Findings Of Fact Petitioner applied for certification as a physician assistant by application dated June 29, 1991. Under the statutory scheme regulating physician assistants, in certain circumstances, the Board of Medicine may grant temporary certification to applicants for licensure. The temporary certification is good only until the applicant receives notice of the applicant's scores received on the first available examination. At its meeting of October 30 through November 1, 1992, the Board approved Petitioner for temporary certification contingent upon his completion of specified requirements prior to such temporary certification and his completion of 25 hours of continuing medical education after issuance of such certification. Petitioner completed the specified requirements for issuance of the temporary certification and was issued a temporary certificate. Petitioner was so notified by letter dated October 4, 1993. Petitioner was first notified of the need to pay a required fee for the licensure examination by letter dated February 27, 1993. That letter set forth that the fee must be paid by March 31, 1993. Petitioner did not pay the fee by that deadline. On June 8, 1993, Petitioner was notified that the deadline for payment of the required examination fee had been moved to June 25, 1993. The extension had been given because the Board was still involved with processing applications for this special licensure program. Petitioner did not pay the fee by that deadline. On October 11, 1993, Petitioner was sent another letter notifying him that the deadline had been extended once again. This time the deadline was set for November 15, 1993. The notice sent to Petitioner specified three times that the required examination fee must be received in the office of the Board by November 15, 1993. It specifically informed Petitioner that a postmark of November 15, 1993, would not be sufficient. Furthermore, the notice informed Petitioner that if he failed to submit the required examination fee in a timely fashion, he would not be eligible to take the licensure examination. Although Petitioner testified that he was confused with regard to when the required fee could be sent, it was established that he could read the letter and that he understood that his failure to timely pay the examination fee would result in his not being permitted to take the licensure examination. Petitioner did not have the money for the required examination fee until November 14, 1993. Petitioner mailed the examination fee from Miami to the Board office in Tallahassee by certified United States mail on November 15, 1993. Although Petitioner testified that he believed the fee would be delivered the same day or the next day, Petitioner did not use any type of special delivery to provide same day or next day delivery at the Board's office. The fee submitted by Petitioner in the form of three Travelers Express Company checks was received in the Board's office on December 22, 1993. Petitioner did not submit the required examination fee in a timely manner for any of the three deadlines set by the Board. With the exception of one case involving an applicant with a heart condition, the Board has uniformly denied any request for the late payment of the required examination fee. If he does not take and pass the first available licensure examination, Petitioner will not be able to receive his permanent certification as a physician assistant. The licensure examination for persons in Petitioner's category has not yet been given by the Board. Therefore, none of the applicants for certification as physician assistants through this special licensure program have yet been tested.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that Petitioner is not eligible to take the physician assistant examination and that Petitioner's temporary certification is null and void. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of February, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of February, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-4, 7-9, and 13 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 5 has been rejected as being irrelevant. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 6 has been rejected as being subordinate. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 10-12 have been rejected as being not supported by any evidence. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-17 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 18 has been rejected as not constituting a finding of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Allen R. Grossman, Esquire Office of the Attorney General PL-01, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Alexander J. Alfano, Esquire 45 Southwest 9th Avenue Miami, Florida 33130 Dr. Marm Harris, Executive Director Agency for Health Care Administration, Board of Medicine 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Tom Wallace, Assistant Director Agency for Health Care Administration, Board of Medicine 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner in violation of Section 760.10 et. seq., Florida Statutes, as set forth in Petitioner's Petition for Relief filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) and, if so, the penalties that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a female African-American who has completed medical school. On March 19, 1997, Petitioner completed an "Application for Residency," seeking to participate in Respondent's clinical anesthesiology residency program. That program is operated in conjunction with the Public Health Trust. Applicants selected to participate in the residency program become employees of Respondent. The terms and conditions of employment are subject to the policies of both Respondent and the Public Health Trust. Petitioner's application to participate in the residency program related that she had completed an internship at University of Maryland/Harbor Hospital (Harbor) and two years of anesthesiology residency at King/Drew University, Los Angles (King). Petitioner signed the application on March 19, 1997. On April 30, 1997, Petitioner submitted an "Application for Graduate Medical Education at the Jackson Memorial Medical Center" that required her to "list chronologically your activities from time of graduation from Medical School to present. Specify type of post graduate training if any." Petitioner listed the internship at Harbor and the residency at King. She signed the application under the declaration: "I hereby declare that I have examined this application; and to the best of my knowledge and belief, it is true, correct, and complete." Petitioner was accepted into Respondent's clinical anesthesiology residency program based, in part, on the information reflected in the foregoing applications. That acceptance created an employee/employer relationship between Petitioner and Respondent. On July 17, 1997, Petitioner submitted a completed "Personnel Form" to Respondent. The Personnel Form required her to disclose all her activities since her completion of medical school. On that form Petitioner listed her previous internship at Harbor and her previous residency training at King. She verified it was correct to the best of her knowledge and signed the form. At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Dr. Brian Craythorne was a Professor of Medicine at the University of Miami and the Chairman of Respondent's Department of Anesthesiology. Dr. Craythorne had supervisory responsibility for Petitioner and was instrumental in selecting her to participate in the residency program. In April 1998, Dr. Craythorne received routine information from the American Board of Anesthesiology (ABA) setting forth the number of hours of training from other anesthesiology residency programs for which each resident participating in Respondent's residency program had received credit. The information from the ABA also set forth the number of hours of training for which each resident had received no credit. From that information, Dr. Craythorne learned that Petitioner had a total of 39 hours of residency training in anesthesiology from other programs for which she had received no credit. Three of the 39 hours of training for which she had no training were at King, which was reflected on her application and related paperwork. The training at King is not an issue in this proceeding. The additional 36 hours of residency training for which she received no credit was from Howard Hospital. 