The Issue Is Petitioner Haas Publishing Company liable for the taxes and interest assessed under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, specifically the sales and use tax and related surtaxes, pursuant to Section 212.031, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 12A-1.070, for the audit period June 1, 1995 through May 31, 2000, and if so, to what extent?
Findings Of Fact Haas is a Delaware corporation, authorized to do business in the State of Florida. It is a subsidiary of Primedia, Inc. Haas publishes free consumer guides to apartments and homes and is paid by the apartment owners, realtors, and homeowners who advertise in the publications. One of Haas' divisions, Distributech, distributes the guides to retail stores. Haas negotiates with retailers for an appropriate site for its display of publications at each retail location. Nationwide, Haas distributes its publications from approximately 42,000 locations. Nationwide, Haas paid for the exclusive right to distribute, under contracts, in approximately 20,000 locations. Otherwise, it distributes in "free" locations. As required by Section 72.011(1)(b), Florida Statutes, Haas has complied with all applicable registration requirements with respect to the taxes at issue herein. DOR is the agency responsible for the administration and enforcement of Florida's tax laws, including sales and use tax and various local surtaxes. DOR conducted an audit of Haas for the period of June 1, 1995 through May 31, 2000. The audit resulted in an assessment of sales and use tax and associated surtaxes, interest, and penalties (Assessment). After protest and petition for reconsideration, DOR issued its Notice of Reconsideration (NOR) to Haas on May 16, 2003, wherein DOR sustained the Assessment in full, but offered to waive all penalties, without prejudicing Haas' right to challenge the remainder of the Assessment in full. Haas accepted the Department's offer to waive all penalties in their entirety, making a payment on the Assessment at the time the Petition herein was filed. In other words, Haas paid certain uncontested amounts in order to pursue the instant challenge to the remainder of the Assessment of all taxes and all interest, and in order to take advantage of an unrelated "extended amnesty" provided by DOR. This formal proceeding followed. The auditor who actually performed the work of the audit did not testify at the disputed-fact hearing. DOR's only witness, Ms. Gifford, did not participate in the original audit. However, Ms. Gifford reviewed the audit documents in detail and professionally consulted with the auditor and other reviewers to review the auditor's methods against the paperwork of the audit. She also reviewed the audit with input from Haas and its representative in the course of the Technical Assistance and Dispute Resolution (TADR) process, and throughout the informal challenges preceding this formal proceeding. She also reviewed all of the de novo material presented at the deposition of Haas' principal, Mr. Sullender, for purposes of her testimony. She is an expert capable of assisting the trier of fact, in that she is a Florida-licensed certified public accountant (CPA), and the undersigned is satisfied with the accuracy of her explanation of DOR's policies and procedures and of her predecessor's methodology and calculations. Also, her interpretations of rules and statutes are entitled to great weight where they purport to be the interpretation of the agency, but they do not constitute "factual" testimony and are not binding in this de novo proceeding. Ms. Gifford's analysis of case law is not entitled to that same deference. At the disputed-fact hearing, Haas challenged both the timeliness of the audit and the methodology of the audit. It is axiomatic that the amount assessed depends upon the methodology employed by the auditor, but DOR contended herein that because Haas protested only that an assessment had been made and because Haas had accepted all available offers of mitigation, Haas could not protest, at hearing, the amount calculated for the Assessment, whether the audit's calculations were correct, or whether the audit had been conducted in a timely manner. The following allegations of the Petition herein are relevant to these issues: No payment made by Haas to a retailer in Florida constituted payment for a lease of real property; No payment made by Haas to a retailer in Florida constituted payment for a license to use real property; The payments made by Haas to retailers were for distribution rights and/or intrinsically valuable personal property rights; The payments made by Haas to retailers were not subject to Florida sales and use taxes and other surtaxes; Alternatively, the payments made by Haas to retailers should have been apportioned by DOR, pursuant to Section 212.031, Florida Statutes; Some or all of the taxes that the Department claims that Haas owes have been paid by the retailers with whom Haas had agreements; The Department was without statutory authority to impose the Assessment for taxes and interest as set forth in Exhibit A; and The Assessment that is the subject of this proceeding is unlawful and violates the provisions of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes; Petitioner is entitled to relief under Sections 72.011 and Section 120.80, Florida Statutes. Section 212.031, Florida Statutes, dictates that the payments made by Haas to Florida retailers were not subject to Florida tax and therefore requires that the Assessment by DOR be stricken or modified. The auditor sent Form DR-840, the Notice of Intent to Audit (NOI), to Haas on May 30, 2000. This item informed the Taxpayer that the period of the audit would be June 1, 1995 through May 30, 2000, and that the audit would commence before July 29, 2000 (within 60 days) unless an attached waiver was signed and returned. The audit file does not reflect a signed waiver within 60 days. Ms. Gifford, on behalf of DOR, testified that the purpose of this NOI was to warn the Taxpayer that the audit would begin within 60 days unless the Taxpayer waived the timeline and that with a waiver, the audit would begin within 120 days. Ms. Gifford further testified that DOR considers itself limited to going back only five years from the date the auditor begins to review a taxpayer's records and that the Agency interprets Section 213.335, Florida Statutes, to require completion of the audit within one year of the initial letter. Ms. Gifford asserted that with a waiver, DOR would interpret the several applicable statutes and rules to provide the auditor with 120 days to begin an audit to encompass the whole of June 1, 1995 to May 30, 2000. However, if an audit is not begun within 120 days, DOR understands that the statutory audit period is not tolled and DOR usually removes the delay period from the front end (i.e., DOR starts the audit period the delayed number of days after June 1, 1995) and adds it to the back end (ends the audit period the delayed number of days after May 30, 2000) so that a five-year period of audit occurs, but the audit period starts some date later than June 1, 1995, and ends some date later than May 30, 2000. DOR considers the start of the audit to be when the auditor begins looking at records of the taxpayer. Haas provided pertinent, but incomplete, records on August 29, 2000, which was more than 60 days and less than 90 days after the May 30, 2000, NOI. Haas requested several extensions to review work papers received from the auditor. All were honored by DOR. A lot of correspondence ensued between the auditor and Haas and between DOR and Haas' designated representative(s)/accountants, but DOR's auditor did not record any time spent on the audit file until he met with Haas or its representative on October 23, 2000, more than 120 days after May 30, 2000. On the basis of the auditor's work record/timesheet, Haas contends that October 23, 2000, which was more than 120 days after the May 30, 2000 NOI, is when the audit actually began. Exchanges of records, work papers, and information continued, and on or about May 29, 2001, a vice-president of Haas signed and FAXED to DOR's auditor a consent to extend the statute of limitations for sales and use tax assessments through March 29, 2002. However, he did not affix the corporate seal in the designated part of the consent form. The consent form had been prepared by the auditor and mailed to Haas on or about March 25, 2001. It only listed "sales and use tax" as a reference. It did not identify any other tax, which ultimately made up the Assessment, including Charter Transit System Tax, Local Government Infrastructure Tax, Indigent Care Tax, or School Capital Outlay Tax, which, although related to sales and use tax, have separate designations. These surtax audits are based on the same facts, circumstances, and records as the sales and use tax audit herein but DOR lists and computes them separately from the sales and use tax on some of its forms. (See Finding of Fact 19.) The validity and timeliness, vel non, of the foregoing consent to extension was not raised by Petitioner