Findings Of Fact The Charging Party is now, and has been at all times material herein, an employee organization within the meaning of Chapter 447.203(10), Florida Statutes. The Charging Party was certified by the Public Employees Relations Commission on February 4, 1975. At all times material herein Jack Present, was the City Manager of the Respondent, the City of South Miami, Florida and was an agent of the Respondent, acting in its behalf, and/or a managerial employee within the meaning of Chapter 447.203(4) Florida Statutes. The Respondent is now, and has been at all times material herein a public employer within the meaning of Chapter 447.203 (2) Florida Statutes and has as its principal 1ace of business located in Dade County, Florida, where it is engaged in the business of operating a municipality. The Respondent is created directly by the Florida State Constitution or legislative body so as to constitute a department or administrative arm of the government and is administered by individuals who are responsible to public officials or to the general electorate. During the course of contact between the Charging Party and the Respondent, a charge of unfair labor practices was brought by the Charging Party on October 30, 1975, and was served on the Respondent on October 29, 1975, as shown in PERC Exhibit #1A, admitted into evidence. This charge has been withdrawn by the Public Employees Relations Commission. Subsequent to October 30, 1975, an amended charge was filed by the Charging Party dated January 10, 1976, and was served on the Respondent on January 9, 1976, and this amended charge is PERC Exhibit #1B, admitted into evidence. A second amended charge was filed by the Charging Party on January 12, 1976, and was served on the Respondent on January 12, 1976, and this charge is PERC Exhibit #10, admitted into evidence. Pursuant to Chapter 447.503(3)(a), Florida Statutes, and Chapter 8H-4.03, Florida Administrative Code, the Public Employees Relations Commission issued a complaint and notice of hearing. A copy of the original complaint and notice of hearing for May 6, 1976, at 9:00 A.M., Room 358, State of Florida Office Building, 1350 Northwest 12th Avenue, Miami, Florida is PERC Exhibit #1, admitted into evidence. This exhibit shows some amendments which were offered in the course of the hearing on May 6, 1976; however, the final statement of amendment to the complaint was by an amended complaint and notice of hearing to be held on June 3, 1976, at 9:00 A. M. in Room 360, State Office Building, 1350 Northwest 12th Avenue, Miami, Florida. A copy of the amended complaint and notice of hearing is Hearing Officer's Exhibit #1, an exhibit admitted subsequent to the hearing. After the parties began to negotiate on May 14, 1975, the Charging Party submitted a set of contract proposals to the Respondent. A copy of this set of Contract proposals is PERC Exhibit #3, admitted into evidence. One of the articles in these proposals was Article #5 pertaining to dues check off. This article did not make mention of the Respondent charging a fee for providing services for this check off. Later on July 29, 1975, a formal request was made of the Respondent that it deduct fees and dues for the authorized employees of the Charging Party. In that same month of July, 1975, the City of South Miami submitted its own proposals for contract, which is FREE Exhibit #7, admitted into evidence. The management proposal also contains an Article #5, containing dues check off, which does not carry with it a request for payment of a fee to the City for the implementation of such a dues check off system. On September 1, 1975, because of certain disagreements, the parties appeared before a special master in accordance with Chapter 447.403, Florida Statutes. At the special master's hearing, the question of dues check off was considered. The City of South Miami presented an addendum to the previously agreed upon Article #5, which addendum requested that the union pay for the services for any dues check off service performed by the City. This addendum was rejected by the special master and a recommendation was made that the parties may wish to consider renegotiating the Article #5 on dues check off. Statement of the Special Master's position is found in PERC Exhibit #4, admitted into evidence, which is a copy of the Special Master's Report and is specifically found on page 3 of that document. On November 13, 1975, at a negotiating session for purposes of finalizing the contract agreement, further demand was made by the Charging Party that the City implement a dues check off system. PERC Exhibit #2, admitted into evidence, which is a copy of the proposed agreement entered into by Mr. Jack Present, a negotiator for the Respondent, has within it an Article #5 pertaining to dues checkoff. That article does not contain a clause on reimbursement to the City for services rendered in the dues check off system. This agreement was the consummation of the efforts of the session of November 13, 1975, and therefore gives an accurate account of agreement on the check off question. Nonetheless, a dues check off system has not been implemented by the City of South Miami at the time of the hearing before the undersigned. While the negotiations were underway the Respondent was in the process of designing new personnel rules and the initial draft of those rules came out on July 29, 1975. The copy of those proposed rules, as they were passed on March 2, 1976, is Respondent's Exhibit #1, admitted into evidence. It is the testimony of the City of South Miami witnesses, that mention had been made in negotiations with the Charging Party about the proposed rules, prior to the draft of July 29, 1976. They further stated that these initial drafts were given to the Charging Party in August, 1975. It was the understanding of the Respondent, that the proposed rules would be the basis for any contract agreement with the Charging Party. The recollection of the witnesses of the Charging Party was to the effect that the proposed rules were afforded to them on September 11, 1975, the date of the special master's hearing. In their mind, these proposed rules were only given as a matter of background and were not indicated as effective in the negotiations. The proposed rules are in conflict with the contract proposals recommended by the Charging Party in PERC Exhibit #3 and this supports the theory that the Charging Party was not considering the utilization of the proposed personnel rules when it made its initial proposal of agreement to the Respondent. This document is followed by the agreement between the City of South Miami and the Charging Party as negotiated by the representatives of those parties with its attendant introductory correspondence of November 14, 1975. It states in its Articles 19, 20, 22, 23, and 24 that the personnel rules contemplated by the agreement are those rules currently in effect. Again, this contract refers to PERC Exhibit #2. The statement found in those articles refer to current policy and the current policies are stated in the then personnel rules. On November 14, 1975, the personnel rules in effect here as shown by PERC Exhibit #6, admitted into evidence. these rules varied in content from the set of rules finally passed by the City of South Miami, City Council, on March 2, 1976. Both of the sets of personnel rules were introduced at the special master's hearing, as Exhibit #B1 for the current personnel rules as of that date and Exhibit #B2 for the proposed personnel regulations; however, no further comment is made by the Special Master Report as to what rules would have application in any agreement entered into by tie parties. On November 4, 1975, the City Council of the City of South Miami met to consider the impasse articles which were brought before the special master, and on that date no mention was made of which personnel rules would have application The next order of events after November 4, 1975, was the meating of November 13, 1975 held by the parties to consider the finalization of the contract. On December 2, 1975, the City Council considered the passage of the agreement reached between the negotiators of the Charging Party and the Respondent. At that time, members of the council expressed the opinion that the proposed personnel rules would be the rules involved in any contract negotiation and felt that failure to include such changes as shown in the proposed personnel regulations would cause problems in their accepting the agreement between the parties. The City Manager as a negotiator for the Respondent was directed to verify the position of the Charging Party on the question of which personnel rules would be in effect. On December 17, 1975, a meeting was held between the parties and discussion was conducted about which personnel rules would apply. The Charging Party was concerned that it not enter into an agreement to implement rules which had not been finally passed by the City Council and they felt the existing personnel rules would have application. On January 5, 1976, a further workshop meeting was held to consider the proposed personnel rules and the Charging Party indicated that those personnel rules were not acceptable and indicated that they would not negotiate further on those matters. The position of the City of South Miami on January 5, 1976, was that the implementation of the proposed personnel rules was a matter of strong concern for the City, to the extent that any contract agreement which failed to implement those rules would be in serious jeopardy. On January 6, 1975, the full City Council met and voted to reject the agreement entered by its representative and the Charging Party. This vote was by resolution which directed that its City Manager, as negotiator, further negotiate beyond the agreement which they rejected. This resolution is found as Respondent's Exhibit #6 admitted into evidence. Another item considered in the complaint pertains to the statements of paragraphs 5 through 10 of that complaint. The items set forth in those paragraphs were addressed as impasse subjects in the Special Master's Hearing on September 11, 1975. The recommendation of the special master on the subject of that impasse article #29, Section 9d(ii) is found on page 9 of the Special Master's report. In the November 4, 1975, public meeting to consider the impasse items, the City Council voted to accept the Special Master's recommendation on Section 9d(ii). Likewise, in considering the recommendation of the Special Master on Article #29, Section 9d(iv) at page 10 of the Special Master's report, the City Council accepted the Special Master's recommendation with the addition of the words "except for emergencies", which was added at the end of the Special Master's recommendation. Finally, in considering impasse Article #43, Section 10(c), of the Special Master's recommendation on that article, found at page 10 of the Special Master's report, the City Council voted to approve his recommendation with the modification which stated, "unless it becomes necessary to change the hours because of an emergency, it may do so." A tape was made of this meeting of November 4, 1975. After listening to Respondent's Exhibit #7, admitted into evidence after the hearing, there is evidently a great deal of confusion by the City Council about their votes on the impasse articles; however, the tape clearly demonstrates their approval of the three sections previously referred to, with the subjet modification. At the December 2, 1975, meeting of the full council of the City of South Miami, there was some question in the minds of the members of the council about their vote on the impasse items of November 4, 1975. Furthermore at the December 16, 1975, meeting of the full council there was still some question about the impasse articles. Respondent's Exhibit #4, minutes on that meeting, indicates that members of the council felt that the impasse articles of the Special Master that had been voted on, which were found in Article #29 through #31 of the proposed contract (PERC Exhibit #2), should be stricken. These comments on Article #29 through #31 were given as instructions to the City Manager for his negotiating session of December 17, 1975, which has previously been discussed. At the meeting of December 17, 1975, mention was made of the continuing distress that the City Council members had over some of these articles referred to. This mention was made, notwithstanding the City Attorney' s assurance to the Charging Party that he had advised the council that they could not overturn their agreement on impasse articles. This was followed on January 6, 1976, by the vote of the full council to reject the proposed agreement negotiated by the City Manager. On December 2, 1975, at a regular meeting, the City Council passed Resolution 134-75-3362, which appropriated the amount of $900 for the purpose of purchasing turkeys for each and every employee of the City of South Miami. Minutes on this item are found in Respondent's Exhibit 63, admitted into evidence. Payment for the turkeys was made from operating funds of the Mayor and members of the City Council, and these funds are an independent line item of the budget. They are subject to be utilized by the Mayor and other members of the City Council as deemed appropriate by those persons. This action was taken subsequent to a statement by the Respondent at the Special Master's Hearing of September 11, to the effect that wage demands by the Charging Party could not be met because the budget from October 1, 1975 to September 30, 1976, for the City of South Miami, had been passed and could not be changed to meet those demands during the negotiating period. A full explanation of this statement is found ill the Special Master's Report, PERU Exhibit #4 At present negotiations between the Respondent and Charging Party have been discontinued.
Recommendation Based upon the violations of Chapter 447.501(1)(a) and (c), Florida Statutes, it is recommended that the Public Employees Relations Commission issue an order requiring that the Respondent cease and desist from bargaining in bad faith by committing those violations which are set forth in the conclusions of law section of this recommended order, and by their order take such further steps as are necessary to achieve prompt agreement between the parties. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of August, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas W. Brooks, Esquire Public Employees Relations Commission 2003 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 300 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert A. Sugarman, Esquire Kaplan, Dorsey, Sicking & Hessen, P.A. Post Office Drawer 520337 Miami, Florida 33152 Edward N. Moore, Esquire Moore, Kessler & Sheradsky 1995 Southwest 3rd Avenue Miami, Florida 33129
The Issue Whether the City of Ocala (the City or Respondent), violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, sections 760.01- 760.11, Florida Statutes,1/ by discriminating against Nyleah Jackson (Petitioner) because of her race.
