The Issue In June 1989, Leon F. Stewart Treatment Center, Inc. ("Stewart"), advertised to the community that it had a job available as a counselor, for which Anthony R. Starnes ("Starnes") applied. Stewart declined to hire Starnes, who is wheelchair bound. Starnes filed a complaint alleging unlawful employment discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations ("Commission"). On July 25, 1991, the Commission determined that there was no reasonable cause to believe than an unlawful employment practice occurred. Starnes has appealed the determination by the Commission of "no cause" to the Division of Administrative Hearings. The Respondent filed a proposed finding which was read, considered and adopted except for paragraphs 7 and 8. The Petition did not file proposed findings.
Findings Of Fact In June 1989, Stewart advertised an opening for an adolescent chemical dependency counselor ("counselor"). The counselor job description required the individual to work with adolescents, who were chemically dependent, with activities involving extensive physical interaction with the adolescents such as camping trips, weight lifting, playing various sports, and other outdoor activities. The counselor position was an entrance level position paying approximately $14,000.00 annually to individuals with either an associates degree or bachelors degree in mental health or human services. Anthony R. Starnes applied for the position as a counselor with Respondent. Starnes has an advance degree in Pastoral Counseling and experience as a counselor. He is wheelchair bound and disabled physically. John Mullins ("Mullins"), a supervisor with Stewart, was the individual in charge of hiring the counselor. As a matter of practice, Mullins utilized form letters to advise job applicants that they were not being hired; a certain form letter going to individuals who were not interviewed and a different form letter going to individuals who were interviewed, but not hired. Because of the nature of the work, Mullins required female counselors to work with female adolescents and male counselors to work with male adolescents. The counselors worked in shifts and remained with the patients overnight. Although the advertisement did not so state, the counselor to be hired was to work with female adolescents. Mullins never met and never saw Starnes prior to rejecting Starnes' application. Mullins never knew and was not advised Starnes was orthopedically handicapped or wheelchair bound prior to declining Starnes. Mullins testified that he did not hire Starnes because he felt he was over qualified and did not have inpatient counseling experience. This testimony lacks credibility; however, the policy restricting counselors to the same gender as the adolescents being counseled is reasonable. This was the actual basis upon which Mullins made his decision. Starnes' physical handicap was not a factor in Mullins' decision not to hire Starnes.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order denying Starnes' application seeking a determination of unlawful employment practice. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 23rd day of January 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: Anthony R. Starnes 7610 Hellman Corona, California 91720 Charles D. Hood, Jr., Esquire Monaco, Smith, Hood, Perkins, Loucks & Stout Suite 900 444 Seabreeze Boulevard Daytona Beach, Florida 32118 STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of January 1992. Margaret Jones Agency Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1570 Dana Baird, Esquire General Counsel Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1570
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Palm Beach County School Board (Petitioner or School Board), has just cause to terminate or otherwise discipline Respondent, Rayburn White’s, employment based on the conduct alleged in the “Petition” dated January 15, 2009, and filed with DOAH January 20, 2009. Also at issue is the discipline, if any, to be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Petitioner was the constitutional entity authorized to operate, control, and supervise the public schools in Palm Beach County, Florida Petitioner has entered into individual contracts with its employees. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner employed Respondent as an art teacher. The record is silent as to whether he has a continuing contract or a professional services contract. Prior to his reassignment after his arrest in 2008, Respondent’s assigned school was Acreage Pines Elementary School (Acreage Pines). Respondent has been employed by Petitioner since October 17, 1987. Respondent’s job performance has been satisfactory or above during his tenure with Petitioner. Petitioner and the teacher’s union have entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Petitioner has adopted rules and policies that control the activities of its teaching professionals. Respondent is subject to the provisions of the CBA, rules adopted by Petitioner, rules of the State Board of Education, and duly-enacted statutes. Article II, Section M(6) of the CBA pertains to progressive discipline and provides as follows: (6) Where just cause warrants such disciplinary action(s) and in keeping with the provisions of this Section, an employee may be reprimanded verbally, reprimanded in writing, suspended without pay or dismissed upon the recommendation of the immediate supervisor to the Superintendent. Other disciplinary action(s) may be taken with the mutual agreement of the parties. Section 1012.22(1)(f), Florida Statutes, provides that a district school board has the following powers: (f) Suspension, dismissal, and return to annual contract status.--The district school board shall suspend, dismiss, or return to annual contract members of the instructional staff and other school employees; however, no administrative assistant, supervisor, principal, teacher, or other member of the instructional staff may be discharged, removed, or returned to annual contract except as provided in this chapter. Section 1012.27(5), Florida Statutes, provides that a school superintendent has the following powers: (5) SUSPENSION AND DISMISSAL.