Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent, Lawrence P. Weiner, was a registered Florida real estate salesman employed by Continental Marketing Services, Inc. Continental Marketing Services, Inc. solicited real property listings from property owners in the State of Florida by means of postal cards inquiring of those property owners whether they would like to sell their Florida real property. Interested owners were requested to fill out a card with their address and telephone number, and to forward that card to Continental Marketing Services, Inc. which would then contact the property openers by telephone, Respondent, as a real estate salesman in the employ of Continental Marketing Services, Inc., would then contact responding property owners from a list furnished him by his employer. Respondent would obtain information by telephone from property owners such as initial purchase price, size and location of the property. Both Respondent and his employer represented to property owners that, should they list their property with Continental Marketing Services, Inc., the property would be advertised in foreign countries where investors existed who were interested in purchasing Florida real estate. In order to list their property with Continental Marketing Services, Inc., property owners were required to pay an "advance fee" for these listings, usually $350, which amount they were told would be used to defray the cost of initial preparation of a directory listing those properties in Florida which were for sale. After obtaining initial background information, Respondent would submit the information to his employer, which, though unclear from the record, would analyze these facts and return to Respondent for transmission to the property owner a suggested sales price. This suggested sales price was usually several times the initial purchase price for the property. For example, one witness at the hearing testified that a lot purchased on April 27, 1967 for $2,640 was ultimately listed with Continental Marketing Services, Inc. at Respondent's suggestion, at a sales price of $7,600. Testimony at the hearing indicated that comparable lots in the same area are presently selling for $4,700. Another witness testified that two lots purchased in 1965 for $2,390, were discussed in 1977 with Respondent who suggested that they be listed at a suggested sales price of $16,600. Finally, still another witness testified that he listed property with Continental Marketing Services, Inc. as a result of his contacts with the Respondent at a purchase price of $5,000 per acre in 1976 for property that he had purchased for $500 an acre in 1964. Those property owners testifying at the hearing who listed their property for sale with Continental Marketing Services, Inc., indicated that they had no further contact with either Respondent or Continental Marketing Services, Inc. after having paid their $350 listing fee. None of these property owners received any offers to purchase their property as a result of its listing with Continental Marketing Services, Inc., and, as of the date of the final hearing in this cause, the property remained unsold. The Respondent testified that his only responsibilities with Continental Marketing Services, Inc. involved contacting those persons on the lists furnished to him, and obtaining their agreement to listing their property with Continental Marketing Services, Inc. Suggested sale prices for particular pieces of property were furnished to Respondent by other employees of Continental Marketing Service, Inc. Respondent further testified that placing of advertisements for properties listed with Continental Marketing Services, Inc. was accomplished by other employees of the company. Respondent testified that he "understood" that Continental Marketing Services, Inc. had sold properties and that some of these sales were to foreign investors, although he did not know the identity of the foreign investors, or the number of parcels sold by the company. Respondent denied that he had represented to property owners that the sale of their property would be accomplished in sixty to ninety days. This contention is borne out by the testimony of two of the property owners testifying in this proceeding, one of whom testified that Respondent indicated that her property could "probably be sold within sixty to ninety days", and another property owner testified that Respondent made no representation to him concerning the length of time necessary to effect a sale of his property. There is no evidence in the record to establish that Continental Marketing Services, Inc. failed to advertise property listed for sale as promised in the Listing Brokerage Agreement with those property owners testifying in this proceeding. There is no evidence in the record in this proceeding to establish that Continental Marketing Services, Inc., in fact, knew of no foreign investors interested in purchasing property in the United States. Further, there is no testimony in the record in this proceeding to establish that Continental Marketing Services, Inc. had never sold property for other property owners in either the United states or the State of Florida. Finally, although property belonging to three of the witnesses testifying in this proceeding was listed at several times its initial purchase price, there is no indication in the record that Respondent played any part in setting the suggested listing prices.
The Issue In this disciplinary proceeding, the issues are, first, whether Respondent, a certified real estate appraiser, committed various disciplinable offenses in connection with three residential appraisals; and second, if Respondent is guilty of any charges, whether she should be punished therefor.
