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SALMA PETROLEUM, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 14-003133 (2014)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Jul. 09, 2014 Number: 14-003133 Latest Update: Sep. 30, 2015

The Issue Whether Petitioners are liable for sales and use tax, penalty, and interest as assessed by the Department of Revenue (the Department)?

Findings Of Fact Salma is a Florida corporation with its principal place of business at 2231 Del Prado Boulevard, Cape Coral, Florida, 33990. Gausia is a Florida corporation with its principal place of business at 11571 Gladiolus Drive, Fort Myers, Florida, 33908. Petitioners are in the business of operating gas stations with convenience stores. The Department is an agency of the State of Florida and is authorized to administer the tax laws of the State of Florida. Petitioners were selected for audit because their reported gross sales were less than the total cost of items purchased (inventory) for the audit period. The Department issued Salma and Gausia each a Notice of Intent to Conduct a Limited Scope Audit or Self-Audit, dated April 26, 2013, for sales and use tax, for the period February 1, 2010, through January 31, 2013 (collectively referred to as the Notices). The Notices requested that Petitioners provide the Department: (a) a list of all their vendors for alcohol, tobacco, soda, chips, candy, etc.; (b) their total purchases of alcohol and tobacco, by vendor, for the period July 2010 to June 2011; (c) copies of their federal tax returns for the examination period; (d) purchase receipts for all purchases for the last complete calendar month; and (e) daily register (Z tapes) for the last complete calendar month. The Notices gave Petitioners 60 days to gather the requested documents before the audit was to commence. The Notices also requested that Petitioners complete an attached Questionnaire and Self Analysis Worksheet. In response to the Notices, Petitioners requested a 30- day extension of time until July 18, 2013, to provide the requested documents and to designate a Power of Attorney. Petitioners did not provide the Department any books and records for inspection, nor did they complete and return the questionnaire and self analysis worksheets. As a result, the Department's auditor determined the sales tax due based upon the best information available. To calculate an estimated assessment of sales tax, the Department used the purchase data of Petitioners' wholesalers and distributors of alcoholic beverages and tobacco, for July 1, 2010, through June 30, 2011; the 2010 National Association of Convenience Stores average markups and in-store sales percentages of alcoholic beverage and tobacco products; and historical audit data. After reviewing the purchase data for July 1, 2010, through June 30, 2011, and for July 1, 2011, through June 30, 2012, the Department's auditor determined that the data was missing a few vendors. As a result, the Department's auditor estimated the amount of Petitioners' cigarette purchases, based on historical audit data that shows that cigarette sales are generally 4.31 times more than beer sales. The Department's auditor and audit supervisor testified that the estimated gross sales seemed reasonable and consistent with the national averages and the purchase data for July 1, 2011, through June 30, 2012. The Department estimated gross sales (i.e., the retail sale value of the goods sold) by marking up the taxable sales and exempt sales reported on the sales and use tax returns submitted to the Department by Petitioners. For example, for July 1, 2010, through June 30, 2011, Salma purchased beer from its wholesalers and distributors for $148,826.15, and the Department marked up the purchase price by 27 percent for a retail value of $189,009.21. For July 1, 2010, through June 30, 2011, Gausia purchased beer from its wholesalers and distributors for $132,138.65, and the Department marked up the purchase price by 27 percent for a retail value of $167,816.09. The Department's markup on the alcoholic beverage and tobacco products is reasonable because the Department's auditor testified that he used a combination of 2010 National Association of Convenience Stores average markups and the competitive pricing and information from audits of other convenience stores. The Department determined that the exemption ratio reported on the sales and use tax returns submitted to the Department by Petitioners was extremely high for their industry. The Department used an exemption ratio of 15 percent, based on historical audit data for the industry, to calculate Petitioners' estimated taxable sales. A review of Petitioners' sales and use tax returns revealed that they did not apply the tax bracket system to their taxable sales transactions, as required under sections 212.12(9) and (10), Florida Statutes. Instead, Petitioners remitted sales tax on their taxable sales based on their gross receipts at a flat tax rate. The Department's auditor testified that this method of reporting tax is inappropriate and does not accurately reflect the sales activity of the business. The Department calculated the average effective tax rate of 6.0856 percent, based on historical audit data for the industry. To calculate the estimated tax due, the Department multiplied the effective tax rate by the estimated taxable sales and gave Petitioners credit for any tax remitted with their tax returns. The Department issued Salma a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes, dated August 8, 2013, for audit number 200149872. The Department issued Gausia a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes, dated August 8, 2013, for audit number 200149749. The Department assessed Petitioners sales tax on their sales of alcoholic beverages and tobacco. The Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes gave Petitioners 30 days to request a conference with the auditor or audit supervisor, to dispute the proposed changes. Petitioners did not make such a request. The Department issued a Notice of Proposed Assessment (NOPA) to Salma on March 6, 2014, for tax in the sum of $159,282.26; for penalty in the sum of $39,820.57; and interest as of March 6, 2013, in the sum of $27,772.36. The Department issued a NOPA to Gausia on March 6, 2014, for tax in the sum of $213,754.46; for penalty in the sum of $53,438.62; and interest as of March 6, 2013, in the sum of $36,921.79. Additional interest accrues at $30.55 per day until the tax is paid. The NOPAs became final assessments on May 5, 2014. After filing a request for an administrative hearing, Petitioners completed the Questionnaire and Self Analysis Worksheet and produced the following documents to the Department: (a) a list of all of their vendors for alcohol, tobacco, soda, chips, candy, etc.; (b) a list of vendors for alcohol and tobacco, for the examination period of July 2010 to June 2011; (c) a summary of their taxable sales, for the period February 2010 through December 2012; (d) copies of their federal tax returns, for the tax years 2010 through 2013; (e) copies of its purchase receipts for the months of July 2013; and (f) copies of their daily register (Z-tapes) for the month of July 2013. The Department's auditor testified that aside from being untimely, the records and information provided by Petitioners during these proceedings were not reliable because Petitioners did not provide any source documents that would allow the Department to reconcile the reported figures and confirm the supplied information. In addition, the purchase receipts and Z- tapes were not relevant because they were from outside of the audit period. The Z-tapes are also unreliable because the manager of the convenience store testified at the final hearing that employees purposely and routinely entered taxable sales into the cash registers as tax exempt sales. Petitioners argue that the Department did not use the best information available when estimating the taxes due. Petitioners claim that because their businesses are combination gas station/convenience stores, the national data for standalone convenience stores is inapplicable. However, notably absent from Petitioners' testimony or evidence was any alternative data upon which the Department could have relied for more accurate estimates.2/

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order denying Petitioners' requests for relief and assessing, in full, the Department's assessments of sales tax, penalty, and interest against both Salma and Gausia. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of January, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MARY LI CREASY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of January, 2015.

Florida Laws (7) 120.57120.68212.05212.06212.12212.13213.35 Florida Administrative Code (1) 28-106.103
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HIGH-TECH YACHT AND SHIP, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 95-001791 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Hollywood, Florida Apr. 12, 1995 Number: 95-001791 Latest Update: Jan. 08, 1997

Findings Of Fact High-Tech Yacht & Ship, Inc. (Petitioner) is a Florida corporation engaged in the business of retail sales of marine vessels. Also, Petitioner is a registered retail dealer in the State of Florida. The President of Petitioner is its only corporate officer. On or about September 2, 1993, Petitioner, in the capacity of a broker, sold a motor yacht at retail to Regency Group, Inc. (purchaser), through its representative, for $78,000. The motor yacht is described as a 1988, 41' Amerosport Chris Craft, hull Number CCHEU075E788, and called the "Motivator". At the closing of the sale, on or about September 2, 1993, the purchaser refused to pay the sales tax on the purchase, which was $4,680. However, the purchaser agreed to pay the sales tax after being informed by Petitioner that, without the payment of the sales tax, there could be no closing. The purchaser's representative submitted, at closing, a personal check in the amount of $4,680 for the sales tax. All of the necessary documents were completed for ownership and registration to be transferred to the purchaser. Subsequently, Petitioner received notice from its bank that the check for the sales tax had been dishonored by the purchaser's bank. The purchaser's representative had stopped payment on the check. In October 1993, Petitioner submitted its sales and use tax return for the month of September 1993 to Respondent in which the sale of the yacht was reported. Respondent automatically reviews sales and use tax returns. Respondent's review of Petitioner's return revealed a shortage of sales tax collected in the amount of $4,680.. In January 1994, Respondent issued a notice of tax action for assessment of additional tax in the amount of $4,710, plus interest and penalty, to Petitioner. The $4,710 included the loss of Petitioner's collection allowance of $30, which loss resulted from Petitioner's failure to timely remit all taxes due. Having received the notice of tax action, by letter dated January 20, 1994, Petitioner generally informed Respondent of the circumstances regarding the sales tax shortage, including the dishonored check. Petitioner pointed out, among other things, that Respondent had the authority and the means to collect the tax, while it (Petitioner) had limited means, and suggested, among other things, that Respondent cancel the purchaser's Florida registration of the yacht. On or about January 31, 1994, approximately three months after the check for sales tax was dishonored, Petitioner issued a notice of dishonored check to the purchaser, in which Petitioner requested payment of the sales tax. The notice provided, among other things, that Petitioner could seek criminal prosecution and civil action if the monies were not paid to Petitioner. Having not received the $4,680, Petitioner contacted the local law enforcement agency. After investigation, the law enforcement agency informed Petitioner that a civil action would have to be instituted because the purchaser, through its representative, had indicated that it was not satisfied with the yacht. Although Petitioner engaged the services of an attorney for civil action, no civil action was commenced. Additionally, Petitioner did not engage the services of a collection agency for assistance in collecting the sales tax. Subsequent to its notice of tax action, on or about March 12, 1994, Respondent issued a notice of assessment to Petitioner. The notice of assessment provided, among other things, that Petitioner was being assessed taxes in the amount of $4,710, plus penalty and interest in the amount of $2,342.61, totalling $7,052.61. Petitioner protested the assessment. On February 8, 1995, Respondent issued its notice of reconsideration in which Respondent determined, among other things, that the assessment was appropriate and affirmed the assessment of $7,052.61, plus interest and penalty. The interest accrues at the rate of $1.55 per day. Petitioner has not remitted any of the assessed tax, including interest and penalty, to Respondent. Petitioner has not identified on its federal tax return the noncollection of the sales tax from the purchaser as a bad debt. Sales tax is part of the total sale price for an item. Respondent considers the sales tax as collectable by a seller in the same manner as any other debt owed by a purchaser to a seller. A retail dealer, who is also a seller, is considered to be an agent for the State in the collection of sales tax. The burden of collecting the sales tax is placed upon the retail dealer by Respondent. Some of Respondent's employees have been sympathetic to Petitioner's tax assessment matter. However, none of the employees indicated to or advised Petitioner that Respondent was or is in error.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order affirming the assessment of sales tax against High-Tech Yacht & Ship, Inc. in the amount of $7,052.61, plus interest and penalty. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of August 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of August 1996.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57120.68212.07
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IKE FARHUD, D/B/A IKE`S FOOD MARKET vs. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 77-001153 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-001153 Latest Update: Feb. 16, 1978

