Findings Of Fact The Agency hereby adopts the findings of fact set forth in the Recommended Order.
Conclusions This cause was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for a formal administrative hearing. The assigned Administrative Law Judge ALJ”) has submitted a Recommended Order to the Agency for Health Care Administration (“Agency”).. The Recommended Order of June 29, 2001, entered herein is incorporated by reference.
The Issue Whether the South Florida Water Management District’s (“District”) intended award of a contract for aerial spraying services, granular application services, and aerial transport services, to Coastal Air Services, Inc. (“Coastal”), is contrary to the District’s governing statutes, rules, policies, or the bid specifications; and, if so, whether the decision was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.
Findings Of Fact The Parties The District is an independent taxing authority created pursuant to section 373.069, Florida Statutes, with the authority to contract with private entities to maintain real property controlled by the District. See § 373.1401, Fla. Stat. HAI is a Florida corporation duly authorized to do business in the State of Florida with a business address of 1090 Airglades Boulevard in Clewiston, Florida. Coastal is a Florida corporation duly authorized to do business in the State of Florida with a business address of 7424 Coastal Drive in Panama City, Florida. The RFB On February 7, 2018, the District issued the RFB, soliciting bids for qualified respondents to provide the following: [F]urnish all labor, equipment, perform data entry and perform all operations for spraying of aquatic, ditchbank and invasive vegetation by helicopter and provide aerial flight services for site inspection and plant surveys. Both HAI and Coastal submitted timely bids, which the District deemed responsive and responsible under the terms of the RFB. The District deemed Coastal the lowest responsive and responsible bidder for aerial spraying, granular application, and aerial transport services. The District deemed HAI the lowest responsive and responsible bidder for spot spraying services. On May 11, 2018, the District posted its Notice of Intent to Award the respective contracts to Coastal and HAI. HAI challenges the award to Coastal because it is not a responsible bidder under the terms of the RFB. HAI’s challenge focuses on two items required to document the bidder’s responsibility to perform the requested services. First, the RFB requires the bidder to provide at least two helicopters certified pursuant to 14 CFR Part 133, Rotocraft External-Load Operations; and 14 CFR Part 137, Agricultural Aircraft Operations (Part 137 Certificate). Second, the RFB requires the bidder to demonstrate its ability to obtain required insurance coverage. Part 137 Certificate HAI contends that Coastal’s bid does not meet the responsibility provisions of the RFB because it did not include sufficient Part 137 Certificates for its subcontractor, HMC Helicopters (“HMC”). HAI contends the Part 137 Certificates are required to expressly state that aircraft are certified to dispense economic poisons. Petitioner’s argument fails for three reasons. First, the RFB does not require the bidder’s Part 137 Certificate to expressly endorse aircraft to dispense economic poisons.3/ Second, assuming the express endorsement was required, the requirement does not apply to HMC. The RFB defines the term “Bidder” and “Respondent” as “[a]ll contractors, consultants, organizations, firms or other entities submitting a Response to this RFB as a prime contractor.” (emphasis added). In its bid, Coastal is listed as the prime contractor, and HMC as a subcontractor. The RFB requires each Respondent to list at least two aircraft which are Part 133 and 137 certified. The requirement applies to Coastal as the primary contractor, not to its subcontractor. Coastal’s bid listed five aircraft with both Part 133 and 137 Certificates, actually exceeding the requirement for two such certified aircraft. Third, assuming an express endorsement for dispensing economic poisons was required, and that the requirement applied to HMC, HMC’s Part 137 Certificate documents HMC’s authority to dispense economic poisons. Pursuant to 14 CFR 137.3, “Agricultural aircraft operation” is defined as follows: [T]he operation of an aircraft for the purpose of (1) dispensing any economic poison, (2) dispensing any other substance intended for plant nourishment, soil treatment, propagation of plant life, or pest control, or (3) engaging in dispending activities directly affecting agriculture, horticulture, or forest preservation, but not including the dispensing of live insects. To obtain a Part 137 Certificate, the operator must pass a knowledge and skills test, which includes the safe handling of economic poisons and disposal of used containers for those poisons; the general effects of those poisons on plants, animals, and persons and precautions to be observed in using those poisons; as well as the primary symptoms of poisoning in persons, appropriate emergency measures in the case of poisoning, and the location of poison control centers. See 14 CFR § 137.19. However, if the operator applies for a Part 137 Certificate which prohibits dispensing of economic poisons, the applicant is not required to demonstrate the knowledge and skills listed above. See Id. HMCs’ certificates do not contain an express prohibition against dispensing economic poisons. The authorization for HMC’s aircraft to dispense economic poisons is inherent in its Part 137 Certificate. Coastal’s bid meets the solicitation requirement for at least two aircraft with Part 137 Certificates. Insurance Requirements The RFB requires each Respondent to “provide evidence of the ability to obtain appropriate insurance coverage.” Respondents may meet the insurability requirement by having their insurance agent either (1) complete and sign an insurance certificate which meets all of the requirements of Exhibit H to the RFB; or (2) issue a letter on the insurance agency’s letterhead stating that the Respondent qualifies for the required insurance coverage levels and that an insurance certificate meeting the District’s requirements will be submitted prior to the execution of the contract. In response to this requirement, Coastal submitted a letter from Sterlingrisk Aviation, dated March 6, 2018, stating, “All required coverage amounts are available to Coastal Air Service, Inc. to fulfill the requirements of this contract.” In the Re: line, the letter refers to the specific RFB at issue in this case. Coastal also submitted a certificate of insurance from Sterlingrisk Aviation demonstrating the levels of insurance coverage in effect at the time the bid was submitted, although the coverages are less than the amounts required under the RFB.4/ HAI takes issue with Coastal’s evidence of ability to obtain the required coverage because the letter from Sterlingrisk does not state “an insurance certificate reflecting the required coverage will be provided prior to the contract execution.” Based on the totality of the evidence, the undersigned infers that Sterlingrisk’s letter omits the language that a certificate “will be provided” prior to contract execution, because Sterlingrisk will issue an insurance certificate only when Coastal applies, and pays the premium, for the increased coverage limitations. The letter from Sterlingrisk substantially complies with the insurance requirements of the RFB, and constitutes competent, substantial evidence of Coastal’s ability to obtain the required insurance coverage. HAI introduced no evidence that Coastal obtained an economic advantage over HAI by failing to include language from its insurance agent that “an insurance certificate reflecting the required coverage will be provided prior to the contract execution.” Instead, HAI argued that by failing to enforce that provision of the RFB, the District cannot ensure the winning bidder will be responsible to undertake the contract. HAI argued that the District’s failure to adhere to this RFB requirement may create inefficiencies that “would result in the event that Coastal were unable to obtain the required insurance coverage” before execution of the contract. Coastal’s bid documents its eligibility for insurance coverage in the amounts required by the RFB. If Coastal does not provide said certificates, it will not be qualified for final execution or issuance of the contract.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Southwest Florida Water Management District enter a final order dismissing Helicopter Applicator, Inc.’s Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of November, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 2018.
The Issue Whether the petition for administrative determination of the invalidity of a proposed rule was filed within the time Section 120.54(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), prescribes for instituting challenges to proposed administrative rules?
