The Issue The issues are whether Respondent is guilty of: 1) failing to practice medicine within the applicable standard of care, as required by section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes, by inappropriately and excessively prescribing one or more controlled substances and 2) failing to keep medical records that justify the course of treatment for prescribing one or more controlled substances, as required by section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes, by failing to document patient histories, examination results, test results, results of drugs prescribed, dispensed or administered, or reports of consultations or hospitalizations, or failing to justify the amount and dosage of pills prescribed.
Findings Of Fact Introduction At all material times, Respondent has been a physician licensed to practice medicine in Florida. His license number is ME 33389. His practice is located in Delray. Respondent is not Board certified in any specialty. He appears to have practiced for many years. In 1987, Respondent was disciplined for a failure to keep medical records. The Board of Medicine reprimanded Respondent, imposed $2000 of costs and one year's probation, required 30 hours' coursework in risk management and recordkeeping, and restricted Respondent's license by requiring the submission of quarterly reports covering prescribing activities, among other things. In 2007, Respondent was disciplined for a violation of the requirements imposed on a dispensing practitioner. The Board of Medicine imposed a fine and probation. The Board also required a drug course, a law and rules course, ten hours' coursework in the responsibilities of dispensing practitioners and 25 hours' community service. This case involves Respondent's use of chronic opioid therapy for chronic and breakthrough pain not associated with cancer or other terminal disease. As detailed in the Conclusions of Law, the issues require consideration of whether Respondent's medical records are adequate to justify these prescriptions and whether these prescriptions are inappropriate, excessive, or otherwise unjustified, so as to violate the applicable standard of care. In attempting to prove these two sets of violations, Petitioner has limited its allegations to Respondent's prescriptions of five Schedule II controlled substances and one Schedule III controlled substance. The five Schedule II controlled substances are oxycodone, roxicodone, Oxycontin®, Oxyfast®, and Percocet®. The lone Schedule III controlled substance is Norco®. A Schedule II controlled substance has a high potential for abuse and has a currently accepted, but severely restricted, medical use in treatment in the United States. Abuse of a Schedule II controlled substance may lead to severe psychological or physical dependence. A Schedule III controlled substance has a lower potential for abuse and a currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States. Abuse of a Schedule III controlled substance may lead to moderate or low physical dependence or high psychological dependence. People have used opium for pain relief for thousands of years. The pharmacological production of opioid drugs started after the identification of the morphine alkaloid in 1806. By the end of the 19th century, in the United States, legal controls were imposed on opioids. By the 1940s, opioids could be legally used only if prescribed by physicians, pursuant to strict regulatory controls. By the end of the 20th century, tension had emerged between physicians reluctant to prescribe opioids due to professional-liability considerations and advocates of pain control. Particularly contentious issues are whether and how to prescribe opioid therapy for chronic pain not associated with terminal disease. Oxycodone and hydrocodone are short-acting opioids with an onset of 30-90 minutes and duration of 4-6 hours. Roxicodone is oxycodone hydrochloride. In controlled-release form, such as Oxycontin®, oxycodone hydrochloride is a long-acting opioid with an onset of 1-12 hours and duration of 8-72 hours. With a quicker onset than oxycodone in pill form, Oxyfast® is a liquid containing 20 mg of oxycodone hydrochloride in a one-ml bottle. Percocet® is oxycodone and acetaminophen: a dosage of "10/325" is 10 mg of oxycodone and 325 mg of acetaminophen. Norco® is hydrocodone and acetaminophen: a dosage of "10/325" is 10 mg of hydrocodone and 325 mg of acetaminophen. Methadone is an inexpensive synthetic opioid with long- acting effect. The half-life of methadone typically ranges from 15-60 hours, but may extend to 120 hours. The long, variable half-life of Methadone discourages its wider use in pain control because of difficulties in maintaining not more than therapeutic levels. During the time in question, Oxycontin® was relatively expensive among the opioids listed in the preceding paragraph. At that time, one 30-mg roxicodone pill cost an uninsured patient about $0.70-$1.00, one 40-mg Oxycontin® pill cost an uninsured patient about $8.00, and one 80-mg Oxycontin® pill cost an uninsured patient about $14.00. The record does not reliably establish street values for these drugs, but all of them were traded and consumed at high rates illegally on the street. Short-acting opioids are more appropriate for breakthrough pain, which is a temporary spike in pain above chronic-pain levels due, for example, to physical exertion. A short-acting opioid is well-matched to the relatively short duration of breakthrough pain. This record does not permit resolution of the dispute over whether long-acting opioids are more effective than short-acting opioids for the relief of chronic pain. Generally, prescribed opioids pose distinct risks of consumption and diversion by the patient. For the opiate-naïve patient, doses of opioids that may be easily tolerated by the opiate-tolerant patient may cause potentially life-threatening side effects, including respiratory depression. For the opioid- tolerant patient who is consuming opioids not prescribed by the practitioner--from other, undisclosed practitioners or from street purchases--additional doses of prescribed opioids may cause the same life-threatening side effects as those faced by the opiate-naïve patient, although, with controlled dosing among opioid-tolerant patients, opioids typically may be increased until pain control is attained. Pain medicine practitioners may manage these risks, in part, by administering periodic urinalyses to their patients. The urinalyses administered to the ten patients in this case were threshold tests that would detect the presence of various substances above a certain level. Such tests would uncover opioid-naïve patients and patients consuming other controlled substances, but not the level of any controlled substance detected by the test. Sometimes, opioid rotation may achieve the desired analgesic effect at relatively low doses. Otherwise, chronic pain may require increasing doses of the same opioid to obtain the same relief originally obtained by lower doses, although some patients may find effective relief for extended periods at a dosing level that is not increased. Less frequently, higher opioid doses may produce hyperalgesia. Optimally, effective pain management is multifaceted, including such disciplines or techniques as psychotherapy, cognitive behavioral therapy, biofeedback, relaxation techniques, physical therapy, and reliance on nonopioid analgesics. But limits on insurance coverage or lack of insurance and the relatively high costs of most of these alternative disciplines or techniques may legitimately require the practitioner to rely more on the relatively inexpensive opioids. Even Petitioner's expert witness admitted, "Sometimes I have self-pay patients who are on opiates only because they can't afford anything else." (Pet. Ex. 4, p. 7.) Petitioner's expert acknowledged that roxicodone "is something you tend to give people who have no insurance." (Tr., p. 85.) Cost considerations may also require that the practitioner break down what would be a single prescription of, say, 100 pills into two prescriptions of 50 pills each, so the patient can effectively pay for his prescription in two installments. Again, Petitioner's expert witness admitted that there was nothing wrong with this practice. (Pet. Ex. 4. p. 41.) None of the ten patients addressed in this case had insurance during the relevant period. (One patient potentially had COBRA coverage that would have expired long before the period in question.) Although at least a couple of patients were employed in professions in which at least moderate earnings might be expected, the record does not reliably describe the financial resources of any of the ten patients. The record contains no evidence of injury to the patients discussed below in terms of the care, including prescribed opioids, that they received from Respondent. Excessive consumption of prescribed or diverted opioids is dangerous and can be fatal. But, as Respondent's expert witness testified, the fatal combination seen "excessively" in the eight deaths per day in Florida from prescription drug abuse is opioids; benzodiazepines, such as Xanax®; and muscle relaxants, such as Soma®. Although Respondent prescribed medications in all three categories, Petitioner has not alleged any violations arising from Respondent's prescriptions of any drug besides the opioids discussed above, so Respondent's prescriptions of benzodiazepines and muscle relaxants to these ten patients are generally omitted from the Findings of Fact. As Petitioner's expert testified, there is no quantitative criterion for the standard of care in prescribing opioids. (Tr., pp. 29 and 108.) The standard-of-care determination is dependent on the facts. Two facts of importance are the achievement of pain relief and the restoration or maintenance of function in the patient. The record contains ample evidence of the extent of pain relief, although nearly all of it is in the form of reports from patients, whose credibility is difficult to assess. The record contains relatively little evidence of functionality for most patients. As discussed in the Conclusions of Law, contrary to the testimony of Petitioner's expert, a standard-of-care violation is not established, per se, by a medical-records violation. The record is problematic in several other respects. Most notably: 1) Petitioner's expert witness stated in his initial report to Petitioner that Respondent's medical records were adequate and justified the course of treatment (Tr., pp. 111-22); but 2) Respondent's expert witness stated that Respondent's medical records were inadequate, at least based on present practices. (Depo. Tr., Forest S. Tennant, Jr., pp. 51- 52.) Also, in what probably came as a surprise to Petitioner, its expert witness three times opined that, under certain conditions, a physician may lawfully deviate from the applicable standard of care in the prescription of opioids. (Tr., pp. 65, 90, and 95-96.) The testimony of each expert witness was uneven. Most of the flaws of Petitioner's expert are listed above, but he repeatedly tended to agree with the attorney asking him questions. Neither expert displayed an over-familiarity with the details of the medical records; sometimes, Respondent seemed somewhat unfamiliar with them too. Petitioner's expert is Board certified in the subspecialty of pain medicine and practices in Orlando; Respondent's expert is not Board certified in any specialty or subspecialty and has never practiced in Florida. But Respondent's expert thoughtfully explained how a higher blood pressure and pulse rate might be associated with under- medication, and a lower blood pressure and pulse rate might be associated with over-medication. Respondent's expert also recognized the difference between a medical-records violation and a standard-of-care violation. During the time in question, Respondent saw 15 patients daily, not 60 or more patients daily, as are seen by some high-volume opioid-prescribing physicians. The ten patients in this case are all residents of Florida, not residents of other states drawn to the opioid-prescribing practices of a compliant Florida physician. (One of the ten patients appears to have been a resident of Mississippi, but had a Florida driver license--tending dispel an inference that he was in Florida briefly for the purpose of obtaining opioids.) Almost always, Respondent obtained patient records from the physician who had been treating the patient immediately before he or she began seeing Respondent. And, at a time when the practice was not required by statute or rule, Respondent used urine screens to determine whether his patients were consuming the opioids that he was prescribing them. For none of the ten patients has adherence to the dosing practice of a preceding physician, per se, constituted compliance with the applicable standard of care. Except for a relatively brief period after acquiring the patient, Respondent could only satisfy the applicable standard of care by appropriate treatment, regardless of the dosing practice of the preceding physician. In large part, the purpose of administering urinalyses was to detect aberrant behavior by the patient. In this context, aberrant behavior means patient diversion of opioids or consumption of other opioids or other controlled substances without disclosure to Respondent or, in the case of illegal consumption of such substances, even with disclosure to Respondent. W. C. From February 12, 2007, through July 16, 2009, Respondent prescribed to W. C. 150 30-mg roxicodone pills and 120 15-mg roxicodone pills each month. Respondent first saw W. C. on June 20, 2001, when Respondent served as the medical director of the Pain Management Center in Miami. At the time of this initial visit, according to Respondent's medical records, Respondent complained of rheumatorial arthritis of the left knee, on which he had had surgery, two years earlier, to repair a tear of the medial collateral ligament. W. C. also complained of lower back pain and tendonitis in the left elbow and shoulder. The patient's situation was exacerbated by his job, which involved moving refrigerators. The initial note states that the patient's general practitioner, Dr. Martin Coleman, had prescribed him 5-mg pills of Roxicet®, and the patient had taken some Xanax® from his wife to relieve spasms and stress. The next office visit took place on July 16, 2001, at which time Respondent brought a "note," not medical records, from Dr. Coleman. According to Respondent's medical records, Dr. Coleman's note stated that the degenerative arthritis was of the right knee, not the left knee, which had been treated with Percocet®, which is similar to Roxicet®. Evidently relying on the patient's statement that he had tried his wife's Xanax®, the July 16 record states: "His anxiety is helped tremendously with Xanax®." At this time, Respondent saw W. C. for seven or eight months. These medical records are missing, but they are not at issue in this case. At some point, W. C. transferred to the Delray office of the Pain Management Center while this office was staffed by Drs. Morency, Rabinsky, and Weed. In November 2005, W. C. suffered a wedge fracture of the T12 vertebra, which caused him severe back pain, as a result of an automobile accident. On February 14, 2007, Respondent saw W. C. in the Delray office of the Pain Management Center, to which Respondent had since transferred. Among the records that Respondent reviewed was a neurological consultation dated September 7, 2006, in which the neurologist, Dr. Perry Hoeltzell, described cervical, left arm, left lower back, and left leg complaints since the November 2005 accident. Respondent also examined an MRI of the spine taken on September 7, 2006, that showed a T12/L1 collapse of the disc with chronic anterior wedging of the T12 vertebra. The appearance was of a flexion trauma. These conditions supported the finding or complaint of cervical radiculopathy of C3 through C6 and lumbar radiculopathy of L4-5/L5-6. W. C. informed Respondent that he liked the flexibility of his current prescription of 150 pills of 30-mg roxicodone and 120 pills of 15-mg roxicodone monthly, so he could decide which dose to take when. However, W. C. did not appear to be an uncritical consumer of every controlled substance that he could get. The July 16, 2009, medical note reports that W. C. declined a renewal of Cymbalta®, saying that it did not work and, "I didn't think I needed it." At the time of the February 14, 2007, office visit and through the final office visit of July 16, 2009, W. C. was able to work and suffered no side effects. Each month, Respondent saw W. C. in the office and typically spent 15-30 minutes talking with him. The medical records over this period are inadequate and do not justify the opioid prescriptions that Respondent gave W. C. during this time. For two and one-half years, Respondent prescribed the same two prescriptions of roxicodone with medical records consisting of monthly reports of blood pressure, pulse, general appearance, patient history, and complaints, such as level of pain, the extent of pain relief, side effects, sleep, and mood. As tended to be his practice with all ten patients, Respondent never filled in the bottom of the medical-record form, which prompted insertion of the "plan." Respondent never recorded any diagnosis or general assessment of W. C., or recorded how he was managing the patient. For over two and one-half years, Respondent failed to document these important elements of medical records. This was too long for Respondent to claim that he was merely maintaining the prescription regime of the preceding physician until Respondent had the opportunity to assess the patient, discuss with the patient treatment alternatives, and develop a pain- management plan. In this timeframe, Respondent should have documented these tasks multiple times. The absence of this critical patient assessment and treatment information from the medical records means that the records fail to justify the course of treatment. Petitioner's expert witness opined that Respondent violated the applicable standard of care due to the excessive prescription of medications. But when asked why the prescribed medications were excessive, the expert responded, "the medical records," which, he explained, failed to provide an understanding of how the patient was managed, failed to provide a diagnosis, assessment, or treatment plan, and omitted any description of level of functioning, clinical exams, or physical exams. (Tr., p. 23.) Petitioner's expert witness described Respondent's medical records as "poor." (Tr., p. 27.) If there were any doubt that the basis of the expert's standard-of-care opinion was the inadequate medical records, he dispelled it in the following exchange: Q: Dr. Gerber, this prescribing of roxicodone 30 mg of 150 pills in conjunction with roxicodone 15 mg of 120 pills, what is your opinion about the appropriateness and whether or not the prescribing of those two--that combination is within the standard of care and why? A: Well, without medical records justifying it, if falls below the standard of care. There's no explanation of why these two potent opioids are being prescribed together. . . . (Tr., pp. 24-25.) Obviously, where the patients, other than W. C., do not testify, the ability of Petitioner's expert to opine as to the standard of care is limited to what he has learned of their care from the medical records and the testimony of Respondent, which supplies very little in addition to what is contained in the medical records. After an extensive discussion of the inadequacies of the medical records, in response to a standard- of-care question, the expert admitted that the lack of medical records left him "not able to formulate an opinion as to how this patient was managed." (Tr., p. 23.) Immediately after this statement, Petitioner's expert twice testified that the standard-of-care violation was due to the problems with the medical records. (Tr., pp. 23-24.) The frustration of Petitioner's expert witness, although understandable, does not justify elevating a medical-records violation to a standard-of- care violation--again, as explained in the Conclusions of Law. The sole attempt of Petitioner's expert to predicate a standard-of-care violation on something besides the inadequate medical records was unsuccessful. Although he elsewhere disclaimed reliance merely on the quantity of prescribed opioids as the sole basis of a standard-of-care violation, Petitioner's expert complained about Respondent's prescription of "these two potent opioids . . . together." (Tr., p. 25.) Of course, there is only one potent opioid at issue in the W. C. counts-- roxicodone. (Xanax®, which Respondent also prescribed to W. C., is not an opioid and, as noted above, is not alleged as a basis of any liability in this case.) If the two opioids were the two dosages of roxicodone, the expert's complaint appears to be a back-door attempt to object to the quantity of prescribed opioids--in isolation from other relevant factors. Significantly, Petitioner's expert testified that, with acceptable documentation, "one [of the roxicodone prescriptions] by [itself] might be acceptable" (Tr., p. 25)--implying that his underlying problem is with the quantity of this opioid that Respondent has prescribed. But, as Petitioner's expert witness conceded, "patients can have a lot of pain and require high doses of opioids even with minimal diagnostic studies." (Tr., p. 26.) Petitioner's expert eventually admitted that a monthly prescription of 120 pills of a hypothetical 45-mg roxicodone, which is slightly less than Respondent's prescription of 120 pills of 15-mg roxicodone and 150 pills of 30-mg roxicodone, might have met the standard of care, if "there was good documentation of physical functioning [and] the notes and records clearly documented an assessment and plan." (Tr., p. 31). For W. C., clinical reports amply documented injuries that could have accounted for the pain that W. C. consistently reported during the period in question. The record establishes sustained function during the course of treatment--and