The Issue The ultimate issue in this proceeding is whether proposed Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G15-21 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner resides in Mebane, North Carolina. Sometime in April 2003, Petitioner requested the Board to release certain information that is public information within the meaning of Chapter 119, Florida Statutes (2003). Sometime in October 2003, the Board provided some of the information requested by Petitioner. The information included "scores, converted and raw and seat numbers of test applicants." Respondent did not include the "listed areas as agreed." The Board charged Petitioner $90.00 for providing "what they felt Petitioner should have," and the Board was "quite insulting about it." On a date not identified in the Petition, Petitioner asked a representative of the Board if the Board "currently" had an advertisement in the Florida Administrative Weekly concerning a "rule challenge that dealt with raw scores or scores in general." The representative stated there was no proposed rule change pertaining to scores. Petitioner asked for any and all data pertaining to scores as a rule change. The representative for the Board stated there was no such information to provide. At some time not identified in the Petition, Petitioner requested a copy of any records that "had been submitted" to the [B]oard pertaining to scores as part of a rule change. The representative of the Board repeated that nothing had gone before the Board pertaining to applicants sitting for the "Intern Test or the PE Exam." The Florida Administrative Weekly dated October 10, 2003, contains a proposed change to Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G15-21 that is directly related to Petitioner's "public information request." Petitioner believes that the Board had to approve the rule change before the Board advertised it on October 10, 2003, and that the previous denials by the Board's representative constituted "unethical" conduct. Petitioner requested a public hearing pursuant to the advertisement in the Florida Administrative Weekly on October 10, 2003, but doubts if the Board will comply with the "Florida Administrative Laws" based on what Petitioner believes to be the Board's "previous unethical behavior." The Board may be "in violation of The Florida Sunshine Law and the Florida Administrative Laws." The behavior of the Board's representative "in trying to deceive" Petitioner on this issue is "certainly a red flag" and indicates a necessity to notify all previous testing applicants to make sure they are aware of the proposed rule change before adoption. The Florida Administrative Weekly alone is not "a well read media for the general [sic] affected masses." Florida law states that any substantially affected person may seek an administrative determination of the invalidity of a proposed rule by filing with DOAH a petition seeking such a determination within 21 days after the date of publication of the notice required by Chapter 120, Florida Statutes (2003). Petitioner timely filed a petition challenging the proposed change to an existing rule. Petitioner believes the term "substantial" denotes "having a reasonable basis in law and fact" and that the term "reasonable" denotes "that which is fair, proper or moderate under the circumstances." Petitioner believes it is Respondent's "negligence in complying with FS 120, FS 119 that gives Petitioner standing in this case." Petitioner made a "public information request" sometime in July 2003. Respondent did not provide the information in the months of August and September 2003. In September 2003, Respondent requested Petitioner to pay $90.00 for release of part of the information requested by Petitioner. The information Respondent agreed to release included: statistical data broken down by race and sex identifying each applicant by assigned number and a list of the "number of applicants" who sat for the past five professional engineer exams; the number of times "testees" took the test; raw and converted scores; the "city of the testees"; and the race and sex of the "testees." When Respondent requested the payment of $90.00, Respondent failed to disclose that Respondent would not release all of the requested information. Respondent did not release the "testees' candidate numbers." There may be no statutory exemption for "testees' candidate numbers." Petitioner believes Respondent violated Chapter 119, Florida Statutes (2003), by exceeding the statutory time limit for releasing public records and by not releasing all of the information that Petitioner requested. Petitioner believes that Petitioner is entitled to all of the information she requested, asserts that it is a misdemeanor to violate Chapter 119, Florida Statutes (2003), and alleges that such a violation is grounds for removal or impeachment. Petitioner believes Respondent failed to grant Petitioner a public hearing in violation of applicable rulemaking procedures. During a conversation with a representative for Respondent concerning Petitioner's request for information, the representative failed to advise Petitioner of the proposed rule change advertised in the Florida Administrative Weekly on October 10, 2003. If the proposed rule change were adopted, "without credibly addressing the remaining issues of Petitioner's public records request," there may be no further opportunity to retrieve the data now in the possession of Respondent. Respondent accepted payment for the requested data, cashed Petitioner's check, and "arrogantly" released what information Respondent felt Petitioner should have. Counsel for Respondent advised Petitioner that Respondent would not cash Petitioner's check, but would return the check to Petitioner. Counsel for Respondent also threatened in a telephone conversation to advise Respondent not to grant the request and to require Petitioner to come to Florida and "go through the records" herself. Petitioner requested counsel for Respondent to put the requested information in "chart form." Counsel stated he would not advise Respondent to place the information in any particular format. Counsel was "extremely hostile and arrogant" and "later apologized for his behavior." However, Petitioner believes counsel for Respondent is "extremely hot tempered with certain people." Counsel for Respondent stated to Petitioner that Respondent would release the information "just as it is" in Respondent's database, and Petitioner could then put the information in any format she desired. That is "exactly what Respondent did. The information was extremely fragmented and difficult to read." Respondent had "no credible basis" for denying Petitioner the requested information. Petitioner believes that Respondent's action, "at best was deceptive and nonresponsive to Petitioner's inquiry." The trier of fact cannot summarize the next assumptive finding from Petitioner's response to the Motion to Dismiss, but must quote from the response. On October 16, 2003, Petitioner asked [Respondent's representative] via e-mail for the immediate release of all data whether electronic or written or telephonic messaging; and any and all communications between staff, and any other entity, person, corporation, business, governmental agency relative to the proposed change of scores, etc. Identify the date of origination of the proposed rule change and the reason for the proposed change. Please indicate any Board action on this issue and the date of Board action. Please include any supportive reports or data submitted to the Board to support or necessitate the need for a change in policy. Lastly, will the legislature need to act on your proposed rule change? As the e-mails will illustrate [the representative] continued to deny that any rule change existed pertaining to the very same public records request by Petitioner. The actions of [the representative] breached the public trust [and] eroded the fiber of 'ethics' in government. When Petitioner found the proposed rule change in the October 10, 2003, issue of the Administrative Weekly, [the representative] was listed as the contact person. Petitioner believes Chapter 120, Florida Statutes (2003), creates a two-pronged right to participation in the rulemaking process, i.e., "those [at] whom the intended action is directed and those who may just be affected by the new rule." Rulemaking procedures require notice to all persons named in the rule and to all persons who have timely requested notice. Respondent conducted its "rule change meeting in a closed meeting not open to the public." The records of that meeting are not available to the public. The Florida Administrative Weekly is not a well read publication for the "affected parties, directly affected parties, or the intended target parties." Therefore, Petitioner believes "in the spirit of open government, Respondents [sic] failed to meet the standard."
The Issue The issues in this case are: Whether Petitioner, Warren M. Briggs ("Briggs"), should be issued a Wetland Resource Permit (WRP) for the construction of a single-family dwelling on a lot with jurisdictional wetlands in Santa Rosa County, Florida, as proposed in his application submission of 1998; and Whether the Department would permit the construction of a single-family dwelling on the subject lot under conditions and circumstances other than those set forth in Briggs' application.
Findings Of Fact Briggs is the owner of Lot 67, Block H, Paradise Bay Subdivision, located in southern Santa Rosa County ("Briggs lot"). Paradise Bay Subdivision was developed in approximately 1980, prior to the passage in 1984 of the Warren Henderson Wetland Protection Act. (Official Recognition of Section 403.918, Florida Statutes). The subdivision consists of modestly priced single- family homes that are attractive to young families because of the quality of nearby schools. The typical non-waterfront home in the subdivision is single story, approximately 2,000 square feet in area, and built on a concrete slab. The typical setback from the road to the front edge of a home is 75 feet. This fairly consistent setback from the road prevents the view from one home into the adjacent property owner’s back yard and, thereby, adversely affecting the neighbor’s property value. The undeveloped Briggs lot was purchased in 1981 for approximately $15,000 and remains undeveloped. Briggs bought the lot, along with three other lots in the subdivision, as investment property. The other three lots have been sold. One of the lots sold earlier by Briggs was a waterfront lot on East Bay located in jurisdictional wetlands. The entire lot was filled pursuant to a permit issued by the Department. The Briggs lot is 90 feet wide by 200 feet deep. It is located on the south side of Paradise Bay Drive. The lots on the north side of Paradise Bay Drive are waterfront lots on East Bay. To the rear (south) of the Briggs lot and other lots on the south side of Paradise Bay Drive, is a large swamp that eventually discharges into East Bay. The major connection between the Briggs lot and East Bay is through a culvert under Paradise Bay Drive. The Briggs’ lot consists of 2,914 square feet of uplands and 15,086 square feet of state jurisdictional wetland, with all of the uplands located in the northern half of the lot. Converted to acres, the Briggs lot consists of 0.067 acres of uplands and 0.347 acres of state jurisdictional wetland. Lot 66, immediately east of the Briggs lot, has been cleared and is about half tietie swamp with the remainder consisting of uplands and disturbed wetlands. Some fill has been placed on the lot. Lot 68, immediately