Findings Of Fact On May 2, 2016, Petitioner, who is an African-American female, was hired by the City as an Administrative Specialist II in its Electric Utility Department. On October 10, 2016, Petitioner moved to a lateral Administrative Specialist II position with the City’s Public Works Department to perform generally the same type of duties in that department’s sanitation division. An Administrative Specialist II is expected to regularly and competently prepare correspondence, maintain records, provide customer service, compile reports, and prepare schedules and payroll. As an Administrative Specialist II, Petitioner received mostly satisfactory, although never exceptional, ratings in her performance evaluation reviews in both the City’s Electric and Public Works Departments. In each of Petitioner’s performance evaluation reviews, her rater or supervisor was tasked with assigning a 1, 2, or 3 rating for each of 10 different tasks, examples of which include “Quality of Work,” “Efficiency,” “Responsibility,” and “Customer Focus.” A rating of 1 means that the employee performed a task below the standard. A rating of means that the employee meets task requirements. A rating of means the employee exceeds standards. Petitioner received a rating of 2 (Meets Standard) for every task on every review produced by the City, except for her April 19, 2017, evaluation on which Petitioner received a 1 in the category of “Responsibility” due to alleged problems related to tardiness and failure to properly notify her supervisors of absences. During January 2017, an Administrative Specialist III position became available within the City’s sanitation division because the person previously filling that position moved into another position. In accordance with the City’s hiring process governed by its City Employee Handbook, the City’s Human Resources Department (HR) reviewed the vacant Administrative Specialist III position, confirmed that it was budgeted and set to be filled, and evaluated whether it was governed by any collective bargaining agreements. Upon determining that the position was governed by the City’s collective bargaining agreement with the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, on January 13, 2017, the City posted the job internally for five days to allow existing City employees to apply for the position before allowing external applications. Similar to the Administrative Specialist II position, the City’s Administrative Specialist III position is required to regularly and competently prepare correspondence, maintain records, provide customer service, compile reports, and prepare schedules and payroll. An Administrative Specialist III, however, has expanded duties and responsibilities. While all administrative specialists throughout the City perform similar tasks, each division in the City may have a different distribution of duties for its employees due to the kind of work required for that division’s services. These differences would not be reflected in the listing for an open Administrative Specialist III position. Such listings were drafted by an outside consultant to generally describe the Administrative Specialist III position for all departments throughout the City. For the sanitation division, the Administrative Specialist III position has a substantial customer service component. Specifically, the Administrative Specialist III position in the sanitation division is required to answer a large volume of phone calls from angry citizens for various sanitation complaints. For that reason, the hiring managers placed importance on the applicants’ people skills, patience, and ability to maintain a calm, customer-friendly demeanor when dealing with angry citizens. Petitioner testified that the director of the City’s Public Works Department, Darren Park, suggested that she apply for the open Administrative Specialist III position due to Mr. Park’s belief that she had performed well in a previous interview. Therefore, Petitioner explained, on January 23, 2017, she applied for the City’s vacant Administrative Specialist III position in the sanitation division. In accordance with City policy, HR reviewed all of the internal applications for the position to preliminarily screen applicants who did not meet the minimal qualifications. Petitioner’s application and three other internal candidates’ applications were found to have met the minimal qualifications and were forwarded to the department’s hiring managers for interviews. Of the four internal applicants forwarded by HR to the hiring managers, the only other minority applicant was a Hispanic male. Shortly after the internal applications were submitted, the two hiring managers, Dwayne Drake and Cloretha McReynolds, reviewed the applications and interviewed the City’s internal applicants. Dwayne Drake, a Caucasian male, was the division head of sanitation. Cloretha McReynolds, an African-American female, was a supervisor in the sanitation division. A few days after the City received Petitioner’s application, Mr. Drake and Ms. McReynolds interviewed Petitioner for the open position. During Petitioner’s interview, as well as in all of the other interviews for the position, the hiring managers used a list of prepared questions, entitled “Sanitation Administrative Specialist III Behavioral Interview Questions.” The questions were designed to allow the hiring managers to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of an applicant’s personality traits, people skills, and behavioral characteristics. During her interview for the position, Petitioner admitted that one of her weaknesses was that her assertiveness could sometimes be mistaken for aggressiveness. This comment by Petitioner concerned Mr. Drake because the sanitation division has many callers already upset when they call. Mr. Drake felt that Petitioner’s comment was a “big hurdle” that Petitioner would have to overcome in order to be selected for the Administrative Specialist III position. Similarly, Ms. McReynolds testified that Petitioner’s response that her assertiveness could be misinterpreted as aggressiveness concerned her because “we were looking for a specific – we were looking for someone with a great personality.” When further pressed by Petitioner why customer service was valued so highly for the Administrative Specialist III position, Ms. McReynolds testified: Q. Okay. Are there different weights that you hold for one question than the other? For example, someone said they don’t have experience in payroll, but they also said that they are very well with handling customers, is there a system for you that you say: “Hey, well, this is more important than the other one? This one holds more weight than the other one”? A. Anyone can be taught to do payroll. Q. Right. A. Anyone can’t be taught to be respectful on the phone and customer friendly. I can teach someone how to do payroll, I can teach someone to do billing. I can teach someone how to do that position, but I can’t teach someone to be nice to the customers. And I needed a nice person, a person who is going to be able to, when they get yelled at, better keep calm and deal with it, calm the customer down. And that’s what I was looking for. After the internal interviews, and as provided for by the City Employee Handbook and its collective bargaining agreements, the hiring managers decided to list the available Administrative Specialist III position externally. Petitioner testified that, following her interview, Mr. Drake came to her office and told her that the hiring managers were looking for a “better fit” for the vacant Administrative Specialist III position and that the City would advertise the position externally. Petitioner testified that, based on this statement, she inferred that the hiring managers had already determined that the City would not hire any of the internal applicants for the vacant Administrative Specialist III position because they had already determined that none of the internal applicants were qualified. In his testimony, Mr. Drake confirmed that he spoke with Petitioner following her interview, but denied that he told Petitioner, or any other City employee applicant, that they were already disqualified. Instead, Mr. Drake explained that, following the internal applicant interviews, he spoke to Petitioner because she was a Public Works employee and he wanted to tell her in person that they were going to look for external applicants. Mr. Drake’s testimony is credited. After the open Administrative Specialist III position was listed externally, three external applications were forwarded to the hiring managers, who interviewed those candidates consistent with City policy, using the same prepared questions as used in the internal interviews. After completing the external interviews, the managers both decided Jenna Hylkema, a Caucasian female and external applicant, to be the best applicant, and she was hired for the position. Ms. Hylkema had a high school diploma, a bachelor degree in criminal justice and had previously worked for the City as a dispatcher for the Ocala Police Department. At the time she was hired for the Administrative Specialist III position, Ms. Hylkema was working at the Department of Children and Families investigating child abuse cases and related issues. Both of the hiring managers agreed that Ms. Hylkema’s employment history and performance in her interview made her the strongest candidate for the vacant Administrative Specialist III position. Notably, Ms. McReynolds testified that Ms. Hylkema “was a call – a 911 call person [at the police department], and she was able to deal with - I thought she would be better to deal with the stress level, as far as – and also her personality in accepting calls.” Both Mr. Drake and Ms. McReynolds confirmed that their ranking preference was informal and not reduced to writing, but that, after all of the interviews, they discussed each of their orders of preference out of the seven applicants. According to both hiring managers, Petitioner ranked third or fourth of the seven applicants. Although they believed Petitioner was qualified, the hiring managers thought that Jenna Hylkema’s work experience and performance in her interview made her the most qualified applicant for the position. Also notable, Ms. Hylkema performed better on the objective components of the interview process. Petitioner herself confirmed that Ms. Hylkema performed better than she had in the objective portions of the interview, including scoring twice as high in an objective typing speed test. Both hiring managers credibly testified that neither Petitioner’s race, Jenna Hylkema’s race, nor anyone else’s race influenced their decision to hire Ms. Hylkema for the vacant Administrative Specialist III position. A few months after Ms. Hylkema was hired for the vacant Administrative Specialist III position, another Administrative Specialist III position opened in the Public Works Street Division, which was filled by Erica Wilson, an African-American woman who, like Petitioner, was working as an Administrative Specialist II when she applied. Petitioner did not apply for this position. Petitioner confirmed this, but failed to provide any explanation as to why the City’s policies discriminated against her, as an African-American woman, but apparently did not discriminate against Erica Wilson in their decision to hire her for another open Administrative Specialist III only a few months later. When asked why she did not apply for the other Administrative Specialist III position, Petitioner testified that she wanted the Administrative Specialist III position in the sanitation division. Despite evidence indicating that there was no illegal discrimination in the City’s process of filling the position for which Petitioner had applied, Petitioner alleged that there were irregularities in the selection process. For example, Petitioner contends that Ms. Hylkema was not qualified because Ms. Hylkema held a criminal justice degree that did not include advanced business or secretarial classes in college. The evidence, however, demonstrated that the City’s hiring process was flexible enough to allow certain criteria to be waived in favor of other experience, and that all applicants who were interviewed met the minimal qualifications for the position. Petitioner also alleged improprieties in the hiring process on the grounds that the City’s hiring managers did not use a formal numerical scoring in their evaluations and failed to keep complete notes during their interviews to confirm that each question was asked to every candidate. The City’s hiring process for vacant positions, however, does not require any specific numerical scoring system or prescribed notation process. Rather, the evidence demonstrated that the hiring managers appropriately weighed their impressions of the candidates through their interviews and the other materials provided to determine who would be best to respond to angry phone calls that the City’s sanitation department would receive. Throughout that process, and with no evidence of illegal discrimination, the managers appropriately ranked Petitioner as the third or fourth best candidate for the Administrative Specialist III position. The evidence at the hearing did not reasonably suggest that the process used during the selection process was suspicious, vulnerable to arbitrariness, or indicative of illegal discrimination. When asked about the City’s interview procedure, Petitioner said that she had no objection to the City asking questions to discern whether or not, subjectively, the interviewers thought an applicant was a good fit for the job. In sum, the evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner was not hired for the open position for which she applied because of her race, or that the City otherwise engaged in illegal discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s Complaint and Petition for Relief consistent with the terms of this Recommended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of December, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of December, 2018.
