sustaining the above-described assessments against Petitioner. ENTERED on February 12, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of February, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Dr. James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Attorney Lisa Raleigh Department of Legal Affairs Tax Section, Capitol Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050 Kathryn M. Jaques Arthur Andersen & Co. Suite 1600 701 B Street San Diego, CA 92101-8195
Findings Of Fact On January 22, 1986, American Aviation Resources, Inc., sold an airplane to Munur Yurtsever, a resident of Brazil. This aircraft was a Hansa jet model HFB-320 with U.S. registration number N71DL (the subject aircraft). On January 28, 1986, Mr. Yurtsever transferred title of the subject aircraft to Petitioner, Selcuk Yetimoglu. At the time of the transfer, the subject aircraft was in the State of Florida undergoing repairs. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Mr. Yetimoglu resided at 20530 Jacaranda Road, Cutler Ridge, Miami, Florida, in a residence owned by Mr. Yurtsever. The aircraft bill of sale dated January 28, 1986, reflects that Mr. Yetimoglu was the purchaser of the subject aircraft and that Mr. Yurtsever was the seller. The bill of sale recited that the consideration paid was $20.00 and other good and valuable consideration. While the bill of sale reflects that Mr. Yetimoglu resided in Miami, Florida, the bill of sale does not state that the sale occurred in the State of Florida. On January 29, 1986, Mr. Yetimoglu applied to the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for the registration of the subject aircraft in his name. On March 13, 1986, Mr. Yetimoglu wrote to the FAA regarding the registration and stated, in pertinent part, as follows: Mr. Munur Yurtsever sold the aircraft to me on January 28, 1986, five days after he bought the aircraft from American Aviation Resources, Inc. when he found out that the government of Brazil did not give him a (sic) permission to import the aircraft and that he could not register the aircraft in the United States because he was not a citizen of the United States. By letter dated May 15, 1986, Mr. Yetimoglu provided the FAA proof that the subject aircraft had not been registered in Brazil. Mr. Yetimoglu was the record owner of the subject aircraft between January 28, 1986, and March 13, 1987. On March 13, 1987, Mr. Yetimoglu sold the subject aircraft back to Mr. Yurtsever. The bill of sale identifies the purchaser as being: Munur Yurtsever Rico Taxi Aereo Ltda. Av. Mal. Camara 160-GR. Rio de Janeiro - RJ Brazil On April 8, 1987, Mr. Yetimoglu wrote the FAA and stated, in pertinent part: ... I request cancelation of U.S. registra- tion for the aircraft ... because I sold the aircraft back to Rico Taxi Aereo Ltda. ... On January 11, 1988, Respondent issued to Petitioner a "Notice of Delinquent Tax Penalty and Interest Due and Assessed" (Notice of Assessment) based on the transaction involving Mr. Yetimoglu, Mr. Yurtsever, and the subject aircraft. The Notice of Assessment contained the following statement: "This Department has information that you purchased the following aircraft. However, there is no evidence of payment of Florida Sales and/or Use Tax". The Notice of Assessment reflected that Respondent had, pursuant to Section 212.12(5)(b), Florida Statutes, estimated the value of the aircraft as being $320,000 and assessed the following taxes, interest, and penalties: Florida State Sales/Use Tax 5% $16,000.00 (Estimated) Per 212.06(8), F.S. Penalty 5% per month; Maximum 25% of 4,000.00 (25%) Tax Due Per Section 212.12(2), F.S. Additional Penalty 11,840.00 (50%) Per 212.12(2)(a), F.S. Interest = 1% per month from date of 3,680.00 (23%) Purchase To Date of Payment Per Section 212.12(3), F.S. Less Tax Paid ----------------- TOTAL DUE WITH THIS NOTICE $35,520.00 Respondent requested that Mr. Yetimoglu provide it information and documentation as to the value of the aircraft. Mr. Yetimoglu contends that he paid Mr. Yurtsever nothing for the aircraft, that the title was transferred to him and registered in the FAA in his name so that the aircraft could be test flown after it was repaired, and that Mr. Yurtsever had paid $100,000 for the aircraft. There was no evidence as to the sales price that Mr. Yetimoglu paid for the aircraft other than Mr. Yetimoglu's testimony. Respondent estimated that the reasonable value of the subject aircraft on January 28, 1986, was $320,000. This estimate was based on an appraisal prepared for Respondent and assumed that the aircraft was in a scrapped or junked condition. Respondent generally uses a standard reference work on the value of aircraft to assist it in estimating the value of the subject aircraft. Because of its age and model, the subject aircraft is no longer listed in this standard reference. In support of his contention that Mr. Yurtsever paid $100,000 for the aircraft, Mr. Yetimoglu provided Respondent with a copy of a wire transfer of funds from Mr. Yurtsever to American Aviation Resources, Inc. in the amount of $100,000. However, there was no documentation provided that established that the $100,000 constituted the entire purchase price paid by Mr. Yurtsever. The dispute between the parties as to the value of the aircraft is resolved by finding, based on the greater weight of the evidence, that the reasonable value of the aircraft at the times pertinent to this proceeding was $320,000.00. In December 1986, while Mr. Yetimoglu was the record owner, the subject aircraft engaged in international flight between the Turks and Caicos Islands and the State of Florida. Respondent's Notice of Redetermination, dated February 26, 1990, upheld the Notice of Assessment on the basis that the underlying transaction was subject to use tax pursuant to Section 212.06(8), Florida Statutes. The issue to be resolved was framed by the Notice of Redetermination as being: "The only issue involved pertains to a use tax assessment upon an aircraft brought into this country". This determination was based, in part, upon a letter to Respondent from an attorney who was representing Mr. Yetimoglu at the time the letter was written. 1/ The letter implied that the aircraft was brought into Florida after the title was transferred to Mr. Yetimoglu, and provided, in pertinent part, as follows: The transferor of the aircraft, Munur Yurtsever, is a nonresident alien. His inten- tion is to deliver the plane to a purchaser outside the country. Mr. Yurtsever advises that the F.A.A. will not allow the plane to be flown in this country unless it is owned by a U.S. resident. As it was imperative to fly the plane here in order to prepare it for its flight outside the country, Mr. Yurtsever transferred the plane to his partner, Selcuk Yetimoglu, who is a resident of the United States. ... At the formal hearing, Mr. Yetimoglu established that the aircraft was in Florida undergoing repairs at the time the title was transferred to him. Prior to and at the formal hearing, Respondent asserted the position that use taxes, interest, and penalties were due for this transaction. In its post- hearing submittal, Respondent, for the first time in this proceeding, contends that sales taxes, interest and penalties are due for this transaction.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered which withdraws the subject assessment. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 11th day of March, 1991. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of March, 1991.
The Issue The parties stipulated that the following legal issues were presented on the facts: When the taxpayer fails to claim the tax credit for sales tax on bad debts charged off during the month for which the return is filed as permitted by Section 212.17(8) Florida Statutes, may the taxpayer claim a refund of the overpayment pursuant to Section 215.26, Florida Statutes? Does claiming a bad debt credit on a return for a month later than the month in which the charge-offs were made constitute an "application for refund" within the meaning of Section 215.26(2), Florida Statutes? STIPULATIONS The parties entered into a written stipulation of the issues, of the facts, and stipulated to the introduction into evidence of the attachments to the written stipulation of facts and the Exhibits 1 through 6. The following are the pertinent findings of fact in this case.