even beyond. Alone among the patients, W. C. testified to his extensive orthopedic problems in his back and to the role of Respondent and his medication regime in preserving W. C.'s functionality. Respondent's treatment of W. C. left one question unanswered. In general, Petitioner's expert rightly asked why Respondent did not offer or explore nonopioid treatments. (Tr., p. 27.) The absence of any consideration of nonopioid treatments is a deficiency in the medical records, but also relevant in determining whether Respondent met the standard of care. Respondent's usual explanation--the prohibitive costs of such alternative treatments--may not apply to W. C., who was continuously employed throughout his treatment, possibly even as the owner of the company for which he worked. Respondent testified: "He was a laborer, he had his own moving company." (Tr., p. 209.) But, standing alone, this question does not establish a standard-of-care violation. There is less, if any, value in the suggestion of Petitioner's expert that a standard-of-care violation may be based on Respondent's failure to prescribe methadone. As noted above, this record fails to establish that the standard of care requires the use of long-acting opioids for chronic pain, and this repeated suggestion by Petitioner's expert fails to account for the difficulties, noted above, in the use of this persistent opioid, which even Petitioner's expert admitted must be used "carefully." (Tr., p. 32.) Petitioner proved a medical-records violation, but not a standard-of-care violation. D. M. From January 8, 2007, through July 18, 2007, Respondent prescribed to D. M. a monthly regime of roxicodone and Oxycontin®. The sole exception to the monthly office visits with Respondent is an office visit dated February 5, 2007, which, judging from the handwriting on the note, involved another physician at the Pain Management Center. Respondent's prescriptions for January 8 and March 5 were for 100 30-mg roxicodone pills and 180 40-mg Oxycontin® pills. On April 2, Respondent increased the monthly prescription to 180 30-mg roxicodone pills while maintaining the number and dose of Oxycontin® pills. On April 30, Respondent increased the number of roxicodone pills to 200 monthly, but decreased the dosage to 15 mg, while maintaining the number and dose of Oxycontin® pills. On May 24, Respondent issued a prescription for 200 15-mg roxicodone pills, 100 30-mg roxicodone pills, and 180 40-mg Oxycontin® pills. On June 21, Respondent prescribed 200 15-mg roxicodone pills and 180 40-mg Oxycontin® pills. On July 18, Respondent prescribed 100 30-mg roxicodone pills and 180 40-mg Oxycontin® pills. D. M. is unique among the ten patients in two regards. She has the shortest treatment period at six months, and she is the only patient to have received Oxycontin® monthly for the duration of her treatment under Respondent. Another unusual aspect of D. M.'s case is Respondent's clear confusion about his treatment of her. Respondent testified that he first saw her on May 24, 2007. This testimony is contrary to the stipulation, and it is not borne out by the medical records. The medical notes for January 8 (Joint Ex. 2, p. 159), March 5 (Joint Ex. 2, p. 157), April 2 (Joint Ex. 2, p. 156), and April 30 (Joint Ex. 2, p. 155) all appear to be in the handwriting of the physician who filled out the medical note for May 24 (Joint Ex. 2, p. 346). D. M. bore a diagnosis of fibromyalgia, which is a diagnosis of a condition whose existence divides the medical community. However, associated with the diagnosis is widespread pain involving the muscles and soft tissues and sleep disturbances, both of which D. M. reported. Although the disease is not like a fracture or herniated disc in its ability to be confirmed by some form of imaging technology, the present record provides an inadequate basis to disregard the existence of this condition or dismiss the potential severity of the pain associated with this condition. In 1995, D. M.'s physician, Thomas Fitzpatrick, M.D., referred D. M. to John H. Gridley, Jr., M.D., who specialized in internal medicine and rheumatology. After an examination of this 35-year-old patient, Dr. Gridley diagnosed D. M. with what is now referred to as fibromyalgia. She has borne this diagnosis ever since. D. M. had been a patient of the Kendall office of the Pain Management Center since 2003. Her condition had deteriorated since 1995; she had spent two years in bed. During this time, she had received the opioids that Respondent later maintained. When D. M. first saw Respondent nearly 12 years later, she had gained 70 pounds, and her systolic blood pressure had increased 34 mm to 144/72. D. M. advised Respondent that the only medication that relieved her pain was Oxycontin®, so, after discussing diet and exercise, Respondent continued her existing prescription of Oxycontin® with roxicodone for breakthrough pain. On D. M.'s next visit, on March 5, no vital signs were taken. On her next visit, on April 2, her blood pressure had dropped to 102/78, although her pulse was 78. Her pain, which was reported as "6" on her first visit, was down to "5" on this visit. In addition to his confusion over when he started treating D. M., Respondent seemed confused by his own treatment plan for this patient. Alluding to his much-used explanation of financial constraints precluding the prescription of Oxycontin®, Respondent testified that, due to "financial reasons," "we converted one Oxycontin® to Roxy 30s, giving her exactly the same dosage. The patient was having financial problems. I remember that." (Tr., p. 227.) However, the record reveals no reduction in the relatively expensive Oxycontin® prescription, only an increase in the roxicodone prescription on April 30 and again on May 24. Later, Respondent testified that his office mistakenly increased the roxicodone prescription on April 30 from "100 to 180 milligrams." (Tr., p. 228.) However, this increase amounted to only 20 30-mg pills for the month or about 20 mg daily. The increase on May 24 was much larger--from 6000 mg/month of roxicodone to 9000 mg/month of roxicodone. This was also a mistake, but a much bigger one. D. M. never informed Respondent of the prescription error, which Respondent "didn't like." (Tr., p. 228.) Respondent reduced the June 21 prescription, probably to allow D. M. to use some of the extra roxicodone that she had on hand. (Tr., p. 228.) However, Respondent never attempted to explain how these two dosing mistakes happened or, if they were not mistakes, what justified these dramatic increases in opioids being prescribed to the patient. Respondent probably did not attempt a justification of these increased dosages because no justification existed: D. M. reported a small increase in pain from April 30 to May 24, but only from a "5" to a "6." Consistent with his refusal to predicate a standard- of-care violation strictly on the quantity of opioids prescribed, Petitioner's expert witness admitted, "counting pills is not the best way of managing a patient." (Tr., p. 43.) But his standard-of-care analysis regarding Respondent's care for D. M. includes the quantity of pills in the context of patient complaints, the underlying diagnosis, and the existence of alternative means of treating the patient's pain, such as a fentanyl patch. (Tr., pp. 40 and 45.) The standard-of-care violation for D. M. relies on this broader record of Respondent's care for this patient, not on the following testimony of Petitioner's expert: "So, the whole case boils down to, you shouldn't be putting patients with fibromyalgia on this much medication." (Tr., p. 44.) Neither in May 2007 nor three and one-half years later at the hearing did Respondent have any idea why he dramatically increased D. M.'s roxicodone prescription on May 24. To the extent that Respondent claimed a "mere" mistake, his explanation would have carried more weight, if he had not also offered his well-worn financial argument that the patient could not afford the additional cost of the long-acting opioid, Oxycontin®. This argument did not apply to D. M., who was already paying for Oxycontin® each month. This makeshift defense, the unjustified increase of opioids, the mistaken recollection of the substitution of roxicodone for Oxycontin®, and the failure to recall when Respondent's treatment of this patient started combine to make Respondent's brief treatment of D. M. appear random and chaotic. On these facts, Respondent's prescription of opioids was inappropriate, excessive, and otherwise unjustified. Petitioner proved a medical-records violation and a standard-of-care violation. R. H. From January 29, 2007, through July 7, 2009, Respondent prescribed to R. H. a monthly regime of 30-mg roxicodone and 10/235 Norco®. For January 29 and March 2, the dosages were 60 roxicodone pills and 240 Norco® pills. On March 27, Respondent raised the roxicodone prescription to 90 pills. This prescription continued through visits on April 24, May 22, June 20, and July 18. On August 2, which was only two weeks after the preceding office visit, Respondent doubled the number of roxicodone pills to 180. On September 28, Respondent increased the roxicodone by one-third, from 180 to 240 pills. On November 30, Respondent increased the roxicodone prescription to 300 roxicodone pills and, for the first time, changed the Norco® prescription, raising it from 240 pills to 300 pills. Respondent maintained these prescriptions through 14 "monthly" visits in 2008--actually, 13, as the last is on December 23, 2008--and visits on January 21 and February 17, 2009. On March 17, Respondent decreased the Norco® to 280 pills. On the final visit, on July 7, 2009, Respondent decreased the roxicodone to 270 pills and Norco® to 240 pills. Respondent first saw R. H. in 2001 due to failed-back syndrome following a car accident three or four years earlier and a micro-discectomy of L5/S1, which had resulted in additional complications. R. H. had been wheelchair-bound for eight months and was learning to walk again; she was in intractable pain. A psychiatrist later diagnosed her with severe anxiety disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder. R. H. visited the Pain Management Center after a referral by her physician, who was no longer comfortable prescribing her Vicodin ES®. R. H. disclosed in her 2001 initial office visit that she had recently had another automobile accident, for which she had been charged for driving under the influence. R. H. reported that epidural injections had failed to control her pain, and she had gained 50 pounds in the past couple of years. An unsettling consultation note is in R. H.'s medical records. On January 31, 2001, Anjan K. Ghosh, M.D., of the Anesthesia Pain Care Consultants, Inc., saw R. H. in consultation. Dr. Ghosh concluded the R. H. suffered from lumbar post-laminectomy pain syndrome "with conflicting physical signs on examination," mechanical lumbar axial pain, severe anxiety disorder, and gastroesophagael reflux disease. In a detailed plan of treatment, Dr. Ghosh proposed a caudal catheter neuroplasty and nerve root decompression to treat R. H.'s recurrent lumbar radiculitis. Based evidently in part on an adverse surgical experience, R. H. refused this treatment, saying, "the reason I was sent to see you [was] for only pain medication." After Dr. Ghosh explained that he would continue her Vicodin ES® only for two weeks, R. H. asked again if she could consider the surgical intervention later, but, for now, obtain prescriptions for an opioid regimen, which Dr. Ghosh declined to do. R. H. was an unusual patient because, even though she was in her mid-thirties when she first saw Respondent, she often brought her mother, who, according to Respondent, "doled" out her prescribed opioids. (Tr., p. 242.) In contradictory statements, Respondent testified: "She did well. She was able to function. She lost jobs constantly." (Tr., p. 243.) Respondent's testimony about this patient is surprisingly brief based on the lengthy two and one-half years that he saw her, as covered by this case; the dramatic increase in roxicodone from 1800 mg monthly to 9000 mg monthly, with a smaller increase in Norco®; and the instability of the patient, as reflected by her dogged pursuit of opioids, her DUI arrest five or six years earlier, and the role of her mother as the gatekeeper to her prescribed opioids. Petitioner's expert witness noted that the March 27, 2007, medical note, in which Respondent raised the roxicodone from 60 pills to 90 pills monthly, contained no explanation for the increase. Likewise, Petitioner's expert found no justification in the medical records for the doubling of the roxicodone from 90 pills to 180 pills monthly in August 2007, the increase from 180 pills to 240 pills monthly two months later, or the increase of the Norco® from 240 pills to 300 pills monthly one month later. Petitioner's expert noted these increases in opioids were not accompanied by physical exams, physical findings, or any consideration of alternative therapies, such as nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs. Respondent's medical records reveal a "4" for reported pain on March 1, 2007, but no vitals, and no pain report or vitals on March 27, 2007, when Respondent hiked the roxicodone by 50% and prescribed Neurontin®, which Respondent testified at the hearing he did not "even know what it is." (Tr., p. 240- 41.) The medical note for April 24, 2007, consists of a few scribbled lines without any vitals or pain report. On May 22 and June 20, 2007, the medical records contain vitals, but no pain report. Finally, on July 18, the medical note contains a pain report, but it is still a "4." Two weeks later, when Respondent doubled the roxicodone from 90 to 180 pills monthly, the medical note reflects that the pain is still only a "4." During this period of time, R. H. had had a molar surgically removed on April 7, 2007, and had been passing out weekly since that event. In mid-September 2007, R. H. was admitted to a local hospital one week after an automobile accident. In the followup to the automobile accident, a CT scan of the brain revealed vascular abnormality, which required a followup hospital admission that did not reveal anything especially serious. However, the accident had resulted in some upper extremity pain and some back pain. At the time of the hospital admission in connection with this accident, R. H. admitted only to the use of Soma® and Valium®, as well as occasional marijuana, but not the extensive opioids that Respondent was prescribing. All of this information is in Respondent's medical records. R. H. reported a pain level of "8" on the September 28 medical note, despite the large increase in roxicodone prescribed two months earlier. If there was a discussion of the recent automobile accident, it does not emerge from the nearly illegible notes, and Respondent did not testify to any analysis of the effect of this recent accident. At this time, Respondent increased the roxicodone by 50%--from 180 pills to 240 pills monthly. On November 1, 2007, the medical note reveals that R. H. reported pain at a level of "5." On a patient questionnaire, R. H. reported that pain had not interfered at all in the past month with her mood, walking, sleeping, concentrating, appetite, work, or relationships, and she denied any side effects. Despite this information, one month later, on November 30, with the pain reported at only a "4," Respondent increased the roxicodone by 60 pills monthly. While Respondent maintained this prescription through 2008, R. H. reported pain at only a "4." On February 17, 2009, in a medical review, Respondent noted that R. H.'s urine had tested positive for THC. This note records R. H.'s difficulty in keeping a job. This note describes a treatment plan to continue the present pain medications, possibly taper benzodiazepines, and continue to refer R. H. to psychotherapy. There is little connection between the medical records--most notably, the self-reported pain levels--and the amount of opioids that Respondent prescribed. Given the obvious difficulties that this patient was experiencing and the large increases in opioids that Respondent prescribed her, the treatment plan described in the preceding paragraph was insufficient. These facts do not depict merely a failure of the medical records to justify the course of treatment. Even without regard to the single indication of marijuana use, R. H. was a substance abuser who lied to health-care providers about what she was taking and required her mother to control her access to the opioids that Respondent prescribed. Respondent's treatment "plan" was to give R. H. exactly what she wanted, including one drug with which Respondent was completely unfamiliar. This patient needed help, and Respondent, for two and one-half years, failed to practice in accordance with the applicable standard of care by continuing to supply her with an increasing supply of opioids--essentially, failing to treat her. Under these circumstances, Respondent's opioid prescriptions were inappropriate, excessive, and otherwise unjustified. Petitioner proved a medical-records violation and a standard-of-care violation. K. L. From March 15, 2007, through July 16, 2009, Respondent prescribed to K. L. a monthly regime of mostly 30-mg roxicodone with occasional 10/325 Percocet®, 80-mg Oxycontin®, and 15-mg roxicodone. On March 15, 2007, Respondent prescribed 420 30-mg roxicodone pills (all roxicodone prescriptions for K. L. are for 30 mg unless otherwise stated) and 120 Percocet® pills. This prescription continued through office visits on April 11, May 9, and June 6, at which time Respondent dropped the Percocet® prescription. From July 2, 2007, through November 14, 2007, which covers five and one-half months, Respondent prescribed "monthly"--on six occasions--420 pills of roxicodone. On December 12, 2007, Respondent reduced the prescription to 400 pills of roxicodone, but added 60 Percocet® pills. This prescription continued through office visits on January 8, 2008, and February 7. On March 5, 2008, Respondent dropped the Percocet® from the prescription, but raised the roxicodone to 420 pills. This prescription continued until January 5, 2009--so as to cover 11 months with 12 "monthly" prescriptions. On January 30, 2009, Respondent reduced the roxicodone from 420 pills to 360 pills. On February 26, 2009, Respondent effectively increased the prescription by reducing the 30-mg roxicodone from 360 pills to 280 pills, but adding 200 pills of 15-mg roxicodone. On March 5 and 6, 2009, Respondent prescribed 90 roxicodone pills, 30 Percocet® pills, and 26 Oxycontin® pills (in two prescriptions). Four days later, on March 10, Respondent prescribed 120 roxicodone pills. Fifteen days later, on March 26, Respondent prescribed 390 roxicodone pills. On April 22, Respondent prescribed 360 roxicodone pills. On May 20, he prescribed 330 roxicodone pills. And on June 17 and July 16, 2009, Respondent prescribed 300 roxicodone pills each office visit. At the initial visit, K. L. informed Respondent that he had been seeing another pain physician, Frederick Swartz, M.D., but was required to visit every three weeks and found the office hours inconvenient. One may safely infer that the frequency of visits was part of Dr. Swartz's attempt to restrict K. L.'s aberrant behavior. Dr. Swartz had prescribed, every three weeks, 84 Percocet®, 284 roxicodone, and 84 Xanax®. On a monthly basis, the 84 pills translate to about 121 pills, and the 284 pills translate to about 410 pills. Respondent's initial prescription thus maintained the levels of Percocet® and roxicodone that the preceding physician had prescribed. During the initial interview, K. L. advised Respondent that he had suffered orthopedic injuries from being struck in the face with a baseball bat many years earlier, as well as two automobile accidents more recently. Having previously worked as a personal trainer, according to the notes, K. L. "works now in the New York State Business." The meaning of this statement remains known only to its author, but does not necessarily mean that K. L. was an out-of-state patient. K. L. informed Respondent that he obtained adequate pain relief from the 14 roxicodone that he took daily. K. L. stated that he had tried Oxycontin® for a couple of days, but did not like it due to cognitive impairment. His only surgical history involved the repair of the eye socket following the baseball bat injury. K. L. rated his pain as a "6." Respondent testified that, after four months, he eliminated the Percocet® because there was no need for K. L. to be taking two short-acting opioids simultaneously, and Respondent was concerned about potential acetaminophen toxicity. These were prudent concerns. A major issue in this patient's treatment developed when, on March 15, 2007, he took a urinalysis, and it tested positive for opiates, in addition to the oxycodone and benzodiazepine that Respondent had been taking, as prescribed. The test results distinguish between the oxycodone present in the roxicodone and Percocet® that had been prescribed for K. L., and other, nonprescribed opiates, such as heroin and codeine. K. L. failed subsequent urinalyses administered by Respondent. On May 9, 2007, his urine tested positive for oxycodone and other opiates, but not benzodiazepines. On February 7, 2008, January 30, 2009, and February 26, 2009, K. L.'s urine tested positive for oxycodone, morphine (another opiate that evidently is disclosed separately from opiates), and benzodiazepines. Respondent's contradictory testimony confirms his mishandling of the patient. Initially, Respondent testified that he had concluded, when K. L.'s urinalyses first disclosed opiates, that K. L. suffered from some sort of rare condition in which the liver failed to metabolize the oxycodone and caused the urinalyses to detect the oxycodone as other opiates. This explanation is discredited because Respondent failed to order additional lab work on liver function at the time and failed generally to proceed to rule out or otherwise deal with any liver problems. Respondent later admitted, in cross- examination, that he