Findings Of Fact The petitioners Petitioners are special taxing districts and political subdivisions of the State of Florida, which were created pursuant to Chapter 298, Florida Statutes. The petitioners and their pertinent structures and operations were authorized by Chapter 298, Florida Statutes, for the purpose of providing irrigation, drainage and flood protection for the landowners within their respective boundaries. In order to effect this purpose, the petitioners designed and operate their water control structures to pump excess stormwater and surface water directly to Lake Okeechobee (the "Lake") in the case of East Beach Water Control District (East Beach) and directly to the Rim Canal at the southern end of the Lake in the case of South Shore Drainage District (South Shore), East Shore Water Control District (East Shore), and South Florida Conservancy District (South Florida). East Beach covers a total area of approximately 6,542 acres located along the southeast shore of the Lake. Approximately 75-80 percent of the lands contained within the District are used for agriculture, with most of those lands planted in sugarcane. The remaining 20-25 percent of the drainage area is urbanized. The urban area includes the City of Pahokee. South Shore covers a total area of approximately 4,230 acres located along the Rim Canal at the south end of the Lake. Approximately 80-85 percent of the lands contained within the District are used for agriculture, with most of those lands planted in sugarcane. The remaining 15-20 percent of the drainage area is urban and industrial. The urban area includes a portion of the cities in South Bay, Lake Harbor, Bean City, South Shore Village, and sparsely scattered home sites throughout the District. East Shore covers a total area of approximately 8,136 acres located along the Rim Canal at the south end of the Lake. With the exception of lands developed as canals, levees, roads, and other service-related systems, the entire district is used for agricultural purposes. South Florida covers a total area of approximately 32,754 acres located along the Rim Canal at the south end of the Lake with 28,649 acres located in Palm Beach County and 4,105 acres located in Hendry County. Approximately 85-90 percent of the land is used for agricultural purposes and the remaining 10-15 percent is used for urban or industrial purposes. The City of Belle Glade constitutes a major part of the urban land with the remainder situated around the cities of South Bay, Lake Harbor and other scattered home sites. Here, the parties have stipulated that petitioners have standing to maintain this challenge. Background Before 1986, petitioners' discharges into the Lake had not been regulated by the respondent, Department of Environmental Regulation (Department). In 1985 the Governor of the State of Florida issued Executive Order Number 86-150. This executive order observed that the Lake Okeechobee Technical Committee, formed to study water quality and water supply conditions in the Lake, had found the Lake to be in danger of becoming hypereutrophic because of the excessive amounts of nutrients, especially phosphorus, it was receiving, and had recommended corrective actions to substantially reduce the nutrient load and provide for long-term monitoring, research and management needs for the Lake. To protect and preserve the Lake, the executive order directed, inter alia, that the Department "bring all private and publically controlled backpumping sources into the lake under permit review or under enforcement for operating without a permit." Pursuant to that executive order, the Department, in concert with petitioners, began the process of regulating petitioners' discharges into the Lake. The Department initially attempted to have the petitioners enter into consent orders; however, the petitioners objected to that concept. Ultimately, both the Department and petitioners agreed to the issuance of short-term operating permits (TOPs) containing specific conditions aimed at determining the composition of the discharges from petitioners' systems and at reducing the pollution loading into the Lake. The TOPs, issued December 30, 1986, and effective until September 23, 1988, were issued pursuant to the Department's regulatory authority over pollution sources contained in Chapter 403, Florida Statutes, and Rule 17-4, Florida Administrative Code. 2/ Pertinent to this case, Section 403.088, Florida Statutes, provided, and continues to provide, as follows: 403.088 Water pollution operation permits; temporary permits; conditions-- (1) No person, without written authorization of the department, shall discharge into waters within the state any waste which by itself or in combination with the wastes or other sources, reduces the quality of the receiving waters below the classification established for them . . . (2)(a) Any person intending to discharge wastes into the waters of the state shall make application to the department for an operation permit. Application shall be made on a form prescribed by the department and shall contain such information as the department requires. If the department finds that the proposed discharge will reduce the quality of the receiving waters below the classification established for them, it shall deny the application and refuse to issue a permit. . . (3)(a) A person who does not qualify for an operation permit or has been denied an operation permit under paragraph (b) of subsection (2) may apply to the department for a temporary operation permit . . . After consideration of the application, any additional information furnished, and all written objections submitted, the department shall grant or deny a temporary operation permit. No temporary permit shall be granted by the department unless it affirmatively finds: The proposed discharge does not qualify for an operation permit; The applicant is constructing, installing, or placing into operation, or has submitted plans and reasonable schedules of constructing, installing or placing into operation, an approved pollution abatement facility or alternate waste disposal system, or that the applicant has a waste for which no feasible and acceptable method of treatment or disposal is known or recognized but is making a bona fide effort through research and other means to discover and implement such a method; The applicant needs permission to pollute the waters within the state for a period of time necessary to complete research, planning, construction, installation, or operation of an approved and acceptable pollution abatement facility or alternate waste disposal system; There is no present, reasonable, alternative means of disposing of the waste other than by discharging it into the waters of the state; The denial of a temporary operation permit would work an extreme hardship upon the applicant; The granting of a temporary operation permit will be in the public interest; or The discharge will not be unreasonably destructive to the quality of the receiving waters. A temporary operation permit issued shall: Specify the manner, nature, volume, and frequency of the discharge permitted; Require the proper operation and maintenance of any interim or temporary pollution abatement facility or system required by the department as a condition of the permit; Require the permitholder to maintain such monitoring equipment and make and file such records and reports as the department deems necessary to ensure compliance with the terms of the permit and to evaluate the effect of the discharge upon the receiving waters; Be valid only for the period of time necessary for the permit holder to place into operation the facility, system, or method contemplated in his application as determined by the department; and Contain other requirements and restrictions which the department deems necessary and desirable to protect the quality of the receiving waters and promote the public interest. And, Section 403.927, Florida Statutes, provided, and continues to provide, as follows: 403.927 Use of water in farming and forestry activities.