Findings Of Fact Causeway Lumber Company, Inc., (Causeway) is a Florida corporation engaged in the sale of lumber and building materials. During the years 1973- 1977 it operated two yards; one at 2701 South Andrews Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Broward County, and one and 400 Northwest 2nd Avenue, Boca Raton, Palm Beach County. Because it operated in two counties, separate tax returns were filed for the Fort Lauderdale yard and the Boca Raton yard. Causeway uses the accrual method of accounting, the specific charge-off method of writing off bad debts, and its fiscal year ends March 31. Causeway did not collect the sales tax on credit sales at the time such sales were made, but billed sales tax to its customers as part of the credit sales. Although the sales taxes were not received by Causeway at the time the credit sales were made, Causeway reported and paid the sales tax on credit sales on the return for the month in which the sale was made as required in Section 212.06, Florida Statutes. In March of 1974, 1975, and 1976 the accounts receivable were reviewed and the account deemed worthless were written off as uncollectable and so reported on the corporation's income tax returns for those years. Causeway attempted to take as a credit in September of 1976 all of the bad debts written off in March of 1974, 1975 and 1976. The taking of this credit was questioned by the Comptroller, and Causeway paid the taxes due on the September 1976 sales tax remittance and then filed an application for refund on January 20, 1978, pursuant to provisions of Section 215.26, Florida Statutes. The Comptroller denied the application for refund stating as the grounds that there was no authority in Section 212.17, Florida Statutes, for a refund. Causeway's two outlets overpaid sales taxes in the following amounts in the years indicated: 1974 1975 1976 Boca Raton $ 1,072.51 $ 9,208.17 $ 30,477.11 Ft. Lauderdale 3,323.15 10,237.33 10,004.22 $ 4,395.66 $ 19,445.50 $ 40,481.33
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Hearing Officer recommends to the Comptroller that the taxpayer be refunded the taxes overpaid in 1975, and 1976, in the total amount of $59,926.83. DONE and ORDERED this 9th day of October, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of October, 1978. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard W. Roe 2900 East Oakland Park Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33306 Harold F. X. Purnell Assistant Attorney General The Capitol, Room LL04 Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Eugene J. Cella General Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background Petitioner, Gainesville Amateur Radio Society, Inc. (GARS or petitioner), a Florida non-profit corporation, was incorporated on December 31, 1975. Its stated purpose is to promote an interest in amateur radio operation. Among other things, GARS provides preparation for Federal Communication Commission licensing examinations, supports community activities with free communication services, and encourages public awareness of ham radio activities through the publication of a monthly newsletter called the GARS-MOUTH. Respondent, Department of Revenue (DOR), is charged with the responsibility of administering and implementing the Florida Revenue Act of 1949, as amended. It has the specific task of collecting sales taxes and enforcing the state tax code and rules. By law, certain transactions are exempt from the state sales and use tax. Among these are sales or lease transactions involving "scientific organizations." In order for an organization to be entitled to an exemption, it must make application with DOR for a consumer's certificate of exemption and demonstrate that it is a qualified scientific organization within the meaning of the law. Once the application is approved, the certificate entitles the holder to make tax exempt purchases that are otherwise taxable under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. In the case of petitioner, a certificate would enable it to save a hundred or so dollars per year. Claiming that it was entitled to a certificate of exemption as a charitable organization, GARS filed an application with DOR on December 21, 1993. After having the application preliminarily disapproved by DOR on the ground it did not expend "in excess of 50.0 percent of the . . . organization's expenditures toward referenced charitable concerns, within (its) most recent fiscal year," a requirement imposed by DOR rule, GARS then amended its application to claim entitlement on the theory that it was a scientific organization. Although DOR never formally reviewed the amended application, it takes the position that GARS still does not qualify for a certificate under this new theory. Is GARS a Scientific Organization? Under Section 212.08(7)(o)2.c., Florida Statutes, a scientific organization is defined in relevant part as an organization which holds a current exemption from the federal income tax under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. A DOR rule tracks this statute almost verbatim. Accordingly, as a matter of practice, in interpreting this statutory exemption, DOR simply defers to the final determination of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). If the IRS grants an organization a 501(c)(3) status based on the determination that it is a scientific organization, then DOR accepts this determination at face value. DOR does not make an independent determination whether the organization is "scientific" or question the decision of the IRS. This statutory interpretation is a reasonable one and was not shown to be erroneous or impermissible. GARS received a federal income tax exemption from the IRS regional office in Atlanta, Georgia by letter dated August 12, 1993. The record shows that GARS was granted an "exempt organization" status as a "charitable organization" and as an "educational organization" under Treasury Regulation Section 1.501(c)(3). However, GARS did not receive an exempt status as a "scientific organization" nor did the IRS make that determination. Therefore, GARS does not qualify as a scientific organization within the meaning of the law. While petitioner submitted evidence to show that it engages in what it considers to be a number of scientific endeavors, these activities, while laudable, are irrelevant under Florida law in making a determination as to whether GARS qualifies for a sales tax exemption as a scientific organization. Therefore, the application must be denied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent enter a final order denying petitioner's application for a consumer certificate of exemption. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of June, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of June, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-1200 Petitioner: 1-2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 5. Rejected as being irrelevant. 6. Rejected as being unnecessary. 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 8-9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 10. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 12. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 13. Rejected as being unnecessary. 14. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. Respondent: 1. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 3. Rejected as being unnecessary. 4. Rejected as being cumulative. 5-12. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 13-14. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 15. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 16. Covered in preliminary statement. 17. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 18-19. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 20-21. Rejected as being unnecessary. 22. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 23-24. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. Note - Where a proposed finding has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary for a resolution of the issues, not supported by the evidence, cumulative, subordinate, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Larry Fuchs Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Linda Lettera, Esquire General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Sidney Schmukler, Esquire 3922 N. W. 20th Lane Gainesville, Florida 32605-3565 Olivia P. Klein, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol-Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner owes sales tax of $15,230.15 plus interest from October 15, 1993.