was not concerned about K. L.'s liver in 2007 (Tr., p. 339.), but only became concerned about it in 2009. (Tr., p. 340.) The actual explanation for the failed urinalyses was K. L.'s consumption of other opiates that he was not disclosing to Respondent. And Respondent was aware of this aberrant behavior. Undermining his testimony about a later suspicion of liver dysfunction, Respondent, reading from a medical note dated January 30, 2009, testified: "I even put [K. L.] on probation because I thought he was lying to me." Obviously, he would not have put a patient on probation for impaired liver function. Even if Respondent were telling the truth that he did not realize, until January 30, 2009, that K. L. had been lying to him about other opiate use--which he was not--two facts nonetheless undermine Respondent's attempted explanations. First, from March 15, 2007, through January 30, 2009, Respondent prescribed to K. L. over 10,000 roxicodone pills. After Respondent claimed to have concluded that K. L. was lying about other opiate use, Respondent prescribed, from February 26, 2009, through July 16, 2009, over 2000 more roxicodone pills plus 200 15-mg roxicodone pills. As was the case with R. H., these facts do not depict merely a failure of the medical records to justify the course of treatment. K. L. is also a substance abuser, engaging in the especially dangerous behavior of combining his prescribed opioids with unprescribed opioids. For almost two years, Respondent joined K. L. in an elaborate rationalization process designed to avoid confronting the patient's urgent problem. K. L. needed help, and Respondent, for two years, failed to practice in accordance with the applicable standard of care by continuing to supply him with an increasing supply of opioids-- essentially, failing to treat him. Under these circumstances, Respondent's opioid prescriptions were inappropriate, excessive, and otherwise unjustified. Petitioner proved a medical-records violation and a standard-of-care violation. J. K. From May 22, 2007, through July 27, 2009, Respondent prescribed to J. K. a monthly regime of 30-mg roxicodone plus Oxyfast® occasionally. (All roxicodone prescriptions for J. K. are for 30 mg.) On May 22, 2007, Respondent provided J. K. with two prescriptions of 120 roxicodone pills each. On June 19, Respondent wrote J. K. two roxicodone prescriptions--one for 150 pills and one for 170 pills. On July 16, Respondent wrote J. K. a prescription for 150 roxicodone pills, a prescription for 120 roxicodone pills, and one bottle of Oxyfast®. On August 13, Respondent wrote J. K. a prescription for 300 roxicodone pills, five roxicodone pills, and two bottles of Oxyfast®. On September 10, Respondent wrote J. K. a prescriptions for 295 roxicodone pills, five roxicodone pills, and one bottle of Oxyfast®. On October 8, Respondent reduced the numbers of roxicodone pills by giving J. K. prescriptions for 190 roxicodone pills, 140 roxicodone pills, ten roxicodone pills, and one bottle of Oxyfast®. On November 2, Respondent maintained these prescriptions, dropping only the prescription for ten roxicodone pills. But, three days later, Respondent gave J. K. a prescription for ten roxicodone pills. On December 3, 2007, Respondent greatly increased the prescription, raising it to 410 roxicodone pills and two bottles of Oxyfast®. On January 4, 2008, Respondent reduced the prescription to 330 roxicodone pills in one prescription and ten roxicodone pills in the other, as well as two bottles of Oxyfast®. Again, on February 1, 2008, Respondent increased the prescription, raising it to 380 roxicodone pills, but dropping the Oxyfast®. Respondent repeated this prescription on February 28 and raised it to 410 roxicodone pills on March 28. Respondent lowered it to 380 roxicodone pills on May 22. Then, on May 22, June 19, July 17, and August 13, Respondent prescribed 450 roxicodone pills each month. Respondent did not see J. K. for the next five months. On January 19, 2009, Respondent gave J. K. separate prescriptions of 200 and 250 roxicodone pills. On February 13, Respondent issued J. K. a single prescription for 450 roxicodone pills. On March 12, Respondent issued five roxicodone prescriptions for 200 pills, 100 pills, 100 pills, 50 pills, and 70 pills--for a total of 520 pills. Six days later, on March 18, Respondent gave J. K. another roxicodone prescription--this time for 30 pills. On April 7, Respondent gave J. K. two roxicodone prescriptions--one for 100 pills and one for 250 pills. Six days later, on April 13, Respondent gave J. K. two more roxicodone prescriptions--one for 200 pills and one for 50 pills. On May 5, Respondent gave J. K. a roxicodone prescription for 250 pills. On June 1, Respondent gave J. K. roxicodone prescriptions for 250 and 200 pills each. And on June 29 and July 27, Respondent gave J. K. roxicodone prescriptions for 450 pills each. J. K. had been a semi-professional hockey player who retired prematurely due to back pain. He exacerbated his back problems when he was involved in an automobile accident on April 19, 2004. On July 16, 2007, J. K. reported a pain level of "7," but this increased to a "9" on August 13, 2007. At this time, Respondent increased the roxicodone prescription. However, the medical records do not reveal escalating pain reports during the first half of 2008 when Respondent twice ramped up the roxicodone levels. The complaints of Petitioner's expert witness are that Respondent prescribed short-acting opioids for chronic pain, and Respondent prescribed excessive opioids for the injury at issue, which Petitioner's expert first identified as the older hockey injury, not the newer injury from the car wreck. These complaints appear ungrounded. As noted above, this record fails to reveal the superiority of long-acting opioids over short-acting opioids for the treatment of chronic pain, and Petitioner's expert acknowledged that a practitioner must sometimes prescribe roxicodone, rather than a long-acting opioid, such as Oxycontin®, due to cost considerations. Obviously, in suggesting that J. K.'s pain was disproportionate to his injury, Petitioner's expert would have enjoyed greater credibility if he had not first based his testimony on the much- older hockey injury to the face, rather than the newer injuries to the back from the automobile accident. In her cross-examination of Respondent, Petitioner's counsel tried to suggest that Respondent violated the standard of care by resuming the roxicodone prescription, after a five- month hiatus in visits between August 2008 and January 2009. However, Respondent first confirmed that J. K. was positive for oxycodone and, thus, not opioid-naïve. Respondent also explained that J. K. had seen a doctor in New Jersey while he was there visiting his mother. Essentially, for J. K., the standard-of-care opinion of Petitioner's expert witness is based entirely on inadequate medical records. The expert noted correctly that Respondent's medical records, which span two years, lack assessments, diagnoses, and treatment plans. At times, the medical records fail to support changes in medications. But Petitioner has failed to prove that Respondent's treatment of J. K. itself violates the standard of care because there is some correspondence between pain reports and prescription quantities. Petitioner proved a medical-records violation, but not a standard-of-care violation. K. G. From June 19, 2007, through July 27, 2009, Respondent prescribed to K. G. a monthly regime of 30-mg roxicodone pills. (All roxicodone prescriptions to K. G. are for 30-mg doses, unless otherwise indicated.) For the first four months, Respondent prescribed 300 roxicodone pills monthly. For the next four months, Respondent prescribed 280 pills monthly. For the next year, Respondent did not see K. G. When K. G. returned on December 19, 2008, Respondent prescribed 280 roxicodone pills, which he maintained for the next two months' prescriptions. On April 6, 2009, Respondent maintained the prescription at 160 30-mg roxicodone pills plus 240 15-mg roxicodone pills, which is the equivalent of 280 30-mg pills. On April 30, 2009, Respondent provided two prescriptions of 160 and 120 roxicodone pills, and, on May 26, June 24, and July 27, 2009, Respondent prescribed 280 roxicodone pills each month. K. G. presented to Respondent with complaints of lower back pain, probably resulting from two automobile accidents. An MRI of the lumbar spine showed a herniated disc at L5/S1, causing impingement of the right and left S1 nerve root, and a herniated disc at L4/L5. Dr. Deluca, who was no longer practicing, had been prescribing K. G. 120 80-mg Oxycontin® pills and 420 30-mg Oxycontin® pills, presumably monthly. K. G. had been switched to Suboxone®, which is used to withdraw a patient from opioids, but K. G. admitted to buying and using Oxycontin® on the street. The initial note contains a treatment plan. Claiming a pain level of "9," K. G. asked to resume Oxycontin®, but Respondent declined, based in part of K. G.'s history of high intake of opiates. Respondent instead suggested interventional pain management. A urinalysis administered on the initial visit was negative as to "everything." Respondent then prescribed ten roxicodone pills daily, perhaps revealing a belief that K. G. was not, in fact, opioid-naïve at the time. On K. G.'s next visit, on July 17, 2007, he tested positive for THC. In a medical note dated October 22, 2007, Respondent noted that K. G. had not seen the orthopedist, to whom he had referred him. Respondent found K. G. difficult to manage because he traveled a lot, working as a market maker for stocks. K. G. took Suboxone®, but only to avoid withdrawal symptoms from interruptions in his roxicodone regime while he was in other countries, where he presumably could not take his roxicodone. On January 4, 2008, Respondent placed K. G. on probation due to unspecified aberrations in behavior. K. G. promptly discontinued seeing Respondent for over ten months between January 4 and November 21, 2008. On his return, K. G. again tested positive for THC. Respondent testified that he counseled him not to continue to use marijuana, but his records do not document this fact. Respondent continued treating K. G. for another eight months without administering another urinalysis. Again, the medical records reveal no assessment, diagnosis, or treatment plan. Petitioner's expert witness pursued some false trails in trying to establish a standard-of-care violation. He complained about a split prescription on April 30, 2009, but there were only three such prescriptions over two years, and this record fails to reveal a sinister purpose in splitting prescriptions. About the worst thing that Petitioner's expert has to say about the practice is that he is "not sure of the purpose for that." (Tr., p. 70.) Petitioner's expert witness raised the issue of short-acting versus long-acting opioids, but this has already been addressed. Petitioner's expert objected to Respondent's prescription of Xanax® and Soma®, but, as already noted, Petitioner did not plead these matters. Petitioner's expert witness mentioned the polysubstance use of benzodiazepines and oxycodone--both prescribed--with marijuana. Petitioner's expert opined that patients who persist in using marijuana "need to be tapered off their [opioids] and referred for [substance abuse] counseling." (Tr., pp. 72 and 145.) Respondent's expert opined that practitioners are divided in what to do with patients whose aberrant behavior involves exclusively marijuana use. The standard of care as applied to marijuana use is discussed in the Conclusions of Law. Petitioner's expert finds firmer footing when he ties in the other aberrant behavior of K. G., including obtaining Oxycontin® on the street and K. G.'s on-again, off-again misuse of Suboxone® as a opiate-substitute, not as an agent to assist in opiate detoxification. When K. G. ignored Respondent's referral to an orthopedist, K. G. blatantly ignored Respondent's lone attempt to initiate a reexamination of the patient's underlying condition. There were one or more unspecified aberrant behaviors, and, when Respondent finally placed the patient on probation, K. G. quit seeing Respondent for ten months: on his return, he promptly tested positive for marijuana again. These facts are the grounds of the standard-of-care violation. As was the case with R. H. and K. L., so it is with K. G. By continuing to prescribe opioids and not treating the underlying condition, or tapering him off and then dismissing K. G. as a patient, if he refused to stop his aberrant behavior, Respondent essentially deprived K. G. of the treatment that he required. Petitioner proved a medical-records violation and standard-of-care violation. D. D. From June 30, 2008, through June 3, 2009, Respondent prescribed to D. D. a monthly regime of 290 30-mg roxicodone pills. And, in this case, a one-year span produced only 12 prescriptions. At his initial visit on June 30 or July 1, 2008, D. D., a diabetic in his 50s, presented with pain in both knees. His left knee had been replaced two years earlier and was doing well, but he was awaiting replacement of his right knee. D. D. had an abscess at L5/S1. He was on SSI disability. Although taking 30-mg and 15-mg roxicodone, D. D. wanted to get off the 30-mg pills because he had no insurance. Obese at 192 pounds, D. D. reported his pain to be an "8." The treatment plan involved converting D. D.'s 15-mg roxicodone pills for 30-mg roxicodone pills, despite his interest in dropping the 30-mg pills, but Respondent maintained the same dosage as had been prescribed by the preceding physician. Otherwise, the treatment plan consisted of discussing the rules of the Pain Management Center. Petitioner's expert witness complimented Respondent on his initial medical record: he called it a "well presented medical record, a good history there. I think this is an appropriate medical record." (Tr., p. 85.) And it is. Petitioner's expert also testified that the patient required opiate management. Laboring under a misunderstanding as to the amount of roxicodone that Respondent had prescribed on the first visit, Petitioner's expert was alarmed by what he thought had been a doubling on the second visit; in fact, the quantity had remained unchanged. In this case, given the short time of treatment and the extensive medical difficulties of the patient, whom Respondent described aptly as "one of the saddest patients I have" (Tr., p. 230), Petitioner's expert lacked support in the record for his opinion that Respondent was required to address eliminating pain medications from D. D.'s life. D. D. was a low-functioning person when he presented to Respondent, and the standard of care did not require, within one year, that Respondent either get D. D. off opioids or substantially improve his function. However, toward the end of the treatment period, D. D. enjoyed greater functionality, as he was able to help raise his grandson. Petitioner failed to prove a medical-records violation or a standard-of-care violation. J. M. From October 1, 2007, through July 3, 2009, Respondent prescribed J. M. a monthly regime of 30-mg roxicodone pills and Oxyfast bottles. (All roxicodone prescriptions to J. M. are for 30-mg doses, unless otherwise indicated.) On October 1, 2007, Respondent prescribed 240 roxicodone pills and one bottle of Oxyfast.® On October 23, Respondent maintained the roxicodone, but doubled the Oxyfast® to two bottles. Respondent maintained this prescription level the next month. On December 21, Respondent essentially maintained the same prescription level by prescribing 105 30-mg roxicodone pills and 273 15-mg roxicodone pills, as well as two bottles of Oxyfast.® On January 18, 2008, Respondent again maintained the same prescription level by prescribing 70 30-gm roxicodone pills and 340 15-mg roxicodone pills, plus two bottles of Oxyfast.® But four days later, Respondent prescribed another 70 roxicodone pills. On February 18, Respondent prescribed 240 roxicodone pills in two prescriptions--one for 70 pills and one for 170 pills--but no Oxyfast.® On March 25, Respondent prescribed 240 roxicodone pills--in separate prescriptions of 110 and 130 pills--and two bottles of Oxyfast®. Respondent repeated this prescription, but with a single roxicodone prescription each month, for the next nine months. The only exceptions were split prescriptions of 140 pills each on June 17 and the discontinuation of visits between June 17 and September 8. On February 24, 2009, Respondent reduced the prescription to 60 pills of 15-mg roxicodone. On March 23, he raised it to 300 pills of roxicodone--split into prescriptions of 120 pills and 180 pills--and two bottles of Oxyfast.® On April 17, Respondent prescribed two bottles of Oxyfast®, and, on April 23, Respondent prescribed 70 roxicodone pills. On May 15 and June 10, 2009, Respondent prescribed 300 roxicodone pills--divided into two prescriptions of equal amounts--and two bottles of Oxyfast®. On July 3, 2009, Respondent prescribed 300 roxicodone pills--divided into prescriptions of 80 and 220 pills--and two bottles of Oxyfast®. In the initial visit in 2002, J. M. presented as a 32-year-old male with lower back pain. He reported that he had injured his back a few months earlier picking up an object. Unable to lift, J. M. had had to quit working as a gardener. He had been taking four or five Percocet 10/325's daily. The treatment plan, which was prepared by Respondent, was to help J. M. quit smoking tobacco and convert him from Percocet, with the potential acetaminophen toxicity, to roxicodone. J. M. told Respondent that his girlfriend had let him try some of her Xanax®, which had helped him with spasms and sleeping, so Respondent prescribed that too. They also discussed that J. M. should exercise his COBRA rights on his insurance because he was going to get some evaluations, as well as epidural injections. An MRI of the lumbar spine performed on February 6, 2008, revealed multilevel central disc herniations at L2/L3, L3/L4, L4/L5, and L5/S1 with annular tears in the herniations at L3/L4, L4/L5, and L5/S1. The MRI disclosed mild spinal stenosis at L4/L5. None of the ten patients involved in this case displayed the same extent of objective bases for the pain of which he or she complained. In August 2007, while being seen by Dr. Morency at the Pain Management Center, J. M. expressed a desire to be seen by a different physician, but the medical record fails to reveal why. On October 1, 2007, when first treating J. M., Respondent continued the level of opioids that Dr. Morency had been prescribing. Respondent prescribed Oxyfast® with roxicodone because the former, as a liquid, has a faster onset than the pill, which can take 45 minutes to take effect. Respondent testified that he doubled the Oxyfast® on October 23 because the pain was worse. But, according to the medical records, J. M. reported pain of "5" on October 1, 2007, and, three weeks later, reported pain of only "3." On July 3, 2009, a urinalysis revealed THC. Respondent discussed with J. M. his aberrant behavior and placed him on probation, warning him not to test positive for marijuana again. However, J. M. had tested positive for marijuana on April 17, 2006, August 7, 2007, and October 23, 2007--each time he had been tested. Respondent did not test J. M. again for nearly two years. Petitioner's expert faulted Respondent for his handling, or lack of handling, of J. M.'s apparently ongoing marijuana use during treatment. This is addressed in the Conclusions of Law. Petitioner's expert witness faulted Respondent for using short-acting opioids rather than long-acting opioids, but this has been dealt with already. Except for the doubling of the Oxyfast® early in the period of treatment, the medical records fail to establish a correspondence between pain reports and prescription levels of roxicodone on three occasions: the two months during which Respondent supplemented the roxicodone prescription with 70 pills and the 25% increase in roxicodone in early 2009. The medical records lack assessments, diagnoses, and treatment plans. In particular, the medical records are deficient because they do not justify the three increases in prescribed opioids. But there is insufficient evidence of a standard-of- care violation as to J. M. There is insufficient evidence of aberrant behavior that would require Respondent to taper off J. M. from pain medications--despite well-documented sources of pain--while he obtained counseling to help him stop using marijuana. And the three instances in which increased prescriptions were not justified in the medical records prove a medical-records violation, not a standard-of-care violation, as discussed in the Conclusions of Law. No other evidence in the record establishes a lack of justification for the prescribed opioids. Petitioner proved a medical-records violation, but not a standard-of-care violation. M. L. From April 26, 2007, through March 3, 2009, Respondent prescribed to M. L. a monthly regime of 30-mg roxicodone pills, except for a single prescription of oxycodone and two prescriptions of Percocet® 10/325. (All roxicodone prescriptions to M. L. are for 30-mg doses.) On April 26, 2007, Respondent prescribed 440 mg of roxicodone pills in two prescriptions--one for 200 pills and one for 240 pills. Respondent repeated this prescription monthly for seven months--eight times--when, on December 6, 2007, he raised it to 540 mg in two prescriptions--one for 290 pills and one for 250 pills. Starting January 8, 2008, Respondent returned to his initial pattern of prescribing 440 pills of roxicodone in two prescriptions. This continued through 2008--again, counting January 8, this amounted to 13 prescriptions, not 12, over the year. Respondent continued this prescription pattern on January 6 and February 2--the latter incorporating 40 15-mg roxicodone pills to achieve the same total prescription in dosage. On March 3, 2009, Respondent prescribed 150 roxicodone pills, 210 5-mg oxycodone pills, and 210 Percocet® 10/325 pills. In 1999, David Buchalter, M.D., referred M. L. to the Pain Management Center with a report stating that