until the disputed-fact hearing. A Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes (also called an NOI) was dated September 21, 2001. The Notice of Proposed Assessment (NOPA) was issued December 5, 2001. DOR considers this document to be the completion of the audit. After the audit was completed, it was submitted to DOR's TADR, a dispute resolution process. A Notice of Decision (NOD) was entered July 30, 2002. Haas petitioned for reconsideration, alleging additional facts. By a May 16, 2003, Notice of Reconsideration (NOR), the audit was upheld. The NOR and NOIA lump all Chapter 212, Florida Statutes' taxes together. The NOPA lists each surtax separately. The compromise of amounts and this formal proceeding followed, as described above in Findings of Fact 5-6. Many contracts and other records were not provided by Haas to DOR until TADR, until the informal proceedings, or until after the Petition for this formal proceeding had been filed. Among other things, DOR had upheld the auditor's initial decision with regard to calculating Haas' 1997 tax. The auditor had not tested or sampled Haas' records for the full of the audit period in order to arrive at a tax figure for 1997. Because Haas had not provided certain records (RDAs) for 1997, Haas' figures for December 1996 were "extrapolated" by the auditor to the first six months of 1997, while the figures for January 1998 were "extrapolated" back to the last six months of 1997. Ms. Gifford felt this method constituted a legitimate estimate of the taxes due where a taxpayer had failed to provide adequate records. For the audit period, Haas published and distributed, free of charge to the public, apartment and home guides. The distribution was accomplished through contracts, on a regional and national level, with major retail store chains such as K-Mart, Blockbuster, Eckerd's, and Winn-Dixie Stores. The tax-assessment problems herein are compounded by Haas' choice not to use uniform contractual arrangements with all retailers; by its failure to designate within its contracts and/or accounting records what, if any, intangible uses it believed it was paying for; and its failure to allocate within its contracts and/or accounting records the amounts it believed it was paying for each alleged intangible use. Some of the contracts state that there is no corporate relation between Haas and the retailer. Haas has one major and several smaller competitors who distribute their own publications at retail store chains. Haas' contracts with the retail store chains guarantee to Haas the exclusive right to distribute apartment and home guides from the retail stores' locations and usually include the right to use the retail chains' respective logos and trademarks in Haas' promotional/sales materials and publications. One exception is Seven-Eleven, which limits to a greater degree use of its trademark and logo than do some of the other retailers. Not every contract contains a reference to a retailer's trademark or logo. Haas used its exclusive rights to distribute with certain retail store chains as an inducement to sell advertising to the apartment owners, realtors, and others who advertise in its publications. It was valuable to Haas to be able to tell potential print advertisers that its apartment/home guide was the only one allowed to be distributed from the particular retail chains. It was valuable to Haas to be able to show potential print advertisers the logo of retailers in Haas' promotional materials and publications. In most places, the exclusive right to distribute from the specified retail locations distinguished Haas from its competitors and allowed it to charge more for its advertising than they did. Mr. Sullender, Haas' principal, is credible that in each instance where Haas' contracts do not mention the use of trademarks and logos, each retail chain otherwise gave permission or provided Haas with its logo and trademark materials to use, as a result of the contracts. However, Haas provided nothing to DOR prior to instituting this formal case, by which DOR could have determined that such permission had been provided outside the contracts. Haas' right to place the retailers' logo or trademark on Haas' publication racks was a valuable right and every Haas rack displayed logos. Yet, the contracts do not obligate Haas to use the retailers' logos or trademarks, and Haas can still distribute from the racks without a logo. The contracts made no specific allocation of payments by Haas to the retailers for use of the retailers' logos and trademarks. The issue of whether payment for use of a logo or trademark should have been separately allocated from Haas' payment to the retailer in its contracts was not taken into consideration by DOR because this issue, in those terms, was not raised during the audit or subsequent informal protest/review procedures. However, the issue of allocation based on fair rental value of the space utilized in connection with prior audits of some of the respective retailers was raised. This is largely an issue of semantics. (See Findings of Fact 55-56.) All except one of the contracts at issue guarantee Haas the exclusive right to distribute its publications from the particular retail chains' locations. Exclusivity of the rights accruing to Haas is singularly important to Haas' business. However, Haas has been known to charge its competitors for space on its racks. Haas also is free to enter into partnerships with its competitors. In order to secure the exclusive right to distribute its publications from the retail locations and the right to use the retailers' trademarks and logos, Haas pays fees to the retail store chains under the contracts. Typically, Haas has to "outbid" at least one other competitor to obtain the foregoing exclusive rights. The payments under the contracts were typically made "per store," per month, and did not vary depending on the location of the store within the State. Part of Haas' negotiating strategy and ultimate success in securing exclusive use of most of its locations is the judicious use of "signing bonuses." Signing bonuses are specifically allocated in some, but not all, of Haas' contracts. In some contracts, they are directly linked to the right of exclusivity. They can be substantial amounts. However, according to Ms. Gifford, signing bonuses have never been part of DOR's Assessment in this case. (TR-62-63) Because the exclusive right to distribute its print materials was so valuable to Haas, it paid up to $375 per month per store under one contract. When Haas did not secure the exclusive right to distribute from a retail chain, it would not pay for the right to distribute, but distributed its publications from "free" locations. Nationwide, this compares at 20,000 paid to 22,000 unpaid locations. (See Finding of Fact 1.) The amount Haas paid a retail chain did not vary by particular store location within the chain nor by the size of the rack that Haas placed in a particular store. Haas' racks take up from two to four-feet worth of floor space. Haas supplied the racks, but, in general, the retail chains had control over the size, type, and color of the racks placed in its stores and limited Haas' access to the racks. Haas was solely responsible for set-up, replenishing, and maintenance of its racks on the retailer's property. Haas purchases liability insurance. Haas is always assigned covered space by the retailer. Haas considers space near an entrance/exit of the retailer's covered premises to be premium space. Retailers consider this same space to be "dead space," beyond its cash registers, which is essentially useless for display or sale of their retail goods. However, some retailers park carts or post notices in these areas. Haas does not sell or distribute any goods of, or for, the retailer. It merely stocks its own publications in its own racks in the retailer's space. Haas has no other contact with the retailers' business. Under the contracts, retailers have no obligation to market Haas' publications. They do not buy or sell them or pay to advertise in them. Retailers pay nothing to Haas. If Haas uses a retailer's logo and/or trademark in Haas' own advertising or in its publications per their negotiated arrangement, it is for the purpose of promoting Haas' publications. Use of the retailers' logos and trademarks has a benefit to the retailer, but a purely incidental one, since the retail customer who picks up a Haas publication from the Haas rack has already made the decision to enter the retail store in the first place. None of the retail chains ever attempted to charge sales or use taxes to Haas based on the payments made under the contracts. There is no evidence that Haas or any retailer, on Haas' behalf, tendered sales or use taxes to the State on the contracts at issue herein. Although some contracts acknowledge that a retailer is a franchisee of a third party, none of the contracts refer to the relationship between Haas and the retailer as a "franchise" or acknowledge Haas as a franchisee. Ms. Gifford did not equate Haas' use of a retailer's logo or trademark to market