--Suspend members of the instructional staff and other school employees during emergencies for a period extending to and including the day of the next regular or special meeting of the district school board and notify the district school board immediately of such suspension. When authorized to do so, serve notice on the suspended member of the instructional staff of charges made against him or her and of the date of hearing. Recommend employees for dismissal under the terms prescribed herein. Florida Administrative Code Rule 6B-1.001 sets forth the Code of Ethics of the Education Profession in Florida. Subsections (2) and (3) thereof provide as follows: The educator’s primary professional concern will always be for the student and for the development of the student’s potential. The educator will therefore strive for professional growth and will seek to exercise the best professional judgment and integrity. Aware of the importance of maintaining the respect and confidence of one’s colleagues, of students, of parents, and of other members of the community, the educator strives to achieve and sustain the highest degree of ethical conduct. School Board Policy 6Gx50-1.013(1) requires School Board employees to “. . . carry out their assigned duties in accordance with federal laws, rules, state statutes, state board of education rules, school board policy, superintendent’s administrative directives and local school and area rules.” THE 1994 INCIDENT On or about June 27, 1994, Respondent entered a plea of guilty to the following charges brought in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi: Interference with Government Employee, Disorderly Conduct, and Reckless Driving. A U.S. Magistrate adjudicated Respondent guilty of all three charges, imposed court costs, and placed him on probation for one year with the following special condition of probation: “Defendant shall not visit any area of the Tennessee Tombigbee Waterway while on probation supervision.” On March 21, 1995, the Florida Education Practices Commission (EPC) filed an Administrative Complaint against Respondent that included the following factual allegations in paragraphs 3, 4, and 5: On or about June 18, 1994, Respondent was observed masturbating in his car. When approached by an undercover federal office, Respondent fled the scene and was later apprehended. Respondent was arrested in the U.S. Northern District of Mississippi and charged with Interference with Government Employees, Disorderly Conduct and Reckless Driving. On or about June 27, 1994, Respondent plead guilty to all three charges and the Court adjudicated him to be guilty as charged. Respondent was sentenced to serve one year probation, not return to the Tennessee Tombigbee Waterway and pay a $400 fine and court costs. Thereafter Respondent and the EPC entered into a Settlement Agreement which included the following in paragraphs 3 and 4: The Respondent elects not to contest the allegations set forth in the Petitioner’s Administrative Complaint, which are incorporated herein by reference. The Respondent agrees to accept a letter of reprimand for the conduct described in the Administrative Complaint, a copy of which shall be placed in his certification file with the Department of Education, and a copy of which shall be placed in his personnel file with the Palm Beach County School Board. The Settlement Agreement also includes the following in paragraphs 6 and 7: The Respondent agrees that within thirty [30] days of entry of the Final Order herein he shall provide the Education Practices Commission [EPC] written verification from a professional approved by the Recovery Network Program that he poses no threat to the safety or well-being of students and that he is able to perform the responsibilities of an educator. All expenses incurred in connection with providing this verification shall be borne by the Respondent. The Respondent agrees that he shall be placed on probation for a period of two [2] years . . . The Settlement Agreement was approved by Final Order issued by the EPC on September 22, 1995. Respondent served his period of probation. Respondent did not admit the alleged facts that underpin the EPC’s Administrative Complaint.1 THE 2008 INCIDENT Okeeheelee Park (the park) is located in suburban Palm Beach County. The park’s various recreational amenities include walking trails. The park also has restroom facilities at multiple locations. Detective Van Garner of the Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office and his partner, Detective Peter Lazar, were assigned to conduct undercover operations in the park on July 21, 2008. Their assignment included the apprehension of people engaging in illegal sexual acts in the park. This assignment was in response to citizen complaints about such activity in the park. Both officers were in civilian dress. Detective Garner wore a tee shirt and short pants. On July 21, 2008, Respondent was exercising in the park by walking to lose weight. Because of medical problems, Respondent needed to lose weight. To work up a good sweat, Respondent wore a one-piece wet suit that covered his torso, but not his arms or his legs. The wet suit had a front zipper, which zipped in a downward, diagonal motion from his neck area to his left thigh area. Respondent wore a shirt and a pair of walking shorts over the wet suit. During that summer, Respondent typically walked from noon to 4:00 p.m. Respondent attracted the attention of Detective Garner on the afternoon of July 21, 2008, because he saw him go into more bathrooms in the park than “normal.”2 At approximately 3:00 p.m. on July 21, 2008, Respondent had been walking for three hours. He went to the area of a bathroom at the top of a hill near a pavilion where there was a cool breeze. Detective Garner pulled up in a truck, got out, and went inside the bathroom from the door on the opposite side of the building from where Respondent was standing.3 Almost immediately thereafter, while Detective Garner was standing at a urinal, Respondent entered the bathroom, walked past Detective Garner, and went to a handicapped stall. Respondent left the door to the handicapped stall ajar. Detective Garner and Respondent were the only two people in the restroom. Detective Garner testified that sometimes a man who is in a restroom for sexual activity will do things to attract the attention of other patrons of the facility. Respondent did not make any hand signal, say anything, or do anything to attract the attention of Detective Garner other than leaving the door to the stall ajar. Respondent did nothing in the restroom that would have attracted Detective Garner’s attention had Detective Garner not been a law enforcement officer. Respondent stood in the handicapped stall in the proper stance to urinate. His feet faced the toilet and his body was turned so that one looking into the stall from the door would have seen his back and side, but not his front. Detective Garner became suspicious because he did not hear a stream of urine coming from the stall. There was a conflict in the evidence as to what Respondent was doing in the stall. Respondent testified that he had unzipped the wet suit so he could urinate. Respondent testified that with one hand he was holding up his shorts and with the other he was trying to prevent the wet suit from becoming completely unzipped. Respondent testified that it is very difficult to get the wet suit zipper started once it becomes completely unzipped. According to Respondent, when Detective Garner approached the stall, Respondent was removing his penis from the wet suit in order to urinate. Detective Garner testified that when he approached the stall, he saw Respondent move his hands back and forth below the level of his waist in an activity Detective Garner believed could only have been masturbation. Detective Garner could not see Respondent’s genital area until Respondent turned toward Detective Garner after Respondent sensed Detective Garner’s presence. Detective Garner testified that he saw Respondent’s erect penis when Respondent turned. In resolving the conflicting evidence, the undersigned finds that Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent masturbated in the handicapped stall of the park’s bathroom on July 21, 2008.4 Petitioner also failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent was attempting to solicit Detective Garner or anyone else for sex. When Respondent turned towards him, Detective Garner pulled out his badge and identified himself as a deputy sheriff. Respondent immediately began to put his penis back in the wet suit and his short pants. Within 20-to-30 seconds of that identification, Respondent had accomplished that purpose and started to exit the stall. In leaving the stall, Respondent pushed Detective Garner aside. Detective Garner pushed back. Before Respondent left the bathroom, there was a brief scuffle between Detective Garner and the Respondent consisting of Detective Garner trying to restrain Respondent and Respondent attempting to exit the bathroom. No blows were thrown during the scuffle. When he left the restroom, Respondent walked down a hill away from the restroom and Detective Garner. Detective Garner walked in the opposite direction to retrieve his firearm from his vehicle. While walking to his vehicle, Detective Garner called Detective Lazar on a cell phone and requested that Detective Lazar come to the scene to assist him. As Detective Lazar was heading to the scene, he asked a uniformed officer to follow him to the scene. Shortly thereafter, Detective Lazar and the uniformed officer arrived on the scene. Respondent promptly complied with their orders. Respondent was charged with Exposing Sexual Organs in violation of Section 800.03, Florida Statutes; Resisting Arrest Without Violence in violation of Section 843.02, Florida Statutes; and Loitering in Public Restroom in violation of a county ordinance. Respondent entered into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement in resolution of the criminal charges. Respondent successfully completed the Deferred Prosecution Agreement, which included undergoing supervision, paying the costs associated with the supervision, completion of the Prostitution Impact Prevention Education School, undergoing HIV/STD test, provision of a DNA sample, and no contact with adult establishments. Respondent timely self-reported his arrest as required by School Board policy. The School Board’s Department of Employee Relations conducted an investigation into Respondent’s employment history, his background, and the events that culminated in his arrest on July 21, 2008. The results of the investigation were presented to the School Board’s Employee Investigative Committee (EIC), which makes non-binding recommendations to the Superintendent of Schools. The EIC voted to substantiate the charges against Respondent and recommended to the School Superintendent that Respondent’s employment be suspended for 20 days and that Respondent be transferred to another school. Dr. Johnson made the decision that Respondent’s employment should be terminated. When he made that recommendation, Dr. Johnson thought that Respondent had been caught masturbating for the second time.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board of Palm Beach County enter a final order dismissing the charges against Respondent and reinstating his employment with full back pay. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of February, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of February, 2010.
Recommendation There are factors in mitigation which should be considered in this case to include the following: Carlson and Benedict had personal reasons for discrediting Beach and their actions show their anamosity toward her. The events which constituted the majority of the charges against Beach happened over one year before the Report was made to the Florida State Board of Nursing by Carlson. Beach worked at Lancaster Youth Development Center approximately seven years. She received good efficiency ratings for her employment from Carlson and Benedict for the period of time covered by the allegations relating to employment of unlicensed persons and unauthorized administration of medication, although, if their testimony is believed, they had knowledge of these matters. The testimony of the witnesses is largely unsupported by any physical evidence with the exception of the testimony of Rollings, whose testimony was rejected because of the changes which she had made from her original statements. Beach called and obtained authority to administer valium to a rape victim, who under any reasonable interpretation of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services policy, was entitled to treatment at the infirmary. Having sought authority to administer valium under these circumstances, it is difficult to conclude that she would have administered valium or any other prescription drug to Rollings or Campbell without obtaining authority. Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and factors in mitigation, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Florida State Board of Nursing take no action against the license of Adeline Beach. DONE and ORDERED this 31st day of May, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Julius Finegold, Esquire Florida State Board of Nursing 1107 Blackstone Building Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Smith and Johnson Post Office Box 508 Gainesville, Florida 32602
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner may terminate Respondent's employment as a teacher.
Findings Of Fact Respondent has been a teacher since 1993. She is a 34- year-old divorced mother of a four-year-old son. Respondent has suffered from a chemical dependency since she was 18 years old. At that time, she completed a 28- day detoxification program at Mt. Sinai Medical Center in Miami. Six or seven years later, Respondent underwent additional inpatient treatment for her addiction to drugs. She submitted to a third detoxification, lasting five to seven days, in 1993 or 1994. Respondent underwent a fourth detoxification ten months later and, in 1996, a fifth detoxification. Respondent admits that she has undergone detoxification several more times since 1996. These detoxifications and Respondent's intermittent participation in Narcotics Anonymous were parts of treatment programs attempting to relieve Respondent from her addiction to cocaine and heroin. Respondent's addiction has spanned her college years through her entire teaching career. The effects of Respondent's illness have, at times, precluded her from reaching her full potential as a classroom teacher. After a brief period of employment by Petitioner as a permanent substitute teacher, Respondent began fulltime employment with Petitioner in August 1994 as a teacher at Oak Grove Elementary School. While at Oak Grove, Respondent was a satisfactory teacher, although her attendance was less than satisfactory. Also, on at least six occasions, evidently starting in her second year, Respondent fell asleep while conducting a reading tutorial session in which the students spent 20 minutes in separate cubicles. Respondent's principal at Oak Grove documented by a memorandum dated December 4, 1995, eleven full-day absences and two half-day absences during the 1995-96 school year and two instances of sleeping while charged with the instruction of a student--both on the same day and both discovered by the principal. Due to these incidents and an earlier incident of sleeping while on duty, the principal administratively