Findings Of Fact The Parties. The Petitioner, Andrea Bateman, is a female. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Ms. Bateman was 41 or 42 years of age. Ms. Bateman is an attorney. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that she was a member of The Florida Bar during the period of time at issue in this proceeding. The Respondent, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is an agency of the State of Florida. Ms. Bateman's Employment by the Department. In October of 1990, the Department employed Ms. Bateman as an attorney in the Department's Office of Child Support Enforcement. Ms. Bateman was required to be a member of The Florida Bar. Ms. Bateman's position with the Department was classified as a "Select Exempt Service" position. Pursuant to Chapter 22SE-1.002(5), Florida Administrative Code, and Part V, Chapter 110, Florida Statutes, persons employed in select exempt service positions may be terminated from employment without cause. Ms. Bateman's immediate supervisor was Chriss Walker. Mr. Walker is a Senior Attorney with the Department and, at the time Ms. Bateman was hired, also served as the Assistant Secretary for Child Support Enforcement. As of December 4, 1991, the Assistant Secretary for Child Support Enforcement, and Mr. Walker's immediate supervisor was Anne F. Donovan. At all times relevant to this proceeding, William H. Bentley was an Assistant Deputy Secretary of the Department with supervisory authority over the Department's Assistant Secretary's, including Mr. Walker and Ms. Donovan. "Productivity Enhancement" at the Department. During 1991, the Department was required to evaluate all employment positions at the Department and to reduce those positions in an effort to improve the productivity of the Department. Generally, all positions at the Department and the work performed by the persons filling those positions were considered and decisions were made as to which positions could be eliminated. The Department referred to the elimination of positions as "red-lining". The Department also made efforts to insure that any person affected by the elimination of their position would be placed in another position. Ms. Bateman's attorney position with Child Support Enforcement was identified for elimination. Another attorney position in Child Support Enforcement and Mr. Walker's Senior Attorney position were not identified for elimination. The decision to eliminate one of the attorney positions was based upon conclusion that the administrative duties of the two attorney positions could be handled by a paralegal position and the legal duties could then be handled by one attorney. Efforts to assist Ms. Bateman to find another position were not successful. Ultimately, the Department decided to find a position in which to continue to employ Ms. Bateman rather than to terminate her position and release her. The Department reclassified another vacant position so that Ms. Bateman could continue to be employed as an attorney for Child Support Enforcement. Mr. Walker was directed to create an attorney position for Ms. Bateman by the Assistant Secretary for Human Services. This decision was made during the early Fall of 1991. The Department's decision to continue to employ Ms. Bateman was based in part on the Department's concern about terminating an employee of the Department. The evidence failed to prove that the Department acted unreasonably with regard to the red-lining of Ms. Bateman's position. Ms. Bateman's Performance. During the year after Ms. Bateman began her employment with the Department, Mr. Walker, Ms. Bateman's supervisor, began to develop concerns about the adequacy of her work product. Ms. Bateman also began to evidence behavior which was not acceptable for an attorney of the Department. As a result of Ms. Bateman's odd behavior, Mr. Walker became concerned about Ms. Bateman's mental well-being. Mr. Walker memorialized his concerns about Ms. Bateman in a memorandum to Mr. Bentley dated December 2, 1991. The memorandum was revised December 19, 1991 to eliminate references to a counselor that Ms. Bateman had informed Mr. Walker she was seeing. Ms. Bateman's work deteriorated to an extent which necessitated other employees carrying out some of her duties. Among the difficulties experienced with Ms. Bateman which formed a reasonable basis for terminating her employment were the following: Ms. Bateman had difficulty communicating with other employees and her supervisor. As an attorney, Ms. Bateman was required to communicate orally and in writing. She was unable to do so in an adequate manner. Ms. Bateman failed to demonstrate good judgment and trustworthiness and, therefore, her supervisors were unable to rely upon her judgment as an attorney of the Department. Ms. Bateman's appearance was unacceptable for an employee of the Department who was required to meet and communicate with the public. Ms. Bateman's hair was unkempt and dirty, her clothes were often soiled and wrinkled, she failed to brush her teeth and she appeared not to be bathing based upon her appearance and her strong body odor. Although required to do so by Department policy, Ms. Bateman refused to give her supervisor a permanent home address or phone number. On one occasion Ms. Bateman was found asleep in the offices of the Department at night and on one occasion she was found asleep during working hours. Based upon the inadequacy of Ms. Bateman's performance, the Department had a reasonable basis for terminating Ms. Bateman's employment. Mr. Walker's Evaluation of Ms. Bateman. On December 18, 1991, Mr. Walker presented Ms. Bateman with a Professional Employee Performance Appraisal form he had completed on her performance. The Appraisal was reviewed by Ms. Bateman and signed by her on December 18, 1991. Mr. Walker gave Ms. Bateman's performance a rating of "effective" on the Appraisal. Of the factors evaluated on the Appraisal, Mr. Walker judged Ms. Bateman's performance as "excellent" on one factor, "effective" on eleven factors and "needs improvement" on nine factors. Mr. Walker gave Ms. Bateman's performance an "effective" rating despite his conclusion that her work product was not acceptable and despite his concerns about her inappropriate behavior. He did so because he had recently been directed to create a position to keep Ms. Bateman as an employee of the Department and in an effort to avoid litigation over Ms. Bateman's termination. Mr. Walker did not believe that his supervisors wanted to avoid any difficulties concerning Ms. Bateman employment. Mr. Walker failed to follow Department procedure in presenting the Appraisal to Ms. Bateman. The Appraisal was required to be reviewed and approved by Mr. Walker's immediate supervisor, Ms. Donovan, before it was given to Ms. Bateman. Mr. Walker, contrary to Department policy, presented the Appraisal to Ms. Bateman before Ms. Donovan had seen and approved it. Ms. Donovan was aware of the problems with Ms. Bateman's performance and would not have approved an "effective" rating. Upon receiving the Appraisal, Ms. Donovan discussed the Appraisal with Mr. Walker and rejected it, as it was her right to do. Ms. Donovan, consistent with Department policy, specified that Ms. Bateman would be evaluated again in sixty days. The Department's Request that Ms. Bateman Undergo a Psychological Evaluation. Although the Department had a reasonable basis for terminating Ms. Bateman's employment by the end of 1991 and in early 1992, the Department decided to attempt to discover the cause of Ms. Bateman's decline in performance and the onset of her odd behavior rather than terminate her employment. The Department made this decision in an effort to determine what assistance Ms. Bateman might need. Ultimately, the Department was attempting to determine what work, if any, Ms. Bateman was capable of performing. The Department's decision was based upon a number of incidents involving Ms. Bateman. Those incidents are included in Mr. Walker's Chronology of December 2, 1991 and his Revised Chronology of December 19, 1991 and are hereby incorporated herein. Although not all the incidents described in the chronologies were proved during the final hearing to have occurred, the Department's consideration of the incidents reported by Mr. Walker was reasonable. Due to the Department's concerns about Ms. Bateman, the Department requested that Ms. Bateman voluntarily participate in the Department's employee assistance program. Ms. Bateman refused. In order to determine what could be done to help Ms. Bateman, and to determine what duties and responsibilities she was capable of performing, the Department requested that Ms. Bateman undergo a psychological, or other, evaluation. Ms. Bateman refused. After discussing the matter with Ms. Bateman and legal counsel she had retained, the Department notified Ms. Bateman that her continued employment was conditioned upon her undergoing a psychological evaluation or some other evaluation which would allow the Department to determine what work she was capable of performing. In a letter of February 12, 1992, Ms. Bateman, through her representative, was informed of the following: As you also know, we are attempting to help Andrea address a problem which we believe exists and has been well documented over the past 16 months. In return, we need Andrea's help and cooperation. If Andrea chooses to agree to our request that she undergo a psychiatric evaluation and authorize the release to us of the psychiatrist's prognosis, diagnosis and recommendation for treatment, we will be glad to schedule an appointment for her with a psychiatrist, and will pay for such an evaluation. We will use the evaluation to determine an appropriate course of action. Ms. Bateman's Termination from Employment. Ms. Bateman continued to refuse to undergo any evaluation or to suggest any alternative course of action. Consequently, based upon Ms. Bateman's inadequate and unacceptable work performance, the Department terminated Ms. Bateman's employment with the Department on or about February 13, 1992. Ms. Bateman's termination from employment was effective February 28, 1992. Ms. Bateman was terminated from employment due to the fact that she was not adequately performing her job and she refused to cooperate with the Department to find out what could be done to help her become an effective employee. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that the Department's reason for terminating her employment was a pretext. Ms. Bateman's Charge of Discrimination. On or about September 15, 1992, Ms. Bateman filed a Charge of Discrimination against the Department with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. Ms. Bateman alleged that she had been discriminated against on the basis of sex and a perceived handicap. On February 10, 1993, the Commission issued a "Determination: No Cause" finding "no reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice has occurred " Ms. Bateman filed a Request for Redetermination on March 4, 1992. On April 12, 1993, the Commission issued a "Redetermination: No Cause" affirming its decision. On May 12, 1993, Ms. Bateman filed a Petition for Relief seeking a formal administrative hearing. In the petition Ms. Bateman alleged that the Department had discriminated against her on the basis of sex, a perceived handicap and, for the first time, age. The Commission requested that the Division of Administrative Hearings assign a Hearing Officer to conduct the hearing requested by Ms. Bateman. Alleged Sex Discrimination. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that any action of the Department was based upon Ms. Bateman's sex: she was not held to any standard or requirement based upon her sex, she was not terminated because of her sex and the Department's efforts to determine the cause of Ms. Bateman's problems was not based upon her sex. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that any Department policy or standard had a disparate impact on female employees. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that she was replaced by a male attorney. Ms. Bateman's grooming habits were discussed with her. Some of those discussions concerned the wearing of panty hose and her makeup. It must be inferred that such discussions were not carried on with male employees. The evidence, however, failed to prove that Ms. Bateman's termination was based upon these matters. Although grooming played a part in the decision to terminate Ms. Bateman's employment, it was grooming related to basic cleanliness and neat appearance required of all employees and not just female employees. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that the Department discriminated against her on the basis of her sex, female. Alleged Age Discrimination. At the time that Ms. Bateman was hired she was 41 years of age, and at the time she was terminated she was 42 years of age. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that age played any part in her treatment by the Department. This finding is supported, in part, by the fact that the difference between Ms. Bateman's age when she was hired and when she was terminated was only one year. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that she was replaced by a younger person. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that the persons who made the decision to terminate her employment were aware of her age. Ms. Bateman failed to prove that the Department discriminated against her on the basis of her age. Alleged Perceived Handicap. The Department did believe that Ms. Bateman was suffering from some mental problem. This belief was based upon Ms. Bateman's odd behavior and a concern that Ms. Bateman was "homeless". It was for this reason that the Department requested that Ms. Bateman undergo a psychological evaluation. Ms. Bateman failed to prove, however, that the Department treated her differently from the manner other employees of the Department were treated under similar circumstances. Ms. Bateman also failed to prove that the Department's request that she undergo a psychological or other evaluation to determine how to assist her to meet the requirements of her employment was made for a discriminatory reason. Under the circumstances, the Department's request of Ms. Bateman was reasonable. Ms. Bateman also failed to prove that she was terminated from employment because of any perceived handicap. The evidence proved that she was in fact terminated from employment due to her inability to satisfactorily carry out her job responsibilities. Ms. Bateman also failed to allege or prove that she has a handicap based upon her mental condition. Ms. Bateman also failed to prove that the Department discriminated against her on the basis of a handicap or a perceived handicap.
