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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES vs JONATHAN LEE DUCLOS, 05-002596PL (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Viera, Florida Jul. 19, 2005 Number: 05-002596PL Latest Update: Dec. 23, 2024
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FABIAN L. DIXON vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 02-004812 (2002)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Chattahoochee, Florida Dec. 16, 2002 Number: 02-004812 Latest Update: Feb. 27, 2004

The Issue Whether Petitioner was discriminated against based on his race in violation of Chapter 760.10, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Fabian L. Dixon, is an African-American male. At all times relevant to this Petition, Petitioner was employed by the Florida Department of Children and Families as a Unit Treatment and Rehabilitation Specialist–Forensic Corrections at Florida State Hospital, Chattahoochee, Florida. Petitioner was aware of Florida State Hospital’s strict policies regarding Falsification of Records or Statements; Willful Violation of Rules, Regulations or Policies and Conduct Unbecoming a Public Employee. Petitioner was also aware that violations of such policies could result in dismissal of the employee. Violations of these policies had resulted in dismissal of both non-minority and minority employees in the past. 4. On June 22, 2001, at 8:32 a.m. and 8:33 a.m., Unit 21 received two faxed copies of Inter Agency Leave Transfer forms from Petitioner, each donating twenty-four hours of sick leave for a total of forty-eight hours and both purportedly signed by Norman Torres. Mr. Torres subsequently discovered that over twenty-four hours had been deducted from his sick leave balance, and discovered that forty-seven hours had been used by Fabian L. Dixon. Mr. Torres then informed his timekeeper that he only donated twenty-four hours of sick leave to Petitioner. In reviewing the sick leave donation forms it appeared the date was changed on one of the forms, then the two forms were faxed to Unit 21. Written statements from Mr. Torres indicated that he only donated twenty-four hours of sick leave to Petitioner. Because of the serious nature of the violation, and given Petitioner's past history of discipline, Respondent terminated Petitioner on September 21, 2001. The employment decision was not based on Petitioner's race and was consistent with Respondent’s disciplinary policy. On October 1, 2001, AFSCME elected to file a grievance on behalf of Petitioner under the provisions of the Master Contract between the State and the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees. The grievance was initially reviewed by the Department of Children and Family Services and it was determined that there was cause for Petitioner’s dismissal. The grievance was then appealed to Step 3 of the grievance procedure, which provided for review of agency action by the Department of Management Services. The issue determined at Step 3 was whether the Department had just cause to discipline Petitioner. Review of the Department’s actions revealed that the Department had just cause to discipline Petitioner and that the penalty imposed was within the range for each charged violation. The grievance and relief requested was denied. On December 4, 2001, a “Request for Arbitration” was filed by AFSCME on behalf of Petitioner and a hearing was scheduled for June 2, 2003. On May 20, 2003, AFSCME filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Arbitration. In response to the notice, the hearing was cancelled and an Order Closing the File of the Department of Management Services was issued on May 20, 2003. At hearing, Petitioner admitted that he altered the Inter Agency Leave Transfer Form, but contended that the hospital did not terminate other white employees for similar offenses. However, Petitioner failed to present any independent testimony to corroborate this claim and made absolutely no showing that there was any relationship between his race and his termination.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of July, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850)488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of July, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Fabian L. Dixon 4634 Century Road Greenwood, Florida 32443 Kathi Lee Kilpatrick, Esquire Florida State Hospital Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 1000 Chattahoochee, Florida 32324-1000 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (1) 760.10
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THE RETREAT vs HEALTH CARE COST CONTAINMENT BOARD, 89-004219RP (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jul. 28, 1989 Number: 89-004219RP Latest Update: May 21, 1990

The Issue Whether the challenged portion of Rule 10N-5.015(15), Florida Administrative Code, as proposed by the Respondent, the Health Care Cost Containment Board, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority?

Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated to the following facts: The Retreat is a 100 bed short-term psychiatric specialty and substance abuse hospital located at 555 S.W. 148th Avenue, Sunrise, Broward County, Florida. The Retreat admitted its first patient on September 12, 1988. The Retreat operates on a fiscal year from September 1, through August 31. Therefore, The Retreat's 1989 fiscal year was for the period beginning when The Retreat opened on September 12, 1988, through August 31, 1989. The Retreat filed its 1989 budget with the Respondent on June 3, 1988. The Retreat's 1989 budget was approved by the Respondent on August 25, 1988 with an approved gross revenue per adjusted admission (hereinafter referred to as "GRAA"), of $20,323.00, and a net revenue per adjusted admission (hereinafter referred to as "NRAA"), of $17,973.00. The Retreat's 1990 fiscal year is from September 1, 1989, through August 31, 1990. Pursuant to Section 407.50(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.), The Retreat submitted a budget letter described in Section 407.50(2)(a), Florida Statutes, to the Respondent on May 24, 1989, for its 1990 fiscal year. The budget letter submitted by The Retreat certified that its FY 1990 maximum allowable rate of increase in GRAA over its budgeted GRAA in FY 1989 would be 7.8% and that its GRAA would not exceed $21,908.00 in FY 1990. Said rate of increase stated in The Retreat's budget letter represented the National Hospital Input Price Index (hereinafter referred to as the "NHIPI"), for the 1990 fiscal year plus two percentage points. At the time the Respondent received said budget letter, no administrative rule had yet been adopted that required a hospital entering into its second fiscal year of operation to file a full budget subject to detailed budget review. By letter dated June 5, 1989, the Respondent's staff advised The Retreat that, based on staff's interpretation of the controlling statute, staff could not accept said budget letter filed by The Retreat and a detailed budget would be required for The Retreat's 1990 fiscal year. The June 5, 1989, letter enunciated a non-rule agency policy based upon staff's interpretation of Section 407.50, Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.), that a hospital filing a budget for its second fiscal year is not eligible to file a budget letter and must file a budget subject to detailed review. On June 29, 1989, The Retreat filed a Petition to determine the invalidity of the non-rule policy explicated in said June 5, 1989, letter. Also on June 29, 1989, The Retreat filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing regarding the decision by HCCCB to reject its budget letter. Said Petition was assigned DOAH Case No. 89-3579H. On May 25, 1989, proposed Rule 10N-5.015 was approved by the HCCCB. Said proposed rule was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly, in Volume 15, No. 27, Florida Administrative Weekly (July 7, 1989). The last sentence of proposed Rule 10N-5.015(15), Florida Administrative Code, provides as follows: A new hospital or replacement hospital relocated to a different medical services area shall submit a budget report for review in the first two years of operation, but may submit a budget letter for its third year of operation if it does not require an increase in GRAA in excess of its hospital specific MARI calculated pursuant to Rule 10N-5.013. The last sentence of proposed Rule 10N-5.015(15), Florida Administrative Code, codifies, in rule form, the non-rule policy set forth in the HCCCB letter of June 5, 1989. The Retreat filed a Petition to Determine the Invalidity of Proposed Rule 10N-5.015(15), Florida Administrative Code, on July 28, 1989. Said Petition was assigned DOAH Case No. 89-4219RP. DOAH Case No. 89-3436RU, 89-3579H and 89-4219RP were subsequently consolidated for a single final hearing. The Retreat has standing in each of the three above-styled causes. Florida hospitals subject to Section 395.509(1), Florida Statutes (1985), were required to file detailed budgets before the start of each fiscal year prior to 1990. The Respondent reviewed each budget, including the hospital's GRAA. Depending upon the rank of a hospital's GRAA among the hospitals it was assigned to for budget review, the hospital's budget would either be automatically approved or subjected to detailed review. During the 1988 legislative session, Chapter 88-394, Laws of Florida, was enacted. Chapter 88-394, which was codified in Chapter 407, Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.), applies to a hospital's 1990 fiscal year and to later fiscal years. Section 407.50, Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.), provides that a hospital is required to file either a detailed budget or a "budget letter". In particular, Section 407.50(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.), provides that each hospital, "[e]xcept for hospitals filing a budget pursuant to subsection (3) . . . shall file with the board a certified statement, hereafter known as the 'budget letter' . . . ." If a budget letter is filed the hospital must acknowledge its maximum rate of increase in its GRAA from the previous year "as calculated pursuant to s. 407.002(17) . . ." and its maximum rate of increase for the next fiscal year, and it must affirm that it will not exceed the applicable maximum allowable rate of increase. If a budget letter is filed by a hospital the hospital's base for budget review is governed by Section 407.50(1), Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.): The base for hospital budget review for fiscal year 1990-1991 shall be the hospital's prior year actual gross revenues per adjusted admission inflated forward by the hospital's applicable current year's maximum allowable rate of increase or the board- approved budgeted gross revenues per adjusted admission, whichever is higher; provided that, in cases where the board has approved a rate of increase below the MARI, the board-approved maximum allowable rate of increase shall apply. For a 1990-1991 budget, a hospital's base is the