referred Respondent to Petitioner's Employee Assistance Program (EAP). The December 4 memorandum documented the actions taken at a conference held the same date involving, among others, Respondent and the principal. Respondent then missed work on December 6 and 7--calling in at 10:06 a.m. on December 7 saying that she had overslept and asking if it was too late to report to work. Respondent missed a considerable amount of work during the 1996-97 school year. Some of the absences, especially from early December through early February, were due to Respondent's chemical dependency. However, some absences, especially during the latter part of the school year, may be attributed to the birth of Respondent's child on July 9, 1997, following a high- risk pregnancy. The record does not disclose much about the 1997-98 school year. However, Respondent missed ten days of work due to sick or personal leave and eleven days of work due to unpaid, but authorized, leave. The absence of additional administrative action against Respondent suggests that she may have improved her attendance and eliminated her sleeping while on duty. For the 1998-99 school year, Respondent transferred to a new school, Linda Lentin Elementary School. Again, Respondent was a satisfactory teacher, except for absenteeism. However, during a nine-day absence from May 20 through June 2, 1999, the principal received a telephone call from someone claiming that Respondent had had a breakdown and was in a "drug rehabilitation hospital." Accordingly, the principal requested that Petitioner's Office of Professional Standards (OPS) monitor Respondent's return to work. On June 8, 1999, Respondent, the principal, Petitioner's OPS Director, and others participated in a Conference for the Record (CFR). Respondent attributed her 21 absences in the 1997-98 school year, as well as 20.5 absences in the 1998-99 school year, to six miscarriages and depression. Petitioner's OPS Director explained the procedures for reasonable-suspicion drug testing. The CFR memorandum concludes by emphasizing that Respondent must report to work when scheduled and on time, obtain medical excuses for all absences, provide lesson plans for substitute teachers, and obtain approval for scheduled leave. At the same time, Petitioner's OPS Director referred Respondent to Petitioner's EAP. Subject to these actions, Petitioner approved Respondent's return to the classroom. However, Respondent's attendance did not improve the following school year, and her behavior became somewhat eccentric early in the school year. At noon on September 27, 1999, Respondent told the principal that she was ill and needed to go home for the remainder of the day and the following day. Respondent went home, but, despite requesting leave and a substitute for the following day, returned to work the following day without calling first. Near the end of the school day, while her students were in a special-area class, Respondent signed out of school and walked down the street, despite the fact that it was raining. The next day, Respondent left the school grounds without permission and, the following day, failed to attend a mandatory teachers' meeting. The situation deteriorated in mid-October 1999. From October 11-14, Respondent telephoned the school each day and reported that she was sick and in the hospital. The following Monday, October 18, Respondent reported to work. However, on October 19, Respondent failed to report to work or call, leaving her class sitting in the hallway. Respondent telephoned the school at mid-day and stated that she had been in a five-car accident. This accident did not take place. On October 20, while driving to school, Respondent was involved in a two-car accident, which resulted in her striking a fire hydrant not far from the school. The accident took place at about 8:45 a.m., which was about 15 minutes after Respondent assumed direct supervision of her students. Respondent arrived at school late, crying and disconcerted. An acquaintance transported Respondent home. The next morning, prior to the start of school, Respondent called the school and stated that she would not be at work. On the following morning, October 22, Respondent reported to work, and her principal ordered her to submit to a reasonable-suspicion drug test. Respondent complied, and the drug test revealed the presence of cocaine and morphine. The drug test accurately detected the presence of these substances because Respondent had used crack cocaine and heroin within the period for which the drug test is sensitive. By memorandum dated October 29, 1999, Respondent's principal asked Petitioner's OPS to monitor Respondent's return to work. By memorandum dated November 1, 1999, Petitioner's OPS informed Respondent that she would require a clearance from OPS before returning to work. On November 8, 1999, Respondent requested a leave of absence without pay to extend from October 22, 1999, through June 16, 2000. Petitioner granted this request. Shortly after starting her leave from work, Respondent was first seen by Dr. John Eustace. Dr. Eustace is Board-certified in internal medicine and is also certified in the treatment of addictions. He is the medical director of the Addiction Treatment Program at Mt. Sinai Medical Center. He is also an assistant professor of psychiatry at the University of Miami medical school. In the last ten years, Dr. Eustace has performed 2000 evaluations of professionals to assess whether they can return to practice with the requisite skill and safety. During his career, Dr. Eustace has diagnosed and treated over 10,000 patients for addictions. Dr. Eustace admitted Respondent as an in-patient at Mt. Sinai for, among other things, a four- or five-day detoxification program. He found that Respondent was in the late middle stage of addiction to heroin and cocaine and that her illness was active. When releasing Respondent from the detoxification program, Dr. Eustace recommended that Respondent enter a twelve- step program to better prepare Respondent for the difficult recovery process, which requires, among other things, gaining insight into the consequences of the addiction. Following the detoxification process, Dr. Eustace opined that Respondent had an even chance of avoiding another relapse. However, this prognosis improves with time. After the first five years without relapse, the relapse rate is only ten percent. Also, after a second treatment, the recovery rate is over 90 percent. Of the 2000 professionals whom Dr. Eustace has treated, over 90 percent have recovered. Unfortunately, Respondent relapsed after her 1999 detoxification and treatment by Dr. Eustace. Despite her return to active use of illegal drugs, Respondent chose to restart the process by which she could return to the classroom. Petitioner's OPS informed Respondent that she would need OPS clearance before returning to work. Reacting to Respondent's request for a clearance, OPS scheduled a CFR with Respondent and others to take place on July 28, 2000. At the July 28 CFR, Respondent signed an Employee Acknowledgement Form concerning Petitioner's drug-free workplace policy. The form states: "Before returning to duty, I must undergo a return-to-duty . . . controlled substances test with verified negative results." At the