Findings Of Fact There have been no significant changes in the organizational structure of the Public Employer since August, 1975. The duties, responsibilities, and day-to-day activities of persons who occupy given job titles within the Public Employer have not changed in any significant respect since August, 1975. The Findings of Fact set out in the Hearing Officer's Report entered on October 20, 1975 have continued vitality, and are hereby incorporated into this report as Findings of Fact as fully as if they were set out in full herein. The Sheriff of Brevard County is an officer who holds his position by virtue of Article VIII, Section 1(d) of the Constitution of the State of Florida. The duties, responsibilities, and powers of the Sheriff of Brevard County are delineated in Florida Statutes Ch. 30. There are no special statutes which alter the provisions of Ch. 30 with respect to the Sheriff of Brevard County. The organizational structure of the Public Employer is accurately described in an organizational chart which was received in evidence at the hearing as Public Employer's Exhibit 8. The organization structure is set out with more detail in a personnel roster which was received in evidence as Public Employer's Exhibit 2. The job descriptions of all job positions within the Public Employer were compiled and presented into evidence as Public Employer's Exhibit 5. The job descriptions accurately reflect the qualifications for each position, and the duties, responsibilities, and day-to-day activities of persons who fill the positions. The duties, responsibilities, and day-to-day activities of the employees are more fully described in the testimony of chief supervisory personnel of each division. 5 The functions of the Public Employer are divided among eleven divisions. The functions are appropriately and efficiently divided in this manner; however, there are features of the Public Employer which make generalizations difficult. A lieutenant in Division Four - Uniform Division has supervisory functions that are very different from the supervisory functions of a lieutenant in another division. Similarly the two sergeants in Division Ten - Headquarters Squad have profound supervisory functions which will not find their equivalent with sergeants in Division Eight - Communications. In defining an appropriate collective bargaining unit, it is important to consider each job title within each division separately. ENTERED this 3rd day of August, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. G. STEVEN PFEIFFER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph R. Moss, Esquire MOSS & HOLCOMB 653 Brevard Avenue Post Office Box 1907 Cocoa, Florida 32922 Phillip Nohrr, Esquire NOHRR & NOHRR Post Office Box 369 Melbourne, Florida 32901 Geoffrey B. Dobson, Esquire 1311 Executive Center Drive Suite 251 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Curtis L. Mack, Chairman Public Employees Relations Commission 2003 Apalachee Parkway Suite 300 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Did Respondent, Emerald Grande, LLC (Emerald), discharge Petitioner, Shelia Demons, on account of her race in violation of chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2013)?1/
Findings Of Fact By Notice dated December 3, 2013, the hearing was originally scheduled for January 14, 2014. On January 8, 2014, Petitioner filed a request that the hearing be continued. The undersigned continued the hearing until February 4, 2014. On January 17, 2014, Respondent filed an Unopposed Motion for Continuance. The undersigned continued the hearing until March 11, 2014. On March 7, 2014, Respondent filed a Motion to Exclude Petitioner’s Undisclosed Witnesses and (Proposed) Exhibits on the grounds that Petitioner had not disclosed her witnesses and exhibits to Respondent as required by the Order of Pre-Hearing Instructions. The hearing convened as scheduled at 9:00 a.m., Central Time, on March 11, 2014. Counsel for Emerald and Emerald's representative and witnesses appeared. Emerald had previously timely provided Petitioner with its witness and exhibit lists. As of 9:16 a.m., Ms. Demons had not appeared or contacted the office of the undersigned. At 9:17 a.m., counsel for Respondent moved, ore tenus, for an order of dismissal. The undersigned informed counsel for Respondent that a written recommended order would be entered granting Respondent’s motion. Ms. Demons presented no evidence. Emerald presented no evidence. The hearing was adjourned at 9:20 a.m. When the undersigned left the hearing room at 9:30 a.m., Petitioner had still not appeared or contacted the office of the undersigned.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations deny the Petition for Relief of Shelia Demons. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of March, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of March, 2014.
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner's position was properly reclassified from Career Service status to Selected Exempt status.
Findings Of Fact Prior to July 1, 2001, Petitioner, Cooper was employed in the Office of the Secretary of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) as a quality control analyst in a Career Service Employment Position classified and titled Administrative Assistant II Career Service. At the time, Petitioner held permanent Career Service status. The Administrative Assistant II position was certified by the Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC) as within the Career Service Administrative-Clerical collective bargaining unit, represented by the Florida Public Employees Council 79, AFSCME. In her position, Petitioner performed clerical functions. She did not supervise other employees, perform any managerial functions, or perform any confidential duties. She had no role in labor relations, collective bargaining, the adjustment of grievances filed by employees, or the imposition of discipline upon other employees for breaches of conduct. Similarly, Petitioner had no role in the preparation of agency budgets for collective bargaining, or for other purposes. Sometime around June 15, 2001, Petitioner was notified by DCFS that her position as an Administrative Assistant II would be reclassified as a position within the Selected Exempt Service (SES). The reclassification was effective July 1, 2001. No input from the Petitioner regarding the duties of her position was sought by the Department in its decision to reclassify Petitioner's position. Indeed, the Department reclassified the position based on the fact that Petitioner assisted or aided managerial employees and allegedly had access to confidential material. However, there was no evidence in the record that Petitioner's position involved any confidential matters. Petitioner was terminated from employment with DCFS, without explanation, on June 28, 2002. In terminating her employment as an Administrative Assistant II, DCFS represented that Petitioner had no appeal rights either to PERC or under the bargaining agreement between AFSCME and the State of Florida because her position had been reclassified. However, the evidence does not demonstrate that Petitioner's position was managerial, confidential or supervisory. Therefore, Petitioner's position should not have been reclassified to SES and she is entitled to her rights as a Career Service employee.
Findings Of Fact William H. Mathias was initially employed by SWFWMD as Director of Employee Relations on January 30, 1980, at pay grade At the time of Petitioner's employment William C. Tatum was Executive Director of SWFWMD. Petitioner has over ten years' experience in personnel relations and security and holds two master's degrees. Due partly to Petitioner's aggressiveness and strong personality, he began exerting influence in the personnel division in pushing the Personnel Department in directions not necessarily approved by Tatum. Tatum wanted to reduce the influence the Personnel Department was having on SWFWMD. On July 26, 1982, Petitioner was transferred to the Field Operations Division with no change in grade. Exhibit 5, which announced this transfer, stated Petitioner was transferred as Assistant Director. On July 28, 1982, a subsequent memorandum, Exhibit 6, was issued by Tatum changing Petitioner's title from Assistant Director to Acting Administrative Assistant. Prior to this transfer Tatum spoke with William F. Sietman, Director of Field Operations, who advised Tatum that he had no need for Petitioner in the Field Operations Division however, Tatum insisted that Petitioner, with his two master's degrees, could make a valuable contribution to SWFWMD if placed in the right niche. Shortly thereafter, Tatum was replaced as Executive Director by Gary W. Kuhl, who was promoted to that position from Assistant Executive Director. The first evaluation report submitted by Sietman on Petitioner, at the end of his first six months on the job, was unsatisfactory. Petitioner appealed to Kuhl, who withdrew his evaluation partly because no job description had been prepared for the position occupied by Petitioner. Kuhl directed the preparation of a job description for the work to be done by Petitioner. When the job description_ was prepared, the position was given the title of Program Management Analyst and the duties to be performed are as contained in Exhibit 1. Principally, Petitioner's function was to do some coordinating of the budgets prepared by the various sections in Field Operations, coordinate planning and negotiate and oversee the building maintenance contract. This position was a staff function as opposed to a line function in which the incumbent would exercise direction, or command, over the section heads. As a staff function his duties were coordination as opposed to direction. Subsequent to his initial unsatisfactory evaluation at the end of his six months probationary period, Petitioner's evaluations improved each evaluating period and at the time of his termination his performance can be described as very good. However, on several occasions complaints about Petitioner giving personnel advice to Respondent's employees regarding overtime, job classifications, and pay grades reached Kuhl. This was the subject of a memorandum addressed to Petitioner and Sietman by Kuhl on May 15, 1984 (Exhibit 7). Petitioner was told to leave personnel matters and advice to the Personnel Department or face disciplinary action. Changes in the functions imposed on Respondent in 1984 necessitated the employment of additional technical people and the establishment of additional technical positions at SWFWMD. The Governing Board indicated to the Executive Director that the budget could not be raised by the amount needed to fund all of these positions and that cuts would have to be made. Kuhl met with the various division heads to require more justification for the proposed new positions and to ascertain which existing positions they could eliminate. This resulted in a proposed list of positions including the librarian, Petitioner's position, and other positions currently unoccupied. As a result of these discussions it was concluded the unfilled positions and the position of Program Management Analyst could be eliminated. By memorandum dated August 17, 1984 (Exhibit 4), Kuhl advised the Governing Board of the proposed reduction in work force. By letter dated August 20, 1984 (Exhibit 15), Kuhl advised Petitioner that the position of Program Management Analyst was eliminated effective immediately and that he was eligible to apply for any other position in SWFWMD for which he was qualified. Petitioner appealed the termination to the Governing Board and, when the Board affirmed his termination, he filed the instant petition. Prior to the transfer of Petitioner to the Field Operations Division, the budget was prepared by each section chief for his section, and the division director coordinated the budgets. While Petitioner was assigned to Field Operations, he performed this budget coordination role previously taken by the director. When Petitioner's position was eliminated, the division reverted to the way it operated before Petitioner's arrival, with little, if any, noticeable effect. The role Petitioner had assumed in supervising the maintenance contract also reverted back to where it was before Petitioner's arrival, again with no noticeable effect.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment action against Petitioner contrary to Sections 760.10(1)(a) and 760.10(7), Florida Statutes (2006).