-- . . . it is the intent of the Legislature to provide for the construction and operation of agricultural water management systems under authority granted to water management districts and to control, by the department or by delegation of authority to water management districts, the ultimate discharge from agricultural water management systems. . . . The department may require a stormwater permit or appropriate discharge permit at the ultimate point of discharge from an agricultural water management system or a group of connected agricultural water management systems. . . (4) As used in this section, the term: * * * (b) "Agricultural water management systems" means farming and forestry water management or irrigation systems and farm ponds which are permitted pursuant to chapter 373 or which are exempt from the permitting provisions of that chapter. The agricultural water management systems owned and operated by petitioners fall within the definition of "agricultural water management systems" set forth in Section 403.927(4)(b), Florida Statutes. Consistent with the provisions of Section 403.088, Florida Statutes, Rule 17-4.070(1), Florida Administrative Code, provides: A permit shall be issued to the applicant upon such conditions as the Department may direct, only if the applicant affirmatively provides the Department with reasonable assurance based on plans, test results, installation of pollution control equipment, or other information, that the construction, expansion, modification, operation, or activity of the installation will not discharge, emit or cause pollution in contravention of Department standards or rules. However, for discharges of wastes to water, the Department may issue temporary operation permits under the criteria set forth in Section 403.088(3), F.S. Chapter 17-4, Florida Administrative Code, further delineates the specific procedures to obtain permits and the specific standards for issuing and denying permits. In July 1988, petitioners applied for an extension of their TOPs. The monthly water quality monitoring data petitioners had submitted to the Department reflected, however, that the discharges from petitioners' systems were in contravention of the Department's rules and standards. Accordingly, since petitioners had not met the obligations set forth in the TOPs, the Department advised petitioners that the TOPs would not be extended and that they were required to apply for new operating permits. The new permit applications Following the Department's refusal to extend the TOPs, petitioners filed applications for operating permits for their discharges, and the Department, consistent with its previous reviews, undertook its review pursuant to Chapter 403, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 17-4, Florida Administrative Code. Effective July 1, 1989, however, Part IV of Chapter 373, Florida Statutes, was amended with regard to, inter alia, the definition of stormwater management systems so as to include pumped discharges such as petitioners. Further, pertinent to this case, Part IV of Chapter 373 provided: 373.416 Permits for maintenance or operation-- (1) . . . the governing board or department may require such permits and impose such reasonable conditions as are necessary to assure that the operation or maintenance of any stormwater management system, dam, impoundment, reservoir, appurtenant work, or works will comply with the provisions of this part and applicable rules promulgated thereto, will not be inconsistent with the overall objectives of the district, and will not be harmful to the water resources of the district. 373.418 Rulemaking; preservation of existing authority.-- It is the intent of the Legislature that stormwater management systems be regulated under this part incorporating all of existing requirements contained in or adopted pursuant to chapters 373 and 403. Neither the department nor governing boards are limited or prohibited from amending any regulatory requirement applicable to stormwater management systems in accordance with the provisions of this part. It is further the intent of the Legislature that all current exemptions under chapters 373 and 403 shall remain in full force and effect and that this act shall not be construed to remove or alter these exemptions. In order to preserve existing requirements, all rules of the department or governing boards existing on July 1, 1989, . . . shall be applicable to stormwater management systems and continue in full force and effect unless amended or replaced by future rulemaking in accordance with this part. Upon the amendment of Part IV, Chapter 373, Florida Statutes, petitioners amended their pending applications to reflect their desire that the applications be processed pursuant to the newly amended provisions of Part IV, Chapter 373, as they relate to stormwater management systems. The Department, acknowledging the amendments to chapter 373, processed the applications accordingly; however, in view of the provisions of section 373.418(1) which "incorporat[ed] all of the existing requirements contained in or adopted pursuant to chapters 373 and 403," the Department did not in fact change the standards by which these applications were reviewed, to wit: Chapter 403, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 17-4, Florida Administrative Code. On March 14, 1991, the Department issued a notice of permit denial to each petitioner. In each of the denials, the Department noted the provisions of Section 373.416(1), Florida Statutes, ["the . . . department may require such permits and impose such reasonable conditions as are necessary to assure that the operation . . . of any stormwater system . . . will comply with the provisions of this part and applicable rules promulgated thereto . . . and will not be harmful to the water resources of the district"] and Section 373.418(1), Florida Statutes, ["incorporating all of existing requirements contained in or adopted pursuant to chapters 373 and 403"], and concluded that the applications should be denied for the following reasons: The Department has completed its review of the subject application, supporting documents and the discharge monitoring reports submitted by the applicant as required by Department Permit NO. IT50- 125678. Based on this review the Department has made the determination that the applicant has failed to provide reasonable assurances that the discharge from the agricultural stormwater management system proposed by the applicant will be in compliance with the aforementioned sections of Chapter 373, F.S. and the Class I Surface Water Quality Standards adopted by the Department pursuant to Chapter 403.061, F.S. and contained in Section 17-302.540, F.A.C. and the Antidegradation Policy for Surface Water Quality contained in Section 17-302.300(3), F.A.C. The Department's action is facially consistent with the provisions of chapter 373, and chapter 403 incorporated therein, as well as the existing rules adopted pursuant to such chapters which require, whether the system be exempt or not, that discharges comply with state water quality standards. See e.g., Sections 373.416, 373.418, 403.088 and 403.927, Florida Statutes, and Rules 17- 4.070(1), 17-25.060, 17-25.080, and Chapter 40E-4, Florida Administrative Code. Availing themselves of the point of entry accorded by the notice of permit denial, petitioners filed a request for administrative hearing, pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, to contest the denial of their applications. Such proceedings are currently pending before the Division of Administrative Hearings, but distinct from this proceeding under Section 120.535, Florida Statutes. The Section 120.535 challenge The challenged policy, as alleged in paragraphs 19 of the petition, purports to be as follows: The Department has made a policy determination, which draws a distinction between "agricultural stormwater discharges" and other stormwater discharges regulated by Chapter 373, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. The Department has identified the Petitioners' discharge as "agricultural stormwater discharges" and has subjected the petitioners to a set of rules and criteria that the Department has not adopted but which are apparently different from the general stormwater regulations adopted pursuant to Chapter 373, Florida Statutes. Such articulation of the challenged policy is substantially identical to petitioner's statement of the issue identified in their proposed final order, as follows: The issue for determination in this case is whether the Department's policy to apply criteria different from that contained in its "Regulation of Stormwater Discharge" Rule 17-25, Florida Administrative Code, and/or Rule 40E-4, Florida Administrative Code, of the South Florida Water Management District (SFWMD), when seeking to regulate an agricultural stormwater management system, as defined in Chapter 373, Part IV, Florida Statutes, constitutes a rule . . . . The premises for the petitioners' challenge are their contention that the Department has drawn a distinction between the agricultural stormwater discharges of petitioners and other stormwater discharges, which is not supported by statutory or duly promulgated rules, and that the Department