Findings Of Fact On August 27, 1976, the Respondent, State of Florida Department of Revenue, notified the Petitioner of its intention to assess sales tax, penalties and interest against the Respondent for business transactions in the period August 1, 1973 through July 31, 1976. This Notice of Proposed Assessment was revised on May 27, 1977, and the Petitioner was notified of that revision. By his letter of June 19, 1977, the Petitioner has challenged the assessment, as revised. Upon receipt of the June 19, 1977 petition, the Respondent moved for a more definite statement and the Petitioner was afforded fifteen (15) days from the date of the Order within which time to amend his petition. Petitioner took advantage of that opportunity to amend and by an undated document did make such an amendment. The Respondent subsequently moved to strike certain portions of the amended petition and filed its answer to the petition. A pre-hearing conference was held to consider the Motion To Strike and after that pre-hearing conference was concluded an Order was issued which struck certain portions of the amended Petition and allowed copies of the proposed notices of assessments of August 27, 1976 and the revision of May 27, 1977 to be made a part of the complaint/petition as Exhibits 1 and 2, respectively. After the pre-hearing Order had been issued by the undersigned, the case was noticed for hearing for December 5, 1977. At the December 5, 1977 hearing date a Second Revised Notice of Proposed Assessment of Tax, Penalties and Interest Under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes was tendered. This revision dated from December 5, 1977, was allowed to be introduced as the final position of the Respondent on the question of the assessment. It was also allowed to be attached as Exhibit 3 to the amended petition. (Under cover of a separate correspondence the original petition, amended petition, exhibits to the amended petition, an Order which was entered after consideration of the Motion To Strike, are being submitted as a part of the record herein). In the ordinary course of his duties a tax examiner employed by the Respondent went to the business premises of the Petitioner to perform an audit to determine whether or not the Petitioner was collecting and remitting sales tax for the category of sales which the Petitioner was making, that required the payment of sales tax. These requirements spoken of are those set forth in Chapter 212, F.S. Mr. DeCico, the tax examiner, allowed Mr. Farhud to pick three (3) months in the year 1976 as being the period to be audited. DeCico then returned to Farhud's place of business and showed him the details of the three (3) month audit. Farhud was dissatisfied wish this audit and indicated that he preferred to have the audit sample expended for a full three (3) years. DeCico replied that he would be willing to expand the audit period. but cautioned Farhud that expansion of the audit period might promote an increased liability. Nonetheless, at Farhud's request, the audit period was expanded to one for thirty-six (36) months. The new audit period dated from August 1, 1973, through July 1, 1976. The work papers on that audit may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 1 admitted into evidence. This audit which is depicted in the Respondent's Exhibit No. 1, left out invoices pertaining to stamps, electric bills, wrapping paper, grocery bags, etc., since they were not retail items for sale. The audit was rendered on August 27, 1976. Before the Notice of Assessment was filed, Farhud had expressed his displeasure with the outcome of the second audit process because he felt that certain amounts depicted in the gross sales were not accurate; to wit, the inclusion of certain so-called "service fees", namely income tax preparation, notary fees, etc. DeCico tried to get a reasonable statement of the amounts of the categories which Farhud desired to have excluded. Farhud did not have records of the matters and was unable to provide an estimate as to the amount of income which had been derived from the aforementioned "service fees". The August 27, 1976, proposed assessment was computed on the basis of the proposition that the gross sales are equivalent to actual sales and are subject to sales tax in the taxable categories. As indicated before, this audit did not take into consideration any "service fees", nor did it grant any allowance for pilferage. No allowance was made for the latter category, because Farhud had not provided any estimate and/or police records to indicate the amount which would be lost to pilferage, and cause a reduction of the sales tax liability. Farhud formally challenged the audit of August 27, 1976, by his correspondence of September 8, 1976 in which he rejects the amount claimed and asks for a hearing. A copy of this correspondence may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 2 admitted into evidence. An informal conference was held between the parties on October 12, 1976 to see if a resolution of the dispute could be achieved. Mr. Farhud was represented at the informal conference by Michael J. Burman, Esquire, an attorney in Jacksonville, Florida. By a letter of October 14, 1976, Farhud's attorney requested the Respondent to utilize the figures for the three (3) month audit period, as opposed to the thirty-six (36) month period. The letter concluded by stating that Mr. Burman was unaware of any intention Mr. Farhud had to appeal the assessment of August 27, 1976. This letter was followed by a series of letters in which the various parties were indicating the desire to determine whether or not Mr. Farhud intended to accept the August 27, 1976 assessment or to appeal it. In the course of his correspondence Mr. Farhud continued to insist that he did not accept the amount of assessment as accurate. Mr. Farhud failed to indicate to Mr. Burman whether he was going to appeal the assessment or not and Mr. Burman withdrew as his attorney, as shown in the January 31, 1977 correspondence addressed to one of the employees of the Respondent. This correspondence is Respondent's Exhibit No. 7 admitted into evidence. On February 2, 1977, the audit supervisor in the Jacksonville district of the Respondent wrote Mr. Farhud indicating the intention of the Respondent to collect the taxes pursuant to the August 27, 1976 audit. A copy of this correspondence is Respondent's Exhibit No. 8 admitted into evidence. It should be indicated at this point, that the Respondent's representative had continued to request documentation from Farhud on the items requested for exemption which have been referred to as "service fee". The subject of pilferage had also been discussed at the October 12, 1976 informal conference and a request made for some form of records of police reports which would verify pilferage allowances. No documentation had been provided at the time the February 2, 1977 letter was written to Farhud. Subsequent to the February 2, 1977 letter another informal conference was held on April 4, 1977. As a result of that conference it was determined that certain items would be deleted from the audit assessment of August 27, 1976. This is evidenced in Respondents Exhibit No. 9 which is a copy of a letter dated May 27, 1977, from the audit supervisor, Mr. McCrone, to Mr. Farhud. At the April 4, 1977, discussion the subject of pilferage allowance as brought up in the deletion of 4 percent of the purchase price of taxable goods, as to soft drinks, paper and said products, pet foods and miscellaneous sundries were allowed. No allowance was given for beer, wine and tobacco products because these were felt to be out of reach of prospective pilferers. Again, this deletion is found in the Respondent's Exhibit No. 9. The 4 percent figure was arrived at as an industry estimate. Farhud still was not satisfied after the April 4, 1977, conference had been held and adjustments to the assessment had been mode. In view of this dissatisfaction, the Respondent elected to make a new type of audit, which was performed and was premised upon an analysis of the taxable purchases by the Petitioner for the three (3) year period. These purchases were divided into taxable categories and these categories were then marked up in price using an industry average to arrive at the actual taxable sales. The industry average was based upon an examination of the United Food Stores, Inc.'s sales catalog, which had suggested retail prices for low volume and high volume stores. The Respondent gave the Petitioner the benefit of the range of high volume stores, although the Petitioner's store was a neighborhood convenience store and therefore a low volume operation. The effect of allowing the average retail price for the high volume stores was that it made the differential between his purchase price and the retail price less than that for a low volume neighborhood store, causing lesser tax liability. As stated before, this alternative method was elected for the reason that the Respondent had objected that the gross sales figures reported in the monthly tax returns were incorrect, due to the fact that the Petitioner was unable to document his claim for entitlement to certain exemptions due to pilferage and "service fees", and due to the belief that the more correct approach to the audit was the second method. The work sheet on the alternative method may be found on Respondent's Exhibit No. 10 admitted into evidence. The utilization of this method led to the revised assessment of May 27, 1977, which is the subject of the appeal by petition, and amended petition of the Petitioner. This revision was superceded by the second revision of December 5, 1977, which was allowed to be entered without objection from the Petitioner. The second revision reduces the amount of tax liability claimed by the Respondent. An analysis of the documents offered in this cause and the testimony, leads to the conclusion that the Petitioner/taxpayer owed sales tax during the audit period August 1, 1973 through July 31, 1976. Furthermore, the more correct form of audit procedure under the circumstances, was the alternate method employed in arriving at the May 27, 1977 revised Notice of Assessment as further revised by the December 5, 1977 Second Revised Notice of Proposed Assessment. This conclusion is grounded on the requirements of Section 212.05(1), F.S., which requires persons in the Petitioner's category for the exercise of the privilege of doing business, to assist in levying a tax in the amount of 4 percent in the categories covered. Furthermore, Sections 212.06(3) and 212.07(2), F.S., places the duty on the Petitioner to collect this 4 percent sales tax. The Petitioner failed to act in accordance with the provision of Chapter 212, F.S. and the Second Revised Notice of Proposed Assessment is correct and in keeping with the authority of Section 212.12(6), F.S.

Recommendation Therefore, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Second Revised Notice of Proposed Assessment of Tax, Penalties and Interest found as Exhibit 3 to the amended petition which total is $2,238.92 be allowed with such adjustments as may be necessary for a computation of interest prior to the rendition of a final order. DONE and ORDERED this 3rd day of January, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Nathan Weil, Esquire 203 Washington Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Patricia Turner, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 John D. Moriarty, Esquire Attorney, Division of Administration Department of Revenue Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304

Florida Laws (4) 212.05212.06212.07212.12
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CARL R. GLASS, D/B/A OSCEOLA FORGE vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 93-000249 (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Jan. 19, 1993 Number: 93-000249 Latest Update: Oct. 07, 1993

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is Carl R. Glass, d/b/a Osceola Forge located at 2749 North Orange Blossom Trail, Kissimmee, Florida 34744. Petitioner is engaged in the business of manufacturing and fabricating burglar bars, steel gates, decorative plastic ornamental castings and injection moldings. Petitioner built and erected one double sided billboard on his business property at 2749 North Orange Blossom Trail, Kissimmee, Florida. It is anchored by its owns supports into the ground as a permanent improvement to Petitioner's real property. The size of the billboard is approximately 12' x 38', plus an apron that runs along the length of the bottom of the billboard. Petitioner leases the face and apron of each side of billboard to customers who are generally required to supply their own labor and material to create an advertising message. The billboard was built to provide double-sided advertising for lanes of traffic going northbound or southbound past Petitioner's place of business. Petitioner has rented the billboard to various lessees for a monthly rental fee over the relevant period. Petitioner did not charge or collect sales and use taxes on the rental fee. Respondent conducted an audit of Petitioner's entire business, for the period May 1, 1986 through April 30, 1991. There was only one item assessed as a result of the audit which was on the lease of the billboard located on Petitioner's business property. Petitioner was assessed sales and use taxes, interest and penalties totalling $6,142.38, including taxes ($4,017.76) with a per diem interest rate of $1.32 to be computed from 10/3/91 to the present. Additional interest due, as of July 1, 1993, was calculated to equal $842.16 (638 days x $1.32). The sales tax assessment was based on invoices and other information provided by the Petitioner and followed the Department of Revenue routine procedures required for all audits. From January 1987 through February 1991, Petitioner, or his secretary, made five telephone calls from Osceola Forge to the Taxpayer Assistance Number of the Department of Revenue's regional office located in Maitland, Florida, requesting assistance. On each occasion, the Department's employee advised Petitioner or his employee that they could call the Department's Tallahassee 800 taxpayer assistance number. On at least one occasion, Petitioner's secretary or Petitioner was advised that the transaction was tax exempt, and need not be collected. Petitioner was aware of the 800 taxpayer assistance number in Tallahassee and tried to call the number. However, he was unable to get through, and called the local office only. On April 9, 1992, Petitioner personally telephoned the Titusville office of the Department of Revenue. On each occasion, Petitioner inquired whether or not sales or use taxes should be collected on the rental of the billboard. A free, updated Sales and Use Tax Rules Book is available to any tax payer upon request. In addition, a taxpayer could personally appear and bring documentation relating to any questions relating to the sales and use tax at any regional office. Petitioner did not obtain an updated rules book or personally appear at a regional office. On April 30, 1992, Petitioner filed a Protest Letter with Respondent challenging the abovementioned tax assessment. Respondent issued to Petitioner a Notice of Decision dated December 1, 1992. On January 8, 1993, Petitioner filed a Request for a Formal Administrative Hearing with Respondent. To date, Petitioner has not paid any of the contested taxes, interest, and penalties to Respondent. Petitioner relied on information provided by his secretary, his accountant, and brief phone conferences with the DOR's Maitland office to determine that the rental fees were tax exempt, and did not collect the sales tax from his customers. The DOR Audit Supervisor testified that there is a clear distinction between the taxable rental of a billboard and the nontaxable services of placing an advertising message on the billboard. The rental of the face of the billboard is a taxable transaction. On the other hand, if a person rents or leases a billboard, then hires a third party to place an advertising message on the billboard, this advertising service is tax exempt.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a Final Order upholding its sales and use tax assessment, waive penalties and interest accrued prior to October 2, 1991, and assess a tax of $4,017.76, plus interst from the date due. DONE and ENTERED this 14th day of July, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of July, 1993. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner. Petitioner did not submit proposed findings of fact. Proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent. Proposed findings submitted by Respondent are accepted except as noted below. Those proposed findings neither noted below nor included in the Hearing Officer's findings were deemed unnecessary to the conclusions reached. Rejected as argument: paragraphs 37, 38, 39 COPIES FURNISHED: Carl R. Glass 2749 North Orange Blossom Trail Kissimmee, Florida 34741 James McAuley, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Capitol Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Larry Fuchs Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Linda Lettera General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100

Florida Laws (6) 120.57120.68212.031212.12212.14213.21 Florida Administrative Code (2) 12A-1.05112A-1.070
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PHILIP E. HANCOCK, D/B/A ACTION PLANTS vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 03-001341 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Apr. 01, 2003 Number: 03-001341 Latest Update: Mar. 31, 2004

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner performed nontaxable services as a decorating contractor, as he maintains, or, rather, whether he leased tangible personal property and thereby incurred sales tax liability, as Respondent alleges.