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female who worked for Respondent's Division of Administrative Services from September 1992 through May 2006. Throughout her tenure, Petitioner consistently received favorable personnel evaluations. During her employment, Petitioner received only the legislatively mandated annual state worker pay increases. However, at the time she was terminated in May 2006, Petitioner was the highest paid non-supervisory employee in Respondent's Division of Administrative Services. At that time, Petitioner was making $70,000. From September 1992 until November 1993, Petitioner worked as Respondent's human resources/relations administrator. Sandy DeLopez, a white female who served as Respondent's Director of Administrative Services, was on the selection team that hired Petitioner for the position of human relations administrator. In that position, Petitioner was charged with the intake and administration of race-based discrimination complaints within the agency. Petitioner supervised two employees in her position as human relations administrator. In November 1993, Respondent moved Petitioner to the Office of Employee Relations. This move occurred because the former human relations administrator wanted to return to her previous position. There is no evidence that Petitioner objected to being moved to the Office of Employee Relations. In the Office of Employee Relations, Petitioner reported to Ken Wilson, the manager. While under his supervision, Petitioner handled employee grievances and drug testing, as well as maintaining Respondent's Supervisor Assistance System (SAS), a statewide computer program for supervisors. In 1997, Respondent moved Petitioner into the Bureau of Personnel Services. This move was in conjunction with Mr. Wilson's move to the Bureau of Personnel Services as Bureau Chief. Petitioner's assignment was to continue handling special projects, including the drug testing program and the SAS computer program. The Office of Employee Relations became the employee relations section in the Bureau of Personnel Services when Mr. Wilson became Bureau Chief. The Bureau of Personnel Services had other sections, including benefits, pay and classification, and employment. In 1997, the pay and classification section was combined with the employment section, and referred to thereafter as the organization development section. When Mr. Wilson became Bureau Chief of the Bureau of Personnel Services, his previous job position as manager of employee relations remained vacant after being advertised two times. Petitioner told Mr. Wilson that she was interested in filling his former position but she did not apply for the position either time it was advertised. Mr. Wilson had a very open relationship with Petitioner. Petitioner frequently told Mr. Wilson that she wanted or needed more money. Mr. Wilson never told Petitioner that Ms. DeLopez would not let Petitioner fill his former position as manager of the employee relations section because Ms. DeLopez had a "hard-on" for Petitioner. Mr. Wilson never heard Ms. DeLopez make the following statements: (a) referring to Petitioner as another one of Mr. Wilson's experiments that had failed; and (b) Petitioner could have been one of "Ms. Ever's boys." There is no evidence that Petitioner ever complained to Mr. Wilson about any statement by Ms. DeLopez. From June 1995 to March 1997, Rene Knight, a white female, was manager of the benefits section in the Bureau of Personnel Services. As manager, Ms. Knight was a senior personnel manager with supervision responsibilities. In March 1997, Ms. Knight applied for, and was appointed to, the position of manager of the organization development section. Her title continued to be senior personnel manager. In June 1997, Ms. Knight began dating Jim Hage, a white male, who worked in the one of the areas under Ms. Knight's supervision. For that reason, Ms. Knight requested a job reassignment as manager of the employee relations section. Mr. Wilson granted Ms. Knight's request for the lateral reassignment that did not require advertisement or an increase in pay. In the Bureau of Personnel Services, the pay grade for the manager of employee relations had been downgraded from a pay grade of 26 to a pay grade of 24. Ms. Knight kept her pay grade of 24 after the lateral transfer. Petitioner's pay grade was 25. It would have been a demotion for Petitioner to accept the position of manager of employee relations. After Ms. Knight moved into the position as manager of the employee relations section, her old position was advertised as vacant. Petitioner did not apply for that position. Subsequently, Ms. Knight married Mr. Hage. Later in 2002, Mr. Hage applied for and was appointed as a manager in one of the sections in the Bureau of Personnel Services. There is no evidence that Petitioner applied for that job when it was advertised. In any event, Mr. Hage's managerial position would have been a demotion for Petitioner. In April 2002, Respondent transferred Petitioner into the Office of Program Support. The move was the result of a need to accommodate a disabled employee, who was put in charge of the drug testing program, formerly part of Petitioner's duties. There is no evidence that Petitioner objected to the transfer. In the Office of Program Support, Petitioner served as a management review specialist and worked under the supervision of Mallory Horne, Jr., then Chief of Staff. Mr. Horne reported directly to Ms. DeLopez. In the Office of Program Support, Petitioner participated in special projects, such as executing the STARS report and working on workers' compensation claims. In 2003, Ms. Knight became the Assistant Chief of Personnel Services just before Mr. Wilson retired. Ms. Knight received this lateral transfer/reassignment because she had served as a manager/supervisor in just about every office in the Bureau of Personnel Services. Ms. Knight was appointed Bureau Chief of the Bureau of Personnel Services when Mr. Wilson retired in May 2003. The Bureau Chief position was a promotion to a higher pay grade for Ms. Knight. The most persuasive evidence indicates that Petitioner was not qualified for the Bureau Chief job. Unlike Ms. Knight, Petitioner did not have five years of experience as a supervisor in the human resources area. In 2002 or 2003, Ms. DeLopez authorized Petitioner's participation in Respondent's Educational Leave with Pay Program. The program allows employees to be full-time students for the final year of their educational programs, with Respondent paying the costs of the programs, as well as their full salary and benefits. Ms. DeLopez also personally authorized at least one semester longer than the usual term for Petitioner because she needed extra time to complete the coursework for a doctorate in instructional systems. Petitioner completed the coursework but did not earn the doctoral degree. When Ms. Knight became Bureau Chief of the Bureau of Personnel Services, Ms. Knight recommended that Cindy Mazzar, a white female, apply for the position of manager of employee relations. Ms. Mazzar applied for and was appointed to the position. Petitioner did not apply for the job and never told Ms. Knight that she was interested in filling the position. In 2004, Kristen Watkins, a white female, applied for and was appointed to the advertised position of human resources manager. Petitioner did not apply for the job. The position of human resources manager would have been a lateral transfer for Petitioner if she had been interested. It would not have increased her pay grade. In 2006, Petitioner continued to work for Mr. Horne in the Office of Program Support as a management review specialist. In that capacity, Petitioner continued to serve as a special projects person. Among other things, Petitioner helped develop an agency-wide safety program. Toward the end of April 2006, Respondent decided to implement a realignment of some of its administrative offices. The reorganization called for the elimination of the Office of Program Support and for Petitioner to be transferred to the Bureau of Personnel Services, working under Ms. Knight as Bureau Chief, and under Ms. DeLopez as Division Director of Administrative Services. As with any reorganization, Respondent wanted to find a position for Petitioner rather than terminate her employment. However, there is no evidence that there ever was a vacant position to which Petitioner preferred to be assigned rather than moving to personnel services. On April 24, 2006, Petitioner received a telephone call from Ms. DeLopez, asking Petitioner to attend a meeting in Ms. Knight's office. During the meeting, Ms. DeLopez informed Petitioner that due to the realignment, effective May 1, 2006, Petitioner would work in Bureau of Personnel Services with Ms. Knight performing Petitioner's Annual Performance Evaluation. Petitioner's office furniture would be moved to her new office on May 3, 2006. Petitioner inquired whether the new job assignment was a promotion. Ms. DeLopez responded by commenting that Petitioner already was the highest paid employee in administrative services that was not a Bureau Chief. Ms. DeLopez also stated that when a Bureau Chief position became available, Petitioner could compete for it. On April 25, 2006, Ms. Knight scheduled a meeting with Petitioner to discuss her currently assigned work projects. The meeting was set for 3:00 p.m. on April 26, 2006, in the personnel services conference room. On April 26, 2006, Ms. Knight sent Mr. Horne an e-mail, requesting a copy of Mr. Horne's position description for Petitioner. Ms. Knight also wanted to know Petitioner's job responsibilities and assigned projects with timelines. On April 26, 2006, Petitioner sent Ms. DeLopez an e- mail, requesting an opportunity to discuss the personnel action being taken. Petitioner wanted Ms. DeLopez to know that Petitioner was seeking an opportunity to advance within the agency and that she wanted to discuss further options. Around 1:00 p.m. on April 26, 2006, Petitioner went to Ms. DeLopez' office uninvited and with no appointment. Ms. DeLopez was working in her office suite alone. Petitioner began talking to Ms. DeLopez about Petitioner wanting to make more money. As the conversation continued, Petitioner became agitated and hostile. When Petitioner would not stop talking, Ms. DeLopez stood up to leave the office. Petitioner, who was standing in the doorway, then stated that she would call 911 if Ms. DeLopez left the office. At that point, Ms. DeLopez felt threatened and decided to leave the room. Petitioner followed Ms. DeLopez down the hall to the office of Lieutenant Colonel Rick Gregory of the Florida Highway Patrol. Ms. DeLopez informed Lt. Col. Gregory that she could not make Petitioner disengage. Lt. Col. Gregory told Petitioner to go back to her office and asked Ms. DeLopez to stay in his office to talk to him. Lt. Col. Gregory went to Petitioner's office a few minutes before 2:00 p.m. He advised Petitioner about a meeting with Ms. Knight that afternoon at 2:00 p.m. In the 2:00 p.m. meeting, Ms. Knight explained that she would be the in-take officer for Petitioner's complaint against Ms. DeLopez. Petitioner stated that she did not want to discuss her complaint with Ms. Knight because both of them were subordinate to Ms. DeLopez. Petitioner also would not discuss her complaint without having someone else in the room. Petitioner then told Ms. Knight that Petitioner was leaving the meeting and that Ms. Knight should "just go ahead and call the police." Ms. Knight and Petitioner never had the 3:00 p.m. meeting to discuss Petitioner's new job responsibilities. Later on the afternoon of August 26, 2006, Petitioner had a meeting with Fred Dickinson, Respondent's Executive Director, David Westberry, Respondent's Deputy Executive Director, and Lieutenant Colonel Austin of the Florida Highway Patrol. Petitioner misunderstood the results of this meeting. She erroneously thought the following: (a) the planned move of her office location would be placed on hold; (b) she would not work for Ms. DeLopez or Ms. Knight; and (c) she would contact the Executive Director's office the week of May 8, 2006, to schedule an appointment to explore other options with the agency. On April 28, 2006, Ms. DeLopez sent Petitioner an e-mail. The message requested her work schedule, an outline of her work assignments, and a list of projects or activities that Petitioner was working on for the week of May 1-5, 2006. On May 1, 2006, Petitioner responded with the requested information by e-mail. In a letter to Mr. Westberry dated May 8, 2006, Petitioner described her employment history at the agency and samples of her work, including but not limited to a concept paper relating to technological innovations and workplace performance. The letter stated that Petitioner wanted to discuss employment options within the agency. The May 8, 2006, letter and attached documents were not responsive to the request that Mr. Dickenson and Mr. Westberry made in the August 26, 2008, meeting. The documents did not identify a position or place within the agency where Petitioner could be of value to the organization and benefit Petitioner at the same time. During a meeting on May 8, 2006, Petitioner gave the above referenced letter and documents to Mr. Westberry. Because Petitioner could not identify another vacant position in the agency that she preferred, Mr. Westberry directed Petitioner to coordinate with Ms. Knight about future job duties. On May 11, 2006, Petitioner participated in a meeting in Mr. Westberry's office where Ms. Knight and Petitioner sat together on a love seat. Later, Petitioner falsely accused Ms. Knight of having intentionally kicked Petitioner when Ms. Knight crossed or uncrossed her legs. In a letter dated May 11, 2006, from Petitioner to Mr. Westberry, Petitioner complained that Ms. DeLopez had subjected Petitioner to a hostile work environment, disparate hiring and promotional practices, and a form of retaliation. The letter states that Petitioner's complaint stems from an extended period of time during her employment and most recently on April 26, 2006. The letter requested that someone other than Ms. Knight be assigned as the complaint in-take officer. The letter did not specify race, gender, age, or any specific form of discrimination as a basis for the alleged mistreatment. In a letter dated May 12, 2006, from Mr. Westberry to Petitioner, he states that he received Petitioner's complaint naming Ms. DeLopez and Ms. Knight as parties. In the letter, Mr. Westberry directed Petitioner to go to Maggie Lamar, Senior Consultant in the employee relations section, who would serve as the in-take officer and investigator of Petitioner's complaint. Mr. Westberry advised Petitioner that Ms. Lamar would report directly to Judd Chapman, as Respondent's counsel, and Mr. Dickenson. In the mean time, Mr. Westberry directed Petitioner to continue under the direct supervision of Ms. Knight. Mr. Westberry specifically directed Petitioner to contact Ms. Knight prior to