has applied criteria, which are not supported by statutory or duly promulgated rules, to evaluate petitioners' applications. The credible proof fails, however, to support petitioners' premises. Contrary to the assertions raised by petitioners, the statutory and duly promulgated rules heretofore discussed provide ample authority for the Department's action, and there is no credible proof that the Department is applying any criteria that is not apparent from an application or reading of such statutes and existing rules. Indeed, Rule 17-25.060(2), Florida Administrative Code, provides: The permit requirements of Chapter 17-4 or other applicable rules, rather than those of this chapter, shall apply to discharges which are a combination of stormwater and industrial or domestic wastewater or which are otherwise contaminated by non-stormwater sources unless: (a) the stormwater discharge facility is capable of providing treatment of the non- stormwater component sufficient to meet state water quality standards . . . . Here, the proof is compelling that the Department's decision was predicated on existing statutory and rule authority, and that it did not apply any criteria not promulgated as a rule or not contained within existing statutory authority to evaluate petitioners' applications, or treat petitioners' discharges differently than any other stormwater discharge contaminated by non-stormwater sources.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, as well as my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses who observed and/or participated in each of the four episodes, the following facts are found: At all times material to the charges herein, respondent DeSantis was an on-duty Clearwater Police Department. officer, holding the rank of patrol sergeant. The respondent had been employed by the Clearwater Police Department since March 14, 1977. He was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on July 7, 1977, and was issued Certificate Number 02-18239. THE ANDERSON INCIDENT At approximately 8:00 p.m. on October 27, 1984, a radio dispatch was transmitted to Clearwater police officers advising that there was an armed black male in the area who had threatened that he was either going to get some money or someone would be hurt. Respondent observed a suspect, later identified as Harold Anderson, in front of a laundromat where three or four people were sitting in chairs. Respondent drove up to the laundromat, and observed Mr. Anderson walk inside. A woman and a child were inside the front area of the laundromat. Respondent followed Anderson into the laundromat and Anderson proceeded to walk the back area, keeping his back to the respondent. Assuming that Anderson had a gun in his hand and fearing a possible hostage situation with the woman and child, respondent drew his service revolver and informed Anderson that he was under arrest. With pistol drawn and facing Anderson's back, respondent made two attempts within the laundromat to take Anderson into custody. During the second attempt and while respondent's gun was placed on Anderson's spine, a struggle ensued near the front doorway. The struggle caused both the respondent and Anderson to fall, with Anderson on the bottom, upon the hood of a car parked outside the entryway to the laundromat. Sometime during the struggle, respondent was attempting to place his service revolver under Anderson's chin. Instead, the barrel of respondent's pistol went into Anderson's mouth, where it remained for between 20 and 40 seconds, causing Anderson to make choking and gagging sounds. Respondent's pistol was removed from Anderson's mouth after Anderson was handcuffed with the assistance of two other police officers. A loaded handgun was retrieved from the waistband of Anderson's trousers. Officer Kettel arrived on the scene as respondent and Anderson were struggling at the doorway of the laundromat. He observed that Anderson was resisting arrest and that respondent was attempting to calm Anderson down and to retrieve his gun. He recalled that respondent's pistol went into Anderson's mouth as they both landed on the car hood. Officer Watson was the third police officer to arrive. He did not observe the struggle between respondent and Anderson prior to the two reaching the hood of the parked car. When Watson arrived at the scene, Anderson was lying on his back on the car hood and respondent was holding a pistol in Anderson's mouth. Watson's testimony was conflicting as to the exact point in time that Anderson ceased to struggle and the point in time that the pistol was removed from his mouth. Until the point in time that Anderson was handcuffed and his loaded gun retrieved from him, respondent was in fear for his life. He admits that the barrel of his service revolver went into Anderson's mouth, but states that this was unintentional and that he could not remove it without endangering himself until he received assistance from other officers in subduing Anderson. The testimony of two civilian eyewitnesses to this incident was somewhat conflicting as to when the gun went into Anderson's mouth, when Anderson ceased resisting his arrest, and when the gun was removed from Anderson's mouth. There was no evidence that Mr. Anderson was injured as a result of respondent's revolver being inside his mouth. THE HEYWOOD INCIDENT On November 3, 1984, three police officers responded to a radio dispatch concerning an individual who had returned to a Maas Brothers department store armed with sticks and bricks after previously having had an altercation with the security guard there. The individual was Steve Heywood, a 19 year old black male, who had testified that he had returned to Maas Brothers "to defend himself" because the security guard had broken his necklace approximately one-half hour earlier in the evening. When respondent drove into the Maas Brothers parking lot, he observed five or six people standing near the doorway and saw Heywood, dressed only in shorts and tennis shoes, throw some bricks and sticks in a bush. Respondent got out of his cruiser and Heywood started walking away from him. Respondent told Heywood to "freeze" and to "hit the ground." Heywood took three or four more steps, then turned around quickly. At that point, respondent drew his service revolver. Heywood put his hands out or up, started pleading that he had done nothing and went down to the ground on his stomach, with his hands visible. Respondent then approached Heywood with his gun still pointing at him, put his knee on Heywood's back, and placed the barrel of his service revolver next to Heywood's head where it remained for a period of about 30 seconds until another officer handcuffed Heywood. While Heywood appeared excited or upset during this process, he did not fight or struggle. THE TRUBY INCIDENT On October 5, 1984, respondent and Reserve Officer Karen Jackson were dispatched to investigate a report of a fight at an apartment complex. Soon after the officers arrived, Paul Truty began creating a disturbance in the parking lot by shouting abusive and threatening remarks at a victim of a prior sexual abuse, her family and the police officers. Detective Margaret Jewett was also dispatched to the scene to assist the sexual a~use victim. When Truby refused to stop yelling obscenities and inciting the crowd, respondent told him he was under arrest. Truty then began to walk backwards away from the respondent. Respondent pounded his nightstick on the ground three or four times, demanding that Truby return, and Truby then turned and started walking between two apartment buildings. Respondent and Detective Jewett followed Truby a short distance and apprehended him. The respondent pushed Truby against a wall and Jewett placed handcuffs on Truby, securing his hands behind his back. The respondent and Detective Jewett each took one of Truby's arms and escorted him approximately fifty yards back to the respondent's police car. During the walk back to the car, Truby did not resist or struggle and was cooperative and submissive. From this point, there is conflicting evidence between respondent's recollection of events and the recollections of Reserve Officer Jackson and Detective Jewett. Respondent states that Truby was highly intoxicated at the time of his arrest and that he had to use his nightstick to keep Truby's spine stiff and steer him while they were walking back to the patrol car. Respondent explains that Truby stumbled near the car due to the presence of some concrete tire stops adjacent to the passenger side of the cruiser. Detective Jewett and Officer Jackson recall that respondent positioned his police baton parallel to Truby's spine and