west of the Briggs lot, is undeveloped and consists of all tietie wetlands. Lots 69, 70 and 71 of Block H of the subdivision are undeveloped and consist primarily of wetlands. The Department issued a permit on October 31, 1996, that allowed the owners of Lot 71 to fill 0.22 acres (9,570 square feet) of wetlands. The fill is allowed to a lot depth of 145 feet on the west side, and to a width of 73 feet of the total lot width of 90 feet. The fill area is bordered on the east and west by wetland areas not to be filled. The Department issued a permit on November 13, 1997, that allowed the owner of Lot 61 to fill 0.26 acres (11,310 square feet) of wetlands. Fill is allowed over the entire northern 125 feet of the 185 foot-deep lot. On April 28, 1998, Briggs applied to the Department for a permit to fill Lot 67. The Department, in its letter of August 7, 1998, and its permit denial of September 2, 1998, erroneously described the project as consisting of 0.47 acres of fill. The entire lot consists of only 0.41 acres, of which 0.067 acres is uplands, leaving a maximum area of fill of 0.343 acres. If Briggs’ residential lot is to be used, some impact to the wetlands on the lot is unavoidable. Alternatives discussed by Briggs and the Department, three of which are still available for Briggs to accept, included the following: One hundred feet of fill with a bulkhead separating the fill from the wetland area, with no off-site mitigation; Fill pad could be placed on property with the remainder of the wetlands on the site to remain in their natural state with no backyard, with no off-site mitigation required; One hundred feet of fill with a bulkhead separating the fill material from the wetland, with a small back yard, with no off-site mitigation required. Briggs did not accept any of the foregoing alternatives or proposed acceptable mitigation measures.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying the permit application, provided that the parties may reach subsequent agreement regarding proper mitigation in order to make the construction of a single-family dwelling possible on the Petitioner’s property in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. _ DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles T. Collette, Esquire Lucinda R. Roberts, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard The Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Jesse W. Rigby, Esquire Clark, Partington, Hart, Larry Bond and Stackhouse 125 West Romana Street, Suite 800 Post Office Box 13010 Pensacola, Florida 32591-3010 Kathy C. Carter, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard The Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Teri L. Donaldson, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard The Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the State of Florida Department of Environmental Regulation (DER, or the Department) should grant the request of Medico Environmental Services, Inc. (Medico) for a one-year extension of the expiration date for air construction permit AC52-184546 for a biological waste incinerator located at 13200-58th Street North, Clearwater, Florida.
Findings Of Fact The Prior and Related Proceedings.-- Medico holds an air construction permit issued by the DER on March 8, 1991, for the construction of a biological waste incinerator in Pinellas County, Florida. The permit contains general and special conditions, including prohibitions against the incineration of non-exempt amounts of radioactive and hazardous wastes, a requirement that all operators be trained in a DER-approved training program, and a requirement that the facility undergo compliance testing after it is constructed to assure that its operation complies with emission standards established by DER rule. Several weeks after the grant of the air construction permit, on March 29, 1991, the DER changed the equipment model number on the permit, but the change in model number represented no change in the actual equipment described in the application. Local government building and construction permit procedures, and negotiations with potential investors, delayed construction of the facility. By letter dated November 14, 1991, Medico requested an extension of the expiration date of the permit from January 7, 1992, to January 7, 1993. No other change in the permit was sought. On or about December 6, 1991, the Department issued a second air construction permit for a biological waste incinerator in Pinellas County to Bayfront Medical Center (Bayfront). Bayfront has since requested two extensionns on the expiration date of its permit. The second request is currently pending challenge in Division of Administrative Hearings Case Nos. 92- 6879 and 92-6880. The Applicant and Principals.-- Medico is a corporation consisting of two fifty percent shareholders: Gerald Hubbell; and Robert Sheehan. Hubbel operates a funeral home and Bay Area Crematory, Inc., in Pinellas County; he has less than 50 percent ownership of those businesses. Previously, Sheehan co-founded a medical waste incineration facility in New York known as Medi-Waste, Limited, of which he was one-third owner. In 1986, he sold the company, and it merged with Medi-Gen, Medical Generation Associates, a wholly owned subsidiary of a company known as Legeis Resources (Legeis). Sheehan held two percent of the shares of Legeis and served as an officer of Medi-Gen until he resigned in 1989. Sheehan does not own more than 50 percent of Medico, and he has not had any interest in any other air construction or air operation permit in the State of Florida. Since March, 1991, he has not held an interest in any other entity involved in medical waste incineration. Air Quality. Medico will be capable of incinerating 2,350 pounds of medical waste per hour, which is about ten percent of Flrodia's medical waste. Pinellas County generates about 75,000 pounds of such waste per day but currently has the capacity to burn only 480 pounds per hour. A computer-generated air dispersion model was run on the theoretical maximum impact of Medico, of Bayfront, and of both facilities, on the ambient air in the affected parts of Pinellas County. The model used was the EPA's Industrial Source Complex, Short Term, Version 2, March, 1992. This model is recommended by the DER and preferred by the EPA. It follows the DER's Guideline on Air Quality Models. Average background ambient air was calculated using monitoring data collected by Pinellas County for the EPA criteria pollutants (sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, carbon monoxide, ozone, lead, and particulate matter) and for hydrochloric acid in accordance with the requirements of title 40, part 58, of the Code of Federal Regulations, as reported in the DER's 1991 ALLSUM. (According to EPA publications, hydrochloric acid is the only toxic pollutant on the DER's air toxics list for which medical waste incinerators like Medico's are considered to be a source.) The theoretical maximum impacts of Medico and Bayfront were based on the AP42 emission standards for those kinds of facilities. Meteorological data was taken from the nearest national weather service station (at the Tampa International Airport). The air model shows that none of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for any of the criteria pollutants would be exceeded by adding either the impact of the Medico facility, or the impact of the Bayfront facility, or both combined, to the average ambient air in the affected parts of Pinellas County. (Both Total Suspended Particulate (TSP) and the newer PM10 category of particulates less than ten microns in size cases, which is more relevant to public health concerns, were considered for particulate matter levels.) Testimony indicates that the National Ambient Air Quality Standards would not be exceeded for any of the criteria pollutants by adding either the impact of the Medico facility, or the impact of the Bayfront facility, or both combined, to the maximum ambient air in the affected parts of Pinellas County. Also, even assuming a "worst case" weather scenario, no problematic toxic pollutants are expected, based on a Pinellas County Department of Environmental Management, Air Quality Division, screening computer model. Lead and hydrochloric acid would be under the EPA's "no threat level" (NTL). (As for the original application, these determinations are based on the scrubber manufacturer's hydrochloric acid efficiency claim of 99.9% and, in the case of lead, on its particulate efficiency claim.) As previously stated, according to EPA publications, there are no other toxic pollutants on the DER's air toxics list for which medical waste incinerators like Medico's are considered to be a source. The theoretical emissions for the Medico facility are below 100 tons per year, and the facility does not have the potential to emit more than ten tons per year of any hazardous air pollutant, as defined by the EPA. Past Conduct and Reliablily of the Principals.-- On or about March 5, 1991, the temperature in the secondary chamber of the biohazardous waste incinerator then operated by Hubbell dropped below 1800o at the end of a burn, and there was still a small amount of waste in the primary chamber and some small amount of flame still visible in the primary chamber. This violation, however, did not result in visible emissions, which would be an indication that there was a combustion or related problem in the incinerator. On or about March 4, 1991, one of the crematory units operated by Hubbell had visible emissions of 44% opacity. Identical warning letters regarding the March 4 and March 5 violations were sent on March 20 and March 27, 1991. Hubbell respondent by telephone on April 1, and in writing on April 5, 1991. There have been no other violation of Florida Statutes or DER rules since the original construction permit issued. Taking these violations into consideration, the compliance history of Hubbell's facilities does not undermine Medico's ability to give the necessary reasonable assurances. Between October, 1981, and October, 1991, Hubbell's facilities have been guilty of only the following violations: On or about March 25, 1987, Hubbell began to incinerate biohazardous medical waste before he was aware that a special permit for incinerating medical waste, in addition to his permit to operate the crematory, was required by law. On or about August 19, 1988, Hubbell's facility was notified that the Pinellas County Division of Air Quality had received a written complaint about smoke, and that a county permit would be required for the infectious waste incinerator along with retrofitting some controls. On or about October 4, 1989, Hubbell's facility apparently had a visible emissions violation. Three annual operating reports for Hubbell's facilities--for 1981, 1985, and 1989--would be considered late under current policy. There was no evidence whether they were late under the policy in effect at the time the reports were filed. Over the course of those ten years, there is no suggestion in the evidence that any of the other annual operating reports may have been late, and there are no other violations recorded in the Pinellas County compliance contact logs. To the contrary, the records indicate that no violations were found on 15 inspections. Hubbell voluntarily has shut down the old, smaller and less sophisticated medical waste incinerator where some of the recorded violations occurred, pending the construction of the Medico facility. Sheehan has not had an interest in any biohazardous waste incinerators in the State of Florida, other than the Medico application, and has not had a controlling interest in, or operational role in, any entity operating a medical or biohazardous waste facility in any state since June, 1989. Although, under the prehearing rulings, it would not even be relevant to this proceeding, the only evidence of any violations by any entity in which Sheehan had a controlling interest in, or operational role in, that operated a medical or biohazardous waste facility in any state, at any time, was evidence of two New York State Department of Environmental Conservation ash container violations and one failure to close up the back of the building housing an incinerator in October, 1988.