Conclusions The time limit Section 120.54(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1987) sets for filing petitions which seek determinations of invalidity under Section 120.54, Florida Statutes (1987), before proposed rules ever take effect, is jurisdictional Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services vs. Alice P., 367 So.2d 1045 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Organized Fishermen of Florida vs. Marine Fisheries Com'n, No. 88-3821R (DOAH; Sept. 14, 1988); City of Gainesville vs. Florida Public Service Com'n., 3 FALR 2448-A (DOAH 1981). Contra, Florida Medical Center vs. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, No. 88- 3970R and consolidated cases, Nos. 88-4018R and 88-4019R (DOAH; Nov. 1, 1988). If a petition challenging a proposed rule is not filed within 21 days of the notice initiating rulemaking which Section 120.54(13)(b), Florida Statutes (1987) requires agencies to publish, those seeking invalidation are relegated to rule challenge proceedings under Section 120.56, Florida Statutes (1987), unless they are parties to the rulemaking, and take timely stems to secure judicial review of the agency action adopting the rule. See City of Key West vs. Askew, 324 So.2d 655 (Fla. 1st DCA). Substantially affected parties who fail to file a Section 120.54 challenge in time are not without an administrative forum in which to litigate both whether the substance of a rule is authorized by statute and whether the manner of its adoption was lawful. Since the petition alleges no constitutional infirmity in the rule, nothing petitioners have pleaded here would be foreclosed from consideration in a Section 120.56 proceeding. See Department of Environmental Regulation vs. Leon County, 344 So.2d 297 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). On appeal from an order invalidating an existing rule which had been challenged pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes (1987), the court in Department of Administration vs. Herring, 530 So.2d 962 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), while rejecting the hearing officer's conclusions, considered the propriety of the procedures employed in rulemaking. Challenges to existing rules on grounds of inadequacy of economic impact statements are other instances in which rulemaking procedures have been tested in Section 120.56 proceedings. See Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services vs. Delray Hospital Corp., 373 So.2d 75 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). Even where an agency makes no claim that it has followed any of the procedures required for rulemaking, challengers must ordinarily file under Section 120.56, Florida Statutes (1987). See State, Department of Administration vs. Stevens, 344 So.2d 290 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). The petition in the present case may be read as alleging that DER published notice of proposing a mitigation rule in June of 1987, although the Florida administrative Weekly reflects publication on May 1, 1987. But it is clear from the petition that more than a year elapsed, after publication, before the present petition (or the earlier petition dismissed July 21, 1988) was filed. This makes the petition untimely under Section 120.54, Florida Statutes (1987) It is, accordingly, ORDERED: The petition for administrative determination of the invalidity of a proposed rule is dismissed, without prejudice to the filing of a petition pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes (1987). DONE and ENTERED this 15th November, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Peter B. Belmont, Esquire 511 31st Avenue North St. Petersburg, FL 33704 David A. Crowley, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399 Janet E. Bowman, Esquire P.O. Box 1876 Tallahassee, FL 32302 James S. Alves, Esquire Thomas T. M. DeRose, Esquire P.O. Box 6526 420 First Florida Bank Building Tallahassee, FL 32314 Lawrence E. Sellers, Jr., Esquire P.O. Drawer 810 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Cindy L. Bartin, Esquire P. O. Box 271 Tallahassee, FL 32302
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Florida Hospital, is a tertiary care hospital located in Orange County, Florida, and consisting of three different campuses, with a total of 1,075 licensed beds. It is the second busiest and biggest hospital in Florida. T2. 9,20. Florida Hospital submitted its original FY 1984 budget to the Hospital Cost Containment Board (HCCB) on October 31, 1983. Petitioner's Exhibit 5. The FY 1984 budget was revised at least once through informal negotiation with HCCB staff before it was considered by the HCCB, and these revisions were accepted by the staff of the HCCB. T1. 54, 104. These changes were not placed in evidence. The HCCB reviewed Petitioner's FY 1984 budget at its meeting on April 19, 1984. T1. 54; Petitioner's Exhibit 4. The budget was accepted and not selected for public hearing, and the HCCB found that Petitioner's hospital had one of the top three highest case mixes in the state. Petitioner's Exhibit 4. Petitioner's 1984 fiscal year ran from January 1, 1984 to December 31, 1984. T1. 52. Although the budget was not considered by the HCCB until April, 1984, the budget was effective for all of fiscal year 1984. T1. 54. By letter dated October 11, 1984, but received October 15, 1984, Florida Hospital submitted an amended FY 1984 budget to the Hospital Cost Containment Board. T1. 54; T2. 51; Petitioner's Exhibit 6. The amendment thus was submitted 289 days after the beginning of Petitioner's 1984 fiscal year, using the date of receipt as the date of submission, and 77 days from the end of the fiscal year. By letter dated February 11, 1985, the HCCB staff notified Florida Hospital that its amended 1984 budget would not be accepted because it was received less than 90 days before the end of Florida Hospital's 1984 fiscal year. T1. 54-55; Petitioner's Exhibit 2. Florida Hospital is not aware of any analysis made by the staff of the HCCB with respect to the merits of the proposed amendment. T1. 56. In the fall of 1984, the HCCB applied the 90 day policy to all hospitals which submitted proposed budget amendments. T1. 7, 13. The policy was initiated in late summer or early fall, 1984. T1. 6,7. The HCCB did not provide the Petitioner with any other reason for the proposed denial of its amendment. T1. 23. The HCCB has now abandoned its policy of refusing to accept budget amendments within the last 90 days of the fiscal year, and that issue is not present in this case because the HCCB does not rely upon it to deny the amendment proposed by the Petitioner. T1. 11, 27. Effective May 18, 1984, the Legislature substantially amended the Health Care Cost Containment Act of 1979, section 395.501, et seq., Fla. Stat. Chapter 84-35, Laws of Florida (1984). Historically, there was no practice or policy of the HCCB or its staff to either encourage or discourage amendment of budgets after submission to the HCCB, and although such amendments were not required by law, amendments were routinely allowed. T1. Under prior law, the HCCB had no regulatory authority over hospital budgets, and could not require a hospital to revise its budget or to abide by its budget. T1. 40. The HCCB only had the power to subject the hospital to a public hearing. Id. It often occurred that hospitals would revise a budget under the former law, after preliminary staff analysis and recommendation, and it is inferred that often such amendments were prompted by the possibility that the unrevised budget would trigger a public hearing. T1. 39. In fiscal year 1984, ninety-nine hospitals submitted amendments or other changes to their budgets after initial budget Submission to the HCCB. Petitioner's Exhibit 1. Sixty-five of those amendments were accepted by the staff of the HCCB or the HCCB and became a part of the hospital's 1984 budget. Id. At least fifteen or twenty of the attempts to amend the FY 1984 budget set forth above were filed after the particular fiscal year had already begun. T1. 70. The majority of these fifteen or twenty were changes or amendments submitted prior to the time that the particular budget was submitted to the board of the HCCB. Id. In most eases, these fifteen or twenty amendments were accepted by the HCCB. T1. 