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a sole proprietorship organized in this state and doing business at 851 Monterey Road, Stuart, Florida. Respondent is the governmental agency responsible for administering the state sales tax in accordance with Chapter 212, Florida Statutes.1 In 1992, other businesses located at Petitioner's address reported to Respondent that they paid rent to Petitioner. However, Petitioner did not collect and remit sales tax on the rental income and was not registered as a dealer. On February 3, 1992, Respondent mailed a Notice of Intent to Audit Petitioner's books and records ("Notice of Intent to Audit") for the tax period February 1, 1987, through January 31, 1992. The Notice of Intent to Audit included a detailed list of the books and records needed for Respondent to conduct a detailed audit. The Notice also requested that Petitioner provide Respondent with a date on which it would be convenient to begin the audit. On February 11, 1992, Respondent had not heard from Petitioner. The auditor contacted Petitioner to schedule a date on which the audit could begin. At that time, Petitioner stated that he would not provide the auditor with any books and records. Petitioner refused to make available the books and records for 1990 through 1992 because Petitioner incorrectly suspected that Respondent maintained a secret "blacklist." Petitioner based his suspicion, in part, on the fact that he had refused to respond to a questionnaire Respondent had mailed to taxpayers throughout the state prior to the Notice of Intent to Audit. Petitioner also based his suspicion on the erroneous assumption that Respondent's audit was part of a criminal investigation by the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") into Petitioner's federal taxes for 1987 and 1988. Petitioner refused to make available the books and records for 1987 through 1989 because those records were in the possession of the IRS. Petitioner maintained that the proposed audit was illegal. Respondent sent Petitioner copies of its statutory authority to audit Petitioner and made numerous attempts to arrange a mutually convenient time to begin the audit. Respondent did not commence the audit until March 10, 1993. On March 10, 1993, the auditor and audit group supervisor met with Petitioner and Mr. Eugene Nail, Petitioner's paralegal. Petitioner stated that he did not have the books and records Respondent needed to conduct a detailed audit because the IRS had confiscated them in connection with the pending criminal case. Respondent conducted the audit using the information Petitioner made available to the auditor. Petitioner made available: sales invoices for 1990 and 1991 and one month in 1992 grouped together by calendar month; sales and use tax return booklets; resale and exemption certificates; and commercial lease agreements. No journals and ledgers were available. Respondent determined Petitioner's tax deficiency by sampling the available information. Pursuant to Petitioner's request, the auditor used a six month sample period. The auditor explained to Petitioner that she would use Petitioner's invoices during the sample period to determine tax- exempt sales. She compared the invoices to resale certificates and calculated an error ratio based on discrepancies between the sales invoices and the resale certificates. Respondent determined the actual deficiency in sales tax during the six month sample period based on actual invoices that did not have a resale certificate and for which no sales tax was remitted. Respondent estimated the additional deficiency in sales tax by applying the error ratio to the balance of the audit period. Respondent examined only those invoices provided by Petitioner and previous sales tax returns filed by Petitioner. On April 9, 1993, the auditor conducted a meeting with Petitioner and discussed the audit procedures, results, applicable law, and abatement rules. On June 15, 1993, Respondent issued a Notice of Intent to Make Sales and Use Tax Changes in the amount of $45,469.05 ("Notice of Intent"). The Notice of Intent included a copy of all audit exhibits and workpapers. On August 30, 1993, Petitioner provided additional invoices to Respondent in a meeting with the auditor and audit group supervisor. On October 15, 1993, the auditor adjusted certain items in the audit file, reduced the proposed assessment, and issued a Revised Notice of Intent to Make Sales and Use Tax Changes in the amount of $37,417.45 ("Revised Notice of Intent"). Petitioner requested additional time to provide more information, including additional resale certificates. However, Petitioner failed to provide the additional information. By letter dated December 9, 1993, the audit group supervisor notified Petitioner that she was closing the case and sending it to the Tallahassee office as a contested case. On December 23, 1993, Respondent issued a Notice of Proposed Assessment to Petitioner assessing Petitioner for $37,417.45 in tax, penalty, and interest through October 15, 1993. On February 21, 1994, Respondent received Petitioner's written protest dated February 10, 1994. Respondent revised the audit figures again. On January 20, 1995, Respondent issued its Notice of Decision reducing the assessment against Petitioner to $15,230.15. The Notice of Decision assessed Petitioner for taxes of $8,900.55, penalties of $2,225.14, and interest of $4,104.46 through October 15, 1993. Interest accrues at the per diem rate of $2.93 until paid. On March 16, 1995, Petitioner timely appealed the Notice of Decision by filing a Petition for Formal Hearing with Respondent. Inadequate Records Petitioner failed to maintain adequate books and records within the meaning of Sections 212.12(6), 212.13(2), 212.35, and Florida Administrative Code Rules 12A-1.093(2) and (5).2 Petitioner failed to maintain adequate books and records for the five year audit period prescribed in Section 213.34(2). Petitioner failed to maintain general ledgers and journals for the five year audit period. The only records Petitioner maintained were sales invoices for 1990 and 1991 and one month in 1992. Petitioner was unable to produce adequate records for 1987 through 1989. Petitioner asserted that the IRS had those records and that Petitioner could not obtain the records required by Florida law. The federal tax case has been pending against Petitioner since 1990.3 During those seven years, Petitioner was unable to obtain copies of any records in the possession of the IRS. The journals and ledgers for 1987 and 1988 were maintained on computer floppy disks. Petitioner asserts that the floppy disks were lost. Petitioner asserts that his attorney kept the books and records for 1989 in an out-of-state location to avoid producing those records for the IRS. The journals and ledgers for 1990 though 1992 are in the possession of Petitioner's accountants. Petitioner did not produce those records during the audit or at the administrative hearing. Petitioner could have requested the journals and ledgers for 1989 through 1991 from his attorney and accountants, respectively, but chose not to do so. Petitioner made available to Respondent only sales invoices for 1990 and 1991 and one month in 1992. Without the general ledgers and cash journals to cross- reference the sales invoices, Respondent could not corroborate the financial records available for audit. Respondent was required by applicable law to conduct the audit by sampling Petitioner's available records. Exempt Sales: Resale Certificates Certain exempt sales claimed by Petitioner during the six month sample period were not supported by resale certificates. Respondent disallowed the exempt sales that were not supported by resale certificates and allowed the invoices that were supported by resale certificates. For the six month sample period, Respondent assessed an actual sales tax deficiency for those sales that did not have a corresponding resale certificate.4 Respondent prepared audit schedules for the six month sample period that listed the invoices with a sales tax deficiency due to the lack of a resale certificate. Based on the audit schedules, Respondent determined an error ratio and applied the error ratio over the five year audit period to determine the estimated tax deficiency.5 Respondent conducted the audit in accordance with generally accepted audit procedures and with applicable state law. Disallowed exempt sales were listed individually by invoice, name of vendor, and the date and amount of the sale. Disallowed exempt sales were listed for each of the six months in the sample period. Additional Taxable Sales Sales invoices for the six month sample period showed that Petitioner collected more sales tax than he reported to Respondent on his monthly sales tax returns. Respondent treated the collected, but unremitted, sales tax as "additional taxable sales" rather than as an unremitted sales tax. Respondent assessed Petitioner for the sales tax paid on Petitioner's invoices but not remitted to Respondent by Petitioner. The deficiency existed for May and June, 1990, and for January and February, 1991. Taxable Rent Respondent reviewed lease agreements relating to property rented by Petitioner at his business address. Respondent determined that Petitioner failed to collect and remit sales tax on the rental of his property. Respondent assessed Petitioner for sales tax Petitioner failed to collect and remit on taxable rent. Petitioner does not contest that portion of the assessment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order and therein UPHOLD Respondent's assessment of $15,230.15 plus interest statutorily due from October 15, 1993, until paid.RECOMMENDED this 17th day of February, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of February, 1997.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner should be assessed sales and use tax for the audit period May 1, 1997 through April 30, 2002, per the Notice of Proposed Assessment dated July 3, 2003.