an MRI suggested that the patient had a small herniated disc at C3/C4, a mild disc bulge at C4/C5, and degenerative disc space narrowing at C5/C6. By the time that Respondent saw M. L., he had been complaining of neck and lower back pain for many years. M. L. could not afford Oxycontin®, but a urinalysis confirmed that he was taking his prescribed short-acting opioids. M. L. had been seen by the Pain Management Center for several years, and he had never exhibited aberrant behavior. Nothing stands out in the record concerning the care received by M. L., although, again, two years of medical records contain no assessment, diagnosis, or treatment plan. Petitioner proved a medical-records violation, but not a standard-of-care violation. M. P. From February 12, 2007, through July 7, 2009, Respondent prescribed to M. P. a monthly regime of Oxycontin and methadone initially and, later, mostly roxicodone. (All roxicodone prescriptions for M. P. are for 30 mg, unless otherwise indicated.) M. P. had been seen by the Pain Management Center since at least 2002. He was operating a forklift in 1999 when boxes fell on him, injuring his neck. An MRI revealed a ruptured disk at C3/C4, a disc bulge at C4/C5, and degenerative disc disease at C5/C6. At the time of the office visit, M. P. was still employed driving a forklift, but was taking 120 mg of Oxycontin® daily. Despite a medical record dated January 5, 2006, stating that M. P. could not afford Oxycontin®, he was still on this relatively expensive, long-acting opioid at the start of the period in question. During his years of treatment at the Pain Management Center, M. P. had never displayed any aberrant behavior, as periodic urinalyses revealed that M. P. was taking his prescribed opioids and nothing else. The medical records during the period in question contain no patient assessments or treatment plans, nor do they explain the switching of medications. Of particular interest, as to the standard of care, is the relatively long period that Respondent prescribed two long-acting opioids, methadone and Oxycontin®. As Petitioner's expert testified, such overlapping is appropriate during a dosage-transition phase, as the practitioner transitions the patient from one such opioid to another. But here, Respondent prescribed methadone and Oxycontin for five months. At the end of this period, Respondent discontinued the Oxycontin®, but there is no constant tapering off of Oxycontin® during this period. From February to July 2007, the monthly prescriptions for Oxycontin® are for 14,400 mg, 14,400 mg, 14,400 mg, 14,400 mg, 0 mg, and 4800 mg. As noted above, methadone is difficult to use for analgesic purposes. Doubtlessly, this difficulty is increased by adding another long-acting opioid, even if its half life is much shorter than the half-life of methadone. But this is really all that Petitioner presents for a standard-of-care violation. Although it is a close question, Petitioner's evidence fails to convince that five months' dual prescribing of two long-acting opioids was inappropriate, excessive, or unjustified. Petitioner's expert questioned the amount of roxicodone prescribed, in conjunction with methadone, for back pain. This criticism was less well-founded, as Respondent eventually discontinued the methadone also. Additionally, M. P. tended to report high pain levels during the period in question. Again, during the two and one-half years of relevant treatment, the medical records fail to include an assessment, diagnosis, or treatment plan, including any guide to the transitioning of the patient off of two long-acting opioids. Petitioner proved a medical-records violation, but not a standard-of-care violation.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of nine counts of medical-records violations and four counts of standard-of-care violations and imposing $107,500 in administrative fines, four years' suspension from the practice of medicine, 200 hours' community service, six years' probation after completion of the suspension, restrictions upon Respondent's license after it is reinstated, coursework, and costs. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of June, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of June, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: Shirley L. Bates, Esquire Grace Kim, Esquire Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Sean Michael Ellsworth, Esquire Ellsworth Law Firm, P.A. 1501 Collins Avenue, Suite 208 Miami Beach, Florida 33139 Renee Alsobrook, Acting General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Larry McPherson, Jr., Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399
The Issue Whether disciplinary action should be taken against Respondent’s license to practice as a medical doctor based on allegations that he violated sections 458.331(1)(t), (m), and (q), Florida Statutes (2008-2010), as alleged in Petitioner’s Amended Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact The following Findings of Fact are based on the testimony presented at the final hearing, exhibits accepted into evidence, admitted facts set forth in the pre-hearing stipulation, and matters officially recognized. The Parties and the Origin of This Litigation The Department is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to chapter 456, Florida Statutes (2006-2017). At all times relevant to the instant case, Dr. McKenzie was a Florida-licensed physician having been issued license ME 93485. Dr. McKenzie is also licensed to practice medicine in Alabama. Dr. McKenzie is board-certified in internal medicine with sub-specialties in pulmonary disease and sleep medicine. Dr. McKenzie earned his medical degree at the University of South Alabama (“USA”) in May of 2000. Over the next three years, Dr. McKenzie completed an internship and a residency in Internal Medicine at USA. By June of 2005, Dr. McKenzie had left USA after completing a fellowship in “Pulmonary & Sleep Medicine, Critical Care.” Dr. Victor Ortega has a medical practice in Panama City, Florida, known as Pulmonary Associates, and Dr. McKenzie began working for Dr. Ortega on approximately July 1, 2005. Dr. McKenzie had no ownership interest in Pulmonary Associates. He was an employee of Dr. Ortega. Therefore, Dr. Ortega owned the medical records for the patients Dr. McKenzie treated at Pulmonary Associates. Dr. McKenzie worked at Pulmonary Associates until July of 2006, and the separation was acrimonious. Dr. McKenzie elected to leave Pulmonary Associates after learning that the compensation system instituted by Dr. Ortega unfairly enriched him at the expense of his associates.1/ Dr. McKenzie began practicing at Bay Clinic, Inc. (“Bay Clinic”), in Panama City in July 2006, and continued there through May 2009. At Bay Clinic, Dr. McKenzie shared office space and administrative expenses with Dr. Jesus Ramirez. Dr. McKenzie had no ownership interest in Bay Clinic. The record is unclear as to whether Dr. McKenzie had an employment contract with Bay Clinic. In May of 2009, Dr. McKenzie opened his own practice at The Lung and Sleep Center in Panama City. Dr. McKenzie owns The Lung and Sleep Center, and he owns the medical records for the patients he treats there. In addition to his practice at The Lung and Sleep Center, Dr. McKenzie is a staff physician at Bay Medical Center, Select Specialty Hospital, and Health South in Panama City. Since August of 2015, Dr. McKenzie has been a clinical instructor for the nurse practitioner program at USA. Because Dr. McKenzie has been practicing in close proximity to Pulmonary Associates, Dr. Ortega sued Dr. McKenzie in 2011 in order to enforce a non-compete agreement.2/ During the course of that litigation, Dr. Ortega’s attorney asked Dr. McKenzie during a deposition whether he had ever treated a current or former employee with narcotic medications at Pulmonary Associates. Because Dr. McKenzie had rendered such treatment to K.D., he responded affirmatively. On January 28, 2011, Dr. Ortega wrote the following letter to the Board of Medicine: A deposition with Dr. McKenzie took place and is enclosed. Dr. McKenzie acknowledged under sworn statement that he had prescribed controlled substances for employees at Pulmonary Associates of Bay County. That person, of course, was [K.D.]. Dr. McKenzie’s attorney opposed any further questioning alleging privacy violations, etc. Since [K.D.] was our employee and he was under contract and under the privacy and umbrella of our corporation, that record keeping was by contract to be kept under our protection. As I understand it, this is a criminal occurrence and violation of the prescription of controlled substances. I am forwarding all this to the law enforcement agency and to the state with the hope that you will proceed accordingly with prosecution and stop this practice as soon as possible. I recognize that the problem of illegal use, abuse, and prescription of controlled substances is a significant issue throughout the United States. This represents one more way in which drugs are being diverted from their legal and appropriate use. To this day I am certain that this illegal prescription practice continues with different individuals. The rapid check of prescriptions at the local pharmacies for controlled substances, particularly Lortab, Dilaudid, etc., by this physician will reveal a number of individuals which I am sure will not have corresponding medical record entries to justify the use of pain control medication by appropriate evaluation, diagnosis, and treatments as required by law. (emphasis added). Dr. Ortega ultimately identified A.W., R.W., and K.D. to the Department as patients who received inappropriate prescriptions from Dr. McKenzie. However, the Department and the Florida Department of Law Enforcement’s (“FDLE”) investigation began due to a confidential informant observing Dr. McKenzie disposing of pill bottles at a car wash. FDLE investigated the matter, but limited resources led to FDLE referring the case to the Department for administrative action. The Department’s allegations pertaining to A.W., R.W., and K.D. will be separately addressed below. Was Dr. McKenzie’s Treatment of A.W. Below the Standard of Care? A.W. has been a Florida-licensed nurse since April of 2007 and has worked at Bay Medical Center since 2005. She was in nursing school when her employment at Bay Medical Center began. A.W. and Dr. McKenzie were co-workers at Bay Medical Center. While Dr. McKenzie was married and A.W. was engaged, they began a romantic relationship in 2005 that continued until 2006 or 2007. When A.W. learned that Dr. McKenzie’s wife was pregnant, their relationship ended, and A.W. did not have any meaningful communication with Dr. McKenzie for the next year. Even though she was already treating with a general medicine practitioner who she considered to be her primary care physician, A.W. began treating with Dr. McKenzie in approximately April of 2009 because she was experiencing “really severe headaches,” anxiety, and abdominal pain. Dr. McKenzie prescribed Lortab, the brand name for an opioid pain medication consisting of acetaminophen and hydrocodone. Under section 893.03(3), Florida Statutes (2008-2017), hydrocodone, in the dosages found in Lortab, is a Schedule III controlled substance. From April of 2009 through October of 2010, Dr. McKenzie prescribed 90 Lortab pills a month to A.W. A.W. was to take one pill every six hours as needed for pain. When A.W. began treating with Dr. McKenzie, they resumed having a personal relationship. While A.W. describes their relationship at that time as being friendly rather than romantic, A.W. and Dr. McKenzie were having sex while Dr. McKenzie was writing prescriptions for her. A.W.’s first documented treatment with Dr. McKenzie at The Lung and Sleep Center occurred on July 22, 2009, and she presented with several issues. For instance, A.W. was experiencing anxiety, and Dr. McKenzie noted on the medical record that A.W. needed to see a psychiatrist. A.W. was also experiencing pain from multiple sources. Migraines were one source of pain, and Dr. McKenzie recommended continuing with Lortab and discussed obtaining a neurology consult. A.W. also had abdominal pain, and Dr. McKenzie discussed obtaining a colonoscopy and consulting with a gastroenterologist. In addition to migraines and abdominal pain, A.W. was experiencing pain from pleurisy. Pleurisy is inflammation of the lining of the lungs, and its symptoms include chest and back pain. It is characterized by a sharp pain that worsens with deep breaths. Pleurisy is treated with nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (“NSAIDs”) such as Motrin, Aleve, and ibuprofen. If NSAIDs have no effect, then, narcotics can be used. A.W.’s next documented treatment at The Lung and Sleep Center occurred on December 9, 2009. Dr. McKenzie noted in the medical record associated with that office visit that A.W. had gastroesophageal reflux disease, i.e., GERD. In order to treat that condition, Dr. McKenzie prescribed over-the-counter Prilosec and advised A.W. to avoid NSAIDs because they can aggravate heartburn. If a patient cannot take NSAIDs, then Lortab is a reasonable alternative. By the time of her next documented office visit at The Lung and Sleep Center on July 22, 2009, A.W. was still suffering from anxiety, abdominal pain, and pleurisy. A.W. had neglected to obtain any of the consultations recommended by Dr. McKenzie. Dr. McKenzie testified that it can be difficult to get patients to obtain consultations: So a lot of times, it’s hard to get people to be compliant. Nobody wants to go and have scopes in both ends, but especially when something flares up and goes away, because every time you see – it’s like taking your car to the mechanic, when you take it to the mechanic, it quits knocking. So a lot of these people come in, well, it’s not that bad. And they they go home and it will be bad. So a lot of times it’s hard to get them to be compliant with these. Because the [esophagogastroduodenoscopy] and the colonoscopy, I don’t know if anybody has had one, but they can be unpleasant, at best. Because A.W. is a nurse, Dr. McKenzie assumed that she would eventually obtain the consultations: [O]ne thing about A.W. is she’s a nurse. And so you kind of put more weight, because a normal patient, when they say, well, I’m going to call psychiatry, or I’m going to get this down or this done, you know, then you may push them a little harder. But if you have a medical professional, when they tell you that, well, I’ll call this and I’ll do that, you kind of put more weight to that. And so, you know, she did – you know, and she was told, and she said, well, I’ll call psychiatry. And then she would call – was going to call GI and she was going to call neurology. And she eventually did, of course. When asked about prescribing narcotics for a year to a patient who was not obtaining the recommended consultations, Dr. McKenzie testified as follows: So you give people the benefit of the doubt. And her symptoms would come and go. And then she said – like I said, she kept saying, well, I’m going to go see this person, see this person. She worked nights. She had a lot of compounding issues that would make it harder for her to follow up and be compliant. Dr. McKenzie did not have an office visit with A.W. every time that he wrote a prescription for her. The next documented visit by A.W. to The Lung and Sleep Center occurred on December 9, 2009. The medical record notes that A.W. continued to have stomach pain. As a result, she was to continue avoiding NSAIDs, and she was supposed to consult with a gastroenterologist. A.W. was still suffering from pleurisy, anxiety, and migraines. A.W.’s next documented treatment at The Lung and Sleep Center occurred on May 5, 2010. A.W. still had not obtained the consultations mentioned above, and Dr. McKenzie recognized that doing so would be difficult because A.W. was working nights. A.W.’s last documented treatment at The Lung and Sleep Center occurred on October 11, 2010. She still had not obtained the consultations previously recommended by Dr. McKenzie. Dr. McKenzie notified A.W. during this office visit that he would not prescribe any more pain medication until she obtained the psychiatry, neurology, and gastroenterology consultations they had discussed. A.W. then treated with Dr. Mariusz J. Klin, a gastroenterologist, on November 24, 2010. Dr. Klin performed an endoscopy on A.W. and discovered that she was suffering from “severe gastritis from NSAIDs and a 2 centimeter hernia.” Dr. McKenzie testified that severe gastritis is painful. A lot of people call the ambulance, you know, they get all kinds of heart workup and all kinds of pulmonary workup and they did a lot of workup because of the severe pain. And it’s episodic. You can have episodes where you won’t have any issues and then you’ll have flare-ups and have issues. Dr. McKenzie testified that a hiatal hernia can be painful: It can be. A lot of times your – what causes a hiatal hernia is your stomach and your esophagus are above the diaphragm. And your esophagus fits into your diaphragm like a lock and key. And so if your esophagus is in the right place, it helps close off the stomach so the acid can’t come out. Well, when you have a hernia, it pulls the lock and key in the wrong direction to be optimal, so now the stomach acid can leak out and cause more of a problem. Dr. Francisco Calimano, the Department’s expert witness, reviewed A.W.’s medical records and provided expert testimony on the Department’s behalf. Dr. Calimano is licensed to practice medicine in Florida and is board-certified in internal medicine, pulmonary medicine, and critical care medicine. Dr. Calimano testified that the amount of Lortab prescribed to A.W. by Dr. McKenzie was “excessive.” However, Dr. Calimano’s objection was directed more toward the length of time that Dr. McKenzie prescribed 90 Lortab pills a month, rather than the monthly amount of Lortab prescribed. Specifically, Dr. Calimano testified that he would do no more than a two to three month Lortab prescription for a patient with migraines, anxiety, and abdominal pain: In my opinion, you know, in my professional opinion, you know, at least in the scope of practice that I have, which I am not a pain specialist, I wouldn’t go for this length of time prescribing this amount of narcotics. I will feel uncomfortable doing that. So I think that I would refer to the pain management specialist. I would have been, you know, up to the point I said, you know, usually what I tell my patients is I give you a prescription, because you are having acute pain. I might give a second prescription if the pain is not resolved or so with the understanding that he needs to get that addressed. Before I give him that second prescription, I tell him I no longer will prescribe you these medications. And so before she runs out of that prescription, she knows in advance that it’s a no, the answer is no. That she needs to get some help, professional help. Because I think if not I would be doing a disfavor. Dr. David Hart Goldstein provided expert testimony on Dr. McKenzie’s behalf. Dr. Goldstein is licensed to practice medicine in Florida, and he practices internal, pulmonary, and hospital medicine at Sarasota Memorial Hospital. In addition, Dr. Goldstein currently works as an Assistant Clinical Professor of Internal, Pulmonary, and Hospitalist Medicine at Florida State University’s School of Medicine. Dr. Goldstein rendered a different opinion regarding Dr. McKenzie’s treatment of A.W. and the Lortab prescriptions: Q: Does anything appear remarkable to you in terms of the dosage? A: The dosages are on the high side. But when a patient has severe pain sometimes you need a higher dose. It seems that Dr. McKenzie was managing this patient for a long period of time. There was no pain specialist involved at that time. Q: From your review of the record, did it appear that patient A.W. had significant gastric distress? A: Yes. In fact, it appears from the record and the note by Dr. Klin that she tried other methods to relieve the pain. The reasons I say that is his diagnosis was severe gastritis related to the use of NSAIDs. Meaning that she tried using things like Advil. So that caused the issue. So NSAIDs would be prohibited. And this would be consistent with a person who has, according to the record, significant headaches, abdominal pain, which was [caused] by gastritis and pleurisy. Q: So from your review of the records, particularly Dr. Klin’s clinical records, would it be appropriate if NSAIDs were not effective to step up to a Lortab prescription? A: If that was the only way the patient’s pain could be managed, yes. * * * Q: So taking all of these records together, did you see anything clinically inappropriate as to either the medical care or the prescribing that Dr. McKenzie offered to patient A.W. during this timeframe? A: The only thing is as I mentioned – I think I mentioned it in my deposition also. There are a lot of prescriptions for Lortab. The medical record documents that she has a lot of pain. I think there might have been better documentation of the fact that this was failing or this was working. So I am not that impressed with the documentation, but the record is consistent with symptoms that can be treated and are often treated with narcotics such as Percocet or Lortab. Q: Dr. Goldstein, did you see anything that appeared to you to be a practice beneath the standard of care? A: Just as I mentioned, I don’t think the records were great, but I don’t believe that’s a deviation of the standard of care. I just think that’s poor recordkeeping. As for the length of time that Dr. McKenzie prescribed Lortab to A.W., Dr. Goldstein testified that, “I would not prescribe it for a year unless I was comfortable that this patient had made attempts to see a neurologist and had migraines and was not abusing this medication.” Because A.W.’s gastric issues prevented her from taking NSAIDs, Dr. Goldstein opined that it was appropriate to treat A.W.’s headache pain, abdominal pain, and pleurisy with Lortab. With regard to the fact that Dr. McKenzie wrote prescriptions for A.W. without