The Issue Whether Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G16-9.001 is an invalid exercise of legislatively delegated authority in violation of Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes, and whether certain statements of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (DBPR or the Department) are "agency statements" defined as rules that should be adopted through the rulemaking process pursuant to Section 120.54, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Dr. Bacchus, is a hydroecologist with a multidisciplinary degree. While Dr. Bacchus lives in Georgia, she alleges that a substantial amount of her income comes from conducting environmental consulting services in Florida. According to her Amended Petition, Dr. Bacchus is not licensed by the Department. Respondent, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, is the state agency charged with the licensing and regulation of a variety of professions. The practice of geology is among the professions it regulates, pursuant to Chapters 455 and 492, Florida Statutes. Created within the Department is the Board of Geology. Petitioner is the subject of an Administrative Complaint issued on or about September 27, 2006, charging her with the unlicensed practice of geology in violation of Section 492.112(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2005). The Administrative Complaint, which is attached as an Exhibit to the Amended Petition, does not cite to any rules. As of the date of hearing, the Administrative Complaint had not been referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings Petitioner does not allege that she has any intention of seeking licensure from the Department. Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G16-9.001 Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G16-9.001 is a rule adopted by the Board of Geology, as opposed to the Department of Business and Professional Regulation. The rule, entitled "Disciplinary Guidelines," identifies the range of penalties normally imposed by the Board of Geology against licensees for violations of provisions in Chapters 455 and 492. All of the possible violations addressed by the Disciplinary Guidelines are statutory violations. The rule is lengthy and will not be repeated ver batim. The text of subsections (1) and (2) are tables of penalty ranges. Subsection (1) deals with violations of provisions in Chapter 492, whereas subsection (2) of the rule addresses violations of Chapter 455. Subsection (3) is entitled "The Usual Conditions" and outlines provisions that are included in all disciplinary orders; conditions imposed whenever fines and costs are imposed; conditions which may be imposed with probation; and conditions which may be imposed when a license is suspended. Subsection (4) identifies the purpose of the Disciplinary Guidelines, and states: (4) Purpose of guidelines -- The range of penalties set forth above is the range from which disciplinary penalties will be imposed upon licensees guilty of violations of the laws and rules. The purpose of these guidelines is to give notice of the range of penalties which will normally be imposed for specific violations. The guidelines are based upon a single count violation of the provision listed. Multiple counts of violations of the same provision, or unrelated provisions of the law or rules will be grounds for enhancement of penalties or imposition of additional penalties. [Emphasis supplied.] Subsection (5) of the rule addresses aggravating and mitigating circumstances to be considered when imposing penalty, and subsection (6) identifies those instances when the Department may issue a Notice of Noncompliance. The rule lists as its specific authority Sections 455.2273, 492.104(1), and 492.113(3), Florida Statutes. The laws implemented are Sections 455.227, 455.2273, 492.104(1), and 492.113(2), Florida Statutes. Section 455.227, Florida Statutes, identifies "across- the board" acts that constitute grounds for which disciplinary action may be taken by professional licensing boards or by the Department, where no professional licensing board exists. The penalties that can be imposed are the refusal to certify, or certify with restrictions, an application for a license; suspension or permanent revocation of a license; restriction of practice; imposition of an administrative fine; issuance of a reprimand; placement of a licensee on probation; or corrective action. Section 455.2273, Florida Statutes (2006), provides in pertinent part: 455.2273 Disciplinary Guidelines Each board, or the department where there is no board, shall adopt, by rule, and periodically review the disciplinary guidelines applicable to each ground for disciplinary action which may be imposed by the board, or the department where there is no board, pursuant to this chapter, the respective practice acts, and any rule of the board or department. Section 492.104(1), Florida Statutes (2006), provides: The Board of Professional Geologists has authority to adopt rules pursuant to ss. 120.536(1) and 120.54 to implement this chapter. Every licensee shall be governed and controlled by this chapter and the rules adopted by the board. The board is authorized to set, by rule, fees for application, examination, certificate of authorization, late renewal, initial licensure, and license renewal. These fees should not exceed the cost of implementing the application, examination, initial licensure, and license renewal or other administrative process and shall be established as follows: The application fee shall not exceed $150 and shall not be refundable. Section 492.113(2), Florida Statutes (2006), states that the Board of Geology shall specify what acts or omissions constitute a violation of section (1) of the section, which is entitled "Disciplinary Proceedings." Subsection (1) identifies several different grounds for which disciplinary action may be taken against a licensee. While Section 492.113(2) is listed as a law being implemented by Rule 61G16-9.001, the Rule does not specify any acts or omissions constituting a violation of Section 492.113(1), Florida Statutes. It simply paraphrases the statutory language of each statutory provision and gives a range of penalties for each violation. Agency Statements as Rules Petitioner also attempts to challenge agency statements and agency actions not adopted as rules. The Amended Petition states: 2. . . . Examples of the text and description of the statements and agency actions, pursuant to § 120.56(4)(a), F.S. and as defined in § 120.52, F.S., are provided in the Department's: Administrative Complaint against Petitioner, SYDNEY T. BACCHUS, Ph.D. (hereinafter "Dr. Bacchus") signed on September 27, 2006, attached and incorporated by reference hereto as Exhibit A; Undated Settlement Stipulation accompanying the above-referenced Administrative Complaint against Dr. Bacchus, attached and incorporated by reference hereto as Exhibit B. Cease and Desist Order against Dr. Bacchus signed on February 15, 2006, attached and incorporated by reference hereto as Exhibit C. Complaint No. 2005056737 against Dr. Bacchus signed on January 26, 2006 and threatening criminal charges, attached and incorporated by reference hereto as Exhibit D; and Complaint No. 2003063556 against Dr. Bacchus signed on May 22, 2003 and threatening criminal charges, attached and incorporated by reference hereto as Exhibit E. [Emphasis Supplied.] Failure to Adopt Rules Petitioner apparently also seeks to address the failure of the Department to adopt rules identifying what acts constitute the unlicensed practice of geology. The