Findings Of Fact Wales is a Florida S corporation. Its principal place of business is located at 2916 Southeast 6th Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Wales' federal employee identification number is 59- 1703273. Wales' Florida sales and tax number is 16-03-095273- 26/1. By letter dated June 6, 2002, the Department issued to Wales a Notice of Intent to Audit Books and Records (Notice of Intent). The Notice of Intent identified the audit number as A0205310975. On July 10, 2002, the Department's auditor assigned to perform the audit conducted an initial interview with Wales. The auditor discussed, among other things, the audit and sample methods that would be employed during the audit. On August 13, 2002, the auditor began examining Wales' books and records at Wales' business location. Wales was cooperative during the audit. Wales provided all available books and records for the audit. The sole shareholders of Wales are Stewart Levy and Diane Levy. Wales leased its business location from Element Two Enterprises, Inc., ( Element Two) a related entity. Stewart Levy and Diane Levy are also the sole officers of Element Two, president and secretary, respectively. Element Two is the record owner of the improved real property located at 2916 Southeast 6th Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, (realty). The address for the realty is also the address for Wales' place of business. Element Two mortgaged the realty leased by Wales. Wales paid monthly monetary consideration to Element Two in lease payments, which directly correlated to the amount of the monthly mortgage payments. Ad valorem taxes and property insurance were included in the monthly mortgage payments. Wales paid the ad valorem taxes and property insurance on the leased property. The lease payments to Element Two by Wales included the amount of the ad valorem taxes, property insurance, and common areas of maintenance. Wales did not pay sales tax on any of the lease payments to Element Two. Element Two did not charge or remit sales tax to the Department on the lease payments by Wales. Element Two was not registered with the Department as a dealer. Only dealers that are registered can remit sales tax on lease payments. Consequently, Element Two could not remit sales tax on the lease payments by Wales. Wales did not utilize all of the property it leased. Wales sub-leased a portion of the leased property to an unrelated entity. A prior sales and use tax audit was conducted of the sub-lessee, which included the period May 1997 through December 1998. The Department examined the sublease audit to determine whether Wales owed additional sales tax. The Department's examination of that audit revealed that the sales and use tax on the rent paid by the sub-lessee for the period May 1997 through September 1998 was assessed and paid by the sub-lessee. For the period May 1997 through December 1998, Wales had neither charged or collected sales tax nor remitted sales tax to the Department on the sub-lessee's payments. No sales tax was charged or paid on the sublease payments for the period October 1998 through December 1998. From January 1999 through April 2002, Wales charged, collected, and remitted sales tax on the sublease payments. The Department credited Wales for sales tax already paid on the subleased portion for the period May 1997 through September 1998 and January 1999 through April 2002. On its general ledger, Wales posted the lease payments to Element Two as rent payments. Element Two posted the lease payments to its general ledger as rent income. On its federal income tax returns, Wales reported the lease payments to Element Two as rent expense. Element Two reported the lease payments on its federal income tax returns as rent income. On November 29, 2002, the Department issued to Wales a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes for audit number A0205310975. Wales requested and the Department agreed to hold an audit conference to discuss the audit findings. Wales claimed that rent payments made were not subject to sales tax because both Wales and Element Two signed the mortgage and promissory note on the realty leased by Wales. However, only Element Two was reflected as the borrower on the loan and only Element Two was the signatory on the mortgage even though both Wales and Element Two signed the promissory note. On January 10, 2003, Wales executed a Consent to Extend the Time to Issue an Assessment or to File a Claim for Refund (Consent). The Consent extended the statute of limitations for the period of time in which an assessment may be issued or a claim for refund may be filed to December 31, 2003. On July 3, 2003, the Department issued, by certified mail, the Notice and an Addendum to Proposed Assessment for audit number A0205310975. The Notice provided, among other things, for the assessment of sales and use tax in the amount of $17,481.73; penalty in the amount of $8,741.10; interest in the amount of $5,756.03, with additional daily interest being computed at the rate of $3.54 per day from July 3, 2003; and a total assessment in the amount $31,978.86. On September 1, 2003, the Notice became a Final Assessment for audit number A0205310975. Wales contested the Final Assessment and requested a hearing. Wales is not contesting that part of the audit which found that Wales failed to pay sales tax on certain fixed assets purchased for use in its business. At hearing, Wales contended that its federal income tax returns could be amended to reflect the payments to Element Two as mortgage payments instead of rent payments, which would, in turn, change the Department's audit to reflect the payments as mortgage not rent. To address this contention, the Department presented the testimony of an expert witness in the area of rental consideration and sales tax audits. The Department's expert testified that the consideration for rental or use of property is the payment between/to one who owns the real property and/from one who uses the property; and concluded that consideration, as rental, was provided to Wales by Element Two based on the Department's taxing statute, Section 212.031, Florida Statutes, and its rules and regulation, Florida Administrative Code Rule 12A-1.070. The expert opined that the mortgage payments were consideration for a lease or license to use the real property and that, therefore, the monthly lease payment, which equaled the monthly mortgage payment, paid by Wales to Element Two was consideration for the lease or license to use the realty. The expert's testimony is found to be credible. The evidence presented shows that the mathematical computations performed by the Department in its audit are correct. Further, the evidence shows that the mathematical computations as to tax, penalty, and interest assessed are correct.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue's assessment of sales tax, interest, and penalty against Wales Garage Corporation be sustained and that the Department of Revenue enter a final order assessing sales tax, interest, and penalty against Wales Garage Corporation for the period May 1, 1997 through April 30, 2002, consistent herewith. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of May, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of May, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald S. Schnitzer GSS Advisory Services, Inc. 2455 East Sunrise Boulevard, Suite 502 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33304 Carrol Y. Cherry, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner, Richard Ruble, is entitled to renewal of his loan originator license, pursuant to chapter 494, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner, Richard Ruble, holds a loan originator license, National Mortgage Licensing System Identification Number 209981 ("LO License"), which was issued by Respondent, Office of Financial Regulation, and is the subject of this proceeding. Respondent is the state agency charged with administering and enforcing chapter 494, including part II of that statute, which regulates loan originators. Background and Evidence Adduced at the Final Hearing Petitioner has held his LO License since approximately 2004. As required by section 494.00312(7), Florida Statutes, loan originator licenses must be annually renewed.2/ In 2005 and 2006, Petitioner earned a substantial income from his business as a loan originator for real estate mortgage loans. As a result, he incurred a substantial federal income tax liability. When the real estate market took a dramatic downturn starting in 2007, Petitioner's income also dramatically dropped. He suffered significant loss of income starting in 2007. As a consequence, he has been unable to pay his federal income taxes since 2006. As a result of Petitioner's federal income tax liability for the years of 2005 and 2006, on February 12, 2013, the Internal Revenue Service(“IRS”) recorded a Notice of Federal Tax Lien ("Tax Lien") against Petitioner's real property located at 3801 South Ocean Drive, Unit 6Z, Hollywood, Florida,3/ and in Leon County, Florida. As a consequence of the creation of the Tax Lien, information constituting "adverse credit history information," as defined in Florida Administrative Code Rule 69-40.0113(2), has been included in his credit report. The inclusion of adverse credit history in Petitioner's credit report prompted Respondent to contact Petitioner sometime after February 12, 2013, and before June 8, 2013, and request him to provide specified information about release