71. Thus, it was common for the HCCB to accept amendments to the FY 1984 budget after the beginning of that fiscal year. There is no evidence, however, that any of these amendments accepted by the HCCB had the effect, under the amended 1984 law, of reducing the variance between a 1984 budget as originally filed and 1984 audited actual experience to diminish or entirely avoid the base year adjustment required by section 395.509(11), Fla. Stat. (1985). On March 6, 1984, Kissimmee Memorial Hospital submitted an amendment to its FY 1984 budget after the beginning of that fiscal year. Its fiscal year was calendar year 1984. This amendment was accepted by the HCCB in April, 1984, and was effective retroactively and prospectively, for the entire fiscal year. T1. 71-77; Petitioner's exhibit 7, worksheets C-3, C-4 and X-4. Of the fifty FY 1984 files reviewed at the HCCB by Scott Miller, witness for the Petitioner, one contained an amendment to a budget which was accepted by the HCCB after the HCCB had approved the budget. T1. 77. That hospital was Central Florida Regional Hospital. Id. The fiscal year for Central Florida Regional Hospital was calendar year 1984. T1. 79. The HCCB accepted the budget during their June, 1984, meeting. T1. 79; Petitioner's Exhibit 8. Subsequently, by letter dated September 21, 1984, Central Florida Regional Hospital submitted a proposed amendment to its FY 1984 budget. T1. 79-80. The proposed amendment was received by the HCCB on September 24, 1984, and sought an amendment due to receipt of favorable prior year Medicare settlements. Petitioner's Exhibit 8, letter of September 21, 1984, and worksheets C-2 and X-4; T1. 81. This was 22 days before the HCCB received the amendment proposed by the Petitioner in this case, and was more than 90 days from the end of the 1984 fiscal year. Apparently the amendment proposed by Central Florida Regional Hospital was subjected to the same 90 day amendment policy as Petitioner's amendment, but since the amendment of Central Florida Regional Hospital was submitted with more than 90 days left in the fiscal year, the amendment was not precluded by application of that policy. T1. 7, 13. The amendment proposed by Central Florida Regional Hospital related to past and future periods, and was proposed to be effective for the entire fiscal year. T1. 136, 81. The amendment was concerned solely with actual experience, the receipt of a Medicare settlement, which was a single unusual revenue event. The HCCB accepted the amendment, T2. 69, and the amendment became effective for the entire 1984 fiscal year. T1. 80-81; T2.69. (Specifically, staff of the HCCB accepted the amendments, the amendments were entered into the HCCB computer, this was deemed to be acceptance by the HCCB itself, and the amendments were averaged on the computer for the entire 12 month period. T2. 67, 69-70.) The effect of the amendment was to increase net revenue per adjusted admission by about $180, and this increase was too small to have any impact upon the issue of whether Central Florida Regional Hospital would be subject to a base year adjustment pursuant to section 395.509(11), Fla. Stat. (1984). T1. 61-62. The policy described in finding of fact 8 above was never promulgated by the HCCB as a rule. T1. 9, 12. No general written notice was given to hospitals potentially affected by the policy. T1. 13. The first notice given to hospitals of the existence of the policy was when staff of the HCCB notified a particular hospital in response to proposed fiscal year 1984 budget amendments. Id. Florida Hospital first learned of the existence of the policy when its attempted budget amendment was rejected by the HCCB staff on February 11, 1985. T1. 54-55. The amendment proposed by the Petitioner to its FY 1984 budget included a reduction of about 21,000 patient days, and a reduction of about 1900 admissions from the original budget. T1. Additionally, the amendment sought to increase revenue amounts which resulted primarily from a change in case mix. Id. Finally, there were increases in expenses for malpractice insurance and data processing software. Id. Revenues respond quite directly to increases or decreases in case mix. T1. 68. Case mix is a mathematical expression of the intensity of services provided to the patient, T2. 16, which correlates to the degree of illness of the patient. Id. The average case mix is 1.0. T2. 17. In the summer and early fall of 1983, when the Petitioner prepared its original budget for 1984, case mix standards did not exist, T1. 61, and the 1984 budget was not based upon a case mix. Id. Case mix data for fiscal years 1982 and 1983 became available in January, 1984. T1. 135. Florida Hospital's case mix, and its revenues, increased in fiscal year 1984 primarily due to the introduction of the Medicare prospective payment system on October 1, 1983. T1. 59, 65, 96. Additionally, in the market served by Florida hospital there was increased activity from health maintenance organizations and preferred provider organizations. T1. 59. The Medicare prospective payment system was a major change in the reimbursement system. T1. 119. These changes in the health care market caused Florida Hospital to experience a decrease in length of stay and an increase in the intensity of services rendered to sicker patients. This occurred because the new Medicare System, as well as HMO's and PPO's, were intended to reduce hospital stays and treat less sick patients outside the hospital. T1. 59. The budget of Florida Hospital was initially prepared and submitted in October, 1983, with virtually no actual experience under the new Medicare prospective payment system. T1. 95-96. See also findings of fact 2 and 19, supra. Florida Hospital hired two consultants to assist it in trying to predict the impact of the new Medicare program. T1. 95. Florida Hospital receives many of its patients on referral from other hospitals which cannot provide services to such patients. T2. 18, 33-34. Thus, Florida Hospital is relied upon by the surrounding area to treat sicker patients. T2. 25. It is hard to predict trends in such referrals, and consequently, it is difficult to predict the impact of other market changes, such as the Medicare changes and the success of health maintenance organizations described above, since Florida Hospital must rely on referrals. Health maintenance organizations in the first year of operation in the surrounding community were able to substantially reduce days of care, and this success was not predictable by Florida Hospital when it formulated its FY 1984 budget. T2. 14- Additionally, the Orlando area in the last two years has experienced significant unpredictable increases in population, which added to the foreseeability problems of Florida Hospital. T2. 18-20. Over the several years preceding fiscal year 1984, Florida Hospital experienced a trend of increasing open heart surgical procedures. T1. 60. In 1984, Florida Hospital originally budgeted for a significant increase over 1983, to its maximum capacity using a 5 day week. Id. But the demand continued, and in 1984, Florida Hospital began doing open heart surgery on weekends. T1. 61. This decision, coupled with a decrease in length of stay per surgery, resulted in an increase in open heart surgeries greater than originally predicted in the 1984 budget. Id; T1. 110-111. Florida Hospital might have anticipated using weekends when it prepared its 1984 budget, but did not do so because weekend work is not a normal practice. T1. 112. In the fall of 1983, the national trend for open heart surgery was showing a decrease in such procedures. T1. 135-36. Additionally, Florida Hospital experienced a shift of less complicated surgeries, such as cataract surgeries, from inpatient to outpatient procedures, resulting in an overall increase in intensity of the remaining surgical procedures. T1. 62-63. The Hospital has no control over this choice, since it is made by physician and patient and is affected by reimbursement policies of insurance and governmental programs. Id. Florida Hospital monitors its budget on a monthly basis, but does not have specific criteria for evaluating the meaning of trends. T1. 86-87. A change of 5 percent would cause concern to Florida Hospital but other circumstances would be evaluated. T1. 87. In the first two months of the first quarter of FY 1984, Florida Hospital experienced a slight increase of admissions over budget estimates. T1. 85-88. In a letter to the HCCB dated March 23, 1984, Florida Hospital noted that the intensity of its case mix for Medicare patients had increased about 50 percent since 1979, and that the length of stay had dropped 0.2 days from 1983 to 1984. Intervenor's Exhibit I. At the time the letter was prepared, the Hospital had no way of knowing if the non-Medicare case mix was the same. T1. 109. The data further showed a trend away from psychiatric patient days, which produce less revenue per day, toward more intense forms of care, which produce more revenue per day. Id. The letter was sent to provide information requested by staff of the HCCB, and to explain changes to the budget as originally submitted. Id.; T1. 