1/ The program at Howard, which was equivalent to a three-year program, was not reflected on any application or related document Petitioner submitted to Respondent before April 1998. Petitioner's failure to disclose her participation in the residency program at Howard was intentional. Petitioner's failure to disclose her participation in the residency program at Howard violated the clear policies of both Respondent and the Public Health Trust that require applications and related documents to be truthful, correct, and complete. Dr. Craythorne confronted Petitioner about the foregoing omissions in her applications and associated paperwork. In response, Petitioner submitted a letter dated May 27, 1998, in which she tried to explain why she did not obtain credit at Howard and why she had not divulged that information to Respondent. Petitioner asserted that she had sued Howard and had subsequently settled the litigation with instructions from her attorney that she could not discuss the litigation. 2/ Petitioner's letter of May 27, 1998, was not satisfactory to Dr. Craythorne. On June 3, 1998, Dr. Craythorne issued to Petitioner a "Disciplinary Action Report" (DAR) advising he was recommending that Petitioner be dismissed from the residency program (thereby terminating her employment with Respondent). The grounds for the action were her violation of Respondent's policies by making a false statement or statements on her application for employment and related documents and her violation of Public Health Trust Policy #305 pertaining to falsifying records or any other record of the Trust. Referencing Respondent's Department of Anesthesiology, the DAR also contained the following: Our department's recruiting and hiring practices . . . includes a policy/practice not to accept residents [sic] who have had more than one prior anesthesia residency experience for the clinical anesthesia years 1 through 3. [3/]] On June 29, 1998, Dr. Craythorne wrote a letter to Petitioner terminating her employment on the grounds set forth in the DAR. The termination letter advised Petitioner that she could request the Senior Vice President for Medical Affairs (Dr. Gerard A. Kaiser) to review the decision to terminate her participation. The letter also advised Petitioner that "[u]nless the Senior Vice President rescinds the proposed action, it will become effective following his review and decision." On July 21, 1998, Dr. Kaiser advised Petitioner that he had reviewed the facts surrounding her termination and agreed with the termination decision. Consistent with her rights pursuant to the applicable collective bargaining agreement, Petitioner requested and received a hearing before the Peer Review Committee, which was composed of other participants in the anesthesiology residency program. On December 1, 1998, the Peer Review Committee issued its report upholding Petitioner's termination for the reasons cited by Dr. Craythorne. On December 23, 1998, Ira C. Clark, president of the Public Health Trust, advised Petitioner that he had upheld her dismissal based on his review of the Peer Review Committee's findings and recommendation. Petitioner thereafter filed a grievance pursuant to her collective bargaining rights. On October 21, 1999, an evidentiary hearing was conducted before an arbitrator. On November 1, 1999, the arbitrator entered his Opinion and Award upholding Petitioner's termination of employment. Petitioner thereafter filed a complaint of discrimination with the FCHR on or about March 27, 2000. The gravamen of the complaint was that Respondent fired her in retaliation for her complaint to Dr. Craythorne that another resident had made a derogatory racial comment towards her. On December 10, 2001, the FCHR entered a determination of "no cause," determining that there was no cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice had occurred. On January 14, 2002, Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from an unlawful employment practice with the FCHR. The Petition alleged the following facts in support of her claim of discrimination: On April 1, 1998, a racial remark was made to me by Dr. Kirsten O'Neal, which was, "we know how lazy you Blacks are." I reported it (the statement) to Dr. Craythorne and Dr. Brindle, as well as in writing (copies are in my file). Dr. Craythorne asked me if I had any witnesses, I said yes. The following month they decided to investigate my application, and terminated me on July 1998 (sic). The Petition described the disputed issues of fact as follows: I was terminated because I did not put on my application that I had worked for Howard Hospital in Washington, D. C. They stated the reason I was terminated is because the ABA (American Board of Anesthesiology) requires that you only attend two programs if you have received credit. I did not receive any credit. Please see the enclosed pamphlet from the ABA at page 9. The Petition set forth the following ultimate facts entitling Petitioner to relief: When JMH terminated me, it was because I made a claim of racial discrimination, which I reported prior to investigation of my application. Had I not complained of racial remarks that was made to me by the above Dr. Kirsten O'Neal, it would not have come up about my application. The evidence established that Petitioner complained to Dr. Craythorne that Dr. O'Neal had made the derogatory, racial remark set forth in the Petition. 4/ There was no evidence to establish a link between the complaint made by Petitioner to Dr. Craythorne pertaining to Dr. O'Neal and the decision to terminate her participation in the residency program. Respondent established that Petitioner was terminated because she failed to adhere to Respondent's and the Public Health Trust's clear policies requiring applications and other employment documents to be truthful, correct, and complete.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of August, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of August, 2002.