or payment of the Tax Lien by a June 8, 2013, deadline. Petitioner, through his counsel, contacted Respondent by correspondence dated June 7, 2013, explaining the circumstances under which the Tax Lien had been created and stating that Petitioner would provide the requested information, and notifying Respondent that Petitioner's accountant would need additional time beyond the June 8, 2013, deadline to gather and provide the requested information. On July 30, 2013, Respondent proposed to deny renewal of Petitioner's LO on the basis of the Tax Lien. On August 13, 2013, Petitioner provided to Respondent the requested additional information explaining the circumstances under which the Tax Lien was created. On August 15, 2013, Respondent withdrew its notice of denial of renewal of Petitioner's LO License; this withdrawal document expressly stated: "Please consider the Notice of Denial previously issued as withdrawn and of no force and effect." Respondent renewed Petitioner's LO, effective August 15, 2013. On December 30, 2013, Petitioner applied to renew his LO license for the year 2014. On June 30, 2014, Respondent issued a notice of denial of renewal of Petitioner's LO. Petitioner timely requested a hearing challenging the proposed denial of the renewal of his LO License. However, before the final hearing in that proceeding, the parties settled the matter by executing a Settlement Stipulation, a condition of which was that Petitioner provide, by December 31, 2014, all information required by Respondent to complete review of the renewal application for his LO. To comply with this condition, on December 22, 2014, Petitioner submitted Respondent's4/ Response Pursuant to Settlement Stipulation ("Response"), consisting of an explanation of his adverse credit history due to the Tax Lien and two lines of credit he had taken out to cover his business and personal expenses after the 2007 economic downturn and his consequent loss of income. The Response was supported by extensive documentation consisting of Petitioner's personal and business federal income tax returns; correspondence from Petitioner's counsel to Respondent addressing the Tax Lien and the status of Petitioner's efforts to resolve the Tax Lien matter with the IRS; and correspondence from the IRS dated September 8, 2014, stating that due to information Petitioner had provided, it (the IRS) had refunded some taxes paid and applied them to Petitioner's 2005 tax liability, which had, in part, given rise to the Tax Lien. On December 24, 2014, a Final Order incorporating the Settlement Stipulation was issued, and the file was closed on December 29, 2014. On December 31, 2014, Petitioner filed, and Respondent deemed received, Petitioner's application to renew his LO License for the year 2015. Sometime before October 19, 2015——over nine months later——Respondent informed Petitioner that the information that he had provided was not substantively adequate to support renewal of his LO License for 2015. Thereafter, on October 19 and December 14, 2015, Petitioner, through his counsel, submitted information consisting of copies of his income tax returns filed with the IRS for years 2005 through 2010, as well as copies of his 2011, 2012, and 2013 income tax returns that were filed with the IRS by his accountant, Chris Bagnall. The last three years of tax returns (for years 2011, 2012, and 2013) were offered by Petitioner as evidence that he was working diligently with the IRS to become current with respect to his filed income tax returns. On December 28, 2015, Petitioner applied to renew his LO License for the year 2016. On February 15, 2016, Respondent issued a Notice of Intent to Deny Renewal Application for Loan Originator License Pursuant to Chapter 494, Florida Statutes (hereafter, "Notice of Intent to Deny"), proposing to deny Petitioner's application to renew his LO License for the years 2014, 2015, and 2016.5/ The Notice of Intent to Deny cited three grounds, two of which remain pertinent to this proceeding: (1) Petitioner failed to demonstrate that he possessed the general fitness and responsibility necessary to command the confidence of the community and warrant a determination that he, as the applicant, would operate honestly, fairly, and efficiently, as required by section 494.00312(4)(b) and rule 69V-40.113; and (2) a background check revealed that Petitioner's credit history contained adverse credit history information——specifically, that the IRS holds an outstanding federal income tax lien on property owned by Petitioner. At the final hearing, Respondent expressly abandoned the third ground for its proposed denial—— specifically, that Petitioner had failed to provide certain information as required under the terms of a final order of settlement (discussed in greater detail below); accordingly, that ground is no longer at issue in this proceeding.6/ At the final hearing, Petitioner presented the testimony of his accountant, Chris Bagnall, who was retained in 2013 to assist Petitioner in preparing and submitting his overdue tax returns for years 2005 through 2015, and negotiating a plan for paying his past due income taxes for these years. Bagnall explained that it is the IRS's preference to have the taxpayer make payments toward the outstanding liability, and then to issue refunds if the taxpayer has overpaid. Alternatively, if the taxpayer is not able to make payments toward resolving the outstanding tax liability, the IRS will negotiate payment plans applying the carryback rules, which allow income gains and losses to be "netted out" for purposes of determining overall tax liability. Under this approach, the IRS will not negotiate payment plans until all past due tax returns have been filed. In the meantime, interest and penalties continue to accrue on the outstanding income tax liability. Bagnall testified, credibly, that after the real estate market crash in 2008, Petitioner did not have the money to pay the income tax he owed, and he used what little money he did have to try to keep his business afloat. Because Petitioner was not in a position to make a payment toward his tax liability due to his drastically diminished income, and due to not having timely filed income tax returns for several years, he was not in a position to negotiate a plan with the IRS to pay the income taxes he owes. In the meantime, interest and penalties on Petitioner's past due taxes continued to accrue. As of the date of the final hearing, Petitioner's total liability was approximately $366,000, a significant portion of which was attributable to penalties and interest accruing on the outstanding tax liability.7/ Bagnall testified that since Petitioner retained him in 2013, he has been preparing and filing Petitioner's past due income tax returns in batches, as Petitioner has been able to garner the funds to pay for Bagnall's accounting services. As of the date of the final hearing, Bagnall recently had filed Petitioner's income tax return for 2014, and he testified, credibly, that he would be filing Petitioner's 2015 income tax return within a few days after the final hearing. Once Petitioner's 2015 return was filed, he would be current regarding the filing status of his income tax returns, so finally would be in a position to negotiate with the IRS to develop a plan to pay off his tax liability, with the ultimate aim of dissolving the Tax Lien. Petitioner acknowledged that as of the date of the final hearing, he had not voluntarily made any payments toward addressing his income tax liability. Additionally, Petitioner's tax returns show gambling losses of $8,782 in 2011, $2,100 in 2012, and $18,546 in 2013. However, as discussed above, the evidence shows that Petitioner, through Bagnall, is taking a comprehensive approach to resolving his income tax liability based in part on the use of the carryback rules to net out his overall tax liability. The evidence does not show that it would have been feasible for Petitioner to have made individual payments toward his outstanding tax liability until all of his returns had been filed and he was in a position to negotiate a repayment plan. Respondent elicited testimony from Petitioner that in the application for renewal of his LO License filed in December 2013 for the year 2014, he had failed to disclose the existence of the Tax Lien until Respondent brought to his attention that they were aware of the existence of the Tax Lien. Respondent also elicited testimony that until brought to his attention by Respondent, Petitioner had failed to disclose, in his LO License renewal application filed in December 2015 for the year 2016, that he had filed for personal bankruptcy in September 2015. Respondent elicited this testimony to establish that Petitioner exhibited a pattern of being untruthful and incomplete in his responses to the application questions, and, thus, lacks the character to warrant a determination that he would operate honestly, fairly, and efficiently, as required by rule 69V-40.0113(3)(b), for purposes of entitlement to renewal of his LO License.8/ However, the evidence does not clearly and convincingly show that Petitioner