close of the business day to clarify work assignments and related responsibilities. On May 12, 2006, Petitioner sent Mr. Westberry a letter. In the letter, Petitioner states that she had contacted Ms. Knight to clarify job responsibilities. According to the letter, Ms. Knight had not provided Petitioner with information about Petitioner's work assignments and related responsibilities. The letter states Petitioner's concerns that Ms. Knight will abuse her authority as Petitioner's supervisor. The letter includes Petitioner's requests as follows: (a) that Respondent have Ms. Knight clarify Petitioner's work assignments and related responsibilities in writing pending completion of the investigation of Petitioner's complaint; and (b) that Respondent provide a witness during any meeting or conversations between Petitioner and Ms. Knight. In a letter dated May 16, 2006, Mr. Westberry acknowledged Petitioner's May 12, 2006, letter. Mr. Westberry then proceeded to clarify his previous instructions as follows: (a) Petitioner should attend a meeting with Ms. Knight and Mr. Chapman at 11:00 a.m. on May 17, 2006; and (b) In the absence of any documented threat to Petitioner's personal safety, Respondent would not provide a witness to document day- to-day discussions between Petitioner and Ms. Knight. Finally, Mr. Westberry reminded Petitioner of the appointment of Ms. Larmar as the in-take officer for Petitioner's complaint. On May 16, 2006, Ms. Knight sent Petitioner an email. The e-mail alleged that Petitioner had not been at work and had not requested sick leave or any other kind of leave on May 15, 2006. Ms. Knight had left Petitioner several written and telephone messages at Petitioner's office. Ms. Knight called Petitioner's home. Petitioner did not respond to any of the messages on the day in question. Ms. Knight's e-mail urged Petitioner to contact Ms. Knight as soon as possible to discuss work assignments. Petitioner responded to Ms. Knight's May 16, 2006, e-mail by requesting a 4:00 p.m. meeting on May 17, 2006. On May 17, 2006, Ms. Knight sent Petitioner an e-mail, confirming a meeting at 4:00 p.m. in Petitioner's office with Ms. Knight and Mr. Chapman. During the 4:00 p.m. meeting on May 17, 2006, Petitioner gave Ms. Knight a written statement. The statement asserts, in part, that Petitioner considered the meeting to be a continued abuse of authority by Ms. DeLopez and Ms. Knight with the intent to adversely affect Petitioner's employment. During the meeting, Petitioner for the first time accused Ms. Knight of kicking Petitioner on May 11, 2006, in Mr. Westberry's office. It was during this meeting that Ms. Knight first knew about Petitioner's unhappiness with being transferred to the Bureau of Personnel Services. On May 17, 2006, Petitioner sent Ms. Knight an e-mail referencing the 4:00 p.m. meeting. The message provided Ms. Knight with Petitioner's schedule for May 18 and 19, 2006. Petitioner stated she was available to meet with Ms. Knight at her convenience within the confines of that schedule. On May 19, 2006, Ms. Knight visited Petitioner's office at 2:45 p.m. because Ms. Knight wanted to make sure Petitioner knew about the meeting scheduled with Ms. Knight on May 23, 2006, at 9:30 a.m. During the visit, Ms. Knight and Petitioner discussed their professional relationship. Ms. Knight advised Petitioner that everything would work out as long as Petitioner refrained from making further false allegations. Petitioner then said she knew Ms. Knight had not meant to bump Petitioner with her foot in the May 11, 2006, meeting in Mr. Westberry's office. Ms. Knight answered that if Petitioner knew it was an accident, why did Petitioner accuse Ms. Knight of kicking her in front of Judd Chapman in the May 17, 2006, meeting. After the meeting with Ms. Knight on May 19, 2006, Petitioner sent an e-mail to Kay Pietrewicz, Ms. Knight's personal assistant. The e-mail states that Petitioner wanted to change the time of the 9:30 a.m. meeting on May 23, 2006, with Ms. Knight because it conflicted with an unspecified commitment that Petitioner wanted to honor. The message went on to express Petitioner's view of her employment issues, including details of the alleged kicking incident and subsequent conversations with Ms. Knight regarding that incident. After work on May 19, 2006, Ms. Knight got a call at home from Ms. Pietrewicz. During that conversation, Ms. Knight learned about Petitioner's e-mail to Ms. Pietrewicz. Ms. Knight subsequently sent Petitioner an e-mail, giving her a direct order to cease communications relative to her employment issues with any employee except Ms. Knight and Ms. Lamar. Ms. Knight advised Petitioner that the meeting at 9:30 a.m. on May 23, 2006, would take place as scheduled. On May 23, 2006, Petitioner sent Ms. Knight an e-mail to recap the meeting they had earlier in the day. The e-mail indicates that the following topics were discussed during the meeting: (a) the physical move of Petitioner's office furniture on May 24, 2008; (b) the signing of certain administrative forms; (c) the reduction of Petitioner's annual leave balance by eight hours because Petitioner had not been at work on May 15, 2006; (d) the drafting of Petitioner's position description; (e) Petitioner's volunteer/mentor activities; (f) Ms. Knight's direction for Petitioner to refrain from sending e-mails like the one she sent to Ms. Pietrewicz on May 19, 2008; Petitioner's dissatisfaction with her work assignment; Petitioner's computer skills; and (i) Petitioner's project assignment to begin updating the SAS. In a letter dated May 24, 2006, Mr. Westberry advised Petitioner that her employment was terminated effective at the close of business that day. Mr. Westberry made the decision to fire Petitioner 12 days after referring Petitioner to Ms. Lamar. At the time of Petitioner's termination, there was no pending complaint because Petitioner had not contacted Ms. Lamar. Instead of discussing her complaint with the designated in-take officer, Petitioner continued to demonstrate unwillingness to accept the responsibilities assigned to her as a result of the agency reorganization. Three law enforcement officers went to Petitioner's office around 5:00 p.m. on May 24, 2006. They delivered the termination letter and offered to escort Petitioner out of building. Respondent uses officers to escort terminated employees when the agency has concerns that termination might be less than a mutual parting of the ways. In this case, Petitioner refused to sign the termination letter or to leave the building. Petitioner inquired about what would happen if she did not leave. After hearing the response to her question, Petitioner stated that the officer would have to arrest her and take her to jail. Next, Petitioner called her husband and the Tallahassee Democrat. When Lt. Col. Austin arrived, he talked to Petitioner alone. He was unsuccessful in persuading Petitioner to leave the premises. When the officers re-entered Petitioner's office, Petitioner confirmed that she wanted to be arrested rather than leave the office voluntarily. The officers then put the handcuffs on Petitioner and began to inventory her purse. Lt. Col. Austin reentered the office, accompanied by Petitioner's husband. After removing the handcuffs, all of the officers left the office so that Petitioner could talk to her husband alone. The officers continued to wait for Petitioner to leave the building. Other officers and Petitioner's pastor arrived to offer assistance in persuading her to exit the building. Petitioner eventually left the premises without being arrested. On May 24, 2006, Ms. DeLopez was afraid for her personal safety after the termination letter was delivered to Petitioner. Ms. DeLopez requested that Mr. Westberry escort her to her car at the end of the workday. Mr. Westberry complied with the request. On May 25, 2008, Petitioner attempted to call Ms. Lamar by telephone. In a letter dated May 26, 2008, Petitioner requested Ms. Lamar to move forward with the processing of her complaint against Ms. DeLopez and Ms. Knight for retaliatory and harassing behaviors toward Petitioner. Petitioner's letter did not allege that the behavior of Ms. DeLopez and Ms. Knight was due to a specific type of unlawful discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the forgoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of October, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of October, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 H. Richard Bisbee, Esquire H. Richard Bisbee, P.A. 1882 Capital Circle Northeast, Suite 206 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Glen A. Bassett, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding are whether Respondent was the employer of Petitioner; and, whether Petitioner was terminated from his employment with Respondent because of his race.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a white male. At all times relevant to this matter, Petitioner was employed with the City of Tallahassee (City). Petitioner continues to be employed by the City. As part of its municipal function, the City of Tallahassee has the responsibility of maintaining drainage ditches located within the City limits. The Leon County Sheriff’s Office (Sheriff's Office) provides inmate work crews to the City for assistance in carrying out this responsibility. The Sheriff's Office also provides the inmates with any food or other items they require. The inmate work crews are supervised by City employees who have completed the Sheriff’s Office certification program for supervising inmates. The certification program is required because of security concerns involved with utilizing the labor of incarcerated individuals outside of the controlled environment of a jail. Because of security concerns, employees are instructed not to provide contraband to inmates. Contraband is defined as any item given to an inmate which the Sheriff's Office has not authorized to be given to the inmate. If any items are provided to inmates, all inmates must receive the item. Petitioner completed the certification program and was employed by the City to supervise inmate work crews. He was told during the training session that inmate supervisors could not provide contraband to inmates, but if any items were provided to inmates, all inmates must receive the item. On or about August 16, 2000, Petitioner gave a bucket of Popeye's chicken to an inmate under his supervision. The bucket of chicken had been given to Petitioner by a Popeye’s employee to give to the inmates because the Popeye's employee knew one of the inmates. Each inmate received a piece of chicken. However, even though Petitioner checked the bucket for weapons, Petitioner did not obtain or attempt to obtain authorization from the Sheriff's Office to give the chicken to the inmates. When Sergeant Lee, a Sheriff’s Office sergeant, visited the work site and saw the chicken bucket and that chicken had been eaten, he asked Petitioner if he had given the chicken to the inmates. Believing that he had done something wrong, Petitioner lied to Sergeant Lee and said that he had not given chicken to the inmates. Sergeant Lee instructed Petitioner to return the inmates to the Leon County Jail. While at the jail, Petitioner admitted that he had given the chicken to the inmates. Petitioner was advised by the Sheriff’s Office that he could no longer supervise inmates. The Sheriff's Office also advised the City that Petitioner was no longer certified to supervise inmates. The City then transferred Petitioner to another position but did not reduce his pay or benefits. On a date after Petitioner’s removal from supervising inmates, the City held a luncheon and invited inmates. There was no evidence presented that the invitation to lunch was or was not authorized by the Sheriff’s Office. Ted Hubbard, a white City employee, has provided watermelons to inmates and other unnamed black inmate supervisors were present when Leon County employees gave Gatorade and other items to inmates. Neither Hubbard nor any other person has been removed from supervising inmates. However, other than very vague references to these "other" supervisors, Petitioner offered no evidence of any similarities between his employment and these other employees or that the items allegedly given to the inmates were not authorized by the Sheriff's Office or that the Sheriff's Office even knew alleged contraband had been given to any inmates. Certainly, no other person lied about providing items to inmates. At no time did the Sheriff's Office make any employment decisions on behalf of the City. Likewise, at no time did the Sheriff's Office employ Petitioner. In fact, the City made all decisions with regard to Petitioner's employment and was the actual employer of Petitioner. Therefore, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of July, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of July, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda G. Bond, Esquire Powers, Quaschnick, Tischler & Evans Post Office Box 12186 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-2186 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Donald H. Lairsey 8031 Smith Creek Road Tallahassee, Florida 32310 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Charge of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on December 26, 2011.