Amended Petition states in pertinent part: In 1987, the Board was authorized to govern and control every licensed professional geologist, pursuant to s. 4, ch. 87-403, Laws of Florida. The Board was not authorized to govern and control persons not licensed as a professional geologist. In 1987, the Department was mandated to "specify, by rule what acts or omissions constitute a violation" of the "[P]ractice of geology," pursuant to subsection (2) s. 12, ch. 87-403 Laws of Florida. * * * 46. The Department has failed to specify, by rule, "what acts or omissions constitute a violation" of the "[P]ractice of geology," to allow an unlicensed person to "know" what constitutes the practice of geology. In the absence of such specificities, a person cannot "knowingly" engage in the unlicensed "[P]ractice of geology" or "knowingly employ unlicensed persons to practice geology, pursuant to subsection (1) s. 12, ch. 87-403 Laws of Florida. [Emphasis in original.] Petitioner's Unilateral Pre-Hearing Statement does not mention Rule 61G16-9.001. Petitioner's statements identifying what she views as the scope of the proceeding state the following: Brief General Statement of Petitioner's Position The Department is regulating unlicensed members of the public under Chapters 492 and 455 Florida Statutes, using unpromulgated rules and rules that are an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Such unlawful regulation violates the constitutional freedom of speech of unlicensed persons. The Department is impermissibly encroaching on the powers of the judiciary. * * * Issue of Fact that Remain to be Litigated 1. Whether the Department is regulating unlicensed members of the public under Chapters 492 and 455 Florida Statutes, using unpromulgated rules and rules that are an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Issue of Law that Remain to be Litigated Whether the Department exceeded its lawful delegation of authority to regulate the "practice of professional geology" in the manner in which it is being regulated in Florida. Whether the Department has failed to give adequate notice to the public regarding what constitutes the unlicensed "practice of professional geology" in Florida. Whether the Department's rules are over- broad, vague, and are in invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. . . . Whether the Department was required to promulgate rules to regulate the unlicensed "practice of professional geology" in Florida, but failed to promulgate those rules. Whether the Department has been engaged in a pattern of action that constitutes an unpromulgated rule. Whether the Department's recent regulation of the "practice of professional geology" in Florida constitutes selective enforcement. Petitioner was questioned at length during the consideration of the Motion to Dismiss regarding the basis of her challenge. She indicated not that she was concerned with the application of Rule 61G16-9.001 against her, but that she wished to challenge the entire regulatory scheme: THE COURT: . . . Doctor, all the disciplinary guideline rule does is name a statutory or rule violation. It paraphrases the statute itself. It doesn't provide any additional language to my knowledge and provides what penalty would be imposed should a licensee violate one of those statutory provisions. It doesn't -- and as I look at this, it doesn't even have any rule violations. Its statutory. DR. BACCHUS: Yes, Your Honor, I understand that, and I understand that it is confusing, but in fact I had received two charges from the department over a period of -- beginning -- I received the first notice in 2003 for a complaint filed I believe the previous year, and then second complaint that I received early in 2006 for a complaint filed against me in 2005 basically alleging that I was producing documents that in fact were required to have the seal and signature of a licensed geologist. So in fact the agency is regulating unlicensed persons using the language from 61G16 despite the fact that they are not referencing the rule citation. You know, I'm an unlicensed individual, complaints are being filed against me because I am producing documents that have only my name. No reference to the title of professional geology, no insinuation that I am a geologist, a professional geologist, a licensed professional geologist, no reference to that whatsoever, yet complaints are being filed against me with the department and they are taking action against me. THE COURT: But again, getting back to this rule. Even assuming -- and the merits of your administrative complaint are not before me and we're not going to talk about them. DR. BACCHUS: Yes, Your Honor, I understand. THE COURT: But even assuming that, even assuming that the department were going to take action against you based on whatever is charged in that administrative complaint, how is this rule -- you're not going to be -- this rule specifically says licensees. DR. BACCHUS: Yes, Your Honor, I understand that, but that's not how its being applied by the Department. I understand that this hearing is not a hearing to be addressing my complaints, but as I understand, my complaints are relevant with regard to my standing for this issue before the court today. And in fact because of the actions of the department against me, you know, multiple complaints can be filed against me for any written document that I have produced in the past or any written document that is pending, peer-reviewed publications that are pending to be released, because I don't have a license, they are using that language without referencing that rule to take action against me, your Honor. THE COURT: But again, you're saying they're not referencing that rule. DR. BACCHUS: That's correct, Your Honor. They're not referencing that, but because there is no comparable rule that has been promulgated and adopted and is being implemented for unlicensed activities, there is only the statute they are referencing, only 492 and 455, and because there isn't a comparable rule to 61G16 for unlicensed people, then by nature you have to look at what the licensed activity is to determine what the unlicensed activity is. Similarly, with respect to the actions taken by the Department against her personally, Dr. Bacchus asserted that these actions, which she characterizes as agency statements, give her standing to file this rule challenge. However, she does not allege that the Department's actions necessarily give her standing to challenge the specific rule alleged in the Amended Petition: THE COURT: So what is your position in terms of standing? These agency statements give you standing to challenge what? DR. BACCHUS: To challenge the regulation of unlicensed practice of professional geology in Florida. Because the broad sweeping net they are casting, Your Honor, encompasses every form of speech, every form of written document that I produce, whether it is a peer-reviewed publication, whether it is a comment letter to a public agency proposed action, I would have to challenge every single act. I literally cannot act until I am able to know what constitutes the practice of professional geology and the statute does not tell me that. Finally, with respect to what Dr. Bacchus describes as "illegal unpromulgated rules," Dr Bacchus described the unpromulgated rule as "this sweeping action, the fact that the statute does not define geological services, the statute does not define geological documents, yet the agency is taking action not only against me but against a myriad [of] other people for theoretically actions that constitute geological services."