Haas' publications, not the retailer's goods, with all the accoutrements of a franchise, as she understood those accoutrements. DOR issued to a different taxpayer (not Haas) Technical Assistance Advisement No. 03A-002 (the TAA), concerning real property lease agreements. Although this advisory letter from a DOR attorney is not binding, except between DOR and the party to whom it is addressed, and although it is limited to the specific facts discussed within it, the legal conclusions therein are instructive, if not conclusive, of DOR's official interpretation of the statutes and rules it administers and of its agency policy with regard to when allocations are appropriate between intangible rights and real property rights. TAA 03A-002 cites, with approval, paragraphs 56 through 59 of the Final Order in Airport Limousine Service of Orlando, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, DOAH Case No. 94-1790, et seq., (March 23, 1995)1/ and State ex rel. N/S Associates v. Board of Review of the Village of Greendale, 473 N.W. 2d 554 (Wisc. App. 1991), and states, "The test for isolating intangible business value is as simple as asking whether the disputed value is appended to the property, and thus transferable with the property, or is it independent of the property so that it either stays with the seller or dissipates upon sale." This TAA also states that DOR will view the reasonableness of allocations of payments made pursuant to a lease agreement on a case-by-case basis in reference to whether the allocation is made in good faith or lacks any basis. It further cites with approval Bystrom v. Union Land Investment, Inc., 477 So. 2d 585, 586 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1985) ("Good faith for property tax valuation purposes will mean 'real, actual, and of a genuine nature as opposed to a sham or deception.'") The TAA anticipates that DOR would require that the taxpayer make reasonable allocations, within the taxpayer's own records, of lease payments to rent and other items not subject to tax, and that the taxpayer would also be required to otherwise maintain records adequate to establish how the taxpayer determined that each allocation was reasonable, and further, that if DOR auditors were satisfied with the taxpayer's records, an appraisal would not be required by DOR. The TAA does not foreclose the requirement of an appraisal to test the taxpayer's records. Synopsized, the TAA opines that separate payments by a tenant to a landlord for trademark, service mark, or logo rights of the landlord are subject to the tax on real property rentals unless the allocation of payments made by the taxpayer is reasonable, and further, that the allocation is not reasonable where no substantial, competent, and persuasive evidence is provided to establish the value of the trademark, service mark, or logo rights of the landlord received by the tenant and a legitimate business purpose for the tenant to acquire those rights is not demonstrated. Herein, Haas had not allocated rent and intangibles within its own contracts/records. It was Ms. Gifford's view that if the Taxpayer herein had not allocated the value of the trademarks, etc. and the real property value of its contracts, it was not up to DOR to do so in the course of an audit. Nonetheless, during the protest period, DOR had considered allocating the payments made by Haas under its contracts, into taxable and non-taxable payments, by reviewing the market rate rental for the space occupied and obtaining a valuation of the identifiable intangible property. Ultimately, DOR did not use this method on the basis that Haas had not submitted sufficient records. At hearing, Haas attempted to present evidence of the fair market value of the real estate involved and of the so- called intangible rights through an intangible property appraiser and a Florida-certified real estate appraiser. Lee Waronker is a Florida-certified real estate appraiser who was accepted as an expert in real estate appraisal. Mr. Waronker prepared a report which made a comparison of Haas' contracts with allegedly comparable rental properties, but he only used three "comparables," none of which included racks owned by similar advertising businesses. He did not consider what Petitioner's real competitors paid for similar space. Thus, when he arrives at an average fair rental value of Haas' space in all the retailers' locations as $25-50 per square foot, his base figures are suspect. Therefore, when he concluded that since Haas was paying an average of $355 per square foot and all the remainder of the contract payments should be allocated to intangible rights, such as trademarks and exclusivity, he was not credible or persuasive. His figures also apply only to the date of his appraisal in 2003, and admittedly would not be representative of the value of the rental property during the audit period. Therefore, his analysis that only 11.3 percent, plus or minus, of the contract prices constituted rent or a license to use is discounted and not accepted. Petitioner also presented the testimony and report of James N. Volkman, an intangible property appraiser who was accepted as an expert in that field. Mr. Volkman obtained all of his data from either the Securities and Exchange Commission filings of eighty-three percent of the retailers involved, from Haas, or from information compiled by DOR. These are legitimate appraisal sources. He performed his appraisal within the professional standards of the Financial Accounting Standards Board. He concluded that Haas' contracts could best be described as "distribution agreements," "because they are the means by which Haas distributes its publications" and because anyone familiar with the operations of a publisher would understand a line item on a balance sheet of a "distribution agreement" and not everyone would understand the term "license to use real property." It is noted that "distribution agreements" are not listed in the statute, but this, by itself, is not a fatal flaw. He maintained that the Haas contracts could not reasonably be characterized as a license to use real property, because the amount paid was well in excess of the fair rental value of the space. However, as part of his analysis, Mr. Volkman did not rely on Mr. Waronker's independent real estate appraisal, but conducted his own analysis as to the amount a retailer would likely charge a party seeking to utilize the floor space taken up by the approximate size of a single Haas rack. In doing so, Mr. Volkman was admittedly outside his realm of expertise. Mr. Volkman allocated the amounts Haas was paying as twelve percent to the "right to use real property"; twenty-four percent to "non-compete rights" (his term for exclusivity); fourteen percent to "trademark rights"; thirty-five percent to "distribution cost savings" (a term which seems to describe Haas not having to identify and mail its publications to interested persons or use a retailer's magazine rack);2/ and fifteen percent to "market penetration premium."3/ The last two calculations are not credible and undermine the entire allocations summary he presented. The distribution cost savings figure contains too many assumptions not fully documented. Mr. Volkman also arrived at his calculation of the "market penetration premium" merely by selecting the residual percentage sufficient to make up the difference, so that his other figures added up to 100 percent of the total fee paid by Haas to retailers. His reason for doing this is not plausible. He assumed that just because the growth rate of Haas' business far exceeded the growth rate in multi- family units, it must be that Haas substantially increased its market share during the audit period due to exclusivity. Ultimately, he could not explain the fifteen percent calculation for "market penetration" by the documents he relied on for calculating the other three categories. More damaging to the weight and credibility of his report is that Mr. Volkman did not consider Haas' signing bonuses as having anything to do with the exclusivity rights accruing to Haas. He considered the signing bonuses not to be an intangible right but only "compensation to retailers for negotiating these agreements." However, signing bonus rights seem to be the only intangible rights allocated in any of the contracts and were inherently recognized as such by DOR when it chose not to address them in the Assessment. There are also a number of other questionable portions of his report and opinion which cause it to be discounted and not accepted here.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order finding the Assessment factually and legally correct and sustaining the Assessment plus interest to date. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ______ ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of June, 2004.
The Issue The issue is whether respondent's license as a public adjuster should be revoked, suspended, or otherwise disciplined after his conviction for aiding in the preparation of a false tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C. Section 7206(2).