104. While March and April of 1984 showed some signs of a change from predictions in the budget, it was not until June, 1984, that Florida Hospital experienced a significant decline in patient days. T1. 97-98. Even then, it was determined that the June, 1984, experience was not a good trend indicator, but was an anomaly. Id. This was shown to be the case when June, 1984, was compared to June, 1985. Id. Moreover, these were only gross trends in patient days and admissions, and were not specific for case mix. T1. 99. In fact, Florida Hospital finished the fiscal year at about the gross revenue level it had predicted in its 1984 budget; the problem was an increase in intensity of case mix, with lower patient days generating higher revenue per adjusted admission. Id. In June, 1984, Florida Hospital received a Medicare settlement for two or three prior years. The settlement was $10 million, and the timing of the receipt of such settlements was not within the control of Florida Hospital. T1. 63, 93. Significant variances were first noticed by Florida Hospital in revenue per adjusted admission in July, 1984. T1. The variances were cumulative from April, 1984. T1. 100. The vice president for finance at Florida Hospital, Scott Miller, was first aware of the amendments to the Hospital Cost Containment law, chapter 84-35, Laws of Florida (1984), establishing a base year adjustment for fiscal year 1984 based upon actual experience in 1984, in June, 1984. T1. 100. Section 395.509(11), Fla. Stat. (1984), requires comparison of the 1984 budget for net revenues per adjusted admission filed with the HCCB with the audited actual experience of each hospital for such revenues. The bulk of the work in preparation of the proposed amendment to its FY 1984 budget, Petitioner's Exhibit 6, was done in August, 1984, based upon data to June 30, 1984. T1. 92, 83. One of the reasons for submitting the amended budget was to diminish the base year adjustment described in finding of fact 30 above. T1. 100. Since the potential loss to Florida Hospital is over $10,000,000, it is likely that this was a major cause for the amendment. Additionally, the proposed amendment was submitted to more honestly reflect changes in the predicted budget. T1. 102. From a purely fiscal point of view, without consideration of regulatory consequences, there is an incentive to underestimate revenues and overestimate expenses. T2. 26-27. During the preparation of the proposed budget amendment, Florida Hospital did not consult the Florida Hospital Reporting System Manual, and did not talk with any employee of the HCCB for advice with respect to the proposed amendments. T1. 130. The proposed budget amendment submitted in October, 1984, dealt with the entire fiscal year 1984, and did not distinguish between portions of the year which already had been completed and the remainder of the fiscal year. T1. 131-132. As set forth in finding of fact 16, the basis of the proposed amendment was actual experience in fiscal year 1984, T1. 139-140, and contained revenues actually received that were substantially greater than originally predicated. With respect to future periods, the budget was a projection. Due to seasonal variances, unpredictable receipt of lump sum payments, and variations in changes in admissions for various types of cases, it is not practicable to prorate the budget of Florida Hospital, as proposed to be amended, in daily, monthly, or quarterly segments, T1. 133, and the proposed amended budget does not contain a method for such proration. A budget can be defined as a projection for a future time of expenditure and revenue, and it reflects anticipated goals. T1. 127, 131. There is no evidence in the record to suggest that Florida Hospital has ever attempted to avoid a public hearing by underestimating revenue, and there is no evidence in the record to suggest that Florida Hospital's original FY 1984 budget contained intentional underestimations of revenue or intentional overestimations of reductions from gross revenue. As found in findings of fact 18 through 31, Florida Hospital's original FY 1984 budget was based upon the best information then available. It took six months to prepare, T. 127, and was reasonable at the time submitted. Florida Hospital submitted amendments to its budgets in FY 1982 and 1983. Petitioner's Exhibit 1. In years prior to 1984, Florida Hospital had submitted amendments to budgets after the beginning of its fiscal year. T1. 134. Florida Hospital has claimed in previous years that it offers services not offered by other hospitals in its group. T2. 72-73. Through discussions with the staff of the HCCB, it was agreed between Florida Hospital and the staff of the HCCB that Florida Hospital could delete from its FY 1984 budget revenues and expenses associated with kidney transplant, employee housing, pathologist laboratory fees, sales of gasoline to employees, and a laundry. T2. 73-74. See Petitioner's Exhibit 10, attachment 2 and 3. The effect of deletion of these items from the FY 1984 budget was to delete a predicted $3,231,000 in revenue. Petitioner's Exhibit 10, attachment 1. When Florida Hospital filed its audited actual experience for 1984, the HCCB had a new staff analyst assigned to review the budget of Florida Hospital, and the new analyst concluded that the items described in finding of fact 40 should be included in the actual report initially, Petitioner's Exhibit 10, attachment 4, but that these items would be "pulled back out" for purposes of analysis later. T2. 75. However, Respondent's Exhibit 1 did not implement this agreement. Instead, the items described above were deleted from the FY 1984 budget but were included in the FY 1984 actual experience figures on this exhibit. Id. The total amount of revenue actually received for these items in FY 1984, which should be deleted from the FY 1984 actual experience of Florida Hospital pursuant to the understanding with staff of the HCCB, is $4,074,415. If this amount is not deleted, Florida Hospital's base year adjustment pursuant to section 395.509(11), Fla. Stat. is larger by nearly $3 million. T2. 76. Respondent's Exhibit 1 computes the FY 1984 net revenue per adjusted admission for Florida Hospital for the following: FY 1984 original budget; FY 1984 budget as proposed to be amended; FY 1984 budget if the proposed amendment is allowed for only the last 77 days of the fiscal year; and the 1984 actual experience. T2. 51-53. As discussed in finding of fact 41, the figure for 1984 actual experience does not delete the items discussed in that finding. Respondent's Exhibit 2 computes the adjustment to base year if the proposed amendment is not accepted, and if the items described above in findings of fact 40 and 41 are not deleted from actual experience. T2. 56-58. The amount of this adjustment would be $13,771,310 which is $344.52 per adjusted admission for FY 1986. Respondent's Exhibit 2. Respondent's Exhibit 3 computes the adjustment to base year if the proposed amendment is accepted for the 77 days remaining in the fiscal year, and if the items described above in findings of fact 40 and 41 are not deleted from actual experience. T2. 59-60. The amount of this adjustment would be $10,476,400, which is $262.09 per adjusted admission for FY 1986. Respondent's Exhibit 3. If the proposed amendment is not accepted, but the items described in findings of fact 40 and 41 are deleted from actual experience, the adjustment to base year would be $10,871,303, which is $271.97 per adjusted admission for FY 1986. Petitioner's Exhibit 9. If the proposed amendment is accepted for the 77 days remaining in the fiscal year, and if the items described in findings of fact 40 and 41 are deleted from actual experience, the adjustment to base year would be $7,760,747, which is $190.15 per adjusted admission for FY 1986. Petitioner's Exhibit 9. If the proposed amendment is accepted by the HCCB to be effective for the entire FY 1984, the budgeted net revenue per adjusted admission for Florida Hospital is $4,008.70. Respondent's Exhibit 1. Assuming that the deductions from actual experience in 1984 are not made (see findings of fact 40 and 41), the net revenue per adjusted admission actually experienced by Florida Hospital in 1984 was $4,346.66. Id. Since the difference between these two figures is less than 10 percent above the budgeted amount, $4,008.70, the base year of Florida Hospital would not be adjusted pursuant to section 395.509(11), Fla. Stat., if the proposed amendment were accepted for the entire fiscal year. This result would occur even though the deductions from revenue described above are not made.