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Environmental Regulation enter a final order extending the expiration date for air construction permit AC52-184546 for one year from the entry of the final order, subject to a DER determination that construction did not begin by March 20, 1992, and that the Chapter 92-31 moratorium applies. RECOMMENDED this 6th day of January, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-0851 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1991), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioners' Proposed Findings of Fact. I.1.-3. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. First sentence, accepted and incorporated. Second sentence, argument and subordinate. Accepted and incorporated. First four sentences, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Fifth sentence, rejected as not supported by the evidence and as contrary to facts found. Fifth sentence, accepted but subordinate to facts contrary to those found. First four sentences, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Fifth sentence, accepted but subordinate to facts contrary to those found. (He raised questions but had no answers; other witnesses satisfactorily answered the question.) Last sentence, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence and to the facts found. First sentence, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Second sentence, irrelevant to the extension the expiration date of an air construction permit, and unnecessary. Also, state law and regulations govern some aspects of the handling of these wastes. First two sentences, accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Third and fourth sentences, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence and to facts found. (Reasonable assumptions can be made, in accordance with EPA publications, based on the nature of the facility.) Also, irrelevant to the extension the expiration date of an air construction permit, and unnecessary. Finally, res judicata. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence and to facts found. Also, irrelevant to the extension the expiration date of an air construction permit, and unnecessary. Finally, res judicata. First sentence, accepted but accepted but subordinate to facts contrary to those found, and unnecessary. Second sentence, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence and to facts found. Also, irrelevant to the extension the expiration date of an air construction permit, and unnecessary. Finally, res judicata. First two sentences, accepted and incorporated in part (another reason was that the application passed a screening model both initially and on the extension request and that most of the toxics would not be expected to be generated from this source), but res judicata, and unnecessary. Third sentence, accepted and incorporated. Fourth and fifth sentences, accepted but res judicata, subordinate to facts contrary to those found, and unnecessary. II.9.-10. Rejected as contrary to facts found and to the greater weight of the evidence. III.1.-2. Rejected as being conclusions of law. Medico's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-3. Accepted and incorporated. 4. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. 5.-7. Accepted and incorporated. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated. Irrelevant and unnecessary. 11.-23. Generally accepted but largely subordinate. Incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Generally accepted, but largely res judicata, irrelevant, subordinate and unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated. 30.-31 Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Generally, accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Last sentence, rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Rest, accepted but subodinate and unnecessary. 34.-35. Generally, accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. 38.-43. Accepted and incorporated. 44.-45. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated. Accepted but largely subordinate and unnecessary. Some, irrelevant. 48.-49. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. 50. Accepted but irrelevant, subordinate and unnecessary. DER's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-9. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 10. The law was signed on March 20, 1992. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated. 11.-15. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Adrien W. Helm, Esquire 925 Fourteenth Avenue North St. Petersburg, Florida 33705 Sandra P. Stockwell, Esquire Douglas L. Stowell, Esquire Post Office Box 11059 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 W. Douglas Beason, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Dept. of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blairstone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Carol Browner, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson, Esquire General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400
The Issue This proceeding concerns an Intent to Issue a dredge and fill permit given by the Department of Environmental Regulation ("DER") to Respondent, Edmund Burke ("Burke"), for construction of a retaining wall and wooden pile-supported bridge crossing a portion of the South Fork of the St. Lucie River in Martin County, Florida. The ultimate issues for determination are whether Petitioner has standing to challenge the proposed DER action, and if so, whether the proposed agency action complies with the requirements of Sections 403.91 through 403.938, Florida Statutes, and applicable rules.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Edmund Burke, on January 15, 1988, filed with the Department of Environmental Regulation ("DER") application number 431441608 for a permit to construct a permanent, pile supported, wooden bridge approximately 80 feet long and 10 feet wide connecting the mainland with an island in the South Fork of the St. Lucie River in Martin County, Florida. The bridge was to span a 50 foot canal or creek ("channel") in the River. One of two retaining walls was to be located on the mainland peninsula. The other retaining wall was to be located on the island (the "initial project"). Between January 15, 1988, and April 28, 1989, the initial project was modified by Respondent, Burke, to satisfy DER concerns over potential impacts, including secondary impacts, relevant to the application. The width of the bridge was reduced from 10 feet to 6 feet. The retaining wall initially planned at the point where the bridge intersects the island was eliminated. The retaining wall on the mainland side of the bridge was relocated above mean high water. Sixty feet of the proposed bridge runs from mean high water to mean high water. An additional 10 feet on each end of the bridge is located above mean high water. The project remained a permanent, pile supported, wooden bridge (the "modified project"). The Intent to Issue, dated April 28, 1989, indicated that the modifications required by DER had been made, that the modifications satisfied DER concerns relevant to the initial project, and that DER intended to issue a permit for construction of the modified project. The elimination of the retaining wall obviated any necessity for backfill on the island. The reduction in the width of the bridge virtually eliminated the secondary impacts on the surrounding habitat, resulted in less shading of the water, and precluded vehicular traffic over the bridge. The final modification that was "necessary in order for [DER] to approve this application" was the reduction in the width of the bridge from 10 feet to 6 feet. Petitioner's Exhibit 17. DER's requirement for this final modification was communicated to Mr. Cangianelli in a telephone conversation on April 6, 1989 (Petitioner's Exhibit 18), and memorialized in a letter to Respondent, Burke, on April 14, 1989 (Petitioner's Exhibit 17). The final modification was made, and the Intent to Issue was written on April 28, 1989. Petitioner's Case. Property commonly known as Harbor Estates is adjacent to the site of the modified project. A constructed harbor and contiguous park are located within the boundaries of Harbor Estates. Both are used by residents of Harbor Estates and both are proximate to the site of the modified project. The harbor entrance and site of the modified project are located on opposite sides of a peninsula approximately 40 feet wide and approximately 125 feet long. Boats operated by residents of Harbor Estates that can navigate under the modified project need only travel the length of the peninsula, a distance of approximately 125 feet through the channel, in order to reach the harbor entrance. Boats operated by residents of Harbor Estates that cannot navigate under the proposed bridge must travel around the island, a distance of approximately 1800 feet in the main body of the St. Lucie River, in order to reach the harbor entrance. However, Petitioner presented no evidence that prior to the construction of the bridge the channel was navigable by boats not capable of passing under the bridge after the bridge was completed. Petitioner, Harbor Estates Associates, Inc., submitted no evidence to show facts necessary to sustain the pleadings in the Petition concerning the inadequacy of modifications required by DER. Of Petitioner's 26 exhibits, Exhibits 1-19, 24 and 25 were relevant to the initial project but were not material to claims in the Petition concerning the inadequacy of the modifications required by DER. Petitioner's Exhibit 20 was cumulative of DER's Exhibit 6B. Petitioner's Exhibits 22 and 26, respectively, concern a 1980 bridge permit and a Proposed Comprehensive Growth Management Plan for Martin County, Florida. Petitioner offered no expert testimony in support of the pleadings in the Petition including assertions that: the modified project will have a direct adverse impact upon water quality and the welfare or property of others; the channel is navigable by deep-draft motor vessels; the modified project will result in shoaling that will have to be corrected at the expense of Harbor Estates; the modified project will result in prohibited destruction of mangroves; or that the modified project will cause any of the other specific adverse effects described in the Petition. The testimony of fact witnesses called by Petitioner was not material to Petitioner's claims that modifications required by DER were inadequate. The testimony of Bob Nicholas was relevant to allegations of prior violations but was not dispositive of any issue concerning the adequacy of modifications required by DER. The testimony of William Burr was admitted as rebuttal testimony relevant to precedents in the general area of the modified project but failed to address the adequacy of modifications required by DER. Petitioner consistently demonstrated a lack of knowledge of the applicable law, the proper scope of the formal