Findings Of Fact The Parties At all relevant times, Petitioner Philip E. Hancock ("Hancock") was a sole proprietor doing business in and around Fort Lauderdale, Florida, under the names "Action Plant Rental" and "Action Plants." Respondent Department of Revenue ("Department"), an agency of the State of Florida, is authorized to administer the state's tax laws. An Overview of Hancock's Businesses In 1980, Hancock and his then-wife purchased a nursery and, as proprietors, started a business called "Landscape Concepts." Initially, the couple's business activities involved landscaping and (b) sales of plants and nursery stock at wholesale (mostly) and retail. Sometime in 1983, Landscape Concepts began "renting" plants and trees for special events, such as weddings, banquets, and charity fundraisers.2 In time, this plant rental business eclipsed the original landscaping and sales operations, and by the late 1980's the ascendant enterprise was dubbed "Action Plant Rental."3 In 1990, having established Action Plant Rental, the Hancocks sold their nursery, whereupon Landscape Concepts stopped selling plants on a regular basis. The landscaping business, in contrast, tapered off gradually, continuing for several more years until being discontinued completely at the end of 1993. As of January 1994, plant rental was Petitioner's sole vocation. A Closer Look At the Plant Rental Business The evidence concerning the details of how Hancock's plant rental business operated during the audit period is relatively sparse, consisting of little, if anything, other than Hancock's testimony, which is generally credible as far as it goes, but not comprehensive. Hancock's clients, for the most part, were not the individuals who hosted or sponsored the events for which Action Plant Rental supplied "green décor" (to use Hancock's phrase), but rather were the event planners, designers, florists, and hotels (which frequently acted as planners in connection with events held on their premises) who had been hired by the hosts or sponsors to make their events happen. Thus, Hancock usually did not deal directly with, for example, the bride, but with the bride's wedding planner. In effect, he was a subcontractor. Hancock did not enter into written contracts with his clients. When a client retained Hancock, the client informed Hancock when and where the event would be held, and told Hancock (or asked him for an opinion about) which plants would be appropriate. The evidence is ambiguous as to the degree of Hancock's input and discretion in selecting the particular plants to bring to a given event. While the undersigned is persuaded that Hancock had some involvement in choosing the plants at least some of the time, it cannot be found that this service, to the extent provided, added substantial value to the transaction——or was one for which clients specifically and knowingly paid. When the time came for Hancock to perform the agreement, he delivered the plants and trees to the site and, at a time before the event was to begin, set them up in the hall or ballroom. Setting up the plants to create a pleasing and appropriate environment no doubt required decorating skill. It is undisputed, moreover, that Hancock commonly added decorating touches, such as lights and decorative containers, to his plants and trees, which made the display more attractive. What is less clear, however, is whether clients purchased Hancock's decorating expertise——or if, instead, Hancock executed the commands of someone else who decided how to arrange and present the plants. On this point, as others, it might have been helpful to hear from some clients. As it is, Hancock's own testimony is somewhat ambiguous. While the question is extremely close, the undersigned is persuaded, on the evidence presented, that Hancock usually operated under the direction of his client and had relatively little control over the design and arrangement of his plants and trees at the event site. Thus, the undersigned is unable to find that Hancock's decorating services provided the ultimate value to Hancock's clients. Once the plants were set in place and Hancock was assured that the arrangement satisfied his client, Hancock left the event site. (This meant, of course, that someone——the client, the host, or even a guest——could have moved the plants around.4 The Department contends that Hancock's absence from the premises demonstrates decisively that possession and control of the plants was surrendered to his client. The undersigned has given this fact some weight, but not a great deal. For one thing, there is no persuasive evidence that the client typically remained on-site with the plants. Further, since the plants were generally set up in a "public" place (as opposed to a personal space such as an office) over which neither the client, nor the host, nor the guests had exclusive control,5 the undersigned is not persuaded that the client or others attending the event had possession and control of the plants in any meaningful sense. Indeed, under the Department's theory, the plants apparently would have been in the constructive possession, at least, of everyone present at the party——a conclusion that runs counter to common sense and ordinary experience. The opportunity to move a plant is not, in the undersigned’s mind, equivalent to having a possessory right or power over the plant.) When the event was over, Hancock returned to the site to retrieve and remove his plants. Later, Hancock sent the client an invoice for his "services." As far as the evidence shows, Hancock did not bill his clients separately for delivery, set up, removal, or design, but rather he charged a lump sum for the plants, which price included these associated services as part of the total package. Petitioner's History As a Sales Tax-Paying Dealer From at least 1985, and continuing through the middle of 1994, Landscape Concepts, as a registered dealer having identification number 16-03-109301-76, collected and remitted sales taxes on the revenues generated through retail plant sales and plant rentals, filing monthly sales tax returns as legally required.6 If a client gave Petitioner a resale certificate, however, Petitioner did not collect sales tax from that client. Because most of Petitioner's plant rental customers were other businesses (e.g. event planners, florists, and hotels) that provided resale certificates to Petitioner, a relatively small percentage of these transactions were taxed. In mid-1994, while in one of the Department's regional offices attending to some since forgotten sales tax-related matter, Hancock was shown Rule 12A-1.071 of the Florida Administrative Code. This Rule then contained the following provision: (35)(a) A decorating contractor who uses materials and supplies such as bunting, streamers, colored paper, wreaths, pennants, lights, rope, etc., in fulfilling a contract which requires the furnishing of arrangements and decorations to, and their subsequent removal from, hotels, offices, public buildings, etc., is the consumer of such materials and supplies and shall pay tax on their acquisition. The contractor's charge under such contract is a service charge and is exempt. Fla. Admin. Code R. 12A-1.071(35)(a).7 Hancock concluded that he was entitled to the benefit of the foregoing "decorator's exemption." Hancock asked a local employee of the Department whether he could claim the exemption, and she advised him to write a letter to the Department's main office in Tallahassee. Hancock sent the Department a letter announcing his intent to stop filing monthly sales tax returns. Enclosed with this letter was Hancock's sales tax certificate, which Hancock purported to "relinquish." The Department did not respond to Hancock's letter. Hancock did not file another sales tax return.8 The Audit and Protest In January 2001, the Department commenced a sales and use tax audit of Hancock's plant rental business, initially concentrating on the five-year period from December 1, 1995 through November 30, 2000. The Department later enlarged the audit period to span 16 years, reaching all the way back to June 1, 1985, and continuing through June 30, 2001. This expansion was based on the Department's belief that Hancock had never filed any sales tax returns respecting his business——a belief that, as found above, would prove to be incorrect. After concluding that Hancock's tax records were "adequate but voluminous," the Department used a sampling method to calculate the amount of tax allegedly owed.9 To determine the total amount of revenue subject to sales tax, the Department used as a starting point the gross receipts figures as reported on Hancock's federal income tax returns for the years 1995 through 2000, inclusive.10 From these figures, the Department calculated the average monthly receipts for each of the six years in question (by dividing 12 into each respective year's gross sales revenue). It also computed an average annual gross sales figure (by dividing 6 into the sum of the known annual gross receipts), along with an average average-monthly sales amount (by dividing 6 into the sum of the average monthly receipts). Year Here are the relevant Gross Sales numbers: Avg. Monthly Sales 1995 $ 99,045 $ 8,253.75 1996 $113,973 $ 9,497.75 1997 $171,721 $14,310.08 1998 $169,961 $14,163.42 1999 $126,306 $10,525.50 2000 $154,253 $12,854.42 Average Annual Gross Sales: $139,210.00 Average Average-Monthly Sales: $ 11,600.82 The Department apparently acquired more specific information regarding monthly receipts for the 11-month period from January through November 2000. During this period, Hancock's gross receipts totaled $113,661.00.11 The Department determined, based on these figures, that the total tax due for this particular period was $6,861.41. Dividing 113,661 into 6,861.41, the Department derived a "percentage of error" of .060367. This "percentage of error" was effectively the tax rate because, as we have seen, the Department believed that Hancock had paid no taxes whatsoever. The "percentage of error" slightly exceeded 6 percent (the present state sales tax rate) due to the inclusion of some county taxes.12 The Department computed the total sales tax allegedly due and owing as follows. To determine the tax due per month for the 121 months comprising the periods from (a) June 1985 through December 1994 and (b) January through June 2001, for which there were no "known-sales" numbers, the Department applied the "percentage of error" (=tax rate) against the average average-monthly sales figure of $11,600.82. To determine the tax due per month for the years 1995 through 2000, the Department applied the "percentage of error" against each respective year's average monthly sales figure. The sum of these monthly figures equaled the total alleged tax liability. Here are the numbers: Period Average Monthly Sales Tax Rate Tax Due Per Month Tax Due For Period Jun 1985 — Dec 1994 (115 months) 11,600.82 0.060367 700.31 80,535.65 Jan (12 — Dec 1995 months) 8,253.75 0.060367 498.25 5,979.00 Jan (12 — Dec 1996 months) 9,497.7613 0.060367 573.35 6,880.20 Jan (12 — Dec 1997 months) 14,310.08 0.060367 863.86 10,366.32 Jan (12 — Dec 1998 months) 14,163.42 0.060367 855.00 10,260.00 Jan (12 — Dec 1999 months) 10,525.50 0.060367 635.39 7,624.68 Jan (12 — Dec 2000 months) 12,854.4314 0.060367 775.98 9,311.76 Jan — Jun 2001 (6 months) $11,600.82 0.060367 700.31 4,201.86 135,159.47 In sum, the Department found that Hancock was liable for $134,337.17 in state sales taxes and $822.30 in County Taxes, see endnote 12, which amounts, when added together, equaled $135,159.47. Additionally, the Department found that Hancock owed small amounts of state use taxes in connection with several fixed assets. This aspect of the case received little attention, if any, at final hearing and accordingly will not be examined in great detail here. The following table summarizes the amounts that the Department claims are due and owing: Asset Transaction Date Tax Due Computer September 1995 229.12 Office refrigerator April 1997 24.00 Computer October 1998 72.00 Office Furniture December 1998 21.62 Printer May 1999 24.66 371.40 In January 2002, the Department notified Hancock that it intended to collect the alleged tax deficiencies just described, in the total principal amount of $135,530.87. In addition, the Department claimed $135,666.86 in interest through January 2, 2002, together with a total of $52,359.05 in penalties, making a grand total of $323,556.78. Hancock disputed the assessments and timely requested a formal administrative hearing. Ultimate Factual Determinations The factual question whether Hancock performed nontaxable services as a decorating contractor, as he maintains, or leased tangible personal property and thereby incurred sales tax liability, as the Department contends, is very close, at least based on the evidence presented. On a better record it might have been possible to answer this question with greater confidence——and, indeed, to obtain a different result. On this relatively limited record, however, the undersigned finds that the weight of the evidence tips ever so slightly in the Department's favor, primarily because it appears more likely than not that Hancock's clients were given a meaningful right to direct the use of the material personal property involved, namely the live plants and trees. Thus, while reasonable minds could differ, the undersigned finds that Hancock was engaging in the taxable business activity of leasing personal property. The evidence does not establish, however, and hence the undersigned does not find, that Hancock filed a grossly false or substantially incorrect return or made a substantial underpayment of tax. Likewise, Hancock did not file any fraudulent returns. Rather, Hancock properly filed returns through mid-1994, paying all of the sales and use taxes then due and owing. What Hancock failed to do was make all required tax payments after May 1994——a significant default, to be sure, but one that leaves him less liable, in fact, for back-taxes than the Department has contended. Hancock's decision to stop collecting and remitting sales taxes, moreover, was based not upon an intent to defraud but upon an honest, if mistaken, belief that the business of Action Plant Rental fell within the "decorator's exemption."15 Apart from any question of liability, the Department's assessment of the amount of state sales taxes and County Taxes allegedly due and owing for the period from June 1985 through December 1993 is clearly erroneous, for at least three reasons. First, the state sales tax was not six percent during that entire period, yet the Department has computed Hancock's alleged tax liability as if it were.16 Second, the Department did not make any adjustments to account for the time-value of money when it projected sales figures from 1995-2000 back as many as 15 years. It is commonly known, however, that dollars earned in the year 2000, for example, had less purchasing power than, say, 1985 dollars; thus, sales figures from 2000 must be discounted if a fair and reasonable comparison to 1985 is to be made. The Department's failure to reduce recent earnings to the then- present value of income derived from plant rentals in the earlier years of the audit period is tantamount to charging interest——which, of course, the Department has also assessed, separately. Finally, the Department's calculation assumed, incorrectly, that (a) Hancock's business had not changed during the entire 16-year audit period and (b) Hancock had never paid any sales taxes. In fact, until the end of 1993, Hancock derived income not only from his plant rental business but also from landscaping and plant sales; not only that, he paid sales taxes on the receipts from these activities, through May 1994. In sum, then, even if Hancock were liable for the taxes that allegedly accrued before 1994, the Department's figures for that period of the audit are simply too unreliable to be credited. Period Average Monthly Sales Tax Rate Tax Due Per Month Tax Due For Period Jun 1994 — Dec 1994 (7 months) 11,600.82 0.060367 700.31 4,902.17 Jan — Dec 1995 (12 months) 8,253.75 0.060367 498.25 5,979.00 Jan — Dec 1996 (12 months) 9,497.7617 0.060367 573.35 6,880.20 Jan — Dec 1997 (12 months) 14,310.08 0.060367 863.86 10,366.32 Jan — Dec 1998 (12 months) 14,163.42 0.060367 855.00 10,260.00 Jan — Dec 1999 (12 months) 10,525.50 0.060367 635.39 7,624.68 Jan — Dec 2000 (12 months) 12,854.4318 0.060367 775.98 9,311.76 Jan — Jun 2001 (6 months) $11,600.82 0.060367 700.31 4,201.86 59,525.99 It is found, therefore, that Hancock owes state sales taxes and County Taxes in the following sums: Additionally Hancock must pay use taxes amounting to $371.40, bringing to $59,897.39 the total principal amount of taxes proved to be due.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order directing Hancock to pay state sales taxes and County Taxes in the total amount of $59,525.99, plus state use taxes in the amount of $371.40, bringing to $59,897.39 the principal sum of back-taxes due and owing. In addition, Hancock should be ordered to pay interest and penalties on the unpaid taxes, in amounts to be determined by the Department in accordance with the methodologies reflected in the audit work papers that are included in the evidentiary record of this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of January, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of January, 2004.