CFR, Respondent admitted that she had had a chemical dependency, but represented that she was now clean and sober. Apparently, Respondent did not anticipate that she would be required to take a drug test at the July 28 CFR. However, with the new school year imminent, it is difficult to understand exactly when Respondent thought she would be required to take the drug test. If she were going to teach the next school year, her principal needed more than a few days' notice. In any event, Respondent took the test on July 28, and the test revealed the presence of morphine, although not cocaine. By memorandum dated September 6, 2000, from Petitioner's OPS Director to Respondent, Petitioner advised Respondent that it was reviewing its options after receiving the results of the July 28 drug test. By letter dated October 6, 2000, to Respondent, Petitioner's Superintendent advised Respondent that Petitioner was suspending her and initiating dismissal proceedings due to just cause, including incompetency, misconduct in office, gross insubordination, excessive absences, and violation of Petitioner's Rules 6Gx13-4-105 (drug-free workplace) and 6Gx13-4A-1.21 (responsibilities and duties). By letter dated October 12, 2000, and revised October 17, 2000, Petitioner's board took the action recommended by the Superintendent. The contract between Petitioner and the United Teachers of Dade (Contract) provides in Article XXI, Section 1.B.1.a, that "[a]ny member of the instructional staff may be suspended or dismissed at any time during the school year, provided that the charges against him/her are based upon Florida Statutes." Article XXI, Section 2.G, sets forth the Drug-Free Workplace General Policy Statement. Section 2.G.b provides the policy statement on illegal drugs, Section 2.G.c provides the policy statement on alcohol and prescription drugs, and Section 2.G.d provides the policy statement on employee drug screening. Under employee drug screening, Section 2.G.d.5 states: [Petitioner] recognizes that chemical dependency is an illness that can be successfully treated. It is the policy of [Petitioner], where possible, to seek rehabilitation of employees with a self- admitted or detected drug problem. Disciplinary action may be instituted against employees who the Board believes will not be assisted by rehabilitation or who have negatively impacted students and/or staff. Employees who have previously been referred for assistance or employees unwilling or unable to rehabilitate may be subject to appropriate action, pursuant to Board Policy, applicable Florida Statutes, State Board Rules, and applicable provisions of collective bargaining agreements. Petitioner has invoked two of its rules in this case. Rule 6Gx13-4A-1.21, which is a statement of "Responsibilities and Duties," requires, at Section 1, all employees "to conduct themselves, both in their employment and in the community, in a manner that will reflect credit upon themselves and the school system." It is unnecessary to determine whether the Contract incorporates this rule, or whether Petitioner may otherwise rely on this rule to dismiss an instructional employee during the school year. Rule 6Gx13-4-1.05 (Rule), which is the "Drug-Free Workplace General Policy Statement," is a restatement of the Drug-Free Workplace General Policy Statement contained in the Contract. The prominent role of the Drug-Free Workplace General Policy Statement in the Contract, as well as its provision for the dismissal of employees, justifies Petitioner’s reliance upon a violation of the Rule as a basis for dismissing an instructional employee during the school year, notwithstanding the provision of the Contract otherwise requiring that all such dismissals be based on violations of Florida Statutes. In most respects, the Drug-Free Workplace General Policy Statement is the same in the Rule and the Contract. The Rule provides for "disciplinary sanctions" against employees who have violated the "standards of conduct" set forth within the Rule. Like the Contract, the Rule contains three "policy statements," which supply most of the operative provisions of the Rule. For illegal drugs, the policy statement, as set forth in the Rule, provides: "Employees are expected to conduct themselves in a manner consistent with the following provisions: Employees on duty or on School Board property will not manufacture, distribute, dispense, possess or use illegal drugs, nor will they be under the influence of such drugs. Employees on or off duty will not influence students to use illegal or abuse legal drugs. An employee convicted, adjudicated guilty, or who has entered a plea of guilty for an criminal drug statute violation occurring in the workplace shall notify [Petitioner] within 48 hours after final judgment. Paragraphs A and C are limited to acts and conditions that take place while an employee is on Petitioner's property or on duty. Paragraph B is limited to acts of the employee directed toward students. The evidence does not suggest that Respondent violated any of these provisions of the Rule. Petitioner failed to serve that the incidents involving Respondent sleeping while in charge of students appear not to have been due to her cocaine or heroin intoxication; it is at least as likely that the sleeping resulted from fatigue following the use of one or both of these drugs the preceding night. The distinction between intoxicating levels of these drugs and nonintoxicating trace amounts is explicitly dismissed by the Rule's treatment of alcohol, as to which employees must be "free of measurable . . . concentrations." After the policy statements on illegal drugs and alcohol and prescription drugs, the Rule sets forth the policy statement on employee drug screening. Although this part of the Rule fails to provide explicitly that a positive drug screen is a violation of the Rule, the introductory paragraph of the Rule acknowledges that Petitioner and the United Teachers of Dade are jointly committed "to create and maintain a drug-free work environment." Paragraph D within the drug-screening policy statement restates this purpose. Also, the disciplinary sanctions provided by the Rule clearly state that a refusal to submit to a drug test or a second violation of the Rule constitutes an inability to be assisted by rehabilitation; if a refusal to submit to a drug test is a violation, a failed drug test must also be a violation. These statements are therefore sufficient to provide that the presence in employees of even nonintoxicating amounts of illegal drugs, while on duty, constitute a violation of the Rule. In two respects, the Drug-Free Workplace General Policy Statement, as described in the Rule, is materially different from the Drug-Free Workplace General Policy Statement, as described in the Contract. First, the Rule adds another objective: To communicate that persons who violate the standards of conduct cited in this rule and who refuse or cannot be assisted by rehabilitation or who have negatively impacted students and/or staff shall be dismissed. Second, the Rule provides disciplinary sanctions for any violation--not just for violations of the drug-screening policy statement, as provided by the Contract--of the Drug-Free Workplace General Policy Statement. The Rule also adds