greater of the hospital's GRAA for its 1988 fiscal year increased by its 1989 MARI or its 1989 budgeted GRAA. Section 407.50(3), Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.), requires the submission of a detailed budget for "each hospital requesting a rate of increase in gross revenue per adjusted admission in excess of the maximum allowable rate of increase for the hospital's next fiscal year . . . ." [Emphasis added]. If a detailed budget is filed, Section 407.50(3), Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.), provides that the hospital's "base" shall be determined as follows: In determining the base, the hospital's prior year audited actual experience shall be used unless the hospital's prior year audited actual experience exceeded the applicable rate of increase in which case the base shall be the gross revenue per adjusted admission from the year before the prior year, increased by the applicable rate of increase for the prior year, and then inflated by the applicable rate of increase for the current year. . . . The "maximum allowable rate of increase" for budget letters or detailed budget requests is defined by Section 407.002(17), Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.), as follows: (17) "Maximum allowable rate of increase" or "MARI" means the maximum rate at which a hospital is normally expected to increase its average gross revenues per adjusted admission for a given period. The board, using the most recent audited actual experience for each hospital, shall calculate the MARI for each hospital as follows: the projected rate of increase in the market basket index shall be divided by a number which is determined by subtracting the sum of one-half of the proportion of Medicare days plus the proportion of Medicaid days and the proportion of charity days from the number one. Two percentage points shall be added to this quotient. The formula to be employed by the board to calculate the MARI shall take the following form: MARI = NHIPI +2 1-[(Me x .5) + Md +Cc] where: MARI = maximum allowable rate of increase applied to gross revenue. NHIPI = national hospital input price index which shall be the projected rate of change in the market basket index. Me = proportion of Medicare days, including when available and reported to the board Medicare HMO days, to total days. Md = proportion of Medicaid days, including when available and reported to the board Medicaid HMO days, to total days. Cc = proportion of charity care days to total days with a 50-percent offset for restricted grants for charity care and unrestricted grants form local governments. Pursuant to this definition of "maximum allowable rate of increase" hospitals are entitled to a base of the NHIPI plus two percentage points inflated by the hospital's prior year Medicare, Medicaid and charity care days, if any. The Respondent has suggested that calculation of the MARI in accordance with Section 407.002(17), Florida Statutes, is a prerequisite to filing a budget letter and that Section 407.002(17), Florida Statutes, requires that audited actual experience be available in order for the Respondent to calculate the MARI for a hospital. In support of the Proposed Rule, the Respondent has suggested that it cannot "certify that a budget letter is correct pursuant to s. 407.50(2)(a) . . . ." This argument is rejected because there is no requirement in Section 407.50, Florida Statutes, that the Respondent provide such a certification. Additionally, the Respondent has not adequately explained why it is only concerned about its calculation of the MARI for hospitals in their first or second years of operation and not all hospitals. The problem with the Respondent's position is that, while Section 407.002(17), Florida Statutes, does require that the Respondent use audited actual experience to calculate the MARI, Sections 407.50(1) and (2), Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.), do not require that the Respondent calculate the MARI. If a budget letter is filed by a hospital, the Respondent is only required to "determine if the gross revenues per adjusted admission submitted by the hospital are within the maximum allowable rate of increase for that hospital." The Respondent can accomplish this task without calculating the MARI; it can rely upon the MARI acknowledged by the hospital. If a hospital files a budget letter, only the hospital is required to calculate its MARI. The hospital, unlike the Respondent, is not required by Section 407.002(17), Florida Statutes to use audited actual experience in its calculation of the MARI. All of the elements of the MARI may be obtained by the hospital from unaudited experience. The NHIPI is a national standard that is not hospital specific. The two percentage points are also not hospital specific. The only hospital specific information taken into account is the number of Medicare, Medicaid and charity care days. Even the Respondent agrees that audited actuarial experience is not necessary to calculate Medicare, Medicaid and charity care days. Therefore, hospitals may calculate the MARI for purposes of Section 407.50(2), Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.), without audited actual experience. In further support of the Proposed Rule, the Respondent has characterized the action of The Retreat as using a "zero" in lieu of audited actual 1988 GRAA for purposes of calculating its budget letter base for 1990. The Respondent suggests that Section 407.50(1), Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.), requires a "comparison" of the two values which may be used as a hospital's base and that The Retreat's action circumvents such a comparison. The plain language of Section 407.50(1), Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.), does not require any comparison of the two values which may be used as a hospital's base. Section 407.50(1), Florida Statutes (1988 Supp.), simply provides that a hospital's base for 1990-1991 shall be the greater of the two values. If a hospital only has one of the values, that is obviously the greater value and should be used as the hospital's base.