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Teresa Urbana, began employment with Sanmar Corporation (Sanmar) in August 2008 as a seasonal employee and worked there until November 2008. She was rehired in July 2009 in a Re-stocker position. She was promoted to Order Processor and was made a full-time regular employee later that year. Sanmar is a distributor of promotional apparel and accessories to companies that sell promotional apparel. The Jacksonville location is one of seven distribution centers (DC) throughout the country. The Jacksonville DC fulfills customer orders by receiving, picking, checking, packing and shipping them. Respondent is an employer as contemplated by chapter 760, Florida Statutes. An Order Processor is responsible for picking and checking the order, and then packing the order for distribution to Sanmar's customers. The position description for Order Processor includes the following: PHYSICAL DEMANDS: While performing the duties of this job, the employee is constantly required to walk and stand. The employee is frequently required to reach with hands and arms, handle or feel product, to pull/push cart with product, grasp and perform repetitive hand, wrist and arm motions. The employee is frequently required to climb, kneel/squat, bend and carry. The employee occasionally lifts and/or moves up to 40 pounds, and seldom lifts and/or moves up to 50 pounds. Specific vision abilities required by this job include close vision, color vision, peripheral vision, depth perception and ability to adjust focus. WORK ENVIRONMENT: Work environment is moderately noisy. The employee is occasionally required to work near conveyor systems. There is exposure to dust and changes in weather conditions. Employee must be able to handle stress that is involved in meeting strenuous customer deadlines, working in high volume areas, and be flexible and able to interact with employees at all times. Paul Rhodes is the Distribution Manager and Alice Torres is Human Resources Manager for Sanmar's Jacksonville DC. Ms. Torres reports to Olivia Thurmond, Senior Manager of Human Resources. Ms. Thurmond is in the corporate headquarters for Sanmar, which is located in Issaquah, Washington. Sanmar's Employee Handbook includes an Equal Employment Opportunity Policy, an Anti-Harassment and Non-Discrimination Policy, and a Reasonable Accommodation Policy. Petitioner received a copy of the Employee Handbook. Allegations Related to Disability On April 21, 2011, Petitioner approached Ms. Torres to inform her of pain Petitioner was having in her wrists and hands. Petitioner informed Ms. Torres that she believed that this condition was work-related. With the help of Ms. Torres' assistant, Yadira Batlle, Petitioner completed an Accident/Incident Report. Ms. Batlle actually completed the form based on information provided by Petitioner, because Petitioner is not fluent in English, as her primary language is Spanish. The Accident/Incident Report was signed by Petitioner and references carpel-tunnel in both hands as the description of the injury. On that same day, Sanmar provided Petitioner with contact information for Solantic Baptist Occupational Health (Solantic) so she could receive evaluation and treatment for her injury which Petitioner claimed was work related. While there was some dispute as to whether Petitioner's condition was work related and covered by workers' compensation, it is undisputed that Sanmar reported the injury to its workers' compensation carrier and Petitioner did receive benefits and medical treatment through workers' compensation. On April 22, 2011, Petitioner was evaluated at Solantic. As a result of her evaluation, Petitioner was released to return to work with a work restriction of wearing wrist braces. Petitioner continued to perform her Order Processor job duties wearing wrist braces. Petitioner also was evaluated by her personal physician, Dr. Esquivia-Munoz, who provided a note dated June 1, 2011, which stated as follows: This patient has bilateral moderate carpal tunnell [sic] syndrome worse at right wrist, which is interfering with her regular duties and regular activities for which she will need surgical decompression in the future. When Ms. Torres received this doctor's note, she explained to Petitioner that the note did not include any specifics as to any work restrictions. As a result, Ms. Torres advised Petitioner she could not allow her to return to work until the company received work restrictions from her doctor. Therefore, Sanmar placed Petitioner on a leave of absence under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). On June 2, 2012, Ms. Torres sent a fax to Dr. Esquivia-Munoz with a request that he complete an attached certification of Petitioner's health condition. He completed the form, but the information he provided essentially repeated what he wrote on the June 2, 2011, note, and did not provide specific working restrictions which Sanmar requested and needed to be able to provide appropriate and safe working restrictions for Petitioner. Ms. Torres forwarded these documents to Christy Hammond, Sanmar's Leave Supervisor, who is located in the Washington office. On June 3, 2012, Lori Shutter, Sanmar's Benefits Manager, faxed a request to Dr. Esquivia-Munoz, requesting that he complete an enclosed "release to return to work" form identifying work restrictions. She also attached a position description for the Order Processor position. Sanmar did not receive a completed form or further specific work restrictions from Dr. Esquivia-Munoz despite this request. Petitioner went back to Concentra, the workers' compensation medical provider, for further evaluation. Concentra identified her activity status as "modified activity" and identified her work restrictions as no pushing, pulling or lifting over zero pounds, and referred her to a hand surgeon. The facsimile shows that this information was faxed to Sanmar on June 13, 2011. Ms. Torres forwarded this information to Ms. Hammond in the corporate office, and discussed it with Mr. Rhodes. The Order Processor position involved frequent reaching, pushing, grasping, and performing repetitive hand motions. Pushing, pulling, and lifting are essential functions of the Order Processor job. Accordingly, the work restrictions received from Concentra prevented Petitioner from performing essential functions of the job of Order Processor, with or without reasonable accommodations. Sanmar found light-duty work that Petitioner could do within the work restrictions as set forth by Concentra. She was assigned to do "go-backs," which is part of the order processing job, but not the entire job. Go-backs are items, such as hats or t-shirts, found in the wrong bins. The go-back work required Petitioner to use a computer to find the product's correct location, write down that location, and carry the product to the correct location. There is no regular go-back position at Sanmar. This was a temporary assignment created to accommodate Petitioner by eliminating many of the regular functions of the Order Processor position, including pushing, pulling, picking, and packing items to fill customer orders. On June 13, 2011, Ms. Torres called Petitioner to advise her that Sanmar had light-duty work within Petitioner's work restrictions. Petitioner returned to work on June 15, 2011, performing go-backs at her regular rate of pay, i.e., as when she could perform all functions of the Order Processor position. On June 17, 2011, Petitioner submitted a Leave of Absence Request Form, requesting to commence leave on June 20, 2011. Ms. Torres then provided a Notice of Eligibility and Rights and Responsibilities for leave under FMLA to her. This document notified Petitioner that she was eligible to receive FMLA leave, and further notified her that she needed to provide sufficient certification to support her request for FMLA leave by July 1, 2011. On June 20, 2011, Petitioner clocked in at work at approximately 12:24 p.m., after an appointment with Petitioner's hand specialist, Dr. Greider. Petitioner immediately went to the Human Resources office and provided a note from Dr. Greider which confirmed that she had an appointment with him that morning, and left his office at 11:30. Petitioner also provided a doctor's note from Dr. Greider detailing Petitioner's work restrictions. She gave the note to Ms. Batlle, because Ms. Torres was out of the office at that time. The note reads as follows: LIGHT DUTY WORK RESTRICTIONS No repetitive gripping and pinching. No repetitive pulling and pushing. No lifting greater than 5 pounds. No production keying (until further notice) Frequent rest breaks- 5 minutes per hour. Effective until pending surgery. Ms. Batlle left copies of these doctor's notes for Ms. Torres, along with a handwritten note stating that Petitioner was going home for the day. Ms. Thurmond happened to be visiting the Jacksonville DC on June 20, 2011. Ms. Torres, Ms. Thurmond, and Mr. Rhodes, along with Ms. Hammond by telephone, discussed Petitioner's new work restrictions and concluded that, because processing go- backs required keyboarding, gripping and pinching, Petitioner could no longer perform that light-duty work.2/ Accordingly, Sanmar approved Petitioner's request for FMLA leave. Beginning June 21, 2011, Petitioner began taking the FMLA leave she had requested. During this leave, Petitioner had surgery on her right hand on July 21, 2011. Petitioner remained on FMLA leave until September 13, 2011, at which point she had exhausted her FMLA leave entitlement and had still not been released to work. Rather than terminating Petitioner's employment at that time, Sanmar provided additional leave until the company was able to determine whether Petitioner would be able to return to work. Sanmar provided Petitioner an FMLA Designation Notice which informed her that her absence from September 14 through September 25 would be provided to her "as a reasonable accommodation under the Americans with Disability Act (ADA)." On September 16, 2011, Ms. Hammond prepared a letter to Dr. Greider outlining the modified work description in doing go-backs, and asking him to advise whether or not she would be able to perform those duties. Dr. Greider faxed a reply to Ms. Hammond on September 20, 2011, advising that the activities described in Ms. Hammond's letter would be acceptable. Ms. Torres and Ms. Hammond prepared a letter to Petitioner dated September 22, 2011, advising her that Sanmar had received a written confirmation from Dr. Greider that she had been approved to return to work with the modified duties (performing go-backs). The letter further notified Petitioner that she was expected to return to work on September 26, 2011, which she did. Ms. Torres did not receive any complaints from Petitioner during the September to November timeframe regarding her ability to perform the go-backs duty. On November 2, 2011, Petitioner provided Ms. Torres with a note from Dr. Grieder confirming Petitioner would be out of work for surgery on her left hand from November 7 through 10, 2011. The note states the following: Patient is scheduled for hand surgery on 11/7/11 and may remain out of work from date of surgery until 11/10/11 at which point patient may return to work with no use of the left hand until follow up appointment on 11/21/11. Ms. Torres and Petitioner had a discussion regarding Dr. Greider's note during which Petitioner expressed doubt that she would be able to return to work November 10 as she still had restrictions on the use of her right hand and did not know what kind of work she would be able to perform after surgery on her left hand. Ms. Torres than contacted Ms. Hammond via e-mail requesting her assistance in confirming the work restrictions, if any, on Petitioner's use of her right hand. On November 8, 2011, Ms. Hammond, through the company's workers' compensation carrier, received confirmation from Dr. Greider's office that she was released from work restrictions with regard to her right hand as of October 17, 2011.3/ On November 9 and 10, Petitioner left voice mail messages for Ms. Torres and her assistant regarding her inability to work. On November 11, 2011, Petitioner did not report to work. Because this was the date that had been indicated by Dr. Greider as the date she was released to return to work (regarding her right hand), and after receiving guidance from Ms. Hammond and input from the workers' compensation carrier, Ms. Torres called Petitioner and informed her that Sanmar had not received any additional information from Dr. Grieder and advised Petitioner that it was Petitioner's responsibility to obtain a new note from her doctor if she could not work. Ms. Torres reminded Petitioner that she needed to come in to discuss her restrictions and possible light-duty work. Ms. Torres received another call from Petitioner on November 14, 2011. Ms. Torres reiterated to Petitioner that she needed to report to work with her restrictions so Sanmar could attempt to accommodate her appropriately. Petitioner reported to work later that same day. She met with Mr. Rhodes and Ms. Torres to discuss her ability to work and what accommodations would be necessary. Mr. Rhodes first advised Petitioner that she would be doing go-backs which could be performed without the use of her left hand. When Petitioner expressed concern about her ability to perform that task, Mr. Rhodes agreed to assign her a temporary light-duty position auditing the restock until they could review the matter further. Petitioner agreed to perform the restock work. Also on November 14, 2011, Ms. Torres received a fax from Dr. Grieder's office which attached the same November 2, 2011, note regarding Petitioner's restrictions. Nothing in the November 14, 2011, fax from Dr. Grieder's office changed Petitioner's work restrictions. Auditing the restock is not a regular position at Sanmar, but is one part of the many duties of the inventory department. In offering this temporary work to Petitioner, Sanmar eliminated many of the essential functions of the Order Processor job. Petitioner left the November 14 meeting with Ms. Torres and Mr. Rhodes and worked for about two hours. After about two hours, Petitioner apparently fainted