Florida Laws (14) 120.57120.80159.47212.02212.05212.12213.21220.23253.75337.1772.01190.408902.1795.091
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INTERNATIONAL SURFACE PREPARATION GROUP, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 07-002845 (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jun. 27, 2007 Number: 07-002845 Latest Update: Feb. 26, 2008

The Issue Whether Petitioner collected and remitted to the Florida Department of Revenue the correct amount of sales tax on Petitioner's retail sales; and Whether Petitioner remitted to the Florida Department of Revenue the proper amount of sales tax on Petitioner's general and fixed assets purchases and on its commercial lease.

Findings Of Fact Petitioning Taxpayer, Surface Preparation Group, Inc., is a "C" corporation, incorporated in the State of Texas. The Taxpayer's product or service is the sale, service, and rental of surface preparation equipment. The Taxpayer has been registered with the Department since October 7, 1999. By letter dated January 12, 2005, the Department notified the Taxpayer of its intent to audit the Taxpayer's books and records to verify the Taxpayer's compliance with Florida's sales and use tax statutes. The audit period in this case is from December 1, 2001, through November 30, 2004. When the audit started, the Taxpayer had a presence in LeGrange, Georgia. During the course of the audit and negotiations, the Taxpayer removed itself back to its Texas headquarters. Specific records were requested to be made available for the Department's auditor to review. Four subject areas were developed in the audit plan: (1) sales; (2) fixed expense; (3) general expense; and (4) commercial rent. Although the Taxpayer provided some sales data, the information contained therein did not correlate with other information the Department had concerning the Taxpayer's Florida sales. For instance, auditors had traced through general ledgers to Petitioner’s federal tax return and compared the return with the company’s Florida sales and use tax return, and the figures did not correlate. Despite repeated requests by the Department's auditor, the Taxpayer provided no information explaining the reasons for this discrepancy, nor was any information provided regarding the Taxpayer’s general purchases, fixed asset purchases, or its commercial lease expenses. Therefore, in order to complete the audit process, the Department had to use the best information available to estimate the additional tax due on fixed assets, general purchases, and commercial rent. That information in this case consisted of materials provided by the Taxpayer and industry averages and past audit assessments of businesses in similar industries. Because total sales reported by the Taxpayer on its DR-15 monthly sales returns were different than the amounts the Taxpayer reported in response to the audit request, there was no assurance that the reported taxable sales and exempt sales were correct. Accordingly, the Department's auditor disallowed all exempt sales as reported by the Taxpayer. Because the Taxpayer had a location in Polk County, Florida, during part of the audit period, it must have had fixed assets there. This meant that a use tax was due for all the Taxpayer’s purchases in Florida, without credit for sales tax paid to vendors who in many cases were located in Georgia. No information was provided by the Taxpayer for general expenses or rental expenses. Without any information from the Taxpayer for general expenses or rental location, the Department had to proceed differently than it would have normally proceeded. In anticipation of submitting more documents to be analyzed by the Department as part of the audit, Mr. Hillebrand, tax manager for Petitioner, signed, on October 24, 2005, a consent to extend the statute of limitations and time for completing the audit to July 31, 2006. (Exhibit R-2, page 000030). On March 15, 2006, Mr. Schnaible, one of the Taxpayer’s Controllers, signed a consent to extend until December 31, 2006. (Exhibit R-2, page 000029). On September 26, 2006, after analyzing all that had been received from the Taxpayer up to that date, the Department mailed a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes (NOI) to Petitioner, along with the work papers supporting the changes, and a letter from the auditor explaining the findings. The amount of tax assessed totaled $197,714.38, and comprised: Schedule A01: Disallowed Exempt Sales $169,994.38; Schedule B01: Estimated Fixed Asset Purchases $10,080.00; Estimated General Expenses: $5,040.00; and Estimated Commercial Rental $12,600.00. Interest accrued through September 26, 2006, totaled $57,353.50. The penalty at that date totaled $49,428.09, bringing the total assessment amount to $304,496.47. The Department’s September 26, 2006, letter offered the Taxpayer another opportunity to provide records if it disputed the auditor's findings, and another option to continue the audit process. (Exhibit R-2, pages 000044 through 000045). On October 25, 2006, Mr. Spomer, Taxpayer’s Controller who eventually signed the Petition and Amended Petition herein, wrote a letter (Exhibit R-2, page 000042) to the auditor stating that he requested to extend the audit and that he would mail back the signed, correct form. Normally, a DR-872e form to extend the statute and audit period must be signed within 30 days of the NOI. In this case, it was signed two months later. Apparently, one such form signed by Mr. Spomer was inadvertently filled-in by the Department with the extension date of "June 30, 2006," (copy attached to Amended Petition). Therefore, a second form was executed by Mr. Spomer on November 1, 2006. This form bears the correct extension date of June 30, 2007. (Exhibit R-2, page 000028). No additional information was provided by the Taxpayer which would change any of the tax amounts identified in the NOI. Therefore, on January 31, 2007, the Department issued it Notice of Proposed Assessment (NOPA). Therein, the amount of tax due remained unchanged. The amount of accrued interest through January 31, 2007, increased to $65,023.73, and the penalty was reduced to zero. The Department currently seeks $262,738.11, with interest accruing on the unpaid tax liability at the statutory rate.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order sustaining the Notice of Proposed Assessment dated January 31, 2007. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of December, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Revenue The Carlton Building, Room 204 501 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Lisa Echeverri, Executive Director Department of Revenue The Carlton Building, Room 104 501 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 John Mika, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capital - Revenue Litigation Bureau Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Dale Spomer International Surface Preparation Group (Texas), Inc. 6330 West Loop South, Suite 900 Houston, Texas 77401

Florida Laws (4) 120.57212.12213.05213.34
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TAN, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 94-002135 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Apr. 25, 1994 Number: 94-002135 Latest Update: May 30, 1996

The Issue Whether the contested and unpaid portions of the tax, penalty and interest assessment issued against Petitioners as a result of Audit No. 9317210175 should be withdrawn as Petitioners have requested?

Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Shuckers is an oceanfront restaurant and lounge located at 9800 South Ocean Drive in Jensen Beach, Florida. In November of 1992, Petitioner Mesa's brother, Robert Woods, Jr., telephoned Mesa and asked her if she wanted a job as Shuckers' bookkeeper. Woods had been the owner of Shuckers since 1986 through his ownership and control of the corporate entities (initially Shuckers Oyster Bar Too of Jensen Beach, Florida, Inc., and then NAT, Inc.) that owned the business. Mesa needed a job. She therefore accepted her brother's offer of employment, notwithstanding that she had no previous experience or training as a bookkeeper. When Mesa reported for her first day of work on November 19, 1992, she learned that Woods expected her to be not only the bookkeeper, but the general manager of the business as well. Mesa agreed to perform these additional responsibilities. She managed the day-to-day activities of the business under the general direction and supervision of Woods. After a couple of weeks, Woods told Mesa that it would be best if she discharged her managerial responsibilities through an incorporated management company. Woods had his accountant draft the documents necessary to form such a corporation. Among these documents were the corporation's Articles of Incorporation. Mesa executed the Articles of Incorporation and, on December 3, 1992, filed them with the Secretary of State of the State of Florida, thereby creating Petitioner TAN, Inc. TAN, Inc.'s Articles of Incorporation provided as follows: The undersigned subscribers to these Articles of Incorporation, natural persons competent to contract, hereby form a corporation under the laws of the State of Florida. ARTICLE I- CORPORATE NAME The name of the corporation is: TAN, INC. ARTICLE II- DURATION This corporation shall exist perpetually unless dissolved according to Florida law. ARTICLE III- PURPOSE The corporation is organized for the purpose of engaging in any activities or business permitted under the laws of the United States and the State of Florida. ARTICLE IV- CAPITAL STOCK The corporation is authorized to issue One Thousand (1000) shares of One Dollar ($1.00) par value Common Stock, which shall be designated "Common Shares." Article V- INITIAL REGISTERED OFFICE AND AGENT The principal office, if known, or the mailing address of this corporation is: TAN, INC. 9800 South Ocean Drive Jensen Beach, Florida 34957 The name and address of the Initial Registered Agent of the Corporation is: Linda A. W. Mesa 9800 South Ocean Drive Jensen Beach, Florida 34957 ARTICLE VI- INITIAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS This corporation shall have one (1) director initially. The number of directors may be either increased or diminished from time to time by the By-laws, but shall never be less than one (1). The names and addresses of the initial directors of the corporation are as follows: Linda A. W. Mesa 9800 South Ocean Drive Jensen Beach, Florida 34957 ARTICLE VII- INCORPORATORS The names and addresses of the incorporators signing these Articles of Incorporation are as follows: Linda A. W. Mesa 9800 South Ocean Drive Jensen Beach, Florida 34957 On the same day it was incorporated, December 3, 1992, TAN, Inc., entered into the following lease agreement with the trust (of which Woods was the sole beneficiary) that owned the premises where Shuckers was located: I, Michael Blake, Trustee, hereby lease to Tan, Inc. the premises known as C-1, C-2, C-3, C-4, 9800 South Ocean Drive, Jensen Beach, Florida for the sum of $3,000.00 per month. This is a month to month lease with Illinois Land Trust and Michael Blake, Trustee. Mesa signed the agreement in her capacity as TAN, Inc.'s President. She did so at Woods' direction and on his behalf. No lease payments were ever made under the agreement. 3/ The execution of the lease agreement had no impact upon Shuckers. Woods remained its owner and the person who maintained ultimate control over its operations. At no time did he relinquish any part of his ownership interest in the business to either Mesa or her management company, TAN, Inc. Mesa worked approximately 70 to 80 hours a week for her brother at Shuckers doing what he told her to do, in return for which she received a modest paycheck. Woods frequently subjected his sister to verbal abuse, but Mesa nonetheless continued working for him and following his directions because she needed the income the job provided. As part of her duties, Mesa maintained the business' financial records and paid its bills. She was also required to fill out, sign and submit to Respondent the business' monthly sales and use tax returns (hereinafter referred to as "DR- 15s"). She performed this task to the best of her ability without any intention to defraud or deceive Respondent regarding the business' tax liability. The DR-15s she prepared during the audit period bore NAT, Inc.'s Florida sales and use tax registration number. On the DR-15 for the month of December, 1992, Mesa signed her name on both the "dealer" and "preparer" signature lines. Other DR-15s were co-signed by Mesa and Woods. In April of 1993, Woods told Mesa that she needed to obtain a Florida sales and use tax registration number for TAN, Inc., to use instead of NAT, Inc.'s registration number on Shuckers' DR-15s. In accordance with her brother's desires, Mesa, on or about May 14, 1993, filed an application for a Florida sales and use tax registration number for TAN, Inc., which was subsequently granted. On the application form, Mesa indicated that TAN, Inc. was the "owner" of Shuckers and that the application was being filed because of a "change of ownership" of the business. In fact, TAN, Inc. was not the "owner" of the business and there had been no such "change of ownership." By letter dated June 22, 1993, addressed to "TAN INC d/b/a Shuckers," Respondent gave notice of its intention to audit the "books and records" of the business to determine if there had been any underpayment of sales and use taxes during the five year period commencing June 1, 1988, and ending May 31, 1993. The audit period was subsequently extended to cover the six year period from June 1, 1987 to May 31, 1993. Relying in part on estimates because of the business' inadequate records, auditors discovered that there had been a substantial underpayment of sales and use taxes during the audit period. The auditors were provided with complete cash register tapes for only the following months of the audit period: June, July, August and December of 1992, and January, February, March, April and May of 1993. A comparison of these tapes with the DR-15s submitted for June, July, August and December of 1992, and January, February, March, April and May of 1993 revealed that there had been an underreporting of sales for these months. Using the information that they had obtained regarding the three pre- December, 1992, months of the audit period for which they had complete cash register tapes (June, July and August of 1992), the auditors arrived at an estimate of the amount of sales that had been underreported for the pre- December, 1992, months of the audit period for which they did not have complete cash register tapes. The auditors also determined that Shuckers' tee-shirt and souvenir sales, 4/ Sunday brunch sales, cigarette vending sales, vending/amusement machine location rentals 5/ and tiki bar sales that should have been included in the sales reported on the DR-15s submitted during the audit period were not included in these figures nor were these sales reflected on the cash register tapes that were examined. According of the "Statement of Fact" prepared by the auditors, the amount of these unreported sales were determined as follows: TEE-SHIRT SALES: Sales were determined by estimate. This was determined to be $2,000/ month. No records were available and no tax remitted through May, 1993. SUNDAY BRUNCH SALES: Sales were determined by estimate. This was determined to be 100 customers per brunch per month (4.333 weeks). No audit trail to the sales journal was found and no records were available. CIGARETTE VENDING SALES: The estimate is based on a review of a sample of purchases for the 11 available weeks. The eleven weeks were averaged to determine monthly sales at $3/pack. VENDING MACHINE LOCATION RENTAL REVENUE: The revenue estimate is based on a review of a one month sample. TIKI BAR SALES: The sales estimate is based on a review of infrequent cash register tapes of February, 1993. The daily sales was determined by an average of the sample. The number of days of operation per month was determined by estimate. In addition, the auditors determined that TAN, Inc. had not paid any tax on the lease payments it was obligated to make under its lease agreement with Illinois Land Trust and Michael Blake, Trustee, nor had any tax been paid on any of the pre-December, 1992, lease payments that had been made in connection with the business during the audit period. According to the "Statement of Fact" prepared by the auditors, the amount of these lease payments were determined as follows: The estimate is based on 1990 1120 Corporate return deduction claimed. This return is on file in the Florida CIT computer database. The 1990 amount was extended through the 6/87 - 11/92 period. For the period 12/92 - 5/93 audit period, TAN's current lease agreement of $3,000/month was the basis. No documentation was produced during the audit supporting any the sales tax exemptions that the business had claimed during the audit period on its DR-15s. 6/ Accordingly, the auditors concluded that the sales reported as exempt on the business' DR-15s were in fact taxable. Using records of sales made on a date selected at random (February 1, 1993), the auditors calculated effective tax rates for the audit period. They then used these effective tax rates to determine the total amount of tax due. An initial determination was made that a total of $201,971.71 in taxes (not including penalties and interest) was due. The amount was subsequently lowered to $200,882.28. On or about December 22, 1993, TAN, Inc., entered into the following Termination of Lease Agreement with Ocean Enterprises, Inc.: TAN, Inc., a Florida corporation, hereby consents to termination of that certain lease of the premises known as C-1, C-2, C-3 and C-4 of ISLAND BEACH CLUB, located at 9800 South Ocean Drive, Jensen Beach, Florida, dated December 3, 1992, acknowledges a landlord's lien on all assets for unpaid rent; and transfers and sets over and assigns possession of the aforesaid units and all of its right, title and interest in and to all inventory, equipment, stock and supplies located on said premises 7/ in full satisfaction of said unpaid rent; all of the foregoing effective as of this 22nd day of December, 1993. FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION of the foregoing termin- ation of lease, OCEAN ENTERPRISES, Inc., a Florida corporation, hereby agrees to pay Linda Mesa, each month all of the net revenues of the operation of the bar and restaurant located on said premises, up to the sum of $15,000.00, for sales tax liability asserted against TAN, Inc. or Linda A. W. Mesa based upon possession or ownership of said premises or any of the assets located thereon, plus attorney's fees incurred in connection with defending or negotiating settlement of any such liability. Net revenue shall mean gross revenue, less operating expenses, includ- ing, but not limited to, rent, up to the amount of $5,000.00 per month, costs of goods sold, utilities, payroll and payroll expense and insurance. OCEAN ENTERPRISES, Inc. represents that it has entered into a lease of said premises for a term of five years commencing on or about December 22, 1993, pursuant to the terms and conditions of which OCEANFRONT [sic] ENTERPRISES, Inc. was granted the right to operate a restaurant and bar business on said premises. Ocean Enterprises, Inc., leases the property from Island Beach Enterprises, which obtained the property through foreclosure. TAN, Inc., has been administratively dissolved.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order withdrawing the contested and unpaid portions of the assessment issued as a result of Audit No. 9317210175, as it relates to TAN, Inc., and Linda A. W. Mesa. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 27th day of June, 1995. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of June, 1995.

Florida Laws (8) 212.031212.05212.06212.07212.12213.28213.3472.011 Florida Administrative Code (2) 12A-1.05512A-1.056
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TRUE BLUE POOLS CONTRACTING, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 10-008807 (2010)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Sep. 02, 2010 Number: 10-008807 Latest Update: Jan. 20, 2011