under his handcuffed hands. As Truby was beginning to enter the police cruiser, respondent intentionally pulled up on the lower end of the nightstick near the handcuffs, thus causing TruLy to stumble and fall off balance. According to these witnesses, respondent then made a sarcastic remark about Truby falling and subsequently pulled Truby up with the nightstick and placed him in the car. Detective Jewett stated that Truby may have been intoxicated. THE VONDERAU INCIDENT On the evening of October 5, 1984, Officer David Watson was dispatched to investigate a report of a domestic disturbance in a residential neighborhood. Officer Green was dispatched as a back-up officer. Upon arrival at the scene, the officers spoke to a very upset woman who told them that her son had done extensive damage to her home and had threatened her. The interior of the woman's home was in shambles. A neighbor led the son, later identified as John Vonderau, to the area of the street where the officers were. He was wearing no shirt and the officers believed he had been drinking. Vonderau exhibited bizzare behavior, marked bye dramatic swings of mood from calm and lethargic to aggressively pacing the street with clenched fists. Officer Watson was concerned that Vonderau could become violent, but he was unsure of his legal right to arrest him since no crime had been committed in Watson's presence. He considered taking Vonderau to a detoxification center or effecting an involuntary commitment to a treatment facility for the mentally ill, pursuant to the Baker Act. Being unsure of the legal ramifications of doing so, Watson radioed respondent, who was his superior on duty that evening, and asked him to come to the scene to advise on the proper course of action. Before respondent arrived, Officer Desrosiers drove by and Officer Watson requested that he stay because Vonderau appeared to be getting more agitated. When respondent and Reserve Officer Jackson arrived on the scene, Officers Watson, Green and Desrosiers were standing in the street in a loose circle around Vonderau, who was pacing back and forth. Officer Watson advised respondent that Vonderau had made death threats to his mother and had completely ramshackled her house. A decision was made that the officers would take Vonderau into custody as a Baker Act patient. When respondent and Watson began to approach Vonderau, he brushed against respondent's shoulder and then assumed a martial arts/karate-type stance, and said, "You'd better get your clubs out. You're going to need them." The officers all took out their police batons, and Vonderau continued to make karate- type motions. Officer Desrosiers was talking on his radio when Vonderau swung at him. Respondent thought Vonderau struck Desrosiers, but no contact was made. Vonderau also approached Officers Watson and Green in an aggressive fashion. When he turned away from Officer Watson, Watson struck Vonderau's leg with his police baton. Vonderau then ceased his crouched stance, stood erect, put his hands in the air and said, "You got me." Officer Watson then ordered Vonderau to get down on the ground. After hesitating momentarily, Vonderau then assumed a push-up position, facing the street and suspending himself with his feet and hands. Immediately after Officer Watson ordered Vonderau to lie flat on the street, the respondent struck a very hard blow with his police baton across Vonderau's shoulders, causing a welt. Vonderau then went immediately to the ground. Once Vonderau was down flat on the street, at least three of the officers quickly moved to securely hold him down and handcuff his hands behind his back. The fourth officer walked over to the police vehicle to retrieve a set of "flex cuffs" to place around Vonderau's legs. At some point, respondent drew his service revolver and, after Vonderau was down and was being handcuffed by the other officers, respondent held his gun to the back of Vonderau's neck behind his ear, while pushing his nightstick against Vonderau's neck. Vonderau had ceased resisting and being aggressive from the time he went flat on his stomach to the street. Respondent held the gun to Vonderau's neck or head for approximately thirty seconds, angrily telling him that if he moved, respondent would "blow his head off." After Vonderau was hand and leg cuffed, he was taken to the police station by Officers Watson and Desrosiers. The testimony is somewhat conflicting as to the exact point in time that respondent withdrew his service revolver from his holster. Respondent states, and the other officers present admit the possibility, that his pistol was drawn when Vonderau first assumed his karate-type stance and began swinging at the other officers. He further states that he thereafter attempted to place his pistol back in its holster, but, because his holster lining was torn, he had to hold it there. However, on cross- examination, respondent admitted that he intentionally placed his gun next to Vonderau's head because he felt he and the other officers were in jeopardy. Respondent felt that the placing of his service revolver against Vonderau's neck was effective in calming him down. All officers on the scene believed that Vonderau possessed knowledge of a martial art and that he was dangerous. However, officers Watson, Green, Desrosiers and Jackson agreed that Vonderau ceased to resist completely once he was flat on the ground on his stomach.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED THAT: Respondent Joseph DeSantis be dismissed as an employee of the Clearwater Police Department for utilizing excessive force during the arrests of Steve Heywood and John Vonderau, and that the Administrative Complaint filed by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission be DISMISSED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 20th day of April, 1987. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer The Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway The Oakland Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488 9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of April, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Louis Kwall, Esq. 133 N. Ft. Harrison Avenue Clearwater, FL 33516| Margot Pequignot, Esq. P.O. Box 1669 Clearwater, FL 3351 Robert G. Walker, Jr., Esq. P.O. Box 4748 Clearwater, FL 33516 Miles A. Lance, Esq. P.O. Box 4748 Clearwater, FL 33516 Joseph S. White, Esq. Florida Department of Law Enforcement P.O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 APPENDIX The proposed findings of fact submitted by each of the parties have been carefully considered and have been accepted and/or incorporated in this Recommended Order, except as noted below: Petitioner, CJSTC 22. The evidence is unclear as to the number of officers holding Vonderau down. 40, 41 and 43. Rejected; not established by competent, substantial evidence. Rejected; not established by competent, substantial evidence. First sentence rejected; contrary to the evidence. 55. Rejected, contrary to the evidence. Petitioner, City of Clearwater (NOTE: Many of the City's proposed findings of fact constitute recitations or summaries of an individual's testimony. The following rejections of the proposed factual findings does not indicate that the cited witness did not so testify, but that said testimony was not sufficient, in light of other testimony, to support a factual finding.) 8(b) Rejected. 8(f) Rejected. 8(i)(2) Rejected, as contrary to the evidence. 8(i)(5) Rejected, as contrary to the evidence. 8(i)(6) Rejected, as contrary to the evidence. 8(i)(7) Rejected, as constituting a legal conclusion as opposed to a factual finding. 9(i) McKenna was accepted as an expert in the area of law enforcement standards. 9(k)(5) Rejected as a factual finding. 10(d)(l) Rejected, not established by competent, substantial evidence. 10(d)(3) Rejected, not established by competent, substantial evidence. 10(g)(3) & (i) Rejected, not established by competent, substantial evidence. Respondent (NOTE: Many of respondent's proposed factual findings constitute verbatim recitations of testimony. These are improper findings of fact and are rejected as such.) page 6, first Rejected, as contrary to the sentence of last evidence. paragraph page 24, second Rejected, not supported by full paragraph competent evidence. page 27, first Rejected, as contrary to the paragraph evidence. page 28A, last Rejected as irrelevant and paragraph immaterial to the issues in dispute. ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION, Petitioner, vs. DOAH Case Nos. 85-3698 86-0889 JOSEPH R. DESANTIS, CJSTC Case No. L-1703 Certificate Number: 02-18239 Respondent. /