Recommendation It is therefore recommended that the Hospital Cost Containment Board enter its Final Order approving the proposed amendment to the FY 1984 budget of Florida Hospital only for the last 77 days, and, as a result, calculating the adjustment pursuant to section 395.509(11), Fla. Stat. (1985), in the following amounts: subtraction of a total of $7,760,747 net revenues from FY 1986 budget, which is subtraction of $190.15 net revenues per adjusted admission for the FY 1986 budget. DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of February, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida WILLIAM C. SHERRILL, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of February, 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 85-0747H Rulings upon Proposed Findings of Fact. Pursuant to section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat., the following are specific rulings upon all proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. The numbers herein correspond to the numbers of each proposed finding by party. Findings of fact in this recommended order are indicated by the abbreviation "FF". Findings of Fact Proposed by the PETITIONER, Florida Hospital. Adopted, FF 1. Adopted, FF 2. law. law. Adopted, FF 3. Adopted, FF 4. Adopted, FF 6. Adopted, FF 7. Adopted, FF 8. Adopted, FF 9. Rejected because the proposed finding is a question of Rejected because the proposed finding is a question of Adopted, FF 10. Adopted, FF 11. Adopted, FF 12. Rejected because of insufficiency of evidence that this categorical, all inclusive finding of fact can be mode. There is a marked distinction between amendments submitted by Hospitals before acceptance of the budget by the HCCB, and amendments submitted after the budget has been accepted by the HCCB. See FF 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14. Further, of the ninety-nine instances of amendment, the Petitioner presented only one occasion when an amendment was accepted after the budget had been approved by the HCCB and was accepted for the entire fiscal year, some of which had already been executed. See FF 14. Through 19. Adopted, FF 13. 20. Through 28. Adopted, FF 14. Adopted, FF 8 and 14. Adopted, FF 15. Adopted, FF 8. Adopted, FF 15. Adopted, FF 15. Adopted to the extent found in FF 11 end 12, and the remainder rejected for lack of evidence. Adopted, FF 8. Rejected because irrelevant since the basis for the 90 day incipient policy is not at issue because the policy is not at issue. Adopted, FF 7 and 8. Adopted, FF 8. Adopted, FF 15. Adopted, FF 8. True, but irrelevant and therefore rejected. Rejected because not supported by the evidence. As found in FF 17 through 31, Florida Hospital was aware of the amended law, effective May 18, 1984, that subjected hospitals to a potential base year adjustment resulting from FY 1984 budget data, but as also found in those findings, Florida Hospital could not prepare its proposed amendment any sooner due to lack of data. The delay in filing the amendment, on this record, occurred due to lack of data, not lack of notice concerning the 90 day policy. Adopted, FF 39. Adopted in part, FF 39. However, the purpose of prior year amendments cannot be a portion of this finding of fact because there is insufficient evidence. Without evidence as to the nature of such prior year amendments, and given the reverse incentive in those years to understate revenues to avoid public hearing, it cannot be concluded that the motives for such amendments were to "present a fair document to the HCCB." Adopted, FF 8. and 48. Adopted, FF 16. and 49. through 51. Adopted, FF 17. 52. and 53. Adopted, FF 18. 54. and 55. Adopted, FF 19. 56. and 57. Adopted, FF 20. 58. and 59. Adopted, FF 21. 60. and 61. Adopted, FF 22. Adopted, FF 21. Rejected. It is unclear from the evidence whether volume of patient days and admissions "magnifies" the impact of changes in market conditions. It could be statistically true that a greater volume produces more reliable predictions due to a larger base pool of data, which averages out small anomalies in data. Adopted, FF 19. through 69. Adopted, FF 23. 70. and 71. Adopted, FF 24. Adopted, FF 38. Adopted, FF 29. Adopted, FF 31. Adopted, FF 28. and 77. Adopted to the extent modified in FF 38. To the extent not adopted in the modified language, it is rejected for lack of evidence. Adopted, FF 33. Since there were no other definitions given in the record, adoption of this finding as proposed would be misleading. T1. 127-128. Thus, it is rejected as phrased. Adopted, FF 37, except this is the same definition, not "another" definition. Rejected as phrased. There is not evidence in the record that the budget which is the subject of testimony at T1. 129 was prepared or used in any manner with respect to past time in the budget year. Adopted in the introduction, but not, strictly speaking, a finding of fact. Adopted, FF 42. and 86. Adopted, FF 43. and 87. Adopted, FF 44. 88. and 89. Adopted, FF 14. Adopted to the extent relevant in the introduction. Adopted, FF 40. Rejected as unnecessary and cumulative to FF 40. Adopted, FF 40. through 96. Adopted, FF 41. Adopted, FF 45. Adopted, FF 46. Findings of Fact Proposed by the RESPONDENT, HCCB. The first sentence is adopted, FF 9. The next two sentences are rejected as issues of law, not fact. The next sentence is adopted, FF 7 and 9. The last sentence, also a matter of law, is rejected because not fact. Adopted only to the extent in FF 8, and remainder is rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant since the policy is not used by the HCCB to deny amendment in this ease. Adopted, FF 5 and 7. Adopted, FF 8, except the last sentence, which is not relevant as discussed above. The first two sentences are adopted as modified in FF The next sentence is adopted in FF 16. The next sentence is adopted as modified in FF 26. The last sentence is adopted as modified in FF 27 and 29. The first sentence is adopted in FF 16, the second sentence is adopted in FF 19, the last two sentences are adopted in FF 23. The first sentence is adopted in FF 3. The last sentence is true, T2. 51, but not relevant. Adopted, FF 32 and 34. Adopted, FF 35. Adopted, FF 40. The first sentence is rejected for the reasons stated in FF 40 and 41. The second sentence is rejected as an issue of law, and also rejected because irrelevant: there does not appear to be any statute allowing or prohibiting the HCCB to "disregard" any portion of a budget. But as found in FF 10, there is apparently some discretion afforded the HCCB, discretion that is exercised frequently. Adopted, FF 14 and 8. Findings of Fact Proposed by the INTERVENOR, The Public Counsel. Adopted, FF 1. Adopted, FF 9. Adopted, FF 2. Adopted, FF 2, 3, and 4. Adopted as modified in FF 16. and 7. Adopted as modified in FF 16, but there is not enough evidence to show a "trend." Adopted, FF 3 and 4. Adopted, FF 7. Adopted, FF 16. Adopted, FF 31. Adopted, FF 19. Adopted, as modified in FF 27 and 29. Adopted, FF 30. Adopted, FF 30. Adopted, FF 32. The record contains no evidence that the subject matter of the proposed amendment is incorrect, or false, and thus the motive for such amendment is largely irrelevant. For this reason, this finding is rejected. Adopted, FF 34. Rejected because the record citation does not support the proposed finding. Rejected because misleading. The proposed amendment does not relate to a specific future time, but in fact relates to the remaining days of the fiscal year, since that was all that was left of the budget year when the amendment was filed. Adopted, FF 35. Adopted as modified, FF 35. Adopted as modified, FF 36. Adopted as modified, FF 36. Adopted as modified, FF 35. Adopted, FF 36. Adopted, FF 26 and 36. Adopted as modified, FF 35 and 36. Adopted as modified, FF 35 and 36. Adopted, FF 19 and 20, except the last sentence, which is cumulative and unnecessary. Rejected because irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant and cumulative to FF 20. Adopted, FF 20. Rejected as irrelevant and cumulative to FF 20. Adopted, FF 19. Rejected as irrelevant. See FF 18 and 20. The record supports only one conclusion regarding the prospective payment system: no one knew what massive changes would occur in the market place prior to actual implementation of that system for a number of months. Awareness that PPS was on the way, without knowing what it would do, is irrelevant. Adopted as modified, FF 30. Rejected as irrelevant. See FF 15 through 31, which conclude that the Petitioner acted in a timely manner to prepare and submit its proposed amendment. Adopted, FF 37. Adopted, FF 38. Adopted, FF 10. Adopted, FF 3 and 10. Adopted, FF 12. Adopted as modified, FF 12. Adopted as modified, FF 12. Further, the point is irrelevant. Rejected because the proposed finding is an issue of law. Rejected because inextricably mixed with the issue of law contained in proposed finding 46. Rejected because inextricably mixed with the issue of law contained in proposed finding 46. COPIES FURNISHED: Curtis Ashley Billingsly, Esquire Hospital Cost Containment Board 325 John Knox Road Building L, Suite 101 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 David Watkins, Esquire Oertel & Hoffman, P.A. 2700 Blairstone Road, Suite C Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jack Shreve, Public Counsel Office of Public Counsel 202 Blount Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 T. L. Trimble, Esquire 2400 Bedford Road Orlando, Florida 32803 James Bracher, Executive Director Hospital Cost Containment Board 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303