two presumptive conditions for determining when an employee is unable to be assisted by rehabilitation. The Rule states: Employees who violate the standards of conduct cited it this rule and who the Board determines will not be assisted by rehabilitation or who have negatively impacted students and/or staff shall be dismissed. A refusal to submit to a drug test or a second violation of the Drug-Free Workplace Policy shall constitute an inability to be assisted by rehabilitation. . . . This case turns on whether Petitioner has proved that Respondent would not be assisted by rehabilitation because Petitioner has produced little detailed evidence of any negative impact upon Respondent's students. The record lacks detail of Respondent's specific teaching duties, the specific impact of her sleeping incidents or absences, and the academic achievements of her students during the periods in which these shortcomings took place. Notwithstanding the marked shortcomings in Respondent's performance as a teacher, Petitioner did not dismiss her until first giving her a chance to rehabilitate herself. The most likely inference is that Petitioner's administrative employees found that the situation did not satisfy the first criterion for dismissal--negatively impacting students. The basic issue, then, is whether Petitioner could reasonably have determined, from July to October 2000, that Respondent would not be assisted by rehabilitation. Petitioner could choose to show rehabilitation would be futile by relying on one of the two presumptions contained in the Rule. However, Respondent never refused to submit to a drug test, and difficult questions of her employment status in July 2000 obscure the determination as to whether her failure of the July 2000 drug test constitutes a second violation of the Rule. In this case, though, Petitioner may satisfy its standard of proof without regard to either of the presumptions in the Rule. After a display of considerable patience and good faith by Petitioner, Respondent, in July 2000, misrepresented to Petitioner that she was clean and sober and prematurely requested permission to return to teaching duties despite her knowledge that she was still abusing drugs and not ready to return to the classroom. These facts support the finding that, as of July or October 2000, Respondent would not be assisted by rehabilitation. This finding of the futility of rehabilitation, as of July or October 2000, is difficult due to the fact that subsequent events suggest that Respondent may finally be rehabilitating herself. After Petitioner dismissed her, Respondent underwent detoxification and then began treatment at St. Luke's Addiction Recovery Center, which is sponsored by Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Miami, Inc. She was in intensive residential treatment from November 6, 2000, through January 24, 2001. She later underwent nine urinalyses, through June 1, 2001--a day after the end of the hearing in this case-- and all of them were negative. Respondent is successfully participating in the St. Luke's aftercare program, where she takes weekly drug tests. She is proud of the fact that she has turned her life over to God and has achieved the longest period of sobriety that she has experienced in many years. After regaining sobriety, Respondent substituted for awhile and then found a job teaching a third-grade class at a private school in the Miami area. At the time of the hearing, Respondent had been so employed for six weeks, she had not been late or missed a day of school, and the school had invited her to teach again for the 2001-02 school year. Dr. Eustace opines that Respondent's prognosis is much improved from the prognosis of September 2000.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order dismissing Respondent from employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of November, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Roger C. Cuevas, Superintendent Miami-Dade County School Board 1450 N. E. Second Avenue Room 912 Miami, Florida 33132-1308 Luis M. Garcia Attorney's Office School Board of Miami-Dade County 1450 Northeast Second Avenue Suite 400 Miami, Florida 33132 Richard Baron Baron and Cliff 11077 Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 307 Miami, Florida 33161 Honorable Charlie Crist Department of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 James A. Robinson, General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, Suite 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue Whether Respondent’s application for renewal of its child care facility license was untimely submitted; and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact DCF is the state agency that licenses and regulates child care facilities in Florida. Small World is a licensed child care facility in Miami, Florida, that has been doing business at this location for at least several years. As a licensed child care facility, Small World undergoes at least three routine inspection visits a year by DCF. During its second routine evaluation in the summer of 2020, Small World was reminded by Alexis Stevens, former DCF Family Services Counselor, that its renewal application was due to be submitted to DCF at least 45 days prior to its license expiration on November 23, 2020. Ms. Stevens provided this courtesy reminder to prevent Small World from incurring a penalty for a late filing. Ms. Stevens, who had been Small World’s point of contact at DCF for several years, had no concern that Small World would be late because, in the past, Small World was never late, and it consistently filed all materials needed for renewal of its license. At the beginning of October 2020, Ms. Stevens advised Small World that DCF’s Miami office was closed to the public due to COVID-19 and directed Small World to mail its renewal application rather than hand- delivering it as it had done in the past. The owners of Small World were aware the renewal application needed to be submitted to DCF on or before October 9, 2020. Small World’s owner, Marcia Martorell, completed the renewal application packet on October 1, 2020. On the next day, her daughter mailed the application packet from the Miami post office to DCF’s Miami office by certified, return receipt requested, mail. They reasonably anticipated that, at most, delivery would occur within a few days and in plenty of time to avoid the October 9, 2020, deadline. According to the United States Postal Service (“USPS”) tracking record, the application package was signed for by an individual at the DCF Miami office on October 13, 2020. However, the actual “green card” receipt bears no signature, and instead is marked “CO19” (presumably for COVID-19) on October 15, 2020. DCF Secretary Assistant, Susan Freeman, received the package on October 13, 2020, from the DCF mailroom and date-stamped each page. Ms. Freeman does not know on what date the package arrived in the mailroom. Ms. Freeman testified that although the office was closed to the public, most days the staff came to the office to complete their assigned duties, including receiving checks and other mail, including license renewal packages. However, she also recalled that the office was completely closed to personnel for several days due to riots in Miami.