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Darryl James McGlamry, is an inmate under the supervision of the Respondent. The Petitioner is incarcerated at Dade Correctional Institution. The Respondent is the Department of Corrections, an agency of the State of Florida. The Petitioner has challenged Rule 33-5.006(8), Florida Administrative Code. The Challenged Rule governs the visitation privileges of unmarried inmates. The Petitioner has alleged that the Challenged Rule "impairs the Petitioner's substantial interest in that it restricts the Petitioner's First Amendment Right of Freedom of Association, as it substantially limits the number of female visitors that the Petitioner may have." The Petitioner has also alleged that the Challenged Rule is invalid because the restriction on visitation of the Challenged Rule is: . . . contrary to the Civil Rights Act of Florida, Chapter 760.01, Florida Statutes. 11. As such, it is an "invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority". The Respondent does not have the authority to pass rules that are contrary to other statutes. This amounts to vesting unbridled discretion to the agency in violation of Section 120.52(8)(d), Florida Statutes. The Amended Petition is devoid of any alleged facts which, if proven, would support a determination that the Challenged Rule is invalid under Section 120.56, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Phillip Moultrie, seeks an administrative determination of the validity of Rule 33-22.008 (2)(b)13a, b and c, Florida Administrative Code. The Petitioner is a prisoner of the State of Florida in the lawful custody of the Florida Department of Corrections (Department). On June 8, 1981, the Petitioner was charged with a disciplinary infraction involving destruction of State property at the Zephyrhills Correctional Institute in Zephyrhills, Florida. A disciplinary team was convened to hear the charges against the Petitioner involving property destruction. A disciplinary team is a group of Department employees designated by the institution's administrator to handle major disciplinary actions. In most cases, the team is made up of a classification officer, a correctional officer and either a work supervisor or educational staff member. See Rules 33- 22.002(1) and 33-22.003(1)(c), Florida Administrative Code. The disciplinary team, proceeding in accordance with existing Department rules, found the Petitioner guilty of destruction of State property. The team recommended a penalty of a loss of 60 days gain time, 60 days disciplinary confinement, and, in accordance with then-existing Rule 33- 3.08(6)(b)4a, b and (substantially re-enacted and renumbered as Rule 33 22.008(2)(b)13a, b and c, the rule under challenge), the team assessed $300 against the Petitioner, representing one half of the cost of replacement or repair of the State property involved. Petitioner's cell mate was also charged with a like disciplinary infraction and assessed the other $300 of the total $600 property damage loss the Department was found to have sustained. The Petitioner's inmate bank account did not contain enough money to pay the entire cost of his assessment. Therefore, a "notation" or "debit" was placed on his bank account whereby funds received by him would be deducted from that account as payment on the $300 assessment until it was paid in full. The estimate of damages relied upon by the disciplinary team in assessing the amount Petitioner was to pay was provided by a commercial vendor, Mr. Nick Meyers, representing Chadco Products Company of Atlanta, Georgia. The estimate indicated that damages to the Petitioner's cell at Zephyrhills Correctional Institution amounted to $600. The Petitioner was later transferred to Florida State Prison at Starke, Florida. While at the State Prison, the Department continued to make withdrawals against his inmate bank account from July 24, 1981 until October 9, 1985, when the $300 assessment was fully paid. The deductions from Petitioner's inmate bank account were made regardless of the source of the funds. Some of the funds in the bank account came from a Department of Corrections work program, Prison Rehabilitative Industries and Diversified Enterprises (PRIDE). Other funds contained in that bank account came from private sources. The monies deducted from the inmate bank account were sent directly to the Zephyrhills Correctional Institution. The funds were deposited in a general operating account to be used by that institution. Inmates appearing before disciplinary teams are entitled to be advised of the charges against them and to be assisted by Department staff members and to have the possible range of punishments explained to them. They are entitled to be advised of the decision of the disciplinary team and to be advised of their rights to appeal that decision through the inmate grievance procedure. Inmates are not permitted to be represented by counsel at these hearings and further, are not permitted to cross-examine witnesses at the hearing. The disciplinary hearing of June 8, 1981 was conducted in accordance with procedural guidelines established by Rule 33-22.006 and 33-22.007, Florida Administrative Code. Subsequent to the hearing, the Petitioner utilized the Department's grievance procedure regarding the imposition of the assessment against his inmate bank account. He filed grievances both at the institutional level and to the Department's central office. The institutional level grievance was denied and the appeal to the Department's central office, was also denied. The Department relied upon renumbered Rule 33-22.008 (2)(b)3 as authority to require the Petitioner to make the subject restitution to the State of Florida.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Finding of Fact and Conclusion of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief in this case. RECOMMENDED this 28th day of February, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of February, 1990.