hearing, and the distinction between argument and evidence. Petitioner repeatedly attempted to establish violations of laws not relevant to the proceeding including local laws and other environmental laws. Petitioner attempted to establish issues by arguing with witnesses during direct and cross examination, and by repeatedly making unsworn ore tenus representations of fact. There was a complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact in this proceeding because Petitioner failed to show facts necessary to sustain the pleadings. Petitioner presented no evidence refuting Respondent, Burke's, showing that the modifications required by DER were adequate to assure water quality and the public health, safety, or welfare, or the property of others. Evidence presented by Petitioner was not material to the issue of whether the modifications required by DER were adequate for the purposes of the law applicable to this proceeding. Therefore, Petitioner participated in this proceeding for a frivolous purpose, primarily to cause unnecessary delay, or to needlessly increase the cost of licensing or approval of the proposed activity. Respondents' Case. The island to be accessed by the modified project is approximately 2.5 acres in area and contains mostly wetland. The island is approximately 900 feet long. The portion of the island that is beyond DER permit jurisdiction is less than 200 feet long and less than 50 feet wide. The site of the modified project is located in Class III waters. Respondent, Burke, provided adequate assurances that portions of the modified project not extending over open water will be constructed upon property owned by him. The single retaining wall to be constructed at the southeastern terminus of the modified project will be constructed landward of DER jurisdiction. The modified project permits neither the installation of water or electrical conduits to the island nor any excavation, filling, or construction on the island. Respondent, Burke, must provide notification to DER before any such activity is begun. The bridge will accommodate no vehicular traffic larger or heavier than a golf cart. Golf cart access is necessary in order to accommodate a physical disability of Respondent, Burke. The modified project employs adequate methods to control turbidity, limit mangrove alteration on the island, and limit potential collisions with manatees. Vegetation, including mangroves, will not be removed. Incidental, selective trimming of vegetation will be allowed to create access to the island. The single retaining wall to be constructed on the mainland will be located landward of mangroves. Turbidity curtains will be used during construction to minimize short term water quality impacts. The modified project requires turbidity screens to be installed if there is any indication of sedimentation. No mechanical equipment will be located on the island during construction. No boats will be moored at the site of the modified project. The modified project will cause no significant downstream shoaling or silting. The site of the modified project is located approximately 15 feet from an existing fishing platform. No significant shoaling has been associated with that platform. The impacts associated with the modified project are similar to the impacts associated with single family docks in the area. No significant shoaling has been associated with such docks. The modified project is not a navigational hazard. The elevation is sufficient to accommodate small boats, canoes, and row boats. Reflective devices are required to alert night boat traffic of its presence. There is adequate clearance under the bridge to prevent obstruction. DER reviewed all applicable rules and criteria in considering the modified project. The modified project will have no adverse effect upon public health, safety or welfare, or the property of others. The modified project will not adversely impact the conservation of fish, wildlife, or their habitats. The modified project will not adversely affect navigation, the flow of water, or cause harmful erosion or shoaling. The modified project will not adversely impact fishing value or marine productivity in the area. The modified project will have no adverse impact upon recreational values in the vicinity. The modified project was reviewed in a manner that is customary for similar projects reviewed by DER. It is common practice for DER employees, as they did in this case, to rely upon opinions of other DER professionals in formulating an intent to issue. Other projects within DER jurisdiction in the general geographic area of the modified project and within the same region were considered in DER's review process. Other docks and marinas have been constructed and are proposed for construction within the South Fork of the St. Lucie River. Bridges including pedestrian bridges have been and are proposed to be constructed in Martin County. DER did not require a hydrographic study because the modified project was considered a minor project. DER review took into account the intended future use of the island property and DER's past experience with Respondent, Burke. As part of its review, DER reviewed a conceptual bridge to a single family residence on the island which would not require any fill or construction of retaining walls. In addition, DER considered previous violations on the island under Florida Administrative Code Rules 17-4.070, 17-4.160, and 17-4.530 in connection with an earlier permit that expired before the initial project was begun. Respondent, Burke, provided reasonable assurances that he is the owner of the site of the proposed project. Respondent, Burke, signed DER's property ownership affidavit and submitted a survey. DER's Intent to Issue does not authorize any construction in any area within the jurisdiction of DER other than the modified project. The Intent to Issue constitutes compliance with state water quality standards. DER has not received any requests for a jurisdictional determination in the general geographic area of the modified project. No enforcement action has been initiated by DER or at the request of a third party against Respondent, Burke, for alleged violations of DER rules.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Regulation enter a Final Order on the merits issuing the requested permit and awarding reasonable attorney's fees and costs in accordance with this Recommended Order. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 4th day of April, 1990. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of April, 1990. APPENDIX Petitioner has submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. Although most of Petitioner's proposed findings were cast in the form of "fact", they were in substance argument and rejected accordingly. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 Included in part in Finding 1 Findings as to ownership are rejected as beyond the jurisdiction of the undersigned. Finding as to the late filed exhibit is rejected as irrelevant. 2-4, 10-12, Rejected as either irrelevant 16, or not supported by the record. 5 and 6, 37, 40 Rejected as unsupported by 42 the record. 7, 8, 15 Rejected as irrelevant 17, 21-29 and immaterial 9, 13, 14, 18-20 Rejected as immaterial 30-33, 35 and 36 37(a), 38, 39, 41, 48 20(A) Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial except the last sentence is included in Finding 13 34 Included in Finding 12 Rejected as not supported by the record, hypothetical and immaterial. Rejected as not established by clear and convincing evidence. Respondent, Burke, has submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. Respondent. Burke's, Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 15 and 16 Included in Finding 1 17, 26, 27 Included in Finding 2 18, 48 Included in Findings 15 and 16 19, 30, 31, 42 Included in Finding 13 20, 21, 44 Included in Findings 4 and 14 22, 23, 25, 32 Included in Finding 17 24 Included in Finding 16 25, 36-38 Included in Finding 17 Included in Finding 18 Included in Finding 3 Included in Finding 10 Included in Finding 19 35, 39, 43 Included in Finding 20 40, 41 Included in Finding 11 45-47 and 49 Included in Finding 16 51 and 52 Included in Findings 6-8 54 Included in Finding 5 and 8 50 and 53 Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial Respondent, DER, has submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 and 2 Included in Findings 1 and 2 3 Included in Finding 10 4 and 5 Included in Finding 16 6, 9 Included in Finding 2 7 and 8 Included in Findings 9 and 11 10 Included in Finding 13 11 Included in Finding 15 Included in Finding 17 and 14 Included in Finding 16 COPIES FURNISHED: Dale H. Twachtmann, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Patricia E. Comer Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Patricia V. Bartell Qualified Representative 615 S.W. St. Lucie Street Stuart, FL 34997 J. A. Jurgens Jones, Foster, Johnson & Stubbs, P.A. 505 South Flagler Drive West Palm Beach, FL 33402
Findings Of Fact FEC is the owner and developer of the project at issue in this proceeding, an industrial park to be located on 322.1 acres in Section 32, in the Town of Medley, in northwestern Dade County, Florida. Not at issue in this proceeding is the related but separate project planned by FEC for construction in Section 6, an unincorporated area of Dade County, lying immediately southwest of the property at issue. FEC proposes 5,193,570 gross feet of floor space for the project, to be constructed in six phases. Seventy-four percent of the floor area is to be completed or under construction within the first five years of the park's operation. Expected uses of the park, when completed, are expected to fall into four general categories: Distribution, comprising 792,516 square feet; wholesale trade, 2,509,018 square feet; manufacturing, 873,520 square feet; and offices and services of 1,017,515 square feet. There is no specification of what types of industries will be located in the project, or what types of chemicals or materials each may handle. FEC has applied for and received various approvals of the proposed industrial park. On June 6, 1983, the South Florida Regional Planning Council ("RPC") recommended approval of the FEC proposal, with conditions. On August 1, 1983, the town council of Medley adopted Resolution No. C-426, which approved and issued a development order for a development of regional impact for the project. Before the issuance of the Medley development order, Metropolitan Dade County adopted its own development order, Resolution No. Z-114-83, on June 23, 1983, approving the development proposed for Section 6 in the unincorporated area of the county. In September, 1983, DCA appealed the Medley development order. On October 3, 1983, the RPC voted not to appeal that order. The proposed project is located in an industrialized and largely unsewered area. The FEC property surrounds or abuts numerous out parcels within Section No. 32, which are served only by septic tank disposal systems, unlike the sewer system planned for the FEC development. The Northwest Wellfield is located about three miles to the southwest of the proposed FEC industrial park at its closest point to Section 32, and about four miles from the furtherest reach of the park. The wells of the Northwest Wellfield form a line about two miles west of the Florida Turnpike, and four miles southwest of Medley. The wellfield presently comprises 15 wells, each 42 inches in diameter, fully penetrating the Biscayne Aquifer to a depth of about 70 feet. The county has equipped each well with a two-speed pump capable of producing