The Issue The issues for determination in this case are: 1) whether Respondent, the Agency for Health Care Administration has made a nonrule policy statement which constitutes a “rule” as defined in Section 120.52(15), Florida Statutes, which in substance states that a hospital, licensed as a general hospital as defined in Section 395.002(10), Florida Statutes, may use the term “children’s hospital” and otherwise hold itself out and advertise as a “children’s hospital” without obtaining a license as a specialty hospital for children as defined in Section 395.002(27), Florida Statutes, and Rule 59A-3.02, Florida Administrative Code; 2) whether such agency policy statement, if made, constitutes a “rule” as defined in Section 120.52(15), Florida Statutes; 3) whether such agency policy statement, if made, has been adopted by rule as provided for in Section 120.54, Florida Statutes; and, 4) whether such agency policy statement, if made, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority as defined in Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, ALL CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL, INC. (ALL CHILDREN’S), is a licensed Class II Children’s Specialty Hospital located in St. Petersburg, Florida. ALL CHILDREN’S is licensed for 168 beds, including 108 acute care beds, 36 Level II neonatal intensive care (NICU) beds, and 24 Level III NICU beds. Historically, since its founding in 1926, ALL CHILDREN’S has been primarily committed to providing medical services to children, although ALL CHILDREN’S does provide limited services to adult patients, including a shared open heart surgery program with Bayside Medical Center. Petitioner, VARIETY CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL, INC., d/b/a MIAMI CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL (VARIETY), is a licensed Class II children’s specialty hospital located in Miami, Florida. VARIETY is licensed for 268 beds, with 218 acute care beds, 20 psychiatric beds, 7 Level II NICU beds, and 23 Level III NICU beds. Respondent, FLORIDA AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION (AHCA), is the agency of the State of Florida vested with the statutory authority for administering the provisions of Chapter 395, Florida Statutes, relating to hospital licensure and regulation. Intervenor, ST. JOSEPH’S HOSPITAL INC. (ST. JOSEPH’S), is licensed as a Class I general acute care hospital located in Tampa, Florida. ST. JOSEPH’S is licensed for 883 beds, with 799 acute care beds, 42 adult inpatient psychiatric beds, 15 Level II NICU beds, and 27 Level III NICU beds. ST. JOSEPH’S operates a pediatric unit within the hospital which is designated as Tampa Children’s Hospital at ST. JOSEPH’S. ST. JOSEPH’S uses this designation in its publications and advertisements. Intervenors, FLORIDA STATUTORY TEACHING HOSPITAL COUNCIL and SHANDS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA (SHANDS), intervened jointly; however, the primary party substantially affected by the issues raised in this case is SHANDS. SHANDS is a statutory teaching hospital located in Gainesville, Florida. SHANDS is licensed as a Class I general acute care hospital and has 568 beds including 484 acute care beds, 24 adult inpatient psychiatric beds, 18 child inpatient psychiatric beds, 30 Level II NICU beds, and 20 Level III NICU beds. SHANDS provides children’s health care services in a distinct pediatric unit within the hospital. SHANDS uses the term “children’s hospital” in its publications and advertisements regarding the provision of the services in its pediatric unit. Intervenor, SOUTH BROWARD HOSPITAL DISTRICT d/b/a MEMORIAL REGIONAL HOSPITAL and JOE DIMAGGIO CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL (MEMORIAL), is licensed as a Class I general acute care hospital located in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. MEMORIAL is licensed for 680 beds, including 515 acute care, 100 adult inpatient psychiatric beds, 36 comprehensive rehabilitation beds, 10 Level II NICU beds, and 19 Level III NICU beds. MEMORIAL operates the Joe DiMaggio Children’s Hospital (which MEMORIAL has registered as a fictitious name) as a distinct pediatric unit within MEMORIAL, and uses the term “children’s hospital” in its publications and advertisements. Intervenor, HOSPITAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF LEE COUNTY d/b/a LEE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL (LEE), is licensed as a Class I general acute care hospital located in Ft. Myers, Florida. LEE is licensed for 427 beds, including 367 acute care beds and 60 comprehensive medical rehabilitation beds. LEE also is licensed for its Health Park campus which contains 220 beds. Within the hospital LEE operates a distinct pediatric unit which has been designated the “Children’s Hospital of Southwest Florida” (registered as a fictitious name), and which designation LEE uses in its publications and advertisements. THE AGENCY STATEMENT As indicated above, the Petition filed in this case alleges that AHCA has made the following nonrule policy statement which constitutes a rule: The Agency for Health Care Administration takes the position that a hospital licensed as a general hospital, pursuant to Chapter 395, can designate itself as a “Children’s Hospital” and advertise such hospital status to the general public, without following the requirements of Rule 59A-3.202 and 59A- 3.201(65) and without obtaining a license as a Class II Specialty Hospital for Children. In this respect, Rule 59A-3.202(1), Florida Administrative Code, provides that AHCA will license four classes of hospital facilities. In pertinent part, the rule provides: 59A-3.202 Classification of Hospitals. The agency will license four classes of facilities: Class I or general hospitals which includes; General acute care hospitals with an average length of stay of 25 days or less for all beds; Long term care hospitals, which meet the provisions of 59A-3.201(31); and Rural hospitals designated under s. 395, Part III, F.S. Class II specialty hospitals offering the range of medical services offered by general hospitals, but restricted to a defined age or gender group of the population which includes; Specialty hospitals for children; and Specialty hospitals for women. Class III specialty hospitals offering a restricted range of services appropriate to the diagnosis, care, and treatment of patients with specific categories of medical or psychiatric illnesses or disorders which include; Specialty medical hospitals; Specialty rehabilitation hospitals; Specialty psychiatric hospitals, which may include beds licensed to offer Intensive Residential Treatment programs; Specialty substance abuse hospitals, which may include beds licensed to offer Intensive Residential Treatment programs; and Class IV specialty hospitals restricted to offering Intensive Residential Treatment Programs for Children and Adolescents, pursuant to s. 395.002(16), F.S. Regulation of advertisement by licensed hospitals is provided for in Section 395.003(1)(b)1., Florida Statutes, which states: (b)1. It is unlawful for any person to use or advertise to the public, in any way or by any medium whatsoever, any facility as a “hospital” or “ambulatory surgical center” unless such facility has first secured a license under the provisions of this part. For several years, and at least since 1990, concerns have been expressed to AHCA and its predecessor agency, the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), regarding the use of the term “children’s hospital” by Class I general acute care hospitals. While not adopting a specific agency position on this issue, Sharon M. Gordon-Girven, the former HRS Director of Community Health Services & Facilities Regulation and Health Facilities, by letter dated June 1, 1990, expressed the following concerns regarding the legal permissibility of the portrayal of pediatric beds within a general hospital as a separate and distinct licensed facility: The portrayal of the pediatric beds as a separate and district licensed entity from the licensee, Baptist Medical Center, may not be legally permissible. I call this to your attention so that you can obtain a legal interpretation concerning the provision of Chapter 395.003(1)(b)1. Subsequently, by letter to ALL CHILDREN’S dated March 17, 1994, Gloria Crawford Henderson, then Director of the Division of Health Quality Assurance for AHCA, expressed continuing agency concerns: First, let me address the issue as it relates to unlicensed acute facilities. Let me assure you that it is this agency’s policy to vigorously enforce the prohibition in section 395.003(1)(a), Florida Statutes (F.S.), against the