Findings Of Fact The Florida Real Estate Appraisal Board ("Board") is the state agency charged with regulating real estate appraisers who are, or want to become, licensed to render appraisal services in the State of Florida. The Department of Business and Professional Regulation ("Department") is the state agency responsible for investigating and prosecuting complaints against such appraisers. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Elsa Cartaya ("Cartaya") was a Florida-certified residential real estate appraiser. Her conduct as an appraiser in connection with the matters presently at issue falls squarely within the Board's regulatory jurisdiction. Case No. 04-1680 In the Administrative Complaint that initiated DOAH Case No. 04-1680, the Department charged Cartaya with numerous statutory violations relating to her appraisal of a residence located at 930 East Ninth Place, Hialeah, Florida (the "Hialeah Property"). Specifically, the Department made the following allegations against Cartaya:1 Respondent developed and communicated an appraisal report (Report) for the property commonly known as 930 E. 9 Place, Hialeah, Florida 33010. A copy of the report is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 1. On the Report, Respondent represents that: she signed it on July 27, 2000, the Report is effective as of July 27, 2000. On or about October 26, 2001, Respondent provided a "Report History" to Petitioner's investigator. A copy of the report history is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 2. On the Report History, Respondent admits that she completed the report on August 7, 2000. On Report, Respondent represents that there were no prior sales of subject property within one year of the appraisal. Respondent knew that a purchase and sale transaction on subject property closed on July 28, 2000. Respondent knew that the July 28, 2000, transaction had a contract sales price of $82,000. A copy of the closing statement is attached hereto as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 3. Respondent knowingly refused to disclose the July 28, 2000, sale on Report. On [the] Report, Respondent represented that the current owner of subject property was Hornedo Lopez. Hornedo Lopez did not become the title- owner until on or about July 28, 2000, but before August 7, 2000. On [the] Report, Respondent represents that quality of construction of subject property is "CBS/AVG." The public records reflect that subject property is of mixed construction, CBS and poured concrete. On [the] Report, Respondent represents: "The income approach was not derived due to lack of accurately verifiable data for the mostly owner occupied area." The multiple listing brochures indicate as follows: for comparable one: "Main House 3/2 one apartment 1/1 (Rents $425) and 2 efficiencies each at $325. Live rent free with great income or bring your big family." A copy of the brochure for comparable one is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 4. for comparable three: "Great Rental . . . two 2/1 two 1/1 and one studio. Total rental income is $2,225/month if all rented." A copy of the brochure for comparable three is attached and incorporated as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 5. On or about October 23, 2001, Petitioner's investigator inspected Respondent's work file for Report. The investigation revealed that Respondent failed to maintain a true copy of Report in the work file. On [the] Report, Respondent failed to analyze the difference between comparable one's listing price, $145,000, and the sale price, $180.000. On [the] Report History, Respondent admits to having received a request for appraisal of subject property indicting a contract price of $195,000. On [the] Report History, Respondent admits that the multiple listing brochure for subject property listed the property for $119,900, as a FANNIE MAE foreclosure. On [the] Report History, Respondent also admits that she had a multiple listing brochure in the file, listing subject property for $92,000. On [the] Report History, Respondent admits that she did not report the listings in Report. On [the] Report History, Respondent admits knowledge that comparable three was "rebuilt as a 2/1 with two 1/1 & 1 studio receiving income although zoned residential." On [the] Report, Respondent failed or refused to explain or adjust for comparable three's zoning violations. On the foregoing allegations, the Department charged Cartaya under four counts, as follows: COUNT I Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest conduct, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in any business transaction in violation of Section 475.624(2), Florida Statutes.[2] COUNT II Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of having failed to use reasonable diligence in developing an appraisal report in violation of Section 475.624(15), Florida Statutes. COUNT III Based upon the foregoing, Respondent has violated a standard for the development or communication of a real estate appraisal or other provision of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice in violation of Section 475.624(14), Florida Statutes. COUNT IV Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of having accepted an appraisal assignment if the employment itself is contingent upon the appraiser reporting a predetermined result, analysis, or opinion, or if the fee to be paid for the performance of the appraisal assignment is contingent upon the opinion, conclusion, or valuation reached upon the consequent resulting from the appraisal assignment in violation of Section 475.624(17), Florida Statutes.[3] In her Answer and Affirmative Defenses, Cartaya admitted the allegations set forth in paragraphs 5-9, 11, 13-15, 17-19, and 23-25 of the Amended Complaint. Based on Cartaya's admissions, the undersigned finds these undisputed allegations to be true. Additional findings are necessary, however, to make sense of these particular admissions and to determine whether Cartaya committed the offenses of which she stands accused. In April 2000, Southeast Financial Corporation ("Southeast") asked Cartaya to prepare an appraisal of the Hialeah Property for Southeast's use in underwriting a mortgage loan, the proceeds of which would be applied by the prospective mortgagor(s) towards the $205,000 purchase price that he/she/they had agreed to pay Hornedo Lopez ("Hornedo") for the residence in question.4 In preparing the appraisal, Cartaya discovered that the putative seller, Hornedo, was actually not the record owner of the Hialeah Property. Rather, title was held in the name of the Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae"). The Hialeah Property was "in foreclosure." Cartaya informed her contact at Southeast, Marianella Lopez ("Marianella"), about this problem. Marianella explained that Hornedo was in the process of closing a sale with Fannie Mae and would resell the Hialeah Property to a new