ten million gallons per day (MGD) at low speed, and about 15 MGD at high speed. Current maximum capacity of the wellfield is about 225 MGD. The county holds a valid consumptive use permit from the South Florida Water Management District authorizing an average pumpage of 50 MGD. The county has applied for a permit to increase the pumpage to 180 MGD. The county is presently pumping the wellfield at the rate of 140 MGD to offset the reduction in pumpage from the Hialeah and Miami Springs wellfields as a consequence of the discovery of contamination in those fields. The Hialeah and Miami Springs wellfields are currently pumping at a rate varying from three to ten MGD. The Northwest Wellfield, completed in 1983, at a cost to the public of $38,000,000, is located within the Biscayne Aquifer, which underlies all of southeastern Florida, including all of Dade County, from north of Boca Raton to the northwest area of Monroe County. The Biscayne Aquifer is a highly permeable, unconfined shallow aquifer composed of limestone and sandstone. The aquifer is a regional resource, serving as a sole source of potable water for the approximately 1.8 million residents of Dade County. Because of its cavernous nature, the aquifer has high vertical and horizontal permeabilities, permitting both rapid infiltration of rainfall as recharge to the aquifer, and rapid drainage through canals. Recharge to the aquifer is primarily from rainfall. In the latter part of the dry season, however, the main recharge to the aquifer results from infiltration from canals fed from water conservation areas. Net recharge from rainfall to the aquifer ranges from 8 to 20 inches per year. Because of wide fluctuations in annual rainfall amounts in South Florida, recharge from canals to the wellfield is important. The South Florida Water Management District operates an intricate system of canals, levees, control structures, and large water conservation areas for flood control, water conservation, and salinity control. These systems significantly affect water levels in the Biscayne Aquifer, including the area around the Northwest Wellfield. The levees impound fresh water and prevent overland sheet flow from the Everglades eastward through agricultural and urban areas. The complex system of interconnected canals provides necessary drains for the urban coastal areas in the wet season and transfers water from the conservation areas during the dry season to replenish water in the aquifer removed by various municipal and county wellfields. Water levels in the canals are controlled by opening or closing control structures during the wet season to prevent flooding in urban agricultural areas, and leaving the structures closed during the dry season to conserve fresh water and limit saltwater intrusion. Canal levels usually reach their seasonal lows in May. In the vicinity of the Northwest Wellfield, the system of levees and canals provides a substantial amount of recharge to the wellfield. The canal most significantly affecting water levels in the Northwest Wellfield is the Snapper Creek Canal, a borrow canal running immediately east of and parallel to the Turnpike, about two miles east of the wellfield. The Snapper Creek Canal borders the western line of the FEC property in Section No. 6 and lies about one mile west of Section No. 32. The terms "cone of influence" or "cone of depression" are terms applied to the area around a well from which the well draws water. Before a well commences pumping, ground water fills the pores and fractures in underground rock formations to a water level at which the fluid pressure of the ground water equals the atmospheric pressure exerted from above. Pumping the well reduces the fluid pressure of the ground water in the vicinity of the well, and results in a cone of depression or influence. Viewed from above, a drawing of a hydrologic cone of depression appears roughly circular, centered on the pumping well. A cross section of the cone would show an inverted shallow cone in the upper aquifer, whose lowest point coincides with the intersection of the cone where it enters the well. Pumping the well creates a down gradient for water below the area of the cone to flow toward the well. A "hydrologic cone of influence" is that point marking the outer bounds of the influence of a pumping well at a given point in time. A "regulatory cone of influence" arbitrarily fixes the location of the cone as a zone in which activity is regulated. The extent of a regulatory cone depends upon policy decisions taking into account the margin of safety deemed necessary for the protection of a well, regardless of the actual location of the hydrologic cone and technology available to protect ground water. The generally accepted value adapted by most regulatory agencies for the "regulated cone of influence" of a wellfield is the 0.25 foot draw-down line. This is so because it is also generally accepted that, with proper engineering practices and proper annual inspections, potential contaminants be generated and stored within this regulated cone of influence without inordinate risks of contamination to the underlying aquifer. The extent of a hydrologic cone of influence varies continuously, and is dependent upon the characteristics of the involved aquifer, such as its ability to transmit and to retain water, as well as the pattern and the amount of rainfall in the area, and the effect of nearby streams or canals. In addition, the rate of pumping of a well controls the extent of the cone of influence under any given set of aquifer conditions. Dade County regulates land uses in the area of the Northwest Well field according to whether property falls within the projected cone of influence of the field. In March, 1981, Dade County adopted an ordinance prohibiting the handling, use, transportation, disposal, storage, discharge, or the generation of hazardous materials in an area west of the Florida Turnpike, defined as being within 210 days travel time for a hypothetical particle of contamination to the Northwest Wellfield. That initial protective zone lay entirely to the west of the Turnpike, and included neither Section 6 nor Section 32. As a result of further study and computer modeling, the county subsequently adopted Ordinance No. 83-82 on September 20, 1983, amending the map of the cone of influence for the Northwest Wellfield, and adopting new regulations requiring the use of sewers instead of septic tanks in industrial areas. The amended map projected a cone of influence that greatly expanded the protective zone around the wellfield, and included both Section 6 and Section 32. The regulatory cone of influence selected by Dade County does not conform to the hydrological cone of influence, but excepts instead the area around the well depressed by 0.25 feet or more from the original unpumped surface. The county based its modeling of the regulatory line on an assumed pumpage of 150 MGD for the Northwest Wellfield, which is approximately equal to its present pumpage, and 75 MGD from the Miami Springs, Hialeah, and Preston wellfields, which is approximately ten times the current combined rate of pumpage for those fields. In addition, in running its computer model, the county conservatively assumed the highly unlikely condition for the aquifer--a 210-day period during which the aquifer would receive no recharge from rainfall. This "worst case" condition has never occurred during this century. In addition to this assumption, the county's computer modeling also ignored the substantial contraction of the cone during every wet season because of rainfall recharge, and omitted consideration of recharge to the wellfield from canal systems in the area. Within the line defined by its regulated cone of influence, Dade County currently bans all use, handling, generation, and transportation of hazardous materials. The cone of influence currently contained in the county's ordinances includes all of Section 32, including FEC's proposed project. Dade County Ordinance No. 83-82 is considered an interim regulation, intended to remain in force while Dade County continues to gather information concerning the aquifer in the vicinity of the Northwest Wellfield under pumping conditions. Since the enactment of the wellfield protection ordinance, Dade County has initiated a study to formulate a more detailed management plan for the wellfield. Dade County is conducting the study and generally implementing its environmental regulation and wellfield protection through its Department of Environmental Resources Management (DERM). DERM's powers extend into municipal areas, such as Medley, as well as throughout the unincorporated area of Dade County. The agency has a budget in excess of $5 million annually. Both within the municipalities and throughout the unincorporated areas of Dade County, DERM reviews building permit applications of all industries expected to potentially discharge chemicals into sewer systems. DERM requires all such industries to obtain an annual permit under Section 24-35.1 of the Dade County Code, and to install pretreatment facilities to ensure that no unsafe chemicals are discharged directly into sewers. In addition, DERM requires that all users or generators of hazardous materials throughout Dade County follow best management practices, including ground water monitoring, when appropriate. A special section of the agency focuses on the enforcement of hazardous materials regulation. In addition, Dade County has initiated a hazardous waste cleanup fund, a liquid waste transporter's permit ordinance, and regulation for underground storage facilities for hazardous materials. Further, Dade County has adopted Resolution No. R-114-84, which incorporates a non-exclusive list of numerous hazardous materials subject to regulation under the wellfield protection ordinance and other regulations. The more credible evidence of record in this cause establishes that even should Dade County remove the current ban on hazardous materials in Section 32, the proposed industrial park, as restricted by the Medley development order, would pose no significant threat of contamination to the Northwest Wellfield. As modeled under realistically conservative assumptions, including pumpage rated far exceeding the presently permitted legal rate of 50 MGD, the Northwest Wellfield hydrological cone of influence would reach into Section 32 for no more than one or two months per year, at the end of the dry season. For most of the year, the Snapper Creek Canal will act as a natural recharge boundary for the Northwest Wellfield. The canal would normally carry sufficient water northward from the Tamiami Canal to maintain a pressure head in the canal, driving water into the aquifer on both sides, replenishing the water drawn by the wellfield in the area west to the canal, and holding the cone of influence at the west side of the canal. On the east side of the canal, ground water would resume its natural flow to the southeast or east, unaffected by pumping in the Northwest Wellfield. During the dry season, the recharge mound in the Snapper Creek Canal would diminish, and the cone of influence could gradually expand, possibly recharging Section 32 for a month or two at the end of the dry season. As soon as the rainy season commenced again, however, the canal would fill up rapidly and resume its function as a recharge boundary. The more credible evidence establishes that it is highly unlikely that ground water contaminants originating from Section 32 would ever reach the Northwest Wellfield. Ground water moves only a few feet or even inches per day in the Biscayne Aquifer. Because