The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner collected and remitted to Respondent the correct amount of sales and use taxes during the audit period from October 1, 2004, through September 30, 2007, and, if not, what additional amount of tax plus penalty and interest is due.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner True Blue Pools (Petitioner, taxpayer, or TBP) is a domestic corporation headquartered in Miami-Dade County, Florida. TBP services, repairs, and renovates swimming pools and constructed some pools during the audit period. Respondent, Florida Department of Revenue (Respondent or DOR), is the agency of state government authorized to administer the tax laws of the State of Florida, pursuant to section 213.05, Florida Statutes.2 DOR is authorized to prescribe the records to be kept by all persons subject to taxes under chapter 212, Florida Statutes. Such persons have a duty to keep and preserve their records, and the records shall be open to examination by DOR or its authorized agents at all reasonable hours pursuant to section 212.12(6), Florida Statutes. DOR is authorized to conduct audits of taxpayers and to request information to ascertain their tax liability, if any, pursuant to section 213.34, Florida Statutes. On November 2, 2007, DOR initiated an audit of TBP to determine whether it was properly collecting and remitting sales and use taxes to DOR. The audit period was from October 1, 2004, through September 30, 2007. On December 15, 2008, DOR sent TBP its Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes (NOI), with schedules, showing that TBP owed to DOR additional sales and use taxes in the amount of $113,632.17, penalty in the amount of $28,406.05, and interest through December 16, 2008, in the amount of $34,546.59, making a total assessment in the amount of $176,586.81. On October 26, 2009, DOR issued its Notice of Proposed Assessment. TBP timely challenged the Notice of Proposed Assessment, filing its petition with DOR and requesting an administrative hearing. Subsequent to the petition being filed, additional documentation was provided by TBP resulting in a revision to the tax, interest, and penalty amount due. DOR's revised work papers, dated May 27, 2010, claim Petitioner owes $64,430.83 in tax, $16,107.71 in penalty, and interest through May 27, 2010, in the amount of $27,071.99, with an assessment of $107,610.53. The assessed penalty, $16,107.71, was calculated after 25% of the penalty was waived, pursuant to subsection 213.21(3)(a), Florida Statutes, based on DOR's determination that there is no evidence of willful negligence, willful neglect, or fraud. The audit was conducted to determine liability in four categories: improper sales tax exemptions, unpaid sales taxes for taxable expenses, unpaid use taxes on fixed assets, and unpaid use taxes on taxable materials used to fulfill contracts to improve real property. Sales Tax Exemptions Due to the large volume of invoices and other records, the auditor conducted a random sampling of invoices for three months during the audit period, October 2004, January 2005, and September 2007.3 If no sales tax was collected and the Petitioner claimed that the transaction was exempt from the requirement to pay taxes, the auditor looked for proof that either the TBP customer was an exempt organization, for example, a school or a church, or that TBP had provided its suppliers with a DOR Form DR-13 to exempt from taxes products acquired for resale. In the absence proof of either type of exemption, DOR assumed taxes should have been paid. Using the difference between taxes collected and taxes due for the three months, the auditor determined that the percentage of error was .016521. When .016521 was applied to total sales of $1,485,890.79 for the 36-month audit period, the results showed that an additional $24,548.41 in sales taxes should have been collected from customers, and is due from TBP. Although a business is required to pay taxes for the materials it purchases to use in its business, it is not required to collect taxes from its customers when it enters into lump sum contracts to perform a service for customers. At least one invoice for $9,500.00 that the auditor treated as an improper exemption was, in fact, a partial payment on a lump-sum contract. The invoice referenced a "shotcrete draw," which represented the collection of funds after the concrete part of pool construction was completed. TBP is not required to collect taxes when it uses lump-sum contracts. Other invoices for pool repair and services were also mischaracterized as exempt by the TBP, but it is not clear that all were payments related to lump-sum contracts. DOR's auditor, nevertheless, testified as follows: With the knowledge that I have for True Blue Pools, being a lump-sum contractor, True Blue Pools should not charge their customer any sales tax. Transcript at pages 67-68. DOR concedes that some of TBP's transactions are also exempt from taxes as improvements to real property. In its Proposed Recommended Order, DOR asserted that TBP's use of the term "improvements to real property" is overbroad, but it did not specify how or why this is the case. During cross- examination of the owner of TBP, only one invoice for $500.00 for leak detection on the Delgado property was shown to have been for a service rather than for swimming pool construction. Taxable Expenses DOR audited TBP's purchases of tangible personal property used in the daily operation of its business. The products included chlorine and other chemicals, office supplies, and vehicle parts, expenses, and repairs. The ledger for a 12- month period, calendar year 2006, showed an average monthly additional tax due of $111.18, or a total of $4,002.48 in additional taxes for the 36-month audit period. As noted in Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order, "[t]he representative of TBP did not dispute DOR's allegation that no tax may have been paid on the purchase of all of these items " Fixed Assets TBP's list of fixed assets was taken from the depreciation schedule on Internal Revenue Service Form 4562. The items listed are computer- and software-related. TBP provided no proof that it had paid a use tax. The additional tax due equals $419.94. Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order includes the statement that "[a]gain, the representative of TBP did not dispute DOR's allegation that no tax may have been paid on the purchase of these items " Taxable Materials Taxable materials, those purchased to fulfill a contract to improve real property, included items used to build, renovate, and repair pools. The items included concrete, meters, drains, and valves. For the 12-month sample period, calendar year 2006, TBP failed to pay taxes on material purchases in the total amount of $168,310.05, or an average of $14,078.96 a month. For the 36-month audit period, the total of the purchases was $506,842.56. With a 6 percent tax due for the state and 1 percent for the county, the total additional tax due on materials is $35,460.00. TBP conceded that it improperly used a resale exemption to purchase taxable materials from suppliers without paying taxes. The materials were used to provide services and were not resold. Acknowledging again that TBP uses lump-sum contracts, this time to support the collection of additional taxes, the auditor testified as follows: And the law states that the taxpayer's [sic] an ultimate consumer of all materials purchased to fulfill a lump-sum contract, and that's what they told me they operate under, a lump-sum contract. Transcript at page 58. At the hearing, TBP used its actual profit and loss statement to show that the cost of goods it sold (general purchases and taxable materials) in the amounts of $18,360.77 in October 2004, $8,519.22 in January 2005, and $4,818.65 in September 2007. Corresponding taxes for each of those months should have been $1,285.25, $596.35, and $337.31, or an average of $739.63 a month, or a total of $26,626.68 for 36 months. The goods that it sold were not at issue in the audit of taxable materials, rather it was TBP's purchases from vendors that should have been taxed that resulted in DOR's audit results. Total Additional Sales and Use Taxes Due The three categories of additional taxes due, $4,002.48 for taxable expenses, $419.94 for fixed assets, and $35,460.00 for taxable materials, equal $39,882.42 in additional taxes due during the audit period. Taxes Paid TBP filed DOR Forms DR-15, monthly sales and use tax reporting forms, and paid sales and use taxes during the audit period. For the sample months used by DOR to examine sales tax exemptions, TBP paid $1,839.10 in taxes in October 2004, $1,672.73 in January 2005, and $1,418.13 in September 2007. Using the three months to calculate an average, extended to 36 months, it is likely that TBP paid $59,712 in taxes. TBP asserted that DOR was required to, but did not, offset the deficiency of $39,882.42, by what appears to be an overpayment of $59,712.00 in sales and use taxes. Other than pointing out that the amount reported on the DR-15s differed, being sometimes more and sometimes less than the amount shown on the profit and loss statements, DOR did not dispute TBP's claim that it had paid sales and use taxes. TBP's representative explained that end-of-the-year adjustments for additional collections or for bad debt could cause the amounts on the DR-15s and profit and loss statements to differ. With regard to the taxes paid, DOR took the following position in its Proposed Recommended Order: Petitioner's DR-15's [sic] for the collection periods October 2004, and January 2005, [and September 2007] (Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 1) do reflect sales tax being collected and remitted to DOR. DOR does not allege that Petitioner never paid tax on its purchases, or made bona fide exempt sales for which no tax was collected. DOR's audit findings identify just those which occurred within the sample period, scheduled in the auditor's workpapers, and applied over the entire audit period. The DR-15s are taken from the sample months selected by DOR within the audit period, and DOR does not address TBP's claim that a set off for taxes paid was mandatory, pursuant to subsection 213.34(4), Florida Statutes. Using the audit schedules, DOR showed credit for taxes paid in the amounts of $20.63 for taxable expenses, $0 for fixed assets, and $24.31 in state taxes and $1.03 for county taxes on taxable materials. The amounts are far less that the $59,712.00 in sales/use taxes TBP showed that it paid during the audit period.

Recommendation Based upon the forgoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Revenue issue a final order dismissing the Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes dated December 15, 2010. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of January, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of January, 2011.

Florida Laws (10) 120.57212.0506212.06212.12213.05213.21213.34215.26408.0572.011
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ROWES SUPERMARKETS, LLC vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 12-000698 (2012)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Feb. 20, 2012 Number: 12-000698 Latest Update: Jan. 10, 2014

The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Petitioner is liable for the sales and use tax, penalties, and interest assessed by the Department of Revenue and if so, what amount?