The Issue The issue in this case is whether just cause exists for the termination of the Respondent's employment by the Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, Gary Ellerson was employed as a Police Aide II by the City of Clearwater Police Department (Department). The position held by Mr. Ellerson is classified as a permanent part- time and is subject to the City of Clearwater Civil Service Rules. At some time during his employment with the Department, Mr. Ellerson has also worked for the "NuCops" program, a part of the federally-funded "Americorps" project. One of Mr. Ellerson's NuCops assignments was to provide assistance to a regularly scheduled Boy Scout meeting. Although on one occasion the Department funded Mr. Ellerson's attendance at a NuCops training program, the NuCops program is not funded or operated by the Department. At some point immediately prior to April 1, 1995, Mr. Ellerson sought permission from Lt. Frank Daly, a superior, to work as a Police Aide with the Boy Scouts on April 1, 1995. Lt. Daly approved the request, contingent on the further approval of Police Aide Lead Worker Chris Corino and Police Sergeant Heinz. Based on Lt. Daly's approval, Mr. Ellerson obtained the approval of Mr. Corino and Mr. Heinz. Mr. Ellerson did not advise Lt. Daly that the April 1 Boy Scout meeting was part of his regularly assigned NuCops duties. Lt. Daly testified that had Mr. Ellerson identified the Boy Scout meeting as part of his NuCops assignment, the request to include it on Mr. Ellerson's Department time sheet would not have been approved. According to a review of the time sheets submitted to the Department and to the NuCops program by Mr. Ellerson for April 1, 1995, Mr. Ellerson reported working the same hours to both employers. According to a review of the time sheets submitted to the Department and to the NuCops program by Mr. Ellerson for April 4, 1995, Mr. Ellerson reported working the same hours to both employers. According to a review of the time sheets submitted to the Department and to the NuCops program by Mr. Ellerson for April 10, 1995, Mr. Ellerson reported working the same hours to both employers. There is no evidence that Mr. Ellerson sought or received the Department's permission to include the April 4 and 10 Boy Scout meetings on his Department time sheets. There is no evidence that Mr. Ellerson worked for the Department during the hours reported on the time sheets for the dates cited herein. On the three relevant dates, Mr. Ellerson attended a meeting of Boy Scouts, a duty of his employment with the NuCops program. Department time sheets contain a signature line where the employee attests to the truth and correctness of the hours reported. Mr. Ellerson signed the statement on the relevant time sheets. The Department conducted an investigation of the erroneous time sheets. During the investigation, Mr. Ellerson asserted that he listed "training" hours and "studying" hours separately. Review of the time sheets fails to support the assertion. There is no evidence that Mr. Ellerson had differentiated such hours on prior time sheets. The Petitioner asserts that after the April 1 incident, Mr. Ellerson was told by Police Aide Lead Worker Chris Corino not to include the NuCops/Boy Scout time on his Department time sheets and that Mr. Ellerson failed to follow the directive. Mr. Corino did not testify at the hearing. Mr. Ellerson denies he was told by Mr. Corino that his time sheet was improper. Because there is no non-hearsay evidence which could establish that Mr. Ellerson was specifically told not to include the Boy Scout program on his Department time sheets, the assertion is rejected. Mr. Ellerson has been previously disciplined by the Department for failure to obey orders (resulting in a written reprimand) and for tardiness and absence from duties (resulting in a one day suspension.) The evidence establishes that based on the facts of this case, the appropriate disciplinary action is termination of employment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the City of Clearwater Civil Service Review Board enter a Final Order terminating the employment of Gary Ellerson. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of April, 1996 in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of April, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-4250 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, the following constitute rulings on proposed findings of facts submitted by the parties. Petitioner The Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order. Respondent The Respondent did not file a proposed recommended order. COPIES FURNISHED: H. Michael Laursen Human Resource Director City of Clearwater Post Office Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 34618-4748 Leslie K. Dougall-Sides, Esquire City of Clearwater Post Office Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 34618-4748 Mr. Johnny Long, Representative c/o Mr. Gary Ellerson (address of record)
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the evidence sustains the decision of the City of Clearwater Development Code Adjustment Board (the Board) to grant the application of the Appellant, the City of Clearwater for dock length, width and setback variances to allow the reconstruction of the public pier facility located at the west end of Magnolia Drive in Clearwater, Florida. (The pier was destroyed by the "No Name Storm of the Century" on March 12-13, 1993.)
Findings Of Fact On or about September 1, 1993, the City of Clearwater applied to the City of Clearwater Development Code Adjustment Board (the Board) for dock length, width and setback variances to reconstruct the public pier facility located at the west end of Magnolia Drive in Clearwater, Florida, where it terminates at the waterfront in an "aquatic lands/coastal zoning district." The pier was 91.5 feet in length and 40 feet in width; it was set back 12.5 feet from the extension of the adjacent property lines. It was destroyed by the "No Name Storm of the Century" on March 12-13, 1993. Since the site has 65 feet of waterfront, reconstructing it to its previous dimensions requires variances of: (1) 59 feet in dock length (over the 32.5 feet allowed by the City of Clearwater Development Code); (2) 17.25 feet in dock width (over the 22.75 feet allowed by the Code); and (3) 7.5 feet reduction in setback from the extended adjacent property lines (below the 20 feet required by the Code.) Before its destruction, the public pier at the west end of Magnolia Drive in Clearwater had been in existence for many years. (The original version was built in approximately 1915.) The evidence is that the community at large desires to reconstruct the pier to its former dimensions. The old pier has historic and sentimental significance. It also serves as a recreational facility for residents without private access to a dock on the waterfront. Especially in the last several years before its destruction, public use of the old pier brought with it problems of misuse, loitering, litter, noise, trespassing, and crime. The police did not have the resources to prevent these problems. Criminal activity in the area seems to have decreased since the destruction of the old pier. As a result, the property owners closest to the pier do not want the public pier reconstructed at all, and certainly do not want it reconstructed to its former dimensions. They oppose the variance application. The conditions imposed by the Board (no deviation from the proposed materials and building plan, the erection of signs as to closing times to be enforced by the police, proper lighting, and the installation of an electronic safety system, including a gate, to be monitored by the police) will help alleviate many of the concerns of the neighboring property owners but are not guaranteed to eliminate them in their entirety. The water is shallow in the vicinity of the site, and a dock of a certain length is necessary for the dock to be used for boats of any appreciable size and draft. However, this condition is not unique to the particular site in question, but is uniformly applicable all along the City waterfront, and there was no evidence as to the length of dock required for adequate water depth for use by boats. There is no competent, substantial evidence in the record from which it could be found that the granting of the variances will not be materially detrimental or injurious to other property or improvements in the neighborhood in which the property is located. There is no competent, substantial evidence in the record from which it could be found that the granting of the variance will not impair the value of surrounding property.