Section 32 is located three to four miles from the Northwest Wellfield, the gradient to the wells in the cone of influence in Section 32 is extremely slack. In the driest of droughts, a hypothetical plume of contaminants beneath Section 32 would move only slightly towards the wellfield. At the return of the wet season, the gradient draining ground water from Section 32 eastward to the Miami Canal would be very steep and would rapidly flush any contaminants away from the wellfield and its cone of influence. The Medley development order imposes several restrictions on the development which protect the Northwest Wellfield from any threat of potential contamination from the proposed industrial park. The development order requires the removal of all exotic vegetation and the planting of native species to reduce the demand for water and the use of fertilizer, a potential contaminant; restricts irrigation in the project to the use of non-potable water from onsite lakes and wells; obligates FEC to construct, or provide $600,000 to the Dade County Fire Department for construction of, a fire station according to county specifications within the primary response district for Section 32, to improve the fire department's capability to respond quickly to any spill of hazardous materials; requires FEC to submit to the RPC, Dade County and Medley a detailed management operation plan within six months of the date of issuance of the development order; and further requires that FEC submit a hazardous material spill contingent fee and response plan to the RPC, Dade County, and Medley within one year of the date of the development order. The development order contains detailed criteria for the management/operation plan, including inspections, monitoring, and the use of best management practices designed to minimize the risk of contaminating ground water. Further, these requirements include approval of specific standards for hazardous materials accident prevention, mitigation, and response; adequate pre-treatment facilities to assure segregated retention of hazardous waste and their removal and disposal in accordance with local, state, and federal requirements; that all facilities be readily open for inspection by Medley and DERM; and appropriate storage and accurate labeling of hazardous materials. The order also requires that FEC receive review and approval of its plans by the RPC, Medley, and Dade County. The RPC will, if deemed appropriate, in the course of review, impose its customary policy of ground water monitoring for a project using or generating hazardous materials. The development order provides that whatever wellfield protection regulations Dade County might adopt after further monitoring of the Northwest Wellfield will apply to the FEC project in Section 32. The RPC compiled, and Medley adopted, in the development order, "Table 22" as a tool for determining the types of land uses that should be excluded from locating in the proposed industrial park. In the event Dade County were to remove the present ban on hazardous materials in Section 32, the Medley development order requires that every firm and industry listed in Table 22 desiring to locate in the development to apply to RPC, Dade County, and Medley for a waiver of restriction on hazardous materials, based upon the tenant's demonstration that its use of appropriate best management practices or other measures will adequately protect the environment. These applications would be reviewed on a case-by-case basis to determine the adequacy of proposed protected measures. This condition is imposed in the development order in addition to existing local, state, and federal permitting requirements. Further, Dade County also independently requires the use of best management practices, including monitoring when appropriate, by any industry using hazardous materials in Dade County. In summary, the evidence in this cause establishes that the current ban imposed by Dade County on the use, handling, generation, and transportation of hazardous materials in Section 32, when viewed in the context of the existing hydrological system in the area and the conditions imposed upon FEC in the Medley development order, combine to demonstrate the lack of a permanent ban on hazardous materials in Section 32 will pose no significant threat to the Northwest Wellfield. There is no evidence of record in this proceeding to demonstrate that the proposed project is in any way inconsistent with an existing state land development plan, any local land development regulation, or the regional planning council report.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with the responsibility of enforcing Chapter 253, Florida Statutes on behalf of the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (Board). The Board holds title to submerged sovereign lands pursuant to Sections 253.03 and 253.12, Florida Statutes, and Article X, Section 11, Florida Constitution. Fraraccio, together with his wife, owns a parcel of real property located in section 13, township 38 south, range 41 east which is commonly known as 26 High Point Road and which is located in Martin County, Florida. The southern boundary of the Fraraccio's property (subject property) borders the St. Lucie and Indian Rivers. In June, 1987, Fraraccio filed an application for permission to alter mangroves which grow along the shoreline of the subject property. It was Fraraccio's intention to cut the tops of the trees in order to promote horizontal growth. This application was filed with and processed by the Department of Environmental Regulation (DER). On September 1, 1987, DER issued a permit for the mangrove alteration. Pertinent to this proceeding is the following specific condition of the Fraraccio permit: 4. "No person shall commence mangrove alteration or other activity involving the use of sovereign or other lands of the state, title to which is vested in the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund or the Department of Natural Resources under Chapter 253, until such person has received from the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund the required lease, license, easement, or other form of consent authorizing the proposed use. Pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 16Q-14, if such work is done without consent, or if a person otherwise damages state land or products of state land, the Board of Trustees may levy administrative fines of up to $10,000 per offense. In October, 1987, the Department's Bureau of Survey and Mapping was asked to survey the west line of the Jensen Beach to Jupiter Inlet Aquatic Preserve (Preserve) at the confluence of the St. Lucie River. Terry Wilkinson, chief surveyor for the bureau, conducted the field survey on October 14-16, 1987. Mr. Wilkinson placed a metal rebar with a cap designating "D.N.R." at a point on the mean high water (MHW) line at the Fraraccio's property. Mr. Wilkinson also staked three points with lathe markers on a line northerly along the MHW line from the rebar monument. It was Mr. Wilkinson's opinion that the Preserve abutted the Fraraccio property from the point marked by the rebar monument northward along the coast. That portion of the Fraraccio property which was south and west of the rebar did not abut the Preserve. Fraraccio disputed the findings regarding the Preserve boundary reached by Wilkinson and did not concede that his property abuts the Preserve. On December 15, 1987, the issue of the Preserve boundary was taken before the Governor and Cabinet sitting as the Board at the request of the Department, Division of State Lands. Fraraccio was represented before the Board by counsel who argued against the staff recommendation. Mr. Wilkinson's interpretation of the boundary line for the Preserve was approved. That area waterward of the MHW line from the rebar monument northerly along the Fraraccio shoreline was, therefore, deemed to be part of the Preserve and sovereign submerged land. Prior to cutting any mangrove trees, Fraraccio telephoned Casey Fitzgerald, chief of the Department's Bureau of State Lands Management, to inquire as to whether Department permission was required to trim mangroves located above the MHW line. Fitzgerald's letter advised Fraraccio "that trimming mangroves located above the MHW line would not be within the purview of this department." Fitzgerald further recommended that Fraraccio "employ the services of a registered land surveyor to specifically identify the individual trees which are so located." Fraraccio did not obtain an independent survey. Instead, he relied upon the rebar monument and the lathe markers placed by Wilkinson, and contracted to have the mangroves landward of that line trimmed. One of difficulties encountered in determining the location of a mangrove in relation to the MHW line is the fact that one tree may have several trunks and prop roots which emanate from the center of the tree. Consequently, there is some uncertainty regarding how to locate the tree. One method used locates the centermost trunk and considers that point the tree location. Another method calculates the greatest percentage of tree mass and considers that point the center of the tree. This calculated center is then matched against the MHW line. Either method results in a judgment based upon visual inspection. This judgment may differ among reasonable men. In January, 1988, Fraraccio supervised the cutting of mangroves based upon the MHW line as established by the Wilkinson survey. Fraraccio did not intend to cut trees waterward of the MHW line. No trees were cut waterward of the Wilkinson line. A number of trees were trimmed landward of the Wilkinson line. There is no evidence that either the rebar monument or the lathe markers placed by Wilkinson were moved either prior to or after the mangrove alteration. Fraraccio was responsible for the direct supervision of the workmen who completed the mangrove trim. No work was done without Fraraccio's authorization. On March 22, 1988, Kalani Cairns, inspected the Fraraccio property. Cairns took field notes of the inspection. One of comments made at that time was that it was "difficult to determine if MHWL stakes have been moved." Based upon his review of the area, Cairns determined approximately 20 mangrove trees below the MHW line had been topped. Subsequently, the Department issued the Notice of Violation and Order for corrective action. Since Fraraccio did not believe he had cut waterward of the MHW line, no corrective measures were taken. Subsequent to the Notice, additional mangroves were not cut. Fraraccio timely sought review of the notice. In preparation for the formal hearing in this cause, the Department contracted with Greg Fleming to prepare a survey of a portion of the Fraraccio property. The purpose of this second survey was to locate the MHW line along the Fraraccio shoreline and to plot mangrove trees which had been trimmed and which were waterward of the line. Approximately 24 trimmed mangrove trees were located waterward of the MHW line as determined by the Fleming survey. The Fleming survey resulted in a MHW line which was upland of the line established by the Wilkinson survey. The trimmed trees in dispute are located between the two lines, as marked on the ground, by the lathes placed by the two surveyors. Mr. Wilkinson did not testify and no credible explanation was given for why the lines, as marked in the field, differ. At the time of the cutting, however Fraraccio believed the Wilkinson lathes marked the MHW line. This belief was based upon the representations that the Department had made regarding the rebar monument marked "D.N.R." and the fact that the placement of the lathe stakes had coincided with placement of the rebar.