a corresponding office visit, Dr. Calimano acknowledged that “you don’t absolutely need a face-to-face contact with the patient if you have established a diagnosis and you are sure of what you are treating and so on.” Nevertheless, Dr. Calimano objected to Dr. McKenzie not doing more to treat the sources of A.W.’s pain, and the Department takes Dr. McKenzie to task because A.W.’s medical records do not set forth a treatment plan, objectives, etc. However, A.W. was a difficult patient because she did not obtain the consultations requested by Dr. McKenzie until he threatened to discharge her as a patient. Such consultations would be an essential prerequisite to formulating an effective treatment plan for A.W. If A.W. had obtained those consultations when she had been directed to do so, then her illnesses might have resolved much sooner. While Dr. McKenzie probably should have threatened to discharge A.W. sooner, he believed that A.W., as a medical professional, would eventually obtain the consultations, and he recognized that A.W.’s night shift work made it difficult for her to obtain those consultations. In sum, even Dr. Goldstein acknowledged that Dr. McKenzie’s recordkeeping for A.W. could have been better. However, the evidence does not clearly and convincingly demonstrate that Dr. McKenzie’s treatment of A.W., under these particular circumstances, fell below the standard of care.3/ Did Dr. McKenzie Falsify A.W.’s Medical Records and Use Her to Illegally Obtain Lortab? Contrary to the medical records described above, A.W. asserts that she has never sought treatment at The Lung and Sleep Center. While she acknowledges visiting The Lung and Sleep Center, she asserts that she was only there as a friend of Dr. McKenzie and to assist her father with obtaining treatment.4/ A.W. testified that Dr. McKenzie never determined the cause of her headaches, her anxiety, or her abdominal pain. A.W. testified that Dr. McKenzie never performed a physical exam on her or discussed a treatment plan with her. A.W. also denies that she received any treatment from Dr. McKenzie at Bay Clinic, but she acknowledges visiting him there as a friend. As noted above, A.W.’s Lortab prescriptions enabled her to obtain 90 Lortab pills a month. As a result, she could take one pill every six hours. A.W. testified that she could not tolerate taking that amount of Lortab. The medicine made her drowsy and upset her stomach. A.W. also testified that she never had to take four Lortab pills in a single day in order to control her pain. After the first month of her treatment with Dr. McKenzie, A.W. testified that she continued to fill the Lortab prescriptions but gave a large majority of the pills to Dr. McKenzie. A.W. testified that she kept a few pills for those times when she would experience severe headaches or abdominal pain, and one pill a day was enough to keep her pain under control. As for why she gave large portions of her Lortab prescriptions to Dr. McKenzie, A.W. testified that she did so “[b]ecause he was my friend, and he had told me he was going through a lot, and he was embarrassed to go see a physician in town. He asked me if he wrote me a script could I give him some back or give it back to him.” During the time in question, Dr. McKenzie was experiencing marital difficulties and opening his own practice. A.W. testified that she would fill the Lortab prescriptions at a CVS Pharmacy in Panama City and then meet Dr. McKenzie in a parking lot so that she could give him the medication. A.W. and Dr. McKenzie’s personal relationship ended again in 2011 when A.W. became pregnant. At some point in 2011, A.W. was contacted by investigators from the Department and the Drug Enforcement Agency. A.W. then alerted Dr. McKenzie to the aforementioned agencies’ investigation. A.W. testified that she assisted Dr. McKenzie with fabricating medical records demonstrating that she had treated at The Lung and Sleep Center and that the Lortab prescriptions were medically necessary. She testified that she did so because Dr. McKenzie was her friend and she wanted the investigation to “go away.” Moreover, A.W. testified that she was worried that she could be charged with impaired nursing. When asked why she fabricated medical records, A.W. testified as follows: Because he was my friend and I didn’t want him to get in trouble for all of this, and I wanted it to be done with. I was worried about being a nurse and being a part of this. And I had been – the whole impaired nursing thing had been brought up, and I figured if I did this everything would just go away. A.W. learned of the Administrative Complaint when Dr. McKenzie showed it to her during a 2014 visit to his apartment. A.W. visited Dr. McKenzie’s apartment “quite a few times” and their last sexual encounter probably occurred in 2015. Despite testifying that she and Dr. McKenzie had been friends, A.W. testified against Dr. McKenzie at the final hearing and claimed that she was doing so because she felt it was the right thing to do and did not “want this over [her] head anymore.” Medical records from Dr. Klin and a Dr. Elzawahry memorialize treatment rendered to A.W. in October and November of 2010. However, those records, which were in the possession of The Lung and Sleep Center, bear a facsimile timestamp of March 1, 2011, and March 2, 2011. Those dates are four months after A.W.’s treatment dates. Also, the facsimile timestamps are seven days after the Department served Dr. McKenzie with a subpoena for A.W.’s medical records. While concerning, the facsimile timestamps do not conclusively demonstrate that Dr. McKenzie fabricated the records pertaining to A.W.’s treatment at The Lung and Sleep Center. While the undersigned has doubts about Dr. McKenzie’s credibility, there are reasons to question A.W.’s credibility. A.W. and Dr. McKenzie had a complicated relationship, and Dr. McKenzie is currently seeing another nurse employed at Bay Medical Center. The undersigned cannot ignore the possibility that A.W. and Dr. McKenzie’s prior relationship did not end on good terms. As noted above, Dr. Ortega brought A.W., R.W., and K.D. to the Department’s attention. The January 28, 2011, letter from Dr. Ortega to the Board of Medicine is suspicious because Dr. Ortega confidently states (without stating the basis for his assertions) that there are other patients who have received illegal prescriptions from Dr. McKenzie. Given the January 28, 2011, letter and the acrimony between them, one of Dr. McKenzie’s defenses to the Amended Administrative Complaint is that Dr. Ortega persuaded or coerced A.W., R.W., and K.D. to provide false testimony against him. It is possible that Dr. Ortega could be in a position to exercise some sort of leverage over A.W. due to the fact that Dr. Ortega works as a pulmonary doctor at Bay Medical Center and A.W. is a pulmonary nurse. During the hearing, A.W. acknowledged that she is taking 14 medications such as Latuda for psychosis; Ativan for anxiety; Prozac for depression; Nuvigil for Attention Deficit Disorder (“ADD”) and narcolepsy; Adderall for ADD; Fioricet for migraines; Metoprobol for hypertension; Lamictal for bipolar disorder; Carafate to coat her stomach; Prilosec for indigestion, gastric reflux, and gastritis; and Rispedal, a mood stabilizer associated with bipolar disorder. The fact that A.W. is currently receiving treatment for psychosis and bipolar disorder does not cause the undersigned to discredit her testimony. However, the undersigned cannot ignore the fact that there was no testimony as to what extent (if any) the aforementioned conditions affected her during the time period relevant to the instant case. In sum, there is evidence indicating that Dr. McKenzie used A.W. to obtain Lortab. Nevertheless, the evidence taken as a whole does not clearly and convincingly demonstrate that Dr. McKenzie prescribed Lortab to A.W. outside the course of his professional practice. Was Dr. McKenzie’s Treatment of R.W. Below the Standard of Care? R.W. was a Florida-licensed respiratory therapist from approximately 2000 to 2012. R.W. met Dr. McKenzie sometime between 2005 and 2006 when both of them were employed at Gulf Coast Medical Center. Dr. McKenzie and R.W. often worked together. While R.W. considered Dr. McKenzie to be a friend, they did not spend time together outside the hospital. Since his first marriage ended in 1993, R.W. had been taking Ativan in order to alleviate anxiety resulting from his divorce. Ativan is the brand name for Lorazepam and is prescribed for anxiety. According to section 893.03(4), Lorazepam is a Schedule IV controlled substance. Approximately one year after meeting Dr. McKenzie, R.W. inquired about becoming Dr. McKenzie’s patient. R.W. had become heavily dependent on Ativan and admits that he was engaging in “doctor shopping” in order to obtain more Ativan prescriptions. Other doctors had declined to treat R.W. because they believed he was taking too much Ativan: Q: So my question was about Dr. McKenzie and how did you begin treating as a patient with Dr. McKenzie. A: I was taking large amounts of Ativan. After that many years, you build up a tolerance to it. I [did] what was called doctor shopping. I had asked a couple of other physicians if they would follow me for my Ativan. Because generally I am healthy. And I had become dependent on it and was taking pretty large amounts of it and approached him about that, if he would prescribe it for me. Q: Did the other physicians you had asked to follow you begin following you and providing you with Ativan? A: No. Q: Why not? A: They said I was taking an incredibly large dose of it. They didn’t think I should be on that much. Q: Did they offer to take you as a patient and prescribe you alternatives? A: No. Q: They wouldn’t follow you altogether? A: They wouldn’t follow me altogether. They wanted to know who had been prescribing me that much. I guess it was because I wasn’t getting the answer I was wanting, I just didn’t pursue it any further. Q: So what did you do to get it after that? A: I approached Dr. McKenzie. Q: Was Dr. McKenzie aware that any other practitioners wouldn’t give it to you? A: I don’t know. I don’t believe I made that – I don’t know. Q: Do you recall how you approached Dr. McKenzie about the Ativan? A: Yeah. We were at the hospital. I approached him. I said, look, I am on Ativan. Explained the reason I was on it. I am on large doses of it. I need someone to follow me for this, is that something you could do. The first documented treatment occurred on November 2, 2007, when R.W. presented at Bay Clinic. A patient intake form indicates that R.W. placed notations on the form indicating that he was suffering from “anxiety/stress” and “problems with sleep.” A follow-up note dated November 20, 2007, lists Ativan as R.W.’s current medication and states that he will continue with Ativan. The note records the following: The patient follows up today. He is complaining of chest pain. He states that he has had chest pain in the center of his chest which radiated into both arms for about 15 minutes. He has had no further episodes of this. The patient had a normal stress test last year. We will try to obtain the results. The patient does have a smoking history. Today we did an EKG which showed no significant abnormalities. The patient states that he has been under a lot of stress. He continues to take his Ativan. The patient is an avid kick boxer[5/] and exercises often. Lab work was obtained. The patient knows to seek immediate medical attention for any worsening of his condition. The next documented treatment occurred on August 29, 2008, at Bay Clinic. The medical record reports the following: The patient follows up today. States that he has had no further chest pain. The patient does have significant anxiety. The patient has been on Ativan for several years. Risks, benefits, and alternatives [to] Ativan were explained to patient and patient voiced understanding. The patient does not want to decrease the Ativan. Does not want to change the Ativan. The patient denies suicidal or homicidal ideation. The patient jogs several miles each day. The patient exercises. The patient is a respiratory therapist, and I have contact with [the] patient every day. The patient is compliant with his medications. Does use it at the same pharmacy. The patient is under a narcotic contract here. If the patient violates his contract[6/], the patient knows that he will be discharged immediately. The patient knows to seek immediate medical attention for any worsening condition. The medical record notes that Dr. McKenzie will continue R.W. on Ativan. On January 24, 2009, R.W. was injured in an automobile accident. Another vehicle traveling 40 mph rammed into the back of R.W.’s Corvette. According to R.W., the other vehicle was traveling [f]ast enough to knock me from a red light. I was at a red light. I was in a Corvette. Fast enough to fold the tail end of my Corvette under and knock me across the intersection to the railroad tracks. Pretty hard. When asked if the accident was “significant,” R.W. responded by testifying that his car had been “totaled.” On February 9, 2009, R.W. received a prescription from Bay Clinic for Lortab, but no refills were authorized. On April 3, 2009, R.W. received a second prescription from Bay Clinic for Lortab. Again, no refills were authorized. The next documented treatment occurred at Bay Clinic on May 1, 2009. R.W. presented with anxiety and some depression. Dr. McKenzie discussed R.W. treating with a psychiatrist and prescribing Luvox, an antidepressant. This record notes that R.W. was still experiencing pain from the motor vehicle accident and that Dr. McKenzie “will try NSAIDs.” The next documented treatment occurred on July 23, 2009. With regard to R.W.’s anxiety, Dr. McKenzie wanted R.W. to see a psychiatrist, but R.W. refused. Dr. McKenzie noted in the medical record that he was going to begin decreasing R.W.’s Ativan dosage and replacing it with a short-acting benzodiazepine. Dr. McKenzie explained that he wanted to wean R.W. off of Ativan because: He had been on Ativan, as he testified, for 25 years before I met him. And the goal was to try to get him off the Ativan. And so, we were going to change him from a long- acting benzodiazepine Ativan to a short- acting one, Xanax. And so what you try to do is wean his Ativan down and then wean him to the short-acting, and it’s easier for people to get off the short-acting. But, somebody that’s been on benzodiazepines or like Ativan for 25 years, it does the same thing to your brain that alcohol does. And so abruptly withdrawing benzodiazepines can put people in DT’s, delirium tremens and with a 25 percent mortality, being that one in four people could die if you just took somebody off those medications. Given R.W.’s 25-year use of Ativan, slowly weaning R.W. from Ativan and to a less harmful anxiety drug was certainly a reasonable goal. The medical record indicates that R.W. was still experiencing back pain from the motor vehicle accident and had “failed NSAIDs.” The record notes that Dr. McKenzie and R.W. discussed obtaining x-rays. At that time, Dr. McKenzie began prescribing at least 90 Lortab pills per month to R.W. The next documented treatment occurred on November 20, 2009. R.W. was continuing to take Lortab for chronic back pain, and Dr. McKenzie was still in the process of weaning R.W. from Ativan. This record notes that R.W. refused a psychiatric consult. In February of 2010, Dr. McKenzie increased the Lortab prescription from 90 to 120 pills a month. The next documented treatment occurred on March 10, 2010. R.W. was still experiencing chronic back pain and anxiety. Dr. McKenzie noted that R.W. needed an MRI and consultations with an orthopedist and a pain management specialist. There is a notation in the record indicating that R.W. needed x-rays. However, R.W. reported that he needed to “check his funds” before obtaining the x-rays. In addition, there is a notation that Dr. McKenzie “will stop Lortab soon.” The next documented treatment occurred on August 12, 2010. R.W. was still experiencing chronic back pain, and Dr. McKenzie wanted R.W. to consult with an orthopedist and a pain management specialist. R.W. was aware that Dr. McKenzie wanted MRIs taken. R.W. was still experiencing anxiety, but the medical record notes that Dr. McKenzie was only going to prescribe one more refill of his medication. Dr. McKenzie noted on the record that R.W. stated, “I will get you. This is bullshit.” R.W. testified that his faith has enabled him to stop taking any medication other than BC headache powder. There is no dispute that Dr. McKenzie did not require an office visit from R.W. each time he wrote a prescription. With regard to whether that practice was appropriate, Dr. McKenzie testified as follows: Ideally we did but, like I said, sometimes patients would come in and pick up a prescription. And it’s kind of the rule that they have one each time but, like I said, that’s sometimes rules can’t be ideal. I mean, if you know the patient, and you know what the issues are, I don’t think there was any law or statute that said they need to be seen every single time. With regard to whether Dr. McKenzie’s treatment of R.W. fell below the standard of care, Dr. Calimano explained that a physician should begin treating a patient complaining of back pain by taking the patient’s history and performing a physical exam. The physical exam would be followed by imaging studies such as an MRI. If there is nothing pressuring the patient’s spine, then treatment options include physical therapy and NSAIDs. If the patient’s pain is very severe, then the physician could prescribe narcotics for a short period of time. If the patient’s condition does not improve, then the physician would refer the patient to the appropriate specialists, such as ones dealing with the spine and pain management. With regard to R.W.’s anxiety, Dr. Calimano stated that he would have attempted to refer R.W. to a psychiatrist. Dr. Calimano was of the opinion that Dr. McKenzie’s medical records do not justify the amount of Lortab and Ativan prescribed to R.W. However, his testimony did not sufficiently address the notations regarding R.W.’s pain from the violent motor vehicle accident. His opinion appeared to focus on the notations regarding chest pain. With regard to the Xanax and Lortab Dr. McKenzie prescribed to R.W. between November 20, 2009, and August 12, 2010, Dr. Goldstein testified as follows: Q: Anything about the dosing or the frequency for the Xanax prescriptions that looks remarkable to you? A: Xanax, one milligram. You know, it can be given up to four milligrams a day. So one milligram [four times a day] is on the higher end, but it’s not above the prescribing recommendations. Lortab is being given continuously. Patient has continuous pain. And it’s documented that the doctor wanted to send this patient to a pain specialist, to an ortho doctor and to rehab. So there is a lot of documented pain medicine there. Again, the only thing I mention is there might have been better documentation as to why he needed to continue it. But there is nothing remarkable about the dosages. Q: So, Dr. Goldstein, based upon all the medical records that we’ve been through regarding R.W. and the medication administration record on page 39, could you offer an opinion to the Court as to whether or not you perceive that Dr. McKenzie’s treatment or prescribing of R.W. during the time period at issue to be beneath the acceptable standard of care? A: The fact that the patient was referred to a psychiatrist. The fact that Xanax was given and it was documented on that last note we mentioned, that the patient was not suicidal, which is important if you are prescribing that. The fact that the patient was referred to an orthopedic doctor, a rehab doctor and a pain specialist, I believe it was within the standard of care. I don’t think the documentation is great, but I can’t see anything that says this is beneath the standard of care. The Department takes Dr. McKenzie to task for not doing more to address R.W.’s anxiety, such as recommending behavior modifications and/or psychotherapy. The Department also takes issue with Dr. McKenzie’s not doing more to treat R.W.’s chronic back pain. However, the medical records indicate that Dr. McKenzie attempted several times to have R.W. treat with a psychiatrist, but R.W. refused. It appears from the medical records that R.W. was not compliant with Dr. McKenzie’s request for x-rays. Dr. McKenzie did not offer a reason why he maintained R.W. as a patient when R.W. would not obtain the recommended consultations and tests. But, Dr. McKenzie noted during his testimony regarding A.W. that he gives more leeway to medical professionals when it comes to obtaining recommended consultations. Given R.W.’s refusal to pursue the recommended consultations and tests, it probably would have been appropriate for Dr. McKenzie to have ended the prescriptions much sooner. Nevertheless, the greater weight of the evidence demonstrates that R.W. was a difficult patient who was resistant to obtaining the consultations desired by Dr. McKenzie. If he had been more compliant in obtaining those consultations, then Dr. McKenzie may have been more successful in treating R.W.’s anxiety and chronic pain. In sum, the evidence does not clearly and convincingly demonstrate that Dr. McKenzie’s treatment of R.W. fell below the standard of care given the circumstances associated with R.W. Did Dr. McKenzie Falsify R.W.’s Medical Records and Use Him to Illegally Obtain Lortab? R.W. testified that any pain from his motor vehicle accident only lasted two days, and he denies experiencing any chronic/long-term pain following the accident. R.W. testified that Dr. McKenzie prescribed Lortab and asked him to transfer the medicine to him. R.W. testified that he returned pain medication to Dr. McKenzie on a monthly basis over the course of approximately one year. The transactions would occur at the hospital or in parking lots at a Wal-Mart or a service station. R.W. testified that he would typically give 90 to 100 pills to Dr. McKenzie and retain 10 to 20 for his own use. R.W. denies being