buyer soon after acquiring the deed thereto. Cartaya told Marianella that, to complete the appraisal, she (Cartaya) would need to be provided a copy of the closing statement documenting the transfer of title from Fannie Mae to Hornedo. No further work was done on the appraisal for several months. Then, on July 25, 2000, Marianella ordered another appraisal of the Hialeah Property, this time for Southeast's use in evaluating a mortgage loan to Jose Granados ("Granados"), who was under contract to purchase the subject residence from Hornedo for $195,000. Once again, Cartaya quickly discovered that Fannie Mae, not Hornedo, was the record owner of the Hialeah Property. Once again, Cartaya immediately informed Marianella about the situation. Marianella responded on July 26, 2000, telling Cartaya that the Fannie Mae-Hornedo transaction was scheduled to close on July 28, 2000. On July 27, 2000, Marianella faxed to Cartaya a copy of the Settlement Statement that had been prepared for the Fannie Mae sale to Hornedo. The Settlement Statement, which confirmed that the intended closing date was indeed July 28, 2000, showed that Hornedo was under contract to pay $82,000 for the Hialeah Property——the property which he would then sell to Granados for $195,000, if all the pending transactions closed as planned. Upon receipt of this Settlement Statement, Cartaya proceeded to complete the appraisal. In the resulting Appraisal Report, which was finished on August 7, 2000,5 Cartaya estimated that the market value of the Hialeah Property, as of July 27, 2000, was $195,000. The Department failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the house at the Hialeah Property was, in fact, constructed from CBS and poured concrete, as alleged.6 At the time Cartaya gave the Department a copy of her workfile for this appraisal assignment, the workfile did not contain a copy of the competed Appraisal Report.7 (The workfile did, however, include a working draft of the Appraisal Report.) The allegation, set forth in paragraph 21 of the Administrative Complaint, that Cartaya "failed to analyze the difference between comparable one's listing price, $145,000, and the sale price, $180,000," was not proved by clear and convincing evidence. First, there is no nonhearsay evidence in the record that "comparable one" was, in fact, listed at $145,000 and subsequently sold for $180,000. Instead, the Department offered a printout of data from the Multiple Listing Service ("MLS"), which printout was included in Cartaya's workfile. The MLS document shows a listing price of $145,550 for "comparable one" and a sales price of $180,000 for the property——but it is clearly hearsay as proof of these matters,8 and no predicate was laid for the introduction of such hearsay pursuant to a recognized exception to the hearsay rule (including Section 475.28(2)). Further, the MLS data do not supplement or explain other nonhearsay evidence.9 At best, the MLS document, which is dated July 25, 2000, establishes that Cartaya was on notice that "comparable one" might have sold for more than the asking price, but Cartaya has not been charged with overlooking MLS data. Second, in any event, in her Report History, Cartaya stated that she had analyzed the putative asking price/sales price differential with respect to "comparable one" and concluded that there was no need to make adjustments for this because available data relating to other sales persuaded her that such differentials were typical in the relevant market. Cartaya's declaration in this regard was not persuasively rebutted. Since the evidence fails persuasively to establish that Cartaya's conclusion concerning the immateriality of the putative asking price/sales price differential as a factor bearing on the value of "comparable one" was wrong; and, further, because the record lacks clear and convincing evidence that an appraiser must, in her appraisal report, not only disclose such information, even when deemed irrelevant to the appraisal, but also expound upon the grounds for rejecting the data as irrelevant, Cartaya cannot be faulted for declining to explicate her analysis of the supposed price differential in the Appraisal Report. The evidence is insufficient to prove, clearly and convincingly, that Cartaya "failed or refused to explain or adjust for "comparable three"'s zoning violations." This allegation depends upon the validity of its embedded assumption that there were, in fact, "zoning violations."10 There is, however, no convincing evidence of such violations in the instant record. Specifically, no copy of any zoning code was offered as evidence, nor was any convincing nonhearsay proof regarding the factual condition of "comparable three" offered. Cartaya cannot be found guilty of failing or refusing to explain or adjust for an underlying condition (here, alleged "zoning violations") absent convincing proof of the underlying condition's existence-in-fact. Case No. 04-1148 In the Administrative Complaint that initiated DOAH Case No. 04-1148, the Department charged Cartaya with numerous statutory violations relating to her appraisals of residences located at 1729 Northwest 18th Street, Miami, Florida ("1729 NW 18th St") and 18032 Northwest 48th Place, Miami, Florida ("18032 NW 48th Place"). These appraisals will be examined in turn. With regard to 1729 NW 18th St, the Department alleged as follows: On or about April 29, 1999, Respondent developed and communicated a Uniform Residential Appraisal Report for the property commonly known as 1729 NW 18th Street, Miami, Florida. A copy of the report is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 1. On or about March 18, 2001, David B. C. Yeomans, Jr., A.S.A., and Mark A. Cannon, A.S.A., performed a field review of the report. A copy of the review is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 2. The review revealed that unlike it states in the Report, the subject property’s zoning was not "Legal," but "legal noncomforming (Grandfathered use)." The review further revealed that Respondent failed to report that if the improvements sustain extensive damage or demolishment or require renovation which exceeds 50% of the depreciated value, it is likely that a variance would be necessary to build a new dwelling. The review further revealed that Respondent failed to report that subject property has two underground gas meters. The review further revealed that unlike Respondent states in Report, subject property’s street has gutters and storm sewers along it. The review further revealed that subject property is a part of a "sub-market" within its own neighborhood due to its construction date of 1925. Respondent applied three comparables built in 1951, 1953, and 1948, respectively, all of which reflect a different market, without adjustment. Respondent applied comparables which have much larger lots than the subject, which is of a non-conforming, grandfathered use. Respondent failed to adjust