Findings Of Fact On the evening of February 7, 1978 Officer Di Stasio stopped a vehicle driven by Michael Gross in the City of Clearwater. The primary reason for stopping this vehicle was that Gross had exited onto the main street from a side street and nearly collided with the car driven by Di Stasio. After stopping the vehicle Di Stasio questioned the driver regarding the registration of the vehicle, among other things, and although Gross could not produce the registration he did produce a Bill of Sale for the vehicle dated in 1976. Gross told Di Stasio that the car had been registered in his wife's name, that they were in the process of getting a divorce, and the registration was probably in the mail to him. The tag was from Kentucky, was bent and rusty, and was secured to the vehicle by wire. In lieu of citing Gross for driving with an invalid tag Di Stasio removed the tag from Gross's car and advised Gross that it was unlawful to drive the vehicle without a valid tag. Di Stasio subsequently threw the tag in the trash and made no report of the incident. The Clearwater police had a book showing the various states' automobile tags and expiration dates of these tags. Had Di Stasio radioed in for this information he would have learned that the tag on Gross' car had not expired. Police officers had been instructed regarding the existence of the book but Di Stasio apparently missed the training session when this Information was disseminated. The following morning on February 8, 1978 Gross appeared at the police station to inquire what he needed to do to drive his car. He related the instance of the previous evening to Captain Enlow of the Clearwater Police and when the latter could find no report of the incident called Gross at his home to come down to the police station. Di Stasio advised Captain Enlow that he thought the tag was invalid and therefore he removed it from the car. Although the tag had a `77 decal on it information in the police station indicated the tag was valid until March, 1978. Di Stasio took Gross to the tag office in the courthouse where he was able to obtain a temporary tag for the vehicle. As a result of Officer Di Stasio removing the tag and failing to maintain custody of the tag as required by police regulations he was suspended without pay for three days. Subsequent inquiries to Kentucky confirmed that the car was properly registered to Michael Gross and that the tag on the vehicle was a valid tag on February 8, 1978. Respondent's primary explanation for removing the tag from the vehicle was that Gross told him the tag had been placed on the vehicle to come to Florida and that it did not belong to the car. Gross was not a witness at this hearing and this testimony was rebutted by information in Exhibit 6 received from the Lexington, Kentucky Police. In defense of his actions in not securing the tag as required by Rule 73 when it came into his possession, Respondent produced several witnesses who testified that they had been instructed not to bring in partly filled beer cans or to remove whiskey from a motor vehicle when the driver was apprehended. None of these witnesses recalled any specific instance where a tag had been removed from a vehicle and not accounted for pursuant to Rule 73. Respondent contended that a police officer is given wide latitude to exercise discretion in the handling of property and as an example cited the instances when children's toys are left in the street and the police do not take this property into custody. The principal exception to the rule that property coming into the possession of a police officer is to be turned in to the property office involves the handling of alcoholic beverages which is not evidence.
The Issue Whether Appellant was wrongfully denied a variance of 21.33 feet to construct a second floor deck at 673 Bay Esplanade, Five Palms Motel Condo, Clearwater, Florida.
Findings Of Fact John Shaw, a resident of Massachusetts, purchased the condominium for which the variance is here requested in December, 1988 without first visiting the property or inquiring about zoning restrictions. The unit purchased is on the second floor of a two story building earlier converted from a hotel or motel into condominiums. The seller told Shaw he could construct a deck over the existing deck on the ground floor condominium below the unit purchased by Shaw. While the construction of this deck was in progress it was discovered no permit had been pulled for the project and the work was stopped. The subsequent application for a permit was denied because the proposed deck encroached some 21.33 feet into the setback area. The application for a variance was denied by the Clearwater Development Code Adjustment Board and this appeal followed. The two buildings comprising this complex were erected many years ago and are non-conforming, i.e., the buildings themselves violate the current Development Code. An existing deck extending into the setback area was constructed on the unit directly below the condominium purchased by Shaw and a similar deck extending to the seawall was constructed on an adjacent building. No permits are on file for those decks. Construction of the proposed deck would improve the livability of the condominium greatly by expanding the area usable for looking seaward. The condominium has been used without this deck for many years. This property is zoned CR-24 and the setback requirement is 25 feet from the water's edge.