intended to be untruthful in his application responses or to hide the existence of the Tax Lien or his personal bankruptcy from Respondent. It is as plausible that Petitioner omitted this information in error. With respect to the Tax Lien, the evidence shows that Petitioner had previously disclosed the creation of the Tax Lien to Respondent in correspondence dated June 13, 2013, and had, at that time, provided an explanation regarding the events leading to its creation. It would simply be nonsensical for Petitioner to intentionally falsely deny the existence of the Tax Lien on his application when he had previously submitted that very information to Respondent. Similarly, with respect to disclosure of his personal bankruptcy, Petitioner credibly testified that the matter had been a topic of discussion with Respondent's staff for a period of months. Although Petitioner amended his 2016 LO License renewal application only shortly before the final hearing to correctly reflect that he had filed a personal bankruptcy petition within the past 10 years, the credible evidence indicates that Petitioner believed that Respondent was aware of his personal bankruptcy through previous discussions with Respondent's staff, so would have had no motivation to intentionally provide false information regarding that matter on his renewal application. No evidence was presented at the hearing showing that Petitioner has ever engaged, in the course of conducting his mortgage loan originator business, in any fraudulent, dishonest, or other conduct harmful to the consuming public. Findings of Ultimate Fact The undersigned found Petitioner to be credible and forthright in his explanation of the creation and status of the Tax Lien, his personal bankruptcy, the filing of his tax returns, and his ongoing efforts to resolve his adverse credit history issues that have affected renewal of his LO License.9/ As discussed in detail above, Petitioner's adverse credit history information is, at least in some significant measure, a result of circumstances largely beyond Petitioner's control. When the real estate market collapsed in 2008, Petitioner suffered an immediate, dramatic drop in income; at that point, he incurred the large tax liabilities with which he has been burdened ever since. As discussed above, due to Petitioner's lack of income during and after the real estate market crash, it took some time for him to obtain the accounting services he needed in order to file his overdue tax returns——an essential step in negotiating a tax payment plan with the IRS. Although Petitioner's efforts to resolve the Tax Lien with the IRS have taken some time, Petitioner finally is, or soon will be, in a position to negotiate a payment plan with the IRS to pay his tax liability and, ultimately, resolve the Tax Lien. Before now, Petitioner has not been in a position to comprehensively and systematically pay down his tax liability pursuant to a negotiated plan. Thus, at this juncture, Petitioner's lack of voluntary payments toward resolving his Tax Lien and his gambling losses have not been determined a basis for finding that Petitioner lacks the character, general fitness, and financial responsibility to entitle him to renewal of his LO License.10/ The persuasive evidence shows that Petitioner is making steady progress toward getting himself in the position, through bringing himself current in his income tax returns filings, to negotiate a payment plan with the IRS in order to comprehensively and systematically pay down his tax liability with the aim of dissolving the Tax Lien. For these reasons, the undersigned finds that Petitioner has shown that he possesses the character, general fitness, and financial responsibility to warrant a determination that he will operate honestly, fairly, and efficiently such that his LO License should be renewed for the year 2016.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent issue a final order approving renewal of Petitioner's loan originator license for the year 2016. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of January, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 2017
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Eight Hundred, Inc. (Petitioner), collected and remitted the proper amount of sales tax on its retail sales activities, and either paid or accrued use tax on its purchases.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida corporation. Petitioner's revenues are derived, in part, through the operation of vending machine businesses throughout the State of Florida. Petitioner placed coin-operated cigarette, food and beverage, candy, and amusement vending machines in various bingo halls located throughout the state. These locations included: Pondella Hall for Hire, Inc.; Avon Plaza Bingo; Bingo Trail; Causeway Plaza Bingo; Dunnellon Bingo; Fountains Plaza Bingo; Lamirada Plaza Bingo; Northtowne Bingo; Orlando Bingo; Pondella Bingo; Sanford Bingo; Sarasota Crossings Bingo; South Belcher Bingo; and Towne Centre Bingo. Respondent is the state agency charged with the responsibility of enforcing the Florida Revenue Act of 1949 (Chapter 212, Florida Statutes (2003)), as amended. Among other things, Respondent performs audits on taxpayers to ensure that all taxes due have been correctly paid. In 1994, an audit was conducted on Petitioner covering the audit period from August 1, 1989, through July 31, 1994. After the results of the audit were obtained on June 23, 1995, Petitioner issued a NOI wherein it proposed to assess Petitioner $48,026.75 in unpaid sales tax, $18,520.05 in delinquent penalties, and $15,836.40 in accrued interest on the unpaid tax; and $4,383.13 in unpaid discretionary sales surtax, $1,875.80 in delinquent penalties, and $1,088.58 in accrued interest on the unpaid discretionary sales surtax through the date of the notice for a total of $89,730.71. By letter dated July 18, 1995, Petitioner protested the NOI and stated that (a) Petitioner was not willful in any of the errors discovered during the audit; (b) Petitioner filed and paid the tax it believed to be accurate; and (c) Petitioner has taken steps to correct the problems identified in the audit and is now filing timely in accordance with the applicable rules pertaining to the transactions in which it was engaged. Petitioner requested that the penalties and interest be abated and requested an informal conference if the letter inquiry could not be honored. For reasons unknown, the requested conference was not provided by Respondent. On November 7, 1995, under a search warrant issued at the request of the Florida statewide prosecutor, all business and banking records of Petitioner, then known as Ponderosa-for- Hire, Inc., were seized. Respondent issued its NOPA sustaining the assessment in full, which with accrued interest, then totaled $92,126.52. On March 15, 2000, Petitioner filed a letter of protest of the audit findings. On June 11, 2001, Respondent issued its NOD rejecting Petitioner's position. On July 9, 2001, a Petition for Reconsideration was filed by Petitioner. Additional letters were sent to the Respondent subsequent to the July 9, 2001, petition. Respondent issued its NOR on November 16, 2001, denying the petition. On January 15, 2002, Petitioner filed its petition with Respondent seeking an administrative hearing with DOAH. The private accounting firm of Crawford and Jones conducted a state sales and use tax audit of Petitioner under the authority of Respondent's contract audit program. The audit began on September 8, 1994, upon issuance of Respondent's Form DR-804 (DR-804). The DR-840 included a list of records which were to be produced, including federal tax returns, state sales and use tax returns, sales journals, invoices, and purchase invoices. The authorized representatives of Respondent for the audit was David L. Schultz of the accounting firm Schultz, Chaipel and Company. Representation began upon presentation to Respondent of Form DR-843, Power of Attorney and Declaration of Representation, dated January 9, 1995. Included among the records provided to Respondent's auditor were ledgers, journals, taxpayer copies of DR-15 (sales and use tax return), bank statements, tax returns, financial statements. A schedule of income earned by Petitioner, by location and category of income, was provided to Respondent by Mr. Schultz's office. This schedule of income had been created by Philip Furtney, president of Petitioner, from records he kept on his home computer. The categories of income listed on the schedules were, for each hall location: canteen, cigarette, soft drink machines, crane machines, and telephones. Beginning in fiscal year 1992, a new category titled "miscellaneous" was added; and in fiscal year 1993, the category "rent" was added. Respondent's auditor compared the data contained in these schedules, for each tax year, with other reported items, such as tax returns and financial statements, to ascertain if the figures reported were a reasonable representation of income and that reliance could be placed on the data. After determining the schedules to be reasonable, Respondent's