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that Mr. Lesser be found guilty of violation of Section 626.611(7), Florida Statutes (1987), and that his licensure as a public adjuster be suspended for a period of six months. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 28th day of December, 1989. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of December, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 89-0502 Rulings on findings proposed by the Department: 1 and 2. Adopted in finding of fact 3. Adopted in finding of fact 4. Implicit in findings of fact 5 and 6. Adopted in finding of fact 6. Adopted in finding of fact 8. Adopted in finding of fact 8. Adopted in finding of fact 8. Implicit in finding of fact 11. Rulings on findings proposed by Mr. Lesser: 1-11. Inapplicable. Adopted in finding of fact 3. Adopted in finding of fact 3, to the extent necessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in finding of fact 5. Adopted in finding of fact 5. Adopted in finding of fact 5, though finding of fact 5 includes certain logical deductions or inferences. Made more specific in findings of fact 5 and 6. Adopted as modified in finding of fact 7. Rejected. Not only were the laundering transactions illegitimate because they allowed Benevento Maneri to mischaracterize the source of their income, they also created false expenses for Lesser and Company, Inc., which artificially lowered the income of Lesser and Company, Inc., by the amount of the expense. Adopted as modified in finding of fact 7. It is difficult to determine what Mr. Lesser actually thought the source of the money was, but he knew it was illicit. See, finding of fact 7. Adopted as modified in finding of fact 8. Adopted as modified in finding of fact 9. 25 and 26. Adopted as modified in finding of fact 9. Adopted as modified in finding of fact 10 The extent of Mr. Lesser's danger cannot be determined from this record, although he was in some danger. Covered in finding of fact 9 Adopted as modified in finding of fact 11. Rejected. See, finding of fact 8. The IRS first contacted Mr. Lesser. He then went to Mr. Weinstein to set matters straight. Adopted as modified in finding of fact 11. Adopted as modified in finding of fact 4. Adopted as modified in finding of fact 12. Adopted as modified in finding of fact 12. A light sentence implies the factors set out in finding of fact 35, were taken into consideration, but does not prove that they were all the reasons the U.S. District Judge took into consideration. To the extent necessary, mentioned in finding of fact 12. Rejected as procedural. 38-51. Covered in findings of fact 13 and 14. The proposed findings are subordinate to the findings made in findings of fact 13 and 14. COPIES FURNISHED: S. Marc Herskovitz, Esquire Robert V. Elias, Esquire Office of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 William W. Corry, Esquire Jack M. Skelding, Jr., Esquire Patrick J. Phelan, Jr., Esquire Parker, Skelding, Labasky & Corry 318 North Monroe Street Post Office Box 669 Tallahassee Florida 32301 Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Don Dowdell, General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is liable for the sales and use tax assessment issued by Respondent on February 21, 1995.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this proceeding, Respondent, Department of Revenue (DOR), has issued a proposed sales and use tax assessment in the amount of $24,546.54, plus $6,640.12 in penalties, plus interest from the date of the assessment, against Petitioner, Florida Truck Dock Company (Petitioner or taxpayer). As of March 20, 1997, the assessment totaled $55,195.27, and it continues to increase by $8.07 each day. The assessment constitutes taxes, penalties, and interest allegedly due from Petitioner for various materials and supplies purchased by Petitioner for use in the performance of real property contracts for Petitioner's customers. In its response to the assessment, Petitioner denied that it owed the money. Petitioner's business activities consisted primarily of purchasing truck loading dock equipment from suppliers, principally Kelly Company, Inc. (Kelly), and then installing such equipment as an improvement to real estate. Its records indicate that purchased equipment was generally brought into Florida and installed in real property in the state under a contract whereby parts and labor were furnished for one lump sum contract price. The foregoing contracts were Class A or lump sum contracts within the meaning of Rule 12A-1.051(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code. Class A contracts are considered contracts for the improvement of real estate, not contracts for the resale of tangible personal property. In addition, when the equipment was purchased, Petitioner had not issued resale certificates to its vendors. Under these circumstances, Petitioner was properly treated as an end-user of the equipment in question and owed use taxes on all such purchases of tangible personal property. This controversy began on March 30, 1992, when DOR issued a Notification of Intent to Audit Books and Records of the taxpayer in conjunction with a routine audit. The notice requested that Petitioner make available various corporate records pertaining to its sales and use tax and intangible tax liability. However, only the sales and use tax is in issue here. DOR later advised the taxpayer that the audit period would run from March 1, 1987, through February 29, 1992, and that instead of a detailed audit, only a three-month sampling of the full audit period would be necessary. An initial audit revealed that Petitioner was entitled to a refund. None was given, however, because of information supplied by an employee of the taxpayer regarding the possible destruction and alteration of certain records by the taxpayer, and the auditor's conclusion that a three-month sampling of the records was not representative for the full five-year audit period. In addition, the auditor concluded that the results of the sample period were not reasonable. For these reasons, the scope of the audit was expanded. The auditor then requested, among other things, that copies of all sales (summary) journals for the entire five-year period be produced. Although Petitioner has always contended that these journals were merely "commission" journals for transactions between its vendors and customers, the auditor's finding that they are records of cash transactions is consistent with the language on the face of the journals, referring to "deposits" and "total deposits." Further, a comparison of the journals with Petitioner's own bank statements confirms this finding. At least twelve months of the records were missing, and the taxpayer agreed to recreate the missing records. Once a copy of all journals (both original and recreated) was produced, the auditor tested their validity and then made various audit adjustments, which are reflected on Schedule A-2 of Exhibit 5. In those instances where inadequate cost price information concerning equipment purchases was provided by the taxpayer, the auditor properly used estimates in making his adjustments. The tax liability for each taxable transaction was recorded by the taxpayer under Account 367 on the sales journals. The auditor then examined the source documents (original invoices) to verify the accuracy of the recorded amounts. These numbers were then compared with the taxes paid by the taxpayer on its monthly tax returns filed with DOR. This comparison produced a deficiency which represents approximately 75 percent of the total assessment. However, in those instances where Petitioner collected sales tax from its customers, and remitted the same to DOR, Petitioner was not assessed with a tax for those same items. A sampling of the audit period established that Petitioner also had a number of lump-sum contracts with various governmental customers on which it neither paid taxes to the vendor when the equipment was purchased, nor did it collect taxes from the end-user when the equipment was resold. Thus, it was responsible for the use taxes on these transactions. The deficiency is detailed on Schedule B-3 of the final audit report (Exhibit 6), and it accounts for approximately 14 percent of the total assessment. The remaining part of the assessment is related to four miscellaneous transactions which are unrelated to the sales journals. Two of the transactions occurred during the short period of time when the service tax was in effect in 1987, while the remaining two relate to small purchases of equipment and supplies by the taxpayer for its own consumption. There was no evidence that the taxpayer paid the taxes due on these transactions. DOR met with the taxpayer, its accountant, and its original counsel on various occasions in an effort to obtain more documentation favorable to the taxpayer's position. In most cases, the taxpayer refused to provide more records. At one meeting, however, the taxpayer produced additional source documents (invoices) that appeared to be altered from the original invoices previously given to the auditor. These are shown in Exhibit 7 received in evidence. When asked by the auditor for copies of the same invoices sent to customers so that the discrepancy could be resolved, the taxpayer refused to comply with this request. During the audit process, the taxpayer contended that its primary supplier, Kelly, had already paid taxes on a number of the transactions. No documentation was produced, however, to support this contention. It also complained that there was bias on the part of DOR's auditor. As to this contention, the record shows that the auditor had no relationship with the taxpayer prior to this audit, and for the intangible personal property tax, the auditor's field work actually resulted in a refund for Petitioner. Finally, the taxpayer contended that rather than using the originally supplied records, the auditor should have used Petitioner's recreated or altered records in making the audit adjustments. This latter contention has been rejected.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order sustaining its original assessment against Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of November, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of November, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda Lettera, Esquire Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Jeffrey M. Dikman, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Benjamin K. Phipps, Esquire Post Office Box 1351 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 L. H. Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue Whether the Department of Revenue's ("Department") assessment of tax, penalty, and interest against American Import Car Sales, Inc., is valid and correct.