addicted to Lortab but acknowledges that he was a recreational user and that he “abused” Lortab and Percocet. As for why Dr. McKenzie engaged in this practice, R.W. testified that: As in my deposition, Dr. McKenzie had a corneal abrasion. And I understand, maybe I don’t understand, that physicians, I guess, it’s looked down upon if they are taking medications. So he had a corneal abrasion and asked if I would get him a prescription filled for the pain for his corneal abrasion. When asked why he agreed to divert drugs to Dr. McKenzie, R.W. stated that, “I don’t have a good answer for that. Stupidity I would assume.” As for why he stopped diverting drugs to Dr. McKenzie, R.W. stated that, “Again, when it stopped, my life, it was falling apart. It was a mess.” When asked why he stopped treating with Dr. McKenzie, R.W. testified as follows. A: I don’t even recall. My life was blowing up there. It was a total mess there near the end of my tenure with Gulf Coast. I mean, it was a train wreck. Q: What does that mean? A: I was taking a lot of Ativan. I was taking Lortab. I was drinking heavily. It was a wreck. Q: So the question is why did you stop treating with Dr. McKenzie? A: I left employ – you know, I don’t recall other than we just parted ways and I went my way and that is that. I don’t recall. Q: Did Dr. McKenzie ever have any discussion with you about terminating you as a patient of his? A: He may have. I don’t recall. I am not going to say he didn’t. The Department argues that Dr. McKenzie fabricated the medical records discussed in the previous section because R.W. claims that he only received treatment from Dr. McKenzie at The Lung and Sleep Center on two occasions. Moreover, R.W. claims that he never received treatment from Dr. McKenzie at Bay Clinic.7/ As for why he testified against Dr. McKenzie, R.W. stated the following: A: Well, first of all, I was subpoenaed here. You answer a subpoena. This has been going on for many, many years. Too many for me. I don’t want to be here today. And that is just a fact. Several years ago, I think it was during a – I don’t think, I know. During a fit of anger, withdrawals, all the above, I contacted your department and asked that this be investigated. And I believe the lady’s name was [] Ms. McBride, [and she] came to my residence in Mexico Beach and said that she was going to follow- up and I never heard back. When I heard from you, I was floored that it had taken that long. I figured, well, maybe my – it was a – maybe my suspicions were unfounded when I didn’t hear anything back from her. Q: What do you mean maybe your suspicions were unfounded? A: Maybe I was [the] one off. He was – maybe he was helping me out. Maybe we were helping each other out. I don’t really know. All I know is that I had brought it to your office’s attention a long time ago and nothing was ever done about it. Q: Did anyone ever offer you anything for your testimony today? A: No. Other than the $8.42 check I got from the State for gas I believe. It was delivered to me with my subpoena. Q: Are you referring to [the] witness fee? A: Yes. That I tore up. As was the case with A.W., Dr. McKenzie argues that Dr. Ortega somehow influenced or coerced R.W. into falsely testifying that Dr. McKenzie received Lortab from R.W. Dr. McKenzie testified that Dr. Ortega supervised R.W. at Bay Clinic when R.W. was employed as a respiratory therapist. Therefore, if R.W. held a grudge against Dr. McKenzie for cutting off his Ativan supply as indicated in the August 12, 2010, medical record, it is certainly possible that Dr. Ortega could have learned of that circumstance and sought to take advantage of it. As noted above, the undersigned has doubts about Dr. McKenzie’s credibility. However, R.W.’s statements about engaging in “doctor shopping” for years in order to obtain Ativan, abusing Lortab, and being a “train wreck” when he stopped treating with Dr. McKenzie cast substantial doubt on R.W.’s credibility. Indeed, it appears that R.W.’s difficulties may be the reason why he is no longer a respiratory therapist. Moreover, given R.W.’s own description of the severity of his car accident, it is surprising that he would testify that he experienced little or no pain afterwards. That is especially true given the fact that his car was struck from behind and totaled. Finally, given R.W.’s longstanding dependency on Ativan, R.W. certainly had a motive for filing a false report with the Department after Dr. McKenzie cut off his Ativan supply. In sum, the evidence taken as a whole does not clearly and convincingly demonstrate that Dr. McKenzie prescribed Lortab to R.W. outside the course of his professional practice. Was Dr. McKenzie’s Treatment of K.D. Below the Standard of Care? K.D. began working at Pulmonary Associates in 2007 and was employed there at the same time that Dr. McKenzie worked there. K.D. considered Dr. McKenzie to be her primary care physician, and she treated with him from some point in 2006 at least until August of 2009. K.D. treated with Dr. McKenzie at Gulf Coast Medical Center, Bay Medical Center, Pulmonary Associates, and Bay Clinic. However, K.D. usually treated with Dr. McKenzie at Gulf Coast Medical Center. As her primary care physician, Dr. McKenzie was typically K.D.’s attending physician when she was admitted to either Bay Medical Center or Gulf Coast Medical Center. K.D. primary health problem was intractable pain originating from her hips and one of her knees. K.D.’s knee pain resulted from two knee surgeries and appears to have been aggravated by a car accident. During the course of her treatment with Dr. McKenzie, K.D. was often admitted into hospitals for treatment of her pain. A medical record from Bay Medical Center dated January 22, 2008, describes K.D.’s general condition during the treatment with Dr. McKenzie: This patient is a 37-year-old female who has had long standing problems with chronic pain, particularly involving the right lower extremity. Her history is extensive in that she has been previously diagnosed with torn meniscus in the right knee. She has undergone 2 previous orthoscopic procedures. Also, she has been treated for chronic pes anserinus bursitis. She has had a plethora of complaints over recent years including chronic pain syndrome, migraine headaches, asthma, fibromyalgia, anxiety, depression, and recurrent pain in the right knee and occasionally in the right hip. She was in a motor vehicle accident about a year or so ago, which resulted in no significant abnormalities on workup, but aggravated her chronic pain. She also had a fall and an MRI of the right hip was carried out at the end of 2006, and a partial tear of the gluteus medius was noted. All of her MRIs of the knee demonstrate minimal degenerative change, and previous meniscal pathology. * * * She has been diagnosed previously with chronic pain syndrome and has been utilizing up to 12 mg a day of oral Dilaudid for quite a few months. This is on the basis of chronic migraine headaches and fibromyalgia. From January 2007 through July 22, 2009, Dr. McKenzie prescribed Lortab and Dilaudid on a monthly basis for K.D.’s pain. Dilaudid is a brand name for hydromorphone. Dilaudid is an opioid pain medication that is four times stronger than Lortab. Under section 893.03(2), hydromorphone is a Schedule II controlled substance. For several months in 2008, K.D. was receiving a 120-pill supply of Lortab intended to last 15 days and a 120-pill supply of Dilaudid intended to last 10 days. He also prescribed Xanax for anxiety and Ambien for sleep. The Department takes issue with Dr. McKenzie prescribing two short-acting narcotics, Lortab and Dilaudid, to K.D. between January 2007 and July 22, 2009, without medical records supporting those prescriptions. According to the Department, there is no justified medical purpose for prescribing Lortab and Dilaudid together. Dr. Calimano testified as follows: I’m a pulmonologist, so anything that depress[es] or repress[es] your respiratory drive is always a concern with me. Plus they are all habit forming, so I will be concerned. Going back to the use of narcotics, sometimes you can use a combination of narcotics. But when you are using narcotics on a chronic basis for, like, terminally ill patients and so on, the combination will be you do a long-term or long acting narcotic. You know, there are some preparations, Morphine, and so on and so forth that will last 12 hours. And then you use preparations for breakthrough pain, like short acting ones and so on. But if you have two narcotics that are both, like, will give you the hit quickly, but will disappear three or four hours later, I am not sure, you know, what the advantage would be. In contrast, Dr. Goldstein testified that prescribing two short-acting narcotics is appropriate in order to treat “breakthrough pain:” Q: Is Dilaudid a short acting narcotic? A: Yes. It’s considered an immediate release with a half life of two to three hours. Q: Is Lortab a short acting narcotic? A: Yes. Two to three hours. The answer is yes. Q: In your practice, have you ever prescribed a combination of both Lortab and Dilaudid? A: Yes. But never to be used, as I said in my deposition, at the exact same time. You could use one and another for breakthrough. In other words, you wouldn’t say to the patient take a Dilaudid and a Lortab at the same time for pain. You would say take a Dilaudid on the scheduled basis. And then you may use Lortab for breakthrough. Lortab is not as strong as Dilaudid. And it would be better to use Lortab for breakthrough than Dilaudid for breakthrough. Q: Why would you prescribe a patient two short acting narcotics as opposed to one long acting narcotic such as Fentanyl or Morphine with a short acting narcotic for breakthrough pain? A: Yes. As a matter of fact, the recommendations for pain control, and you can check it [is] up-to-date, are to reserve the long acting pain medications like Oxycontin and Fentanyl for people who have severe chronic pain like cancer. And that should not be the first thing. That should be the last thing you should do. In other words, we try to get away with short acting and try to stay away from the long acting ones. In other words, the long acting one is progression. That’s something you go to next, not before. If the long acting pain medications, for patients, for example, who have cancer and are on hospice, those are the ones we give Fentanyl patches to or Oxycontin. And that’s currently what a lot of the pain management doctors are doing with severe pain. The short acting ones are not as effective. Dr. McKenzie explained why he prescribed two short- acting narcotics as follows: Well, I mean, that your – the goal for the patient is to get them off narcotics. And just like Dr. Goldstein testified that, you know, once you put people on long-acting narcotics, they’re kind of stuck there. And so, you know, what you – cancer patients and terminally ill patients, you put them on long-acting, you know, morphine, long-acting Oxycontin and then for the breakthrough pain, you add a short-acting [narcotic]. Well, that’s not the goal with [K.D.]. The goal is to get her off these medications. And so the medications that I had her on were two short-acting and, yes, you have to use caution with two short acting medications but, again, the goal was to get her off the medication, not advance her to a higher level where she’s – it’s a lot harder to get her off. Once you get somebody on a long-acting narcotic, pain medications to wean them off and that’s the perpetual state that she was in, trying to get her off the narcotics, not keep going up. The Department also takes issue with the lack of medical records supporting the prescriptions written between February 26, 2008, and July 22, 2009. According to the Department, Dr. McKenzie should have had a treatment plan with objectives to assess the success of K.D.’s treatment. In addition, the Department asserts that Dr. McKenzie should have documented recommendations for referrals to other physicians. For the vast majority of the time between February 26, 2008, and July 22, 2009, Dr. McKenzie’s non- hospital practice was based at Bay Clinic, and Dr. McKenzie testified that K.D. had office visits with him in 2008 at Bay Clinic. Therefore, it is possible that Dr. McKenzie treated K.D. at Bay Clinic between February 26, 2008, and July 22, 2009, and that the lack of medical records is attributable to him retaining no ownership over the corresponding records. The Department has presented no persuasive evidence conclusively establishing that Dr. McKenzie owned or should have owned the medical records associated with the patients he treated at Bay Clinic. While K.D. testified that she only visited Bay Clinic on two occasions, Christen Tubbs, a former medical assistant at Bay Clinic, testified that K.D. visited Bay Clinic frequently and that there were many medical records pertaining to K.D. at Bay Clinic.8/ For reasons discussed in detail below, Ms. Tubbs’ testimony on this point was more credible than K.D.’s. As a result, medical records pertaining to K.D.’s treatment at Bay Clinic were created but unavailable for the final hearing. Without those medical records, it is impossible to evaluate whether Dr. McKenzie practiced below the standard of care with regard to not having a treatment plan with objectives to assess the success of K.D.’s treatment. The lack of medical records makes it extremely difficult to evaluate whether Dr. McKenzie practiced below the standard of care by prescribing Lortab and Dilaudid to K.D. in the quantities at issue. The Department presented no sufficiently persuasive evidence demonstrating that the quantities of Lortab and Dilaudid prescribed to K.D. were per se below the standard of care given the circumstances associated with K.D.’s treatment.9/ In sum, the Department has not presented clear and convincing evidence that Dr. McKenzie’s treatment of K.D. fell below the standard of care. Did Dr. McKenzie Use K.D. to Illegally Obtain Lortab? Rather than ingesting the Lortab prescribed for her, K.D. testified that she would fill the Lortab prescriptions and give the pills to Dr. McKenzie in a mall parking lot or her home. According to K.D., Dr. McKenzie would usually give her $40 to $100 for the Lortab. K.D. testified that she would not have taken Lortab because she is allergic to it. K.D. explained that she had her tonsils removed at 16 and was given hydrocodone, an ingredient in Lortab. The hydrocodone caused her to have an itchy, swollen throat. Medical records from Bay Medical Center and Gulf Coast Medical Center note that K.D. was allergic to Lortab. Dr. McKenzie pointed out that he authored a July 16, 2007, medical record, which stated K.D. was allergic to Lortab. However, that same record notes that K.D. “states it makes her nose itch, but has no significant abnormal affect.” Dr. McKenzie testified as follows: And so that, as far as I’m concerned, that she was not, you know, she was not allergic to Lortab. Plus, she had over 80 different independent medical exams because she had been in the hospital 20, 30 different times where she didn’t tell physicians, at that time, or nurses, that she was allergic to Lortab. So that’s not on there. So she would pick and choose who she would tell she was allergic to Lortab and who she wasn’t. And you would say, well, is that a red flag, well, I didn’t know that. And so I don’t go back and look. She was my patient. She told me she wasn’t allergic to Lortab. That’s what I document. And so I would prescribe Lortab for her. Even in the hospital, they did a – and it’s in the records, we can find the Bates number, they got tired of her saying Lortab or not, and there’s a whole section where they went through and viewed every single allergy she had, and they deemed her not to be allergic to Lortab. So, I don’t see how her telling one physician that she’s allergic to Lortab and one physician that she’s not, that that’s – that’s a red flag or that’s anything that I would even notice if I was to go back and look at these medical records. There are aspects of K.D.’s testimony that cause the undersigned to consider Dr. McKenzie’s testimony to be more credible. Rather than testifying during the final hearing, K.D. was deposed on August 9, 2017, at the Gadsden Correctional Facility where she was serving a 36-month sentence for recruiting patients to obtain prescriptions by fraud. K.D. agreed that the aforementioned offense was a “felony conviction.” K.D.’s own testimony suggested that she had a motive to provide false testimony against Dr. McKenzie. Specifically, K.D. testified that she became addicted to pain medication and asserts Dr. McKenzie knew of her addiction. K.D. stated that pain medication “destroyed” her life and was the reason why she was in prison. While K.D. did not directly state that she blamed Dr. McKenzie for her difficulties, one could easily infer from her testimony that she holds a grudge against him. As is the case with A.W. and R.W., there is a connection between K.D. and Dr. Ortega. K.D. testified that she was forced to resign from Pulmonary Associates because she was suspected of embezzlement. Dr. Ortega brought charges against her, but those charges were dismissed after K.D.’s father paid restitution. While K.D. denies that Dr. Ortega offered to drop the charges against her if she gave testimony against Dr. McKenzie, this circumstance must be taken into account when evaluating K.D.’s credibility. The Department has failed to present clear and convincing evidence that Dr. McKenzie prescribed Lortab to K.D. outside the course of his professional practice.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order dismissing the Amended Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of May, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of May, 2018.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is and at all material times has been a licensed physician in the State of Florida. He holds license number ME 0029977. On August 7, 1984, Flo-Nita Spanogle and Mary Willis, investigators of Petitioner, conducted an inspection of Respondent's medical office at 5705 Hansel Avenue, Orlando, Florida. The following day, Ms. Spanogle inspected Respondent's medical office at 201 Hilda Street, Suite 38, Kissimmee, Florida. Respondent had not registered the Orlando or the Kissimmee office with the Drug Enforcement Administration. The Orlando office had only been open for about one week. However, the registration certificate for Respondent's previous Orlando office states clearly on the bottom in capital letters: "This certificate is not transferable on change of ownership, control, location, or business activity." Respondent maintained no biennial record of his stock of controlled substances and had no separate records of the receipt and disposal of controlled substances. Respondent maintained patient records that contained, among other things, copies of all prescriptions. Respondent never charged patients for drugs dispensed from his office. Ms. Spanogle found in the Orlando office about 20 containers of controlled substances. The only Schedule III controlled substances were six 1/2-ounce bottles of Hycomine, two Tylenol 3 tablets, two Fiorinal 2 tablets, 12 Fiorinal #3 tablets, and 18 tablets of Vicodin consisting of the remainder of an original prescription of 30 tablets issued by Respondent to Grady Lebbit on June 4, 1984. The remaining controlled substances were listed in Schedules IV and V. Those found in significant quantities were: 80 tablets of Valium (5 mg dosage), 70 tablets of Valium (10 mg dosage), 71 tablets of Valium (2 mg dosage), 40 capsules of Valrelease (15 mg dosage), 60 tablets of Xanex (0.25 mg dosage), 60 tablets of Xanex (0.3 mg dosage), 66 tablets of Dalmane (15 mg dosage), 42 tablets of Dalmane (30 mg dosage), 25 tablets of Limbitrol (varying dosages), 140 tablets of Equagesic (no reported dosage), 23 tablets of Halcion (0.25 ng dosage), five one-ounce bottles of Donnagel PG, and nine one-ounce bottles of Actifed with codeine. With the exception of the Vicodin, the controlled substances described in this paragraph were kept in the office for the purpose of dispensing to patients. Ms. Spanogle discovered in the Kissimmee office only one controlled substance, Valrelease, which is a time-release form of Valium. The total quantity consisted of only three physician's samples, each containing a single 15 mg dose. There is no evidence that the Valrelease was in the Kissimmee office for the purpose of dispensing to patients. None of the above-described controlled substances was kept in a securely locked, substantially constructed cabinet. The controlled substances kept in Orlando were in an unlocked room that was behind the receptionist. Ms. Spanogle confiscated from Respondent's Orlando office numerous legend drugs because they were kept in unmarked or unlabeled containers or bore labels that indicated that their expiration date had passed. With the exception of 18 tablets of Vicodin, none of these drugs was a controlled substance. These drugs were either office stock maintained by Respondent for the purpose of dispensing to his patients or were returned prescriptions from various of Respondent's patients. There was no evidence that Respondent dispensed drugs to other patients from the returned prescriptions. Ms. Spanogle seized the following Orlando office' stock: 297 capsules of Tetracycline contained in an unmarked ziplock plastic bag, eight one- and two-ounce bottles of Kwell lotion either unmarked or marked only with the name "Kwell," 16 tablets of Pyridium (100 mg dosage) with a label bearing an expiration date of February, 1981, 42 tablets of Catapres (0.3 mg dosage) with a label bearing only the drug name and dosage, 111 tablets of folic acid (1 mg dosage) with a label bearing only the drug name, 5 1/2 tablets of Inderal (40 mg dosage) with a label bearing only the drug name, five tablets of Sorbitrate Sublingual with a label bearing only the drug name, eight tablets of Urobiotic (250 mg dosage) with a label bearing only the drug name and dosage, nine tablets of Microdantin (100 mg dosage) with a label bearing only the drug name, 24 tablets of Dilantin (100 mg dosage) with a label bearing only the drug name, 62 tablets of Donnatal (30 mg dosage) with a label bearing only the drug name, 10 tablets of Orinase (250 mg dosage) with a label bearing only the drug name, and three tablets of Microdantin (200 mg dosage) with a label bearing only the drug name. Ms. Spanogle seized from the Orlando office 15 vials of returned prescriptions of legend drugs. None of these was a controlled substance except for a vial containing 18 tablets of Vicodin. All but two of the prescriptions had originally been written by Dr. Tandon. None of the vials, which were the original vials supplied to the patient from the pharmacy, bore a lot number or expiration date. There is no evidence that the returned prescriptions were kept for the purpose of dispensing to patients. Ms. Spanogle destroyed the three physician's samples of Valrelease, as well as three outdated legend drugs found in the office stock of the Kissimmee office. The outdated legend drugs, which were found in a refrigerator in the office, consisted of unreported quantities of Metromycin with an expiration date of April, 1984, Mycostatin vaginal tablets with an expiration date of October 1, 1980, and Permapen Isoject with an expiration date of January 8, 1984. On two occasions prior to the inspection, Respondent had written a prescription for an ampule of Demerol, which Respondent then administered to a patient during an office visit. Demerol is a Schedule II controlled substance. A legend drug is a drug that may be dispensed only by prescription. A controlled substance is a legend drug that is subject to additional regulation due to its potential for creating dependence. Controlled substances listed in Schedule I have the greatest potential for producing dependence. Controlled substances listed in Schedule V have the least potential for producing dependence. A legend drug whose expiration date has passed no longer bears the manufacturer's guaranty as to strength. Lot numbers of legend drugs are used to identify drugs that have been recalled by the manufacturer. Respondent was previously disciplined by Petitioner. By Final Order dated February 27, 1984, Petitioner found Respondent guilty of violating Section 458.331(1)(r), Florida Statutes, by unlawfully prescribing legend drugs to himself. The drugs in that case were Nembutal and Ritalin, which are Schedule II controlled substances. Petitioner imposed an administrative fine of $200 and placed Respondent on probation for a period of one month. He successfully completed the probationary period.