Florida Laws (3) 120.52120.54120.68
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES vs WALTER BISCHOFBERGER, 12-000691PL (2012)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Petersburg, Florida Feb. 17, 2012 Number: 12-000691PL Latest Update: Dec. 23, 2024
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AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION vs DYNAMIC MEDICAL SERVICES, INC., 04-003461MPI (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Sep. 23, 2004 Number: 04-003461MPI Latest Update: Dec. 23, 2024
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TAMMI M. GARLAND vs DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 00-001797 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Apr. 27, 2000 Number: 00-001797 Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2001

The Issue May Petitioner proceed to a hearing on the merits of her charge of employment discrimination or does the untimeliness of her Petition for Relief bar her claim?

Findings Of Fact On March 10, 1997, Petitioner filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission), alleging that Respondent Department of State had discriminated against her because of her race (Black) when it had discharged her on October 1, 1996. The Commission concluded its investigation into the matter, and on January 31, 2000, the Commission issued its "Determination: No Cause." A "Notice of Determination: No Cause" was mailed by the Commission to Petitioner on January 31, 2000. It contained the following statements: Complainant may request an administrative hearing by filing a PETITION FOR RELIEF within 35 days of the date of this NOTICE OF

Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief in this cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of July, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of July, 2000.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57760.11 Florida Administrative Code (1) 28-106.204
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES vs JONATHAN LEE DUCLOS, 06-000057PL (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Viera, Florida Jan. 06, 2006 Number: 06-000057PL Latest Update: Dec. 23, 2024
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CAROL BARNARD BAYER vs BUREAU OF INSURANCE, 90-000029 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Jan. 03, 1990 Number: 90-000029 Latest Update: Jul. 03, 1990

Findings Of Fact THE PETITIONER: The first three sentences of paragraph 1 are accepted. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as argument or comment. Paragraphs 2 and 3 are accepted. The first three sentences of paragraph 4 are accepted. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as irrelevant, hearsay, argument or not supported by the record. Paragraph 5 is rejected as irrelevant. The first sentence of paragraph 6 is rejected as irrelevant. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted. With the exception of the last two sentences, paragraph 7 is accepted. The last two sentences of paragraph 7 are rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Dr. Rivera did acknowledge Ritodrine to be a tocolytic drug, the use of which should be monitored. Paragraph 8 is accepted. Paragraph 9 is accepted. Paragraph 10 and, with the exception of the last two sentences, paragraph 11 are accepted. The last two sentences of paragraph 11 are rejected as irrelevant or argument. Paragraph 12 is accepted. Paragraph 13 is rejected as irrelevant. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE DEPARTMENT: Paragraphs 1 through 5 are accepted. Paragraphs 6 through 11 are rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 12 and 13 are accepted but are not controlling as the weight of the evidence in this case would suggest that the device is only investigational as it relates to diagnosis of pre-term labor, not as used in this case. Paragraph 14 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 15 is accepted. Paragraphs 16 through 19 are rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 20 through 29 are accepted. Paragraph 30 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 31 through 34 are rejected as irrelevant, contrary to the facts and weight of the evidence of this case, or inconclusive based upon all facts and circumstances of this case. Paragraphs 35 through 37 are accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Martin J. Sperry SPERRY & SHAPIRO, P.A. Suite 300 805 East Broward Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 William A. Frieder Senior Attorney Department of Administration 438 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Aletta Shutes Secretary Augustus Aikens, Jr. General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Carl Ogden Division Director Division of State Employee's Insurance 2002 Old St. Augustine Road Building B-12 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-4811