for quality of construction even though subject is frame and all three comparables are of concrete block stucco construction. Respondent failed to note on the Report that comparables 1 and 2 had river frontage. Respondent failed to adjust comparables 1 and 2 for river frontage. The review revealed that at the time of the Report there were at least five sales more closely comparable to Subject than those which Respondent applied. On the foregoing allegations, the Department brought the following three counts against Cartaya: COUNT I Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of having failed to use reasonable diligence in developing an appraisal report in violation of Section 475.624(15), Florida Statutes. COUNT II Based upon the foregoing, Respondent has violated a standard for the development or communication of a real estate appraisal or other provision of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice in violation of Section 475.624(14), Florida Statutes. COUNT III Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of culpable negligence in a business transaction in violation of Section 475.624(2), Florida Statutes. Cartaya admitted the allegations set forth in paragraph 4 of the Administrative Complaint. Those undisputed allegations, accordingly, are accepted as true. The rest of the allegations about this property were based upon a Residential Appraisal Field Review Report (the "Yeomans Report") that David B.C. Yeomans, Jr. prepared in March 2001 for his client Fannie Mae. The Yeomans Report is in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 2, and Mr. Yeomans testified at hearing. Mr. Yeomans disagreed with Cartaya's opinion of value regarding 1729 NW 18th St, concluding that the property's market value as of April 29, 1999, had been at the low end of the $95,000-to-$115,000 range, and not $135,000 as Cartaya had opined. The fact-findings that follow are organized according to the numbered paragraphs of the Administrative Complaint. Paragraphs 6 and 7. The form that Cartaya used for her Appraisal Report regarding 1729 NW 18th St contains the following line: Zoning compliance Legal Legal nonconforming (Grandfathered use) Illegal No zoning Cartaya checked the "legal" box. Mr. Yeomans maintains that she should have checked the box for "legal nonconforming" use because, he argues, the property's frontage and lot size are smaller than the minimums for these values as prescribed in the City of Miami's zoning code. The Department failed, however, to prove that Cartaya checked the wrong zoning compliance box. There is no convincing nonhearsay evidence regarding either the frontage or the lot size of 1729 NW 18th St.11 Thus, there are no facts against which to apply the allegedly applicable zoning code provisions. Moreover, and more important, the Department failed to introduce into evidence any provisions of Miami's zoning code. Instead, the Department elicited testimony from Mr. Yeomans regarding his understanding of the contents of the zoning code. While Mr. Yeomans' testimony about the contents of the zoning code is technically not hearsay (because the out-of-court statements, namely the purported code provisions, consisted of non-assertive declarations12 that were not offered for the "truth" of the code's provisions13), such testimony is nevertheless not clear and convincing evidence of the zoning code's terms.14 And finally, in any event, Cartaya's alleged "mistake" (which allegation was not proved) was immaterial because, as Mr. Yeomans conceded at hearing, in testimony the undersigned credits as true, the alleged "fact" (again, not proved) that 1729 NW 18th St constituted a grandfathered use would have no effect on the property's market value. Paragraphs 8 and 9. The Yeomans Report asserts that "[b]ased on a physical inspection as of March 17, 2001[,] it appears that the site has two underground gas meters and there were gutters and storm sewers along the subject's street." It is undisputed that Cartaya's Appraisal Report made no mention of underground gas meters or storm water disposal systems. While the Department alleged that Cartaya's silence regarding these matters constituted disciplinable "failures," it offered no convincing proof that Cartaya defaulted on her obligations in any way respecting these items. There was no convincing evidence that these matters were material, affected the property's value, or should have been noted pursuant to some cognizable standard of care. Paragraphs 10 and 11. The contention here is that Cartaya chose as comparables several homes that, though relatively old (average age: 48 years), were not as old as the residence at 1729 NW 18th St (74 years). Mr. Yeomans asserted that older homes should have been used as comparables, and several such homes are identified in the Yeomans Report. The undersigned is persuaded that Mr. Yeomans' opinion of value with respect to 1729 NW 18th St is probably more accurate than Cartaya's. If this were a case where the value of 1729 NW 18th St were at issue, e.g. a taking under eminent domain, then Mr. Yeomans' opinion might well be credited as against Cartaya's opinion in making the ultimate factual determination. The issue in this case is not the value of 1729 NW 18th St, however, but whether Cartaya committed disciplinable offenses in appraising the property. The fact that two appraisers have different opinions regarding the market value of a property does not mean that one of them engaged in misconduct in forming his or her opinion. Based on the evidence presented, the undersigned is not convinced that Cartaya engaged in wrongdoing in connection with her appraisal of 1729 NW 18th St, even if her analysis appears to be somewhat less sophisticated than Mr. Yeomans'. Paragraphs 12 through 16. The allegations in these paragraphs constitute variations on the theme just addressed, namely that, for one reason or another, Cartaya chose inappropriate comparables. For the same reasons given in the preceding discussion, the undersigned is not convinced, based on the evidence presented, that Cartaya engaged in wrongdoing in connection with her appraisal of 1729 NW 18th St, even if he is inclined to agree that Mr. Yeomans' opinion of value is the better founded of the two. With regard to 18032 NW 48th Place, the Department alleged as follows: On or about August 9, 1999, Respondent prepared and communicated a Uniform Residential Appraisal Report for the Property commonly known as 18032 NW 48th Place, Miami, Florida, 33055. (Report) A copy of the Report is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Administrative Complaint Exhibit 3. On the Report, Respondent incorrectly stated that the property is in a FEMA Zone X flood area. In fact, the property is in an AE Zone. In Report, Respondent states: "Above sales were approximately adjusted per market derived value influencing dissimilarities as noted." Respondent failed to state in Report, that comparables 