Findings Of Fact Ben A. Posdal is the owner of property commonly known as 166 Brightwater Drive, in the City of Clearwater, Florida. On August 7, 1986, he applied for variances to construct two wooden decks on his property, located at the above address. The property which is the subject of the variance request is a building which contains four apartments, which are rented by Ben A. Posdal to various tenants. On August 28, 1986, the Development Code Adjustment Board (DCAB) denied the variance requested by Mr. Posdal on the grounds that he had not demonstrated a hardship and that he had not demonstrated that the requested variance would not violate the general spirit and intent of the Clearwater Land Development Code. On September 9, 1986, an appeal was filed by Ben A. Posdal from the decision of the Development Code Adjustment Board. The appeal alleges that the DCAB decision was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable on the following grounds: Other properties allegedly are in violation of the back line setback regulations; The DCAB failed to give enough evidentiary weight to photographs he submitted; and Appellant allegedly is being deprived of the beneficial use of the property in a manner commensurate with the community. There are no physical conditions which are unique to the property. There is no particular physical surroundings, shape or topographical condition that would result in an unnecessary hardship upon the Appellant. Failure to obtain a variance would not impinge upon Appellant's use of the property in any way. The record on appeal contains competent, substantial evidence to support the DCAB decision. Nonconforming uses in the area of the subject property are legal nonconforming uses.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether Respondent should be disciplined, to include a three day suspension without pay, because of the misconduct alleged in the Notification of Suspension issued herein.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, Respondent, William T. Mooney, worked as a laboratory technician for the City of Clearwater's Public Works/Water Pollution Control Division. On April 15, 1993, Doreen Spano, the City's utility lab supervisor, held a meeting of her division personnel at which she identified Iracema Drysdale as the lead worker and, in order to clarify any misconceptions among lab workers as to work deadlines, presented a policy letter for the lab, entitled "New Work Schedule". The schedule set guidelines and deadlines for the daily workload. The memorandum contains inconsistent statements, however. For example, while Ms. Spano indicated both in the memo and at hearing that the instructions therein are merely guidelines, she also used such imperatives as "must" and "will" in the memo. Specifically, the memorandum indicates the daily plant BOD must be in the incubator by 12:00 PM, and the daily plant bacteria must be in the incubator by 12:30 PM. Respondent has worked in this City laboratory for approximately 14 years. During this time he has developed a method of accomplishing his tasks which is described by Ms. Drysdale as less than efficient. She indicates he frequently misses his time deadlines and works at his own pace. Respondent, on the other hand, claims he has always completed his tasks according to the Standard Methods Manual, but, due to the time the samples are received in the lab, could not accomplish both the BOD and the bacteria procedures within the guidelines set in that manual and the Environmental Protection Agency standards manual. Either one or both would be late. This controversy, much of which was made by both sides, is, in reality, only peripherally related to the issue in controversy here which is whether Respondent was insubordinate or not on September 9, 1993. Both Ms. Drysdale and the Respondent signed the memorandum in question here indicating their receipt and understanding of the directions contained therein. Thereafter, on September 9, 1993, Ms. Drysdale entered the lab shortly before the lunch period to find the bacteria procedure not done and Respondent working on the BOD procedure. It appears that the bacteria sample was taken at 6:00 AM on this day and, under EPA guidelines, had to be preserved in the incubator within six hours or the results of the procedure would be invalid and not eligible for reporting to the EPA. When Ms. Drysdale asked Respondent why he was doing the BOD when the bacteria procedure had not been accomplished, he indicated that Ms. Spano's memorandum required the BOD to be done by 12:00 noon and the bacteria not until 12:30 PM. He considered this a directive and indicated he would complete his work consistent therewith. Again, there is a contradiction in the testimony as to the nature of the conversation between Ms. Drysdale and the Respondent. Ms. Drysdale asserts that about noon on the day in question, she suggested to Respondent that he start the bacteria procedure first and then do the BOD procedure. Respondent refused because he believed he had to follow the new work schedule prepared by Ms. Spano. Ms. Drysdale then told him to do the bacteria procedure first and she would assume the responsibility. Respondent still refused and, raising his voice to her, completed the BOD procedure. When he finished that, he did the bacteria procedure but by that time, the sample was too old and had to be discarded. Respondent's recounting of the incident is somewhat different. He claims he was approached by Ms. Drysdale who asked him why he did the bacteria procedure after the BOD procedure. When he pointed out the dictates of the memorandum, she claimed to know nothing about it even though her signature, along with that of Respondent and Mr. Olson, appears on the bottom thereof. Nonetheless, according to Respondent, Ms. Drysdale said she would check on it. After lunch, according to Respondent, Ms. Drysdale came back with the Standard Methods book. When he showed her the new work rules, he claims, she admitted she was aware that Ms. Spano had written them. When he asked her what Ms. Spano had said about the situation, she allegedly replied, "Why don't you do it the way I say and if Doreen (Ms. Spano) asks, I'll take the responsibility." Respondent was upset because, he contends, things like this always happen. Respondent, in subsequent testimony, denied ever getting a direct order from Ms. Drysdale or that she indicated she would assume responsibility. On balance, while there is little doubt in Ms. Drysdale's testimony as to what happened, Respondent tells two different stories regarding the conversation. At one point he claims she asked him why he didn't do it her way and that if he did, she'd assume responsibility. At another, he claims she merely asked why he was doing the procedures as he was and made no mention of assuming responsibility. It is clear that Ms. Drysdale wanted the bacteria procedure done first, and while she might not have couched her request in directory language, there can be little doubt she communicated her desires to Respondent, albeit in a perhaps more gentle manner. In any case, she was Respondent's supervisor and he knew it. She wanted the work done as she indicated and her request, made under the authority she had to get the work done as she desired, had the force and effect of a direct order which Respondent disobeyed at his peril. Ms. Spano indicated she discussed not only the appointment of Ms. Drysdale as lead worker at the April 15, 1993 meeting, but also the six hour requirement for specimens. Respondent denies this, but it is found he knew exactly what the requirements were. He claims he has been doing things the way the memorandum calls for ever since it was promulgated and this is not inconsistent with his current position on doing the BOD procedure first. When this incident took place, Mr. Reckenwald, the superintendent of the water and pollution control division, and the overall supervisor of the laboratory operation in question, received a recommendation for discipline, primarily because of Respondent's failure to follow orders. In addition, however, the incident created a problem for the City which has to report to the EPA and other federal agencies. Because of this report requirement, it is imperative the work be done properly. If it is not done properly, the work is worthless and may result in sanction action against the city by federal regulatory agencies. Not the least of concerns, also, is the public health consideration since effluent, the source of samples for both BOD and bacteria procedures, is discharged into the public waterways. On the basis of the above, a recommendations was made that Respondent receive a three day suspension. This is consistent with disciplinary guidelines contained in the City's Guidelines For Disciplinary Action. Respondent appealed the action to the City Manager who reviewed his submittal but nonetheless upheld the disciplinary action proposed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the City of Clearwater take final action in this matter to consist of suspension of the Respondent without pay for three days and imposition of 40 disciplinary action points. RECOMMENDED this 24th day of May, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Miles A. Lance, Esquire Assistant City Attorney City of Clearwater P.O. Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 34618 William T. Mooney 1433 Laura Street Clearwater, Florida 34615 Michael J. Wright City Manager City of Clearwater P.O. Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 34618-4748