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the agency responsible for administering the revenue laws of the State of Florida, including the imposition and collection of the state's sales and use taxes. Petitioner, American Import Car Sales, Inc., is a Florida S-corporation with its principle place of business and mailing address in Hollywood, Florida. Petitioner, during the period of June 1, 2007, through May 31, 2010 ("assessment period"), was in the business of selling and financing new and used motor vehicles. On June 29, 2010, the Department issued to Petitioner a Notice of Intent to Audit Books and Records (form DR-840) for sales and use tax for the assessment period. Said notice informed Petitioner that the audit would begin on or around 60 days from the date of the notice and included an attachment identifying the records and information that would be reviewed and should be available when the audit commenced. Specifically, the Sales and Use Tax Information Checklist attachment requested the following: chart of accounts, general ledgers, cash receipts journals, cash disbursement journals, federal income tax returns, county tangible property returns, Florida Sales and Use Tax returns, sales journals, sales tax exemption certificates (resale certificates), sales invoices, purchase invoices, purchase journals, lease agreements for real or tangible property, depreciation schedules, bank and financial statements, detail of fixed asset purchases, and other documents as needed. On the same date, in addition to the Notice of Intent, the Department issued to Petitioner, inter alia, an Electronic Audit Survey, and a Pre-Audit Questionnaire and Request for Information. On September 17, 2010, the auditor requested the following records to review by October 4, 2010: (1) general ledger for the assessment period; (2) federal returns for 2007, 2008, and 2009; (3) lease agreement for the business location; (4) deal folders for the assessment period; (5) all expense purchase invoices for the assessment period; (6) all purchase invoices relating to assets added to the Depreciation Schedule during the assessment period; (7) resale/exemption certificates, shipping documents, and any other exempt sales documentation to support exempt sales during the assessment period; (8) bank statements for the assessment periods; and (9) all worksheets used to prepare monthly sales tax returns for the assessment period. On October 5, 2010, the auditor met with Petitioner's President Joe Levy, Petitioner's Secretary Joanne Clements, and Petitioner's Certified Public Accountant, Steve Levy. At that time, Petitioner provided a hard copy of the 2007 and 2008 general ledger and profit and loss statements. At that time, the auditor again advised Petitioner that the Department needed the federal returns, as well as the completed electronic audit survey and pre-audit questionnaire. On October 5, 2010, the Department and Petitioner signed a Consent to Extend the Time to Issue an Assessment or to File a Claim for Refund (form DR-872). The consent provided that assessments or claims for refunds may be filed at any time on or before the extended statute of limitations, December 31, 2011. On October 18, 2010, Petitioner provided the Department with the completed electronic audit survey and pre-audit questionnaire. Thereafter, Petitioner provided the Department with the following books and records: (1) 2009 "deal folders;" Petitioner's general ledger in Excel format for June 1, 2007, through December 31, 2010; (3) January 2009 through May 2010 bank statements; (4) a listing of exempt sales; and (5) lease agreements with attendant invoices. On August 25, 2011, the Department issued its assessment, entitled a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes (form DR-1215)("NOI"). Said notice provided that Respondent owed $2,324,298.42 in tax, $581,074.61 in penalties, and $515,117.04 in interest through August 25, 2011. The NOI addressed Petitioner's alleged failure to collect and remit tax on: (1) certain vehicle sales (audit Exhibit A01-Sales Tax Collected and Not Remitted)1/; (2) vehicle sales with no documentation regarding its exempt status (audit Exhibit A02-Disallowed Exempt Sales)2/; (3) motor vehicle sales where no discretionary tax was assessed (audit Exhibit A03- Discretionary Surtax)3/; and (4) unreported sales (audit Exhibit A04-Unreported Sales). The assessment also related to Petitioner's alleged failure to pay/accrue tax on: (1) taxable purchases (audit Exhibit B01-Taxable Purchases); (2) fixed assets (audit Exhibit B02-Fixed Assets); and (3) commercial rent (Exhibit B03-Commercial Realty). At hearing, Petitioner stipulated that the only component of the NOI remaining at issue pertains to audit Exhibit A04-Unreported Sales, as Petitioner has conceded A01, A02, A03, and all fee schedules. An understanding of audit Exhibit A04, and the assessment methodology employed by the auditor, is articulated in the Department's Exhibit MM, entitled Explanation of Items, which is set forth, in pertinent part, as follows: Reason for Exhibit: The records received for the audit were inadequate. The taxpayer provided bank statements for the period of January 2009 through May 2010. This period was deemed the test period for unreported sales. A review of the bank statements for the test period revealed that sales were underreported. This exhibit was created to assess for sales tax on unreported sales. Source of Information: Sales tax returns and Bank of America bank statements for the test period of January 2009 through May 2010; The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) [sic] was acquired for the period of June 2007 through May 2010. Description of Mathematical Adjustments: The bank statements were reviewed for the period of January 2009 through May 2010. Taxable Sales on sales tax returns, sales tax on sales tax returns, taxable sales on Exhibit on [sic] Exhibit A01, sales tax Exhibit A01 and Exempt Sales on Exhibit A02 was subtracted from Bank Deposits to arrive at unreported sales. See calculations on page 53. Unreported sales for the period of January 2009 through May 2010 were scheduled into this exhibit. A rate analysis of the DMV database resulted in an effective tax rate of 6.2689. Scheduled transactions were multiplied by the effective tax rate of 6.2689 to determine the tax due on the test period. A percentage of error was calculated by dividing the tax due by the taxable sales for each test period. The percentage of error was applied to taxable sales for each month of the audit period which resulted in additional tax due. The auditor's analysis of the test period, applied to the entire assessment period, resulted in a determination that Petitioner owed $1,599,056.23 in tax for unreported sales. On August 25, 2011, the auditor met with Joe and Steve Levy to discuss and present the NOI. At that time, Joe and Steve Levy were advised that Petitioner had 30 days to provide additional documents to revise the NOI. On September 28, 2011, the Department issued correspondence to Petitioner advising that since a response to the NOI had not been received, the case was being forwarded to Tallahassee for issuance of the Notice of Proposed Assessment ("NOPA")(form DR-831). On October 7, 2011, the Department issued the NOPA, which identified the deficiency resulting from an audit of Petitioner's books and records for the assessment period. Pursuant to the NOPA, Petitioner was assessed $2,324,298.42 in tax, $31,332.46 in penalty, and $534,284.54 in interest through October 7, 2011. The NOPA provided Petitioner with its rights to an informal written protest, an administrative hearing, or a judicial proceeding. On December 5, 2011, Petitioner filed its Informal Written Protest to the October 7, 2011, NOPA. The protest noted that the NOPA was "not correct and substantially overstated." The protest raised several issues: (1) that the calculation was primarily based upon bank statement deposits; (2) not all deposits are sales and sources of income; and (3) a substantial amount of the deposits were exempt sales and loans. The protest further requested a personal conference with a Department specialist. On January 10, 2013, Martha Gregory, a tax law specialist and technical assistance dispute resolution employee of the Department, issued correspondence to Petitioner. The documented purpose of the correspondence was to request additional information regarding Petitioner's protest of the NOPA. Among other items, Ms. Gregory requested Petitioner provide the following: [D]ocumentation and explanations regarding the source of income—vehicle sales, loan payments, etc.—for each deposit. For vehicle sales deposits, provide the customer name, vehicle identification number and amount; for loan payments, provide proof of an existing loan and the amount received from the borrower; and for any other deposits, provide documentation of the source of this income. A conference was held with Petitioner on February 7, 2013. At the conference, Ms. Gregory discussed the January 10, 2013, correspondence including the request for information. The Department did not receive the requested information. Following the conference, the Department provided the Petitioner an additional 105 days to provide documentation to support the protest. Again, Petitioner failed to provide the information requested. On June 14, 2013, the Department issued its Notice of Decision ("NOD"). The NOD concluded that Petitioner had failed to demonstrate that it was not liable for the tax, plus penalty and interest, on unreported sales as scheduled in audit Exhibit A04, Unreported Sales, as assessed within the compliance audit for the assessment period. Accordingly, the protested assessment was sustained. On July 15, 2013, Petitioner filed a Petition for Reconsideration to appeal the Notice of Decision ("POR"). The POR advanced the following issues: (1) the records examined were not the books and records of Petitioner; (2) the audit should be reduced because the auditor's methodology was incorrect; and the Petitioner should be allowed a credit for bad debts taken during the audit period. At Petitioner's request, on October 22, 2013, Petitioner and Ms. Gregory participated in a conference regarding the POR. At the conference, Petitioner requested a 30-day extension to provide documentation in support of Petitioner's POR. No additional documentation was subsequently provided by Petitioner. On April 29, 2014, the Department issued its Notice of Reconsideration ("NOR"). The NOR sustained the protested assessment. Petitioner, on June 30, 2014, filed its Petition for Chapter 120 Hearing to contest the NOR. Petitioner did not file its federal tax returns for the years 2008, 2009, and 2010 until after the Department issued the NOR. Indeed, the federal returns were not filed until June 3, 2014.4/ Ms. Kruse conceded that the auditor's assessment utilized Petitioner's bank statements to determine unreported sales; however, the auditor did not make any adjustments for "unusual items that would have been on the face of the bank statements." Ms. Kruse further acknowledged that the auditor's assessment does not reference Petitioner's general ledger information. Ms. Kruse acknowledged that, for several representative months, the general ledger accurately reported the deposits for the bank statements provided. When presented with a limited comparison of the bank statement and the general ledger, Ms. Kruse further agreed that, on several occasions, deposits noted on the bank statements were probably not taxable transactions; however, the same were included as taxable sales in the auditor's analysis. Ms. Kruse credibly testified that the same appeared to be transfers of funds from one account into another; however, because the Department only possessed the bank statements from one account, and never received the requested "back up information" concerning the other account, the Department could not discern the original source of the funds.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that The Department conduct a new assessment of Petitioner's sales and use tax based on a test or sampling of Petitioner's available records or other information relating to the sales or purchases made by Petitioner for a representative period, giving due consideration to Petitioner's available records, including Petitioner's general ledger, to determine the proportion that taxable retail sales bear to total retail sales. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of April, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S TODD P. RESAVAGE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of April, 2015.