The Issue The issue is whether respondent should be fined $3,350 for allegedly violating various agency rules.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Respondent, Barbara Knight Manors, Inc., d/b/a Four Palms (Four Palms or respondent), operates a licensed adult congregate living facility (ACLF) at 302 11th Avenue Northeast, St. Petersburg, Florida. The facility is subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of petitioner, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS). As such, Four Palms is required to adhere to various HRS rules codified in Chapter 10A-5, Florida Administrative Code (1987). On December 3, 1987, an HRS program analyst, Diane Cruz, conducted a change of ownership survey of respondent's facility. The survey was prompted by the fact that the facility had just been purchased by its present owner, Barbara Knight. During the course of the survey, Cruz noted the following deficiencies which constituted a violation of applicable portions of Chapter 10A-5, Florida Administrative Code (1987): the patient daily medication records were incomplete in that some medications administered to patients had not been documented by the staff (10A-5.024(1)(a)3., FAC); (2) two employees did not have medical certificates reflecting they were free from communicable diseases (10A-5.019(5)(g), FAC); there were no standardized recipes (10A- 5.20(1)(g), FAC) the facility did not have a one week supply of non-perishable food (fruit and vegetables)(10A-5.20(1)(k), FAC) two showers did not have grab bars (10A- 5.023(9), FAC); and there were no screens on the windows (10A-5.023(13), FAC) The deficiencies were noted in a survey report received in evidence as petitioner's exhibit 4. A copy of the survey report was given to the facility's administrator on January 14, 1988. The report advised the licensee that monetary fines could be imposed if the violations were not timely corrected. At the completion of the December 3 survey, Cruz held an exit interview with Knight and explained the reason why each deficiency was cited and the steps required to correct the same. Also, Cruz advised Knight that all deficiencies had to be corrected no later than February 3, 1988 and that she would return for an unannounced follow-up visit to verify whether such deficiencies had been corrected. An "exit letter" confirming this process was furnished to Knight, and Knight signed and acknowledged receiving the letter. On March 2, 1988, Cruz returned to the facility for an unannounced follow-up visit. The purpose of the visit was to ascertain whether the deficiencies noted on December 3 had been corrected. During the visit, Cruz observed the following deficiencies that had not been corrected: The daily medicine records were still not accurately documented (initialed); one staff member had no medical certi- ficate attesting she was free from communicable diseases; there were no standardized recipes; the facility did not have a one week supply of non-perishable food (fruit and vegetables) on hand; two showers did not have grab bars; and two bedrooms did not have screens on the windows. As the result of an unidentified complaint, an HRS analyst, Sharon McCrary, visited respondent's facility on March 28, 1988. McCrary discovered that one resident's records had not been properly documented (initialed) to reflect that the staff had observed the patient receiving medication that morning. This violation was the same type that had been previously noted during the December 3, 1987 survey. On June 24, 1988, Cruz and a registered dietician, Mary Cook, returned to Four Palms to conduct a routine, annual survey. During the course of their survey, the two noted the following deficiencies that constituted violations of chapter 10A-5: there were three employees who had no medical certificate showing they were free from communicable diseases (10A-5.019(5)(g), FAC); three residents required supervision when given medications, but there was no licensed nurse on the staff to supervise this activity (10A-5.0182(3)(c), FAC) the facility had no activities calendar (10A-5.0182(7)(a), FAC) live roaches were observed in the kitchen area (10A-5.020(1)(n)1., FAC); the facility did not have a one week supply of powdered milk on hand (10A- 5.020(1)(k), FAC) there were no meal patterns or modified menus at the facility (10A-5.020(1)(e), FAC), and a county sanitation report citing various health deficiencies contained no evidence that such deficiencies had been corrected (10A-5.024(1)(d)2.a., FAC). An exit interview was conducted after the survey, and respondent was advised that it had until July 24, 1988 in which to correct the deficiencies. Also, a copy of the survey report was furnished to respondent. On September 13, 1988, an unannounced follow-up survey was conducted by Cruz and Cook to determine if the previously noted deficiencies had been corrected. They observed the following deficiencies that were not corrected: One staff member had no medical certificate reflecting he was free from communicable diseases; the facility's records indicated one resident required supervision when given medications but the facility did not employ a licensed nurse; although an activities calendar had been prepared, it was incomplete; there were no modified menus in the kitchen; live roaches were observed in the kitchen area; and the deficiencies noted on the county health inspection report had not been corrected. Respondent did not deny that many of the violations occurred. However, its owner and administrator argued that HRS was unfair in filing an administrative complaint more that a year after the first violations were noted. The facility maintained that HRS should have assisted it in remedying the violations since the owner had just purchased the business a few months earlier and was going through a "learning curve." The owner contended that many of the chapter 10A-5 requirements were impractical for a small ACLF and that HRS was simply "nit-picking." Knight also claimed she did not understand what she had to do in order to meet HRS rule requirements. Respondent offered a number of excuses as to why the violations occurred. For example, she contended that (a) the screens were off the windows because the windows were being painted, (b) her employees either would not bring their medical certificates to work or would not see a doctor to obtain one, (c) the quantity of non-perishable foods required to be kept on hand was a judgment call and was not susceptible to precise measurement, (d) roaches can never be totally eradicated in Florida, (e) one of the bathrooms without a grab bar was not being used by the residents, (f) the patient medication records were inaccurate or incomplete due to a misunderstanding by the physician who had prepared some of those records, and it is impossible to prepare a detailed, accurate activities calendar for ACLF residents. While these matters may serve to mitigate the severity of any penalty to be imposed, they do not excuse or justify the rule violations.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty as charged in the administrative complaint and that it pay an administrative fine of $1600, or $100 per violation DONE and ORDERED this 3rd day of October, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of October, 1989.