and left work in an ambulance which transported her to the hospital. That was the last day Petitioner worked for Sanmar. Petitioner received notes from Dr. Greider dated November 21, 2011, and December 9, 2011, listing the same light duty restrictions (i.e., no repetitive gripping and pinching, no repetitive pulling and pushing, no lifting greater than five pounds, no production keying, and frequent rest breaks), valid for the left hand only. Petitioner also received a note from Dr. Greider dated January 23, 2012, indicating that she may continue previous restrictions until February 6, 2012, at which time the patient may return to work full duty. However, Ms. Hammond, Ms. Thurmond, and Ms. Torres, all testified that they did not receive this note. Petitioner was seen by an orthopedic doctor in August 2012. The doctor's note indicates that she has a permanent work restriction which precludes her from lifting more than 10 to 15 pounds. Facts regarding disciplinary action Through an employee loan program, Sanmar approves loans to employees under certain circumstances. In late December 2010, an incident arose involving Petitioner and her request for an employee loan. On December 28, 2010, Ms. Torres heard Petitioner speaking in a loud voice outside of Ms. Torres' office. She heard Petitioner accusing her assistant at that time, Sandra Colindres, of refusing to help her with papers required for such a loan. Petitioner spoke in a tone of voice that Ms. Torres felt was not appropriate for the office. She then asked Petitioner to meet with her in her office. While in Ms. Torres' office, Petitioner complained that Ms. Colindres was unwilling to help her with the loan paperwork. Petitioner had not been scheduled to work that day. Ms. Torres informed Petitioner that the loan process had very recently been changed, and that the loan would need to be approved by Human Resources if it were determined that there was a critical need. Ms. Torres considered Petitioner's tone of voice during this conversation in her office to be disrespectful, demanding and rude. At the end of this meeting, Ms. Torres told Ms. Colindres to give Petitioner the employee loan form. When Petitioner left Ms. Torres' office, Petitioner approached a co- worker who was also in the office and began talking in a loud voice about what had just happened. Ms. Torres overheard Petitioner talking about their meeting to another employee and asked Petitioner to discuss the issue in her office. Ms. Torres told Petitioner that her conduct was disruptive, unprofessional, and unacceptable. She told Petitioner that she had caused a disturbance in the workplace, that Ms. Torres would be informing the DC manager about this incident, and that Petitioner would likely be receiving corrective action.4/ Shortly thereafter, Ms. Torres accompanied a pest control representative to the break room. When they arrived in the break room, Ms. Torres observed Petitioner telling a group of employees her version of the events in her office. The employees dispersed when they saw Ms. Torres enter the break room. When Ms. Torres turned to leave the break room, she saw Petitioner complaining to yet another group of employees about the incident. Ms. Torres considered this behavior to be extremely disruptive. Ms. Torres then asked a supervisor, Tasha Porter, to instruct Petitioner to leave the premises. Ms. Torres was relatively new to the company, and she consulted with Paul Rhodes and Olivia Thurmond to determine appropriate disciplinary action that would be consistent with the company's response to similar instances of conduct. Mr. Rhodes was out of the office from December 27, 2010, through January 2, 2011. On January 3, 2011, Mr. Rhodes and Petitioner met to discuss the December 28, 2010, incident. Tasha Porter also attended the meeting and supervisor Daniel Serrano attended the meeting as an interpreter. Mr. Rhodes also spoke to and received written statements from Alice Torres, Sandra Colindres and Tasha Porter regarding the incident. After reviewing the matter, a decision was made to give Petitioner a final Written Warning for unprofessional conduct and disruptive behavior which had taken place on December 28, 2010. Petitioner refused to sign the final Written Warning, did not acknowledge that she committed the actions described, but acknowledged that the conduct described would be unacceptable and that a person engaging in such conduct could be terminated. The final Written Warning was given to Petitioner on January 10, 2011, by Mr. Serrano, who also speaks Spanish. Prior to receiving this final Written Warning, Petitioner had not reported a disability to anyone at Sanmar. There is nothing in the record to establish or suggest that any one at Sanmar knew, perceived or regarded Petitioner as having a disability at that time. On the evening of April 18, 2011, Group Lead Terri Andrews was supervising the employees on the lo-bay floor. Employees were working overtime to get all customer orders shipped by the end of the day. Ms. Andrews was at the print station, as Petitioner approached her. Ms. Andrews directed Petitioner to report to the pack line. Petitioner told Ms. Andrews that she wanted to go home. Ms. Andrews told Petitioner again to report to the pack line and Petitioner left the floor. Ms. Andrews described Petitioner as appearing agitated. Petitioner arrived at the pack line where Becquer Rosado, another Group Lead, was directing employees where they were needed the most. Mr. Becquer saw Petitioner approaching and before he could direct her to a position, she put her hand up in the air, walked past him, and told him that she would only take instructions from Patricia Alonso and not from him. This was done in front of other employees. Patricia Alonso was a Department Lead for the pack line. A Group Lead is superior to a Department Lead because Group Leads oversee several functions, while Department Leads only supervise a single function. Employees are expected to follow the directions of both Group and Department Leads. Mr. Rosado reported this incident to his supervisor, Lori Pritchard, and completed an Employee Concern form the following day. Ms. Andrews also reported Petitioner's behavior to Ms. Pritchard, and completed an Employee Concern form on April 21, 2011. It was that day that Petitioner approached Ms. Torres to talk about pain that Petitioner was having in her wrists and hands as more fully discussed in paragraph 6 above. Petitioner was not at work from April 21 until April 26, 2011. After reviewing the Employee Concern forms, Ms. Torres met with Petitioner regarding the April 18, 2011, incident. During this meeting, Petitioner denied being disrespectful to Ms. Andrews and Mr. Rosado. After speaking to Petitioner on April 26, 2011, Ms. Torres recommended that Petitioner be terminated for her actions of April 18, 2011, because Petitioner had just received a final Written Warning for her behavior on January 10, 2011. However, Mr. Rhodes decided to give Petitioner another chance and, instead of terminating Petitioner, decided that Sanmar would issue a Final Warning Follow Up Discussion Memo to Petitioner, which was done on May 5, 2011. This Discussion Memo reiterated that any future violation of company policy by Petitioner would result in further corrective action up to and including termination of employment. During May and June 2011, and pursuant to Sanmar's Voluntary Time Out (VTO) procedure, Petitioner volunteered on several occasions to go home when production was slow and Sanmar asked for volunteers. Employees interested in VTO simply had to write their names on the "Go Home Early Sheet." Sanmar then selected employees for VTO in the order in which the employees volunteered to go home early. Petitioner's name appears on the VTO sheets in evidence, and her name is near the top of the list on most days. She was not sent home early on days that she had not signed up for VTO on the Go Home Early sheet. On June 20, 2011, after leaving the doctor's notes referenced in paragraph 18 through 20 with Ms. Battle, Petitioner proceeded to the break room where Tasha Porter, a supervisor, found her engaged in a conversation with co-workers while on the clock and not on a break. When Ms. Porter asked Petitioner why she was in the break room while clocked in, Petitioner replied that she taking her break. Ms. Porter reported this to Ms. Torres. Afterwards, Petitioner returned to work processing go-backs, although another employee was doing the keyboarding, as further explained above. As discussed in paragraph 21 above, Ms. Thurmond was visiting the Jacksonville DC on June 20, 2011. Ms. Torres, Ms. Thurmond, and Mr. Rhodes discussed the incident in the break room and decided to issue a final Written Warning to Petitioner for falsification of time records for this incident of being "on the clock" while in the break room. This was the same meeting in which they discussed Petitioner's June 20, 2011, work restrictions. Ms. Torres and Ms. Thurmond issued a final Written Warning to Petitioner at the same meeting in which they notified her that Sanmar had approved Petitioner's request for FMLA leave. The weight of the evidence shows that this took place on June 21, 2011. On or around November 3, 2011, prior to Petitioner going on leave for her second hand surgery, Ms. Torres learned of an incident involving Petitioner and her son, Manuel Sanchez, who also worked for Sanmar. Specifically, Ms. Torres learned that Mr. Sanchez may have forged Petitioner's signature on a time-off request which asked for permission to be off work on October 28, 2011. After discussing this with Mr. Sanchez, Ms. Torres concluded that he had forged his mother's name on the time-off request at her request. Sanmar considered this to be falsification of company records. This is an offense for which Sanmar has disciplined employees in the past.5/ On Friday November 4, 2011, which was Petitioner's last day at work before taking leave for her second hand surgery, Ms. Torres discussed the forged time off request with Petitioner. Petitioner admitted that she had asked her son to fill out the request and sign her name. At the end of their conversation, Ms. Torres told Petitioner not to discuss their meeting or the situation with anyone, not even Petitioner's son, because the company was continuing to investigate the matter. Despite this instruction, Lori Pritchard, a supervisor, reported to Ms. Torres that Petitioner went directly to her son and had a heated discussion with him at the print station. Although Ms. Pritchard was unable to fully understand their conversation because it was in Spanish, Ms. Pritchard advised Ms. Torres that she believed they were discussing Ms. Torres' meeting with Petitioner. Following this incident, Ms. Torres met again with Mr. Sanchez and Mr. Sanchez admitted he and Petitioner were discussing the forged time off request at the print station on November 4. Ms. Torres, however, was unable to speak to Petitioner about this incident until November 14, 2011, when Petitioner returned to work after her November 7 (second) surgery. During the meeting with Petitioner upon her return to work on November 14, 2011, (see paragraph 30), Mr. Torres and Mr. Rhodes told Petitioner the company was still reviewing the incident regarding the forged time-off request. They advised Petitioner that they had confirmation she and Mr. Sanchez discussed the forged time off request at the print station. While Petitioner denied this, she admitted she talked about the incident with her son at home, where Mr. Sanchez also resided. Ms. Torres and Mr. Rhodes believed Petitioner should be terminated for the November 4 incident, because it involved an incident of insubordination, following the previous warnings of unprofessional conduct issued In January and May 2011. However, they wanted to discuss their recommendation with Ms. Thurmond and Marty Rask, Operations Manager, in keeping with the company's normal practice. Although they planned to talk to Ms. Thurmond and Mr. Rask and, with their concurrence, terminate Petitioner later during the day on November 14, they were not able to do so because of Petitioner unexpectedly became ill on that day. This began a lengthy leave of absence from which she never returned. Mr. Rhodes and Ms. Torres recommended that Sanmar terminate Petitioner for her insubordination on November 4, when she discussed the document falsification issue with her son in violation of Ms. Torres' instructions, as well as her dishonest and evasive response on November 14, when Mr. Rhodes and Ms. Torres spoke to her about the incident. The final decision to terminate Petitioner was made on November 30, 2011. However, Sanmar did not communicate the termination decision to Petitioner until January 24, 2012. This delay resulted from circumstances related to Petitioner's medical leave and on-going workers' compensation proceedings.6/ Sanmar decided to move forward with its November 30, 2011, termination decision. Sanmar's usual practice of communicating employee termination is to inform the employee in person. However, Christy Hammond had been communicating with Petitioner and respected Petitioner's request that she not be required to come to the workplace only to be fired. Therefore, Sanmar decided to issue the termination letter via mail. Accordingly, on January 24, 2012, Sanmar sent Petitioner a termination letter signed by Olivia Thurmond. Enclosed with the letter was a documentation form explaining the reasons for Petitioner's termination, i.e., Petitioner's insubordination on November 4 and her dishonest and evasive behavior on November 14, combined with her prior discipline.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner, Teresa Urbina. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 2012.