1 and 3 have in-law quarters. In [the] Report, Respondent represented comparable 1 had one bath, where in fact it has at least two. In [the] Report, Respondent failed to state that comparable 1 has two in-law quarters. In [the] Report, Respondent stated that comparable 3 is a two-bath house with an additional bath in the in-law quarters. On the foregoing allegations, the Department brought the following three counts against Cartaya: COUNT IV Based upon the foregoing, Respondent has violated a standard for the development or communication of a real estate appraisal or other provision of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice in violation of Section 475.624(14), Florida Statutes. COUNT V Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of having failed to use reasonable diligence in developing an appraisal report in violation of Section 475.624(15), Florida Statutes. COUNT VI Based upon the foregoing, Respondent is guilty of culpable negligence in a business transaction in violation of Section 475.624(2), Florida Statutes. Cartaya admitted the allegations set forth in paragraphs 18 and 20 of the Administrative Complaint. Those undisputed allegations, accordingly, are accepted as true. The rest of the allegations about this property were based upon a Residential Appraisal Field Review Report (the "Marmin Report") that Frank L. Marmin prepared in May 2001 for his client Fannie Mae. The Marmin Report is in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 5. Mr. Marmin did not testify at hearing, although his supervisor, Mark A. Cannon, did. Mr. Marmin disagreed with Cartaya's opinion of value regarding 18032 NW 48th Place, concluding that the property's market value as of August 9, 1999, had been $100,000, and not $128,000 as Cartaya had opined. The fact-findings that follow are organized according to the numbered paragraphs of the Administrative Complaint. Paragraph 19. Cartaya admitted that she erred in noting that the property is located in FEMA Flood Zone "X," when in fact (she agrees) the property is in FEMA Flood Zone "AE." She did, however, include a flood zone map with her appraisal that showed the correct flood zone designation. Cartaya's mistake was obviously unintentional——and no more blameworthy than a typographical error. Further, even the Department's expert witness conceded that this minor error had no effect on the appraiser's opinion of value. Paragraphs 20 through 24. The Department asserts that two of Cartaya's comparables were not comparable for one reason or another. The Department failed clearly and convincingly to prove that its allegations of fact concerning the two comparables in question are true. Thus, the Department failed to establish its allegations to the requisite degree of certainty. Ultimate Factual Determinations Having examined the entire record; weighed, interpreted, and judged the credibility of the evidence; drawn (or refused to draw) permissible factual inferences; resolved conflicting accounts of what occurred; and applied the applicable law to the facts, it is determined that: Applying the law governing violations arising under Section 475.624(2), Florida Statutes, to the historical facts established in the record by clear and convincing evidence, it is found as a matter of ultimate fact that Cartaya did not commit culpable negligence in connection with the appraisals at issue. Applying the law governing violations arising under Section 475.624(15), Florida Statutes, to the historical facts established in the record by clear and convincing evidence, it is found as a matter of ultimate fact that Cartaya did not fail to exercise reasonable diligence in developing the appraisals at issue. Applying the law governing violations arising under Section 475.624(14), Florida Statutes, to the historical facts established in the record by clear and convincing evidence, it is found as a matter of ultimate fact that, in connection with the Appraisal Report relating to the Hialeah Property, Cartaya did commit one unintentional violation of Standards Rule 2- 2(b)(vi) of Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice and two unintentional violations of Standards Rule 2-2(b)(ix).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board enter a final order finding that: As to Case No. 04-1148, Cartaya is not guilty on Counts I through VI, inclusive; As to Case No. 04-1680, Cartaya is not guilty on Counts I, II, and IV; she is, however, guilty, under Count III, of one unintentional violation of Standards Rule 2-2(b)(vi) and two unintentional violations of Standards Rule 2-2(b)(ix). As punishment for the violations established, Cartaya's certificate should be suspended for 30 calendar days, and she should be placed on probation for a period of one year, a condition of such probation being the successful completion of a continuing education course in USPAP. In addition, Cartaya should be ordered to pay an administrative fine of $500. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of November, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 2004.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a registered real estate broker and was so licensed at all times relevant to this proceeding. At the time of the alleged forgeries, Respondent was an officer of John F. Ring Realty, Inc., and was the manager of that firm's office at 201 North University Drive, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. On June 25, 1980, Respondent wrote two checks on the account of John F. Ring Realty, Inc., payable to Phyllis Cohen in the sum of $425, and to Ann Sanders in the sum of $550. On July 10, 1980, and on the same account, Respondent wrote a second check to Phyllis Cohen in the amount of $1,000. On September 19, 1980, on the same account, Respondent wrote a check payable to Dan Dickerhoff in the sum of $1,210. Respondent wrote a fifth check on this account on September 26, 1980, payable to Rose Friedman, in the sum of $815. All of these checks were purportedly written to cover sales commissions. Each check bore an endorsement which was purportedly that of the payee, and was endorsed by Respondent. Each named payee testified that the endorsement was not his or her signature, that he or she was not entitled to the funds represented by the checks, and never received the check or the funds. Each identified the signature of Respondent as the drawer. Respondent admitted to his ex-partner, Petitioner's investigator and Phyllis Cohen that he had endorsed and cashed these checks. Respondent also apologized to Ann Sanders when she confronted him with the forgery. These were statements against interest and are therefore admissible as hearsay exceptions. 1/ Respondent's character witnesses established that he has a good reputation in the realtors community. These witnesses have found Respondent to be honest and reliable, and would continue doing business with him regardless of any adverse findings here.