establishment or operation of any hospital without first obtaining a hospital license. This agency will respond to any allegation received of any unlicensed facility operating and advertising itself to the public as a children’s hospital. Second, if I am correctly interpreting your letter, your clients’ greater concern is about licensed general hospitals that advertise to the public that they are in whole or in part a children’s hospital, although they have not been licensed as a specialty hospital, as defined in section 395.002(27), F.S. I too, am concerned with public perception, as it relates to this matter. Specifically, a hospital license issued by this office represents an assurance to the public that a hospital meets certain standards of safe and quality care. Clearly, a specialty children’s license, or a general acute license that includes specialty children’s beds/services as approved by the certificate of need office, represents to the public that the hospital has fulfilled particular certificate of need and licensure regulatory requirements related to children’s services. The same assurances of specialized capability and quality of care cannot be made to the public in the absence of such a specialty license or specialty notation on a general license. I believe that the hospital licensure rule as written, Chapter 59A-3, F.A.C., does not adequately address this issue. The rule is presently being substantially revised and it is my intent to include this issue in the revision. It is my objective to clarify the circumstances under which a hospital may advertise children’s services, relative to the statutory licensure and certificate of need framework under which this office regulates hospital quality of care. We will keep you informed as to the status of our rulemaking efforts, and invite your input regarding proposed language. Again, I appreciate you bringing this matter to my attention, and trust that we will be able to achieve a resolution that is satisfactory to the industry as a whole while preserving the integrity of the licensure process and its assurances of public safety and quality of care. On January 20, 1995, AHCA published proposed Rule 59A- 3.202(2) which provided the following restrictions on advertising by licensed hospitals: (2) Licensed hospitals may not advertise to the public, by any medium whatsoever, that they are a specialty hospital, unless they have been licensed as a specialty hospital, as defined in s. 395.002(27), F.S. Proposed Rule 59A-3.202(2), as set forth above was thereafter challenged under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. AHCA then withdrew the proposed rule on advertising restrictions, and on July 13, 1995, the proposed rule challenge case was closed by the Division of Administrative Hearings. By letter dated April 11, 1996, in response to an inquiry by SHANDS, Daryl Barowicz, Supervisor of Hospital and Outpatient Services for AHCA, made the following statements regarding the agency’s position: This is in response to your recent letter and your subsequent telephone conversation with Mr. Elmo Elrod regarding Shands Hospital proposal to establish a Children’s Hospital within a Hospital. You will recall from your conversation with Mr. Elrod, that last year they agency proposed Rule 59A-3.202(2), which in essence would have prohibited licensed hospitals from advertising to the public that they are a specialty hospital, unless they had been licensed as a specialty hospital, as defined in s. 395.002(27), Florida Statute. The rule was challenged and the agency subsequently withdrew the rule, with the plan to develop standards for children’s hospitals in the coming months. The first workshop for developing children’s hospital standards was held on January 12. These standards will apply to free-standing premises, as well as portions of hospitals. Any facility that does not meet the requirements once they are established, will no longer be allowed to advertise itself as a “Children’s Hospital.” Although the present rules would not prohibit Shands from doing what they are proposing to do, we believe that they should consider the potential ramifications of this new rule, once it is adopted. The evidence does not establish that Respondent AHCA has made the specific statement set forth in the allegations of the Petition filed in this case; however, at final hearing in this case, the agency representative, Tanya Williams, AHCA’s Bureau Chief for the Bureau of Health Facility Regulation, testified that it is AHCA’s current position that the provisions of Sections 395.002 and 395.003, Florida Statutes, do not vest the agency with the statutory authority to regulate advertising by licensed hospitals beyond the express limitations of Section 395.003(1)(b)1., Florida Statutes. Because the statute contains no express limitation regarding specialty designations in advertising by licensed hospitals, the agency has taken the position that a rule prohibiting the use of the term “children’s hospital” in advertising by Class I general hospitals is without legislative authority. Accordingly, the agency has in substance adopted the nonrule policy statement at issue in this case. Status of Agency Rulemaking Subsequent to the agency’s withdrawal of proposed Rule 59A-3.202(2) in 1995, the agency has continued development of rules regarding standards for children’s hospitals, and conducted workshops for the development of such rules. The rules currently under development by the agency do not provide for restrictions on advertisement by licensed hospitals. Operation and Advertisement of Children’s Hospitals As indicated above, AHCA is in the process of developing rules regarding standards for children’s hospitals in Florida. On a national level, the National Association of Children’s Hospitals and Related Institutions (NACHRI) has promulgated criteria for children’s hospitals. Membership in NACHRI is limited to those hospitals and institutions which meet NACHRI’s membership criteria. The membership criteria require a commitment to providing children’s medical services, and include specific medical staff training and teaching, organizational support for the pediatric program, appropriate resource allocation, and community involvement. Petitioners, ALL CHILDREN’S and VARIETY, are the only hospitals in Florida with full institutional membership in NACHRI. Intervenor SHANDS has associate membership in NACHRI. Several charitable organizations, including the Children’s Miracle Network raise funds for children’s medical needs. ALL CHILDREN’S currently holds the franchise for the Children’s Miracle Network in central Florida. Advertising for charitable contributions for children’s medical needs may enhance the contributions to a medical institution. AHCA has not received any complaints regarding deceptive or misleading advertisements regarding children’s hospitals.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is ORDERED that the Petition filed in this matter is hereby DISMISSED. DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of April, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. RICHARD HIXSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of April, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald B. Sternstein, Esquire Frank P. Rainer, Esquire RUDEN, MCCLOSKY, SMITH, SCHUSTER and RUSSELL, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 815 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard P. Ellis, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Building 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Carroll Webb, Executive Director Administrative Procedures Committee Holland Building, Room 120 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300 R. Terry Rigsby, Esquire Wendy Delvecchio, Esquire Richard A. Lotspeich, Esquire BLANK, RIGSBY & MEENAN 204 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mark K. Delegal, Esquire John C. Taylor, Jr., Esquire TAYLOR, DAY & RIO 311 South Calhoun Street, Suite 206 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Glenn Burton, Esquire SHEAR, NEWMAN, HAHN & ROSENKRANZ 201 East Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 1000 Tampa, Florida 33601-2378 Robert C. McCurdy, Esquire Hospital Board of County Commissioners Post Office Box 2218 Ft. Myers, Florida 33902-2218 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308
Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, as well as the factual stipulations entered into by the parties, the following Findings of Fact are made: Respondent is now, and has been at all times material hereto, a licensed practical nurse in the State of Florida holding license number PN 0626161. At all times material hereto, Dr. Vladimir Rosenthal owned three clinics in Dade and Broward Counties at which he performed abortions. The clinics were located in Coral Gables (hereinafter referred to as the "Coral Gables clinic"), North Miami (hereinafter referred to as the "North Miami clinic") and Plantation (hereinafter referred to as the "Broward clinic"). All three clinics were licensed under Chapter 390, Florida Statutes. In September and October, 1989, Respondent was employed by Rosenthal and worked full-time as a licensed practical nurse in the North Miami clinic. During this period of time, she had no responsibilities with regard to the other two clinics owned by Rosenthal. Among Respondent's duties at the North Miami clinic during this time period was to prepare, under Rosenthal's direct supervision, packages of medications that Rosenthal gave to his patients, free of charge, to take home with them upon their discharge, a practice that Rosenthal has since discontinued. 6/ On September 30, 1989, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) conducted an on-site inspection at the Coral Gables clinic. Respondent was not present at the clinic during the inspection. Nor were there any patients at the clinic at the time. Approximately 50 small manilla envelopes containing multiple doses of medications were found in a drawer of a desk in the clinic. The envelopes were labeled to the extent that they indicated the name of the drugs they contained, but they did not provide any information regarding the lot number, expiration date or the name of the manufacturer of the drugs. Carmen Penaloza, one of the clinic workers who was present during the inspection, was asked to demonstrate how these packages were prepared. Penaloza proceeded to take an empty manilla envelope like the ones that had been found in the desk drawer and fill it with medication that came from a large container. In performing this demonstration, she did not use gloves and her bare hands came in contact with the medication. Carlos Arias, a licensed pharmacist and one of the HRS employees who participated in the inspection, advised Penaloza that the technique she had employed was unsanitary and recommended that in the future she use a tray and spatula like pharmacists do to perform such a task. The HRS inspection also revealed that medical devices were being stored in a refrigerator that also contained food items. On October 26, 1989, HRS conducted an on-site inspection of the North Miami clinic. Arias was among the various HRS employees who were on the inspection team. Diane Robie, a medical quality assurance investigator with the Department, accompanied the team members on their inspection. Approximately 30 envelopes containing medications were found during the inspection. They were similar to the packages that had been discovered the month before at the Coral Gables clinic. Respondent was at the clinic when the inspection was conducted. Penaloza was also there. No patients were present, however. Respondent was asked to demonstrate how the packages were prepared. Penaloza was nearby at the time the request was made. She saw Respondent nervously looking around and concluded that Respondent was unable to locate any sterile gloves to use. She therefore told Respondent where such gloves could be found. Respondent then donned the gloves, laid a clean piece of paper on top of the desk where she was situated, placed tablets from a large container onto the paper and pushed each tablet with a tongue blade into a small manilla envelope. 7/ The technique that Respondent used during her demonstration, while it may have been unconventional from the perspective of a pharmacist like Arias, nonetheless was antiseptic and therefore acceptable. Sometime during the inspection Respondent made a statement that led Robie to erroneously believe that Respondent was responsible for packaging medications, not just at the North Miami clinic, but at the Coral Gables clinic as well. A finding of probable cause was initially made in this case on May 14, 1990. An Administrative Complaint was thereafter issued and the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings. The Department received the following letter, dated September 4, 1990, from counsel for Respondent concerning settlement of the case: This will confirm our understanding that you will file a notice of dismissal with DOAH of the case now pending against my client and, providing the dismissal is confirmed as a final dismissal and closing order entered by the probable cause panel, that Ms. Echlov will agree not to seek fees against your agency under the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act. In the event the panel does not approve a final dismissal and instructs you to refile the case, neither party will be prejudiced by the present agreement and each party will retain all rights otherwise available to them, including my client's rights to seek fees should the case be refiled. If this does not reflect our understanding, please notify me at once. Otherwise, please fax me a copy of your notice of dismissal so that I can take the final hearing off my calendar. Thank you for your efforts to resolve this matter amicably. Counsel for Respondent sent to the Department, and the Department received, the following follow-up letter, dated November 6, 1990: You may recall that we reached an agreement in the above-referenced case providing for a voluntary dismissal on your part and promise on mine that my client would not seek attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act. You had to take the case back before the Probable Cause Panel and ask them to close it. In order that I can close my file and know that this matter is, in fact, concluded, please let me know whether you have taken the case back before the Probable Cause Panel and, if so, the outcome. If there are documents reflecting same, please, please send me a copy. If the case has not been taken back before the Panel, please let me know when this will be done. Thanks. I'll be looking forward to hearing from you. Counsel for Respondent sent to the Department, and the Department received, a third letter, dated January 14, 1991, the body of which read, as follows: It has now been over four months since we reached our "understanding" that DPR would dismiss the case pending before DOAH (which you did) and that my client would forego her right to seek fees under the EAJA, providing (to quote from my September 4, 1990 letter to you) "that the dismissal is confirmed as a final dismissal and a closing order [is] entered by the probable cause panel." The final part of the bargain has never been performed so far as I know (and, if it was performed, the action was illegal since I requested notification of the date when the matter would be presented to the panel so that I might attend or send a court reporter but never received any). I have not, of course, received any final order of dismissal from the probable cause panel. If, within ten days of the date of this letter, I have not received either: an order of closure from the probable cause panel, or the time, date and place when our agreement will be presented to the panel, I will consider that DPR is in breach of the agreement and pursue all remedies available to my client, including attorneys' fees. I look forward to hearing from you at your earliest convenience. The probable cause panel met a second time, at which it determined not to reconsider its initial finding of probable cause. 