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Administration enter a final order granting Petitioner's request for insurance benefits for the AHUM as utilized under the facts of this case. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of July, 1990.

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HELICOPTER APPLICATORS, INC. vs COASTAL AIR SERVICE, INC., AND SOUTH FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, 18-004498BID (2018)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Aug. 28, 2018 Number: 18-004498BID Latest Update: Dec. 14, 2018

The Issue Whether the South Florida Water Management District’s (“District”) intended award of a contract for aerial spraying services, granular application services, and aerial transport services, to Coastal Air Services, Inc. (“Coastal”), is contrary to the District’s governing statutes, rules, policies, or the bid specifications; and, if so, whether the decision was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.

Findings Of Fact The Parties The District is an independent taxing authority created pursuant to section 373.069, Florida Statutes, with the authority to contract with private entities to maintain real property controlled by the District. See § 373.1401, Fla. Stat. HAI is a Florida corporation duly authorized to do business in the State of Florida with a business address of 1090 Airglades Boulevard in Clewiston, Florida. Coastal is a Florida corporation duly authorized to do business in the State of Florida with a business address of 7424 Coastal Drive in Panama City, Florida. The RFB On February 7, 2018, the District issued the RFB, soliciting bids for qualified respondents to provide the following: [F]urnish all labor, equipment, perform data entry and perform all operations for spraying of aquatic, ditchbank and invasive vegetation by helicopter and provide aerial flight services for site inspection and plant surveys. Both HAI and Coastal submitted timely bids, which the District deemed responsive and responsible under the terms of the RFB. The District deemed Coastal the lowest responsive and responsible bidder for aerial spraying, granular application, and aerial transport services. The District deemed HAI the lowest responsive and responsible bidder for spot spraying services. On May 11, 2018, the District posted its Notice of Intent to Award the respective contracts to Coastal and HAI. HAI challenges the award to Coastal because it is not a responsible bidder under the terms of the RFB. HAI’s challenge focuses on two items required to document the bidder’s responsibility to perform the requested services. First, the RFB requires the bidder to provide at least two helicopters certified pursuant to 14 CFR Part 133, Rotocraft External-Load Operations; and 14 CFR Part 137, Agricultural Aircraft Operations (Part 137 Certificate). Second, the RFB requires the bidder to demonstrate its ability to obtain required insurance coverage. Part 137 Certificate HAI contends that Coastal’s bid does not meet the responsibility provisions of the RFB because it did not include sufficient Part 137 Certificates for its subcontractor, HMC Helicopters (“HMC”). HAI contends the Part 137 Certificates are required to expressly state that aircraft are certified to dispense economic poisons. Petitioner’s argument fails for three reasons. First, the RFB does not require the bidder’s Part 137 Certificate to expressly endorse aircraft to dispense economic poisons.3/ Second, assuming the express endorsement was required, the requirement does not apply to HMC. The RFB defines the term “Bidder” and “Respondent” as “[a]ll contractors, consultants, organizations, firms or other entities submitting a Response to this RFB as a prime contractor.” (emphasis added). In its bid, Coastal is listed as the prime contractor, and HMC as a subcontractor. The RFB requires each Respondent to list at least two aircraft which are Part 133 and 137 certified. The requirement applies to Coastal as the primary contractor, not to its subcontractor. Coastal’s bid listed five aircraft with both Part 133 and 137 Certificates, actually exceeding the requirement for two such certified aircraft. Third, assuming an express endorsement for dispensing economic poisons was required, and that the requirement applied to HMC, HMC’s Part 137 Certificate documents HMC’s authority to dispense economic poisons. Pursuant to 14 CFR 137.3, “Agricultural aircraft operation” is defined as follows: [T]he operation of an aircraft for the purpose of (1) dispensing any economic poison, (2) dispensing any other substance intended for plant nourishment, soil treatment, propagation of plant life, or pest control, or (3) engaging in dispending