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Rowe's Supermarkets, LLC ("Petitioner" or "Rowe's"), is a Florida limited liability company. Robert Rowe was the president and primary shareholder in Rowe's. Respondent, Department of Revenue ("DOR" or "Respondent"), is an agency of the State of Florida authorized to administer the tax laws of the State of Florida. §§ 20.21 and 213.51, Fla. Stat. (2011) During the audit giving rise to this proceeding, Rowe's had its principal address at 5435 Blanding Boulevard, Jacksonville, Florida. Currently, Rowe's is located at 1431 Riverplace Boulevard, Jacksonville, Florida. Rowe's organized in Florida on May 4, 2005. Rowe's was a sales and use tax dealer registered with the Department to conduct business in this state. It was in business approximately four years. Rowe's acquired several former Albertson's grocery retail stores, including the adjacent liquor stores, in Jacksonville, St. Augustine, and Orange Park, Florida. During the audit period, Rowe's sold five stores with the adjacent liquor stores. Soon after beginning operation, Rowe's experienced significant financial difficulties which ultimately led to its demise. Its secured lender forced Rowe's to liquidate assets whenever possible, and all proceeds from the sale of the stores were paid directly into a locked account to Rowe's lender, Textron Financial. On October 29, 2008, the Department issued to Rowe's a Notification to Audit Books and Records, Form DR-840, bearing audit number 200048409, for sales and use tax, for the audit period beginning October 1, 2005, and ending September 30, 2008. On August 14, 2009, the Department issued to Rowe's a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes, form DR-1215, for sales and use taxes, penalties and interest totaling $321,191.45, with additional interest accruing at $53.71 per day. On August 20, 2009, Rowe's canceled its sales and use tax Certificate of Registration. In a letter dated September 11, 2009, Rowe's requested an audit conference. The requested audit conference was held November 19, 2009. On January 8, 2010, the Department issued the taxpayer a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes, form DR-1215, Revision #1, for sales and use tax, penalty and interest totaling $180,435.61, with additional interest accruing at $25.32 per day. On March 10, 2010, the Department issued a NOPA, which indicated Rowe's owed $137,225.27 in sales and use tax; $44,755.99 in interest through March 10, 2010; and $59.70 in penalties, with additional interest accruing at $26.32 per day. Prior to issuance of the NOPA, the Department compromised $34,246.663 in penalties, based upon reasonable cause. By letter dated May 6, 2010, Rowe's filed a protest to dispute the proposed assessment. The letter stated: I am submitting this informal protest on behalf of Rowe's Supermarkets, LLC (RS) as its past President. RS is no longer in business and has not assets. Before this audit began RS was unable to pay its bills. Also, its line of credit, which was secured by all of RS's assets, was in default and had been called by the lender. RS was unable to refinance the loan because of its poor financial condition. As a result, it sold all of its assets to a new company which was able to obtain financing and used the proceeds of that sale to repay its secured loan. RS not only has no assets but also is subject to an unsatisfied judgment lien against it in the amount of $324,936.33, which has been accruing interest at 8% per year from August 25, 2009, the date the judgment was entered by the Circuit Court here in Jacksonville. Even if Supermarkets was still in business and could pay its bills, we don't think it should be assessed with these taxes on the basis of the audit that was conducted. The auditor's lack of communication skills made it difficult for us to understand what information she needed. To the extent we understood her requests, we made every effort to provide her with the relevant information. But because most of the stores RS operated had already been closed, the only repository for obtaining accurate information was RS's general ledger, which she declined to review. She never explained why she made the proposed adjustments. We still don't know. We did our best when RS was operating to properly collect all sales taxes, we reflected all of the sale tax collections in the general ledger and we timely turned over all of the those taxes to the department of revenue, as is clear in the general ledger. We request that the proposed assessment be dropped. The Department issued a Notice of Decision on October 14, 2010, which sustained the assessment in full. In issuing its Notice of Decision, the Department did not review any issues related to the assessment other than doubt as to collectability. With respect to this issue, the Department stated, "[b]ased on our evaluation of all the factors of this case, including the financial information, we have concluded that it is not in the best interest of the State to accept your offer." Petitioner's challenge to the assessment presents five issues: 1) whether it was entitled to an exemption in section 212.12(14) for those additional taxes assessed for "rounding" up to the whole cent as opposed to using the bracket system in section 212.12(9); 2) whether the Department's assessment of additional taxes for expenses was erroneous where it was based on a sampling plan not presented to or agreed to by the taxpayer; 3) whether the additional tax on liquor sales was based on an incorrect application of Florida Administrative Code Rule 12A- 1.057(3)(a); 4) whether the Department violated the Taxpayer's Bill of Rights; and whether the Department was correct in determining that compromise of the assessment based on collectability was not in the best interest of the state. Each issue is treated separately below. The Exemption pursuant to section 212.12(14) Section 212.12(9) and (10), Florida Statutes, requires that sales taxes be paid on a "bracket system," and prescribes the amount of tax due for each portion of a dollar. Subsection (9) provides the tax brackets for those counties, such as St. Johns, which do not have a discretionary sales surtax and for which the tax rate is 6 percent. Subsection (10) provides the brackets for those counties, such as Duval and Clay, where a discretionary sales surtax of one percent has been adopted, making the sales-tax rate 7 percent. Section 212.12(14) provides a "safe harbor" from additional assessment of taxes for those dealers who fail to apply the tax brackets required by section 212.12. The taxpayer is not assessed additional taxes, penalty, and interest based on the failure to apply the bracket system if it meets three requirements: that it acted in a good faith belief that rounding was the proper method of determining the amount of tax due; if it timely reported and remitted all taxes collected on each taxable transaction; and if the taxpayer agrees in writing to future compliance with the law and rules concerning brackets applicable to the dealer's transactions. It is undisputed that Rowe's was not using the bracket system to calculate and collect sales taxes. The point-of-sale cash register system Rowe's purchased when opening its business was represented to Petitioner as compliant with Florida requirements when in fact it was not. The Department's auditor, Delaine Arrington, determined that assessment of additional taxes was appropriate because she believed that Rowe's had not timely reported and remitted all taxes collected on each taxable transaction, and that Rowe's had not agreed in writing to future compliance with respect to the bracketing system. The sales tax records for Rowe's were based upon the meshing of three different computer systems. First, there was a point-of-sale system at each cash register which collected the data, such as sales amounts, taxable sales, and sales tax collected, for each individual transaction. A software system called BR Data would then "pull" the sales data from the individual cash registers to create the cumulative sales register reports for each store. The cumulative data from BR Data was then automatically imported into Petitioner's accounting software, MAS 90, to populate the figures in Rowe's general ledger. Taxes collected were recorded in the general ledger under the credit column. The data in this column was transmitted from BR Data. It could not be adjusted manually, although other columns in the general ledger could be. There were sometimes problems with the transmission of information from BR Data, which generally occurred where there was a power surge or a thunderstorm that would affect the communication of information. As a result of these communication problems, there were times that the sales figure transmitted would be double or triple the actual sales for that day. When such an error was discovered, Rowe's staff would contact BR Data and have the report rebuilt, and the general ledger entry would be corrected. Rowe's informed Ms. Arrington that there had been numerous problems with the exporting process and the resulting need to correct journal entries. Ms. Arrington acknowledged at hearing that she had been advised that due to these problems, the sales figures were sometimes doubled or tripled. Ms. Arrington reviewed the general sales ledger, the cumulative sales register reports, and the sales and use tax returns for the audit period. According to her review, there were three days in August 2006 where the amount of collected tax reflected in the cumulative sales register was higher than what was reflected in the general ledger. Based upon this review, she assessed $1,193.98 in additional sales taxes. For August 1, 2006, the general ledger indicated that $263.48 in sales tax was collected. The cumulative sales report reflected that $790.44 in sales tax was collected. This second number in the cumulative sales report is exactly three times the amount reflected in the general ledger. The difference between the cumulative sales report amount and the general ledger amount is $526.96. For August 2, 2006, the general ledger indicated that $277.04 was collected. The cumulative sales report reflected that $554.08 in sales tax was collected, an amount exactly twice the amount recorded in the general ledger. The difference between the two documents is $277.04. For August 11, 2006, the general ledger indicated that $389.98 in sales tax was collected. The cumulative sales report reflected that $779.96 was collected, an amount exactly twice the amount recorded in the general ledger. The difference between the two documents is $389.98. The difference in the amounts reflected in the general ledger (which Rowe's claims is the more accurate document), and the cumulative sales register (which Ms. Arrington relied upon), is $1,193.98, the amount of additional tax assessed for this item. Ms. Arrington acknowledged at hearing that she credited the cumulative sales register numbers over Rowe's general ledger documents, and that she knew during the audit that there were issues relating to BR Data that occurred during the audit period. The only document upon which she relied was the cumulative sales register. Given the credible testimony by Robert Rowe and Neil Newman regarding the process and the problems encountered with the interface of data, and the fact that in each instance, the difference was an exact multiple of the amount reflected in the general ledger, the greater weight of the evidence presented at hearing supports the finding that the general ledger represents the amount of sales tax actually collected and paid by Rowe's. This finding means that not only is the assessment of additional sales tax for August 2006, in error, but also that means that Rowe's met the second requirement for avoiding the assessment of additional taxes under section 212.12(14) for failing to use the bracket system. Ms. Arrington also found that Rowe's had not agreed in writing to future compliance with the bracket system. On or about November 19, 2009, in conjunction with the Audit Conference, Ms. Arrington prepared an Agreement for Future Compliance (Agreement) and provided it to Mr. Rowe for signature. The text of the Agreement, which is on DOR letterhead and specifically references the Sales and Use Tax Audit number for Rowe's, states: The following dealer had demonstrated the proper actions required by Section 212.12(14),(a) and (b), F.S. (see attachment), and agree [sic] to sign the following suggested form to compliance with the laws concerning brackets applicable to the dealer's transactions in the future. Rowe's Supermarkets, LLC - BP#2134130, succeeded by Rowe's IGA, LLC - 3082649 agrees to future compliance with the laws and rules concerning the proper application of the tax bracket system to the dealer's transactions. Mr. Rowe did not sign the Agreement at the Audit Conference because he wanted to be able to confirm that the point of sale system his store operated could be properly programmed to comply with the bracket system before signing a document stating he would comply. After discussions with both the vendor and Ms. Arrington, and making sure the system was in fact operating in compliance with the requirement, Mr. Rowe signed the Agreement on December 7, 2009, and returned it to the Department. Ms. Arrington did not recall receiving the Agreement, but also admitted she had no specific memory as to whether she received it. Her Case Activity Record indicates that on December 3, 2009, she spoke with Mr. Rowe about whether he was able to input the brackets in his point-of-sale system, and that he indicated he was able to do so. The greater weight of the evidence supports the finding that Mr. Rowe executed and returned the Agreement, and it is so found. The Use Tax Assessment Based on a Sampling Plan Section 212.12 allows the Department to use a sample from the taxpayer's records and project audit findings from the sample to the entire audit period where the records of the taxpayer are "adequate but voluminous in nature and substance." The statute, which is discussed in more detail in the Conclusions of Law, contemplates the use of a sampling plan agreed to by the taxpayer, and in the absence of an agreement, the taxpayer's right to have a review by the Department's Executive Director. The work papers to the Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes dated January 8, 2010, include a sampling plan that runs from January 1, 2006, to December 31, 2006 for the calculation of use tax for purchases by Rowe's where sales tax was not collected by the vendor. Ms. Arrington reviewed Rowe's' records for expense purchases for 2006 to determine the total amount of additional tax due for that period. She then took the total additional tax on expenses for that period, i.e., $14,981.26, and divided it by 12 to obtain a monthly average additional tax of $1,248.44. She then applied that number to the entire 36-month audit period to determine a total assessment of additional tax for expense purchases of $44,943.84. Ms. Arrington testified that at the initial audit conference, she discussed different audit techniques in terms of sampling. However, a specific sampling plan was not discussed with Mr. Rowe and no Sampling Agreement was presented to him. No sampling plan was reviewed by the Executive Director. Ms. Arrington did not tell Mr. Rowe that 2006 would be the year used as the sample. Mr. Rowe never would have agreed to the use of 2006 as a sampling plan, because it would not be representative of the expenses incurred during the audit period. Using 2006 as a sampling period did not take into account the store closures during the audit period, and the concomitant reduction in expenses. Rowe's closed two grocery stores by March 2006, and operated only four stores for the remaining three quarters of the year. A third store was closed in January 2007, a fourth in May 2007 and a fifth in 2008, leaving only one store open for the entire audit period. All of the liquor stores were also closed during the audit period, the last one being sold in May 2008. Ms. Arrington knew that Rowe's had closed almost all of its stores during the audit period, and included information regarding the closings in her Standard Audit Report. She acknowledged at hearing that as the stores decreased, the expenses related to those stores would also most likely decrease. For the 12 months of 2006, the Department determined that an additional tax of $14,981.26 would be due, based on purchases of $253,637.22. There has been no evidence presented to rebut the accuracy of the tax assessment for these 2006 purchases. Petitioner presented evidence establishing that, for the 21 months of the audit period following 2006, Rowe's made purchases from the same vendors reflected in the 2006 sample of only $51,073.72, which would result in additional taxes of $3,575.16. No evidence was presented by either party as to whether there were any other purchases from other vendors for which taxes had not been paid. The difference between the use tax assessed against Rowe's by using the sampling plan and taxes due based on the actual purchases demonstrated at hearing is $22,642.08. In addition, there was one vendor, Advo, Inc. (Advo), which accounted for a significant percentage of the tax due based on the sampling plan. While the audit sample period was for twelve months, payments to Advo for a seven-month period accounted for approximately 58% of the total additional taxes due for expenses. There were no purchases from Advo after July 2006 because of Rowe's shrinking assets and inability to pay for direct advertising. Further, 15 of the 23 vendors reflected in the sample period from whom purchases were made had no sales to Rowe's from January 2007 through September 2008. The Department's work papers indicate that, within the sample year, the purchases tapered off significantly as the year progressed. Given the known closure of five grocery stores and six liquor stores during the audit period, using a time period where the most stores were open is not representative of the expenses experienced by Petitioner, and use of the sampling plan to which the taxpayer had not agreed was inappropriate, and led to an inflated assessment of additional taxes. The Effective Tax Rate at the Liquor Stores During the audit period, Rowe's operated package liquor stores adjacent to the grocery stores. By the time the audit commenced, Rowe's no longer owned any of the liquor stores, and no longer had the cash register tapes from the liquor stores. Because of the lack of cash register tapes, the auditor was unable to determine the effective tax rate Rowe's was collecting. She did not, however, ask Rowe's what rate was collected. A review of the sales tax returns indicates that it remitted a flat rate of 6 or 7 percent, depending on the county. These rates were consistent with what Rowe's was collecting for the grocery store sales, and cash register tapes were available from the grocery store. Ms. Arrington applied the tax rates identified in Florida Administrative Code Rules 12A-1.057(3)(a) and 12A- 15.012(2)(a), both of which identify the rate that should be collected where the dealer sells package goods but does not sell mixed drinks; does not separately itemize the sales price and the tax; and does not put the public on notice that tax is included in the total charge. The work papers paraphrase but do not quote the rules. With respect to the liquor store in St. Johns County, the work papers state: "[a]ccording to Rule 12A-1.057(3)(a), F.A.C., when the dealer is located in a county with no surtax and the public has not been put on notice through the posting of price lists or signs prominently displayed throughout the establishment that the tax is included in the total charge, package stores which sell no mixed drinks shall remit tax at the effective rate of .0635." With respect to the liquor stores in Clay and Duval Counties, the work papers state: "[a]ccording to Rule 12A- 15.012(2)(a)1., F.A.C., when a dealer, located in a county imposing a 1% surtax, sells package goods but does not sell mixed drinks and does not put the public on notice that tax is included in the total charge, the dealer is required to remit tax at the effective tax rate of .0730." The Department's auditor made the assumption that tax was not separately itemized for package store sales and assessed the additional tax accordingly. She did not ask the taxpayer whether this was the case and did not ask about signage in the package stores that were no longer owned by Rowe's. Mr. Rowe testified that the same point-of-sale program was used for the liquor stores as were used for the adjacent grocery stores. That program separately identified the tax due. His testimony is unrebutted and is credited. The Taxpayer's Bill of Rights At hearing, Petitioner took the position that the Department violated the Taxpayer's Bill of Rights as stated in section 213.015(5), by its failure to provide Petitioner with a "narrative description which explains the basis of audit changes, proposed assessments, assessments." In its Proposed Recommended Order, however, Petitioner candidly acknowledged that the evidence did not support a finding consistent with Petitioner's position. In light of this concession, no further findings of fact are necessary with respect to this issue. Collectibility Rowe's asserted in its challenge that it was unable to pay any taxes assessed because it was no longer in business and no longer had any assets. The Department declined to exercise its discretion to compromise the tax assessment based on collectability. While not specifically stated in its Notice of Decision, this position was apparently based upon the belief that the taxes could be paid by Rowe's IGA, LLC, to whom the assets of Rowe's was sold, and which shares the same managing member, Robert Rowe. The two companies share a managing member and one common location, which Rowe's sold to Rowe's IGA. However, no evidence was presented regarding the specifics of the assets sold to Rowe's IGA, and the only evidence presented indicates that any proceeds from the sale went to pay the secured lender for Rowe's, Textron Financial. Other than the involvement of Robert Rowe, no connection between the companies was established. Rowe's provided to the Department the copy of a judgment against it for $324,963.33, which bears interest at a rate of 8% annually. The Department did not identify any assets from which either the assessment or the judgment could be paid.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a Final Order that: Reduces the Department's assessment for additional taxes, penalties, and interest by any amounts attributable to the failure to comply with the sales bracket system at Petitioner's grocery stores; Reduces the Department's assessment for additional use taxes, penalties, and interest by any amounts attributable to the failure to remit all taxes due for the month of August 2006; Reduces the Department's assessment for additional use taxes, penalties, and interest by any amounts attributable to expense purchases for the period January 2007 through September 2008; Sustains the assessment for additional use tax, penalties, and interest for expense purchases in calendar year 2006; Reduces the Department's assessment for additional use taxes, penalties, and interest by any amounts attributable to the asserted basis that Petitioner should have collected tax at a higher effective tax rate at its liquor stores based upon the application of rules 12A-1.057(3)(a) or 12A-15.012(2)(a); Sustains the Department's assessment for additional sales tax, penalties, and interest against Petitioner for failure to pay tax on certain capital asset purchases identified in the audit; Sustains the Department's assessment for additional sales tax, penalties, and interest against Petitioner for failure to pay sales tax on commercial rent payments under certain of Petitioner's store leases identified in the audit; and Sustains the Department's assessment for additional sales tax, penalties, and interest against Petitioner for failure to pay sales tax on Petitioner's payment of ad valorem taxes under certain of Petitioner's store leases identified in the audit. In addition, it is Recommended that the Department reconsider its decision as to whether the remaining assessment is collectible, and whether it is in the best interest of the state to compromise the assessment, based on the record contained in this proceeding. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of July, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 2012.