auditor used this data to calculate the amount of sales tax due based on the income reported. The effective state sales tax rate, when sales are made through coin-operated amusement and vending machines and other devices, is found in Florida Administrative Code Rules 12A-1.044 and 12A-15.001. The effective state sales tax rate for sales involving fractions of a dollar is found in Florida Administrative Code Rules 12A-1.004 and 12A-15.002. Respondent's auditor's work papers break out the different effective tax rates for each of Petitioner's revenue activities, including the different surtax rates. Credit for taxes remitted by Petitioner was calculated from the Form DR-15 downloads. Adjustments were made to this data where the total amount reported was illogical, duplicative, or otherwise appeared incorrect. The total amount of sales tax due, as reported in the Schedule "A" sales, was determined by subtracting sales tax remitted to Respondent from the amount calculated on total retail sales made. This amount was $33,269.75 in sales tax and $3,912.95 in surtax. "Use" tax liability was calculated on two activities: First, items of tangible personal property purchased by Petitioner during the audit period for which the invoices did not affirmatively show that sales tax was paid; and secondly, on the stuffed animals contained in the crane machines which are considered concession prizes. The method for calculating the use tax on concession prizes is described in Florida Administrative Code Rule 12A-1.080. Because the operator of game concessions award tangible personal property as prizes to those who pay to play the machine, the operator is the ultimate consumer of the property (prize). The basis for determining tax liability is computed by multiplying six percent times 25 percent of the gross receipts from all such games, in this instance, the crane machines. The total amount of use tax due, as reported in the Schedule "B" purchases, was $14,757 in tax and $470.18 surtax. After the NOI was issued, the audit file was forwarded to Respondent's Tallahassee office. The preponderance of the evidence supports the conclusion that the sales activity of Petitioner included revenue received from vending and amusement machines and snack bar operations. Federal tax return for the fiscal year 1992 does not list any amount of income as being derived from rental activity. The federal returns for years 1991 and 1993 list rental income; however, no information was given to Respondent's auditor during the audit to explain what this income was and from where it was derived. Applications for Registration were filed by Petitioner when each hall location began operations. Of the 23 registration applications filed, nine of them listed the major business activity as vending-food and amusement; eight of them listed the major business activity as restaurant, snack bar or canteen service; five listed the major business activity as rental; and one gave no activity.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Respondent, Department of Revenue, upholding its assessments in the NOR dated November 16, 2001, for sales and use tax, the applicable surtax, plus applicable penalty and interest against Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of April, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us COPIES FURNISHED: John Mika, Esquire Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of April, 2005. Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Thomas F. Egan, Esquire Law Office of Thomas F. Egan, P.A. 204 Park Lake Street Orlando, Florida 32803 Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent is guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against her, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken, if any.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Anne E. Carr is and has been at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0268356. In 1988 Helen B. Moser and her husband, John J. Moser, Jr., obtained their real estate salesman licenses. In 1989 they became real estate brokers. Upon becoming licensed brokers, they decided that they would like to open their own real estate office. They began contacting various real estate brokers seeking advice on how to open and operate a real estate business. Respondent was one of the brokers the Mosers contacted for advice. She and the Mosers already knew each other from previous professional activities. At the time, Respondent was the broker and sole stockholder of Carr Real Estate, Inc. She also was spending a substantial amount of time selling luxury condominiums for a particular developer, which required her to be on-site at the development. Respondent suggested to the Mosers that they join Carr Real Estate, Inc., and run the office for her rather than opening their own office, which would give them immediate access to her listings and many clients and allow her to devote her time to sales for the large real estate development. The Mosers agreed that was a good opportunity for all concerned and joined Carr Real Estate, Inc., as broker/salesmen in October of 1989. The Mosers began running the business for Respondent at her request, providing Respondent with monthly accountings. During 1990 the Mosers earned approximately $90,000 as a result of the listings they took over from Respondent and as a result of the listings Respondent referred to them. Throughout that year Carr Real Estate, Inc., remained a major presence in the Highland Beach area where Respondent was well known both for her flamboyant fashions and her ability to list and sell luxury ocean-front and water-front properties. During the first week of December 1990 Respondent advised the Mosers that due both to financial problems she was experiencing and pressure on her from the developer to devote full time to his sales she would be closing the business on December 31 unless the Mosers wanted to purchase the company from her. They advised Respondent they were interested in doing so and that they would draft the documents for Respondent's signature. Many discussions took place between Respondent and the Mosers over the next several weeks formulating the terms of the sale of the business, and the Mosers submitted to Respondent a number of drafts of documents. While the negotiations were on-going, Respondent filled out and executed on December 12, 1990, the documents necessary for her to file for personal bankruptcy. On December 15 she faxed written instructions to her attorney to not file the bankruptcy petition because she was selling her company. On December 20, 1990, Respondent and the Mosers executed a Purchase and Sale Agreement and a Bill of Sale. It is noted that those documents also involved the sale of Respondent's interest in two other corporations to the Mosers but that portion of the transaction raises no issues involved in this proceeding. The Purchase and Sale Agreement provided that its effective date would be January 1, 1991. The Agreement specifically represented that Carr Real Estate, Inc., was being sold free of any liabilities and encumbrances and that the corporation did not own any tangible assets. The Agreement further provided that Respondent would indemnify the Mosers from all obligations and liabilities incurred by Carr Real Estate, Inc., prior to January 1, 1991. The Agreement provided for no money to change hands as a result of the Mosers' purchase of Respondent's business; rather, the purchase price for the corporation was five percent of all sales commissions received by the corporation for a period of two years. On December 29, 1990, Respondent executed the Seller's Affidavit given to her by the Mosers. The portion of the Seller's Affidavit pertinent to this dispute is that Respondent attested that there were no actions or proceedings then pending in any state or federal court in which "the Affiant or Corporations" are parties, including bankruptcy. It was very clear in Respondent's mind that what she was selling under the Purchase and Sale Agreement and the Bill of Sale and what she was attesting to in the Seller's Affidavit was in regard to the corporation and not her personally. It never occurred to Respondent that she was representing to the Mosers that she personally had no bills and no assets. Respondent had no intention of defrauding the Mosers. Supporting this intent is the clear language contained in the Purchase and Sale Agreement, the Bill of Sale, and the Seller's Affidavit that she would personally indemnify and hold harmless the Mosers from any liabilities incurred by the corporation prior to the effective date of the sale. In mid-January 1991, approximately two weeks after the effective date of the sale, the Mosers discovered that a bankruptcy petition had been filed on behalf of Respondent as an individual. Although that petition did not involve the corporation, John Moser immediately contacted Respondent who did not know that her attorney had filed the petition contrary to Respondent's instructions. On January 23, 1991, Respondent wrote to Helen Moser apologizing for the erroneous filing of her bankruptcy petition and assuring