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund enter a final order dismissing the Notice of Violation against Charles A. Fraraccio. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of June, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of June, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 88-4309 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner: Paragraphs 1 through 5 are accepted. With regard to paragraph 6, it is accepted Wilkinson put down three lathes and that there is no evidence that those lathes were moved. Otherwise, the paragraph is rejected. Mr. Wilkinson did not testify and, therefore, no evidence was presented on the issue of the lathes. It is clear Fraraccio believed the lathes to be the MHW line. Paragraph 7 is accepted. Paragraph 8 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. The MHW line was correctly depicted on the ground and on paper by the Fleming survey which was done after-the-fact. Pertinent to this case is the fact that Fraraccio and DNR treated the Wilkinson survey on the ground (as shown by-the rebar and the three lathes) as the MHW line prior to the cutting. Paragraph 9 is accepted. With regard to paragraph 10, the record shows Fleming was contacted to perform the second survey in December, 1988, and that it was dated February, 1989. With that modification and clarification, paragraph 10, in substance, is accepted. Paragraph 11 is accepted to the extent that the two surveys differed on the ground (as opposed to on paper). Paragraphs 12, 13, and 14 accepted but are irrelevant. With regard to paragraph 15, it is accepted that the workmen were instructed not to cut waterward of the MHW line. The remainder is irrelevant to this proceeding. Paragraphs 16 through 18 are accepted. With regard to paragraph 10, it is accepted Fraraccio cut or trimmed the trees based upon the Wilkinson survey as depicted by the rebar and 3 lathe markers. Otherwise, paragraph 19, is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 20 is accepted. Paragraph 21 is rejected as irrelevant to this proceeding. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Department. Paragraphs 1 through 16 are accepted. The first sentence of paragraph 17 is accepted since both surveys coincided at the point of the rebar marked "D.N.R.;" otherwise, the paragraph is rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence since the surveys differed as plotted on the ground. Paragraphs 18 and 19 are accepted. Paragraph 20 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 21 is accepted. Paragraph 22 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraph 23 is rejected as irrelevant. The number of trees cut waterward of the MHW line as established by the Fleming survey was approximately The size of the trees is irrelevant. Paragraph 24 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 25 and 26 are accepted. Paragraph 27 is rejected as irrelevant to this proceeding. COPIES FURNISHED: William L. Contole McManus, Wiitala & Contole, P.A. O. Box 14125 North Palm Beach, Florida 33408 Ross S. Burnaman Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Tom Gardner, Executive Director Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-3000
The Issue The issue in this case is whether a development order (Resolution No. 233- 1991) issued by Monroe County on June 26, 1991, to Key Largo Associates, Ltd., is inconsistent with Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, the Monroe County Comprehensive Plan and Land Use Regulations, and/or whether it violates a Joint Stipulation of Settlement previously executed by the Department of Community Affairs ("DCA"), Monroe County (the "County"), and Key Largo Associates, Ltd.'s predecessor in title.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: DCA is the State Land Planning Agency charged with the responsibility to administer the provisions of Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Monroe County is a political subdivision of the State of Florida and is responsible for issuing development orders for development in unincorporated Monroe County. The County issued the Development Order which is the subject of this proceeding. Most of Monroe County, including the subject property, is within the Florida Keys Area of Critical Concern as designated in Sections 380.05 and 380.0552, Florida Statutes. Development orders issued by a local government agency for an area of critical state concern are subject to review by DCA pursuant to Section 380.07, Florida Statutes. On April 8, 1985, DCA, Monroe County, and I. D. Properties, the previous owner of the subject property, executed a Joint Stipulation of Settlement regarding DCA's challenge to a prior development order for the subject property. That Joint Stipulation of Settlement required the preservation of certain tropical hammock on the site including Paradise Tree hammock. After executing the Joint Stipulation of Settlement, I. D. Properties quitclaimed its interest in the site to Key Largo Associates, Ltd. Key Largo Associates, Ltd. proceeded to seek approval from Monroe County to develop the property inconsistent with the terms of the Joint Stipulation of Settlement. Those efforts resulted in the Development Order which is the subject of this case. The County Commission issued the Development Order granting a major conditional use permit for the Project to Key Largo Associates, Ltd., after being ordered to do so by the Circuit Court for Monroe County. The Development Order purports to authorize the complete elimination of existing tropical hammock on the site including the Paradise Tree hammock. The Development Order is inconsistent with the Monroe County Comprehensive Plan and the Land Development Regulations adopted thereunder. In addition, the Development Order is contrary to the terms of the Joint Stipulation of Settlement.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission enter a final order which sustains the appeal filed by the Department of Community Affairs and which rescinds the issuance of Monroe County Resolution No. 233- 1991. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 18th day of August 1993. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Terrell K. Arline Assistant General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Betty J. Steffens, Esquire McFarlain, Wiley, Cassedy & Jones Post Office Box 2174 Tallahassee, Florida 32316-2174 Blackwater Associates Partnership 7225 S.W. 108th Terrace Miami, Florida 33156 Ray Parker Parker Real Estate 2028 North Dixie Highway Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33305 Linda Loomis Shelley, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 G. Steven Pfeiffer General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 David K. Coburn, Secretary FLWAC Exec. Office of the Governor 311 Carlton Bldg. Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner should be issued an air construction permit authorizing its Crystal River steam generating plant Units 1 and 2 to co-fire a five to seven percent blend of petroleum coke with coal.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background Petitioner, Florida Power Corporation (FPC), is an investor-owned public utility engaged in the sale of electricity to approximately 1.2 million customers. Among others, it operates the Crystal River Power Plant consisting of five electric-generating units in Citrus County, Florida. Units 1, 2, 4, and 5 are coal-fired, while Unit 3 is a nuclear unit. Respondent, Department of Environmental Regulation (DEP), is a state agency charged with the statutory responsibility of regulating the construction and operation of business enterprises in a manner to prevent air pollution in excess of specified limits. Among other things, DEP issues air construction permits for a limited period of time to undertake and evaluate initial operations of a business enterprise; long- term approval subsequently is available under an air operation permit. As a part of this process, and pursuant to federal law, DEP engages in a Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) review to determine if non-exempt alterations to major facilities result in net emission increases greater than specified amounts. Under certain conditions, however, the use of alternative fuels or raw materials are exempted from PSD review. Intervenor, Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation, Inc. (LEAF), is a non-profit Alabama corporation licensed to do business in the State of Florida. It is a public interest advocacy organization whose corporate purposes include securing environmental and health benefits from clean air and water. Intervenor, Sierra Club, Inc. (Sierra Club), is a public interest advocacy organization incorporated in California and doing business in Florida. Its corporate purposes include securing the environmental and health benefits of clean air and water. On December 26, 1995, FPC filed an application with DEP for an air construction permit authorizing it to burn a blend of petroleum coke and coal in its existing coal-fired Units 1 and 2 at the Crystal River Power Plant in Citrus County, Florida. In the application, FPC did not address PSD review since it believed it qualified for an exemption from PSD permitting under Rule 62- 212.400(2)(c)4., Florida Administrative Code. That rule exempts from PSD review the [u]se of an alternative fuel or raw material which the facility was capable of accommodating before January 6, 1975, unless such change would be prohibited under any federally enforceable permit condition which was established after January 6, 1975. After reviewing the application, DEP issued an Intent to Deny on June 25, 1996. In that document, DEP stated that [a]ccording to information in Department files, both Units 1 and 2 operated on liquid fuel prior to January 6, 1975. Very substantial modifications of the boilers and pollution control equipment were implemented thereafter by [FPC] to convert the units to coal-firing mode. Therefore the project does not qualify for the exemption from PSD review claimed by the company. Contending that it was entitled to an exemption from PSD review and therefore a permit, FPC filed a Petition for Administrative Hearing on October 4, 1996. In its Petition, FPC generally alleged that petroleum coke is a product with characteristics very similar to coal; Units 1 and 2 were capable of accommodating coal and petroleum coke as of January 6, 1975; and contrary to the statements in the Intent to Deny, any boiler modifications and pollution control improvements to those units were minor and not substantial. The Permitting Program The PSD program is based on similar PSD requirements found in the federal Clean Air Act of 1970, as amended (the Act). The permitting program is a federally required element of DEP's State Implementation Plan (SIP) under Section 110 of the Act. DEP has fulfilled the requirement of administering the federal PSD program by obtaining approval from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) of state PSD regulations that meet the requirements of federal law. The requirements of the SIP are found in Chapters 62-204, 62-210, 62-212, 62-296, and 62-297, Florida Administrative Code. Chapter 62-212 contains the preconstruction review requirements for proposed new facilities and modifications to existing facilities. Rule 62-212.400, Florida Administrative Code, establishes the general preconstruction review requirements and specific requirements for emission units subject to PSD review. The