The Issue Whether Petitioner, as President of Bella Donna Couture, Inc., is liable for a penalty equal to twice the total amount of the sales and use tax owed by that entity to the State of Florida.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Respondent is the agency charged with administering the revenue laws of the State of Florida, including chapter 212, which imposes and authorizes the collection of sales and use tax in Florida. Petitioner was President of Bella Donna Couture, Inc. ("Taxpayer"), a women's clothing store formerly located at 5819 Sunset Drive, South Miami, Florida. Taxpayer is registered with Respondent as a dealer pursuant to section 212.18 and was issued Sales and Use Tax Certificate of Registration Number 23-8012167329-8. Events Giving Rise to the Notice of Assessment Taxpayer did not remit sales tax for November 2003, January 2004, June 2005, September 2005, January 2006, July 2006, September 2006, and November 2006, and so was delinquent in its statutory obligation to remit sales tax for these reporting periods. To collect these outstanding tax liabilities, on January 17, 2007, Respondent issued Warrant No. 40490. The warrant stated that Taxpayer owed $11,471.59 in taxes, $2,060.00 in penalties, $1,623.22 in interest, and a filing fee of $20.00, for a total liability of $15,174.81. The warrant was recorded in the public records of Miami-Dade County on January 24, 2007. In an effort to compromise and resolve Taxpayer's outstanding tax liabilities, on April 25, 2008, Respondent entered into a Stipulated Time Payment Agreement ("STPA") with Taxpayer. The STPA was executed by Petitioner, as Taxpayer's President.3/ Under the STPA, Taxpayer committed to pay $13,526.72, consisting of $9,078.36 in taxes, $1,220.70 in penalties, $3,187.66 in interest, and $40.00 in fees. The STPA established an amortization schedule under which Taxpayer would pay a specified amount per month for a 13-month period. Pursuant to the STPA's terms, Taxpayer, by entering into the STPA, waived any and all rights to challenge the taxes and other liabilities assessed under the warrant giving rise to the STPA. Other key terms were that interest accrued at a rate of 12% per annum until the tax liability was paid; that Taxpayer agreed to meet each payment term on the amortization schedule; and that the STPA would become void if Taxpayer failed to follow the payment terms, file all tax returns that became due, or remit all taxes that became due and payable. The STPA further provided that Respondent was authorized to assess the responsible corporate officer a 200% penalty for failure to pay the taxes due. In accordance with the STPA's terms, Taxpayer made a $2,000 downpayment and three $450 monthly payments, for a total payment of $3,350.00. However, Taxpayer failed to make the stipulated monthly payment due on August 25, 2008. Thus, pursuant to the STPA's terms, it became void, and all taxes, penalties, interest, and fees owed under Warrant No. 40490 became due and payable as of that date. Section 213.75(2) establishes the order of priority for applying payments toward outstanding tax and other liabilities when a warrant has been filed and recorded. Specifically, payments are applied in the following order, with any remaining amounts applied to the subsequent obligation: (1) costs of recording the warrant; (2) administrative collection processing fee; (3) accrued interest; (4) accrued penalty; and (5) taxes due. Once Taxpayer breached the STPA, all payments made under the STPA were applied as payments on Warrant No. 40490 in accordance with section 213.75(2). After the $3,350.00 paid under the STPA was applied toward Warrant No. 40490, and $434.44 was paid on the warrant from a bank levy, Taxpayer continued to owe $9,172.57 in taxes, as well as interest and penalties from its outstanding obligations for November 2003, January 2004, June 2005, September 2005, January 2006, July 2006, September 2006, and November 2006. Pursuant to the terms of the warrant, interest on the amount of taxes due continued to accrue at a rate of 12% per annum. Taxpayer subsequently failed to remit its sales tax for December 2008. In response, Respondent levied Taxpayer's MetroBank account in the amount of $4,000.00 on February 18, 2009. Portions of this levy were applied toward previously- issued Warrant No. 110461 and toward Notices of Liability for outstanding taxes due for the December 2008 and September 2008 sales tax collection periods. In early 2009, Taxpayer and Respondent attempted to negotiate another STPA to again compromise the amount of taxes, interest, penalties, and fees that Taxpayer owed for the November 2003, January 2004, September 2005, January 2006, July 2006, September 2006, and November 2006 sales tax collection periods. However, the parties were unable to reach agreement, so Respondent continued its collection efforts. In March 2011, Respondent again attempted to work with Taxpayer to resolve its outstanding tax and other liabilities. To that end, Barbara Chin, a revenue specialist with Respondent, attempted to contact Petitioner by telephone. Her telephone messages went unanswered, so on March 22, 2011, Ms. Chin sent Petitioner a Demand to Appear, informing Petitioner that an appointment had been set with Respondent for April 4, 2011, for her to discuss Taxpayer's outstanding liabilities. The Demand to Appear specifically informed Petitioner that failure to comply with the letter would result in issuance of a tax warrant and any other legal action Respondent deemed necessary to collect the outstanding taxes. Petitioner failed to appear, so Ms. Chin made a follow-up telephone call to Petitioner, which also went unanswered. Taxpayer failed to remit its sales tax or file a return for April 2011. In response, Respondent issued Warrant No. 219580, for the amount of $1,500.00 due in taxes. The warrant was recorded in the Miami-Dade County public records on June 14, 2011. Petitioner subsequently contacted Ms. Chin to discuss Taxpayer's outstanding liabilities. At this time, Petitioner informed Ms. Chin that she was going to file for bankruptcy of Taxpayer. In response, Ms. Chin sent a letter to the NAFH Bank, with which Taxpayer had an account, freezing the transfer of Taxpayer's credits, debts, and personal property in the bank's control. On June 6, 2011, Petitioner sent Respondent a completed Closing or Sale of Business form, dated May 30, 2011, indicating that Taxpayer's business had been closed. Ms. Chin made two site visits to Taxpayer's location in or about May 2011. On her first visit, Ms. Chin discovered that a business bearing the name "Alexis Nicolette Design Studio and Boutique" was operating at this location, and that Petitioner was working there. Ms. Chin informed Petitioner that this entity needed to obtain its own sales tax number. On Ms. Chin's second visit, Petitioner showed her a certificate of registration for Alexis Nicolette Design Studio and Boutique having the same sales tax number but showing a different business location.4/ Ms. Chin again informed Petitioner that the owner of this entity needed to obtain a new sales tax number for the entity for the new location. Ms. Chin reviewed the Articles of Incorporation for Alexis Nicolette Design Studio and Boutique; this document showed this entity's business address as being the same as Taxpayer's address. Ms. Chin surmised that Petitioner was attempting to avoid Taxpayer's sales tax liabilities and