8/ Neither Respondent nor her attorney were notified of this second meeting of the probable cause panel. Following this meeting, an Amended Administrative Complaint was filed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Board of Nursing enter a final order (1) finding the evidence insufficient to establish that Respondent engaged in "unprofessional conduct," within the meaning of Section 464.018(1)(h), Florida Statutes, as charged in the Second Amended Administrative Complaint, and (2) dismissing said complaint in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 10th day of January, 1992. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of January, 1992.
Conclusions Having reviewed the Administrative Complaint, and all other matters of record, the Agency for Health Care Administration finds and concludes as follows: 1. The Agency has jurisdiction over the above-named Respondent pursuant to Chapter 408, Part II, and Chapter 400, Part X, Florida Statutes, and the applicable authorizing statutes and administrative code provisions. 2. The Agency issued the attached Administrative Complaint and Election of Rights form to the Respondent. (Ex. 1) The parties have since entered into the attached Settlement Agreement, (Ex. 2). Based upon the foregoing, it is ORDERED: 1. The Settlement Agreement is adopted and incorporated by reference into this Final Order. The parties shall comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. 2. The facility’s Certificate of Exemption is deemed surrendered and is cancelled and of no further effect. 3. Each party shall bear its own costs and attorney’s fees. Any requests for administrative hearings are dismissed and the above-styled case is hereby closed. 4. In accordance with Florida law, the Respondent is responsible for retaining and appropriately distributing all client records within the timeframes prescribed in the authorizing statutes and applicable administrative code provisions. The Respondent is advised of Section 408.810, Florida Statutes. 5. In accordance with Florida law, the Respondent is responsible for any refunds that may have to be made to the clients. Filed December 24, 2014 3:10 PM Division of Aadniinistrative Hearings 6. The Respondent is given notice of Florida law regarding unlicensed activity. The Respondent is advised of Section 408.804 and Section 408.812, Florida Statutes. The Respondent should also consult the applicable authorizing statutes and administrative code provisions. The Respondent is notified that the cancellation of an Agency license may have ramifications potentially affecting accrediting, third party billing including but not limited to the Florida Medicaid program, and private contracts. ORDERED at Tallahassee, Florida, on this 7D day of Le cop ple-en 2014. MOS where Elizabeth Dudek, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review, which shall be instituted by filing one copy of a notice of appeal with the Agency Clerk of AHCA, and a second copy, along with filing fee as prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal in the appellate district where the Agency maintains its headquarters or where a party resides. Review of proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the Florida appellate rules. The Notice of Appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I CERTIFY that a true and core oes Final es was served on the below-named persons by the method designated on this LE lay of Z 2 Ly , 2014. Richard J. Sax Agency Cler Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Bldg. #3, Mail Stop #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Telephone: (850) 412-3630 Jan Mills Thomas Jones, Unit Manager Facilities Intake Unit Licensure Unit Agency for Health Care Administration Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) (Electronic Mail) Katrina Derico-Harris Arlene Mayo—Davis, Field Office Manager Medicaid Accounts Receivable Local Field Office Agency for Health Care Administration Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) (Electronic Mail) Shawn McCauley Daniel A. Johnson, Senior Attorney Medicaid Contract Management Office of the General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) (Electronic Mail) Division of Administrative Hearings Dagmar Llaudy, Esquire (Electronic Mail) Law Office of Dagmar Llaudy, P.A. 814 Ponce De Leon Blvd, Suite 513 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 (U.S. Mail) NOTICE OF FLORIDA LAW 408.804 License required; display.-- (1) It is unlawful to provide services that require licensure, or operate or maintain a provider that offers or provides services that require licensure, without first obtaining from the agency a license authorizing the provision of such services or the operation or maintenance of such provider. (2) A license must be displayed in a conspicuous place readily visible to clients who enter at the address that appears on the license and is valid only in the hands of the licensee to whom it is issued and may not be sold, assigned, or otherwise transferred, voluntarily or involuntarily. The license is valid only for the licensee, provider, and location for which the license is issued. 408.812 Unlicensed activity. -- (1) A person or entity may not offer or advertise services that require licensure as defined by this part, authorizing statutes, or applicable rules to the public without obtaining a valid license from the agency. A licenseholder may not advertise or hold out to the public that he or she holds a license for other than that for which he or she actually holds the license. (2) The operation or maintenance of an unlicensed provider or the performance of any services that require licensure without proper licensure is a violation of this part and authorizing statutes. Unlicensed activity constitutes harm that materially affects the health, safety, and welfare of clients. The agency or any state attorney may, in addition to other remedies provided in this part, bring an action for an injunction to restrain such violation, or to enjoin the future operation or maintenance of the unlicensed provider or the performance of any services in violation of this part and authorizing statutes, until compliance with this part, authorizing statutes, and agency rules has been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the agency. (3) It is unlawful for any person or entity to own, operate, or maintain an unlicensed provider. If after receiving notification from the agency, such person or entity fails to cease operation and apply for a license under this part and authorizing statutes, the person or entity shall be subject to penalties as prescribed by authorizing statutes and applicable rules. Each day of continued operation is a separate offense. (4) Any person or entity that fails to cease operation after agency notification may be fined $1,000 for each day of noncompliance. (5) When a controlling interest or licensee has an interest in more than