provisions of the rule generally apply to the construction or modification of a major stationary source located in an area in which the state ambient air quality standards are being met. Paragraph (2)(c) of the rule identifies certain exemptions from those requirements. More specifically, subparagraph (2)(c)4. provides that a modification that occurs for the following reason shall not be subject to the requirements of the rule: 4. Use of an alternative fuel or raw material which the facility was capable of accommodating before January 6, 1975, unless such change would be prohibited under any federally enforceable permit condition which was established after January 6, 1975. The rule essentially tracks verbatim the EPA regulation found at 40 CFR 52.21(b)(2)(iii)(e)1. Therefore, in order to qualify for an exemption from PSD review, FPC must use "an alternative fuel . . . which [Units and 2 were] capable of accommodating before January 6, 1975." In addition, FPC must show that "such change would [not] be prohibited under any federally enforceable permit condition which was established after January 6, 1975." Contrary to assertions by Respondent and Intervenors, in making this showing, there is no implied or explicit requirement in the rule that FPC demonstrate that it had a subjective intent to utilize petroleum coke prior to January 6, 1975. The Application and DEP's Response In its application, FPC proposes to co-fire a five percent (plus or minus two percent) blend of petroleum coke with coal, by weight. It does not propose to make any physical changes to Units 1 and 2 to utilize petroleum coke. Also, it does not request an increase in any permitted air emission rates for the units because it can meet its current limits while burning the proposed blend rate of petroleum coke with coal. The application included extensive fuel analysis and air emissions data obtained from a DEP-authorized petroleum coke trial burn conducted from March 8 until April 4, 1995. Although it is not proposing to make physical changes to the plant, FPC applied for the air construction permit in deference to DEP's interpretation that such a permit is required when a permittee utilizes an alternative fuel. After completing his initial review, the DEP supervisor of the New Source Review program acknowledged in a memorandum to his supervisor that FPC was "entitled to a permit" but suggested that FPC be asked to "change their minds." Before the permit was issued, however, DEP changed its mind and issued an Intent to Deny on the ground that prior to January 6, 1975, Units 1 and 2 were not capable of accommodating coal or a blend of petroleum coke with coal. The Units Unit 1 has a generating capacity of 400 MW and commenced operation as a coal-fired plant in October 1966. It fired coal until March 1970, fuel oil until October 1978, and then again fired coal from June 1979 to the present. Unit 2 has a generating capacity of 500 MW and commenced operations as a coal-fired plant in November 1969. It fired coal until September 1971, fired fuel oil from December 1971 until October 1976, and then again fired coal from December 1976 to the present. Original equipment installed during the initial construction of Units 1 and 2 included the following: the barge unloader, which removes coal from barges that deliver coal from New Orleans; the stacker/reclaimer, which stacks the coal into piles and then reclaims the coal by directing it from the coal piles to conveyors that deliver it to the units; the crusher house, which has two crushers that crush the coal on the way to units down to nuggets no larger than three-quarters of an inch in diameter; the silos, which store the crushed coal; the feeders, located below the silos, which regulate the flow of coal from the silos to the pulverizers; the pulverizers, which grind the coal in preparation for combustion and then direct the pulverized coal to the burners, which are located on the corners of each unit's boiler; and the boilers, where the fuel is combusted, imparting heat to water contained in the waterwalls and thereby producing steam for electrical generation. The foregoing equipment was reflected in the plant's construction specifications and remains in operation, on site, at the plant. Components and parts of this equipment have been maintained, replaced, and repaired periodically. The original operations manual for the barge unloader, stacker/reclaimer, crushers, and conveyor systems are still kept and utilized on site. The primary fuel utilized in Units 1 and 2 is coal, although these units also co-fire from one to five percent number fuel oil and used oil. The combustion of fuel in Units 1 and 2 results in air emissions. As a result of changing regulatory requirements, there have been substantial improvements to the units' air pollution control capabilities since original construction. Existing Air Permits Unit 1 currently operates under Air Operation Permit Number A009-169341. Unit 2 operates under Air Operation Permit Number A-009-191820. Both permits were amended by DEP on October 8, 1996. Although each air operation permit contains an expiration date that has been surpassed, the permits remain in effect under DEP's regulations during the pendency of the agency's review of FPC's applications for air operation permits under the new Title V program found in Chapter 62-213, Florida Administrative Code. The air operation permits governing Units 1 and 2 contain mass emission rate limitations of 0.1 pounds/million (mm) British thermal units (Btu) or particulate matter (PM), and 2.1 pounds/mmBtu for sulfur dioxide. These mass emission rate limitations restrict the amount of each pollutant (measured in pounds) that is to be released into the atmosphere per million Btu of heat energy by burning fuel. The PM limitation is applicable to Units 1 and 2 under state regulations originally promulgated in 1972. The sulfur dioxide limitation was established in 1978 as a result of a PSD air quality analysis performed in conjunction with the permitting of Units 4 and 5. Prior to 1978, sulfur dioxide limits promulgated early in 1975 imposed a limit of 6.17 pounds/mmBtu on coal-fired operations at Units 1 and 2. Because Units 1 and 2 were subjected to a PSD air quality impact analysis along with Units 4 and 5, the units' sulfur dioxide emission limits were reduced from 6.17 to 2.1 pounds/mmBtu. The 2.1 pounds/mmBtu sulfur dioxide emission limitation applicable to Units 1 and 2 was set with the intention of assuring no adverse air quality impacts. The sulfur dioxide impacts associated with Units 1, 2, 4, and 5, after collectively being subjected to PSD air quality review, were much lower than the sulfur dioxide impacts previously associated with only Units 1 and 2. Is Petroleum Coke an Alternative Fuel? Petroleum coke is a by-product of the oil refining process and is produced by many major oil companies. The oil refineries refine the light ends and liquid products of oil to produce gasoline and kerosene, resulting in a solid material that resembles and has the fuel characteristics of coal. Both historically and presently, it has been common- place for electric utilities to rely on petroleum coke as fuel. For example, during the period 1969 through 1974, regular shipments of petroleum coke were sent to various electric utility companies throughout the United States to be co-fired with coal. In addition, DEP has issued permits for Tampa Electric Company to co-fire petroleum coke with coal. In 1987 and again in 1990, the EPA promulgated air- emission regulations which specifically define "coal" as including "petroleum coke." DEP has incorporated these regulations by reference at Rule 62-204.800(7)(b) 3. and 4., Florida Administrative Code. Given these considerations, it is found that petroleum coke constitutes an alternative fuel within the meaning of Rule 62-212.400(4)(c)4., Florida Administrative Code. Were the Units Capable of Accommodating the Fuel? Petroleum coke and coal are operationally equivalent. Petroleum coke can be handled, stored, and burned with the existing coal handling equipment at Units 1 and 2. The barge unloader, stacker/reclaimer, storage areas, conveyors, silos, crusher house, pulverizers, and burners, all installed prior to 1975, can handle petroleum coke. The equipment comprising Units 1 and 2 does not require any modification in order to burn a blend of petroleum coke with coal. Also, there will be no net impact on steam generator design or operation, and there will be no decline in performance or adverse impacts to the boilers. FPC could have co-fired petroleum coke with coal historically without making physical alterations or derating the units. Similarly, petroleum coke can be fired in Units 1 and 2 now without alterations or derating. These findings are further supported by Petitioner's Exhibits 35 and 36, which are reference books published in 1948 and 1967 by the manufacturer of the equipment installed at Units 1 and 2. They confirm that prior to 1975, petroleum coke was suitable for the manufacturer's boilers and pulverizers. Unrebutted testimony demonstrated that Units 1 and 2 could have co-fired petroleum coke with oil during the oil-firing period. Even when Units 1 and 2 fired oil instead of coal for a period of time in the 1970s, the coal-handling equipment remained in existence on-site and available for use, and both units remained readily convertible to their original, coal-firing modes. Because the plant remained capable of accommodating coal, it also remained capable of accommodating petroleum coke. In light of the foregoing, it is found that co-firing petroleum coke with coal at Units 1 and 2 could have been accomplished prior to January 6, 1975. Are there Post-January 6, 1975, Prohibitions? There is no evidence to support a finding that a federally enforceable permit condition was establshed after January 6, 1975, that prohibits co-firing petroleum coke with coal. I. Miscellaneous By letters dated February 14 and June 2, 1997, the EPA Region IV office replied to inquiries from DEP regarding the instant application. The conclusions reached in those letters, however, were based on a misapprehension of the facts in this case. Therefore, the undersigned has not credited these letters. To prove up its standing, LEAF introduced into evidence a copy of its articles of incorporation and a brochure describing the organization. In addition, it asserted that the air quality for its members would be "at risk" if Units 1 and 2 did not meet PSD standards and air emissions were "increased." Intervenor Sierra Club proffered that a substantial number of members "live, work, or recreate in the vicinity of the Crystal River Units 1 and 2, and in the area subject to the air emissions by those units," and that those members "would be substantially affected by the proposed exemption."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order granting the application of Florida Power Corporation and issuing the requested air construction permit. DONE AND ORDERED this 23rd day of September, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of September, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Kathy Carter, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 James S. Alves, Esquire Post Office Box 6526 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6526 W. Douglas Beason, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Gail Kamaras, Esquire 1115 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303-6327 Jaime Austrich, Esquire Post Office Box 1029 Lake City, Florida 32056-1029 F. Perry Odom, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