Findings Of Fact Both parties filed proposed findings of fact. Except as noted below, I have incorporated the substance of these proposed findings into my findings of fact. Rejected DOT Proposed Findings of Fact The following proposed findings are rejected because they are not facts but only recitations of testimony: Rule 22I-6.006 - proposed finding 1 - second and third sentence. Rule 22I-6.037 - proposed finding 1 - second sentence. proposed finding 2 - first and second sentence. The following proposed findings are irrelevant to the resolution of this case: Rule 22I-6.006 - proposed finding 4 and 5 because the proposed rule applies to other agencies than DOT. proposed finding 6 because whether another method of notifying all bidders is more efficient is not the standard to determine validity of the rule. Rule 22I-6.037 - proposed finding 3, 5, and 7. Rejected DOAH Proposed Finding of Fact The following proposed finding of fact are rejected because these are more in the nature of legal argument or conclusions of law rather than findings of fact: Proposed finding 5 - sentences 5 and 6. Proposed finding 6 - second paragraph, sentences 1 and 2; third paragraph, sentence 4 and 5; and fourth paragraph Proposed finding 7 - second paragraph; third paragraph; and fourth paragraph, fifth sentence Proposed finding 8 - fourth paragraph; fifth paragraph; and sixth paragraph The follow proposed findings are rejected as being irrelevant to the resolution of the issues presented in this case. Proposed finding 1 - fourth sentence Proposed finding 6 - second paragraph, sentence 5 and 6 Proposed finding 7 - fourth paragraph, sentence 1 through 4 The following proposed finding is rejected as not supported by the record evidence: Proposed finding 6 - fourth paragraph, sentence 4 fifth paragraph, sentence 4 ANALYSIS Standing The first issue that must be addressed is DOT's standing. DOAH asserts that Dot lacks standing to challenge Proposed Rules 22I-6.035 and 22I-6.037. DOT has the burden to establish that it would be substantially affected by the proposed rules should they be adopted by DOAH. Section 120.54(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1985); Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Alice P., 367 So.2d 1045, 1052 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). In order to resolve whether DOT has met its burden, a review of the pertinent decisions on standing is appropriate. 5/ The case cited most often on standing is the First District Court of Appeal's decision in Florida Department of Corrections v. Jerry, 353 So.2d 1230 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), cert. denied, 359 So.2d 1215 (Fla. 1978). The court held that an inmate who had been confined for committing an assault while in prison lacked standing to challenge an existing rule concerning disciplinary confinement and forfeiture of gain-time. Because the inmate was no longer confined under the rule and had not lost any gain-time when he filed the rule challenge, the court reasoned that the inmate had not suffered an injury in fact at the time of the challenge, end therefore, was not substantially affected by the existing rule. Whether the inmate would be subject to the rule again depended on the likelihood he would commit another infraction. The court deemed this too speculative and subject to conjecture to grant standing. 353 So.2d at 1236. In a later case, the Florida Supreme Court overruled Jerry to the extent it required associations to demonstrate a specific injury to the organization itself rather then to some of its members. Florida Home Builders' Association v. Department of Labor and Employment Security, 412 So.2d 351 (Fla. 1982). In reaching its decision, the court warned against an overly restrictive application of the concept of standing in the rule challenge cases by noting: "Expansion of public access to activities of governmentally agencies was one of the major legislative purposes of the new Administrative Procedure Act." 412 So.2d at 352-53. Standing to challenge proposed agency rules was addressed in Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Alice P., 367 So.2d 1045 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). There, the court held that all women of child bearing age who received medicaid benefits were not substantially affected by a proposed rule denying medicaid payments for abortions except under limited circumstances. In denying standing to a woman who was not pregnant at the time of the rule challenge, the court specifically rejected the argument that standing to challenge a proposed rule under Section 120.54(4), Florida Statutes (1985), is less restrictive than standing to challenge an existing rule under Section 120.56, Florida Statutes (1985), by stating: There is no difference between the immediacy and reality necessary to confer standing whether the proceeding is to challenge an existing rule or a proposed rule. 367 So.2d at 1052. In Professional Fire Fighters of Florida v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 396 So.2d 1194 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), the court held that a group of paramedics had standing to challenge rules establishing additional requirements for renewal of a paramedical certification. There was no showing on any of the individual paramedics had attempted to comply with the new rules or that anything in the new rules would disqualify them from retaining their certification. In rejecting the hearing officer's ruling that these individuals could not claim an injury because they had not yet applied for certification under the new rules, the court stated: The order below would preclude a challenge by anyone who had not first complied with a rule and suffered injury, no matter how clear the rule's applicability to, or substantial its effect on, the challengers... The APA permits prospective challenges to agency rulemaking and does not require that an affected party comply with the rule at his peril in order to obtain standing to chal- lenge the rule. A party may demonstrate standing by showing that a rule has a real and immediate effect upon his case as well as by proving injury in fact. 396 So.2d at 1195-96 (citations omitted) see also 4245 Corp., Mother's Lounge Inc. v. Department of Beverage, 345 So.2d 934 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). The court distinguished Jerry and Alice P. on the grounds that the petitioners in the case before it were immediately subject to the rule which rendered their continued employment as paramedics unlawful without compliance with the rule. The individuals were presently affected by the rule because they worked in the area to be regulated. 396 So.2d at 1196. In Village Park Mobile Home Association v. Department of Business Regulation, 506 So.2d 426, 412 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), the court on rehearing emphasized under the test for standing set forth in Fire Fighters that a party may show "that a rule has a real and immediate effect upon his case, as well as injury in fact." Standing was not found in Village Park for certain mobile home owners to challenge agency approval of the prospectus for a mobile home park because the prospectus only disclosed the method for raising rents and reducing services in the future. It was up to the landlord to implement the prospectus at some unspecified date in the future. 6/ Thus, no standing was found because the alleged injury was contingent upon the future actions of a third party. 