Recommendation From the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent be found guilty of allegations set forth in the Administrative Complaint. It is further RECOMMENDED that Respondent's license as a real estate broker be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of December, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of December, 1981.
The Issue Whether Hellender violated the provisions of Section 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Hellender is a registered real estate broker holding license number 0038269 issued by the Florida Real Estate Commission. Hellender had a listing for the sale of real property owned by Horace E. and Margaret C. Young. An offer to lease with option to purchase was made by Richard W. and Diane B. Milligan through their realtor, Susan Seligman, who was in contact with Seligman several times November 26 concerning the availability of the property and terms of the lease-purchase agreement. Both the Youngs and the Milligans did not live in the Orlando area where the two realtors and property were located. Susan Seligman, a broker-salesperson, presented Ralph E. Hellender with a Contract for Sale and Purchase when she met with Hellender between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m. on the evening of November 26, 1976. This offer, which was received into evidence as Exhibit 1, expired at 12:00 noon on November 27. Hellender took the contract and indicated that he would communicate the offer to the Youngs. Susan Seligman did not accompany Hellender to communicate the offer as is the general custom, because she needed to pick up her children from a football game that evening. Mrs. Ingrid Hellender, a broker salesperson, received a call later on the evening of November 26, 1976, from Susan Seligman. The general topic of the call was the fact that the contract which Seligman had given Mr. Hellender earlier that evening provided for conventional financing of the purchase, and Seligman had second thoughts about the Milligans' desires on financing. She requested that she be given the opportunity to check with the Milligans to determine whether they intended to use conventional or FHA financing. At this point a conflict developed in the testimony of Mrs. Seligman and Mrs. Hellender regarding whether Mrs. Seligman requested that Mr. Hellender hold the contract or whether Mrs. Seligman requested that he present the offer with reservations concerning the nature of the financing. In any event, Mrs. Hellender advised her husband to hold the contract. Similarly, a conflict exists in Mr. Hellender's and Mrs. Seligman's testimony concerning whether Hellender said that the offer has been accepted by the Youngs. Mrs. Seligman stated that Mr. Hellender advised her on November 27, 1976, that the Youngs had accepted the offer. Hellender stated that he did not present the offer and therefore there was no basis for him to communicate an acceptance to Mrs. Seligman and did not communicate an acceptance to her. It should be particularly noted that Mrs. Seligman stated that on November 27 she had Mr. Hellender agreed that the Milligans should execute a new contract on Hellender's forms when the Milligans were to be in Orlando on December 1, 1976. It is also noted that Mrs. Seligman did not request telegraphic confirmation of the acceptance by the Youngs of the offer which she initially submitted to Mr. Hellender, although telegraphic confirmation is the generally accepted practice when dealing with an out-of-city seller and was not standard practice in the real estate firm with which Mrs. Seligman worked. The Hearing Officer discounts the testimony of Mrs. Seligman that Hellender told her the Youngs had accepted the offer because she did not request written confirmation of the acceptance, and because Mrs. Seligman stated that a second written offer was to be prepared on December 1, 1976. All the realtors who testified stated that it was the custom to obtain telegraphic confirmation of an offer from an out-of-town seller. Mr. Seligman, the broker for Mrs. Seligman's company, stated this was the general procedure for his company. Although the record is unclear whether Mrs. Seligman talked with Mr. Hellender before noon or after noon, she was aware the offer expired at noon November 27 and she did not press for written confirmation of acceptance before noon. Instead, she agreed to the preparation of a second offer is totally contrary and repugnant to any theory of acceptance of the first offer. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that there was no acceptance of the first offer communicated by Hellender to Mrs. Seligman. Mrs. Seligman may have formed the opinion that there was an acceptance because Mr. Hellender agreed to the terms presented in the first offer, but her agreement to a second offer to be prepared is in fact and law inconsistent with any assertion that the first offer was accepted. Mrs. Seligman stated, that it is clear from the actions of Mr. Hellender, that they expected a second contract to be presented in behalf of the Milligans. This explains his call to Mrs. Seligman advising her on December 5 that there was activity of the property. It also explains why December 6 he did accept a second offer on the property which was presented by Joe Deligna which he and Delinga communicated to the Youngs together as is the general custom after no offer was presented by the Milligans on December 1. Lastly, it explains why Hellender contacted Mrs. Seligman immediately after the Youngs had accepted the offer by the Maccagnanos and confirmed it telegraphically.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Florida Real Estate Commission take no action against the registration of Ralph E. Hellender. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 15th day of March, 1978. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce I. Kamelhair, Esq. 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Mark A. Koteen, Esq. Post Office Box 3431 Orlando, Florida 32802
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that respondent's registration as a real estate broker be suspended for a period of seven (7) days. Respectfully submitted and entered this 3rd day of June, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Louis B. Guttmann III Staff Counsel Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 Gerard L. Crawford Route L, Box 157 Feeport, Florida 32439 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL AND OCCUPATIONAL REGULATION FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, An Agency of the State of Florida, Plaintiff, PROGRESS DOCKET NO. 2853 WALTON COUNTY vs. DOAH CASE NO. 76-1034 GERARD L. CRAWFORD, Defendant. /
The Issue The issue presented is whether Charles Simon violated subsections 475.25(1)(b) and (f), Florida Statutes (1985) by pleading guilty to crimes involving moral turpitude or fraudulent and dishonest dealing, i.e. grand theft and trafficking in stolen property by reissuing and refunding airline tickets without making payment for them.