Conclusions For Petitioner: Aaron Feuer, Esquire Department of Children and Families 401 Northwest 2nd Avenue, Suite N1014 Miami, Florida 33128-1740 For Respondent: Marcia Esther Martorell, pro se It's A Small World Academy, Inc. 2990 Northwest 81st Terrace Miami, Florida 33147
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Families enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of August, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: S MARY LI CREASY Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of August, 2021. Marcia Esther Martorell It's A Small World Academy 2990 Northwest 81st Terrace Miami, Florida 33147 Aaron Feuer, Esquire Department of Children and Families 401 Northwest 2nd Avenue, Suite N1014 Miami, Florida 33128-1740 Danielle Thompson, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Families Office of the General Counsel 2415 North Monroe Street, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Javier Enriquez, General Counsel Department of Children and Families Office of the General Counsel 2415 North Monroe Street, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32303
The Issue Whether the Respondent, a licensed assisted living facility (ALF), committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and, if so, the penalties Petitioner should impose against Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the regulatory authority responsible for licensure and enforcement of all applicable statutes and rules governing ALFs in Florida. Loving Care is licensed by Petitioner as a 16-bed ALF at 380 Northwest South River Drive, Miami, Florida. Adrian Goett is the principal owner and authorized representative of Loving Care. Adjacent to Loving Care is an independent living facility owned by Mr. Goett and referred to at the formal hearing as 3320 Northwest Seventh Avenue, Miami, Florida (the adjacent facility). The adjacent facility is not licensed as an ALF. A survey of Loving Care in May of 2012 revealed that the facility had 28 residents, which exceeded its licensed capacity by 12 residents. In June and July 2012, four former Loving Care residents moved from that facility to the adjacent facility. A fifth resident moved from Loving Care to an unknown address. Resident 1 was admitted to Loving Care on November 22, 2010, and was discharged from Loving Care on June 4, 2012. Resident 1 moved from Loving Care to the adjacent facility. Resident 2 was admitted to Loving Care on August 18, 2002, and was discharged from Loving Care on June 4, 2012. Resident 2 moved from Loving Care to the adjacent facility. Resident 3 was admitted to Loving Care on July 2, 2010, and was discharged from Loving Care on July 13, 2012. Resident 3 moved from Loving Care to the adjacent facility. Resident 4 was admitted to Loving Care on June 21, 2011, and was discharged from Loving Care on June 4, 2012. Resident 4 moved from Loving Care to the adjacent facility. A Form 1823 (Form 1823) is a health assessment form approved by Petitioner that is completed for each resident of an ALF upon admission and every three years thereafter. The form is also completed if the resident experiences a change of condition. A Form 1823 was completed for Resident 1 on October 25, 2011. That assessment reflected that Resident 1 needed supervision for bathing, dressing, eating, and self-care. The assessment reflected that Resident 1 needed assistance preparing meals, shopping, making telephone calls, handling personal affairs, and taking medication. Resident 1 needed daily oversight in the categories "observing wellbeing," "observing whereabouts," and "reminders for important tasks." A Form 1823 was completed for Resident 2 on June 16, 2011. That assessment reflected that Resident 2 needed supervision and daily reminders for self-care grooming. Resident 2 required supervision with preparing meals, and handling personal and financial affairs. Resident 2 also needed assistance with self-administration of medication. Resident 3 had no records at Loving Care on October 1, 2012, the date of a survey. No records were produced at the formal hearing for Residents 4 and 5. There was no evidence that the respective needs of Resident 1 or 2 changed from the dates of their assessments to the dates of their discharge from Loving Care. After the four former residents of Loving Care moved to the adjacent facility, Loving Care provided those residents cleaning services and food. The adjacent facility charged the former residents rent. There was no evidence that Loving Care or the adjacent facility provided supervision or assistance with the residents’ activities of daily living. There was no evidence as to how those needs were being met. During the survey on October 1, 2012, the surveyors found two locked medication carts in the adjacent facility. The Administrator of Loving Care was summoned to the area and produced a key that unlocked the medication carts. Inside the carts were prescription medicines for Residents 1, 2, and 4. There was no evidence regarding how the medications came to be in the locked medication carts. There was no evidence as to who had keys to the cart, other than Loving Care’s administrator. These medicines were packaged using bingo cards, which is the way medications are typically administered to institutional residents. A bingo card is a sheet, with each dose of medication sealed in a blister package that is punched out when the dose is administered. Mr. Goett testified that all five of the residents cited in the Administrative Complaint lived independently after they were discharged from Loving Care. Mr. Goett denied that the adjacent facility provided any assistance with activities of daily living or any other services to its residents that would require the adjacent facility to become licensed as an ALF.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of April, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of April, 2014. COPIES FURNISHED: Adrian Goett Loving Care Retirement Services, Inc. 380 Northwest South River Drive Miami, Florida 33128 Nelson E. Rodney, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Suite 300 8333 Northwest 53rd Street Miami, Florida 33166 Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Elizabeth Dudek, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration Mail Stop 1 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Stuart Williams, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioners, foster parents trained in the care of children with medical disabilities, permitted a two-year-old medically disabled deaf child to be unattended during a brief conversation, resulting in the child's later being found facedown in the family's swimming pool; and as a result of that near-drowning experience is permanently on a life support system, are guilty of having committed an intentional or negligent act materially affecting the health or safety of the medically disabled child.