The Issue By this action Petitioner seeks to recover costs, expenses and damages associated with state response to an oil spill incident occurring February 26, 1987, within three miles of the Florida shoreline. Respondent's vessel was responsible for that spill. In particular the costs, expenses and damages claimed are related to salaries, per diem allowances, Federal Express charges, beach sand replacement, equipment, use of a cellular phone, and consulting work at the shore and off site. Petitioner also seeks damages for bird mortality resulting from the spill. See Chapter 376, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 16N- 16, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact On the evening of February 26, 1987, the motor vessel Fernpassat struck the south jetty at the entrance to the St. Johns River at a location within three miles of the Florida shoreline. In doing so it ruptured the hull and spilled a substantial amount of heavy fuel oil. The type of the oil was No. 5 or 6 Bunker C. A preliminary estimate placed the amount of oil in excess of 100,000 gallons. While the true amount may have been somewhat less, it was a significant spill in that it substantially threatened the public's welfare and the environment and generated wide public interest. Petitioner's exhibit 3 is a map which depicts the basic location where the vessel collided with the jetty with an "X" mark. The area impacted by the discharge ran from roughly Atlantic Beach, Florida, to Guana State Park in St. Augustine, Florida. This is approximately 25 miles of beach front. Beach property over which Petitioner has regulatory and proprietary responsibility had oil deposited upon it. The oil spill killed or injured a number of birds. The event was responded to by the "Federal Region IV Regional Response Team" (RRT). The federal on-scene coordinator (OSC) was Captain Matthew Woods, U.S. Coast Guard. The RRT, through management and control provided by the OSC, took necessary steps to combat the effects of the spill. Respondent immediately accepted responsibility for the cleanup through the use of a consultant and cleanup contractor. Under this arrangement the OSC monitored the contractor's cleanup efforts to make certain that the job was done satisfactorily. Florida officials were part of the RRT. Rule 16N-16.009(21), Florida Administrative Code, calls for personnel from Petitioner; the State of Florida, Department of Environmental Regulation (DER); and the State of Florida, Department of Community Affairs (DCA) to represent state interests as members of the RRT. Each of these agencies participated as members of the RRT. This furthered the legislative intent expressed at Section 376.021(6), Florida Statutes, to support the RRT through implementation of the "Federal Water Pollution Control Act," which is also known as the "Clean Water Act," 33 U.S.C. ss. 1251-1376. By its efforts the RRT promoted the removal of the oil in accordance with a national contingency plan. Pursuant to Section 376.021(6), Florida Statutes, the state is expected to complement applicable provisions within the "Federal Water Pollution Control Act" as well as render the support previously described. Both the support and complementary functions of the state are part of Florida's "Pollutant Spill and Prevention Control Act," Sections 376.011-376.17, 376.19-376.21, Florida Statutes. Chapters 16N-16, Florida Administrative Code, more completely identifies the role played by the state agencies in this instance. This chapter was adopted pursuant to authority set out in Section 376.07, Florida Statutes, which, among other things, empowered Petitioner to make rules which developed and implemented criteria and plans to respond to spills such as the one at issue. In its complementary role the state has established a "State Response Team" (SRT). This organization in defined at Rule 16N-16.009(13), Florida Administrative Code. It is constituted of predesignated state agencies available continually to respond to a major spill. This incident was a major spill or discharge as defined in Rule 16N-16.009(18), Florida Administrative Code. The predesignated state agencies, pursuant to the rule defining the SRT and Section 376.07(2)(e), Florida Statutes, act independently of the federal authorities, although they are expected to cooperate with the federal authorities in the efforts at cleanup. What that meant here is that notwithstanding the concerns which Captain Woods had and the state participation in the RRT through Petitioner, DER and DCA, there was a parallel function by the SRT which had its own mandate. This allowed the SRT to pursue an independent agenda in the spirit of cooperation with the OSC in an attempt to protect the resources over which the state has jurisdiction, including the beach front and birds. Both Captain Woods and the consultant to the spiller, James L. O'Brien, who is a man of considerable credentials in giving advice about oil spill problems, expressed their understanding of the interests which the state might have in carrying out its functions and did not find that reality a hindrance in performing their duties. As a result, even though state employees and equipment and consultants to the state had limited utility for the OSC and the consultant to the spiller in carrying out their duties, it does not follow that claims by the state for reimbursement in categories set out in the statement of issues must fail unless found to support the OSC or spiller's choice in attempts at cleanup. The question is whether the costs, expenses and damages are reasonably related to support for the RRT or complementary of that function through the SRT and owed or expended from the Florida Coastal Protection Trust Fund (Fund) for recoverable items. See Section 376.11, Florida Statutes. Petitioner's exhibit 15 is a copy of the state contingency plan. See Section 376.07(2)(e), Florida Statutes. It identifies the membership of Petitioner, DER and DCA. Other claimants for costs, expenses, and damages who were involved in the response to this incident as predesignated agencies are the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission (Commission), the State of Florida, Department of Transportation (DOT), and the Attorney General. The state contingency plan explains the operational responsibilities of state agencies when responding to the incident. This is a more specific reference to those responsibilities as envisioned by the general guidelines announced in the "Pollution Spill Prevention and Control Act." Having considered the testimony and exhibits in the context of the state support and complementary role in responding to the spill contemplated by the aforementioned laws, regulations and contingency plans, the costs, expenses and damages sought by the Petitioner are reasonably related to those purposes. Those costs, expenses and damages are detailed in Petitioner's exhibit 16 and summarized in Petitioner's exhibits 8 and 9. With the exception of $15,654.37 in costs and expenses for Petitioner's Executive Office and Division of Law Enforcement and $3,336.16 for salaries for the Commission, DOT and DCA, all claims for expenses and costs have been paid from the Fund. Petitioner wishes to impose the costs, expenses and damages in the state response whether or not claims were disbursed from the Fund. The damage claim associated with future beach re-nourishment by replacement of sand that had been befouled by oil and needed to be removed is a reasonable claim in the amount of $10,222.50. It has been paid from the Fund and is held in the Erosion Control Trust Fund until needed. The on-scene consulting fee of $3,525.00 and the oil spill assessment study fee of $9,880.00 commissioned by Petitioner through Jacksonville University are reasonably related to the Department's role in response to the spill. As Petitioner's exhibit 8 depicts, $30,312.53 has been disbursed from the Fund in costs, expenses and damages reasonably related to the response to the spill. There remains unpaid from the Fund the aforementioned costs and expenses in the amount of $18,990.53 which are reasonably related to the response to the spill. Those latter amounts, although presented for payment from the Fund by the agencies in question, were not paid, based upon some fiscal anomaly. By inference, it does not appear from this record that the Fund owes the agencies for these claims. According to Section 376.13, Florida Statutes, on February 27, 1987, Governor Martinez declared a state of emergency in response to the oil spill. That proclamation was withdrawn on March 25, 1987. The activities for which claims for costs and expenses are advanced transpired in the time frame of the state of emergency declaration. The amount which Respondent has expended in the cleanup effort is $700,000 plus or minus $200,000. None of this money has been paid to satisfy claims for costs, expenses and damages previously described. While it has been found that costs, expenses, and damages are reasonably related to the state's purposes in responding to the spill, not all items are recoverable. They are only recoverable if recognized for recovery by Chapter 376, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 16N-16, Florida Administrative Code, and owed or expended from the Fund. Petitioner's claims in its exhibit 8 in the amount of $12,901.30 and DOT claims for $675.19 in that exhibit qualify for recovery as well as the on-scene consulting fee of $3,525.00. Other claims do not qualify with the exception of a limited recovery for bird mortality. Reasons for this fact finding are set forth in the conclusions of law. Petitioner has disbursed $176,058.00 to the Commission for damages related to alleged bird mortality. This money was disbursed from the Fund. Petitioner now concedes that the amount should be reduced by half. This recognizes that the cost estimate for damages dealt with pairs of birds not single birds. Petitioner now asks for $88,075.00. Two hundred fourteen (214) birds are said to have died as a result of the spill, according to Petitioner. Petitioner seeks damages for each of these birds. The number proven to have been killed by the event and the theory upon which the damage claim is predicated leads to a result which diminishes the claim for reasons to be explained. As with other claims, Section 376.021.