her that it would be corrected. Respondent immediately contacted her attorney to ascertain how the petition could be dismissed. She was advised by her attorney that the only way she could dismiss the petition was to not attend the first meeting of creditors which would cause the petition to automatically be dismissed. Respondent did fail to attend the first meeting of creditors. Due to her failure to attend, her bankruptcy petition was dismissed. She immediately contacted Helen Moser to advise her of the dismissal. On February 1, 1991, John Moser called Respondent to inform her that a statement for a monthly automobile lease payment in the name of Carr Real Estate had been received. Respondent immediately sent the Mosers a note indicating that she had contacted G.M.A.C. but that company refused to allow her to transfer responsibility for her automobile lease payments from the corporation to herself. She acknowledged that she was responsible for any of the lease payments and requested that the Mosers acknowledge that the automobile was not an asset of the corporation. At the time Respondent knew that she was responsible for the lease payments because she signed the lease agreement as an individual. Respondent's contact with G.M.A.C. was unnecessary since her automobile had been leased to her as an individual in June of 1988, a date which preceded the existence of Carr Real Estate, Inc. The automobile was insured in Respondent's individual name and was registered in the name of G.M.A.C. at Respondent's address. The Bill of Sale executed by Respondent and the Mosers does not list the automobile as an asset of the corporation that was conveyed. The automobile leased by Respondent was not an asset of the corporation. The only relationship between Respondent's leased automobile and Carr Real Estate, Inc., concerns the deduction of automobile expenses as business expenses on the tax return for Carr Real Estate, Inc. On February 6, 1992, Helen Moser asked Respondent for a copy of the 1990 corporate tax return for Carr Real Estate, Inc., and Respondent provided a copy to her that same day. The return had been prepared in August or September of 1991 by Mary Dorak, a person enrolled with the Internal Revenue Service. It contained an entry entitled "loan from shareholder" in the sum of $107,060. Respondent had been the sole shareholder of the corporation. On February 26, 1992, the Mosers obtained an opinion letter from an attorney advising them that the corporation was not liable to Respondent for any debts. Neither the Mosers nor their accountant ever contacted Dorak or Respondent about the information contained in that tax return. Instead, the Mosers filed an amended corporate tax return for 1990 for Carr Real Estate, Inc. They removed the automobile as a corporate asset while leaving the shareholder's loan because it benefited them tax-wise. Instead of amending the return, the Mosers could have filed a 1991 return showing Respondent's stock exchange for the basis that was left of the stock in the corporation because the transaction took effect on January 1 of that year. Doing so would have caused no adverse tax consequences to the Mosers. Respondent typically provided Dorak with a listing of Respondent's income and expenses for the year and would then simply sign the return after Dorak had prepared it without reviewing the return first. Without any input from Respondent, Dorak had listed the automobile and some personal debts of Respondent on the 1990 corporate tax return because Respondent could take advantage of certain business deductions. That action had no adverse tax consequences for the Mosers. The Mosers never requested a tangible property tax return which would have reflected if there were any assets in the corporation. Had they made this request, they would have been told that there was none in existence because the corporation had no assets. At the time that Respondent and the Mosers executed the Purchase and Sale Agreement, the Bill of Sale, and the Seller's Affidavit in December, all three believed that the corporation had no assets or liabilities and that any assets and liabilities of Respondent were hers personally. As of January 1, 1991, the effective date of the sale, the corporation had no assets or liabilities. There were no tax consequences to the Mosers because of the listing of the shareholder loan in the 1990 corporate tax return because in that Subchapter S corporation the person ultimately adversely affected by the sale would be Respondent since she owned all of the shares in 1990. On the other hand, the filing of an amended 1990 corporate tax return by the Mosers without Respondent's knowledge and consent has resulted in adverse tax consequences to her, an unnecessary result. In November 1988 Respondent was involved in the sale of a condominium unit owned by Mr. and Mrs. Roy Heinz. Due to extended negotiations, the buyer's decision to not purchase the unit, and instructions from Heinz who was her client, Respondent delayed in placing the buyer's deposit check in her escrow account. Petitioner filed an Administrative Complaint against Respondent only and not also against Carr Real Estate, Inc., since that corporation was not yet in existence. After a formal evidentiary hearing, a Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings specifically cleared Respondent of any intentional wrongdoing and of any culpable negligence. Respondent was found guilty, however, of what was specifically characterized to be a technical violation of failure to immediately place the deposit check into her escrow account. The minimum penalty permissible was assessed against Respondent. Respondent was also dismissed from the civil lawsuit filed by Roy Heinz which emanated out of the same circumstances for which the administrative action was brought. The Mosers knew about the disciplinary action and the civil lawsuit pending against Respondent individually prior to their execution of the December 1990 documents transferring Carr Real Estate, Inc., from Respondent's ownership to theirs effective January 1, 1991. The "Roy Heinz matter" was specifically raised by John Moser during the negotiations among the Mosers and Respondent. In April of 1991 Respondent sent Helen Moser a copy of the Recommended Order finding Respondent not guilty of any dishonest conduct or culpable negligence, and Helen Moser failed to even read the entire Order since she considered it unimportant and because she knew the transaction involved occurred prior to the formation of Carr Real Estate, Inc. The Mosers continue to operate Carr Real Estate, Inc. The business has been diminishing, however, since 1991 due to the reduction in the number of salespersons affiliated with the business, John Moser's inability to attract listings and retain clients, and the amount of time the Mosers have been devoting to John Moser's computer business. Respondent's actions and/or inactions have not been the cause of the decline in Carr Real Estate, Inc.'s, business. Moreover, the Mosers have not been harmed financially or in any other way due to any statements contained in the Purchase and Sale Agreement, Bill of Sale, or Seller's Affidavit executed by Respondent. The sale of Carr Real Estate, Inc., by Respondent to the Mosers benefited all three of them. In her negotiations surrounding that sale, Respondent agreed to the terms desired by the Mosers, acted honestly, and did not knowingly or intentionally misrepresent any material fact. Those misrepresentations alleged by the Mosers and Petitioner to be contained in the closing documents, such as any statement that Respondent personally had no assets or liabilities, were not material to the sale and purchase of the corporation.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent not guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against her and dismissing that Administrative Complaint. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of December 1994, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of December 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-4, 6-11, 13, 15, 18, and 19 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 5, 16, and 17 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the credible evidence. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 12 and 14 have been rejected as being subordinate. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-29, 31, and 33-36 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 30 has been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the credible evidence in this cause. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 32 has been rejected as not constituting a finding of fact but rather as constituting argument of counsel. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack McRay, Esquire Acting General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Theodore R. Gay, Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation 401 Northwest 2nd Avenue, Suite N-607 Miami, Florida 33128 Harold M. Braxton, P.A. Suite 400, One Datran Center 9100 South Dadeland Boulevard Miami, Florida 33156-7815