506 So.2d at 433-34; see also Boca Raton Mausoleum v. Department of Banking, 511 So.2d 1060 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). In this case, DOT has not alleged that it has suffered an injury in fact by Proposed Rules 22I-6.035 and 22I-6.037. That is not surprising with respect to Proposed Rule 22I-6.037 since it is a new rule that has not been implemented. However, with respect to the proposed amendments to Rule 22I-6.035, dealing with attorney's fees and costs, most of DOT's challenges concern portions of the rule that were not substantially changed in the proposed rule. For example, DOT objects to the provisions requiring an agency to file a response or affidavit and the provisions which allow for a waiver of the right to an evidentiary hearing when one is not affirmatively requested by either party. Rule 22I-6.035 presently contains such provisions. Therefore, the injury in fact test would be applicable. However, DOT has not presented any facts indicating that a prevailing small business party has ever filed a petition seeking costs and attorney's fees from DOT under Florida Equal Access to Justice Act. Consequently, no injury exists. The alternative test for standing is whether the proposed rules would have a "real and immediate effect" upon DOT. With respect to Proposed Rule 22I- 6.035, DOT has not met this test merely by demonstrating that it is a party to pending cases involving small business parties. In order for DOT to be affected by Proposed Rule 22I-6.035, a small business party would first have to prevail against DOT and then file a petition for costs and attorney's fees based upon its belief that DOT was not "substantially justified" in bringing the administrative action. Whether these contingencies, which are controlled by a third party, will occur in the future is open to conjecture and speculation. The type of immediacy envisioned by the court in the Fire Fighters case does not appear to be present with respect to Proposed Rule 22I-6.035. Therefore, DOT does not have standing to challenge this proposed rule. On the other hand, I conclude that DOT has standing to challenge Proposed Rule 22I-6.037. DOT presently has at least nine pending cases involving administrative complaints. The proposed rule on voluntary dismissals would be immediately applicable to DOT's ability to take a voluntary dismissal on those cases without being contingent upon the acts of a third party. Such a real and immediate effect on pending cases involving DOT is sufficient to provide DOT with the requisite standing. DOT does not have to invoke the rule by seeking a voluntary dismissal in order to have standing to challenge the rule as suggested by DOAH. See Professional Fire Fighters of Florida, 396 So.2d at 1195. Invalidity of Proposed Rules 22I-6.006 and 22I-6.037 The Florida Legislature has recently defined what constitutes an invalid exercise of Legislative authority. Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes, as amended by Chapter 87-385, Section 2, Laws of Florida, provides: (8) "Invalid exercise of delegated legisla- tive authority" means action which goes beyond the powers, functions, duties delegated by the Legislature. A proposed existing rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority if any one or more of the following apply: (a ) The agency has materially failed to follow the applicable rulemaking procedure set forth in s. 120.54; The agency has exceeded its grant of rulemaking authority, citation to which is required by s. 120.54(7); The rule enlarges, modifies, or con- travenes the specific provisions of law implemented, citation to which is required by s. 120.54(7); The rule is vague, fails to establish adequate standards for agency decisions, or vests unbridled discretion in the agency; or The rule is arbitrary or capricious. These standards are similar to those used by the courts in Florida to test the validity of agency rules. See e.g., Agrico Chemical Co. v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 365 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), cert. denied, 376 So.2d 74 (Fla. 1979); Humana Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 469 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). In Agrico Chemical Co., the First District Court of Appeal stated: [I]n a 120.54 hearing, the hearing officer must look to the legislative authority for the rule and determine whether or not the proposed rule is encompassed within that grant. The burden is upon one who attacks the proposed rule to show that the agency, if it adopts the rule, would exceed its author- ity; that the requirements of the rule are not appropriate to the ends specified in the legislative act; that the requirements contained in the rule are not reasonably related to the purpose of the enabling legislation or that the proposed rule or the requirements thereof are arbitrary or capricious. A capricious action is one which is taken without though or reason or irration- ally. An arbitrary decision is one not supported by facts or logic, or is despotic. Administrative discretion must be reasoned and based upon competent substantial evi- dence. Competent substantial evidence has been described as such evidence as a reason- able person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The requirement that a challenger has the burden of demonstrating agency action to be arbitrary or capricious or an abuse of administrative discretion is a stringent one. 365 So.2d at 763. In this case DOT has the burden to demonstrate that adoption of Proposed Rules 22I-6.006 and 22I-6.037 would constitute an invalid exercise of legislative authority. Proposed Rule 22I-6.006 DOAH is statutorily authorized "to adopt reasonable rules to carry out the provisions of this act [Chapter 120]." Section 120.65(7), Fla. Stat. (1985). Regarding bid protests, an agency is required to forward a protest to DOAH for an evidentiary hearing in accordance with Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (1985), whenever there is a disputed issue a material fact. Section 120.53(5)(d)2, Fla. Stat. (1985). Section 120.57(1) sets forth certain procedures for conducting evidentiary hearings and proceedings where the substantial interests of a party are determined. In light of these statutory provisions, DOAH proposes to amend Rule 6.006 by requiring that an agency send a copy of the notice of hearing to all bidders, other than the protesting bidder, and attempt to telephonically notify these bidders of the date, time, and place the hearing. The purpose of this requirement is to give notice of the deadline to file a motion to intervene in the protest proceeding to the successful bidder, as well as all other bidders who had not filed a timely protest. Motions to intervene must be filed within five days prior to start of an evidentiary hearing. Fla. Admin. Code Rule 6.010. DOT persuasively argues that this portion of Proposed Rule 22I-6.006 requires an agency to do a useless act because any bidder that has not flied a timely protest is precluded from gaining party status in a bid protest proceeding by filing a motion to intervene. I agree. Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes (1985), requires an agency to provide notice of its decision, or intended decision, concerning a bid solicitation. The notice must contain the following statement: "Failure to file a protest within the time prescribed in s. 