(4)(c), Florida Statutes, anticipates the payment of damages from the Fund. Section 376.11(1), Florida Statutes, is in aid of recovery of damages, as is Section 376.11(4)(d), Florida Statutes. However, these claims must be susceptible to proof that readily identifies and explains valuation methods of the birds and recognizes the predicate of establishing the actual number lost in this episode. For the most part, Petitioner has failed in the endeavor. Mark Damian Duda is a wildlife biologist with the Commission. He earned a bachelor of science degree from West Virginia University and received his master's degree in natural resource policy and planning from Yale University, both with honors. He was assigned the task of trying to arrive at an acceptable method for valuing birds that had been killed. His assessment is generally set forth in a report, a copy of which is Respondent's exhibit 3. Having considered a number of options, he reached the decision to employ what he describes as the replacement value method. Quoting from his report concerning this method, he has this to say: Replacement Value Method We believe the replacement value method is the most useful and logical method to determine the value of wildlife lost in the February 27 Jacksonville oil spill. A replacement cost approach can avoid many of the problems involved in attempting to estimate the use of value of biological resources. Under the replacement cost approach, the resource is valued at what it would cost to replace it. If the resource is replaced, the problems of identifying all its uses, the monetary value of these uses, and the users affected by the resource loss are eliminated, except for the period between the initial loss and the replacement. Four Florida institutions were asked to estimate the cost of obtaining specimens of the birds killed in the Jacksonville oil spill, or the price at which they would be willing to sell members of each species. Their estimates are shown in Table 4. One problem with most of these estimates is that they are not true replacements costs; but rather the cost of collecting already existing specimens from the wild and redistributing them to the Jacksonville Area. This does not represent true replacement, since true replacement requires a complete recovery of the species population. This can be most clearly assured by using only captive breeding programs for replacement. However, many of the species in this list probably cannot be bred in captivity. Therefore, true replacement of these species through captive breeding is probably impossible. It is absurd to value them at zero since they cannot be replaced. Therefore, this section presents some calculations on the assumption that they could be redistributed or replaced. Table 1 presents the replacement costs for the birds. The numbers were derived by multiplying the number of dead birds times the average replacement costs given in Table 4. Using this approach, the total replacement costs for the birds estimated to have been killed in the Jacksonville oil spill is $176,058.00. It should be noted that we use a deliberately conservative approach, using body counts only, and thereby underestimating the total mortality. There is an increasing amount of scientific literature indicating that actual body counts appear to significantly underestimate the total mortality resulting from a spill. For example, there have been a variety of experiments that show only 5 percent to 25 percent of the birds that die at sea, wash in or beach themselves on shore. The percent of loons found is probably even lower because of their low buoyancy and wide-ranging distribution. An alternative approach to estimating replacement costs is to estimate the cost of creating new habitat or enhancing existing habitat to support enough nesting pairs of each species to replenish the population. Again, to represent true replacement costs, this should be new or enhances habitat, not just the cost of acquiring already existing habitat. Tables 1 and 4 within Respondent's exhibit 3 are replicated here for convenience as Appendix 2 and Appendix 3, respectively. The numbers of birds shown in Duda's table are not numbers about which he has direct knowledge. They are numbers purportedly obtained from Tim O'Meara and Peter Southall, biologists who work for the Commission who got their information from the Central Region and Northeast Region, respectively. In particular, they allegedly received their information from rehabilitators working in the two regions. Neither biologist testified at hearing, and the exhibits do not satisfactorily establish what involvement the biologists had in a direct inventory of birds, if any, or the other sources of their information which was then given to Duda in preparing his report. The rehabilitators in the Central Region did not testify nor were any exhibits presented which spoke to records kept by those individuals that set out bird deaths in that area. The only person who presented any reliable information concerning bird mortality was Cindy Mosling, rehabilitator in the Northeast Region. Any records which she maintained were not produced at hearing. Nonetheless, she did remember some details concerning bird mortality, and from this testimony 56 common loons, 3 gannets, 1 black skimmer and 2 hooded mergansers are found to have died as a result of the oil spill. The replacement value method by Duda speaks to the fact that his method does not constitute a complete recovery of the species population. Instead, what is shown in Respondent's exhibit 3 is averaging of estimates from Table 4 on costs for collecting existing specimens from the wild and releasing them back to the Jacksonville area after a period as opposed to a captive breeding program. That explanation is not correct, either, because there is no intention to release birds to the wild after raising them or rehabilitating them in captivity in one of the Florida institutions mentioned in Table 4. Moreover, only one of those programs has been relied upon by Petitioner in arriving at a cost estimate. That program is Sea World. As a consequence, the cost analysis in Table 1 related to hooded mergansers is incorrect in that it reflects an average of $150 and not the $200 quoted by Sea world. Again, the prices reflect pairs and not single birds. Robin Friday is the curator from Sea World who supplied cost estimates for pairs in Table 4 to Respondent's exhibit 3. He arrived at his price estimates in a 15 to 20 minute telephone conversation with Duda. To the extent he had no actual experience with price lists reflecting cost of a specie, he assumed that theoretical permits would be issued to collect live birds or eggs in the wild and that he would keep them in a captive environment, hoping they would breed while in captivity. In the latter category, the costs to promote the outcome of breeding in captivity formed his estimate. It can be seen that this departs from Duda's method for valuation. Notwithstanding this fact, Duda relied upon the price quotation by Friday. The main species of birds which Friday has had experience with are waterfowl. Of the species which have been verified as lost in this incident, he had had experience with common loons and hooded mergansers. The hooded merganser is a waterfowl with which he has close experience in breeding, acquisition and disposition. The common loon is a shore bird. In his career he has worked to rehabilitate two or three of those birds. He has had no experience with gannets and black skimmers, which are shore birds. As Friday identified, waterfowl may be sold, shore birds may not. Sale of the shore birds is prohibited by law. His price quotes for the hooded mergansers are from actual experience in sales. His quotations on the other species are matters of conjecture in collecting, housing, feeding and establishing a breeding program for them based upon limited experience in rehabilitating common loons and no experience with gannets and the black skimmer. The price estimate on the hooded merganser of $100 per bird is accepted. The price estimates for common loons, gannets and black skimmers are not. They are too speculative. Jean Benchinol is a curator in Gulf Breeze, Florida, who works for Animal Park, Inc. She testified at hearing. She was presented as a witness who could corroborate the Friday opinion on bird valuation. Her cost estimates may be found as Petitioner's exhibit 14, quotes for single birds. She has had direct involvement with hooded mergansers. She has sold those birds and quoted the price at hearing as being $100. This coincides with the price per bird quoted by Friday. For other birds in her price estimates that cannot be bought and sold and that remain at issue here, that is, common loons, gannets and the black skimmer, she categorized them as capable of surviving in captivity or not. The black skimmers can live in captivity and the common loon and gannet cannot, according to the witness. She had had a common loon in captivity before and noted that it did not do well, being more receptive to northern climes. At hearing her opinion about birds that could not survive in the Florida environment was rejected. In this final analysis, that refers to the common loons and gannets. Likewise, having considered her explanation concerning her valuation for the black skimmer, that opinion is rejected. In rejecting this method, the cross examination at hearing concerning valuation for the royal tern was significant in that it pointed out the inexact and unreliable nature of the method. This method contemplated receiving a live bird in her facility and the costs for medication, housing, feeding and staff time for approximately 60 days. In summary, on the subject of bird mortality, there is no inherent prohibition against valuation; birds do have a value that can be measured in monetary terms. Here the effort to arrive at that understanding fails in the inventory of casualties and method of valuation, with a limited exception. It is also observed that the Respondent had paid the rehabilitators to house, feed and nurse birds back to health that were injured, a similar activity to the theoretical exercise envisioned by Duda, Friday and Benchinol.
Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts and the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered which requires the Respondent to reimburse the Fund in the amount of $17,301.58 and dismisses all other charges against Respondent. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of July, 1990. APPENDIX 1 The following discussion is given concerning the proposed facts of the parties. Petitioner's Facts Paragraphs 1 and 2 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 3 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 4 and 5 are subordinate to facts found. The first two sentences of Paragraph 6 are subordinate to facts found. The last two sentences are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 7 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 8 is subordinate to facts found. The first two sentences of Paragraph 9 are subordinate to facts found. While it is agreed that the correspondence from Petitioner to Respondent did not indicate that claims for costs and expenses were only subject to collection if paid from the Florida Coastal Protection Trust Fund, in the administrative forum recoupment of costs, expenses and damages may only be permitted for monies owed or expended from the fund. Paragraphs 10-13 are subordinate to facts found. It is acknowledged as set forth in Paragraph 14 that money was transferred from Coastal Protection Trust Fund to the Erosion Control Trust Fund for future beach renourishment. The more relevant fact is whether the claim for damages of value under the renourishment is legitimate and that determination has been made favoring the Petitioner. The concept of using the funds that are being held for purposes of future renourishment is in keeping with a reasonable disposition of the damage claim. Paragraphs 15-24 are subordinate to facts found. The first sentence to Paragraph 25 is contrary to facts found. The second sentence is subordinate to facts found. The third sentence is an accurate statement of what Table 1 contributes but the findings in that table are rejected in part. The first sentence to Paragraph 26 is subordinate to facts found. The second sentence is accepted in the sense of recognizing that a list was maintained; however, that list was not produced at hearing as an aide in determining the number of birds that were killed. The third sentence is rejected. The fourth and fifth sentences are knowledged and those underlying facts were taken into account in accepting the representations by the witness Mosling concerning the number of birds that died as a result of the oil spill which she could recall. Paragraph 27 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 28 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 29 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. The first sentence to Paragraph 30 is subordinate to facts found. The second sentence is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. The first sentence to Paragraph 31 is subordinate to facts found. The second sentence is accepted with the exception that certain categories of water fowl are bought and sold in the free market. Concerning the third sentence, while it is acknowledged that curators are the better persons to attempt valuation, they must have sufficient understanding of the varieties on which they are commenting to have their opinions accepted and their methods of analysis of costs must stand scrutiny. This was not achieved in this instance. The last sentence in Paragraph 31 is not accepted in that the replacement value method was not adequately explained and does not allow a ranking of whether it is inexpensive, or cheaper or some where in the middle. Paragraph 32 is subordinate to facts found. The first sentence to Paragraph 33 is subordinate to facts found. The second sentence is subordinate to facts found as it references hooded mergansers. The other references are to species which have not been found to have been lost to the spill. The last sentence is accepted in the sense that the remaining species have limitations placed upon their use by state and federal law which prohibits the buying and selling. Paragraph 34 in its reference to the cost of hooded mergansers is accepted. The balance of the information was not utilized in that the Petitioner failed to demonstrate that other species had been lost to the spill. In Paragraph 35 of the species that testimony was presented about, only the common loon, gannets and black skimmer pertain. While it is acknowledged that the method that the witness Friday used to estimate the value of those species is an accurate portrayal of his efforts, those efforts were rejected as were those of Ms. Benchinol described in Paragraph 36. In Paragraph 36 the explanation of her methods is correct. The methods were not accepted either in support of the testimony by Friday or in her own right. There is no significance to the discussion concerning the brown pelican and inadequate proof was made that the brown pelicans were lost. Respondent's Facts The first sentence to Paragraphs 1 is subordinate to facts found. The last two sentences are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. As to Paragraph 2, it is acknowledged that Mr. Healey served as the liaison to the RRT and OSC. In the second sentence to that paragraph it is accepted that the state supports the RRT. It also has the function to compliment the RRT and to act independent of the federal response. The first sentence to Paragraph 3 is subordinate to facts found. The second and third sentences are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. The fourth and fifth sentences are subordinate to facts found. While Paragraph 4 accurately describes the circumstance, this did not deter the state from pursuing its independent function in responding to the spill event. Paragraph 5 accurately portrays the OCS's idea of who was necessary to support the federal response. It does not preclude the activities of other state employees in carrying out their functions. Paragraph 6 is contrary to facts found. Paragraph 7 is a correct statement but does not preclude the state's efforts in its own right at responding to the spill. Paragraph 8 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 9 while an accurate portrayal does not preclude the state in its efforts. The same pertains to Paragraph 10. Paragraph 11 is contrary to facts found. Paragraph 12 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 13 is contrary to facts found as is Paragraph 14. Paragraph 15 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 16 is not relevant. Paragraph 17 is an accurate portrayal of the federal use of the state helicopter but does not preclude request for reimbursement for uses which the state had of that helicopter. Paragraph 18 is subordinate to facts found. The first two sentences within Paragraph 19 are subordinate to facts found. The third and fourth sentences are not relevant to the issue of whether the state was entitled to seek the assistance or Jacksonville University for its own purposes distinct from those of the federal response. The latter sentence is a correct portrayal of the outcome but for reasons different than contemplated by the Respondent. Paragraph 20 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 21 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 22 is subordinate to facts found in its first two sentences. The third sentence is not accepted beyond the fact that the Department of Interior using a nonconsumptive use technique, whether other federal agencies use that method was not subject to determination from the record. The first three sentences to Paragraph 23 are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. The fourth sentence is not accepted. The fifth and sixth sentences are subordinate to facts found. As to the seventh sentence, it is not clear that there was the intention of redistributing to the Jacksonville area. The eighth sentence is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 24 is subordinate to facts found as are Paragraphs 25 and 26. The suggestion of the price for hooded mergansers as set out in Paragraph 27 is not accepted. The lesser scaup was not found to have been lost to the spill. The state price of $100.00 per bird for hooded mergansers is accepted. Paragraphs 28-31 are subordinate to facts found as it pertains to the species that were proven to have been lost. Paragraph 32 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 33 and 34 are subordinate to facts found, with the exception that it has been determined that the number of dead birds which Ms. Mosling can recall involvement with is accepted. Paragraphs 35 through 37 are subordinate to facts found in the species determined to have been lost, with the exception that the actual price for hooded mergansers was $100. COPIES FURNISHED: Tom Gardner, Executive Director Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399 Kenneth J. Plante, General Counsel Lynn M. Finnegan, Assistant General Counsel Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399 Robert B. Parrish, Esquire James F. Moody, Jr., Esquire Taylor, Moseley & Joyner 501 West Bay Street Jacksonville, FL 32202