one provider and fails to license a provider rendering services that require licensure, the agency may revoke all licenses and impose actions under s. 408.814 and a fine of $1,000 per day, unless otherwise specified by authorizing statutes, against each licensee until such time as the appropriate license is obtained for the unlicensed operation. (6) In addition to granting injunctive relief pursuant to subsection (2), if the agency determines that a person or entity is operating or maintaining a provider without obtaining a license and determines that a condition exists that poses a threat to the health, safety, or welfare of a client of the provider, the person or entity is subject to the same actions and fines imposed against a licensee as specified in this part, authorizing statutes, and agency rules. (7) Any person aware of the operation of an unlicensed provider must report that provider to the agency. STATE OF FLORIDA AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION STATE OF FLORIDA, AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, Petitioner, vs. AHCA No.: 2014008789 Exemption No.: HCC10956 MAGIC HANDS REHABILITATION CENTER, INC., Respondent. / ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT COMES NOW, the Petitioner, State of Florida, Agency for Health Care Administration (“the Agency”), by and through its undersigned counsel, and files this Administrative Complaint ‘ against the Respondent, Magic Hands Rehabilitation Center, Inc. (“the Respondent”), pursuant to Section 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes (2014), and alleges: NATURE OF THE ACTION This is an action to revoke the Respondent’s health care clinic Certificate of Exemption. PARTIES 1. The Agency is the state agency that oversees the licensure and regulation of _ health care clinics in Florida pursuant to Chapters 408, Part Il, and 400, Part X, Florida Statutes (2014); and Chapter 59A-33, Florida Administrative Code. “The Legislature finds that the regulation of health care clinics must be strengthened to prevent significant cost and harm to consumers. The purpose of this part is to provide for the licensure, establishment, and enforcement of basic standards for health care clinics and to provide administrative oversight by the Agency for Health Care Administration.” § 400.990(2), Fla. Stat. (2014). 2. The Respondent applied for and was issued a Certificate of Exemption to operate a health care clinic located at 7392 NW 35" Terrace, Unit 310, Miami, Florida 33122. FYHIRIT 1 Certificate of Exemption from Licensure for Health Care Clinics 3. Under Florida law, “clinic” means an entity where health care services are provided to individuals and which tenders charges for reimbursement for such services, including a mobile clinic and a portable equipment provider. Fla. Stat. § 400.9905(4) (2014). 4. Under Florida law, the term “clinic” does not apply to a sole proprietorship, group practice, partnership, or corporation that provides health care services by licensed health care practitioners under chapter 457, chapter 458, chapter 459, chapter 460, chapter 461, chapter 462, chapter 463, chapter 466, chapter 467, chapter 480, chapter 484, chapter 486, chapter 490, chapter 491, or part I, part III, part X, part XIII, or part XIV of chapter 468, or s. 464.012, and that is wholly owned by one or more licensed health care practitioners, or the licensed health care practitioners set forth in this paragraph and the spouse, parent, child, or sibling of a licensed health care practitioner if one of the owners who is a licensed health care practitioner is supervising the business activities and is legally responsible for the entity's compliance with all federal and state laws. However, a health care practitioner may not supervise services beyond the scope of the practitioner's license, except that, for the purposes of this part, a clinic owned bya licensee in s. 456.053(3)(b) which provides only services authorized pursuant to s. 456.053(3)(b) may be supervised by a licensee specified in s. 456.053(3)(b). Fla. Stat. § 400.9905(4)(g) (2014). Such an entity may claim to be exempt from licensure and may be eligible for a Certificate of Exemption from the Agency. 5. Under Florida law, a facility becomes a “clinic” when it does not qualify for an exemption, provides health care services to individuals and bills third party payers for those services. F.A.C. 59A-33.006(4). Facts 6. On December 19, 2013, Respondent was issued a Certificate of Exemption from licensure, number HCC10956, based upon Respondent identifying itself as solely owned by 2 Peter J. Maffetone, a licensed health care practitioner. 7. On August 22, 2014, Peter J. Maffetone gave testimony during a recorded sworn statement. 8. On that date, under oath, Peter J. Maffetone testified that he does not now, nor has he ever owned or had a financial interest in Respondent, Magic Hands Rehabilitation Center, Inc. 9. Respondent does not qualify for a Certificate of Exemption due to the fact that Peter J. Maffetone does not possess ownership. Sanction 10. Under Florida Law, any person or entity providing health care services which is not a clinic, as defined under Section 400.9905, may voluntarily apply for a certificate of exemption from licensure under its exempt status with the agency on a form that sets forth its name or names and addresses, a statement of the reasons why it cannot be defined as a clinic, and other information deemed necessary by the agency. § 400.9935(6), Fla. Stat. (2014). 11, Under Florida Law, the applicant for a certificate of exemption must affirm, without reservation, the exemption sought pursuant to Section 400.9905(4), F.S., and the qualifying requirements for obtaining and maintaining an exempt status; the current existence of applicable exemption-qualifying health care practitioner licenses; qualified ownership, qualified certifications or registration of the facility or owners; federal employer identification number; services provided; proof of legal existence and fictitious name, when the entity and name are required to be filed with the Division of Corporations, Department of State; plus other satisfactory proof required by form adopted by this rule. F.A.C. 59A-33.006(6). 12. Under Florida Law, facilities that claim an exemption, either by filing an application for a certificate of exemption with the Agency and receiving a certificate of exemption, or self-determining, must maintain an exempt status at all times the facility is in operation. F.A.C. 59A-33.006(2). 13. Under Florida Law, when a change to the exempt status occurs to an exempt facility or entity that causes it to no longer qualify for an exemption, any exempt status claimed or reflected in a certificate of exemption ceases on the date the facility or entity no longer qualifies for a certificate of exemption. In such case, the health care clinic must file with the Agency a license application under the Act within 5 days of becoming a health care clinic and shall be subject to all provisions of the Act applicable to unlicensed health care clinics. Failure to timely file an application for licensure within 5 days of becoming a health care clinic will render the health care clinic unlicensed and subject the owners, medical or clinic directors and the health care clinic to sanctions under the Act. F.A.C. 59A-33.006(3). 14. As demonstrated by the facts outlined herein, Respondent no longer qualifies for a Certificate of Exemption pursuant to § 400.9905(4)(g), Fla. Stat. (2014). 