activities directly affecting agriculture, horticulture, or forest preservation, but not including the dispensing of live insects. To obtain a Part 137 Certificate, the operator must pass a knowledge and skills test, which includes the safe handling of economic poisons and disposal of used containers for those poisons; the general effects of those poisons on plants, animals, and persons and precautions to be observed in using those poisons; as well as the primary symptoms of poisoning in persons, appropriate emergency measures in the case of poisoning, and the location of poison control centers. See 14 CFR § 137.19. However, if the operator applies for a Part 137 Certificate which prohibits dispensing of economic poisons, the applicant is not required to demonstrate the knowledge and skills listed above. See Id. HMCs’ certificates do not contain an express prohibition against dispensing economic poisons. The authorization for HMC’s aircraft to dispense economic poisons is inherent in its Part 137 Certificate. Coastal’s bid meets the solicitation requirement for at least two aircraft with Part 137 Certificates. Insurance Requirements The RFB requires each Respondent to “provide evidence of the ability to obtain appropriate insurance coverage.” Respondents may meet the insurability requirement by having their insurance agent either (1) complete and sign an insurance certificate which meets all of the requirements of Exhibit H to the RFB; or (2) issue a letter on the insurance agency’s letterhead stating that the Respondent qualifies for the required insurance coverage levels and that an insurance certificate meeting the District’s requirements will be submitted prior to the execution of the contract. In response to this requirement, Coastal submitted a letter from Sterlingrisk Aviation, dated March 6, 2018, stating, “All required coverage amounts are available to Coastal Air Service, Inc. to fulfill the requirements of this contract.” In the Re: line, the letter refers to the specific RFB at issue in this case. Coastal also submitted a certificate of insurance from Sterlingrisk Aviation demonstrating the levels of insurance coverage in effect at the time the bid was submitted, although the coverages are less than the amounts required under the RFB.4/ HAI takes issue with Coastal’s evidence of ability to obtain the required coverage because the letter from Sterlingrisk does not state “an insurance certificate reflecting the required coverage will be provided prior to the contract execution.” Based on the totality of the evidence, the undersigned infers that Sterlingrisk’s letter omits the language that a certificate “will be provided” prior to contract execution, because Sterlingrisk will issue an insurance certificate only when Coastal applies, and pays the premium, for the increased coverage limitations. The letter from Sterlingrisk substantially complies with the insurance requirements of the RFB, and constitutes competent, substantial evidence of Coastal’s ability to obtain the required insurance coverage. HAI introduced no evidence that Coastal obtained an economic advantage over HAI by failing to include language from its insurance agent that “an insurance certificate reflecting the required coverage will be provided prior to the contract execution.” Instead, HAI argued that by failing to enforce that provision of the RFB, the District cannot ensure the winning bidder will be responsible to undertake the contract. HAI argued that the District’s failure to adhere to this RFB requirement may create inefficiencies that “would result in the event that Coastal were unable to obtain the required insurance coverage” before execution of the contract. Coastal’s bid documents its eligibility for insurance coverage in the amounts required by the RFB. If Coastal does not provide said certificates, it will not be qualified for final execution or issuance of the contract.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Southwest Florida Water Management District enter a final order dismissing Helicopter Applicator, Inc.’s Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of November, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 2018.

CFR (4) 14 CFR 13314 CFR 13714 CFR 137.1914 CFR 137.3 Florida Laws (10) 120.56120.569120.57120.573120.60120.68373.069373.119373.1401373.427 Florida Administrative Code (3) 28-106.11128-106.20128-106.301
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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES vs DAVID K. GEMMELL, 06-000286PL (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida Jan. 20, 2006 Number: 06-000286PL Latest Update: Dec. 23, 2024
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