Findings Of Fact Charles Simon was at the times material to this proceeding licensed as a real estate broker in the State of Florida holding license number 0123689. The last license was issued to him as a broker at 90 Beacon Boulevard, Miami, Florida 33135. On about October 15, 1986, Mr. Simon pled guilty to six counts of an indictment alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO Act), grand theft and trafficking in stolen property for issuing and refunding of airline tickets without making payment for them. Adjudication of guilt was withheld and Mr. Simon was placed on community control for a period of twenty-four months to be followed by a period of probation of eight years, and he was ordered to pay $50,000 in restitution and court costs. By letter dated October 9, 1986, Respondent informed the Commission of having pleaded guilty to a felony. By letter dated January 6, 1987, Mr. Simon wrote again to the Commission, stated that he had received no reply to his letter of October 9, 1986 and enclosed a carbon copy of the October 9, 1986 letter. The Commission never received his first (October 9, 1986) letter, although it did receive a copy of it when attached to the January 6, 1987 letter. The Department relies solely upon the records of the conviction to make its case. It did not dispute Mr. Simon's explanation of the events underlying his guilty plea. Mr. Simon's version of the events is accepted, in part because his testimony was not contested by the Department, and in part because the explanation is plausible. In May of 1983, Mr. Simon's wife owned a travel agency in Dade County. His real estate office was located in the same suite of offices. While clerical employees of the travel agency would sometimes perform work for the real estate office they were wholly separate businesses. Mr. Simon was not an officer or employee of the travel agency and received no money from it. In May, 1983 Mr. Simon's wife put the agency up for sale. Travel agencies are approved by the Air Traffic Corporation (ATC) to write airline tickets on generic ticket stock if they meet certain requirements. ATC affiliation is important to a travel agency because it makes accounting to airlines for tickets sold much simpler. ATC serves as a clearinghouse; at the end of the week a travel agency sends one check to ATC for all tickets written during the week. ATC separates the billings according to airline, and writes one check to each airline for all tickets sold by the agents belonging to ATC. Blank ticket stock is valuable and purchasers must qualify through ATC to buy a travel agency that is an ATC member. Otherwise an untrustworthy new owner could write tickets out, collect money and never pay the ATC who in turn would not be able to pay the airlines. Mrs. Simon was familiar with people who expressed an interest in purchasing her agency, but they asked her not to tell ATC of the sale. When notified of the impending sale ATC would investigate the qualifications of the proposed new owners, and their previous employer or present employer would be contacted by ATC. The potential buyers were currently working at another travel agency. They wanted to buy Mrs. Simon's agency and move their clients to their new agency (Mrs. Simon's agency). They did not want to tip off their present employer of their intentions by having ATC contact the present employer. Mrs. Simon agreed to withhold notification to ATC to facilitate the sale of the travel agency. After the ownership of the travel agency was transferred and most of the purchase price had been paid, Mrs. Simon was informed that the new owners had ticket stock from other travel agencies at the agency she had sold. Although this is not a violation of any statute, it violates ATC rules and alerted Mrs. Simon that something was wrong. She realized that the reason the purchasers did not want to notify the ATC of the transfer was that they were engaging in a "bust out" of the agency, i.e., issuing valid airline tickets without receiving payment for them. The tickets would then be returned to the airlines for cash refunds (although they had never been paid for) or resold to others at less than their face value. Ultimately, ATC revoked the agency's authority to issue tickets, but by then the owners had defrauded the airlines of many thousands of dollars. Mrs. Simon panicked and Mr. Simon agreed to try to handle the situation. Instead of reporting the matter to the police Mr. Simon tried to cover it up so that Mrs. Simon would not be implicated in wrongdoing. Precisely what Mr. Simon did in his attempt to keep his wife from being implicated in the purchasers' scheme was not explained at the hearing. Those individuals involved in the "bust out" were ultimately arrested and convicted. Mr. Simon was also charged because of his involvement with the sale after Mrs. Simon discovered the purchasers' scheme. Under the sentencing guidelines the charges made against him would have called for a sentence of six years in jail. The state attorney's office agreed to two years of community control, eight years probation and $50,000 restitution to the airlines, if Mr. Simon would plead guilty to the charges rather than require a trial; the state attorney also agreed that no charges would be filed against Mr. Simon's wife in return for his guilty plea. The state attorney's office further agreed to a withholding of adjudication of guilt so that Mr. Simon's real estate license would not be affected. Based on 1) the cost of going through a trial to defend himself and potentially another legal proceeding for the defense of his wife (which would exceed $50,000) and, 2) his erroneous belief that a guilty plea with a withholding of adjudication would not affect his real estate license, Mr. Simon agreed to the state attorney's offer as being in his best interest even though he believed that he had done nothing illegal. Since that time Mr. Simon's community control has been terminated and he has been placed on regular probation, which merely requires a once a month report to a probation officer which can be done by mail. It has also been agreed that Mr. Simon may return to England to live. The lightness of the sentence and the reduction of the period of community control corroborates Mr. Simon's argument that the state attorney's office knew that he had not been involved in the fraudulent plan to "bust out" his wife's travel agency, although he was not entirely forthcoming when the purchaser's plan was discovered.