15. Therefore, Respondent is now required to be licensed as a clinic pursuant to F.A.C. 59A-33.006 and Chapters 408, Part II, and 400, Part X, Fla. Stat, 16. Under Section 400.995, Florida Statutes, in addition to the requirements of Part II of Chapter 408, the Agency may deny the application for a license renewal, revoke and suspend the license, and impose administrative fines of up to $5,000 per violation for violations of the requirements of this part or rules of the agency. § 400.995(1), Fla. Stat. (2014). Each day of continuing violation after the date fixed for termination of the violation, as ordered by the agency, constitutes an additional, separate, and distinct violation. § 400.995(2), Fla. Stat. (2014). 17. Under Section 400.9915(2), Florida Statutes, in addition to any administrative fines imposed pursuant to this part or Part IT of Chapter 408, the Agency may assess a fee equal to the cost of conducting a complaint investigation. § 400.9915(2), Fla. Stat. (2014). WHEREFORE, the Agency seeks to revoke the Respondent's health care clinic Certificate of Exemption. CLAIM FOR RELIEF The Petitioner, State of Florida, Agency for Health Care Administration, respectfully seeks a final order that: A. Makes findings of fact and conclusions of law in favor of the Agency as set forth above. B. Imposing the sanctions and relief as set forth above. Gj RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this / / day of September, 2014. Florida Bar No. 0091175 Office pt the General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Telephone: (850) 412-3658 Facsimile: (850) 922-6484 Daniel. Johnson@ahca.myflorida.com
Findings Of Fact The sole witness for the Petitioner, Dorothy J. Faircloth, established that the Respondent, Dr. Thomas K. Thomas, M.D., was licensed by endorsement by the Board on May 8, 1979. On-March 19, 1982, Witness Faircloth, as Executive Director of the Board, sent a letter to the Respondent, Dr. Thomas, indicating that the records of her office showed that he was licensed by endorsement on the above date and that he had not complied with Section 458.313, Florida Statutes, by demonstrating to the Board that he had actively engaged in the practice of medicine in Florida within a three year period after issuance of the license by endorsement, provided for in that Section, nor that he had continued that practice in Florida continuously for a minimum period of one year. That letter further informed him that if the establishment of his Florida practice was postponed due to the necessity of obtaining additional training or because of military service, then he should submit proper documentation in affidavit form or properly certified to establish that he was in an approved training program at the time of receiving his license, until a date certain, or was in the military service. The letter informed him that in order to avoid cancellation of his license by endorsement he should submit proper documentation in affidavit ford or properly certified to the effect that he had been actively engaged in the practice of medicine within the three-year period after issuance of that license and that he had continued his practice for a minimum of one year. This letter was elated March 19, 1982, and an identical letter pursuant to the Board's procedure was sent one month later on April 19, 1982, which constitute two written warnings sent to the Respondent's last known address and which indeed was shown to be the address from which the letter requesting this proceeding was posted. The doctor failed to demonstrate in the requested manner that he had complied with Florida practice requirements for his licensure by endorsement and accordingly on June 10, 1982, an order was entered by the Board of Medical Examiners declaring his licensure by endorsement void and of no force or effect. By his letter of June 21, 1982, the doctor petitioned for a formal proceeding, in which petition he acknowledged that he had not been able to come to Florida to practice medicine within the three years of acquiring his license by endorsement due to "circumstances beyond my control." This letter was admitted into evidence as a part of Exhibit One. The cause was then transmitted to the Division of Administrative Hearings for a formal proceeding, the hearing being held on the above date. Dr. Thomas failed to appear at the hearing. It was established that Dr. Thomas has not practiced in Florida since his licensure by endorsement on May 5, 1979.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and the evidence in the record, it is therefore RECOMMENDED: That license number ME00345I6 issued to Dr. Thomas K. Thomas, M.D., on May 5, 1979, be revoked. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of March, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 10983. COPIES FURNISHED: Chris D. Rolle, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Thomas K. Thomas, M.D. 842 Moorland Grosse Point Wood, MT 48236 Dorothy J. Faircloth, Executive Director Board of Medical Examiners Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Marty Johnsey (Johnsey), was at all times material hereto licensed as a registered nurse in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 1766782. From November 10, 1986, to November 25, 1986, Johnsey was employed as a certified registered nurse anesthetist at Broward General Medical Center, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. On November 24, 1986, while on duty at Broward General, Johnsey was observed by Dr. Alfredo Ferrari, an anesthesiologist, to be in a rigid and cyanotic condition. Dr. Ferrari immediately summoned assistance, and Johnsey was placed on a stretcher, given respiratory assistance, and taken to the emergency room. While in the emergency room, Johnsey was administered Naloxone, a specific narcotic antagonist used to reverse the effects of synthetic narcotics such as Sufentanil. Within minutes of being administered Naloxone, Johnsey began to breath normally, wake up, and relate to his environment. A urine sample taken from Johnsey on November 24, 1986, as well as a syringe found by Dr. Ferrari next to Johnsey when he first assisted him, were subsequently analyzed and found to contain Sufentanil. Sufentanil is a synthetic narcotic analgesic, and a Schedule II controlled substance listed in Section 893.03(2)(b), Florida Statutes. Under the circumstances, the proof demonstrates that on November 24, 1986, Johnsey, while on duty at Broward General, was under the influence of Sufentanil to such an extent that he was unable to practice nursing with reasonable skill and safety.
Recommendation Based on the forgoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered imposing an administrative fine of $250.00, suspending the license of respondent until such time as he can demonstrate that he can safely practice his profession, followed by a one year term of probation. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 11th day of May, 1988. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-0115 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: 1. Addressed in paragraph l. 2-3. Addressed in paragraph 2. 4-7. Addressed in paragraph 3. 8-10. To the extent pertinent, addressed in paragraph 4. 11-15. Addressed in paragraph 5. Otherwise rejected as subordinate. 16. Addressed in paragraph 7. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael A. Mone', Esquire Mr. Marty Johnsey Department of Professional 180 Skyline View Drive Regulation Collinsville, Illinois 62234 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Judie Ritter, Executive Director William O'Neil Department of Professional General Counsel Regulation Department of Professional Board of Nursing Regulation Room 504, 130 North Nonroe Street 111 East Coastline Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0570 Jacksonville, Florida 32201 =================================================================