Florida Laws (10) 120.569120.57120.8015.01220.21212.12212.13213.015213.2172.011
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DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE vs. HOLIDAY INN OCEANSIDE/CLEVELAND CARIBBEAN, INC., 79-000247 (1979)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 79-000247 Latest Update: Aug. 14, 1979

The Issue Whether the Respondent, Holiday Inn Oceanside/Cleveland Caribbean, Inc., is liable for the payment of $10,176.18, together with a penalty of 5 percent and interest accruing daily as claimed in the audit by the Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Revenue, for the period September 1, 1975, through August 31, 1970.

Findings Of Fact This cause comes on for consideration based upon the Respondent, Holiday Inn Oceanside/Cleveland Caribbean, Inc.`s challenge to the tax audit conducted by the Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Revenue, covering the period September 1, 1975, through August 31, 1978. The claim of the audit is for sales tax due pursuant to Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, and its supporting rules found in the Florida Administrative Code. The audit document showing the Proposed Notice of Assessment of Tax, Penalties and Interest may be found as the Petitioner's Exhibit A admitted into evidence. Although the audit document originally claimed tax in the amount of $29,600.37, at the commencement of the hearing the amount remaining in dispute was $15,288.75, together with a penalty of 5 percent and interest accruing until date of payment. During the hearing, a stipulation was entered into between the parties to the effect that, of the remaining disputed tax, penalty and interest, $5,112.57, together with the applicable penalty and interest was acknowledged to be owed by the Respondent. Therefore, there remains in dispute the amount of $10,176.18, with a 5 percent penalty and interest accruing until date of payment. This amount of tax, penalty and interest claimed represents the difference between the tax rate which the Petitioner has applied in this assessment process and the tax rate that the Respondent claims to be applicable. The Petitioner claims that a tax rate of 4.5 percent against total receipts, in keeping with the authority of Rule 12A-1.57(3), Florida Administrative Code. The Respondent counters that position by offering its own formula arrived at in view of the nature of its prices charged its customers, and that tax rate is 4.1666667 percent. The sales in question during the audit period pertain to sales of alcoholic and malt beverage in the lounges of the Respondent's licensed premises located in Dade County, Florida. The facts reveal that the sale of all alcoholic beverages in the time period at issue were made in increments of a quarter dollar ($.25). These quarter-dollar increments included the imposition of sales tax. As example: SALES PRICE TAX TOTAL $ .48 $.02 $ .50 .72 .03 .75 .96 .04 1.00 1.20 .05 1.25 1.44 .06 1.50 1.68 .07 1.75 Although the tax was computed on the sales price and this system was made known to the public by prominently displaying the price list, which list indicated that the beverage prices included tax; the Respondent did not separate the increment of the total price into categories of sales price and tax at the time of each transaction. Consequently, the books audited in the process of making the claim for assessment only demonstrated the total sales price of a given day's alcoholic beverage sales as an aggregate and did not reflect the tax as a separate item from the sales price. To this aggregate amount the Respondent applied its tax rate formula of 4.166667 by taking the amount of total receipts for the day and dividing by 1.04666667 to get gross sales. The gross sales were then subtracted from the amount of total receipts to obtain the figure for tax collected. This method was rounded off to the nearest penny on each day of computation. The Petitioner, as stated before, relies on Rule 12A-1.57(3), Florida Administrative Code, as a basis for its claim that the rate of tax should be 4.5 percent. That provision states: (3) Dealers in alcoholic and malt beverages are required to remit the actual tax collected to the State. In some instances, however, it may be impractical for such dealers to separately record the sales price of the beverage and the tax collected thereon. In such cases, dealers may elect to report tax on the following basis. Package stores who sell no mixed drinks should remit the tax at 4.3 percent of total receipts and dealers who sell mixed drinks or a combination of mixed drinks and packaged goods should remit the tax at the rate of 4.5 percent of total receipts. In those instances where the sales price and the tax have not been separately recorded but where it can be demonstrated that the public has been put on notice by means of price lists posted prominently throughout the establishment that the total charge includes tax, the dealer may deduct the tax from the total receipts to arrive at the appropriate tax and gross sales figures using the method shown below: Total receipts divided by the tax rate = gross sales. For example, a package store which sells no mixed drinks and whose total receipts are $2,000 would compute sales as follows: $2,000 divided by 1.043 percent = gross sales $1,917.54 tax collected 82.46 A dealer who sells drinks or a combination of drinks and package goods and whose total receipts are $2,000 would compute sales as follows: $2,000 divided by 1.045 percent = gross sales $1,913.87 tax collected 86.12 When the public has hot been put on notice through the posting of price lists that tax is included in the total charge, tax shall be computed by multiplying total receipts by the applicable rates referred to in this rule. In the mind of the Petitioner, by failing to segregate the total amounts collected into the categories of sales price and tax and then to remit the tax collected as a separate item, the Respondent is relegated to the utilization of Rule 12A-1.57(3), Florida Administrative Code, in remitting its tax. Under its theory, the Petitioner has taken the total receipts recorded in the Respondent's work sheets and divided those total receipts by the formula 1.045 percent to get gross sales and then subtracted the gross sales from the amount of total receipts to get the amount of tax that should have been collected, and then made a further subtraction of the tax which the Respondent remitted, from the tax formula which the Petitioner claims to be due on the transactions to arrive at the tax presently outstanding. This amount being the figure referenced above. From that computation, the amount of penalty and interest has been claimed. (By its position the Petitioner does not seem to question the fact that the public has been put on notice by price lists posted throughout the establishment that the total charge reflected on the price lists includes tax, as referred to in the subject Rule 12A-1.57(3), Florida Administrative Code.) According to the Respondent, the reason for the utilization of the rate of 4.1666667 percent was the fact that all beverages having a break in price increments of a quarter-dollar ($.25), it is mathematically impossible for the proper effective rate being charged on all beverages sold in the lounges to vary from their tax rate of 4.1666667 percent because each increment of increase has the same ratio of sales price to tax. The Respondent argues that to claim a rate of 4.5 percent causes the collection in excess of the amount allowed by Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. After considering the position of the parties, the Respondent is found to be correct in its position. The overall scheme of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, calls for the taxation of sales of tangible personal property at a rate of 4 percent, see Section 212.05, Florida Statutes. A further refinement of that theory is found in Subsection 212.12(10), Florida Statutes, which creates a bracketing system for sales representing the various fractions of a dollar in amount. This bracketing system thereby causes imposition of a sales tax greater than 4 percent in some transactions. The Petitioner is granted further authority to refine the system of taxation by those provisions of Subsections 212.17(6) and 212.18(2), Florida Statutes, which state in turn: 212.17(6) The department shall have the power to make, prescribe and publish reasonable rules and regulations not inconsistent with this chapter, or the other laws, or the constitution of this state, or the United States, for the enforcement of the provisions of this chapter and the collection of revenue hereunder, and such rules and regulations shall when enforced be deemed to be reasonable and just. 212.18(2) The department shall administer and enforce the assessment and collection of the taxes, interest, and penalties imposed by this chapter. It is authorized to make and publish such rules and regulations not inconsistent with this chapter, as it may deem necessary in enforcing its provisions in order that there shall not be collected on the average more than the rate levied herein. The department is authorized to and it shall provide by rule and regulation a method for accomplishing this end. It shall prepare instructions to all persons required by this chapter to collect and remit the tax to guide such persons in the proper collection and remission of such tax and to instruct such persons in the practices that may be necessary for the purpose of enforcement of this chapter and the collection of the tax imposed hereby. The use of tokens in the collection of this tax is hereby expressly forbidden and prohibited. It can be seen that the Petitioner has the authority to promulgate the necessary rules for the accomplishment of the purpose of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, but is restricted in this task by being prohibited from making rules and regulations which are inconsistent with this chapter or other statutes within the laws of the State of Florida or the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of Florida and it is further restricted from imposing rules or regulations which cause the tax to be collected on the average more than the rate levied in Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. While it is clear that the legislature intended to keep the effective rate of tax as near the 4 percent level as possible, it is also evident that the system contemplated a segregation of the amount collected in a sale as sales price, and the amount of tax applied to the sale at the point of the transaction. This is a means of accountability that helps insure that the proper remittance of tax due on each and every retail sales occurs. However, the preeminent charge to the Petitioner is the duty to collect the tax at a rate which most closely approximates the 4 percent called for, without abandoning responsibility or the close monitoring of the records of a given taxpayer. When considered in the overall context of the purpose of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, the method which the Respondent used to collect and remit tax, does not violate the conditions of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, nor the rules designed to enforce that chapter. The tax rate of 4.1666667 percent has been proven to be correct, in the sense of more closely approximating the 4 percent tax rate called for than the application of a tax rate of 4.5 percent. The correctness is established because the increments charged for alcoholic beverages are always in the amount of a quarter-dollar ($.25) and each increment of increase carries the same tax rate. This fact, when considered with the additional fact that the break-out of the tax in the price structure as established by the Respondent, is in keeping with the tables of the bracket system found in Subsection 212.12(10), Florida Statutes, is sufficiently convincing to demonstrate the propriety of the Respondent's position. Nonetheless, a further examination of the Petitioner's argument is indicated. The focus of the Petitioner's position is Rule 12A-1.57(3), Florida Administrative Code, and a detailed reading of this rule reveals that dealers who have properly put the public on notice that their sales prices include tax, "may" elect to remit tax by using the formula of the rate of 4.5 percent of total receipts as the tax due. The use of the word "may" in this instance creates an option on the part of the Respondent, an option which it has elected not to proceed under and by the facts of this case, the alternate method which the Respondent used in computing this tax, i.e., the rate 4.1666667 percent is efficacious. Finally, the Petitioner has advanced the argument that the formula found in Rule 12A-1.57(3), Florida Administrative Code, is unique to that rule and may not be utilized unless the prerequisite factors are shown and unless the tax rate factor 4.5 percent is part of the formula. Even though the formula as expressed in Rule 12A-1.57(3), Florida Administrative Code, may have legitimate application to some cases, it is not preemptive in its scope and it would not prohibit the Respondent in this case from using the formula and substituting the rate of tax of 4.1666667 percent for the rate of 4.5 percent in that part of the formula. In summary, the Petitioner has failed to demonstrate its entitlement to the tax, penalty and interest under its claim founded on Rule 12A-1.57(3), Florida Administrative Code. (Petitioner in this cause had submitted Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Recommendation in the case styled, Holiday Inn Oceanside/Cleveland Caribbean, Inc., Petitioner, vs. State of Florida, Department of Revenue, Respondent, D.O.A.H. Case No. 70-1003R, and in doing so made reference to matters which have been considered in the present case. Therefore, to the extent that those matters are not inconsistent with this Recommended Order they have been utilized. To the extent that those proposals are inconsistent with this Recommended Order they are specifically rejected. The Respondent has also submitted Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Recommended Order and to the extent that those matters are not inconsistent with this Recommended Order they have been utilized. To the extent that those proposals are inconsistent with this Recommended Order they are specifically rejected.)

Recommendation It is recommended that the Respondent, Holiday Inn Oceanside/Cleveland Caribbean, Inc., be relieved from further responsibility to pay the amount of tax, $10,176.18 and the 5 percent penalty and interest accruing on that amount of tax. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of June, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Martha J. Cook, Esquire Department of Revenue Room 422, Fletcher Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard Watson, Esquire c/o Spieth, Bell, McCurdy & Newell 1190 Union Commerce Building Cleveland, Ohio 44115 Mark J. Wolff, Esquire and Howard E. Roskin, Esquire First Federal Building, 30th Floor One Southeast Third Avenue Miami, Florida 33131

Florida Laws (4) 212.05212.12212.17212.18
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