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding Mr. Simon guilty of violation of subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes as charged in Count I of the administrative complaint and guilty of violation of subsection 475.25(1)(f), Florida Statutes as charged in Count II of the administrative complaint and that the real estate broker's license held by Mr. Simon be revoked. DONE and ORDERED this 21st day of September, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of September, 1987. APPENDIX The following are my rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1985). Rulings on Proposals of the Petitioner's: Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in Finding of Fact 1. Covered in Finding of Fact 1. Covered in Finding of Fact 2. Covered in Finding of Fact 2. Covered in Finding of Fact 3. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles Simon 90 Beacon Boulevard Miami, Florida 33135 Mr. Charles Simon 10435 S.W. 76th Street Miami, Florida 33173 James H. Gillis, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Florida Real Estate Commission P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Harold Huff, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Florida Real Estate Commission P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Tom Gallagher, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Joseph A. Sole, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
The Issue The issue posed for decision herein is whether or not the Respondent's license to practice real estate should be revoked based on conduct set forth hereinafter.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony adduced at the hearing and the witnesses' demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found. Based on its Administrative Complaint filed herein dated July 28, 1981, the Florida Real Estate Commission (Petitioner) seeks to revoke Respondent's license to practice real estate based on his having been found guilty of a crime involving moral turpitude and fraudulent or dishonest dealing, in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(f), Florida Statutes (1979), and his (Respondent) having been confined to a state or federal prison, in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(m), Florida Statutes (1979). The Respondent, Joel L. Steiner, is a registered real estate salesman and has been issued License No. 0150824 by the Petitioner. The Administrative Complaint filed herein alleges that during the period June 1, 1976, and continuing through March 23, 1977, Respondent, for the purpose of executing a scheme and artifice to defraud the public, caused mails and other matters to be sent from the New York office of Crown Colony in New York, New York 1/ , to be placed in post offices and authorized depositories for mail matter to be delivered by mail by the United States Postal Service. As a result of those actions, Respondent was indicted by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York and charged with a violation of Title XVIII, United States Code, Sections 1341 and 1342, to wit, the use of the mails in a scheme to defraud. Following a trial, Respondent, on January 28, 1981, was found guilty as charged of the offense of the use of the mails in a scheme to defraud and was committed for imprisonment for a period of eighteen (18) months and ordered to pay a fine to the United States in the amount of $12,000.00. (Petitioner's Exhibits 2 and 3 and testimony of Postal Inspector John Muhelberg.) Respondent appeared through counsel; however, no evidence was offered by Respondent in defense of the charges after Petitioner's case in chief.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent's License No. 0150824 to practice real estate as a salesman be REVOKED. RECOMMENDED this 18th day of August, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 1982.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following facts are found. At all times relevant to this proceeding, respondent Lydon was registered with the Florida Real Estate Commission as a real estate salesman. By an administrative complaint filed on February 8, 1978, the petitioner sought to revoke, suspend or otherwise discipline the respondent's license and right to practice thereunder. The ground for such complaint is that respondent collected money as a salesman in connection with a real estate brokerage transaction in a name not his employer's and without the express consent of his employer. The respondent admits, and the evidence demonstrates, that in December of 1973, the respondent obtained a listing agreement for the sale of real property from Mary E. Renney, brought the seller Renney and the buyer Stephen together, prepared the contract for sale and obtained a check made payable to him in the amount of $500.00 for this transaction, which check was cashed by him. Mr. Lydon testified that he did these things as a personal favor to Mrs. Renney and that his broker knew about these transactions. No evidence was presented that respondent's broker gave his express consent to the events described herein.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent Alford R. Lydon, Sr., be found guilty of the charges contained in the administrative complaint dated February 8, 1978, and that said finding constitute the written reprimand discussed above. Respectively submitted and entered this 2nd day of April, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth M. Meer Staff Counsel Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Alford R. Lydon, Sr. 3301 58th Avenue North Lot 146 St. Petersburg, Florida 33714