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent Albert Sneij is a licensed medical physician, having been issued license number ME 0034499. The current office address of the Respondent is 125 Fifth Street, Miami Beach, Florida. Dr. John V. Handwerker, a licensed physician was the Petitioner's sole witness. Dr. Handwerker, who has served as an Assistant Professor of Pharmacology at the University of Miami, was requested by the Department to examine the patient records obtained from the Respondent during the course of a Department investigation, evaluate whether the prescriptions contained in the patient records were appropriate or excessive and whether such prescriptions were adequately documented in the patients' clinical records. Dr. Handwerker evaluated the Department's investigative file and the Respondent's clinical records, involving eight patients: Charles Thomas Whitecup, John Marsden, Carole Rosen, Thomas T. Bellamy, John Barbosa, Rex Bridwell, Thomas Sestito and Margaret Lee Baker. Dr. Handwerker's testimony was based solely on his review of the records since none of the patients involved in this case were seen or examined by him. Charles Whitecup's records revealed that he suffered an injury four years prior to his being prescribed Dilaudid by the Respondent. The injury was a gunshot wound to his left leg on which an exploratory laparotomy was subsequently performed. At that time it was discovered that the gunshot had torn the femoral artery and inflicted substantial nerve plexus damage. Upon examination of Whitecup, the Respondent noted weakness and atrophy in the left extremity and numbness in the anterior portion of his leg. Additionally, Whitecup suffered from bursitis in the knee with pain in the knee and patellar ligament. The Respondent diagnosed chronic left leg pain due to femoral nerve plexus damage and asked Whitecup to bring his medical records to his next appointment which as scheduled in ten days. Based on this diagnosis, the Respondent prescribed 30 Dilaudid, 4 milligrams. Thereafter, Whitecup lost his original prescription and a replacement prescription was issued on April 7, 1982. This was the only prescription which was filled and the only prescription recorded in the Respondent's clinical records for this patient. The records of this patient, Petitioner's Exhibit 1(a) and the Respondent's examination justify and document prescribing the Dilaudid for this patient. Additionally, Whitecup specifically requested that the Respondent prescribe Dilaudid since this was the only medication which relieved his chronic pain. John Marsden was issued a single prescription by the Respondent for Dilaudid, 4 milligrams, on March 8, 1982. Although no clinical records exist to justify this prescription, the Respondent remembered Marsden as suffering from a long-standing chronic pain problem. During the time that the Marsden prescription was written, the Respondent was in the process of moving his office and the clinical records for this patient were probably lost during the move. The Respondent wrote two prescriptions for 20 and 25 Dilaudid, 4 milligrams, to Carol Rosen on February 9, 1982 and March 8, 1982, respectively. Both prescriptions were written when the Respondent was located in his old office and like Marsden, were probably among the records lost in the course of moving offices. The Respondent has no recollection of this particular patient. 2/ In response to the missing Marsden and Rosen records, the Respondent has instituted a new record keeping system and detailed records for all patients are now kept. The Respondent wrote six prescriptions for Thomas Bellamy between March and May of 1982, for 171 Dilaudid, 4 milligrams. Bellamy suffered from back and neck spasms for nine years prior to his initial examination by the Respondent. He was Bellamy had ever obtained for pain was when he was prescribed Dilaudid. During a follow-up examination, the Respondent noted that Bellamy's activities were limited and that his pain was primarily centered in the lower back in the area of L-5, S-1, with occasional radiation to the left leg. The Respondent wanted to take an x-ray but did not because Bellamy was unwilling to incur the cost. Although six prescriptions were written by the Respondent based on only two examinations of the patient, the clinical records for Bellamy, Petitioner's Exhibit 1(d), and the Respondent's examinations of the patient justify and document the prescribing of Dilaudid for this patient. The Respondent examined John Barbosa on May 5,1982, and diagnosed an injured disc between L4-5 during the week prior to the exam. This patient demonstrated spinal spasms during the exam with limited mobility. A single prescription of 36 tablets of Dilaudid, 4 milligrams, was written for the patient. This proscription was justified and documented by the clinical records, Petitioner's Exhibit 1(e) and the examination performed by the Respondent on the patient. In January, 1982, the Respondent first examined Rex Bridwell, a double knee amputee. Bridwell consulted the Respondent due to a vascular disease which caused grangrene and resulted in the amputations. Bridwell's legs had not healed and ulcerous lesions were visual at the amputation sites. Bridwell, who had been unsuccessfully treated for the previous six years, was understandably in a great deal of distress and pain as a result of his condition. The Respondent prescribed painkillers, antibiotics, vitamins and discussed with Bridwell alternative therapy including, prayer, hypnosis and meditation. Bridwell was subsequently examined by the Respondent on February 2, 1982 and March 4, 1982. The Respondent prescribed Tuinal on March 3, 1982, 30 tablets, 3 grams; and Dilaudid on March 23, 1982, 40 tablets, 4 milligrams and April 8, 1982, 24 tablets, 4 milligrams, for Bridwell. These drugs were prescribed for Bridwell's severe pain. Bridwell's clinical record, Petitioner's Exhibit 1(f), and the examinations performed by the Respondent demonstrate that these prescriptions were justified and documented. 3/ On January 26, 1982, the Respondent examined Thomas Sestito, a carpenter, who came to the Respondent complaining of severe back aches which resulted from his falling off a roof in 1979 and subsequently reinjuring his back. X-rays from Baptist Hospital confirmed that Sestito suffered a facture at L2. Sestito's pain was at L4 and LB and radiated into his right thigh. The Respondent diagnosed sciatica and prescribed a total of 70 Dilaudid, 4 milligrams, on January 27, 1982, March 7, 1982 and March 11, 1982 and 30 Tuinal, 200 milligrams, on February 10, 1982. 4/ The prescribing of Dilaudid in this case was justified and is documented by the patient's clinical record, Petitioner's Exhibit 1(g) and the Respondent's examination on January 26, 1982. Finally, the Administrative Complaint charges the Respondent with unlawfully prescribing Dilaudid on April 8, 9 and 14, 1982 to Lee Baker. The clinical record, Petitioner's Exhibit 1(h), indicates that two of these prescriptions were written to "Margaret Baker" and only the April 9, 1982, prescription was written to "Lee Baker." Although Margaret Baker's middle name is "Lee", insufficient testimony was introduced to establish that all three prescriptions were written for the same person. Additionally, the Petitioner did not attempt to amend the Administrative Complaint prior to hearing to conform the allegations contained in the Complaint to the evidence which was to be introduced at final hearing. Accordingly, only the prescription written on April 9, 1982, to Lee Baker is relevant to the allegations contained in Counts 29-32 of the Administrative Complaint. Due to the lack of certainty that "Margaret Lee Baker" and "Lee Baker" are the same person, it follows that the clinical record introduced at final hearing, Petitioner's Exhibit 1(h), might contain two sets of records or one set of incomplete records. Under such circumstances, the Petitioner has failed to prove through the introduction of the clinical record of Margaret Lee Baker, that the Respondent unjustifiably prescribed controlled drugs or kept inadequate records concerning Lee Baker.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Petitioner Board of Medical Examiners enter a Final Order finding the Respondent Sneij guilty of violating Counts 8 and 12 of the Administrative Complaint, not guilty of violating the remaining counts, and placing him on probation for three months subject to the condition that the Respondent demonstrate to the Board of Medical Examiners the adequacy of his present medical record keeping system prior to the end of this period. DONE and ORDERED this 29th day of September, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September, 1983.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to the validation and scoring of his test scores on the Florida Educational Leadership Examination on January 21, 2006.
Findings Of Fact On January 21, 2006, Petitioner took the Florida Educational Leadership Examination (FELE) at a site in Miami. Persons who take and pass the FELE are eligible for certification as administrators. As is the case with all persons taking the FELE, prior to attending the examination, Petitioner received the "Certification Examinations for Florida Educators . . . Registration Bulletin" (Registration Bulletin). The Registration Bulletin warns prominently on page 14: I understand that examinees cannot bring any electronic communication or recording device, including a cellular phone, beeper, personal digital assistant (PDA) such as a Palm Pilot, or listening device such as a compact disc or tape player, into the testing room or break areas around the testing room. Prior to taking the FELE, Petitioner also received a document titled, "Important Information about Cheating Behaviors" (Booklet). Section 1 of the Booklet warns that "cheating" is defined as, among other things: "During the examination, using, or attempting to use, prohibited aids, as identified in Section 2." Section 2 of the Booklet describes "prohibited aids" as follows: You cannot bring any of the following prohibited aids to the test room. They include: cell phones or any other electronic communication or recording device such as a beeper, personal digital assistant (PDA) such as a Palm Pilot, or listening device such as a compact disc or tape player. . . . The last section of the Booklet is titled, "General Testing Information and Procedures." This section warns: "If you bring any prohibited items such as a cell phone to the test, you will not be admitted to the test room." The second to last page of the Booklet restates: "I understand that examinees cannot bring any electronic communication or recording device, including a cellular phone, beeper, personal digital assistant (PDA) such as a Palm Pilot, or listening device such as a compact disc or tape player, into the testing room or break areas around the testing room." Paragraph 4 of the last page of the Booklet warns one last time: "Do not bring to the test room any prohibited aids such as cell phones (see the enclosed letter for other prohibited aids); leave them locked in your car. You will not be admitted to the test if you bring them with you. If you are discovered to have prohibited aids during the test, your test scores may be invalidated." Test administrators, room supervisors, and proctors receive a Test Administration Manual for the Florida Educational Leadership Examination. Page 17 of the manual advises that the examinees receive several warnings not to bring prohibited aids, including cell phone, into the test room or break areas around the test room. The manual informs the testing staff: DO NOT ADMIT an examinee to a test room if you observe a cell phone or other prohibited device. Tell the examinee he or she cannot enter with the device but may be admitted if he or she can return without it (e.g., lock it in the car) AS LONG AS IT IS POSSIBLE TO DO SO AND RETURN TO CHECK IN BY THE TIMETESTING BEGINS (15 minutes after the reporting time on the admission ticket). The manual adds: If the prohibited aid is not discovered until after the examinee has been admitted to the test room, see Identifying and Documenting Suspected Cheating, incident number 1 on the next page. The manual lists three incidents, arranged in ascending order of seriousness. These incidents and the appropriate procedures for the testing staff are: Incident: It is discovered that an examinee has a prohibited device, SUCH AS A CELL PHONE, but the examinee is not immediately suspected of using the device (e.g., a cell phone rings and the examinee turns it off without using it). PROCEDURE: ? Quietly inform the examinee that he or she is in possession of a prohibited aid, which the examinee has been informed is not permitted in the test room. ? Tell the examinee to place the aid in the envelope that has been provided by the Institute for that purpose and write the examinee's name on the envelope. ? Hold the envelope in a safe location. ? Tell the examinee that the item may be retrieved at the end of the test. ? If the examinee refuses to relinquish the prohibited device, follow MISCONDUCT guidelines on page 21. ? Carefully document the incident, noting the time and duration of the incident, for inclusion in the irregularity reports, C-1 and C-2. Attach the answer folder to the C-1 irregularity report. Incident: An examinee is observed USING a prohibited aid, such as a cell phone or photographic device, to obtain or communicate test content either in the test room or in break areas around the test room. PROCEDURE: ? If the Room Supervisor does not observe the event, notify him or her immediately; at least two testing staff must observe and document in writing the behavior and one of them must be the Room Supervisor. ? NOTIFY THE TEST ADMINISTRATOR IMMEDIATELY. If the examinee is to be dismissed during the test, the Administrator should do the dismissal, if available to do so. ? The Room Supervisor should quietly inform the examinee that his or her test is being stopped because of the prohibited aid and ask him or her to step outside the room. The Room Supervisor should take along and protect the test materials and prohibited aid. ? The prohibited device should be examined to determine if there is the possibility that confidential test information was recorded (for example, if the device is a scanner pen or if a cell phone has a lens device). If so, document that information on the C-2, Cheating and Misconduct Observation Report. DO NOT ATTEMPT TO CONFISCATE THE DEVICE. ? If the examinee hides the device, ask him or her to produce it, but do not touch the examinee. ? The Administrator should inform the examinee that he or she is being dismissed from the test. If asked what will happen next, say only that the Department of Education will provide further information. ? Carefully document the incident, noting the time and duration of the incident, on the irregularity reports, C-1 and C-2. Attach the answer folder to the C-1 irregularity report. ? If the examinee causes a disturbance, such as refusing to leave or return test materials, see MISCONDUCT guidelines on page 21. Incident: An examinee is SEEN WITH A "CHEAT SHEET" OR IS OBSERVED USING NOTES OR OTHER WRITTEN MATERIALS to obtain information or pass information to another examinee. PROCEDURE: ? If the Room Supervisor does not observe the event, notify him or her immediately; at least two testing staff must observe and document in writing the behavior and one of them must be the Room Supervisor. ? NOTIFY THE TEST ADMINISTRATOR IMMEDIATELY. If the examinee is to be dismissed during the test, the Administrator should do the dismissal, if available to do so. ? The Room Supervisor should quietly inform the examinee that his or her test is being stopped because of the written notes and ask him or her to step outside the room, taking the test materials and written notes with you. ? The notes should be examined. CONFISCATE THE NOTES. If the examinee hides the notes, ask him or her to produce it, but do not touch the examinee. ? The Administrator should inform the examinee that he or she is being dismissed from the test. If asked what will happen next, say only that the Department of Education will provide further information. ? Carefully document the incident, noting the time and duration of the incident, on the irregularity reports, C-1 and C-2. Attach the confiscated notes and answer folder to the C-1 irregularity report. Respondent's exhibit omits page 21 of the manual, which contains the "misconduct guidelines. The only other relevant provision in the portion of the manual included in the exhibit provides that the Room Supervisor should greet the examinees with a scripted introduction. This introduction includes the warning: "Cell phones, books, study aids, calculators, electronic devices, and papers of any kind, including scratch paper, are NOT permitted during the testing." The Room Supervisor posted in a prominent place at the front of the test room a notice, in large print, stating: "cell phones are prohibited in test rooms and surrounding break areas." Petitioner could not possibly have avoided seeing the notice, which was printed on yellow paper, prior to starting subpart one of the FELE. Although Petitioner arrived at the test room in time for the commencement of subpart one of the FELE, he was late enough that he missed some of the pretest instructions. As he entered the test room, he was wearing an earpiece, which communicates with his cell phone by way of Bluetooth wireless technology, provided the cell phone is sufficiently close to the earpiece. As Petitioner walked past the Room Supervisor to take a chair in the test room, the Room Supervisor immediately noticed the ear piece and recognized it as a Bluetooth device, which would allow for wireless, remote communication with a cell phone. The Room Supervisor informed Petitioner that he needed to remove the device, but Petitioner replied only that he would turn it off. Lacking much time for an extended exchange with Petitioner, the Room Supervisor joked that such devices cause cancer and directed one of the proctors to help Petitioner complete the registration application. By the time that Petitioner had entered the test room, the Room Supervisor had already given the instructions on how to complete the registration application. As Petitioner was taking his seat, the Room Supervisor began giving the instructions on how to take the test. For some reason, Respondent introduced into the record a registration application of Petitioner for the October 22, 2005, administration of the FELE. However, Petitioner likely completed the same form for the January 21, 2006, administration of the test. The form states, just above the examinee's signature: "I hereby agree to the conditions set forth in the Registration Bulletin " At least partly due to Petitioner's late arrival, the group in his room was late starting the test, which was being administered simultaneously in several separate rooms at this test center. A few minutes after starting the test, the Test Supervisor was told by the proctor, who had attended to Petitioner, that Petitioner still had the earpiece in his ear. The Room Supervisor informed the proctor to summon the Test Administrator to handle the situation. The Test Administrator entered the room a few minutes later and saw the Bluetooth earpiece in Petitioner's ear while he was taking subpart one of the FELE. During the next break, the Test Administrator approached Petitioner and told him he could not use the Bluetooth earpiece during the test. Petitioner responded that the device was off and other examinees had cell phones in their pockets and purses. The Test Administrator offered to take the device up to his office. Petitioner refused to relinquish the device. After considerable coaxing, Petitioner finally agreed to remove the device during the next two subparts of the test. By letter dated March 1, 2006, Respondent informed Petitioner that it was invalidating his scores on subtest one, and thus subtests two and three, of the Florida Educational Leadership Examination (FELE) administered on January 21, 2006. The letter states that several witnesses had seen Petitioner, during subtest one, wearing in his ear an earpiece of a cell phone. There is no doubt that the Room Supervisor would have allowed Petitioner to take all three subparts of the FELE, if Petitioner had agreed to the simple request to remove his Bluetooth earpiece. Petitioner tried to justify his intransigence by contending that his earpiece was off and other examinees had cell phones in their pockets or purses. Evidently Petitioner was unaware on the morning of the test that his choice was to remove the earpiece before starting the test or take the test with the earpiece in and have all of his scores invalidated. Petitioner chose the second option, so Respondent properly invalidated all of his scores.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Education enter a final order invalidating Petitioner's scores on subparts one, two, and three of the Florida Educational Leadership Examination administered on January 21, 2006. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of June, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Lynn Abbott, Agency Clerk Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Daniel J. Woodring, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Honorable John L. Winn Commissioner of Education Department of Education Turlington Building Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Scott J. Odenbach Department of Education 1244 Turlington Building 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 John Roques 17475 Southwest 182 Avenue Miami, Florida 33187