Findings Of Fact On March 12, 1985, Applicant filed a request with the Department for a permit to construct a marina in a manmade basin (Captain's Cove) located on Lower Matecumbe Key, Monroe County, Florida. The permit sought by the Applicant, as modified, would allow it to construct a 52-slip docking facility consisting of two 5' x 248' docks, each with fourteen 3' x 40' finger piers and twelve associated mooring piles; and, approximately 590 linear feet of riprap revertment requiring the disposition of approximately 300 cubic yards of rock boulders landward and waterward of mean high water (MHW). All docks and finger piers would be constructed of prestressed concrete supported by concrete piles; mooring piles would be pressure treated wood. The Applicant proposes to organize the facility as a condominium development; however, live-aboard use will be prohibited. A manager's quarters, office, restrooms and a parking area will be provided on the adjacent uplands. The Department's October 3, 1985, notice of intent to issue, proposed to issue the requested permit subject to the following condition: The permittee is hereby advised that Florida law states: "No person shall commence any excavation, construction, or other activ- ity involving the use of sovereign or other lands of the state, title to which is vested in the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund or the Department of Natural Resources under Chapter 253, until such person has received from the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund the required lease, license, easement, or other form of consent authorizing the proposed use." If such work is done without consent, a fine for each offense in an amount of up to $10,000 may be imposed. Turbidity screens shall be utilized and properly maintained during the permitted construction and shall remain in place until any generated turbidity subsides. Only non-commercial, recreational boats shall be allowed to use the proposed marina. The applicant shall incorporate this condition into the condominium document for the proposed marina and supply the Department with a copy of the document prior to any sales of the condominium. No live-aboard boats shall be allowed in the marina. This condition shall also be placed in the condominium document. A portable sewage pumpout wagon shall be provided at the marina. Pumpout effluent shall be properly disposed of by methods acceptable to the department; these methods and locations shall be approved by the department prior to construction. A supply of oil absorbent materials, designed to clean up small oil spills, shall be maintained at the marina office. At least sixty (60) days prior to construction, the applicant shall submit to the Punta Gorda DER office for review, a detailed list of equip- ment to be permanently maintained on site. This list of equipment shall be modified as necessary and approved by the department prior to construction. The uplands on the permittee's property shall be graded to direct stormwater away from the edge of the boat basin. No fuel facilities nor storage shall be allowed at the project. Only clean rock boulders free from attached sediments or other deleterious compounds, and of a minimum diameter of 2' or greater shall be installed as riprap. 1O. The Marathon Department of Environmen- tal Regulation office shall be notified 48 hours prior to commencement of work. "IDLE SPEED-NO WAKE" signs shall be placed at conspicuous locations at the docking facility with additional language that "this precaution exists throughout the length of the canal channel during ingress and egress". At least two trash receptacles shall be provided on each of the two main walkway piers: these receptacles shall be routinely maintained and emptied. Prior to dockage use by boats, marker buoys shall be established around all vege- tated shallow zones within the limits of the submerged property limits with signs advising boaters of "SHALLOW WATERS-NO ENTRY". Prior to construction, the applicant and the Mara- thon DER office shall meet to discuss accept- able locations for these markers. The project shall comply with applic- able State Water Quality Standards, namely: 17-3.051 - Minimum Criteria for All Waters at All Times and All Places. 17-3.061 - Surface Waters: General Criteria 17-3.121 - Criteria - Class III Waters - Recreation, Propagation and Management of Fish and Wildlife: Surface Waters. The Applicant has agreed to comply with all conditions established by the Department. The Marina Site Captain's Cove is a manmade navigable lagoon with access to Florida Bay through a 2,500' long by 100' wide canal located opposite the project site. The waters of Captain's Cove and the canal are designated Class III surface waters, and those of Florida Bay as Outstanding Florida Waters. The controlling depth for access to the proposed marina is found at the mouth of the canal, where Florida Bay is approximately 6' mean low water (MLW). Depths within the canal are typically 1' or 2' deeper than the controlling depth at the mouth. Captain's Cove is roughly rectangular in shape. It measures 1,400' northeast to southwest, and up to 500' northwest to southeast. In the vicinity of the Applicant's property, which is located in the northeast fifth of the cove, the cove measures 350' wide. The bottom depth of the cove is variable. The southwestern four-fifths of the cove was typically dredged to a depth of 25' MLW. Within the northeast fifth of the cove (the basin), a gradation in depths is experienced. The northwest portion of the basin, located outside the project site, is typically 5' - 6' MLW, and heavily vegetated by sea grasses (turtle grass, manatee grass, and Cuban shoalweed). The southeast portion of the basin, which abuts the Applicant's property, consists of a shallow shelf 10' - 20' in width. Beyond this shelf, the bottom drops off steeply to a depth of 20' MLW. The shelf abutting the Applicant's property is sparsely vegetated with mangroves, and provides limited habitat for aquatic fauna such as domingo mussels and paper oysters. Replacement of these mangroves and other shoreline vegetation with riprap would not significantly affect the biological balance within the cove and would provide suitable habitat for existing species. The waters within the cove are quite clear, and meet the Department's water quality standards except for a thin layer at the deepest part of the cove where dissolved oxygen violations were noted. The proposed marina is, however, to be located in the northeast fifth of the cove, opposite the access canal, where the waters are more shallow and water circulation more prevelant. As sited, the proposed marina will not exacerbate or contribute to a violation of the Department's water quality criteria. Areas of Concern During construction of the marina elevated turbidity may be expected by disruption of the basin sediments caused by installation of the facility's pilings. This can be adequately controlled, however, by the use of turbidity curtains during construction. Shading of the benthic environment is a long term impact associated with marinas. Since the boat slips will be located in the deeper 20' MLW depth of the basin, where seagrasses are not present, sunlight will be permitted to reach the productive areas of the basin lying at 5' - 6' MLW and no adverse impact from shading will be experienced. Boats by their very existence and operation present potential negative short term and long term impacts to the environment. Potential damage to the seagrass beds in the northwest portion of the basin will be eliminated or minimized by the planned installation of buoys and/or signs prohibiting navigation in that area. Potential damage from wave action generated by boat operation will be eliminated or minimized by designating and posting the marina and access channel as an "idle speed-no wake" zone.[footnote 1] [footnote 1: Intervenors raised some concern regarding possible impact to the Florida manatee. While manatee have been sighted in the access channel, their occurrence is infrequent. Marking the shallow areas and designating the area as an "idle speed-no wake" zone will provide reasonable assurances that the manatee will not be adversely affected by the proposed marina.] The fueling of boats, hull maintenance, boat cleaning (detergents), and sewage discharge are additional pollution sources associated with marinas. While the proposed marina will have no fueling facilities and no live-aboards will be allowed at the marina, additional conditions must be attached to the permit to eliminate or minimize potential impacts from these potential pollution sources. In addition to the conditions established by the Department, the following conditions are necessary: All craft docked at the marina shall be prohibited from pumping sewage into the waters of the cove. Use of the boat slips shall be limited to those person(s) who own the slip. Leasing of boat slips shall be prohibited. Living aboard any boat docked at the marina is prohibited at all times.[footnote 2] [footnote 2: During hearing some concern was raised regarding the definition of live- aboard. The Department's intent in specifying no live-aboards was that no person(s) stay overnight on any boat moored at the marina. The purpose of this condition is to clarify that intent.] No boat cleaning, hull maintenance, nor fish cleaning shall be allowed at the permitted facility. Limiting use of the boat slips to owners will provide reasonable assurances that the conditions imposed on the requested permit will be complied with. Prohibiting live- aboards, the pumping of sewage, fish cleaning, boat cleaning and hull maintenance, will provide reasonable assurances that Department standards for bacteriological and water quality will not be violated.