obligations by operating Taxpayer's business under a new name. Respondent sent Petitioner a Notice of Assessment ("NOA") dated June 20, 2011, setting forth Taxpayer's outstanding tax liabilities and notifying her that Respondent was personally assessing a penalty against her for double the amount of tax owed by the Taxpayer. The NOA included the taxes owed under Warrant Nos. 40490 and 219580, and specifically stated that the penalty being assessed was for the period from November 2003 through April 2011. It is undisputed that between November 2003 and April 2011, Petitioner was the President of Taxpayer, and thus was the person having administrative control over the collection and payment of sales tax by Taxpayer for purposes of section 213.29. Petitioner's Defenses Against the Notice of Assessment The parties disagree on the amount of taxes that Taxpayer owes. Petitioner claims that Taxpayer owes approximately $194.00 in taxes, while Respondent claims that Taxpayer owes $9,182.60 in taxes. Petitioner claims that pursuant to section 213.29(1), Respondent incorrectly applied Taxpayer's payments made under the STPA, and that all payments Taxpayer made should have been applied first toward outstanding taxes, then interest, then penalties, then toward any applicable fees. This argument is the linchpin of Petitioner's position that the assessments in the June 20, 2011, NOA are incorrect. Petitioner also asserts that the April 2008 STPA is defective because it does not contain a detailed amortization schedule. Petitioner further claims that subsections 95.091(2) and (3)(a)1.a. time-bar Respondent from bringing an action to collect taxes that were due before June 21, 2006. Finally, Petitioner argues that under any circumstances, Respondent did not establish that she sought to willfully evade or defeat Taxpayer's tax liabilities, so she cannot be held personally liable for the penalty assessed under the NOA. Findings of Ultimate Fact In this proceeding, Respondent has the initial burden under section 120.80(14)(b)2., to establish a prima facie case showing that an assessment was made against Taxpayer, and that the assessment was factually and legally correct. Once Respondent meets this burden, the ultimate burden of persuasion shifts to Petitioner to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Respondent's assessment is incorrect, departs from the requirements of law, or is not supported by any reasonable hypothesis of legality. Upon consideration of the credible and persuasive evidence in the record, it is determined that Respondent met its prima facie burden and that Petitioner failed to meet its ultimate burden of persuasion in this proceeding. Petitioner's position that all payments made by Taxpayer under the STPA, as well as payments made toward other warrants, should first have been applied toward its tax liability lacks merit. That argument may have had force if warrants against Taxpayer had not been filed and recorded. However, in this case, by the time Taxpayer began making payments toward its outstanding tax liabilities, those liabilities were the subject of Warrant No. 40490 and other warrants. Once Taxpayer breached the STPA, it became void and all liabilities under Warrant No. 40490 became immediately due. The payments under the STPA were applied to Warrant No. 40490, and other payments toward liabilities not addressed in the STPA made were applied to Warrant No. 40490 and other outstanding warrants, all in accordance with section 213.75(2). Thus, the payments were allocated first toward fees, then penalties, then interest, and, finally, taxes. Respondent established the correctness of amounts assessed, and Petitioner did not show that Respondent incorrectly applied the payments pursuant to section 213.75(2) or that the taxes and other liabilities set forth in the June 20, 2011, NOA were inaccurate. Petitioner's argument that the STPA was "defective" as lacking a detailed amortization schedule also lacks merit. The STPA contained a "Stipulation Amortization Table" that established a detailed 13-month repayment schedule specifying the date on which each payment was due and the specific amount due for each payment.5/ The NOA is not time-barred by section 95.091(2). That statute imposes a five-year limitation period for filing an action to collect taxes if a lien to secure the payment is not provided by law. However, this proceeding was brought against Petitioner to impose penalties for willful nonpayment of Taxpayer's tax liabilities; it is not an action against Taxpayer to collect taxes. Thus, by its plain terms, section 95.091(2) does not apply to this proceeding. Section 95.091(3)(a)1.a. also does not time-bar the NOA. That statute authorizes Respondent to determine and assess the amount of tax, penalty, or interest with respect to sales tax within three years after the date that the tax is due, any return with respect to such tax is due, or such return is filed. Here, Respondent filed warrants and assessments as far back as January 2003 to collect taxes owed by Taxpayer; all were filed well within any applicable three-year limitation period. The greater weight of the evidence also supports the determination that Petitioner, as the corporate officer required to collect and pay sales tax on behalf of Taxpayer, willfully attempted to evade or defeat payment of Taxpayer's tax obligations. Of particular significance is Petitioner's lack of responsiveness to Ms. Chin's multiple attempts to communicate with her to resolve Taxpayer's obligations, and her evasiveness regarding the relationship between Taxpayer and the business entity operating under a new name at Taxpayer's business address and using Taxpayer's sales tax collection number. The evidence gives rise to the inference that Petitioner was attempting to operate the same business under a new name to evade or defeat Taxpayer's outstanding tax liabilities.6/
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Respondent, the Department of Revenue, enter a Final Order determining that Petitioner, Astrid Sarmentero, is liable for to Respondent for a penalty of $18,345.14. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of November, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of November, 2012.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner purchased a used car in Florida in May of 1983 and paid 5 percent sales tax. Petitioner did not title said car in the State of Florida. When Petitioner returned to Maryland, his state of residence, Maryland imposed a 5 percent tax on said car when Petitioner titled said car. Petitioner applied for a sales tax refund to the Department of Revenue in the amount of $225.00. Respondent issued a Notice of Intent to deny said refund application on December 1, 1983. From the exhibits to which the parties stipulated, additional facts are found by the Hearing Officer. A bill of sale indicates that Petitioner purchased a 1979 Buick Regal from Eddy Auto Sales on May 14, 1983. A temporary registration and receipt issued by the State of Maryland on June 17, 1983, shows that Petitioner paid a "title tax" of $222.50 to the State of Maryland. By letter dated January 27, 1984, Agnes Stoicos of the Maryland Department of Transportation indicates that the Maryland tax is a 5 percent excise tax upon the issuance of all original and subsequent certificates of title, and the tax is used primarily for the construction and the maintenance of the Maryland highway system.