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under chapter 120, Florida Statutes." Paragraph (b) of Section 120.53(5), provides: Any person who is affected adversely by the agency decision or intended decision shall file with the agency a notice of protest in writing within 72 hours after the posting of the bid tabulation or after receipt of the notice of the agency decision or intended decision and shall file a formal written protest within 10 days after the date he filed the notice of protest. Failure to file a notice of protest or failure to file a formal written protest shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under chapter 120. The formal written protest shall state with particularity the facts and law upon which the protest is based. These statutory provisions are clear and unequivocal. An unsuccessful bidder must file a protest within the 72 hour limitations period in order to participate in further Chapter 120 proceedings. Xerox Corp. v. Florida Department of Professional Regulation, 489 So.2d 1230 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); see also Capelletti Brothers v. Department of Transportation, 499 So.2d 555 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)(72 hour deadline applies to protest challenging bid specifications). An adversely affected bidder cannot, and should not be allowed to, gain a back door point of entry to obtain party status in a bid protest proceeding by filing a motion to intervene when the bidder has already waived its right to participate in the proceeding. The only substantially effected entity that would be entitled to intervene in a bid protest proceeding is the successful bidder. Therefore, there would be a valid purpose in adopting a rule that required the successful bidder to receive the notice of hearing so that it would be aware of the deadline for filing a motion to intervene. However, as to all other non-protesting bidders, there is no statutory basis for providing the notice of hearing to them in light of what appears to be a clear prohibition against allowing those bidders to obtain party status after failing to file a timely protest pursuant to Section 120.53(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1985). DOAH argues that the need for subsection (2) of Proposed Rule 22I-6.006 is dramatized by the case of Spillis Candella and Partners, Inc. v. School Board of Dade County, No. 86-3002 Bid. There, the hearing officer determined that the agency never complied with the notice requirements triggering the 72 hour limitations period. Therefore, the protest filed in that case was determined to be timely since the 72 hour time limit had not expired. This single case does not provide justification for requiring agencies to give notice of the evidentiary hearing to all unsuccessful bidders in all bid protest cases. No evidence was adduced indicating that the failure to provide the requisite statutory notice issue raised in the Spillis Candella case had ever occurred in any other bid protest proceeding that had come before a DOAH hearing officer. Even if this had been a recurring problem, subsection (b) of the Proposed Rule 22I-6.006 could have been more closely tailored to remedy issues similar to that raised in Spillis Candella. The rule should have limited an agency's responsibility to provide a notice of hearing to all unsuccessful bidders if the agency had not previously complied with the notice requirements of Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes (1985). 7/ In light of the foregoing, I conclude that subsection (2) of Proposed Rule 22I-6.006 is arbitrary because it requires agencies to provide notice of a bid protest hearing to bidders who have waived their right to become parties in the proceeding. The rule also contravenes Section 120.53(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1985), which contemplates that only timely protestors may participate as parties in a bid proceeding. 8/ Subsection (3) is also invalid because it requires that an agency provide to the hearing officer proof that it has complied with subsection (2). DOT's remaining objections to Proposed Rule 22I-6.006 are without merit. The fact that all agencies involved in bid protests must adopt rules end procedures for the resolution of such protests, and that the Administration Commission shall also adopt model rules on the same subject, does not indicate a legislative intent to preempt DOAH from adopting rules pertaining to the procedures for conducting bid protest hearings. Section 120.53(5)(a) and (f), Fla. Stat. (1955). In addition, Section 120.57(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1985), does not prohibit non-parties from receiving notice of an evidentiary hearing. Proposed Rule 22I-6.037 DOT advances numerous arguments in support of its contention that subsections (2) and (3) of Proposed Rule 22I-6.037 constitute an invalid exercise of legislative authority. I am persuaded by two of these arguments that DOT's position has merit. First, with respect to subsection (2), the proposed rule provides a hearing officer with the discretion to grant a motion for voluntary dismissal "upon such terms and conditions as the hearing officer deems just and proper." This language fails to provide any guidance to a hearing officer or to the parties in an administrative complaint proceeding as to what conditions a hearing officer could impose for allowing the agency to withdraw its complaint without prejudice. Instead, the rule gives the hearing officer unlimited discretion to impose any condition the hearing officer subjectively believes is "just and proper." These words cannot be construed as words of limitation because it must always be presumed that a hearing officer will rule in a manner that he or she believes is just and proper. Thus the elimination of the "just and proper" language from the rule would not give any more discretion to a hearing officer than is presently granted by the proposed rule. The fact that Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(2) provides that a trial court may grant a voluntary dismissal filed after submission of a case to the court "upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper," does not provide a basis for concluding that subsection (2) of Proposed Rule 22I-6.037 is valid. The Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted pursuant to the inherent power of the courts, a power that administrative agencies do not possess. Hillsborough County Hospital Authority v. Tampa Heart Institute, 472 So.2d 748, 753-54 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1985). Agency rules may not violate the standards set forth in Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes, as amended by Chapter 57-325, Section 2, Laws of Florida. In this case, subsection (2) of Proposed Rule 22I- runs afoul of paragraph (d) of Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes, as amended, which provides that a rule is invalid if [t]he rule is vague, fails to establish adequate standards for agency decisions, or vests unbridled discretion in the agency." Therefore, subsection (2) of Proposed Rule 22I-6.037 is invalid. Subsection (3) of the proposed rule is also invalid but for a different reason. Unlike subsection (2), nothing is left to the parties' imagination as to the consequences an agency will encounter if it files a notice of voluntary dismissal of an administrative complaint containing nonjurisdictional allegations that were previously the subject of a voluntary dismissal. Those nonjurisdictional factual allegations contained in both complaints will be deemed dismissed with prejudice. The issue with regard to this rule provision