The Issue The remaining issue in this case is whether the Petitioner, the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, should impose an administrative fine on the Respondent, Tight-Grip International, Inc. (Tight-Grip).
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Tight-Grip International, Inc., sells a chemical designed to prevent hard mineral surfaces from being slippery when wet. Tight- Grip sells the product through distributors. Together with the product itself, it sells kits to enable and help its distributors to sell the product to the ultimate consumers. The kit includes materials needed to install the product, form contracts, brochures, a training video and a training manual. It also includes a license to use the trademark "Tight-Grip," which Tight-Grip had registered with the federal government on or about April 15, 1991. The training manual is devoted largely to the actual application of the product, but it also includes a section entitled "How To Land Business." It essentially provides instruction and hints to the distributor on how to sell the product to potential customers. It describes "The Flyer Method," "The Curiosity Method," "The Door Prize Method," "The Free Sample Method," and "The Referral Method" for "landing" residential business. It then describes the "strictly confidential" "trade secret secret" "Method #5" for "landing" commercial business, to be used, in conjunction with "rote training cards," only for training "licensed dealers." Tight-Grip sells its product and solicits distributors in various ways, including participation in trade shows. It utilizes an advertising brochure entitled "There's a Revolution Under Foot 21 Century Technology TODAY." Part of the brochure offers the following answers to "Frequently Asked Questions": Q. How do I market TIGHT-GRIP? A. The public already knows that hard mineral surfaces are treacherous when wet. What they don't know is that there is a solution. TIGHT-GRIP has developed a number of successful methods to bring this fact to their attention. Direct mail, cold calling, telemarketing, trade shows, and organizations all work when implemented correctly. When asked by prospective distributors how one markets the Tight-Grip product, Tight-Grip representatives respond that "it sells itself, you just have to demonstrate it." In addition, prospective distributors are told that the company provides marketing training in its training manuals and provides advertising brochures. Prospective distributors are not told that the company provides "a sales program or a marketing program." It is found that Tight-Grip does not offer its distributors a "sales program" or a "marketing program." Nor is it found that Tight-Grip has a "sales program" or a "marketing program." Tight-Grip has participated in between four and six trade shows in Florida. One such trade show occurred on January 16, 1994. The usual representations were made to a Department representative. The Department decided that Tight-Grip was representing that it provides "a sales program or a marketing program" and that it was offering to sell business opportunities without an advertising identification number and, in all likelihood, was selling business opportunities although it had no approved disclosure statement to give prospective buyers, in violation of the law. Having been notified by the Department that it was in violation of the law, Tight-Grip filed registration materials with the Department on or about March 8, 1994, in order to continue to solicit prospective Tight-Grip distributors, and contract with them, without the risk of additional violations. (Tight-Grip always has maintained that it does not sell "business opportunities" and is not required to have an advertising identification number or to provide prospective buyers with an approved disclosure statement.) On or about March 10, 1994, the Department filed a Complaint to require Tight-Grip to cease and desist from allegedly violating the law by offering to sell business opportunities without an advertising identification number and by selling business opportunities although it had no approved disclosure statement to give prospective buyers. The Complaint also sought to impose an administrative fine. In order to continue to solicit prospective Tight-Grip distributors, and contract with them, without the risk of additional violations, Tight-Grip filed registration materials with the Department on or about March 8, 1994. (Tight-Grip continues to maintain that it does not sell "business opportunities" and is not required to have an advertising identification number or to provide prospective buyers with an approved disclosure statement.) On or about March 23, 1994, the Department approved the materials and issued Tight-Grip an advertising identification number. Tight-Grip entered into approximately 100 distributorship agreements before receiving an advertising identification number. It did not provide those distributors with an approved disclosure statement. The evidence was not clear as to how many of the distributors are in Florida.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order dismissing the Complaint. RECOMMENDED this 11th day of July, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of July, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-1860 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1991), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Accepted and incorporated. Subordinate to facts contrary to those found. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected as contrary to facts found and as conclusion of law that it was a "business opportunity." Also, rejected as contrary to facts found that Tom represented that "each investment included a sales/marketing training program." (Rather, found that he said training included instruction on how to sell and market the product.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 5.-7. Accepted and incorporated. Conclusion of law. Contrary to facts found. Accepted and incorporated. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. 11.-12. Accepted and incorporated. 13. Conclusion of law and contrary to facts found that Florida law required disclosure statements to be provided. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Accepted and incorporated. Subordinate and argument. In part, conclusion of law. Rejected that Harris's was "the only credible testimony before the hearing officer." In part, accepted and subordinate to facts found. In part, subordinate to facts found (there is no "sales or marketing program.") In part, subordinate to facts contrary to those found (that Tight- Grip "only provides some demonstration and promotional materials.") Accepted and incorporated. COPIES FURNISHED: Jay S. Levenstein, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Thomas E. Parnell, Esquire 508 W. Fletcher Avenue, Suite #105 Tampa, Florida 33612 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue The issue is whether the medical license of Respondent, Elizer F. Castro, M.D., should be revoked or otherwise penalized based on the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint. The Petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical Examiners, (DPR) presented the testimony of David F. Scales, M.D., John E. Danson, and Steven J. Clark, M.D. Petitioner's Exhibits 1-3 were admitted in evidence. Respondent presented his own testimony and that of Melvin Greer, M.D., by deposition. Respondent's Exhibit 1 was admitted in evidence. DPR recalled John E. Danson for rebuttal. The transcript of the proceedings was filed on November 2, 1987. The deposition of Melvin Greer, M.D., was filed on November 24, 1987. The parties agreed that they would file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law within ten days following the filing of the Greer deposition. DPR filed its proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on December 4, 1987. Respondent's proposed order was filed on December 11, 1987, and is therefore untimely. It has not been considered. The proposed findings of fact submitted by DPR have been considered and a specific ruling on each proposed finding of fact is made in the Appendix attached hereto and made a part of this Recommended Order.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant, Elizer F. Castro, M.D., was a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 0029506. Dr. Castro treated a patient, A.S., from May 9, 1983, to September 23, 1986. Dr. Castro treated A.S. for narcolepsy. A.S. was formerly treated by David Scales, M.D., of Jacksonville, Florida. Dr. Scales, a neurologist, treated A.S. for narcolepsy from December 16, 1982, until March or April, 1983. At that time, Dr. Scales discontinued treatment because he had received outside information that A.S. was a known drug dealer. Narcolepsy is a sleep disorder in which the patient has an uncontrollable urge to fall asleep at inappropriate times. Diagnosis of narcolepsy can only be made through a patient history and patient information regarding symptoms, past illnesses, past physicians, prior medications, sleep patterns and the existence of features associated with the disease such as cataplexy, nightmares and sleep paralysis. According to Dr. Castro, he took such a patient's history and performed a complete physical examination during the first visit by A.S. on May 9, 1983. Dr. Castro also asserted that he called Dr. Scales' office immediately following the first visit with A.S. and was advised by the physician's assistant that A.S. had been treated by Dr. Scales for narcolepsy. However, Dr. Castro's medical records, including the patient information sheet, do not contain any documentation of the history, specific examination results, or the phone calls to Dr. Scales' office. The first page of the medical records regarding A.S. which is entitled "Patient Information" reflects information regarding tests which were done on August 5, 1983, at Jacksonville Memorial Medical Center following involvement of A.S. in an automobile accident. Clearly this information was not given to Dr. Castro during the first visit of May 9, 1983 (despite Dr. Castro's testimony to the contrary), because these tests were not even done until three months after the first visit. Hence, these tests cannot be relied on by Dr. Castro to support his clinical diagnosis of narcolepsy because the tests postdate the diagnosis and because Dr. Castro never sought copies of the test results. Both Dr. Clark, DPR's expert, and Dr. Greer, Dr. Castro's expert, expressed the opinion that the medical records maintained by Dr. Castro failed to reflect an adequate history upon which to make the clinical diagnosis of narcolepsy. It is also important to perform certain tests in order to rule out other etiologies or problems which can complicate or confuse a physician in the diagnosis of narcolepsy. Here, Dr. Castro's records do not reflect any such testing prior to Dr. Castro's diagnosis of narcolepsy in A.S. In diagnosing narcolepsy in A.S., Dr. Castro acknowledged that his diagnosis was based on the representations of A.S. that he had narcolepsy and had been treated in the past for narcolepsy. Dr. Castro also stated that he did a physical examination, took an extensive patient history, and spoke to Dr. Scales' office for confirmation of the narcolepsy diagnosis. Dr. Castro did not record any of this in the patient records. Dr. Castro treated A.S. for narcolepsy by prescribing Preludin, 75 milligrams, three times per day. A.S. told Dr. Castro that that was medication he had been receiving and that was the dosage he had been receiving form Dr. Scales. In order to follow A.S. on this medication, Dr. Castro began by prescribing 45 tablets for a fifteen day supply. Dr. Castro saw A.S. at fifteen day intervals for the first few visits in order to monitor his progress and to examine him for side effects. Only after assuring himself that the dosage was correct and any side effects were being effectively managed, did Dr. Castro began prescribing the Preludin on a monthly basis. After November, 1983, Dr. Castro saw A.S. on a monthly basis to monitor his medication. Preludin is the brand name for phenmetrazine hydrochloride, which is a sympathomimetic amine and Schedule II controlled substance. The Physician's Desk Reference (PDR) is compiled by drug companies and contains data on all drugs, including indications for use, contraindications, adverse side effects, and recommended dosages. The PDR states that the maximum safe dose of Preludin is one 75 milligram tablet per day. The PDR also reflects that Preludin is contraindicated with hypertension. Dr. Castro was treating A.S. for hypertension. While Dr. Castro was prescribing Preludin in dosages beyond those set forth in the PDR, his prescription was not inappropriate. According to Dr. Greer, prescribing Preludin three times a day is a dosage that would be within a medically safe range and would be within the range appropriate within a physician's professional practice. Additionally, that prescription and dosage, being monitored on a monthly basis for side effects, would be within the range of sound medical practice. The dosage prescribed by Dr. Castro is also within the appropriate range that would be used on a patient of this type who had hypertension, as long as the physician also follows the hypertension. Here, Dr. Castro prescribed medication for A.S.'s hypertension and, according to Dr. Greer, that medication and treatment was appropriate. Dr. Castro's records reflect that A.S. was not referred for any consultations with other specialists until November 20, 1986. According to Dr. Greer, waiting two and one-half years to refer a patient for consultation with a neurologist to confirm the diagnosis of narcolepsy would be inappropriate unless the doctor had gotten additional information to confirm the diagnosis. Here, Dr. Castro asserts that he did receive additional information in the form of telephone confirmation by Dr. Scales' physician's assistant which confirmed the diagnosis of narcolepsy. Dr. Castro did not record this in his medical records. Dr. Castro practiced medicine within the community standard in his diagnosis and treatment of A.S. His failure was in the lack of documentation throughout his treatment of A.S.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical Examiners, enter a Final Order, and therein: Dismiss Counts II, III, IV, and V of the Administrative Complaint. Find Elizer F. Castro, M.D., guilty of violating Section 458.331(1)(n), Florida Statutes, as set forth in Count I of the Administrative Complaint. Assess a fine in the amount of five hundred ($500) dollars. Order Elizer F. Castro, M.D., to attend and complete continuing medical education in the area of record keeping. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of December, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of December, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-4106 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1(1); 2(2); 3(2); 4(3); 5(4); 6 & 7(5-7); 8(7); 9(8); 10(8); 14(10); 15(11); 16(11); 17(11); and 18(12). Proposed findings of fact 11, 12, 13, and 19-23 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Ray Shope, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Clyde E. Wolfe, Esquire 1 Corporation Square, Suite B-10 St. Augustine, Florida 32086 Tom Gallagher, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 =================================================================
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent failed to maintain the good moral character requisite to continued certification as a Correctional Probation Officer in violation of Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is James C. Norman, holder of Correctional Probation Certificate 152252. Respondent was employed in the capacity of correctional officer at the Union Correctional Institute. Bruce M. Fitzgerald, personnel manager at Union Correctional Institute, supervises drug screening of correctional officers at the Institute. Fitzgerald set up a drug screen to be administered to Respondent on October 16, 1995. Respondent came to Fitzgerald’s office on that date where Fitzgerald explained the process to Respondent, provided Respondent with a chain of custody form bearing specimen identification number 09A664423, and obtained Respondent’s signature on a Employee Drug Testing Notice. Respondent was instructed to go to Bradford Hospital in Starke, Florida for the collection of his urine sample and submission of that urine sample for the drug screening process. Pamela Langham, a licensed practical nurse for the past 20 years, was working on October 16, 1995, in the Acute Care Office at Bradford Hospital where obtaining specimens for drug screening was a part of her duties. On October 16, 1995, Langham received from Respondent the chain of custody form bearing specimen identification number 09A664423. Langham then followed standard protocol in obtaining Respondent’s urine sample by having Respondent empty his pockets, turn the pockets inside out, take off any loose fitting garments, wash his hands and clean his fingernails, and remove his footwear. Langham then had Respondent go into the restroom and obtain his urine specimen in a container. Respondent returned from the restroom with the container where Langham then gave Respondent the lid for the container. The specimen container was then sealed in Respondent’s presence. Langham had Respondent sign the specimen container. The container was then sealed in a plastic bag upon which Respondent placed his initials. Respondent’s specimen container was then refrigerated for later pick up by a courier and transportation to the laboratory in Tampa, Florida, for analysis. Langham completed a portion of the chain of custody form number 09A664423 which was sent along with the specimen to the laboratory. Michael Dean Miller, an expert in the field of forensic chemistry, is the toxicology manager and records custodian at the laboratory where Respondent’s specimen was received. The laboratory is certified by the State of Florida and nationally accredited by the College of American Pathologists. At the final hearing, Miller presented the documents prepared in the reception and testing of specimen number 09A664423. Respondent’s specimen was received in a sealed package by Enoris Moore at the laboratory on October 16, 1995. The specimen seal was intact and bore no indication that the specimen had been contaminated in any way. The specimen was analyzed and handled in accordance with the requirements of the laboratory and the State of Florida. Respondent’s specimen was tested in accordance with standard and accepted procedures in the industry. The specimen was examined by Mark Bartalini. The specimen tested positive for the presence of cocaine metabolite. Compared to a minimum cut off for testing for drug presence in urine of 150 nanograms, Respondent’s urine sample contained 11,649 nanograms which is considered a high level. This result indicated the actual presence of cocaine metabolite in Respondent’s system. Respondent denied usage of any other compound which may have affected the level of cocaine metabolite found to exist in his urine sample. His additional denial of cocaine consumption prior to the collection of his urine sample is not credited.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent guilty of failure to maintain good moral character as required by Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, and revoking his certification. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of May, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W.DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 488-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul D. Johnston, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302-1489 James C. Norman Post Office Box 651 Raiford, FL 32083 Michael Ramage, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302