Findings Of Fact Finding no record that Taxpayer had filed or paid intangible taxes for the years 1979 and 1980, on June 17, 1982, DOR notified Taxpayer they were reviewing Taxpayer's intangible personal property tax account for the years 1979 through 1982 (Exhibit 16). During the audit which followed Taxpayer presented copies of the 1981 and 1982 tax returns and cancelled checks evidencing payment. The audit disclosed small discrepancies in these returns and those discrepancies were satisfied by the Taxpayer and are not an issue in these proceedings. On December 15, 1982, Gateway Hospital sold its assets to Humana Corporation and in December 1983 the corporation was dissolved and a liquidating trust was established to settle accounts and distribute proceeds to the stockholders. After this date none of Taxpayer's employees were located at the Gateway Hospital address, 5115 - 58th Avenue North, St. Petersburg, Florida. One of Taxpayer's contentions on the timeliness issue is that all notices from DOR were sent to the 58th Street address and were either not received or not timely received by Taxpayer. No special notification to DOR of a change of address was submitted by Taxpayer. The 1983 intangible tax return showed Taxpayer's address as 5800 49th Street, Suite 201, St. Petersburg, Florida. However, in the petition for hearing dated March 21, 1985, Petitioner's address is shown as 5115 58th Avenue North, St. Petersburg, Florida 33709. On April 2, 1984, DOR sent Taxpayer Notice of Proposed Assessment (Exhibit 6) for tax years 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, and 1983 in the amount of $19,786.36 with interest through February 23, 1984. This notice advised Taxpayer that this was final agency action and of its right to petition for an administrative hearing within 60 days or file an action in circuit court within 60 days, and that failure to so petition or file would render the proposed assessment final and no action could thereafter be brought to contest the assessment. This notice was sent certified mail and receipted for at the 58th Avenue North address. Alan Steinbach, the chief operating officer of the liquidating trust, testified he never received Exhibit 6. Subsequent to June 19, 1984, DOR sent Notice of Demand for Payment (Exhibit 7) to Taxpayer to the 58th Avenue North address. This document, the top part of which is identical to Exhibit 6 except interest has been computed to 6/19/84, was received by Steinbach. Steinbach contacted DOR and told Randy Miller, Executive Director, that this was the first notice of a delinquency he had received from DOR and needed additional time to show the taxes had been paid. Miller agreed to allow Taxpayer more time and communicated this to Steven J. Barger, Jr., Chief, Bureau of Audit Selection. By letter dated August 13, 1984 (Exhibit 8), Barger advised Steinbach that the collection procedure would be delayed 30 days to permit Taxpayer time to submit the information necessary to set aside the assessment. By letters dated September 11, 1984 (Exhibit 9) and October 17, 1984 (Exhibit 12), the collection procedures were further stayed until December 12, 1984. During this period Taxpayer presented evidence that the 1982 and 1983 intangible personal property taxes had been paid and all errors in those returns were corrected and the correct taxes paid. By Notice of Proposed Assessment dated 1/9/85 (Exhibit 14) an audit assessment for the tax years 1979-1983 was forwarded to Taxpayer showing the tax, penalties and interest for the tax years 1979 and 1980 through 1/3/85 in the amount of $12,296.30 were due and no taxes were due for the other years. The explanation of appeal rights attached to this audit assessment advised the Taxpayer had 60 days from the date of assessment to contest the assessment in an administrative proceeding or a judicial proceeding. On March 21, 1985, the instant petition was filed. During the period prior to January 9, 1985, Petitioner was unable to locate tax returns or cancelled checks showing payment for 1979 and 1980 although Taxpayer produced returns and cancelled checks for all of the other years from 1977 through 1983. DOR also located evidence showing intangible personal property taxes paid by Taxpayer before and after 1979 and 1980, but could find no record of returns being filed or taxes paid for the years 1979 and 1980. Upon receipt of a tax return and payment DOR photographs the return and payment check on microfilm, enters the data from the return in the computer, and forwards the tax return to the archives in the Department of State. An index for a tax year is compiled after the close of that tax year. Until this index is prepared, DOR cannot readily locate any tax return. As a result, whether or not a tax return was filed by a particular taxpayer cannot be ascertained by DOR until six to nine months after the close of the tax year. At the time Exhibit 7 was forwarded to Taxpayer, DOR could not have located the Taxpayer's 1983 return which, in fact, had been filed, as had the 1981 and 1982 returns. Taxpayer could not locate the returns or cancelled checks representing payment for the years 1979 and 1980. When asked why Taxpayer did not obtain bank records to establish payment, Steinbach responded that the corporation wrote 1000- 1500 checks per month and too many check would have to be screened. Since all payments by Taxpayer for the five years for which returns were produced were made in June, except for one year, 1983, which was paid in July, that does not appear to be an onerous task to avoid a tax liability of more than $12,000.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner publishes the Fort Lauderdale News and Sun Sentinel. The firm has forty departments, of which one is a letter shop on the premises that prints forms, stationery, and other such needs of the company. About ten percent of the work done in the letter shop is for outside customers. Materials used in processing the in-house work include stock paper, binders, glue, and cardboard. The shop makes letterhead stationery for each department of the company and prints "run" sheets which are forms for reporting news stories and advertisements. It pays State sales tax on the supplies that it purchases from outside firms and collects such tax on the sales made to outside customers. The purpose of the print shop operation is to ensure that the newspaper has an ample supply of forms and printed stationery and it is also cheaper than contracting the work to an outside firm, Many of the forms are used once and then destroyed and stationery is consumed in due course of time. Some of the printed items become permanent files of the petitioner. (Testimony of Hatfield) In January, 1976, respondent's tax examiner conducted an audit of respondent's accounts and thereafter respondent, by notice of assessment dated April 8, 1976, demanded, inter alia, payment of tax, penalty and interest under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, in the total amount of $11,222.48 based on the fabricated cost of the items produced in petitioner's letter shop for its own use. The total cost of the aforesaid items was placed at $208,596.37. This cost was arrived at by the amounts petitioner internally "charged" its various departments for the printed material. Respondent's audit supervisor testified at the hearing that the assessment was laid under Section 212.06(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and Rule 12A-1.34, Florida Administrative Code. After receipt of the assessment, representatives of both parties discussed the matter in May and certain erroneous charges were deleted from the assessment. However, these deletions had reference to taxable transactions other than those involving petitioner's print shop which appeared in Schedule C of the assessment. Additionally, the original assessed penalty was abated to a flat 5 percent of the tax. A second revised notice of proposed assessment dated December 14, 1977, placed the petitioner's tax liability with regard to its print shop operations at $7,338.02. This was corrected after the hearing to show a total of $7,701.00 based on additional interest assessed as to Schedule C items. The assessment period is February 1, 1973 to January 31, 1976. (Testimony of Harris, George, Petitioner's Exhibits 1-3) Dealers such as the petitioner are required to submit a monthly sales and use tax report on Form DR-15 to remit any required tax. This is the only form sent on a monthly basis to dealers such as petitioner. Column B thereof is described in the form as "Purchases not for resale but for use or consumption which are subject to the 4 percent tax rate and not taxed by suppliers." (Stipulation, Petitioner's Exhibit 2) Respondent does not collect the particular tax in question from non- business entities and is unable to determine how much tax has been paid in this regard in cases of voluntary payment by taxpayers. Respondent has records as to only ten (10) cases during the period 1968-1977 in which audits were performed and taxes imposed pursuant thereto under Rule 12A-1.34(3), F.A.C. Only one of these cases involved a print shop in the Fort Lauderdale area. However, there are approximately 150 such commercial enterprises in that area. (Stipulation, Petitioner's Exhibits 1-2)
Recommendation That the proposed tax assessment against petitioner under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, be upheld and enforced by appropriate action. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of August, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 1978. COPIES FURNISHED: E. Wilson Crump, II, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Tax Division Post Office Box 5377 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Thomas A. Groendyke, Esquire Post Office Drawer 7028 1415 East Sunrise Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33338
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this cause, Robert W. Pope has been the holder of license no. 62-600, series 4-COP, SRX, held with the State of Florida, Division of Beverage to trade as The Wedgewood Inn, located at 1701, 4th Street, South, St. Petersburg, Pinellas County, Florida. When the Respondent, Pope, began to operate the licensed premises he was given a registration sales tax number by the State of Florida, Department of Revenue. This number was provided in accordance with 212, F.S. That law required the remittance of the collected sales tax on a month to month basis, the period beginning with the first day of the month and ending with the last day of the month. The remittance was due on the first day of the following month and payable by the 20th day of the following month. Failure to pay by the 20th would result in a 5 percent penalty and 1 percent interest per month. The sales tax remittance due from the licensed premises for December, 1975 through August, 1976 was not made, and a lien was filed to aid collection of the tax. In mid 1976, the Respondent, contacted the State of Florida, Department of Revenue to discuss term payments of the sales tax remittance. The Respondent in October, 1976 tried to effect a partial release of the tax claim by paying $2,900. In keeping with their policy the Department of Revenue rejected these efforts. Subsequently, in February, 1977, the Respondent made a $10,000 initial payment and three monthly installments to satisfy the lien on this licensed premises and another licensed premises which the Respondent owned. At present all taxes due and owing under 212, F.S. are current. The above facts establish that the Respondent failed to comply with the provisions of 212, F.S. pertaining to the remittance of sales tax from the Respondent to the State of Florida, Department of Revenue. This violation, thereby subjects the Respondent to the possible penalties of 561.29, F.S.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Respondent, Robert W. Pope, be required to pay a civil penalty in the amount of $250.00 or have the license no. 62-600, series 4- COP, SRX, suspended for a period of 10 days. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of July, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: William Hatch, Esquire Division of Beverage 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Robert W. Pope, Esquire 611 First Avenue, North St. Petersburg, Florida 33701