is whether DOAH has the statutory authority to adopt a rule that requires dismissal of an administrative complaint with prejudice under these circumstances. Although no cases are directed on point, two district court of appeal decisions are instructive. In Great American Bank v. Division of Administrative Hearings, 412 So.2d 373 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), the First District Court of Appeal revised a hearing officer's order imposing sanctions for a party's failure to make discovery and for a witness' failure to give responsive testimony. The court ruled that certain portions of the model rules, which purported to give such authority to a hearing officer, were invalid because they conflicted with the discovery enforcement provisions found in the Administrative Procedure Act. Section 120.58(3), Fla. Stat. (1981). The Legislature subsequently amended Section 120.58 to specifically grant hearing officers the authority to pose sanctions to effect discovery. Ch. 84-173, Laws of Florida. In Hillsborough County Hospital Authority v. Tampa Heart Institute, 472 So.2d 748 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), the Second District Court of Appeal declared Model Rule 28-5.211 invalid to the extent the rule authorized a hearing officer to impose sanctions, including dismissal, to enforce procedural orders. The court rejected the argument that the same general rulemaking authority relied upon by DOAH as authority for Proposed Rule 22I-6.037, Sections 120.53 and 120.65(7), Florida Statutes (1985), authorized the model rule. Rather, any rule that provides a sanction in the form of a penalty must be based upon explicit statutory authority such as that found in Section 120.58(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1985), or Section 120.57(1)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1986). 9/ 472 So.2d at 747-48. Subsection (3) of Proposed Rule 22I-6.037 imposes the sanction of dismissal with prejudice. However, in contrast to the specific saction authority granted to hearing officers in Sections 120.58(1)(b) and 120.57(1)(b)5, no provision in Chapter 120 specifically authorizes DOAH to impose a sanction under the circumstances set forth in subsection (3) of Proposed Rule 22I-6.037. Therefore, while I find the purpose of adopting subsection (3) of the proposed rule, to ensure failness, is laudable, this portion of the rule is invalid because DOAH does not possess the requisite legislative authority to adopt such a rule. Section 120.52(5)(b), Fla. Stat., as amended by Ch. 87-358, Section 2, Laws of Florida.
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent is guilty of the allegations in the Amended Administrative Complaint filed against him, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him, if any.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent has been licensed as a restricted barber and operating under the name of Miracles in Motion, located in Tampa, Florida. On May 9, 2006, the Department issued a Uniform Disciplinary Citation against Respondent in case numbered 2006030590 in the amount of $400. The fine, due to be paid by July 9, has not been paid. On October 13, 2006, the Department issued a Uniform Disciplinary Citation against Respondent in case numbered 2006058259 in the amount of $250. The fine, due to be paid by December 24, has not been paid. Also on October 13, 2006, the Department issued a Uniform Disciplinary Citation against Respondent in case numbered 2006058271 in the amount of $250. The fine, due to be paid by December 24, has not been paid. On October 24, 2006, the Department issued a Uniform Disciplinary Citation against Respondent in case numbered 2006063364 in the amount of $400. The fine, due to be paid by December 24, has not been paid. Respondent did not dispute the facts contained in these four Citations. Under the terms of the Citations, they, therefore, automatically became final orders 30 days after they were issued. Since Respondent has not paid those fines, he fails to be in compliance with four final orders of the Department. The total amount of fines not paid by Respondent pursuant to the four Citations involved in this proceeding is $1,300.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Respondent is not guilty of violating Section 476.204(1)(i), Florida Statutes, and dismissing the Amended Administrative Complaint filed against him. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Robyn Barineau, Executive Director Barbers' Board Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 42 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Ned Luczynski, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 42 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Philip F. Monte, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 42 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Elvis O'Neil Crooks 7117 Wrenwood Circle Tampa, Florida 33617
Findings Of Fact 1. On March 6, 1984, a person named Earl Cole, who is or was also known as Robert E. Cole entered pleas of nolo contendere in the Circuit Court, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Palm B3each County, Florida, to the following: Case No. Count(s) Crime 82-4836-CF A02 Check 1 Obtaining Property in Return for Worthless 82-7339-CF A02 Check 2 Obtaining Property in Return for Worthless 82-7745-CF A02 1 Uttering a Forgery
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to section 57.111, Florida Statutes (2011).1/
Findings Of Fact By a three-count Administrative Complaint dated June 7, 2011, the Respondent charged the Petitioner with alleged violations of law related to the sale of certain products. The allegations of the Administrative Complaint were prosecuted in the disciplinary case. A final hearing in the disciplinary case was conducted on January 24 and 25, 2012. On April 18, 2012, the ALJ issued a Recommended Order determining that the products referenced in the Administrative Complaint were unregistered securities and that the Petitioner "violated section 626.611(16) [Florida Statutes,] by selling an unregistered security that was required to be registered pursuant to chapter 517." The Administrative Complaint also charged the Petitioner with additional violations of statute including a "[d]emonstrated lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance," in violation of section 626.611(7). As set forth in the Recommended Order, the ALJ determined that the evidence failed to establish the additional violations. Based on violation of section 626.611(16), the ALJ recommended that the Petitioner's license be suspended for a total of six months, two months for each product sale alleged in the three separate counts of the Administrative Complaint. On July 6, 2012, the Respondent issued a Final Order determining that in addition to the violation of section 626.611(16) found by the ALJ, the Petitioner had also violated section 626.611(7). Despite finding the additional violation, the Respondent adopted the penalty recommended by the ALJ. The Petitioner took an appeal of the Final Order to the District Court of Appeal for the Fifth District. The Court determined that the products sold by the Petitioner were not securities that required registration at the time they were sold by the Petitioner, and, on June 21, 2013, issued an order reversing the Final Order issued by the Respondent. The parties have stipulated that the Petitioner was the prevailing party in the disciplinary case and is a "small business party" as defined by section 57.111(3)(d).