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying, exhibits admitted in evidence, and the arguments of the parties, the following relevant, material, and substantive facts are found: Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating foster care in the state. Petitioners were granted a medical foster care license on August 31, 2000, after making application with Help-A-Child, Inc., and being approved by the Department under Section 409.175, Florida Statutes. At all times material to this case, Petitioners, Ronald Bryson and Joyce Bryson, husband and wife, resided at 1476 Highland Circle, in Pinellas County, Florida. Petitioners completed required training in fostering medically needy foster children, and medically needy children were placed with Petitioners through Help-A-Child, a placement agency that specialized in placing medically needy children with special trained foster parents. Petitioners fostered three medically needy children. One medically needy child fostered by Petitioner was A.S., born on April 21, 2000. A.S. suffered with Wardensburg Syndrome (genetic deafness), microcephalic, developmental delays, weakness of motor skills, short stature, and had been in Petitioners' foster care for 14 months, from February 2001 to April 17, 2002, until removed because of a near-drowning incident on April 17, 2002. On April 17, 2002, while fostered at Petitioners' family residence, A.S. was found facedown in Petitioners' swimming pool. The swimming pool is not attached to the family residence. After removing A.S. from the pool, Cardio Pulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) was administered, 911 called, and A.S. was Bayflighted to a hospital in Broward County, Florida. Upon her arrival at the Broward County hospital A.S. was placed on a life support system where she shall remain indefinitely. In response to the 911 call, Sergeant Torres, Clearwater Police Department, along with the patrol office, were the first law enforcement personnel on the scene. Detective Kliensorge, accompanied by Detective Fellicci, arrived shortly thereafter. Detective Kliensorge conducted the initial investigation of A.S.'s near-drowning incident. The record evidence establishes the incident to have occurred sometime between 5:00 p.m. and 5:15 p.m. on April 17, 2002. Petitioner, Joyce Bryson, recalled the following sequence of events leading up to the near drowning of A.S. She and her two grandchildren, Cazi and Izac, had been in the back yard in the swimming pool. She escorted her two grandchildren from the swimming pool through an aluminum screen door onto the patio and through a sliding glass door into the kitchen. After they were in the kitchen, Joyce Bryson instructed her grandchild, Cazi, "to close the door." Joyce Bryson assumed Cazi or Izac closed the sliding glass door and further assumed that the sliding glass door leading into the kitchen and the aluminum screen door on the back porch were both locked. Joyce Bryson did not personally check to ascertain whether the sliding glass door or the aluminum screen door was locked after entry by she and her grandchildren. Once in the kitchen, Joyce Bryson began cooking chicken nuggets and French fries for her grandchildren's birthday dinner. During this time in the kitchen, A.S. was in her sight and in her presence. Joyce Bryson finished cooking the chicken nuggets and French fries. She then seated her grandchildren and at the dining room table. She then lifted Savannah, another foster child, out of her swing set and placed Savannah in her highchair. During these several activities, A.S. was constantly at her side. After Joyce Bryson seated her grandchildren at the dining table; Matt Wolfe, the prospective adoptive parent of Savannah, came into the kitchen. Upon his arrival, Joyce Bryson took Savannah out the highchair and gave her to Matt Wolfe who held her in his arms. With Matt Wolfe holding Savanna, he and Joyce Bryson engaged in a short conversation. At some point during the conversation with Matt Wolf, Joyce Bryson became aware that A.S. was no longer in her presence or within her sight. Joyce Bryson asked of everyone "Where is Angela?" Ronald Bryson, her husband; Mr. Wolf; and her two grandchildren looked about the house for A.S. After an undetermined amount of time, but not more than five minutes,1 A.S. was found face down in the swimming pool by one of Joyce Bryson's grandchildren. In a time span of approximately two to eight minutes, A.S., with weak motor skills, traveled unnoticed from the kitchen area, across the back porch into Petitioners' swimming pool. Due to A.S.'s deafness, Joyce Bryson's minimum duty of care required A.S. to be within her presence or within her sight at all times. During the time interval when Joyce transferred Savannah from her swing to her highchair and from her highchair to Mr. Wolf's arms followed by her conversation with Mr. Wolf, Joyce Bryson did not have A.S. within her sight, and the near drowning incident occurred. But for Joyce Bryson's lack of attention to A.S.'s whereabouts during the time period she was moving Savannah from her swing to her highchair and from her highchair to Mr. Wolf's arms, followed by her conversation with Mr. Wolf, A.S. would not have been able to move from her side into the swimming pool, unobserved. I find that Joyce Bryson's negligent lapse of attention to be the primary cause of A.S.'s near-drowning episode. Based upon the Findings of Fact herein above, Respondent has proven that Petitioners committed a negligent act materially affecting the health or safety of the medically disabled child, A.S.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order affirming revocation of Petitioners' license. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of January, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of January, 2003.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's furlough should be revoked based on his failure to comply with the terms of the furlough agreement which he executed on April 6, 1981. Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Samuel Grant, is a seventeen (17) year-old male who was furloughed to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, Youth Services Division, on April 14, 1981. At that time he agreed to abide by a furlough agreement which required, inter alia, that he (1) obey all laws; (2) not change or leave his residence, employment, or school, or leave the county without the consent of his counselor or other authorized HRS representatives; (3) that he keep in contact with his counselor and (4) that all instructions of his counselor be carried out. Additionally, he agreed to abide by a 9:00 P.M. curfew on week days and an 11:30 P.M. curfew on weekends; attend community mental health for counseling; attend school or find gainful employment and make weekly contact with his counselor on Wednesdays of each week. (Petitioner's Exhibit 2.) On September 8, 1981, the Youth Services Division revoked Petitioner's furlough agreement based on the following facts: (1) Petitioner failed to obey laws and he gambled for his income; (2) failed to follow instructions of his parents and counselor; (3) continuously violated his curfew and (4) failed to attend school or maintain employment. (Petitioner's Exhibits 1 and 3, and Testimony of Jesse Morris, Petitioner's counselor while furloughed at the Belle Glade Youth Center.) The evidence herein also reveals that Petitioner was expelled from school because he possessed marijuana and his mother testified herein that he violated his curfew on numerous occasions. Petitioner's mother indicated that he spent nights away from home on a number of occasions and that he was afforded an opportunity to work with his father, a contractor, who extended a job offer to Petitioner. Petitioner has repeatedly run afoul of criminal laws from December, 1978, through October, 1980, including, but not limited to: (1) unauthorized use of a motor vehicle; (2) malicious mischief; (3) resisting arrest with violence; (4) possession of burglary tools, night prowling, and (5) burglary and grand larceny. Petitioner does not dispute the above findings; offered that he felt that he was not breaking the law and that he did not consider that it was "right" for him to attend school. He offered no explanation as to his failure to accept the offer of employment extended by his father.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Respondent's Order of September 8, 1981, revoking Petitioner's furlough, and ordering him to be reassigned to another program or facility as soon as practical, be SUSTAINED. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of February, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Samuel L. Grant c/o Florida School for Boys Route 7, Box 250 Okeechobee, Florida 33472 K. C. Collette, Esquire Department of HRS 111 Georgia Avenue Third Floor West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
The Issue The issue for determination is whether just cause exists for termination of Respondent Mabel Johnson’s employment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered terminating the employment of Respondent, Mabel Johnson. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of February, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of February, 2005.
